2018 Vietnam protests: Difference between revisions

{{flagicon image|Viet Tan Logo.png}} [[Việt Tân]] (alleged, denied)<br>

** [[File:Head badgeFlag of the Vietnam Self-Defence Militia.svg|15px22px]] [[:vi:Dân_quân_tự_vệ_(Việt_Nam)|''Vietnam Self-Defense Militia'']]

The Special Zone Act<ref>{{Cite web| last = ASEAN briefing| title = Special economic zones in ASEAN: opportunities for US investors| work = ASEAN Business News|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2020-06-04| url = https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/special-economic-zones-in-asean-opportunities-for-us-investors/}}</ref> (also known as the Special Zones Law<ref>{{Cite news| last = China Dialogue| title = Public criticism pressures Vietnam to back down on new economic zones| work = China Dialogue|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2019-03-26| url = https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/11154-public-criticism-pressures-vietnam-to-back-down-on-new-economic-zones/}}</ref> or the Special Economic Zones Law<ref>{{Cite web| last = Trang| first = Doan| title = FAQs about the Special Economic Zones and Vietnam's SEZ draft bill| work = thevietnamese.org| date = 28 August 2018|access-date= 2021-04-10| url = https://www.thevietnamese.org/2018/08/faqs-about-the-special-economic-zones-and-vietnams-sez-draft-bill/}}</ref>) proposes the opening of three [[special economic zones]] (SEZs) across Vietnam, where foreign investors would be allowed to lease land for up to 99 years. Despite no specific mention of China within the lines of the bill, many Vietnamese feared that the SEZs would be dominated by China, leading to worries about the loss of national sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite news| title = China warns citizens in Vietnam after protests over economic zones| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-09| date = 2018-06-11| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-protests-idUSKBN1J70NS}}</ref> On 9 June 2018, the Vietnamese authorities eventually yielded under enormous public pressure and postponed voting on the law indefinitely.<ref>{{Cite web| last = Luong| first = Dien Nguyen An| title = How Hanoi is leveraging anti-China sentiments online|access-date= 2021-01-25| date = 2020| url = https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_115.pdf}}</ref> This is considered the most serious riot in Vietnam since the [[2014 Vietnam anti-China protests|2014 riots]].

The Cybersecurity Law seeks to give the government full authority to strictly police the Internet, scrutinize personal information, censor online discussion, and punish or even jail online dissidents. It has been described as “largely a copy-and-paste version” of the [[:Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China|Chinese Cybersecurity Law]] that commenced a year prior.<ref>{{Cite news| last = Reporters Without Borders| title = RSF calls for repeal of Vietnam's new cybersecurity law| work = RSF|access-date= 2021-02-11| date = 2018-06-14| url = https://rsf.org/en/news/rsf-calls-repeal-vietnams-new-cybersecurity-law}}</ref> The [[National Assembly of Vietnam]] passed the law on 12 June 2018 despite local and international opposition<ref>{{Cite news| last = Nguyen| first = Mai| title = Vietnam lawmakers approve cyber law clamping down on tech firms, dissent| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-09| date = 2018-06-12| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-socialmedia-idUSKBN1J80AE}}</ref> and it has been in effect since 1 January 2019.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = Bertelsmann Stiftung| title = BTI 2020 Vietnam Country Report| series = BTI Transformation Index| url = <!--/en/reports/country-report-VNM-2020.html-->}}</ref>

To mainstream media and many nongovernmental organizations, Vietnam is often perceived as harsh and uncompromising regarding the right to freedom of assembly. Reports from [[Human Rights Watch]] and the US State Department depict the ruling [[Communist Party of Vietnam]] (CPV) as extremely illiberal and unforgiving of political dissent of any kind.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = Human Rights Watch| title = Vietnam: Country Summary| location = New York| series = World Report 2013|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2013| url = https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/vietnam_9.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| last = US Department of State| title = 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam| series = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2011| url = https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160484.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| last = US Department of State| title = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam| series = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2018| url = https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vietnam/}}</ref> [[Freedom House]]’s report on Vietnam in 2020 scores the country at 1 out of 4 for freedom of assembly, specifically citing the arrests and convictions as a result of the 2018 protests as the reason for its score, and 0 out of 4 for freedom for nongovernmental organizations and trade unions or similar professional organizations.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = Freedom House| title = Vietnam: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report|access-date= 2021-04-10| url = https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-world/2020}}</ref> [[Amnesty International]] also reports harassment, assault,and prosecution, torture, and executions towardsof pro-democracy activists, independent journalists, authors, and publishers in its Vietnam 2020 review.<ref>{{Cite web| last = Amnesty International| title = Everything you need to know about human rights in Viet Nam|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2020| url = https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/viet-nam/report-viet-nam/}}</ref> According to Human Rights Watch, in April 2018 the chief judge in Hanoi sentenced political activists to 7 to 12 years of imprisonment each under Article 79 of the Criminal Code for political activism.<ref>{{Cite web| last = The Diplomat| title = Vietnam's Controversial Cybersecurity Law Spells Tough Times for Activists|access-date= 2021-04-11| url = https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/vietnams-controversial-cybersecurity-law-spells-tough-times-for-activists/}}</ref>

Scholars and observers of Vietnam, however, have a different outlook. Many agree that the country has actually been exercising a responsive-repressive strategy since the 1990s, taking certain measures to show its responsiveness and tolerance to criticism from its citizens and exercising repression only as a last resort.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132| issn = 0951-2748| volume = 30| issue = 2| pages = 169–187| last = Bui| first = Nhung T.| title = Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam: evidence from the media during the 2014 oil rig crisis| journal = The Pacific Review|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2017-03-04| s2cid = 156373670| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 13| issue = 1| pages = 61–69| last1 = Ciorciari| first1 = John D| last2 = Weiss| first2 = Jessica Chen| title = The Sino-Vietnamese standoff in the South China Sea| journal = Georgetown Journal of International Affairs| date = 2012}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1525/as.2015.55.1.165| issn = 0004-4687| volume = 55| issue = 1| pages = 165–173| last1 = Malesky| first1 = Edmund| last2 = Morris-Jung| first2 = Jason| title = Vietnam in 2014| journal = Asian Survey|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2015-02-01| url = https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/55/1/165/24778/Vietnam-in-2014Uncertainty-and-Opportunity-in-the}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/10670564.2020.1852737| issn = 1067-0564| pages = 613–629| last = Ross| first = Robert S.| title = China-Vietnamese relations in the era of rising China: power, resistance, and maritime conflict| journal = Journal of Contemporary China|access-date= 2021-03-07| date = 2020-12-07| volume = 30| issue = 130| s2cid = 230609101| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2020.1852737}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 9| issue = 4| pages = 33–66| last = Vu| first = Tuong| title = The party v. the people: anti-China nationalism in contemporary Vietnam| journal = Journal of Vietnamese Studies| date = 2014| doi = 10.1525/vs.2014.9.4.33}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/10670564.2019.1580429| issn = 1067-0564| volume = 28| issue = 119| pages = 712–728| last1 = Wang| first1 = Frances Yaping| last2 = Womack| first2 = Brantly| title = Jawing through crises: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea| journal = Journal of Contemporary China|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2019-09-03| s2cid = 159174351| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580429}}</ref> Political scientist and Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University [[Ben Kerkvliet]] found that Vietnamese citizens “frequently and publicly” spoke out in criticism of their living and working conditions, most often through thousands of strikes, occasionally with thousands of participants each.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Cornell University Press| last = Kerkvliet| first = Benedict J. Tria| title = Speaking out in Vietnam: public political criticism in a communist party-ruled nation| date = 2019}}</ref> His 2019 book ''Speaking Out in Vietnam: public political criticism in a communist party-ruled nation'' showed that at least since 1990, public political criticism has evolved into a prominent feature of Vietnam's political landscape. In the book, he also showed how government officials were in reality often sympathetic to workers’ demands, accommodating to concerns with land confiscation, and even to some extent tolerating calls for democratization that threatened the ideology of the regime. Some regime critics were not detained at all; many were confined for brief periods but never imprisoned; those who were convicted faced shorter lengths of imprisonment compared to past decisive crackdowns and repressions.

Among the Vietnamese populace, anti-China sentiments act as a converging space for their dissatisfaction with a variety of social issues in the country such as unfavorable labour conditions, environmental pollution, socio-economic development, and foreign policy. Placing China as a ‘common enemy’ thereby acts as a linkage between these social groups with mutual encouragement and reinforcement of these sentiments.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/186810341503400305| issn = 1868-1034| volume = 34| issue = 3| pages = 123–150| last = Kurfürst| first = Sandra| title = Networking alone? Digital communications and collective action in Vietnam| journal = Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs| date = 2015-12-01| s2cid = 156716830| doi-access = free}}</ref> Post-ColdPost–Cold War, and especially since 2010, the sharpest crises and ensuing anti-China protests in Vietnam have involved public outrage over [[territorial disputes in the South China Sea]].<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/2347797016645453| issn = 2347-7970| volume = 3| issue = 2| pages = 200–220| last = Thayer| first = Carlyle A.| title = Vietnam's strategy of 'cooperating and struggling' with China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea| journal = Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2016-08-01| s2cid = 156997593| url = https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645453}}</ref>