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| shorttitle = Sherman Antitrust Act
| othershorttitles =
| longtitle = An Act to
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| passedbody1 = Senate
| passeddate1 = April 8, 1890
| passedvote1 = 52–1
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| passedas2 = <!-- used if the second body changes the name of the legislation -->
| passeddate2 = June 20, 1890
| passedvote2 = unanimous vote
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| signeddate = July 2, 1890
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| SCOTUS cases = {{Collapsible list|framestyle=line-height:1em|''[[United States v. E.C. Knight Co.]]'', {{ussc|156|1|1894}}|''[[United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association]]'', {{ussc|166|290|1897}}|''[[Northern Securities Co. v. United States]]'', {{ussc|193|197|1904}}|''[[Hale v. Henkel]]'', {{ussc|201|43|1906}}|''[[Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.]]'', {{ussc|220|373|1911}}|''[[Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States]]'', {{ussc|221|1|1911}}|''[[United States v. American Tobacco Co.]]'', {{ussc|221|106|1911}}|''[[Federal Baseball Club v. National League]]'', {{ussc|259|200|1922}}|''[[Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader]]'', {{ussc|310|469|1940}}|''[[United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.]]'', {{ussc|334|131|1948}}|''[[United States v. National City Lines]]'', {{ussc|334|573|1948}}|''[[Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc.]]'', {{ussc|340|211|1951}}|''[[Lorain Journal Co. v. United States]]'', {{ussc|342|143|1951}}|''[[Continental Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.]]'', {{ussc|433|36|1977}}|''[[Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society]]'', {{ussc|457|332|1982}}|''[[Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde]]'', {{ussc|466|2|1984}}|''[[Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.]]'', {{ussc|467|752|1984}}|''[[Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan]]'', {{ussc|506|447|1993}}|''[[Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.]]'', {{ussc|551|877|2007}}|''[[Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc.]]'', {{ussc|555|438|2009}}|''[[American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League]]'', {{ussc|560|183|2010}}|''[[North Carolina Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC]]'', {{ussc|574|494|2015}}|''[[Ohio v. American Express Co.]]'', {{ussc|docket=16-1454|volume=585|year=2018}}|''[[National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Alston]]'', {{ussc|docket=20-512|volume=594|year=2021}}}}
}}
[[File:John-Sherman-2.jpg|thumb|upright|[[United States Senate|Sen.]] [[John Sherman]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]–[[List of United States Senators from Ohio|Ohio]]), the principal author of the Sherman Antitrust Act]]
{{Competition law}}
The '''Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890'''<ref>Officially re-designated as the "Sherman Act" by Congress in the [[Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act|Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976]], (Public Law 94-435, Title 3, Sec. 305(a), 90 Stat. 1383 at [[s:Page:United States Statutes at Large Volume 90 Part 1.djvu/1447|p. 1397]]).</ref> ({{USStat|26|209}}, {{usc|15|1|7}}) is a [[United States antitrust law]] which prescribes the rule of free competition among those engaged in commerce and consequently prohibits unfair [[Monopoly|monopolies]]. It was passed by [[United States Congress|Congress]] and is named for Senator [[John Sherman]], its principal author.
The Sherman Act broadly prohibits 1) anticompetitive agreements and 2) unilateral conduct that monopolizes or attempts to monopolize the relevant market. The Act authorizes the [[United States Department of Justice|Department of Justice]] to bring [[Lawsuit|suits]] to [[enjoin]] (i.e. prohibit) conduct violating the Act, and additionally authorizes private parties injured by conduct violating the Act to bring suits for [[treble damages]] (i.e. three times as much money in damages as the violation cost them). Over time, the federal courts have developed a body of law under the Sherman Act making certain types of anticompetitive conduct per se illegal, and subjecting other types of conduct to case-by-case analysis regarding whether the conduct unreasonably restrains trade.
The law attempts to prevent the artificial raising of prices by restriction of trade or supply.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://butnowyouknow.net/those-who-fail-to-learn-from-history/sherman-anti-trust-act-and-analysis/|title=Sherman AntiTrust Act, and Analysis|date=12 March 2011|url-status=live|archive-url=http://archive.wikiwix.com/cache/20111118040849/http://butnowyouknow.net/those-who-fail-to-learn-from-history/sherman-anti-trust-act-and-analysis/|archive-date=18 November 2011}}</ref> "Innocent monopoly", or
==Background==
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{{blockquote|... [a person] who merely by superior skill and intelligence...got the whole business because nobody could do it as well as he could was not a monopolist...(but was if) it involved something like the use of means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=OsssAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA279|title=Bills and Debates in Congress Relating to Trusts: Fiftieth Congress to Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, Inclusive|first1=United States|last1=Congress|first2=James Arthur|last2=Finch|date=26 March 2018|publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office|via=Google Books|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170409142100/https://books.google.com/books?id=OsssAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA279&lpg=PA279&source=bl&ots=QI5PFBZPn_&sig=0mccC_vXBFDUc9O8BsmPW2x6HAk&hl=en&ei=VoXFTs28OoObtwej1PWTCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CCgQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&f=false|archive-date=9 April 2017}}</ref>}}
At ''Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader'' [http://supreme.justia.com/us/310/469/case.html 310 U.
{{blockquote|The legislative history of the Sherman Act, as well as the decisions of this Court interpreting it, show that it was not aimed at policing interstate transportation or movement of goods and property. The legislative history and the voluminous literature which was generated in the course of the enactment and during fifty years of litigation of the Sherman Act give no hint that such was its purpose.<ref>Footnote 11 appears here: "''See'' the Bibliography on Trusts (1913) prepared by the Library of Congress. ''Cf.'' Homan, Industrial Combination as Surveyed in Recent Literature, 44 Quart.J.Econ., 345 (1930). With few exceptions, the articles, scientific and popular, reflected the popular idea that the Act was aimed at the prevention of monopolistic practices and restraints upon trade injurious to purchasers and consumers of goods and services by preservation of business competition. ''See, e.g.,'' Seager and Gulick, Trust and Corporation Problems (1929), 367 ''et seq.,'' 42 Ann.Am.Acad., Industrial Competition and Combination (July 1912); P. L. Anderson, Combination v. Competition, 4 Edit.Rev. 500 (1911); Gilbert Holland Montague, Trust Regulation Today, 105 Atl.Monthly, 1 (1910); Federal Regulation of Industry, 32 Ann.Am.Acad. of Pol.Sci., No. 108 (1908), ''passim;'' Clark, Federal Trust Policy (1931), Ch. II, V; Homan, Trusts, 15 Ency.Soc.Sciences 111, 113:
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{{blockquote|Section 1:
:Every contract, combination in the form of [[Trust (19th century)|trust]] or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.
Section 2:
:Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
====Subsequent legislation expanding its scope====
{{unreferenced section|date=July 2022}}
The [[Clayton Antitrust Act]], passed in 1914, proscribes certain additional activities that had been discovered to fall outside the scope of the Sherman Antitrust Act. For example, as ''The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History'' states, the Clayton Act added certain practices to the list of impermissible activities:<ref>{{Cite book |last=Mochoruk |first=James |title=The Oxford Encyclopedia of American Business, Labor, and Economic History |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2013 |isbn=9780199738816 |editor-last=Dubofsky |editor-first=Melvyn |location=New York |chapter=Clayton Antitrust Act}}</ref>
* "price discrimination" between different purchasers, if such discrimination tends to create a monopoly
* "exclusive dealing" agreements
* " 'tying' " arrangements
* mergers and acquisitions that substantially reduce market competition.
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Notable cases filed under the act include:<ref>{{cite web|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcJAAAAAYAAJ|title=Sherman Anti-trust Law and List of Decisions Relating Thereto|first=United|last=States|date=26 March 2018|publisher=U.S. Government Printing Office|via=Google Books}}</ref>
* ''United States v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of New Orleans'' (1893), which was the first to hold that the law applied to labor unions
* ''Chesapeake & Ohio Fuel Co. v. United States'' (1902), in which the trust was dissolved<ref>{{cite web |url=http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=wharton_research_scholars |title=An Early Assessment of the Sherman Antitrust Act: Three Case Studies |access-date=2016-03-08 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150926031609/http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1069&context=wharton_research_scholars |archive-date=2015-09-26 }}</ref>
* ''[[Northern Securities Co. v. United States]]'' (1904), which reached the Supreme Court, dissolved the company and set many precedents for interpretation.
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* ''[[Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States]]'' (1911), which broke up the company based on geography, and contributed to the [[Panic of 1910–11]].
* ''[[United States v. American Tobacco Co.]]'' (1911), which split the company into four.
* ''
* ''[https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-ca2-10-00846/pdf/USCOURTS-ca2-10-00846-0.pdf Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center]'' (2010), where nurses alleged Albany Medical Center suppressed their wages in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, by sharing wage information with other area hospitals. References: (1) Casetext Fleischman vs Albany Medical Center (2) Justia Docket No. 10-0846-mv
* ''[[United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co.]]'' (
* ''[[Federal Baseball Club v. National League]]'' (1922) in which the Supreme Court ruled that [[Major League Baseball]] was not [[interstate commerce]] and was not subject to the antitrust law.
* ''United States v. National City Lines'' (1953), related to the [[General Motors streetcar conspiracy]].
* ''[[United States v. AT&T (1982)|United States v. AT&T Co.]]'', which was settled in 1982 and resulted in the breakup of the company.
*''[[Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n|Wilk v. American Medical Association]]'' (1990) Judge Getzendanner issued her opinion that the AMA had violated Section 1, but not 2, of the Sherman Act, and that it had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy in [[restraint of trade]] "to contain and eliminate the chiropractic profession."
* ''[[United States v. Microsoft Corp. (2001)|United States v. Microsoft Corp.]]'' was settled in 2001 without the breakup of the company.
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===Violations "per se" and violations of the "rule of reason"===
Violations of the Sherman Act fall (loosely<ref>The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like 'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for example, that 'there is often no bright line separating per se from rule of reason analysis,' since 'considerable inquiry into market conditions' may be required before the application of any so-called 'per se' condemnation is justified. [[Cal. Dental Association v. FTC]] at 779 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.26). "'Whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same whether or not the challenged restraint enhances competition.'" 526 U.S. at 779–80 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104).</ref>) into two categories:
* '''Violations "per se":'''
* '''Violations of the "rule of reason":''' A totality of the circumstances test, asking whether the challenged practice promotes or suppresses market competition. Unlike with per se violations, intent and motive are relevant when predicting future consequences. The rule of reason is said to be the "traditional framework of analysis" to determine whether Section 1 is violated.<ref>''Continental T.V.'', 433 U.S. at 49. The inquiry focuses on the restraint's effect on competition. {{ussc|name=National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States|link=|volume=435|page=679|pin=691|year=1978}}.</ref> The court analyzes "facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraining, and the reasons why it was imposed,"<ref>''National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs'', 435 U.S. at 692.</ref> to determine the effect on competition in the relevant product market.<ref>See ''Continental T.V.'', 433 U.S. at 45 (citing {{ussc|name=United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.|link=|volume=388|page=365|pin=382|year=1967}}), and geographic market, see {{ussc|name=United States v. Columbia Steel Co.|volume=334|page=495|pin=519|year=1948}}.</ref> A restraint violates Section 1 if it unreasonably restrains trade.<ref>''Continental T.V.'', 433 U.S. at 49; see {{ussc|name=Standard Oil Co. v. United States|link=|volume=221|page=1|pin=58|year=1911}} (Congress only intended to prohibit agreements that were "unreasonably restrictive of competitive (conditions").</ref>
::'''Quick-look:''' A "quick look" analysis under the rule of reason may be used when "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets," yet the violation is also not one considered
===Modern trends===
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===Application of the act outside pure commerce===
==Preemption by Section 1 of state statutes that restrain competition==
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The antitrust laws allow coincident state regulation of competition.<ref>''See'' Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MD., 437 U.S. 117, 130–34 (1978) (state law with anticompetitive effect upheld to avoid destroying the ability of the states to regulate economic activity); Conant, ''supra'' note 1, at 264., Werden & Balmer, ''supra'' note 1, at 59. ''See generally'' 1 P. Areeda & D. Turner, ''Antitrust Law'' P208 (1978) (discussing the interaction of state and federal antitrust laws); ''id.'' P210 (discussing areas where federal law expressly defers to state law).</ref> The Supreme Court enunciated the test for determining when a state statute is in irreconcilable conflict with Section 1 of the Sherman Act in [[Rice v. Norman Williams Co.]] Different standards apply depending on whether a statute is attacked on its face or for its effects.
*A statute can be condemned on its face only when it mandates, authorizes or places irresistible pressure on private parties to engage in conduct constituting a per se violation of Section 1.<ref>''Rice,'' 458 U.S. at 661. If a statute does not require a per se violation, then it cannot be preempted on its face. ''Id.''</ref>
:If the statute does not mandate conduct violating a per se rule, the conduct is analyzed under the rule of reason, which requires an examination of the conduct's actual effects on competition.<ref>''See ''[''Rice,'' 458 U.S. at 661.]</ref> If unreasonable anticompetitive effects are created, the required conduct violates Section 1<ref>National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687–90 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)</ref> and the statute is in irreconcilable conflict with the Sherman Act.<ref>See Battipaglia v. New York State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1984) (while declining to decide whether a statute required an antitrust violation in a facial attack, the court left open the possibility of preemption based on the statute's operation), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1393 (1985); Lanierland Distribs. v. Strickland, 544 F. Supp. 747, 751 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (plaintiff failed to show anticompetitive effects sufficient to violate the rule of reason); Wine & Spirits Specialty, Inc. v. Daniel, 666 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Mo.) ([[en banc]]) (declining to decide whether the rule of reason might invalidate a law on the record before them), Appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 56 (1984); United States Brewers Ass'n v. Director of N.M. Dept' of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, , 668 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1983) (rejecting a facial attack on a statute but reserving a decision on whether the actual application of the statute might violate the antitrust laws), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 1581 (1984). But see infra note 149 for a discussion on the possibility of a much more limited rule of reason preemption analysis.</ref> Then statutory arrangement is analyzed to determine whether it qualifies as "state action" and is thereby saved from preemption.<ref>See Rice, 458 U.S. at 662–63 n.9 ("because of our resolution of the pre-emption issue, it is not necessary for us to consider whether the statute may be saved from invalidation under the [state action] doctrine"); Capitol Tel. Co. v New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d 1154, 1157, 1165 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the state action doctrine protected the conduct of a private party after assuming that it violated the federal antitrust laws), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2325 (1985); Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhodes, 679 F.2d 656, 662 (6th Cir. 1982) (even if conduct violated Sherman Act, the statute is saved by the state action doctrine); Miller v. Hedlund, 579 F. Supp. 116, 124 (D. Or. 1984) (statute violating Section 1 saved by state action); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 17–18 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (though conduct violates Section 1, state action saves statute).</ref>
Rice sets out guidelines to aid in preemption analysis. Preemption should not occur "simply because in a hypothetical situation a private party's compliance with the statute might cause him to violate the antitrust laws."<ref>Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982).</ref> This language suggests that preemption occurs only if economic analysis determines that the statutory requirements create "an unacceptable and unnecessary risk of anticompetitive effect,"<ref>Id. at 668 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).</ref> and does not occur simply because it is possible to use the statute in an anticompetitive manner.<ref>See Grendel's Den, Inc. v. Goodwin, 662 F.2d 88, 100 n.15 (1st Cir.) (power to control others not sufficient for facial preemption where party had no institutional reason to make anticompetitive decisions especially likely), aff'd on other grounds, 662 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1981) ([[en banc]]), aff'd sub nom. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Flav-O-Rich, Inc. v. North Carolina Milk Comm'n, 593 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D.N.C. 1983) (in an oligopolistic market, price posting would result in an antitrust violation).</ref> It should not mean that preemption is impossible whenever both procompetitive and anticompetitive results are conceivable.<ref>But cf. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 449 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (indicating that a statute neither requiring nor permitting an anticompetitive collaboration gives the private party enough freedom of choice to preclude preemption), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982)</ref> The per se rule "reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them."
Another important, yet, in the context of Rice, ambiguous guideline regarding preemption by Section 1 is the Court's statement that a "state statute is not preempted by the federal antitrust laws simply because the state scheme might have an anticompetitive effect."<ref>Rice, 458 U.S. at 659.</ref> The meaning of this statement is clarified by examining the three cases cited in Rice to support the statement.<ref>Id. (citing [[New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co.]], 439 U.S. 96, 110–11 (1978); [[Exxon Corp. v. Governor of MD.]], 437 U.S. 117, 129–34 (1978); [[Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter]], 384 U.S. 35, 45–46 (1966)).</ref>
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In 1890, Representative [[William E. Mason (American politician)|William E. Mason]] said "trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for instance, were reduced to one cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong done to people of this country by the trusts which have destroyed legitimate competition and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprise."<ref>Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st session, House, June 20, 1890, p. 4100.</ref> Consequently, if the primary goal of the act is to protect consumers, and consumers are protected by lower prices, the act may be harmful if it reduces [[economy of scale]], a price-lowering mechanism, by breaking up big businesses. Mason put small business survival, a justice interest, on a level concomitant with the pure economic rationale of consumer interest.{{citation needed|date=December 2020}}
Economist [[Thomas DiLorenzo]] notes that Senator Sherman sponsored the 1890 [[William McKinley]] tariff just three months after the Sherman Act, and agrees with ''[[The New York Times]]'' which wrote on October 1, 1890: "That so-called Anti-Trust law was passed to deceive the people and to clear the way for the enactment of this Pro-Trust law relating to the tariff." The ''Times'' went on to assert that Sherman merely supported this "humbug" of a law "in order that party organs might say...'Behold! We have attacked the trusts. The Republican Party is the enemy of all such rings.'"<ref name=NYT>{{cite news|url=https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1890/10/01/103268337.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190524101419/https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1890/10/01/103268337.pdf |archive-date=2019-05-24 |url-status=live|title=Mr. Sherman's Hopes and Fears|date=1890-10-01|access-date=2008-04-21|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]}}</ref> Dilorenzo writes: "Protectionists did not want prices paid by consumers to fall. But they also understood that to gain political support for high tariffs they would have to assure the public that industries would not combine to increase prices to politically prohibitive levels. Support for both an antitrust law and tariff hikes would maintain high prices while avoiding the more obvious bilking of consumers."<ref>DiLorenzo, Thomas, ''Cato Handbook for Congress'', Antitrust.</ref>
[[Robert Bork]] was well known for his outspoken criticism of the antitrust regime. Another conservative legal scholar and judge, [[Richard Posner]] of the [[United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|Seventh Circuit]], does not condemn the entire regime, but expresses concern with the potential that it could be applied to create inefficiency, rather than to avoid inefficiency.<ref name=posner>Richard Posner, ''Economic Analysis of Law'', p. 295 et seq. (explaining the optimal antitrust regime from an economic point of view)</ref> Posner further believes, along with a number of others, including Bork, that genuinely inefficient cartels and coercive monopolies, the target of the act, would be self-corrected by market forces, making the strict penalties of antitrust legislation unnecessary.<ref name=posner /> Conversely, liberal [[U.S. Supreme Court]] Justice [[William O. Douglas]] criticized the judiciary for interpreting and enforcing the antitrust law unequally: "From the beginning it [the Sherman Act] has been applied by judges hostile to its purposes, friendly to the empire builders who wanted it emasculated... trusts that were dissolved reintegrated in new forms... It is ironic that the Sherman Act was truly effective in only one respect, and that was when it was applied to labor unions. Then the courts read it with a literalness that never appeared in their other decisions."<ref>Douglas, William O., ''An Almanac of Liberty'', Doubleday & Company, 1954, p. 189</ref>
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==External links==
{{Wikisource|Sherman Act|Sherman Anti-Trust Act}}
* [https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-3055/uslm/COMPS-3055.xml Sherman Act] as amended ([https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/COMPS-3055/pdf/COMPS-3055.pdf PDF]/[https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/COMPS-3055/ details]) in the [[United States Government Publishing Office|GPO]] [https://www.govinfo.gov/help/comps Statute Compilations collection]
; Official websites
* [http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/ U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division]
* [https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/761131/download U.S. Department of Justice: Antitrust Division – text of
;Additional information
* Antitrust Division's [http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/lencorp.htm "Corporate Leniency Policy"]
* [http://www.polyconomics.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1605:antitrust-by-alan-greenspan&catid=47:1998&Itemid=31 ''Antitrust''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140511002404/http://www.polyconomics.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1605:antitrust-by-alan-greenspan&catid=47:1998&Itemid=31 |date=May 11, 2014 }} by [[Alan Greenspan]]
* "Labor and the Sherman Act" (1940). ''[[Yale Law Journal]]'' 49(3) p. 518. {{
* Dr. Edward W. Younkins (February 19, 2000). [http://www.quebecoislibre.org/000219-13.htm "Antitrust Laws Should Be Abolished"].
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{{Benjamin Harrison}}
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