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==Propositions==
Many authors<ref>e.g. Russell, Wittgenstein, and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/facts/#FacPro </ref> use the term '''[[proposition]]''' as truth-bearers. There is no single definition or usage.<ref>McGrath, Matthew, "Propositions", The Stanford
</ref><ref>{{cite web| title = Propositions | last=Mark|first=Richard|url=http://www.encyclopedia.com/article-1G2-3446801663/propositions.html|month=2006|quote=On one use of the term, "propositions" are objects of assertion, what successful uses of declarative sentences say. As such, they determine truth-values and truth conditions. On a second, they are the objects of certain psychological states (such as belief and wonder) ascribed with verbs that take sentential complements (such as believe and wonder ). On a third use, they are what are (or could be) named by the complements of such verbs. Many assume that propositions in one sense are propositions in the others.}}</ref> Sometimes it is used to mean a ''meaningful declarative sentence'' itself; sometimes it is used to mean '''the meaning of''' a meaningful declarative sentence.<ref>"Philosopher's tolerance towards propositions has been encouraged partly by ambiguity in the term 'proposition'. The term often is used simply for the sentences themselves, declarative sentences; and then some writers who do use the term for meanings of sentences are careless about the distinction between sentences and their meanings" Quine 1970, p. 2</ref> This provides two possible definitions for the purposes of discussion as below
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