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{{use dmy dates|date=April 2021}}
{{Infobox civil conflict
| title
| image
| caption
| date
| place
* [[Ho Chi Minh City]]
* [[Hanoi]]
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* [[Taiwan]]
* Japan
| causes = * Special Zone
* Cybersecurity Law
* Environment
* Economic and social problems
| methods = * [[Demonstration (political)|Demonstrations]]▼
▲* [[Demonstration (political)|Demonstrations]]
* [[Nonviolent resistance]]
* [[Internet activism|Online activism]]
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* [[General strikes]]
* [[Riots]]
| result
* Rescinded through Special Zone Act
* Passed Cybersecurity Law on 1st January, 2019
| side1 =
Protesters
----
'''Supported by:'''
{{flagicon image|Viet Tan Logo.png}} [[Việt Tân]] (alleged, denied)<br>
{{flagdeco|South Vietnam}} [[Third Republic of Vietnam]] (alleged)
{{endplainlist}}
| side2 =
* [[File:Communist Party of Vietnam flag logo.svg|15px]] [[Communist Party of Vietnam]]
* [[File:Communist Party of Vietnam flag logo.svg|15px]] [[Political Bureau|Politburo]]
*
**
**
* [[File:Emblem VPA.svg|
** [[File:
* [[File:Flag of HCM Communist Youth Union.svg|22px]][[Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union]]
| leadfigures1 = No centralised leaders▼
| leadfigures2 = [[Nguyễn Xuân Phúc]]<br>[[Nguyễn Phú Trọng]]<br>[[Trần Đại Quang]]<br>[[Tô Lâm]]<br>[[Ngô Xuân Lịch]]▼
▲No centralised leaders
▲[[Nguyễn Xuân Phúc]]<br>[[Nguyễn Phú Trọng]]<br>[[Trần Đại Quang]]<br>[[Tô Lâm]]<br>[[Ngô Xuân Lịch]]
| fatalities = 1 protester dead
| injuries = A few police officers and protesters
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The '''2018 Vietnam protests''', '''June 10 Events''', or '''Protests against the Special Zone Act and the Cybersecurity Law''' ([[Vietnamese language|Vietnamese]]: [[:vi:Biểu tình phản đối Luật đặc khu kinh tế và Luật An ninh mạng|Biểu tình phản đối Luật đặc khu kinh tế và Luật An ninh mạng]]), are a series of both violent and nonviolent protests that erupted across Vietnam in June 2018, chiefly in response to two drafted pieces of legislation: the Special Zone Act and the Cybersecurity Law.
The Special Zone Act<ref>{{Cite web| last = ASEAN briefing| title = Special economic zones in ASEAN: opportunities for US investors| work = ASEAN Business News|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2020-06-04| url = https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/special-economic-zones-in-asean-opportunities-for-us-investors/}}</ref> (also known as the Special Zones Law<ref>{{Cite news| last = China Dialogue| title = Public criticism pressures Vietnam to back down on new economic zones| work = China Dialogue|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2019-03-26| url = https://chinadialogue.net/en/business/11154-public-criticism-pressures-vietnam-to-back-down-on-new-economic-zones/}}</ref> or the Special Economic Zones Law<ref>{{Cite web| last = Trang| first = Doan| title = FAQs about the Special Economic Zones and Vietnam's SEZ draft bill| work = thevietnamese.org| date = 28 August 2018|access-date= 2021-04-10| url = https://www.thevietnamese.org/2018/08/faqs-about-the-special-economic-zones-and-vietnams-sez-draft-bill/}}</ref>) proposes the opening of three [[special economic zones]] (SEZs) across Vietnam, where foreign investors would be allowed to lease land for up to 99 years. Despite no specific mention of China within the lines of the bill, many Vietnamese feared that the SEZs would be dominated by China, leading to worries about the loss of national sovereignty.<ref>{{Cite news| title = China warns citizens in Vietnam after protests over economic zones| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-09| date = 2018-06-11| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-protests-idUSKBN1J70NS}}</ref> On 9 June 2018, the Vietnamese authorities eventually yielded under enormous public pressure and postponed voting on the law indefinitely.<ref>{{Cite web| last = Luong| first = Dien Nguyen An| title = How Hanoi is leveraging anti-China sentiments online|access-date= 2021-01-25| date = 2020| url = https://www.iseas.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/ISEAS_Perspective_2020_115.pdf}}</ref>
The Cybersecurity Law
==Context==
===Protest culture in Vietnam===
To mainstream media and many nongovernmental organizations, Vietnam is often perceived as harsh and uncompromising regarding the right to freedom of assembly. Reports from [[Human Rights Watch]] and the US State Department depict the ruling [[Communist Party of Vietnam]] (CPV) as extremely illiberal and unforgiving of political dissent of any kind.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = Human Rights Watch| title = Vietnam: Country Summary| location = New York| series = World Report 2013|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2013| url = https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/vietnam_9.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| last = US Department of State| title = 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam| series = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2011| url = https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/160484.pdf}}</ref><ref>{{Cite conference| last = US Department of State| title = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam| series = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2018| url = https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vietnam/}}</ref> [[Freedom House]]’s report on Vietnam in 2020 scores the country at 1 out of 4 for freedom of assembly, specifically citing the arrests and convictions as a result of the 2018 protests as the reason for its score, and 0 out of 4 for freedom for nongovernmental organizations and trade unions or similar professional organizations.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = Freedom House| title = Vietnam: Freedom in the World 2020 Country Report|access-date= 2021-04-10| url = https://freedomhouse.org/country/vietnam/freedom-world/2020}}</ref> [[Amnesty International]] also reports harassment
Scholars and observers of Vietnam, however, have a different outlook. Many agree that the country has actually been exercising a responsive-repressive strategy since the 1990s, taking certain measures to show its responsiveness and tolerance to criticism from its citizens and exercising repression only as a last resort.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132| issn = 0951-2748| volume = 30| issue = 2| pages = 169–187| last = Bui| first = Nhung T.| title = Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam: evidence from the media during the 2014 oil rig crisis| journal = The Pacific Review|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2017-03-04| s2cid = 156373670| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 13| issue = 1| pages = 61–69| last1 = Ciorciari| first1 = John D| last2 = Weiss| first2 = Jessica Chen| title = The Sino-Vietnamese standoff in the South China Sea| journal = Georgetown Journal of International Affairs| date = 2012}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1525/as.2015.55.1.165| issn = 0004-4687| volume = 55| issue = 1| pages = 165–173| last1 = Malesky| first1 = Edmund| last2 = Morris-Jung| first2 = Jason| title = Vietnam in 2014| journal = Asian Survey|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2015-02-01| url = https://online.ucpress.edu/as/article/55/1/165/24778/Vietnam-in-2014Uncertainty-and-Opportunity-in-the}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/10670564.2020.1852737| issn = 1067-0564| pages = 613–629| last = Ross| first = Robert S.| title = China-Vietnamese relations in the era of rising China: power, resistance, and maritime conflict| journal = Journal of Contemporary China|access-date= 2021-03-07| date = 2020-12-07| volume = 30| issue = 130| s2cid = 230609101| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2020.1852737}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| volume = 9| issue = 4| pages = 33–66| last = Vu| first = Tuong| title = The party v. the people: anti-China nationalism in contemporary Vietnam| journal = Journal of Vietnamese Studies| date = 2014| doi = 10.1525/vs.2014.9.4.33}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/10670564.2019.1580429| issn = 1067-0564| volume = 28| issue = 119| pages = 712–728| last1 = Wang| first1 = Frances Yaping| last2 = Womack| first2 = Brantly| title = Jawing through crises: Chinese and Vietnamese media strategies in the South China Sea| journal = Journal of Contemporary China|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2019-09-03| s2cid = 159174351| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1580429}}</ref> Political scientist and Emeritus Professor at the Australian National University [[Ben Kerkvliet]] found that Vietnamese citizens “frequently and publicly” spoke out in criticism of their living and working conditions, most often through thousands of strikes, occasionally with thousands of participants each.<ref>{{Cite book| publisher = Cornell University Press| last = Kerkvliet| first = Benedict J. Tria| title = Speaking out in Vietnam: public political criticism in a communist party-ruled nation| date = 2019}}</ref> His 2019 book ''Speaking Out in Vietnam: public political criticism in a communist party-ruled nation'' showed that at least since 1990, public political criticism has evolved into a prominent feature of Vietnam's political landscape. In the book, he also showed how government officials were in reality often sympathetic to workers’ demands, accommodating to concerns with land confiscation, and even to some extent tolerating calls for democratization that threatened the ideology of the regime.
===Past anti-China protests in Vietnam===
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Although public demonstrations are not common in Vietnam, anti-China protests has occurred on numerous occasions and are met with a balance of responsiveness and repression by the state, albeit with extra caution given the addition of an external party – China, no less – into the state-society relationship in Vietnam.
Among the Vietnamese populace, anti-China sentiments act as a converging space for their dissatisfaction with a variety of social issues in the country such as unfavorable labour conditions, environmental pollution, socio-economic development, and foreign policy. Placing China as a ‘common enemy’ thereby acts as a linkage between these social groups with mutual encouragement and reinforcement of these sentiments.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/186810341503400305| issn = 1868-1034| volume = 34| issue = 3| pages = 123–150| last = Kurfürst| first = Sandra| title = Networking alone? Digital communications and collective action in Vietnam| journal = Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs| date = 2015-12-01| s2cid = 156716830| doi-access = free}}</ref>
In May 2011, for instance, a Chinese maritime vessel cut the cables of a Vietnamese ship conducting research operating in Vietnamese waters in the South China Sea, and hundreds in Vietnam took to the streets for over three months in sustained protest.<ref>{{Cite news| title = Vietnam stops anti-China protest, detains many| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2011-08-21| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-protest-idUSTRE77K0FF20110821}}</ref> Demonstrators in Hanoi sang patriotic songs, chanted slogans, and carried banners and flags, including a Chinese flag digitally altered to include a pirate’s skull and crossbones.<ref>{{Cite news| title = Hundreds protest in Vietnam against China over sea row| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2011-06-05| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-57504920110605}}</ref> Public anger flared up even more intensely in 2014, when [[Hai Yang Shi You 981 standoff|China deployed Haiyang Shiyou 981]], a giant oil rig in an area of the South China Sea claimed by Vietnam. This incident triggered large-scale [[:2014 Vietnam anti-China protests|anti-China demonstrations]] with thousands of participants that quickly turned violent.<ref>{{Cite news| last = BBC News| title = Vietnam anti-China protest: Factories burnt| work = BBC News|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2014-05-14| url = https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27403851}}</ref> Protesters set fire to industrial parks and factories, hunted down and sparred with Chinese workers, and attacked police during the confrontations, leaving at least 21 people dead and nearly 100 injured.<ref>{{Cite web| last = The Guardian| title = At least 21 dead in Vietnam anti-China protests over oil rig| work = The Guardian|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2014-05-15| url = http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/15/vietnam-anti-china-protests-oil-rig-dead-injured}}</ref>
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It is important to note that the relationship between the two countries is not totally skewed, however – both sides are bound by the [[16 Word Guideline]], a statement announced by the [[General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam]] and the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party]] in 1999 as a guide for Sino-Vietnamese relations in the future. Specifically, it stipulated that both countries commit to “long-term, stable, future-oriented, good neighborly and all-round cooperative relations”. A study analyzing major diplomatic events from the 1990s to 2018 between the two countries showcase how this official term has been brought up at every single summit meeting since its conception, reminding both sides of their commitment to maintaining bilateral relations.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/10670564.2019.1645484| issn = 1067-0564| volume = 29| issue = 123| pages = 469–486| last = Lai| first = Christina| title = A coercive brotherhood: Sino-Vietnamese relations from the 1990s to 2018| journal = Journal of Contemporary China|access-date= 2021-02-11| date = 2020-05-03| s2cid = 199819828| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10670564.2019.1645484}}</ref> The author thus provides an alternate view to the traditional approach of power politics that emphasize asymmetry between China and Vietnam, instead arguing that the 16 Word Guideline has led to a powerful coercive rhetoric that exerts strong influences on both sides to avoid domestic instability and military conflict.
Regarding the South China Sea in particular, Vietnam pursues a strategy of ‘cooperation and struggle’ with China<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/2347797016645453| issn = 2347-7970| volume = 3| issue = 2| pages = 200–220| last = Thayer| first = Carlyle A.| title = Vietnam's strategy of 'cooperating and struggling' with China over maritime disputes in the South China Sea| journal = Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2016-08-01| s2cid = 156997593| url = https://doi.org/10.1177/2347797016645453}}</ref> – for instance, engaging in a defence self-help programme at home with deliveries of [[:kilo-class submarine|kilo-class submarines]] while engaging major powers including the United States, Russia, India, and Japan to maintain the power balance in the Sea.<ref>{{Cite journal| issn = 0129-797X| volume = 33| issue = 3| pages = 348–369| last = Thayer| first = Carlyle A.| title = The tyranny of geography: Vietnamese strategies to constrain China in the South China Sea| journal = Contemporary Southeast Asia|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = December 2011| doi = 10.1355/cs33-3d| url = https://www.proquest.com/docview/921618975| id = {{ProQuest|921618975}}}}</ref> While the anti-China protests did not change Vietnam’s foreign policy towards China both during the disputes or in the long-term,<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1177/2347797019826747| issn = 2347-7970| volume = 6| issue = 1| pages = 1–29| last = Hoang| first = Phuong| title = Domestic protests and foreign policy: an examination of anti-China protests in Vietnam and Vietnamese policy towards China regarding the South China Sea| journal = Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs| date = 2019-04-01| s2cid = 159373995| doi-access = free}}</ref> the pressure was successfully manipulated for Vietnam’s benefit, with the United States
All in all, within this trio – the Vietnamese people, the Vietnamese government, and the Chinese government – it is all about preserving a delicate balance between appeasing protests and approving of nationalism while maintaining the negotiated asymmetry and avoiding harm to bilateral relations.<ref>{{Cite news| title = Hundreds protest in Vietnam against China over sea row| work = Reuters|access-date= 2021-04-11| date = 2011-06-05| url = https://www.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-57504920110605}}</ref> A study based on an analysis of 570 Vietnamese newspaper articles shows how the Vietnamese government was truly balanced in its response to anti-China protests, extensively publicizing the conflict to show opposition to Chinese aggression but also channeling the anger towards China into a “more positive and constructive form of pro-government nationalism”.<ref>{{Cite journal| doi = 10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132| issn = 0951-2748| volume = 30| issue = 2| pages = 169–187| last = Bui| first = Nhung T.| title = Managing anti-China nationalism in Vietnam: evidence from the media during the 2014 oil rig crisis| journal = The Pacific Review|access-date= 2021-03-06| date = 2017-03-04| s2cid = 156373670| url = https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2016.1201132}}</ref> Scholars ultimately agree on the general approach taken by Vietnam to such anti-China criticism and rallies: that demonstrators were allowed and sometimes even encouraged to protest, with broad media coverage of the demonstrations and issuances of official statements in a sympathetic nature towards protesters that condemned Chinese actions. This permissive stance would continue until events escalated and turned violent, where there would then be a heavy-handed, definitive crackdown often involving arrests and brute force.
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'''2 August''': Reports stated that a protester, Hua Hoang Anh, died on 2 August after local police officers in Kien Giang Province interrogated him concerning his participation in the protests. Social media and nongovernmental organizations reported that there were many injuries to his body, including to his head, neck, and belly, possibly indicating torture.<ref>{{Cite conference| last = US Department of State| title = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Vietnam| series = 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices|access-date= 2021-04-10| date = 2018| url = https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/vietnam/}}</ref> State-run media only stated that he had died.
'''4 September:''' [[Huỳnh Trương Ca]], a member of the Hiến Pháp group who organised protests in Ho Chi Minh City, is arrested. Over the next month, eight further members of Hiến Pháp are arrested.<ref>{{Cite web |date=7 August 2024 |title=Free Vietnam’s Political Prisoners! |url=https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2024/08/07/free-vietnams-political-prisoners |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240808163533/https://www.hrw.org/video-photos/interactive/2024/08/07/free-vietnams-political-prisoners |archive-date=8 August 2024 |access-date=11 August 2024 |website=[[Human Rights Watch]] |language=en}}</ref>
==See also==
|