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The concept of uncorrelated asymmetries is important in determining which [[Nash equilibrium|Nash equilibria]] are [[Evolutionarily stable strategies]] in discoordination games, like the [[Game of chicken]]. In these games, if the two players do not know whether they are player 1 or player 2, then the mixing Nash is the ESS. If the players know their roles, then the pure conditional Nash equilibria are ESSs.
The usual interpretation given to uncorrelated asymmetries is the role of territory ownership in the [[Hawk-dove game]]. Even if the two players ("owner" and "intruder") have the same payoffs (ie, the game is payoff symmetric), the territory owner will play Hawk, and the intruder Dove, in what is known as the 'Bourgeois strategy' (the reverse is also an ESS known as the 'anti-bourgeois strategy', but makes little
==References==
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