Operation Peppermint: Difference between revisions

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In response, the [[Metallurgical Laboratory]] in [[Chicago]] and the [[Victoreen Instrument Company]] in [[Cleveland]] developed portable radiation detection devices suitable for use in the field. In 1944, [[Major General (United States)|Major General]] [[Leslie R. Groves, Jr.]], director of the Manhattan Project, sent [[Major (United States)|Major]] Arthur V. Peterson to brief [[General (United States)|General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] and his senior staff officers at the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]] (SHAEF).

In response, ETOUSA initiated Operation Peppermint. Special equipment was prepared. Eleven survey meters and a [[Geiger counter]] were shipped to England in early 1944, along with 1,500 film packets, which were used to measure radiation exposure. Another 25 survey meters, 5 Geiger counters and 1,500 film packets were held in storage in the United States, but in readiness to be shipped by air with the highest priority. [[Chemical Warfare Service]] teams were trained in its use, and [[Signal Corps (United States Army)|Signal Corps]] personnel in its maintenance. The equipment was held in readiness, but the preparations were not needed, because the Germans had not developed such weapons.

When the [[Manhattan Project]] assumed responsibility for the development of [[nuclear weapons]] in September 1942, it also assumed responsibility for the development of suitable countermeasures. At the time, the threat posed by the [[German nuclear energy project]] was taken very seriously.{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=234–235}}{{sfn|Nichols|1987|pp=134-135}} Consideration was given to issuing a public warning of the danger of a German nuclear attack on the United States, but the director of the Manhattan Project, [[Brigadier General (United States)|Brigadier General]] [[Leslie R. Groves, Jr.]], considered the likelihood of this to be sufficiently remote that he rejected the notion of taking so drastic a step.{{sfn|Groves|1962|p=199}}

A subcommittee of the [[S-1 UraniumExecutive Committee]], chaired by [[James B. Conant]], and consisting of himself, [[Arthur Compton]] and [[Harold Urey]], was appointed to look into the issue, and it similarly assessed the danger as low, but still sufficient to warrant taking some precautions. A program was initiated by the [[Metallurgical Laboratory]] in [[Chicago]] and the [[Victoreen Instrument Company]] in [[Cleveland]] to develop radiation detection devices suitable for use in the field. Some 48 portable detection meters were built in 1943, half of which were capable of detecting 0 to 10 [[roentgen (unit)|roentgen]]s per day, while the other half could detect from 0 to 100 roentgens per day. Instruments sets were stored at Manhattan District offices in [[Boston]], Chicago, [[New York City]], [[San Francisco]] and [[Washington, D.C.]], and the area engineer and some other officers were instructed in their use. A special team of scientists was created at the Metallurgical Laboratory who could respond to any reports of the use of nuclear weapons or [[dirty bomb|radioactive poisons]].{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=234–235}}

It was considered more likely that Germany might employ such weapons against the United Kingdom, so four officers from the [[European Theater of Operations United States Army]] (ETOUSA) including the G-3 Brigadier General George S. Eyster were summoned to Chicago, where they were given a top secret briefing by the Manhattan District's Chicago area engineer, [[Major (United States)|Major]] [[Arthur V. Peterson]]. They were told about possible forms such an attack might take, and what the effects and symptoms of them were, and they were given survey instruments and shown how to use them. They were enjoined to tell other officers in the theater to report unexplained fogging of film or illnesses with symptoms corresponding to the effects of [[radiation sickness]].{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=235–236}}{{sfn|Nichols|1987|pp=134-135}}{{sfn|Jones|1985|pp=194–195}}

As the date for the [[Normandy landings]] (codenamed [[Operation Overlord]]) drew near in early 1944, Groves considered that risk was sufficient to send an officer to brief the Supreme Commander [[General (United States)|General]] [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] of the possible use of radioactive poisons, particularly [[plutonium]] and [[fission products]] that might be created in their [[nuclear reactor]]s.{{sfn|Groves|1962|pp=200–201}} On 8 April 1944, Peterson reported to the [[Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force]] (SHAEF) and met with Eisenhower, his Chiefchief of Staffstaff, [[Lieutenant General (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Walter Bedell Smith]], Assistantassistant Chiefchief of Staffstaff (G-2) ([[Military intelligence|Intelligence]]), [[Major General (United Kingdom)|Major General]] [[John Whiteley (British Army officer)|John Whiteley]], and his Assistantassistant Chiefchief of Staffstaff (G-3) ([[Operations (military staff)|Operations]]), [[Major General (United States)|Major General]] [[Harold R. Bull]].{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=236–237}}

They considered creating an Allied plan to counter the danger, but Whiteley said that he would have to consult with the British command before this could be approved. Colonel G. S. Eyster from G-3 was then ordered to prepare an American plan, under the codename Operation Peppermint.{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=236–237}} Further briefings were given to [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[Harold Rainsford Stark|Harold Stark]], and Lieutenant Generals [[Carl Spaatz]] and [[John C. H. Lee]], and Eisenhower also wrote to [[Lieutenant General (United Kingdom)|Lieutenant General]] [[Hastings Ismay, 1st Baron Ismay|Hastings Ismay]], the Chiefchief of Staffstaff of the [[Prime Minister of the United Kingdom]], [[Winston Churchill]] to inform the [[British Chiefs of Staff]], but no British or American commanders actually participating in Operation Overlord were informed.{{sfn|Groves|1962|p=206}} The British subsequently adopted a similar plan to Operation Peppermint, and SHAEF assumed responsibility for coordinating the British and American efforts. Scientific assistance was provided by the [[Cavendish Laboratory]].{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=236–237}}

The Germans had not developed, and did not employ radioactive poisons, so Operation Peppermint was never put into effect. After [[VE-Day]], the equipment and all the documents relating to Operation Peppermint were collected, returned to the United States, and handed over to the Manhattan Project.{{sfn|Brown|MacDonald|1977|pp=237–238}} However, the effort put into developing portable radiation detection equipment was not wasted. Survey teams from the Manhattan Project wouldused subsequently use portable detectionthe equipment to assess the [[fallout]] from the [[Trinity nuclear test]],{{sfn|Hacker|1987|pp=106–108}} the [[bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki]],{{sfn|Hacker|1987|pp=113–116}} and [[Operation Crossroads]], during which 10,000 film badges were used.{{sfn|Hacker|1987|pp=121–122}}

* {{cite book |editor-last=Brown |editor-first=A.C. |editor-link=Anthony Cave Brown |editor2-first=C.B. |editor2-last=MacDonald |editor2-link=Charles B. MacDonald |year=1977 |title=Secret History of the Atomic Bomb |publisher=Dial Press/James Wade |location=New York |isbn=0-440-57728-4 |oclc=4433564013 |ref=harv }}

* {{cite book |last=Groves|first=Leslie |authorlinkauthor-link=Leslie Groves |title=Now it Can be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project |url=https://archive.org/details/nowitcanbetolds00grov|url-access=registration|location=New York |publisher=Harper & Row |year=1962 |isbn=0-306-70738-1|oclc=537684 |ref=harv }}

* {{cite book |last=Hacker |first=Barton C. |title=The Dragon's Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 |url=https://archive.org/details/dragonstailradia0000hack |url-access=registration |publisher=University of California Press |year=1987 |ISBNisbn=0-520-05852-6 |oclc=13794117 |ref=harv }}

* {{cite book |last=Jones |first=Vincent |title=Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb |publisher=United States Army Center of Military History |location=Washington, D.C. |year=1985 |url=http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-10/CMH_Pub_11-10.pdf |accessdateoclc=10913875 |access-date=8 June 2013 |oclcarchive-date=109138757 October 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141007074359/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/011/11-10/CMH_Pub_11-10.pdf |refurl-status=harvdead }}

* {{cite journal |last=Lapp|first= Ralph E. |title=Survey of nucleonics instrumentation industry |journal=Nucleonics |volume=4 |issue=5 |pages=100–104 |yeardate=May 1949 |month=May |pmid=18126152 |issn=0096-6207 |doiref=none |url=}}

* {{cite web |url=httphttps://www.orau.org/ptphealth-physics-museum/collection/surveymeterssurvey-instruments/vic247amid-to-late-1940s/victoreen-models-247-a-and-247b-ion-chambers.htmhtml |title=Victoreen Models 247 A and 247B Ion Chambers (ca. 1945–1955) |accessdateaccess-date=811 JuneOctober 20132021 |publisher=Oak Ridge Associated Universities }}

* {{cite web |url= http://www.civildefensemuseum.com/southrad/victoreen-247-b.html |title=Victoreen Model 247-B Radiation Survey Meter |work=civildefensemuseum.com |year=2005 |accessdateaccess-date=9 June 2013}}

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[[Category:History of the Manhattan Project]]

[[Category:Code names|Peppermint]]