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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

Order of discussion of agenda items (A/C.1/825 and Add.1)  
(continued)\*

1. The CHAIRMAN said that he had received a letter from the President of the General Assembly (A/C.1/825/Add.1) stating that an additional item on the agenda of the Assembly (agenda item 90) had been allocated to the First Committee.

2. He suggested that the priority to be accorded to the item, which concerned a complaint by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba against the Government of the United States of America, might be considered at the end of the general debate now in progress on the items concerning disarmament.

*It was so decided.*

**AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73**

**Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254) (continued)**

**Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1) (continued)**

**Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254) (continued)**

**Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434, A/C.1/L.252/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.254) (continued)**

**GENERAL DEBATE (continued)**

3. Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that, from statements made by previous speakers and from

\* Resumed from the 1084th meeting.

the proposals presented to the Committee, it was apparent that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and inspection had world-wide support, including that of the great Powers. Afghanistan for one, did not interpret the Soviet position, in its emphasis on the urgent need for laying down specific instructions for any subsequent negotiations on a treaty of general and complete disarmament, to mean that the Soviet Union would not resume useful and constructive negotiations. Nor did it interpret the position of the United States, which had stressed the advisability of proceeding by gradual steps, to mean that that country would refuse to consider the provisions of the Soviet proposal. It believed that the obstacles in the way of an understanding lay mainly in the present international tension, which was due to a number of controversial issues.

4. Afghanistan appreciated the emphasis placed by the great Powers on the useful contribution that the United Nations—which was mainly composed of small Powers—could make by carrying out its responsibilities and exercising its moral influence. Nevertheless, it considered that the only contribution the United Nations could usefully make at the present juncture would be to call upon the great Powers to accept measures which would, first and foremost, reduce the prevailing tension. Accordingly it did not in the existing circumstances favour the imposition by the United Nations of strict disarmament measures on any of the great Powers.

5. That did not mean, however, that there was any time to spare in seeking a solution of the disarmament problem. On the contrary, Afghanistan, like other countries, feared that delay in achieving such a solution would result in a further deterioration of the situation, which would make disarmament efforts even more difficult. It had been suggested that the United Nations should lay down directives for negotiations. Afghanistan would support any directives that would meet with the acceptance of the great Powers.

6. At the present stage, the Assembly should act with caution and realism. Since the great Powers could be assumed to be well aware of the dangers of the international situation and of their responsibility to the world, the Assembly should concentrate on finding a set of principles that would be generally acceptable for subsequent negotiations. Advantage should be taken of the experience of the past to avoid any arrangements which would be doomed to failure from the start. The Afghan delegation hoped for the development of a situation in which the Committee would not be compelled to vote, except on a unanimously acceptable draft resolution.

7. Certain favourable developments were already taking place. On the one hand, efforts were being made by certain members of the Committee which reflected the general desire, and especially the

desire of the smaller countries for an agreement between the great Powers. On the other hand, informal contacts were taking place between the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States. Such contacts were to be welcomed as an indication of the spirit of understanding with which the United States and the Soviet Union were prepared to meet the general desire for a disarmament agreement. It might therefore be useful for the Chairman to make a formal statement on behalf of the members of the Committee, if they so agreed, expressing appreciation that such contacts had been initiated and the hope that they would be continued.

8. Mr. AW (Mali) said that even if a solution of the disarmament problem could be devised, it would be effective only if it was adopted by unanimous decision. Thus the discussion on disarmament was no ordinary discussion; and since persuasion alone could yield results, the use of invective could only jeopardize the prospects of success. Accordingly, the tone used by the representative of Spain in his statement at the previous meeting could only be deplored.

9. Although Mali had no striking force of its own, and could therefore not be considered expert in matters of disarmament, it none the less felt that the problem of disarmament was of equal concern to all countries, great and small, and that in the light of the moral aspects of the issue they all bore equal responsibility for the maintenance of peace. So important were the current discussions that if there were no prospect of their leading to a solution, it would be useless to discuss any other problems, whether social or economic in nature. For it was the very existence of mankind that was at stake; and unless that was ensured, the benefits of international co-operation which the Organization was striving to achieve would be merely illusory.

10. While all countries had a responsibility for ensuring peace, however, the fact remained that two countries, with differing views on disarmament, held the destinies of mankind in their hands. Around those two countries two rival blocs had formed. The newly independent States of Africa and Asia were trying to avoid committing themselves to either bloc. They felt that while the present division of the world might be justifiable if it were confined to peaceful competition for influence or economic supremacy, when it extended to the field of nuclear armaments the non-nuclear Powers had a duty to dissuade the two sides from persisting in their rivalry, which entailed grave danger for all. All members of the Committee should recognize that effective responsibility for the destinies of the world was borne by the Soviet Union and the United States, and that in the present debate on disarmament they should set aside all considerations of bloc loyalty and refrain from taking sides. The utmost objectivity was called for if arguments were to be found that would convince the two responsible Powers that those speaking in the debate had risen above the plane of diplomatic tactics. The main obstacle to agreement could only be mistrust, for it was inconceivable that any country could want a nuclear war or that either of the two sides could entertain designs for overcoming the other. The main task was therefore to bring persuasion to bear on the two sides, and to seek a procedure which would give adequate guarantees of mutual safety.

11. Since all remedies began by checking the course of the disease, it was logical to assume that disarmament should begin with an agreement to cease production of nuclear and ballistic devices for military purposes. It was hard to understand why, at a time when disarmament was the main concern of all, some countries should be embarking on costly nuclear ventures. The French Government's present plans for a striking force of its own were opposed by a majority of the French people; and by its nuclear tests in the Sahara that Government was incurring the animosity of the African nations without thereby achieving the rank of a great nuclear Power. Mali viewed the Sahara tests with particular concern, since a section of its own population lived only a few hundred kilometres away from the testing grounds selected by the French Government. If French reassurances were to be believed and the explosions were really so harmless that they could be conducted in the vicinity of populated areas, then surely France should conduct its tests on its own territory. France's arbitrary disregard of all objections to the tests had caused the people of Mali considerable alarm since there were no reliable data to indicate what the effects of the tests would be on the human organism, not to mention plant and animal life, in years to come. Moreover, the tests had been conducted in defiance of United Nations resolutions and in flagrant violation of the right of all people to peace and security.

12. The Malian delegation supported the proposal made in the General Assembly by the President of Ghana (869th plenary meeting) that the African continent should be freed from all foreign military bases, not because such a measure would necessarily spare Africa the consequences of a nuclear war but because its adoption would be a means of showing Africa's adherence to the principle of non-alliance with military Powers. Moreover it would set an example to other regions, which could give similar evidence of their disapproval of the arms race.

13. Since the immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons should be the first step towards disarmament, it was necessary to examine the reasons why the States concerned had not unanimously agreed to that course. Their persistence in the manufacture of armaments could not be fully explained on the grounds of imperialist designs or fear of surprise attack. One of the main reasons was surely to be found in the problem of converting arsenals to other uses. Since coexistence between socialism and free enterprise was a necessary pre-condition for peace, there was no point in criticizing any particular régime. But the statistics on the material resources employed in the manufacture of weapons showed conclusively that any abrupt discontinuance of such activities would create practical problems, problems which would undoubtedly be more difficult for the free-enterprise countries to solve. No constructive approach to the problem of disarmament could leave out of account that important factor. Another aspect of the problem was the need for disarmament to be applied universally. It was absurd that the People's Republic of China, with its huge population and great military potential, should be excluded from disarmament discussions. There could be no general and complete disarmament if the disarmament agreements failed to include a country which, being a great military Power, could, if it so wished, systematically accumulate all the armaments

which the United Nations had decided to destroy. The participation of the People's Republic of China was therefore a *sine qua non* for general and complete disarmament.

14. It was particularly important that the First Committee should insist on the observance of earlier resolutions on the suspension of nuclear tests, for any disregard of those resolutions would only show the futility of adopting further resolutions. Unfortunately, the United Nations could do no more than make recommendations, for the nature of present-day society made it impossible to legislate at the level of a world community. It could only be hoped that the General Assembly would one day become a genuine international parliament, whose decisions on disarmament would be respected as law by all Governments of the world.

15. Mr. FEKINI (Libya) said that the Soviet and Western proposals on disarmament, despite the divergencies between them, showed agreement on certain important aspects of the problem. Both sides agreed that weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, should be prohibited and abolished and that the means of delivering such weapons should be eliminated; that general and complete disarmament should be carried out as rapidly as possible, in stages and according to a time-table fixed in advance; that both nuclear and conventional disarmament measures should be balanced in such a way that no country or group of countries obtained any military advantage; that a system of international control over disarmament measures should be established within the framework of the United Nations; that a security force should be established under the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security, and that outer space should be used solely for peaceful purposes.

16. The sponsors of the various disarmament plans should make every effort to reconcile their remaining differences, so that the First Committee could agree on principles to serve as a basis for future disarmament negotiations. If necessary, a good offices committee should be appointed to assist them in that task. A victory for one side or the other in a vote on the various draft resolutions would not promote the cause of disarmament; indeed, it might create a dangerous situation. If the two sides found themselves unable to reach agreement on a joint draft of directives for future negotiations, the First Committee's best course would be to agree on a limited draft resolution covering the points of agreement referred to. If that proved impossible, the Committee should adopt a resolution, with a preamble on the same general lines as the preamble to General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV), recommending that negotiations should be continued in a disarmament committee of limited size to which all proposals now under consideration should be referred.

17. The Ten-Nation Committee should not be set aside as a negotiating body, but should be associated more intimately with the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly. His delegation would support the appointment of Mr. Padilla Nervo, the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, to the chairmanship of the Ten-Nation Committee and the selection of a vice-chairman and a rapporteur from among representatives of the Asian and Afri-

can countries. Furthermore, his delegation had no objection to the membership of the Ten-Nation Committee being expanded, subject to appropriate consultations along the lines suggested by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, (A/4509). The proposals to establish a group of experts and an advisory committee to assist the negotiators were interesting and deserved careful study.

18. With regard to the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, he recalled that the General Assembly, in resolution 1402 (XIV), had expressed the hope that the States participating in the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests would reach agreement at an early date, would continue their voluntary suspension of tests, and would report the results of their negotiations to the Disarmament Commission and to the General Assembly; it had also appealed to other States to desist from conducting tests. It was gratifying that the voluntary suspension of tests was continuing. However, France, despite appeals from the United Nations, had carried out nuclear tests in Africa which threatened the health of the peoples of that continent. Furthermore, the Geneva negotiations were making less progress than had been hoped, and no reports had been submitted to the Disarmament Commission or the General Assembly. The First Committee should therefore adopt a resolution appealing to the Geneva negotiators to intensify their efforts and urgently calling upon other States to renounce nuclear tests.

19. His delegation favoured the adoption of measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons, and would therefore support the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.253/Rev.1).

20. He wished to state that his delegation had joined the sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.254,<sup>1/</sup> which called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

*Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.*

21. Mr. COOPER (Liberia) said that so long as fear and distrust prevented any agreement between the great Powers on the approach to the problem of disarmament, no useful purpose would be served by calling upon the First Committee to accept one side's proposal and reject the other's. His delegation supported the Indian representative's suggestion (1094th meeting) that the Committee should offer directives for future negotiations along the lines of those contained in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV). It also endorsed the suggestion made by the Canadian and other delegations that the Ten-Nation Committee should be enlarged by the appointment of a neutral chairman and of a vice-chairman and a rapporteur from Asian or African countries. His delegation did not agree with the Soviet contention that disarmament negotiations could succeed only if the basic principles of a treaty on general and complete disarmament were agreed upon in advance by the United Nations, for agreement on such principles itself presupposed negotiations. Nevertheless, the agreement finally reached must provide for general and complete disarmament, since that alone could prevent

<sup>1/</sup> The addition of Libya to the list of sponsors of the draft resolution was indicated in document A/C.1/L.254/Add.1.

the ultimate extinction of the human race. While his delegation supported the proposals made for the establishment of atom-free zones in Africa and elsewhere, it failed to see how, in an age of intercontinental missiles and nuclear submarines, the creation of such zones or the elimination of military bases in foreign countries could provide real security for the peoples concerned.

22. His delegation supported the proposal in the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/C.1/L.251) that a group of experts should be set up to study the technical aspects of disarmament. However, that group could not take the place of the disarmament committee. As members of the First Committee knew, the almost unanimous conclusions of the experts who had studied the suspension of nuclear tests had not led to a political agreement in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests.

23. His delegation endorsed the proposal made by the Soviet Union, which also met the wishes of the Western Powers, that, under conditions of general and complete disarmament, States should provide contingents for an international police force in order to maintain international peace and security. It did not, however, support the Soviet proposal to change the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council; that would paralyse United Nations efforts to provide countries with economic or military aid.

24. The Liberian delegation hoped that the Committee would adopt the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.254, of which it was a sponsor, for prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would be a first step towards general and complete disarmament.

25. Mr. NIELSEN (Norway) said that advances in military technology had so narrowed the interval between the decision to use modern weapons and their arrival at target that the risk of a nuclear war as a result of miscalculation became a matter of great concern. The next step would be the placing in orbit of satellites carrying thermo-nuclear weapons trained on selected targets and equipped to register events taking place on the earth's surface. It was therefore not as a result of propaganda or political tactics that the General Assembly had unanimously endorsed the goal of general and complete disarmament, but rather because of the human urge for survival, regardless of ideological or political systems. The pursuit of that goal by the major military Powers was a matter of self-interest, for while they knew that they possessed weapons capable of destroying a potential enemy, they also knew that it would be some time before they could develop the means of defending themselves against similar weapons. On the other hand, it was not surprising that, for reasons of basic security, the great Powers should differ sharply regarding the methods for achieving general and complete disarmament.

26. Any large-scale plan required time for its development and implementation. That applied equally to disarmament. Clearly, a State which attempted to redistribute between 10 and 20 per cent of its gross national product in one stroke and simultaneously to redirect the activities of more than 1 per cent of its population would encounter almost insurmountable problems, regardless of its political and economic

system. On the other hand, in less than four years after the Second World War most of the major victorious Powers had returned to a peace-time economy without serious crises, and had at the same time made great technical and economic advances. Accordingly, the Norwegian delegation did not regard the economic consequences of disarmament as serious impediments, and was encouraged to note that it was agreed on both sides that a number of years would be needed to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament. It did, however, agree that the economic problems involved in disarmament, including problems relating to employment and the release of resources to assist the under-developed countries, should be studied. Similarly, greater efforts should be made to work out methods for the application of nuclear science, rocket propulsion technology and electronics to peaceful purposes.

27. The key to real progress towards disarmament was the maintenance of the balance of power between the major military groups at all stages. However, it would be impossible to apply that general principle during the process of disarmament if the control machinery was to be limited to the implementation of agreed disarmament measures with no system for the submission and verification of data on remaining forces. In practice, certain shortcomings would have to be accepted with regard to control of forces being disarmed, and, at the same time, both sides would have some information concerning the size and composition of forces remaining; the more far-reaching the disarmament measure at any stage, the more insistent and the more justified would be the demand for knowledge of what remained on the other side. For those reasons, the Norwegian Government had suggested that a start should be made with limited disarmament measures in which both sides could take certain risks regarding the forces to be disarmed and the control of those forces, because they would know in advance that the measures in question would not alter the existing balance of power. Once the process of disarmament had been started on that basis, it would be realistic to aim at more ambitious measures. That approach did not preclude negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on general or guiding principles for the whole disarmament process.

28. Although, in the course of the negotiations in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the views of the parties on the general content of the various stages leading to complete disarmament had come closer, there had been no discussion of the complicated technical question of what each stage would entail so far as concerned numbers and types of units and weapons. In that respect, the assistance of qualified technical experts would be necessary, in order to ensure that the relative strengths of the two sides remained unchanged and that the controls were adequate. The political negotiators would direct and define the tasks of the experts and would give effect to their findings by political decisions and actions. Only through negotiations leading to agreements voluntarily arrived at between the major Powers could disarmament be achieved. Neither the First Committee nor the Assembly could assume the role of arbiter between those Powers. On the other hand, the small and medium-sized States could assist the negotiations by urging both sides to refrain from aggravating the prevailing international

tension and by pressing for a resumption of negotiations. They should not, however, allow themselves to believe that their number or their desire for progress made them an equal factor in the disarmament field. Their assistance in new negotiations could best be rendered through the appointment to the negotiating body of independent officers from the medium-sized and smaller nations.

29. The Norwegian delegation considered that the Assembly could realistically aim at the current session to elaborate general principles on which both sides could agree. If that could not be done, it favoured the less ambitious step suggested by the Canadian representative at the 1098th meeting, which was embodied in a draft resolution shortly to be submitted.<sup>2/</sup> The purpose of that draft resolution was to ensure that the months to come would be utilized in a practical manner even if it should prove impossible to establish new negotiating machinery. The *ad hoc* committee of small and medium-sized States proposed under the resolution could give further study to the many specific suggestions made during the debate. The proposals embodied in that draft resolution represented the minimum goal to which the Assembly should aspire at its current session.

*Sir Claude Corea (Ceylon) resumed the Chair.*

30. Mr. MENEMENCIOLU (Turkey) said that because of the unparalleled destructive power of modern weapons, the danger that the arms race might in itself lead to war and the heavy drain on resources caused by armaments, at a time when all peoples were striving to raise their levels of development, the need for a solution to the problem of disarmament had assumed greater urgency than ever before. Progress towards a solution could only be made through negotiations between the major Powers concerned; although final responsibility for disarmament continued to rest with the General Assembly, the Assembly could not fruitfully debate the details of concrete programmes designed to achieve that goal and should not vote on proposals dealing with the substance of the issue.

31. The first condition for progress on disarmament was the creation of a more harmonious international atmosphere and mutual confidence. No country would allow itself to be deprived of its means of self-defence unless and until it had absolute assurance that its security was not in jeopardy, and no Government would agree to measures of disarmament which might cause a decline in its relative strength. The second condition for progress was agreement on the essential technical aspects of the problems involved and on the scope of the practical measures envisaged. As, in the course of negotiations, the differences between the parties were gradually narrowed, the necessity for technical and expert committees would become evident. Such committees would have to study what measures should be included in the various stages of disarmament and how the balance of relative strength was to be maintained not only for countries in the Eastern and Western blocs, but also for all other countries, whose right of self-defence had been recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. They would examine how international controls were to be carried out, how the international control bodies would operate, effective methods of detection and verification at each stage of disarmament and mea-

asures to reduce the danger of surprise attacks. Their work would proceed concurrently with the political negotiations.

32. There did not appear to be any essential difference between the parties with regard to the desirability of partial measures of disarmament under effective international control. The importance of such measures should not be underestimated, particularly where early results might be easier to achieve. The under-developed countries were especially eager for such partial measures, which might enable them, under conditions of security, to divert some portion of their current military expenditure, however small, to productive fields of enterprise. Although he disagreed with the details of the Byelorussian representative's statement at the 1093rd meeting regarding the military burden borne by Turkey, the statement that the Turkish people had to pay a heavy price for ensuring their self-defence was essentially correct. Consequently, Turkey would welcome the opportunity to participate in a world-wide agreement, containing all the necessary guarantees, which would allow it to divert a greater part of its resources to development. On the other hand, individual countries could not be said to be responsible for the present world situation, and could not be asked to deprive themselves unilaterally of the means of self-defence.

33. The primary task of the Assembly should be to secure a resumption of negotiations on disarmament and to urge all concerned to refrain from words and deeds which might cause further deterioration in international relations.

34. Mr. CHAMPASSAK (Laos) said that there was too often a tendency to be obsessed with technical details, and that the increasing imbalance between the advance of technology and the development of morality in the world tended to be forgotten. If man's aggressive instincts and the forces of war were to be overcome, the peoples and their leaders would need to be inspired with the highest moral principles. In order to destroy the hatred and mistrust which were frustrating progress towards disarmament, a return to morality and religion was indispensable.

35. In view of the growing danger of nuclear war resulting from the accelerated arms race and the dissemination of nuclear weapons, nothing should be allowed to delay any longer a solution of the disarmament problem. The nations primarily concerned should be urged to resume negotiations at the earliest possible moment, and no change should be made in the structure of the negotiating body. Indeed, a start might be made by unilateral disarmament, in the hope that the example of the nation taking the initiative would be followed by others.

36. Laos had adopted a policy of neutrality; in accordance with the teachings of Buddhism, it declined to join any military blocs. Moreover, it strongly supported the proposal made by the Chairman of the Cambodian delegation at the 877th plenary meeting of the Assembly for the creation of a neutral zone including both Laos and Cambodia, and hoped that serious study would be given to it. If such a neutral zone could be set up and guaranteed by the major Powers, it would provide a model for other countries situated in politically sensitive areas of the world.

<sup>2/</sup> Subsequently circulated as document A/C.1/L.255.

37. The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee of the Afghan representative's suggestion that the Committee might give some recognition to the efforts being made informally by representatives of two of the major Powers to discover areas of agreement which might serve as a basis for a resumption of

negotiations. On behalf of the Committee, he wished to express appreciation of those efforts and to convey to the parties concerned the hope that the informal talks they had initiated would prove fruitful.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.