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Renewed interest today in rhetoric of science is its positioning as a [[hermeneutic]] meta-discourse rather than a substantive discourse practice (Gaonkar 25). If [[exegesis]] and hermeneutics are the tools around which the idea of scientific production has been forged, then seeing science from the point of texts exhibiting [[epistemology]] based on prediction and control offers new comprehensive ways to see the function of rhetoric of science (Gross “The Origin” 91-92). A section that follows below titled “Hermeneutic Rhetoric” offers more on this subject.
The rhetorical challenge today is to find discourse that crosses disciplines without sacrificing the specifics of each discipline. The aim is to render description of these disciplines intact – that is to say, the goal of finding language that would make various scientific fields “commensurable” (Baake 29). In contrast, “incommensurability” is the term to describe a situation where two scientific programs are fundamentally at odds. Two important voices who applied [[incommensurability]] to historical and philosophical notions of science in the 1960s are [[Thomas Kuhn]] and [[Paul Feyerabend]]. Various strands grew out of this idea that bear on issues of communication and invention. These strands are explicated in Randy Allen Harris’s four-part [[taxonomy]] that in turn foregrounds his viewpoint that “incommensurability is best understood not as a relation between systems, but as a matter of rhetorical invention and hermeneutics” (Harris “Incommensurability” 1).
'''Means and Ends of Rhetoric of Science'''
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