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:{{ping|JDiala|Volunteer Marek|Mr rnddude|RadioactiveBoulevardier|Chino-Catane|Manyareasexpert|GordonGlottal}} Pinging all those who have participated in this discussion so far. — [[User:Goszei|Goszei]] ([[User_talk:Goszei|talk]]) 07:18, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
:{{tq|1=the reason this particular demand should be highlighted is because it was the most immediate point of negotiation}}<br>Again those are personal opinions. Another question is why should the lead provide Russian demands but not their assessment by RSs, which assessments are already in the article.{{pb}}{{tq|1=I don't think that a clause like <q>denied any plan to attack</q> or similar should be included, because (1) it is obvious Russia would do this, and (2) the denials became moot after December 17}}<br>Again those are personal opinions. And no, it wasn't obvious, and as far as on February 23 everybody in Russia were laughing and making fun of Ukrainians for them to get concerned with possible invasion rumors. [[User:Manyareasexpert|ManyAreasExpert]] ([[User talk:Manyareasexpert|talk]]) 08:31, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
::Agree. In the run up to the invasion the question of “will they invade or won’t they?” was a huge deal and many commentators were assuring us that Russia wouldn’t invade based on Russian denials. It is also not obvious. Ultimatum in such situations aren’t necessarily rare. In 1991 US pretty much said “leave Kuwait or we’ll invade” - there were no denials. In this case the denials themselves were a propaganda campaign and Kremlin disinformation so yes, they’re important.<small><span style="border:1px solid black;padding:1px;">[[User:Volunteer Marek|<span style="color:orange;background:blue;font-family:sans-serif;">''' Volunteer Marek '''</span>]]</span></small> 16:45, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
* Here's how the Council on Foreign Relations summarized Russia's demands: {{bq|Russian draft treaties on security guarantees released in the run-up to the invasion focused on NATO, not Ukraine. The three key demands in these treaties were an end to NATO expansion, a prohibition on the deployment of offensive weapons along Russia’s borders, and the withdrawal of NATO infrastructure back to the lines of 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed two years before the first post-Cold War wave of expansion.}}
:[https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/what-does-putin-really-want-ukraine What Does Putin Really Want in Ukraine?] [[User:Chino-Catane|Chino-Catane]] ([[User talk:Chino-Catane|talk]]) 10:16, 9 July 2024 (UTC)
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