Content deleted Content added
XTheBedrockX (talk | contribs) removed Category:Man-made disasters in China; added Category:20th-century mass murder in China using HotCat |
No edit summary |
||
(25 intermediate revisions by 17 users not shown) | |||
Line 16:
| j = tou<sup>2</sup> dei<sup>6</sup> goi<sup>2</sup> gaak<sup>3</sup> wan<sup>6</sup> dung<sup>6</sup>
}}
{{Mao Zedong series}}
{{history of the People's Republic of China}}
Line 34 ⟶ 35:
In a speech at the Second National Congress in 1934, Mao addressed the significance of land reform in the context of the struggle against the civil war against the Nationalists:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Coderre |first=Laurence |url= |title=Newborn Socialist Things: Materiality in Maoist China |date=2021 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-2161-2 |location=Durham |pages=65 |oclc=1250021710}}</ref>
{{
=== Prior Communist Party campaigns ===
In the 1920s, the Communist Party began experimenting with land reform.{{sfn|Harrell|2023|p=104}} The CCP launched various rural campaigns as precursors to the land reform movement.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=137}} These mass campaigns adjusted rent and interest to be more favorable to tenants, returned excessive deposits to renters, and overall served to weaken the traditional rural elites.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=137}}
==== In Minxi ====
Line 49 ⟶ 50:
{{Blockquote|text=All lands belonging feudal landlords, local bullies and evil gentry, warlords, bureaucrats, and other large private landlords, irrespective of whether they work the lands themselves or rent them out, shall be confiscated without compensation. The confiscated lands shall be redistributed to the poor and middle peasants through the [CSR]. The former owners of the confiscated lands shall not be entitled to receive any land allotments.}}
The property of rich peasants was also confiscated, although rich peasants were entitled to receive land of lesser quality if they farmed it themselves.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=37}} By 1932, the CCP had equalized landholding and eliminated debt within the CSR.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=44}}
Although the 1931 Land Law remained the official policy in the CSR's territory until the Nationalists' defeat of the CSR in 1934,{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=37}} the CCP was more radical in its class analysis after 1932, resulting in formerly middle peasants being viewed as rich peasants.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|pp=44–46}}
Line 63 ⟶ 64:
Landlords were subjected to public [[struggle sessions]] organized by the CCP where they were accused of crimes against the peasants and sometimes sentenced to death, including being killed in public by peasants at these mass meetings.{{sfnp|Short|2001|pp=436–437}}{{sfnp|Karl|2010|pp=80–81}} Struggle was confrontational by design, consistent with Mao's view that the masses had to actively take part in avenging past injustices.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=104}} ''Speaking bitterness'', defined as "articulating one's history of being oppressed and exploited by class enemies and thus stimulating others' class hatred, and in the meantime consolidating one's own class standpoint", was employed to focus of peasant resentment towards landlords.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Wu |first1=Guo |date=26 April 2014 |title=Speaking Bitterness: Political Education in Land Reform and Military Training under the CCP, 1947–1951 |url=https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1179/1547402X14Z.00000000026 |journal=[[The Chinese Historical Review]] |volume=21 |issue=1 |pages=3–23 |doi=10.1179/1547402X14Z.00000000026 |s2cid=144044801 |access-date=18 March 2023}}</ref> While violence was not necessarily involved, Mao's position that the masses had to be given free rein in confronting their class enemies meant that peasant violence against those deemed landlords was common.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|pp=104–105}}
Rural women had a significant impact on the movement, with the Communist Party making specific efforts to mobilize them. Party activists observed that because peasant women were less tied to old power structures, that they more readily opposed those identified as class enemies. In 1947, [[Deng Yingchao]] emphasized at a land reform policy meeting that "women function as great mobilizers when they speak bitterness."{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|pp=62–63}} The [[All-China Women's Federation]] called for Party activists to encourage peasant women to understand their "special bitterness" from a class perspective. Women activists helped peasant women prepare to speak in public, including by roleplaying as landlords to help such women practice.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=63}} Because land reform resulted in allocations of land titles on the basis of adult household members, rather than on the basis of households (which typically had male heads of household), the economic independence of peasant women increased.{{Sfn|Hammond|2023|p=40}}
From 1950 to 1952, the land reform movement was extended to all [[Han Chinese|Han]] agricultural areas and some of the [[Ethnic minorities in China|ethnic minority]] areas which had intensive agricultural production or had land ownership practices similar that of Han areas.{{Sfn|Harrell|2023}} By 1952, land redistribution was generally completed. Most landlords had been permitted to retain plots of land after admitting to historical crimes, although many had been killed. The amount of cultivated land had grown, along with related infrastructure projects and availability of fertilizers and insecticides.{{sfnp|Karl|2010|pp=80–81}} By 1952, rural agriculture had become hugely more productive in China.{{sfnp|Karl|2010|p=82}}
Line 70 ⟶ 71:
=== Chinese civil war era campaigns (1946–1948) ===
Following Japan's surrender in the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]], land reform campaigns focused on mobilizing peasants to take revenge on traitors who had collaborated with the Japanese.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=33}} The Japanese occupiers and the Nationalist government had favored in interests of the landlords.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=27}}
Throughout the land reform campaigns of the Civil War era, trends towards violent struggle against landlords coincided with increased combat in the war; when Nationalist forces or homecoming regiments were present, land reform and Civil War violence overlapped.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=111}}
At the outbreak of the Civil War in 1946, Mao began to push for a return to radical policies to mobilize the village against the landlord class, but protected the rights of middle peasants and specified that rich peasants were not landlords.{{sfnb|DeMare|2019|p=10-11}}
On May 4, 1946, the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] issued its ''Instructions on Land Issues''.{{sfnp|Huang|2020|pp=249–250}} The May 4th Instructions (also referred to as the May 4th Directive){{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=167}} required local party committees to support landlords who approved of land acquisition by the peasantry.{{sfnp|Huang|2020|p=250}} As part of an effort to address some concerns of some landowners and those connected to them, the May 4th Instructions stated that landlords who "had earned merit for resisting Japan" would be left more land and that the land holdings of wealthier peasants would be mostly unchanged.{{sfnp|Huang|2020|p=250}} It emphasized that while landlord land should be confiscated, land reform should address the holdings of rich peasants instead through rent and interest reductions.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=136}} The May 4th Instructions also provided that dependents of soldiers and dependents of poor peasant cadres should be the first to receive land in order "to consolidate and strengthen the power of the people and the military."{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=137}} Poor peasants not fitting in either of these categories were the next group prioritized to receive land.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=137}}
Line 92 ⟶ 93:
Land reform movement violence surged in early 1948, prompting some CCP leaders such as [[Xi Zhongxun]] and [[Ren Bishi]] to criticize the movement.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=113}} Ren announced a policy shift in January 1948, guaranteeing that targets of the movement would nonetheless be allowed to keep a share of property.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=114}} This policy change contributed to a shift away from economic struggle and to political struggle.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=114}} Mao's January 18, 1948 directive, ''On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy'' likewise marked a less-radical turn in land reform and a broadening of the CCP's coalition.{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=145}} The party instructed that fewer landlords should be targeted and work teams should not beat or torture their targets.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=114}} According to the CCP Central Committee, "the fewer people we attack, the better."{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=145}} It also stated that while "not considering class at all is incorrect, we must absolutely avoid over-emphasis on class origin to the point that everything is reduced to class origin."{{sfnp|Opper|2020|p=145}}
In June 1948, concluding that most peasants were satisfied with the land they had received and that some were even concerned about further mass land reform campaigns because of their radical turns in the past, the Communist Party ended land reform in the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region and
Land reform was a decisive factor in the result of the [[Chinese Civil War]].<ref name=":7">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178961 |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |date=2006 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham [N.C.] |pages=43 |oclc=63178961}}</ref> At the time of the CCP victory, more than half of the population living in Communist areas had participated in land reform and over 25 million hectares of land had been redistributed, largely as a result of confiscations form landlords and rich peasants.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=18}} Millions of peasants who obtained land through the movement joined the [[People's Liberation Army]] or assisted in its logistical networks.<ref name=":7" /> According to academic Brian DeMare, land redistribution was a critical factor in the CCP military success in the civil war because land reforms linked the interests of north and northeast Chinese peasants to the party's success.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=18}} The success of land reform meant that at the founding of the PRC in 1949, China could credibly claim that for the first time since the late [[Qing dynasty|Qing]] period that it had succeeded in feeding one fifth of the world's population with only 7% of the world's cultivable land.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Chun |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/63178961 |title=The transformation of Chinese socialism |date=2006 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8223-3785-0 |location=Durham [N.C.] |pages=44 |oclc=63178961}}</ref>
=== Early People's Republic of China campaigns (1949–1953) ===
The Land Reform Movement continued during
In this period, the CCP's view was that fewer targets were necessary
However, the [[Korean War]] prompted CCP leadership to be concerned that landlords might use the conflict to oppose the new rural order, increasing the view that violent struggle was necessary to defeat class enemies.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=90}} Land reform in May 1951, according to Mao biographer [[Philip Short]], "lurched violently to the left" with Mao Zedong laying down new guidelines for "not correcting excesses prematurely."{{sfnp|Short|2001|pp=436–437}} Beatings, while not officially promoted by the CCP, were not prohibited either. While landlords had no protection, those who were branded rich peasants received moderate
In the early PRC era, there were millions of war widows.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book |last=Lary |first=Diana |url= |title=China's grandmothers: gender, family, and aging from late Qing to twenty-first century |date=2022 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=978-1-009-06478-1 |edition= |location=Cambridge, United Kingdom |pages=92 |oclc=1292532755}}</ref> Widows whose husbands had fought in Communist armies received land through the land reform movement, as well as assistance farming it.<ref name=":8" />
During the early PRC land reform, the folk artists and culture workers were a significant medium for
== Mass killings of landlords<!--'Mass killings of landlords under Mao Zedong' redirects here--> ==
Line 119 ⟶ 120:
| type = [[Massacre]], [[classicide]]
| fatalities = 200,000 – 5,000,000
| injuries = 1.5{{sfnp|Short|2001|p=436}}–6<ref name="Valentino"/> up to 12.5<ref name="
| victims = Landlords, rich [[peasant]]s
| perps = [[Chinese Communist Party]] and radicalized peasants
Line 125 ⟶ 126:
}}
Victims were targeted based on
Mao's 1927 "[[Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan]]" addressed CCP members who were concerned with violence by the peasants against landlords, arguing that these concerns were a tool for continuing the oppression of the peasants. In this context, Mao coined his famous comment that "[[revolution is not a dinner party]]." Mao wrote in response to objections to violence:{{sfnp|Karl|2010|p=31}}
{{Blockquote|text=It is fine. It is not "terrible" at all. It is anything but "terrible." ... "It's terrible!" is
The CCP's tolerance of, encouragement of, or efforts to restrain, violence by peasants against landlords in the course of the land reform movement varied over time and location.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|pp=105–118}} Its directions were not always followed, and as late as the final rounds of land reform in the early 1950s, the future reformer [[Hu Yaobang]] had to explain that the call to "annihilate" the landlord class meant taking landlord property not landlord lives.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=118}}
There were reports of policies that required the public execution of at least one landlord, and usually several, in virtually every village.<ref name="Teiwes" /> An official reported 180 to 190 thousand landlords were executed in the [[Guangxi]] province alone, in addition, a Catholic school teacher reported 2.5% of his village was executed.<ref name="
=== Estimated number of deaths ===
Line 139 ⟶ 140:
Estimates for the number of deaths from 1949 to 1953 vary widely, with a total range of 200,000 to 5,000,000, which historian [[John King Fairbank]] called the upper end of "sober" estimates.<ref name=Mosher1992 /> It is difficult to separate killings due to land reform from killings due to the [[Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries]] (zhenfan), which occurred during the same years. As a result, most estimates below include deaths from both land reform and zhenfan:
* In 1978, historian Benedict Stavis estimated that 200,000 to 800,000 were killed during land reform, part of an estimated 400,000 to 800,000 killed during land reform and zhenfan.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stavis |first1=Benedict |url=https://archive.org/details/politicsofagricu0000stav/page/n5/mode/2up |title=The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China |date=1978 |publisher=Cornell University Press |isbn=978-0-8014-1087-1 |location=University of California |quote=In these circumstances it is impossible to know how many people were officially executed in land reform, how many were lynched by enraged peasants, how many committed suicide. Rough orders of magnitude can, however, be suggested. It would appear that somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 people were killed officially after 1949. What portion of these were landlords and members of the rural power structure (including rural police. Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) troops and commanders, rent collectors, etc.) cannot be said for certain, but it is possible that the rural revolution could have cost 200,000 to 800,000 lives. The Chinese Communist leadership had estimated that landlords and their families constituted 4—5 per cent of the rural population — about 20 million people. This would imply that 1 to 4
* In 2006, historian [[J. A. G. Roberts]] wrote that estimates range from 200,000 to 2,000,000 for those killed during land reform.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Roberts |first1=J. A. G. |author-link1=J. A. G. Roberts |date=2006 |title=A History of China |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofchina0000robe_u3x9 |publisher=[[Palgrave Macmillan]] |page=257 |isbn=978-1-4039-9275-8|quote=Estimates of the number of landlords and rural power-holders who died range from 200,000 to two million.}}</ref>
* In 1954, Xu Zirong, the Deputy Public Security Minister, published a report concluding that, during zhenfan, "712,000 counter-revolutionaries were executed, 1,290,000 were imprisoned, and 1,200,000 were subject to control at various times", for a total of 2,620,000 arrested. In 2008, historian [[Yang Kuisong]] argued that "the actual number of executions was much larger than the reported 712,000" because local officials concealed executions after Mao mildly criticized excessive killing in 1951.<ref name="Kuisong2008">{{cite journal | title=Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries | author=Yang Kuisong | journal=[[The China Quarterly]] | date=March 2008 | volume=193 | pages=102–121 | doi=10.1017/S0305741008000064 | s2cid=154927374 | author-link=Yang Kuisong |quote=The basis of Mao's numbers was a report submitted by Xu Zirong, Deputy Public Security Minister, in January 1954. According to this, 2,620,000 people had been arrested in the country
* In 1957, Mao gave [[On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People|an influential speech]] to senior CCP officials in which he stated that 700,000 had been killed from 1950 and 1952, and another 70,000 to 80,000 from 1953 to 1956, for a total of 770,000-780,000.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=MacFarquhar |first1=Roderick |first2=Timothy |last2=Cheek |first3=Eugene |last3=Wu |title=The Secret Speeches of Chairman Mao |journal=Harvard Contemporary China Series |date=1989 |volume=6 |url=https://brill.com/downloadpdf/book/edcoll/9781684171125/BP000002.xml |page=142 |quote=Have there been any people unjustly killed? Yes, at the time of the great [campaign] to eliminate counterrevolutionaries [sufan], 1950, 1951, 1952, in those three years of the great sufan, there were. [When] killing local bullies and evil gentry [{{lang|zh-Latn|tuhao lieshen}}] in [the campaign against] the five types of counterrevolutionaries, there were. But basically, there were no errors; that group of people should have been killed. In all, how many were killed? Seven hundred thousand were killed, [and] after that time probably over 70,000 more have been killed. But less than 80,000. Since last year,
* Some time before 1961, then-[[Premier of the People's Republic of China|Premier]] [[Zhou Enlai]] told sympathetic journalist [[Edgar Snow]] that 830,000 "enemies of the people" had been "destroyed" before 1954, during land reform and zhenfan.<ref>{{cite book |title=Red China Today: The Other Side of the River |page=346 |first1=Edgar |last1=Snow |authorlink1=Edgar Snow |year=1961 |publisher=New York, [[Random House]] |isbn=9780394716817 |url=https://archive.org/details/redchinatoday00edga |quote=There was Chou En-lai's [Zhou Enlai's] statement several years ago that 830,000 "enemies of the people" had been "destroyed" during the war over land confiscation, mass trials of landlords, and the subsequent roundup of counterrevolutionaries which ended, as a "campaign," in 1954. (Incidentally, the term hsiao-mieh, usually translated as "destroyed," literally means "reduced," "dispersed" or "obliterated," but not necessarily physically liquidated.)}}</ref>
* In 1987, historians [[Denis Twitchett|Twitchett]], [[John King Fairbank|Fairbank]], and [[Roderick MacFarquhar|MacFarquhar]] estimated that 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 were executed in the land reform movement.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Twitchett |first1=Denis |author-link1=Denis Twitchett |first2=John |last2=Fairbank |author-link2=John King Fairbank |first3=Roderick |last3=MacFarquhar |author-link3=Roderick MacFarquhar |title=The Cambridge History of China: Volume 14: The People's Republic, Part I: The Emergency of Revolutionary China 1949-1965 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |isbn=0-521-24336-X |page=87 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ioppEjkCkeEC&pg=PA87 |date=1987-06-26 |quote=In addition, the work teams sought to mobilize the entire village against the landlords through such devices as "speak bitterness" meetings and mass trials. These methods subjected the landlords to public humiliation, and the trials also resulted in the execution of members of this class on a significant scale, perhaps a million to 2 million individuals.24 [...] 24 In the absence of official statistics it is impossible to know the numbers involved, but it appears clear that early 1950s estimates by anti-Communist sources of 14 to 15 million deaths are far too high. For a careful review of the evidence and a cautious estimate of 200,000 to 800,000 executions, see Benedict Stavis, The politics of agricultural mechanization in China, 25-30. A larger number is suggested by reports based on refugee interviews of a "policy to choose at least one landlord, and usually several, in virtually every village for public execution." A. Doak Barnett with Ezra Vogel, Cadres, bureaucracy and political power in Communist China, 228}}</ref>
* In 1999, historian [[Maurice Meisner]] estimated that 2,000,000 people were executed from in China from 1950 to 1952, including both land reform and zhenfan.<ref name="Mao 1999">{{cite book|author-link1=Maurice Meisner |first1=Maurice |last1=Meisner |title=Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic, Third Edition |publisher=Free Press |year=1999 |isbn=0-684-85635-2 |page=72 |quote=In a speech delivered in 1957, Zhou Enlai stated that among an unspecified number of counterrevolutionary cases officially handled by the government through 1952, 16.8 percent were sentenced to death, 42.3 percent to "reform through labor," 32 percent placed under "surveillance," and 8.9 percent subject only to "re-education."14 Using the government's figure of 800,000 counterrevolutionary trials during the first half of 1951, there were some 135,000 official executions during that 6-month period alone. The real figure is no doubt greater, and taking into account the much longer period involved and the considerable number of executions that took place outside of formal judicial procedures, the estimate of many relatively impartial observers that there were 2,000,000 people executed during the first three years of the People's Republic is probably as accurate a guess as one can make on the basis of scanty information. That figure includes the semi-spontaneous "executions" in the countryside when the long-repressed hatreds of an oppressed peasantry were released during the land reform campaigns of 1950-1952. And many more than 2,000,000 were imprisoned or sent to forced labor camps during these years.
* In 1992, social scientist [[Steven W. Mosher]] estimated that several million died from land reform and zhenfan.<ref name="Mosher1992">{{cite book |last1=Mosher |first1=Steven |title=China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality |publisher=[[Basic Books]] |year=1992 |isbn=0-465-09813-4 |page=74 |quote=The Terror—no other term will do—that began in 1950 was to last for three years and cost several million lives before it ended. It originated in two distinct political campaigns, each a ruthless effort to crush a particular class. The land reform, while nominally an effort to reapportion the land to poor and lower-middle-class peasants, was actually intended to destroy the old rural elite, replacing it with a new rural power structure dominated by those who had received parcels of land from the CCP and the new regime.4 The "suppression of counterrevolutionaries" campaign was designed to eliminate the bureaucratic bourgeoisie—those compradores, traders, and KMT functionaries who were seen by the party as economic parasites or political foes. [...] The U.S. State Department in 1976 estimated that there may have been a million killed in the land reform, 800,000 killed in the counterrevolutionary campaign.7 Maurice Meisner, who is sympathetic to the need for revolutionary terror, allowed that perhaps 2 million people were executed during the first three years of the PRC.8 Jacques Guillermaz, the distinguished French Sinologist, who served as French Military Attaché in Nanjing during the civil war and later in Beijing, estimated in his La Chine populaire, published in 1964, that a total of 1 to 3 million were executed.9 He later increased this estimate to 5 million, a figure that Fairbank has cited as the upper range of "sober" estimates.10 The highest estimate comes from Nationalist officials on Taiwan, who were not inclined to underestimate the ferocity of their victorious opponents. They alleged that 6 million urban residents and 4 million rural gentry had been killed during these years. [...] 7. Stephen Rosskamm Shalom, Deaths in China Due to Communism, Occasional Paper No. 15., Center for Asian Studies (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1984), p. 24. 8. Maurice Meisner, Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 81. 9. Jacques Guillermaz, La Chine populaire, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), p. 47. 10. Jacques Guillermaz, The Chinese Communist Party in Power, 1949—1976 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976), p. 24, n. 6}}</ref>
* In 2002, historian [[Lee Feigon]] wrote that "somewhere between 2,000,000 and 5,000,000 landlords had been killed".<ref name="feig">Lee Feigon. ''Mao: A Reinterpretation.'' Ivan R. Dee, 2002. {{ISBN|1-56663-522-5}} p. 96: "By 1952 they had extended land reform throughout the countryside, but in the process somewhere between two and five million landlords had been killed."</ref>
* [[Deng Zihui]], Vice Chairman of the Central South Military and Administrative Council, estimated that 15% of China's 50,000,000 landlords and rich peasants had been sentenced to death, 25% had been "sent to labor reform camps for remolding through manual work" and 60% to "participation in production work under supervision".<ref name="
* In 1952, the [[Free Trade Union Committee]] of the [[AFL-CIO]], which was funded in whole or part by the [[CIA]], released a report allegedly compiled by Wei Min of the Democratic Revolutionary League, which claimed that 14,000,000 to 15,000,000 were killed during land reform and zhenfen. The report cited no sources.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Stavis |first1=Benedict |title=The Politics of Agricultural Mechanization in China |date=1978 |publisher=Cornell University Press |location=University of California |isbn=978-0-8014-1087-1 |url=https://archive.org/details/politicsofagricu0000stav/page/n5/mode/2up |quote=The original report was purported to have been compiled by an underground group in China calling itself "Democratic Revolutionary League," and to have been sent out of China by its secretary Way Min (Wei Min meaning "for the people"?) on July 24, 1952. For evidence and sources, the document merely reported "evidence and data obtained by the League; abstracts compiled by the league." No sources were cited which could be checked. It is highly probable that this report, which has provided the foundation for much scholarship, is bogus.10 The committee that released the report the Free Trade Union Committee of the AFL — was funded substantially (if not entirely) by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's International Organization Division.11 One common activity of the CIA is the creation and spreading of propaganda and "disinformation" through a wide range of publications.12 All the connections cannot be demonstrated conclusively in this case, because the authorship and methodology of the original report remain obscured. In the case of Vietnam, it has been demonstrated convincingly that the CIA helped to finance writers, generate numbers, and spread stories which vastly overestimated the violence of land reform.13}}</ref>
Line 211 ⟶ 212:
=== Economic effects ===
[[File:Visit to the People's Commune named Chinese-Hungarian Friendship-3.jpg|thumb|right|An example of a people's commune collective farm]]
Although land reform is an important social revolution, it has come at a great cost, causing significant rifts and internal strife within rural communities. According to surveys<ref>{{Cite web |title=两种思路的碰撞与历史的沉思——1950-1952年关于农业合作化目标模式的选择 |url=https://ccrs.ccnu.edu.cn/List/H5Details.aspx?tid=4874 |access-date=2024-06-03 |website=ccrs.ccnu.edu.cn}}</ref> conducted in 23 villages in [[Hebei]] and [[Chahar Province|Chahar]], the speed of transition from poor tenant farmers to middle farmers was rapid after land reform. However, the transition from middle farmers to wealthy middle farmers was slower, and the number of those who became wealthy farmers remains limited. In a survey of five villages in [[Shanxi]], 34% of households that experienced a decline still had concerns and were hesitant to engage in active production due to the heavy burden of land reform. Additionally, 56% cited reasons such as illness, laziness, livestock deaths, and lack of labor, while 10% lacked the skills to manage their land. As a result, nearly half of the poor farmers who had risen in status later regressed, indicating that even after acquiring land, they still felt empty and lacked the means of production, making them vulnerable to any setbacks. The main issue remains the concerns of the masses and the lack of funds to expand reproduction. In the Northeast region, land reform did not lead to an expansion of productivity; instead, there was a shrinkage.<ref>{{Cite web |title=高王凌:土地改革──"改天换地"的社会变动_爱思想 |url=https://www.aisixiang.com/data/16705.html |access-date=2024-06-03 |website=www.aisixiang.com}}</ref> Reasons for this included the large number of landlords and wealthy farmers, as well as the fragmented distribution of land leading to a lack of experience in organizing and managing farms.
As an economic reform program, the land reform succeeded in redistributing about 43% of China's cultivated land to approximately 60% of the rural population. Poor peasants increased their holdings, while middle peasants benefitted most because of their strong initial position.<ref name="Teiwes"/> The movement expropriated land from over ten million landlords.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=141}} Historian [[Walter Scheidel]] writes that the violence of the land reform campaign had a significant impact in reducing [[economic inequality]]. He gives as an example the 1940s campaigns in [[Lucheng District, Changzhi|Zhangzhuangcun]], a village called ''Long Bow'' in William Hinton's book ''[[Fanshen]]''. Although poor and middle peasants had already owned 70% of the land: <blockquote>In Zhangzhuangcun, in the more thoroughly reformed north of the country, most "landlords" and "rich peasants" had lost all their land and often their lives or had fled. All formerly landless workers had received land, which eliminated this category altogether. As a result, "middling peasants," who now accounted for 90 percent of the village population, owned 90.8 percent of the land, as close to perfect equality as one could possibly hope for.<ref name=Scheidel226>{{cite book | last1 =Scheidel | first1 =Walter | author-link =Walter Scheidel | title =The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century | publisher =[[Princeton University Press]] | year =2017 | isbn =978-0-691-16502-8 | pages =223, 226 | access-date =|url =https://books.google.com/books?id=CD1hDwAAQBAJ&q=Zhangzhuangcun| archive-date =| url-status =}}</ref>▼
Land reform not only altered the basic relationships in rural areas but also influenced subsequent political and economic developments, prompting China to face a new round of social restructuring and grassroots reorganization. The core of land reform lies in implementing equal land rights, whereby land and property are forcibly pooled and evenly distributed, aiming to optimize the integration of labor and land, thus enhancing economic efficiency. However, after equal land rights were implemented, although land circulation achieved optimal allocation of land and labor, there was soon a phenomenon of land concentration in the hands of expert farmers, leading to a change in the initial equal status. To ensure that this equal status is not altered, the only solution is to restrict land transactions and strip land ownership, thereby preventing land from concentrating in the hands of a few. Additionally, to promote improved economic efficiency, it is necessary to promote scale-oriented operations through mutual aid groups and [[people's commune]], reducing the problem of individual farmers' limited risk-bearing capacity. However, despite farmers gaining land ownership after land reform, there is a free-rider phenomenon in collective labor, lacking incentive mechanisms, resulting in a lack of production enthusiasm among farmers. Therefore, land reform needs to comprehensively consider factors such as land ownership, collective labor, and production enthusiasm to promote the sustainable development of rural economy.<ref>{{Cite web |title=龙登高:百年中国土地制度变革及其启示-清华大学华商研究中心 |url=http://www.cces.tsinghua.edu.cn/info/1027/1090.htm |access-date=2024-06-03 |website=www.cces.tsinghua.edu.cn}}</ref>
▲As an economic reform program, the land reform succeeded in redistributing about 43% of China's cultivated land to approximately 60% of the rural population. Poor peasants increased their holdings, while middle peasants benefitted most because of their strong initial position.<ref name="Teiwes" /> The movement expropriated land from over ten million landlords.{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=141}} Historian [[Walter Scheidel]] writes that the violence of the land reform campaign had a significant impact in reducing [[economic inequality]]. He gives as an example the 1940s campaigns in [[Lucheng District, Changzhi|Zhangzhuangcun]], a village called ''Long Bow'' in William Hinton's book ''[[Fanshen]]''. Although poor and middle peasants had already owned 70% of the land: <blockquote>In Zhangzhuangcun, in the more thoroughly reformed north of the country, most "landlords" and "rich peasants" had lost all their land and often their lives or had fled. All formerly landless workers had received land, which eliminated this category altogether. As a result, "middling peasants," who now accounted for 90 percent of the village population, owned 90.8 percent of the land, as close to perfect equality as one could possibly hope for.<ref name=Scheidel226>{{cite book | last1 =Scheidel | first1 =Walter | author-link =Walter Scheidel | title =The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century | publisher =[[Princeton University Press]] | year =2017 | isbn =978-0-691-16502-8 | pages =223, 226 | access-date =|url =https://books.google.com/books?id=CD1hDwAAQBAJ&q=Zhangzhuangcun| archive-date =| url-status =}}</ref>
</blockquote>
Academic Brian DeMare states, "In the aftermath of land reform and the redistribution of village fields, many peasants indeed prospered. The turn from rural revolution to regular agricultural production generally resulted in increasing harvests and rising incomes. Besides the obvious benefit of the end of decades of warfare and chaos, the enthusiasm of new land owners drove production."{{sfnp|DeMare|2019|p=146}}
In the [[Second Kuomintang-Communist Civil War]], especially during the [[Liaoshen campaign|Liaoshen]], [[Huaihai campaign|Huaihai]], and [[Pingjin campaign|Pingjin Campaigns]], farmers actively supported the war effort by providing a large amount of resources. They supplied numerous stretchers, carts, livestock, and grain, offering solid support for the [[People's Liberation Army|Chinese People's Liberation Army]]'s operations. In addition to collecting grain and taxes, the Communist Party's grassroots rural governance demonstrated strong mobilization capabilities. During the War, farmers in some areas were mobilized to participate in wartime tasks such as dismantling railways and transporting wounded soldiers. Both laborers and militia actively engaged in tasks such as transporting grain, military supplies, rescuing wounded soldiers, and guarding prisoners, meeting the needs of the troops. During the three major campaigns, 8.57 million laborers performed various logistical tasks, while militia from farmer organizations participated in numerous battles, effectively striking at the enemy. These abundant human resources provided essential conditions for the rapid advancement and victory of the Liberation War.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=凯峰 |first=张 |date=2004-09-30 |title=土地改革與中國農村政權 |url=https://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/media/online/0406062.pdf |journal=二十一世紀}}</ref>
Generally, agricultural production increased the most in areas and time periods when landlord wealth was redistributed but the rich peasant economy had been allowed to remain.{{sfnp|Harrell|2023|p=109}}
== See also ==
* [[History of agriculture in China]]
* [[Agriculture in Taiwan]]
* [[Land reform in Taiwan]]
* [[Criticism of communist party rule]]
* [[Dekulakization]]
* [[History of the Chinese Communist Party]]
* [[History of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[Land reform by country]]
* [[List of campaigns of the Chinese Communist Party]]
* [[List of massacres in China]]
* [[Mass killings under communist regimes]]
Line 273 ⟶ 284:
[[Category:Mass murder in 1951]]
[[Category:1950s murders in China]]
[[Category:1940s murders in China]]
[[Category:1947 murders in China]]
[[Category:1951 murders in China]]
|