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''Trieste''{{'}}s successor [[Bathyscaphe Trieste II|''Trieste II'']] incorporated parts of the original bathyscaphe and was completed in early 1964. The bathyscaphe was placed on board {{USNS|Private Francis X. McGraw|T-AK-241|6}} and also shipped, via the Panama Canal, to Boston. Additional operations were conducted at the loss site of ''Thresher'' that were commenced by the first ''Trieste'' the year before. ''Trieste II'' was Commanded by Lt Comdr. John B. Mooney, Jr., with co-pilot Lt. John H. Howland and Capt. Frank Andrews in an operation that recovered bits of wreckage of the lost ''Thresher'', in September 1964. The groundbreaking deep submergence operations helped in the design and construction of other deep-diving submersibles which could be used in rescuing crews and recovering objects from submarines in distress below levels reachable by conventional methods. ''Trieste II'' was subsequently rebuilt and officially placed into service in 1969 as Hull ''X-1'' and designated Deep Submergence Vehicle 1 (DSV-1) in 1971.
Deep-sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of her design and operational history permitted a Court of Inquiry to conclude ''Thresher'' had probably suffered the failure of a salt-water piping system joint which relied heavily on [[silver brazing]] instead of welding; earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints,<ref>[http://www.navsea.navy.mil/NewsView.aspx?nw=NewsWires&id=224 50 Years of Steely Purpose-USS Thresher Remembered]. Navsea.navy.mil. 10 April 2013.</ref> most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require a repair. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, causing a shutdown ("[[scram]]") of the reactor, with a subsequent loss of propulsion. The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the
Subsequent study of [[SOSUS]] data from the time of the incident has given rise to doubts of whether or not flooding preceded the reactor scram, as no water hammer sound could be detected on instrument recordings from SOSUS at the time, which would have been a significant sonic event, and no evidence of that can be found in the recorded data.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iusscaa.org/articles/brucerule/letter_to_the_deputy_cno.htm|title=Information and Security Issues Associated with the Loss of the USS THRESHER}}</ref>
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