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'''Plan W''', during [[World War II]], was a plan of joint military operations between the governments of [[Ireland]] and the [[United Kingdom]] devised between 1940 and 1942, to be executed in the event of an invasion of Ireland by [[Nazi Germany]].
 
Although Ireland was [[Irish neutrality|officially neutral]], after the German [[Blitzkrieg]]s of 1939–40 that resulted in the defeat of [[Poland]], the [[Low Countries]] and [[France]], the British recognised that Germany planned an invasion of Britain ([[Operation Sea Lion]]) and were also concerned about the possibility of a German invasion of Ireland. German planning for [[Operation Green (Ireland)|Operation Green]] began in May 1940 and the British began [[Ultra (cryptography)|intercepting communications]] about it in June. The British were interested in securing Ireland, as its capture by German forces would expose their western flank and provide a base of operations for the [[Luftwaffe]] in the [[Battle of the Atlantic]] and in any operations launched to invade Great Britain as part of Operation Sea Lion.
 
Irish-British co-operation was a controversial proposal for both sides, as most members of the Irish political establishment had been combatants in the [[Irish War of Independence]] between 1919 and 1921. However, because of the threat of German occupation and seizure of Ireland and especially the valuable Irish ports, Plan W was developed. [[Northern Ireland]] was to serve as the base of a new [[British Expeditionary Force (World War II)|British Expeditionary Force]] that would move across the [[Irish border]] to repel the invaders from any beach-head established by German [[paratrooper]]s. In addition, coordinated actions of the [[Royal Air Force]] and [[Royal Navy]] were planned to repel German air and sea invasion. According to a restricted file prepared by the [[British Army]]'s "Q" Movements Transport Control in Belfast, the British would not have crossed the border "until invited to do so by the Irish Government,"<ref>Fisk pp. 237–238.</ref> and it is not clear who would have had the operational authority over the British troops invited into the State by [[Éamon de Valera]].<ref name="ReferenceA">de Valera had agreed to the plan "wholeheartedly" although was more reluctant in private about which would be worse – a German or a British occupying force.</ref> The document added that most people in Ireland probably would have helped the British Army, but "there would have been a small disaffected element capable of considerable guerrilla activities against the British."<ref name="autogenerated1">Fisk pp. 237–238. This is certainly true. While the IRA of the time considered de Valera and the rest of those who had accepted partition of the island as traitors, the act of extending an invitation to British troops back into the 26 counties would have emboldened them even further.</ref>
 
By April 1941, the new [[Headquarters Northern Ireland|British Troops in Northern Ireland]] (BTNI) commander, General Sir [[Henry Pownall]], extended his planning for a German invasion to cover fifty percent of the entire Irish coastline. He believed that German troops were likely to land in [[County Cork|Cork]], [[Limerick]], [[Waterford]], [[Westport, County Mayo|Westport]], [[Galway]], [[Sligo]], and [[County Donegal]], i.e. on the southern or western coasts. British Army personnel also carried out secret intelligence-gathering trips to glean information on the rail system south of the border.
 
==Context==
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The first meeting on establishing a joint action plan in the event of a German invasion was on 24 May 1940.<ref>A phoney war had been waged through public statements prior to this by Churchill hinting at possible invasion of Britain and Ireland.</ref> The meeting was held in London and had been convened to explore every conceivable way in which the German forces may attempt an invasion of Ireland. At the meeting were [[Joseph Walshe]], Irish secretary of External Affairs, Colonel [[Liam Archer]] of Irish Military Intelligence (G2), and officers from the [[Royal Navy]], [[British Army]], and the [[Royal Air Force]]. The [[War Office]] wanted direct liaisons between the Irish military authorities in Dublin and the British General Officer Commanding in [[Belfast]]. Walshe and Archer therefore agreed to fly in secret to Belfast with Lieutenant Colonel [[Dudley Clarke]].<ref>Dudley was a British staff officer who had practical experience of the failed British attempt to [[Allied campaign in Norway|conquer Norway]] and the subsequent evacuation [[Operation Alphabet]].</ref> In Belfast, two British Army staff officers were collected and the group travelled back to [[Dublin]] by rail. This meeting was held underneath Government buildings in [[Kildare Street]] and included a number of Irish Army officers. The meeting was informed that General Sir [[Hubert Huddleston]], the General Officer Commanding (GOC.) Northern Ireland, was already under orders to take a mobile column south of the border to help the Irish Army if the Germans invaded.<ref>Huddleston was awaiting the command from London.</ref>
 
Clarke also met with the Irish Army Chief of Staff, General [[Daniel McKenna (general)|Daniel McKenna]], who explained that the British would not be allowed into the south of Ireland before the Germans arrived. Clarke also met with the Irish Minister for Co-ordination of Defensive Measures, Frank Aiken, and discussed "new ideas for the mechanical improvement of the war."<ref name="fisk235">Fisk p. 235</ref> The point of these meetings was to secure an understanding on the threat faced by both Britain and Ireland, and the benefit of joint action – the details would later be worked out by the respective armed services.
 
Clarke returned to London on 28 May 1940, where he reported that the Irish Army had given him full details of their organisation and equipment "without reservation" and had in return requested information on British troop strength in Northern Ireland.<ref>At that time around 10,000 but 8,000 were later withdrawn, although the [[Ulster Defence Volunteers]] were about to be raised like the [[Local Security Force]] had been in Ireland.</ref> It had been agreed that in the event of a German invasion, the Irish would call for assistance from Huddleston in Belfast. The British Army's advance from Northern Ireland into neutral Ireland was to be called Plan W.
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Sir [[John Loader Maffey]], the British representative to Ireland since 1939, was to transmit the code word "Pumpkins" (later replaced by "Measure") to begin the troop movement of the 53rd Division onto Irish soil.<ref>All British troops entering Ireland were to be issued with the [[Flag of Ireland|Irish flag]] to ensure a friendly reception from the locals, and religious symbols and motifs were banned from use, an image of an Irish Gate was finally chosen as the symbol of their intention to bar the way of the German invader.</ref> This codeword would be received by Huddleston and Lieutenant General [[Harold Franklyn]], the BTNI commander.<ref>Franklyn was a veteran of the British retreat at [[Dunkirk]], and as a consequence of his experience with refugees clogging roads in France had laid down strict rules for Plan W on refugees from Northern Ireland and the border. The Garda cooperated to designate Traffic Control posts at points where refugee routes might cross priority military roads.</ref>
 
Elaborate plans were made in Belfast to supply the BEF with guns, ammunition, petrol, and medical equipment by rail. The British [[Classification yard|marshalling yards]] at [[Balmoral railway station|Balmoral]], south of Belfast, were extended to take long ammunition and fuel trains which were loaded and ready on new sidings. In addition three ambulance trains were equipped and positioned around Belfast and an ambulance railhead established to take the wounded returning from the south of Ireland. British soldiers stripped the sides from dozens of coal trucks transforming them into flat cars for armoured vehicles and tanks that would be sent southwards. Once the 53rd Division was committed in Ireland, the British military authorities planned to run thirty-eight supply trains on the two railway lines to Dublin every day – thirty down the main line through Drogheda (if the viaduct over the [[River Boyne|Boyne]] river remained undamaged), and the remainder along the track which cut through [[County Cavan]]. The Port of Belfast was estimated to have needed to handle 10,000 tons of stores a week and could receive up to 5,000 troops every day for the battle-front.<ref>All trains that were planned to be used were to be equipped with a carrier pigeon messaging system which were to relay their position back to military headquarters. A British officer from the War Office in London briefed men of the 53rd Division on the use of the birds.</ref>
 
The RAF were to fly three [[Hawker Hurricane|Hurricane]] fighter squadrons into [[Casement Aerodrome|Baldonnel Airfield]] southwest of Dublin and two [[Fairey Battle]] light bomber squadrons into [[Dublin Airport|Collinstown]] to attack German troops in Cork. The British 1st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment was to be moved into the State to defend the Drogheda viaduct, Collinstown, and Baldonnel. The Royal Navy was to issue instructions that all British and foreign ships depart from Irish ports. Vessels in Londonderry were to head for the [[River Clyde|Clyde]] and boats in Belfast were to head for [[Holyhead]] and [[Liverpool]]. As many ships as possible would be cleared from Irish ports and taken to the Clyde, Holyhead and Fishguard. Royal Navy officers in Dublin were to direct this exodus and the taking on of refugees was not to be encouraged. British submarines were to patrol off Cork and the Shannon in readiness for an invasion, and should one occur, the Royal Navy was to declare a "sink on sight" zone in the western approaches and off the south and west coasts of Ireland.
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===Irish planning===
[[File:Gloster Gladiator.jpg|thumb|leftright|The [[Irish Air Corps]] had four [[Gloster Gladiator]]s similar to the British-marked aircraft shown here.]]
By May 1940 Irish troops were already organised in mobile columns to deal with parachute landings.<ref name="fisk234">Fisk p. 234</ref> By October 1940, four more regular army brigades had been raised in the State and LSF recruiting figures were increasing. The German style helmets of the army had been replaced by the pale green uniforms and rimmed style helmets of the British Army. They had a total of sixteen medium armoured cars, and thirty Ford and [[Rolls-Royce Armoured Car|Rolls-Royce]] light armoured cars. By early 1941, two infantry divisions had been activated. First Division was headquartered in Cork and included:
1st Brigade (HQ Clonmel: 10th, 13th, 21st Battalions), 3rd Brigade (HQ Cork: 4th, 19th, 31st Battalions), 7th Brigade (HQ Limerick: 9th, 12th, 15th Battalions)
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==See also==
{{Too many see alsos|date=September 2022}}
{{Div col|style=column-count:3|content=
* [[Irish Republican Army – Abwehr collaboration in World War II]]
* [[Operation Dove (Ireland)]]
* [[Operation Innkeeper]]
* [[Operation Lobster]]
* [[Operation Lobster I]]
* [[Operation Mainau]]
* [[Operation Osprey]]
* [[Operation Sea Eagle]]
* [[Operation Seagull I]]
* [[Operation Seagull II]]
* [[Operation Seagull (Ireland)]]
* [[Operation Whale]]
* [[Plan Kathleen]]
* [[The Emergency (Ireland)]]
}}
 
==Notes==
{{Notelist}}
 
==References==
===Citations===
{{reflist}}
===Cited works===
 
===Further reading===
* [[Robert Fisk]], ''In Time of War'' (Gill and Macmillan) 1983 {{ISBN|0-7171-2411-8}}