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Line 6: When the [[Manhattan Project]] assumed responsibility for the development of [[nuclear weapons]] in September 1942, it also assumed responsibility for the development of suitable countermeasures. At the time, threat posed by the [[German nuclear energy project]] was taken very seriously.{{sfn\|Brown\|MacDonald\|1977\|pp=234–235}} Consideration was given to issuing a public warning of the danger of a German nuclear attack on the United States, but the director of the Manhattan Project, [[Brigadier General (United States)\|Brigadier General]] [[Leslie R. Groves, Jr.]], considered the likelihood of this to be sufficiently remote that he rejected the notion of taking so drastic a step.{{sfn\|Groves\|1962\|p=199}} A Subcommittee of the [[S-1 Uranium Committee]], chaired by [[James B. Conant]], and consisting of himself, [[Arthur Compton]] and [[Harold Urey]],– was appointed to look into the issue, and it similarly assessed the danger as low, but still sufficient to warrant taking some precautions. A program was initiated by the [[Metallurgical Laboratory]] in Chicago and the [[Victoreen Instrument Company]] in Cleveland to develop radiation detection devices suitable for use in the field. Some 48 portable detection meters were built in 1943, half of which were capable of detecting 0 to 10 [[roentgen (unit)\|roentgen]]s per day, while the other half could detect from 0 to 100 roentgens per day. Instruments sets were stored at Manhattan District offices in Boston, Chicago, New York, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., and the area engineer and some other officers were instructed in their use. A special team of scientists was created at the Metallurgical Laboratory who could respond to any reports of the use of nuclear weapons or a [[dirty bomb\|radioactive poisons]].{{sfn\|Brown\|MacDonald\|1977\|pp=234–235}} It was considered more likely that Germany might employ such weapons against the United Kingdom, so four officers from the [[European Theater of Operations United States Army]] (ETOUSA) were summoned to Chicago where they were given a top secret briefing by the Manhattan District's Chicago area engineer, [[Major (United States)\|Major]] Arthur V. Peterson. They were told about possible forms such an attack might take, and what the effects and symptoms of them were, and they were given survey instruments and shown how to use them. They were enjoined to tell other officers in the theater to report unexplained fogging of film or illnesses with symptoms corresponding to the effects of [[radiation sickness]].{{sfn\|Brown\|MacDonald\|1977\|pp=235–236}}{{sfn\|Jones\|1985\|pp=194–195}}

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