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MEETING**

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Chairman: Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Kurka (Czechoslovakia), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEMS 67, 86, 69 AND 73

Disarmament and the situation with regard to the fulfilment of General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on the question of disarmament (A/4463, A/4503, A/4505, A/4509, A/C.1/L.249, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251) (continued)

Report of the Disarmament Commission (A/4463, A/4500, A/C.1/L.250, A/C.1/L.251) (continued)

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4414) (continued)

Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/4434) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. RAPACKI (Poland) said that General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) on general and complete disarmament could become a document of historic importance. General and complete disarmament corresponded to both the possibilities and the needs of the modern world and Poland, in common with the other socialist countries, was deeply convinced that, for the first time in history, conditions were such as to make possible the total elimination of war. The advances of science and technology were such that war might bring about the destruction of civilization and the degeneration of the human species, a danger that had never hitherto existed. Notwithstanding that obvious truth, certain circles were impelled by narrow interests to commit actions which could only increase the threat of war. It was therefore imperative to realize the danger in order to avert it effectively. For that reason the Polish delegation had proposed in the General Assembly (874th plenary meeting) the establishment of an international commission of experts to study the effects

of modern war and to disseminate the results of its work as widely as possible.

2. Not only were present-day military techniques fraught with terrible consequences in the event of war, but because of the very nature of modern weapons there were factors which might encourage their possessors to make use of them that had not existed in the case of earlier weapons. Those factors included the increasing rapidity with which missiles could be brought into action and the steadily growing destructive power of nuclear and ballistic weapons. Moreover, the possibility of surprise attacks, as well as the fear of a surprise attack, was constantly increasing, with the result that the life or death of whole nations was held in the hands of an ever-diminishing number of men. The danger of a war by accident was similarly increasing. Mankind was thus gradually losing control over the weapons which could annihilate it. The situation was quite new and could not be met by outdated concepts such as the balance of power, which presupposed an arms race that might lead to appalling consequences. As for the theory of the deterrent, put forward again by the United States representative at the 1086th meeting, it could only lead to war. Radical solutions were needed because if, for example, only the most recent weapons of mass destruction were eliminated, it would take only a few months of conventional war for countries to resume their manufacture with a view to using them. For that reason only complete and general disarmament could ensure the safety of mankind.

3. Nevertheless, the very concept of complete and general disarmament had been questioned by the Western Powers participating in the Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. By putting forward the idea of control over armaments, they had shown that they refused to understand the implications of the nuclear age. In the course of those negotiations, they had also pursued a policy of the "fait accompli", accelerating the arms race and thereby undermining both the purpose and usefulness of the negotiations. Thus the Federal Republic of Germany had been authorized by the Council of the Western European Union once again to lift the restrictions on its armaments. In addition, the Commander of the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had suggested the establishment of a European atomic striking force within NATO and preparations were being made to equip the West German Army with American ballistic missiles of the Polaris type. Indications of a resumption of nuclear tests were becoming increasingly numerous and the network of missile bases in foreign territories was constantly growing. Significantly, the Federal Republic of Germany had undertaken to establish Bundeswehr bases in certain European countries and German units had already been sent into French territory. Finally, aggressive incursions by American military aircraft over the terri-

tory of the Soviet Union and other States, and the statements that had accompanied them, had revealed the basis of the policy of the present United States Government and had brought about a serious crisis in the international situation at the time of the Geneva talks. In such circumstances, disarmament negotiations were fruitless and their indefinite protraction could only increase the threat to peace. Poland had come to the conclusion that the Western Powers, or at least some of them, did not at present want general and complete disarmament. They wanted to slow down the negotiations and divert them to secondary problems and technical studies in order to mislead world public opinion and provide a screen for the continuation of the arms race. In those circumstances, it was the task of the General Assembly at its fifteenth session to establish a starting point and to work out directives and procedures for future negotiations.

4. The two draft resolutions before the Committee, that of the Soviet Union (A/C.1/L.249) and that of Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250), to which the United Kingdom proposal concerning technical studies (A/C.1/L.251) was a significant addition, were concerned with establishing the basic principles for future negotiations on disarmament. However, the fundamental differences in attitude, which had been at the root of the failure of the previous talks, had not been removed. In the first place, no results could be hoped for from negotiations which lacked a specific and concrete aim—in the present instance, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. That aim was stated in the Soviet draft resolution but was absent from the three-Power draft resolution, and the statement by the representative of the United States at the 1086th meeting showed that the true intentions of the sponsors of the three-Power draft fell far short of that goal. At Geneva, the Western Powers had consistently been opposed to that definition of the purpose of the negotiations and had endeavoured to concentrate the discussion on isolated measures dealing primarily with the control of armaments and not with disarmament itself. But it was impossible to approach the question of implementing serious disarmament measures without a treaty which ensured the completion of successive steps, leading to the entire process of general and complete disarmament, the more so as the Western Powers rejected the need for establishing specific time-limits for the completion of the different stages of disarmament. Even now the question of stages was dealt with clearly only in the Soviet draft resolution. Refusal to conclude a treaty firmly establishing an over-all disarmament plan, including time-limits for the different stages, amounted to a rejection of the very idea of general and complete disarmament and robbed negotiations of any concrete purpose.

5. The second difference of opinion was as to whether armaments or disarmament should be controlled. Poland wanted control over disarmament and considered control over armaments unacceptable from the standpoint of the security of all nations, since it constituted an incentive to the arms race. The control of ballistic and nuclear weapons in particular could only increase fear of a surprise attack, of the superior power of the other side, and of annihilation. Knowledge of the military strength of the opposing side would encourage the side which was weaker in any field to seek to reach the level of the stronger side and would

encourage the latter to maintain the edge it had gained or to use its advantage before losing it. Just as knowledge of the military strength of the opposing side constituted an encouragement to preventive war, so a knowledge of the location of defence installations constituted an encouragement to surprise attack, which no amount of control could prevent.

6. In view of the divergent approaches shown by the draft resolutions, there could be no common point of departure for the forthcoming negotiations. The General Assembly should therefore state its position. If it wanted negotiations which could actually lead to disarmament, its decision must be one in keeping with the spirit of the Soviet proposals.

7. The different degrees of emphasis which the Western Powers placed on the control programme and on actual disarmament were particularly apparent in the first stage of disarmament. Under the Western plans and the three-Power draft resolution, a broad system of control would be established not in order to verify the elimination of the most modern instruments of mass destruction and surprise attack but almost exclusively for the purpose of observing them. The proposed basic provisions of a treaty put forward by the USSR (A/4505), on the other hand, provided in the first stage for decisive and controlled disarmament measures relating to the modern instruments which posed the greatest threat of surprise attack and mass destruction, including elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, the liquidation of foreign bases and the peaceful use of outer space. Such measures would drastically alter the present situation and would strengthen mutual confidence. His delegation could not understand why the Western Powers had not responded to the appeal by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Khrushchev, who had stated his willingness to accept any Western suggestions concerning control if the Soviet Union's proposals on disarmament were accepted as well. That offer was surely a new and vital factor in the disarmament discussions.

8. It was also essential for the General Assembly to take a position on the question of international police forces. The socialist States had sought to meet the wishes of the Western Powers by agreeing to the possibility of employing military sanctions in a disarmed world in addition to other measures not entailing the use of armed force for which provision was made in the United Nations Charter. They had agreed, in case of need, to place units of their national police forces at the disposal of the Security Council. However, recent events in the Congo showed that international police forces could, because of the present structure of the various United Nations bodies, become an instrument for political pressure and intervention by States which enjoyed a predominant and unwarranted influence in those bodies. It was therefore essential to modify the structure of those bodies in an appropriate manner.

9. The General Assembly should also take a position with regard to the membership of the body which was to proceed with disarmament negotiations. His delegation supported the position of the Soviet Union, which urged that the membership of the body in question should reflect equally the interests and opinions of the three major groups of States. The States of Asia, Africa and Latin America could make an important contribution to the cause of general and complete disarmament and must be given their proper place.

10. The problems before the current session could be successfully resolved if the two sides were really guided by the idea of general and complete disarmament. Unfortunately, cold war methods and the policy pursued by the United States were incompatible with that idea. It was to be hoped that better prospects would emerge, during the debate, for agreement on the principles which should govern the forthcoming negotiations on general and complete disarmament.

11. It was essential that those negotiations should take place in a climate of reduced tension and of mutual confidence. To that end States must, in accordance with resolution 1495 (XV), recently adopted by the General Assembly, refrain from any action which might aggravate or complicate the international situation and take specific measures for that purpose. In that connexion, his delegation felt that consideration should be given to measures of broader scope that could help to check the arms race. In the first place, steps should be taken to bring about the speedy conclusion of an agreement on the final cessation of nuclear weapons tests. If such a treaty was not concluded by, for example, April 1961, a special session of the General Assembly should be convened to consider the situation and draw the appropriate conclusions. No nuclear weapons tests should, of course, be carried out pending the conclusion of the treaty. In addition, the States which manufactured and possessed nuclear weapons should be asked to refrain from assisting in any way whatever in preparations for the manufacture of those weapons by other States and from providing other States with such weapons. The States which did not possess nuclear weapons should also be asked not to accept them from other States and not to undertake their manufacture in their own territory or in that of other States. The General Assembly should further request States not to establish any new military bases and to desist from introducing or setting up missile-launching facilities in the territory of other States, while the latter should be urged not to permit such facilities to be set up in their territory. States which did not possess their own missile installations should refrain from constructing them, and States which had only begun to do so should not proceed any further. Finally, in conformity with the suggestion made at the 874th plenary meeting of the Assembly by the chairman of his delegation, the existence of foreign bases in the territory of any State should be made subject to a decision of the people of the State concerned given in the form of a plebiscite.

12. Poland, for its part, would make new efforts to promote the elimination of ballistic and nuclear weapons and reduction of the size of the conventional forces facing each other in Central Europe. In carrying out those measures, the States concerned would be serving the cause of security, disarmament and peace and would at the same time be creating a zone in which it would be possible within a fairly short period to acquire practical experience in regard to the implementation of disarmament and the operation of a control system.

13. Mr. DAVID (Czechoslovakia) thought it regrettable that as a result of the pressure of the United States delegation the General Assembly had failed to adopt the Soviet Union's proposal that the grave problem of general and complete disarmament should be considered in plenary meeting with the participation of the Heads of State and Government who were present.

14. There was a reliable and effective method of preventing a nuclear war, which would inflict indescribable suffering upon mankind: that method was general and complete disarmament. The General Assembly faced the grave responsibility at the current session of creating conditions in which discussion of the disarmament question could yield positive results. The Soviet Union's proposals provided a suitable basis for the fulfilment of that task. In particular, the USSR draft resolution (A/C.1/L.249) containing the basic principles of a treaty on general and complete disarmament provided an opportunity of proceeding at once to the preparation of detailed directives for future negotiations. The Conference of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament had demonstrated that broad instructions of the kind contained in General Assembly resolution 1378 (XIV) were not sufficient. Taking advantage of the generalities of that resolution, the Western Powers had attempted to involve the Ten-Nation Committee in interminable discussion of partial measures relating not to disarmament but almost exclusively to control. After several weeks of fruitless negotiation, the socialist States had therefore decided to take no further part in the work of the Ten-Nation Committee because they did not want to lend themselves to the manoeuvres of the Western Powers, which wished to use it as a screen to cloak the arms race in which they were engaging. The basic provisions of a treaty proposed by the Soviet Union (A/4505) were in full conformity with resolution 1378 (XIV) and showed that the Soviet Union and the other socialist States were sincerely working for the conclusion of an agreement acceptable to all, since a great many of the measures contemplated in it took into account the views of the Western Powers, *inter alia*, with regard to the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

15. So far as the Western proposals were concerned, not one of them dealt with general and complete disarmament. That had been confirmed once again at the 1086th meeting when the representative of the United States had merely proposed some separate measures relating essentially to control. That familiar position was also the basis of the draft resolutions submitted by Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.250) and by the United Kingdom (A/C.1/L.251). True, the three Powers in their draft resolution did mention general and complete disarmament, but it was clear at first glance that what they really wanted was to submerge consideration of that question in endless technical discussions which had nothing to do with general and complete disarmament. Not only did they not envisage any concrete programme but they had nothing to say about the disbanding of all armed forces, the destruction of armaments, the abolition of general staffs and military academies, the elimination of military bases on foreign soil, etc. Operative paragraph 3 of the three-Power draft resolution called for the immediate establishment of an extensive system of control without regard to the scope of the disarmament measures, in contradiction with the principle that control must be commensurate with the scope of disarmament and the principle there must be no control without disarmament and no disarmament without control.

16. However, as the United States representative had again shown at the previous meeting, the Western Powers still wished to create the impression, with the help of slanderous attacks, that the socialist States were trying to evade effective control of disarmament.

The fact was that the Soviet Union had proposed effective international control both of the separate stages and of the whole programme of general and complete disarmament. What was more, Mr. Khrushchev had declared several times at the current session that, if the Western Powers accepted the proposals of the socialist countries on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries would agree to any measure of control the Western Powers might request. It went without saying that the socialist countries would continue to oppose control without disarmament, for that would amount to legalizing international espionage and thus facilitating surprise attack. Instead of reducing the danger of war, the adoption of the Western proposals would increase international distrust and encourage States to strive for military superiority. Such an armaments race could only end in a nuclear catastrophe.

17. It was impossible to accept a situation in which certain Western circles would be able legally to collect intelligence information on the deployment of the defence forces of the socialist countries. The ruling circles of the United States had cynically admitted that they had been trying to obtain such information by sending aircraft over the territory of the Soviet Union. According to statements by NATO generals, an aggressor would have to know the exact sites of the enemy's rocket-launching pads because their destruction would be the only step the aggressor could take for a long time to come.

18. Even after the U-2 incident, the President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, had stated his intention of renewing his so-called "open skies" proposal, which could only be interpreted as evidence of a desire to continue United States espionage activities under cover of the United Nations flag.

19. The Soviet proposals referred to the use, once general and complete disarmament was achieved, of units of police (militia) made available to the Security Council by Member States for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the United Nations Charter. In that connexion, it was important to change the structure of the United Nations Secretariat and the Security Council so that the three great groups of States were represented on the basis of equality. The socialist countries were not seeking any advantages; they were concerned with a matter of principle, for the countries members of aggressive blocs must no longer misuse the United Nations for their own purposes.

20. The need for a solution of the problem of disarmament was the more urgent as the Western Powers, while pretending that they were willing to discuss the problem, were feverishly accelerating the arms race. The evidence was to be seen in the substantial increase in United States military expenditures, the construction of missile bases on the territory of member States of NATO, and the United States action in furnishing missiles with nuclear war-heads to the NATO countries, including West Germany, whose militaristic and revanchist activities had already been pointed out by Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and the Soviet Union in their joint statement of 10 October 1960 (A/4540).

21. The Czechoslovak delegation wished to emphasize the dangers inherent in the policy the Western Powers were following in regard to West Germany. The provisions limiting the rearmament of West Germany in the agreements signed at the Conference of Ministers held in Paris in October 1954 were gradually becoming a dead letter, while the Governments of the United States and the NATO countries were concealing the resulting dangerous situation from public opinion in their countries. Czechoslovakia fully endorsed the proposal of the Government of the German Democratic Republic which had been transmitted to the Secretary-General for circulation to the Members of the United Nations by the Czechoslovak Government (A/4504), calling for the stage-by-stage achievement of general and complete disarmament on the territory of the two German States and the signature of a peace treaty with Germany making West Berlin a free demilitarized city.

22. The Czechoslovak delegation would spare no effort in seeking concrete directives from the General Assembly for further negotiations in the disarmament committee, expanded so as to include five neutral countries: India, Indonesia, the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Mexico. If a repetition of the failures of the past became inevitable because of the absence of precise directives and failure to expand the Ten-Nation Committee, the Czechoslovak Government would no longer be able to participate in the negotiations. It was to be hoped, however, that in view of the seriousness of the disarmament problem all delegations, in the spirit of resolution 1495 (XV) recently adopted unanimously by the Assembly, would demonstrate the good will and understanding necessary to permit the drafting of directives for the early conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

23. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) expressed surprise that the representatives of a number of Western countries which had participated in the disarmament negotiations, sponsored draft resolutions and claimed that they were prepared to resume negotiations, had not yet asked to be included in the list of speakers. They should make their views known in order to enable the Committee to arrive at a joint decision.

24. Mr. ORMSBY-GORE (United Kingdom) did not think there was any need for alarm. The representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland had spoken for the socialist side; the representatives of the United States and Canada had already spoken and the representative of Italy was to make a statement at the next meeting. There would then have been three speeches from each side represented at the Geneva negotiations. It was his impression that the Soviet delegation had not wished to continue the negotiations at Geneva because it considered discussions of a purely East-West nature, without the participation of the neutral countries, fruitless.

25. Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) indicated that his delegation was prepared to present its proposals at the next meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.