Japanese nuclear weapons program: Difference between revisions

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Significant amounts of [[reactor-grade plutonium]] are created as a by-product of the nuclear energy industry. During the 1970s, the Japanese government made several appeals to the United States to use reprocessed plutonium in forming a "plutonium economy" for peaceful commercial use. This began a significant debate within the Carter administration about the risk of proliferation associated with reprocessing while also acknowledging Japan's need for energy and right to the use of peaceful nuclear technology. Ultimately, an agreement was reached that allowed Japan to repurpose the byproducts of nuclear power-related activities; however their efforts regarding fast-breeding plutonium reactors were largely unsuccessful.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2017-06-08/japan-plutonium-overhang-origins-dangers-debated-us-officials| title=Japan Plutonium Overhang Origins and Dangers Debated by U.S. Officials| publisher=[[National Security Archive]]| date=8 June 2017}}</ref>
 
In 2012, Japan was reported to have 9 tonnes of plutonium stored in Japan, which would be enough for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, and an additional 35 tonnes stored in Europe.<ref name=aca-20121101>{{cite web |url=http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/Strains-Seen-in-Japans-Plutonium-Policy |title=Strains Seen in Japan's Plutonium Policy |first=Daniel|last=Horner |publisher=Arms Control Association |date=November 2012 |access-date=23 December 2013}}</ref><ref name=wp-20120327>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/japan-has-lots-of-plutonium-on-hand-little-way-to-use-it/2012/03/27/gIQA7jjyeS_story.html |title=Japan has lots of plutonium on hand, little way to use it |first=Chico|last=Harlan |newspaper=Washington Post |date=27 March 2012 |access-date=23 December 2013}}</ref> It has constructed the [[Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant]], which could produce further plutonium.<ref name=aca-20121101/> Japan has a considerable quantity of [[highly enriched uranium]] (HEU), supplied by the U.S. and UK, for use in its [[research reactor]]s and [[fast neutron reactor]] research programs; approximately 1,200 to 1,400&nbsp;kg of HEU as of 2014.<ref name=nti-20140129>{{cite web |url=http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/civilian-heu-japan/ |title=Civilian HEU: Japan |publisher=Nuclear Threat Initiative |date=29 January 2014 |access-date=9 March 2014}}</ref> Japan also possesses an indigenous [[uranium enrichment]] plant<ref name=tipping-point/><ref name=jnfl-enrichment>{{cite web |url=http://www.jnfl.co.jp/english/uranium.html |title=Our Business - Uranium Enrichment |publisher=Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070702173839/http://www.jnfl.co.jp/english/uranium.html |archive-date=2 July 2007}}</ref> which could hypothetically be used to make highly enriched uranium suitable for weapons use.
 
Japan has also developed the [[M-V]] three-stage [[solid-fuel rocket]], somewhat similar in design to the U.S. [[LGM-118A Peacekeeper]] [[ICBM]], giving it a missile technology base. It now has an easier-to-launch second generation solid-fuel rocket, [[Epsilon (rocket)|Epsilon]]. Japan has experience in re-entry vehicle technology ([[OREX]], [[HOPE-X]]). Toshiyuki Shikata, a [[Tokyo Metropolitan Government]] adviser and former lieutenant general, said that part of the rationale for the fifth M-V [[Hayabusa]] mission, from 2003 to 2010, was that the re-entry and landing of its return capsule demonstrated "that Japan's ballistic missile capability is credible."<ref name=wsj-20111028>{{cite news |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203658804576638392537430156 |title=In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear |first=Chester|last=Dawson |newspaper=Wall Street Journal |date=28 October 2011 |access-date=13 November 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200810124901/https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203658804576638392537430156 |archive-date=August 10, 2020}}</ref> A Japanese [[Deterrence theory|nuclear deterrent]] would probably be sea-based with [[ballistic missile submarine]]s.<ref name="jpnbld">{{cite web |title=Would Japan Quickly Build Nuclear Weapons in a Crisis? |author=Kyle Mizokami |date=August 20, 2021 |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/would-japan-quickly-build-nuclear-weapons-crisis-192110 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210820093315/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/would-japan-quickly-build-nuclear-weapons-crisis-192110 |archive-date=August 20, 2021}}</ref> In 2011, former Minister of Defense [[Shigeru Ishiba]] explicitly backed the idea of Japan maintaining the capability of [[nuclear latency]]: