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| shorttitle = Sherman Antitrust Act
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| longtitle = An Act to
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| cite statutes at large = {{usstat|26|209}}
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| passedbody1 = Senate
| passeddate1 = April 8, 1890
| passedvote1 = 52–1
| passedbody2 = House
| passedas2 = <!-- used if the second body changes the name of the legislation -->
| passeddate2 = June 20, 1890
| passedvote2 = unanimous vote
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{{Competition law}}
The '''Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890'''<ref>Officially re-designated as the "Sherman Act" by Congress in the [[Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act|Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976]], (Public Law 94-435, Title 3, Sec. 305(a), 90 Stat. 1383 at [[s:Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1447|p. 1397]]).</ref> ({{USStat|26|209}}, {{usc|15|1|7}}) is a [[United States antitrust law]] which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair [[Monopoly|monopolies]]. It was passed by [[United States Congress|Congress]] and is named for Senator [[John Sherman]], its principal author.
The Sherman Act broadly prohibits 1) anticompetitive agreements and 2) unilateral conduct that monopolizes or attempts to monopolize the relevant market. The Act authorizes the [[United States Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] to bring [[Lawsuit|suits]] to [[enjoin]] (i.e. prohibit) conduct violating the Act, and additionally authorizes private parties injured by conduct violating the Act to bring suits for [[treble damages]] (i.e. three times as much money in damages as the violation cost them). Over time, the federal courts have developed a body of law under the Sherman Act making certain types of anticompetitive conduct per se illegal, and subjecting other types of conduct to case-by-case analysis regarding whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.
The law attempts to prevent the artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://butnowyouknow.net/those-who-fail-to-learn-from-history/sherman-anti-trust-act-and-analysis/|title=Sherman AntiTrust Act, and Analysis|date=12 March 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20111118040849/http://butnowyouknow.net/those-who-fail-to-learn-from-history/sherman-anti-trust-act-and-analysis/|archive-date=18 November 2011}}</ref> "Innocent monopoly", or
==Background==
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{{blockquote|Section 1:
:Every contract, combination in the form of [[Trust (19th century)|trust]] or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Section 2:
:Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
====Subsequent legislation expanding its scope====
{{unreferenced section|date=July 2022}}
The [[Clayton Antitrust Act]], passed in 1914, proscribes certain additional activities that had been discovered to fall outside the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act. For example, as ''The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History'' states, the Clayton Act added certain practices to the list of impermissible activities:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mochoruk |first=James |title=The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2013 |isbn=9780199738816 |editor-last=Dubofsky |editor-first=Melvyn |location=New York |chapter=Clayton Antitrust Act}}</ref>
* "price discrimination" between different purchasers, if such discrimination tends to create a monopoly
* "exclusive dealing" agreements
* " 'tying' " arrangements
* mergers and acquisitions that substantially reduce market competition.
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* ''[[Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States]]'' (1911), which broke up the company based on geography, and contributed to the [[Panic of 1910–11]].
* ''[[United States v. American Tobacco Co.]]'' (1911), which split the company into four.
* ''
* ''[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca2-10-00846/pdf/USCOURTS-ca2-10-00846-0.pdf Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center]'' (2010), where nurses alleged Albany Medical Center suppressed their wages in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by sharing wage information with other area hospitals. References: (1) Casetext Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center (2) Justia Docket No. 10-0846-mv
* ''[[United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co.]]'' (
* ''[[Federal Baseball Club v. National League]]'' (1922) in which the Supreme Court ruled that [[Major League Baseball]] was not [[interstate commerce]] and was not subject to the antitrust law.
* ''United States v. National City Lines'' (1953), related to the [[General Motors streetcar conspiracy]].
* ''[[United States v. AT&T (1982)|United States v. AT&T Co.]]'', which was settled in 1982 and resulted in the breakup of the company.
*''[[Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n|Wilk v. American Medical Association]]'' (1990) Judge Getzendanner issued her opinion that the AMA had violated Section 1, but not 2, of the Sherman Act, and that it had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy in [[restraint of trade]] "to contain and eliminate the chiropractic profession."
* ''[[United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)|United States v. Microsoft Corp.]]'' was settled in 2001 without the breakup of the company.
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The antitrust laws allow coincident state regulation of competition.<ref>''See'' Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MD., 437 U.S. 117, 130–34 (1978) (state law with anticompetitive effect upheld to avoid destroying the ability of the states to regulate economic activity); Conant, ''supra'' note 1, at 264., Werden & Balmer, ''supra'' note 1, at 59. ''See generally'' 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, ''Antitrust Law'' P208 (1978) (discussing the interaction of state and federal antitrust laws); ''id.'' P210 (discussing areas where federal law expressly defers to state law).</ref> The Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining when a state statute is in irreconcilable conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act in [[Rice v. Norman Williams Co.]] Different standards apply depending on whether a statute is attacked on its face or for its effects.
*A statute can be condemned on its face only when it mandates, authorizes or places irresistible pressure on private parties to engage in conduct constituting a per se violation of Section 1.<ref>''Rice,'' 458 U.S. at 661. If a statute does not require a per se violation, then it cannot be preempted on its face. ''Id.''</ref>
:If the statute does not mandate conduct violating a per se rule, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires an examination of the conduct's actual effects on competition.<ref>''See ''[''Rice,'' 458 U.S. at 661.]</ref> If unreasonable anticompetitive effects are created, the required conduct violates Section 1<ref>National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–90 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)</ref> and the statute is in irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act.<ref>See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1984) (while declining to decide whether a statute required an antitrust violation in a facial attack, the court left open the possibility of preemption based on the statute's operation), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); Lanierland Distribs. v. Strickland, 544 F. Supp. 747, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (plaintiff failed to show anticompetitive effects sufficient to violate the rule of reason); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) ([[en banc]]) (declining to decide whether the rule of reason might invalidate a law on the record before them), Appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Director of N.M. Dept' of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, , 668 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1983) (rejecting a facial attack on a statute but reserving a decision on whether the actual application of the statute might violate the antitrust laws), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1581 (1984). But see infra note 149 for a discussion on the possibility of a much more limited rule of reason preemption analysis.</ref> Then statutory arrangement is analyzed to determine whether it qualifies as "state action" and is thereby saved from preemption.<ref>See Rice, 458 U.S. at 662–63 n.9 ("because of our resolution of the pre-emption issue, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invalidation under the [state action] doctrine"); Capitol Tel. Co. v New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d 1154, 1157, 1165 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the state action doctrine protected the conduct of a private party after assuming that it violated the federal antitrust laws), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2325 (1985); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 1982) (even if conduct violated Sherman Act, the statute is saved by the state action doctrine); Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 124 (D. Or. 1984) (statute violating Section 1 saved by state action); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 17–18 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (though conduct violates Section 1, state action saves statute).</ref>
Rice sets out guidelines to aid in preemption analysis. Preemption should not occur "simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws."<ref>Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).</ref> This language suggests that preemption occurs only if economic analysis determines that the statutory requirements create "an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of anticompetitive effect,"<ref>Id. at 668 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).</ref> and does not occur simply because it is possible to use the statute in an anticompetitive manner.<ref>See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 100 n.15 (1st Cir.) (power to control others not sufficient for facial preemption where party had no institutional reason to make anticompetitive decisions especially likely), aff'd on other grounds, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1981) ([[en banc]]), aff'd sub nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (in an oligopolistic market, price posting would result in an antitrust violation).</ref> It should not mean that preemption is impossible whenever both procompetitive and anticompetitive results are conceivable.<ref>But cf. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 449 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (indicating that a statute neither requiring nor permitting an anticompetitive collaboration gives the private party enough freedom of choice to preclude preemption), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982)</ref> The per se rule "reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them."
Another important, yet, in the context of Rice, ambiguous guideline regarding preemption by Section 1 is the Court's statement that a "state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect."<ref>Rice, 458 U.S. at 659.</ref> The meaning of this statement is clarified by examining the three cases cited in Rice to support the statement.<ref>Id. (citing [[New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.]], 439 U.S. 96, 110–11 (1978); [[Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MD.]], 437 U.S. 117, 129–34 (1978); [[Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter]], 384 U.S. 35, 45–46 (1966)).</ref>
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; Official websites
* [http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division]
* [https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761131/download U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division – text of
;Additional information
* Antitrust Division's [http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm "Corporate Leniency Policy"]
* [http://www.polyconomics.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1605:antitrust-by-alan-greenspan&catid=47:1998&Itemid=31 ''Antitrust''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140511002404/http://www.polyconomics.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1605:antitrust-by-alan-greenspan&catid=47:1998&Itemid=31 |date=May 11, 2014 }} by [[Alan Greenspan]]
* "Labor and the Sherman Act" (1940). ''[[Yale Law Journal]]'' 49(3) p. 518. {{JSTOR|792668}}.
* Dr. Edward W. Younkins (February 19, 2000). [http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000219-13.htm "Antitrust Laws Should Be Abolished"].
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