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Chairman: Mr. Franz MATSCH (Austria).

In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Velázquez (Uruguay), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

AGENDA ITEM 69

Suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests (A/4186, A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1, A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE (concluded) AND CONSIDERATION OF DRAFT RESOLUTIONS (continued)

1. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) thought that the cessation of nuclear tests was one of the most urgent partial objectives in the field of disarmament. All countries were ever more resolutely demanding the cessation of tests so that an end could be put to the evolution of nuclear weapons, which threatened all mankind, and so that the growing danger to present and succeeding generations represented by radio-active fall-out would be eliminated.

2. The conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests and the establishment of effective controls would contribute appreciably to easing international tension and to averting the danger of nuclear war by creating favourable conditions for the forthcoming negotiations on putting into effect the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament (A/4219). While regretting that the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests, which was being held at Geneva, had produced only limited results because all the countries participating had not shown as much good will and understanding as the Soviet Union, his delegation hoped that it would terminate with the signing of a treaty on the question. The Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests, held at Geneva in 1958, had stated unequivocally that all types of nuclear explosions could effectively be detected. The Western delegations were accordingly mistaken when they tried to revise the conclusions of the experts, particularly with regard to the question of detecting underground nuclear explosions, and to start new technical talks on problems which had already been fully and satisfactorily discussed by scientists; moreover, the draft treaty stipulated that the entire control system should be regularly subject to revision,

which meant that it would be perfected in the light of the progress of science and technology.

3. The Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had already enabled the participating countries to reach agreement on a number of important questions and those that remained in dispute might be solved to the general satisfaction, thanks to the Soviet proposals which constituted a real basis for reaching sound agreement. The Soviet Union, taking as a basis an idea of The Prime Minister of The United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan, had suggested that each year a definite number of inspections on the territory of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom might be carried out at the request of any party; that proposal, which would constitute an effective way of detecting all underground nuclear explosions, had not yet met with any response from the Western Powers. While it had always stood for the introduction of effective control measures into the treaty on the cessation of tests, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries could not, for security reasons, agree to have several hundreds of mobile inspection teams touring around and across their territory. Moreover, the Soviet Union had recently approved the establishment of a working group to study technical data relating to the dispatch of mobile inspection groups to suspected sites in cases where countries might be thought to have carried out nuclear tests.

4. Nothing should be done at the present time which might endanger the result of the Geneva Conference, and tests of nuclear weapons should not be resumed until a treaty on the question had been concluded. His delegation accordingly hoped that the United States and the United Kingdom would respond to the appeal on that subject made by the Soviet Union and that despite interference by a certain small but influential minority, which based its policy on weapons of mass destruction, they would accede to the justifiable demands of peoples that all nuclear tests should be discontinued completely and for ever. In that connexion, the United Nations should urge the Powers conducting negotiations at Geneva to intensify their efforts to reach agreement, and not to resume their tests until a treaty on the permanent and complete cessation of such tests had been concluded. His delegation hoped that a treaty of that nature would soon be concluded and that it would be a first step towards complete prohibition of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons, which would be an effective contribution towards the strengthening of peace in the entire world.

5. Sir Claude COREA (Ceylon) recalled that it had been the voice of the United Nations, and then that of all the peoples of the world, which had convinced the three nuclear Powers of the urgent need for action to prevent a nuclear outbreak in the future. Those Powers had shown good will and deserved to be thanked; it was to be hoped that they would overcome the few difficulties remaining and that an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests might become an accomplished

fact in the near future. His delegation accordingly felt in a position to agree with draft resolution A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1. However, it preferred draft resolution A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1, and Add.1 and 2, of which it was a co-sponsor, as that draft resolution was designed to secure the complete cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests, so necessary in view of their threat to the people of the world. The draft resolution applied, not only to the existing three nuclear Powers, but to all other countries which might become possessed of nuclear weapons, and it appealed to them to desist from nuclear tests and to do everything possible to bring about the cessation of such tests. The reasons underlying the text had already been fully stated, but there were two of particular importance. First, it was generally recognized throughout the world that the nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests already carried out, or at least their continuation, were a danger to the health and welfare of the people of the world, not only in the present generation but in future generations as well. That fact had been clearly established by many scientists who were persons of no mean repute and had no axe to grind. Second, the resumption of nuclear tests would mean the continuation of the race in nuclear armaments, i.e., the manufacture of new and more dangerous weapons. Today, fortunately, the nuclear weapon was only a deterrent against aggression, but if other countries entered the race, the danger of a nuclear conflagration, whether started by design or accident, would increase considerably.

6. If the nuclear Powers could reach an agreement, it might be hoped that that agreement would extend to other aspects of the disarmament problem. However, while it was to be hoped that the existing suspension of nuclear tests would be prolonged until agreement had been reached, it was also to be hoped that a treaty would be signed banning completely the testing of those dangerous weapons.

7. Mr. PALAMARCHUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) thought that by discussing at five consecutive sessions the question of the suspension of nuclear tests, the General Assembly had brought out the importance which it attached to that question and had admitted its responsibility with regard to a problem of concern to all States of the world. Now, when the Assembly was discussing the question of tests, no test explosion had taken place for a year and the international atmosphere had definitely improved. It was to be hoped that de facto suspension would be maintained until the conclusion of an agreement on the permanent cessation of tests. The Soviet Union, for its part, had declared on 29 August 1959 that it would not be the first to resume tests. The United States had announced that the suspension of its tests would continue till the end of the current year and the United Kingdom was not to resume its tests so long as any useful discussions were being held at Geneva. It was a pity that the statements of the two last-named Powers were not more specific, and the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs had been right when he had pointed out (814th plenary meeting) that success in achieving suspension of such tests depended upon the Governments of the Western Powers. The present suspension was not enough; redoubled efforts should be made to settle the problem safely and permanently by the conclusion of an agreement on the permanent cessation of nuclear tests with the establishment of an appropriate system of control. In conformity with the opinion expressed before the Assembly by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the

USSR, Mr. Khrushchev (799th plenary meeting) his delegation thought that an agreement of that nature would be a first step of primary importance on the way towards general and complete disarmament and would provide specific confirmation of the hope, implied by the First Committee in the draft resolution which it had adopted unanimously at its 1042nd meeting, of putting an end once and for all to the armaments race.

8. The statements made by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union delegations held out hope that the differences still outstanding at Geneva would not constitute serious obstacles to the progress of negotiations. However, his delegation noted with concern some attempts to delay by artificial means the conclusion of an agreement. Thus efforts were being made to show that effective control was impossible owing to the current inadequacy of technical devices for detecting explosions or because of the emergence of new difficulties as a result of the latest scientific progress. However, the Federation of American Scientists, which comprised nearly 2,300 experts, had declared that improved techniques would make it possible to reduce even further the risks, which were already slight, of the violation of a possible agreement on the cessation of tests. Unfortunately, a campaign had been launched in the United States, in which not only the Press and prominent politicians but also official bodies such as the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had taken part, in order to prove that, contrary to the conclusions of the Geneva Conference of Experts, it was essential to go ahead by stages in solving the problem of the final discontinuance of tests. In that connexion, there was reason to recall the United States proposal (1027th meeting) that, if it proved impossible to reach a comprehensive agreement, an understanding should be reached on the cessation of atmospheric tests. Such an approach would be ineffective since it would amount to sanctioning the continuation of underground tests. A limited agreement, although it would in fact reduce atmospheric pollution, would not achieve the essential goal: to prevent the production and development of increasingly destructive nuclear weapons.

9. It was disturbing to see statesmen in some countries call for the resumption of underground tests in order, they said, to strengthen national security. In the United States in particular, the Press had published reports which had not been officially denied: military circles were disturbed by the suspension of tests, which hindered the development of new weapons, and tunnels had been dug and other work carried out in Nevada in preparation for underground explosions; furthermore, a testing ground was being prepared in the Pacific. And yet, if the United States and the United Kingdom showed the same good will as the Soviet Union, the agreement which was so desired by all the peoples of the world would become a reality.

10. As to the two draft resolutions, the twenty-four-Power draft (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) was the more complete and the more positive. It took note of the profound concern existing throughout the world and appealed to all Powers, not only the nuclear Powers, to desist from experimental explosions. That appeal was entirely in keeping with the draft resolution concerning atomic tests in the Sahara, for which his delegation had recently voted (A/C.1/L.238/Rev.1). As to the three-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.236/

Rev.1) there was nothing unacceptable in it, but it did not go so far in meeting the wishes of the people of the world and of the majority of the delegations.

11. Mr. SOSA RODRIGUEZ (Venezuela) paid tribute to India's tireless efforts to obtain the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests and to the understanding and the sense of responsibility shown by the great Powers. Their current attitude was a satisfactory reply to the appeals of India, whose views had already been confirmed by scientists. The suspension of nuclear tests was, on the one hand, a decisive step towards disarmament and the relaxation of international tension and, on the other, an indispensable measure for the protection of the health of present and future generations. For that reason, among the good omens recently noted, the most gratifying one was that the Powers concerned had decided to suspend their tests, and it was to be hoped that they would abide by their decision and that an agreement would shortly be reached on that question. The resumption of tests would constitute a step backward on the road to disarmament and to peace. His delegation had clearly stated, at the thirteenth session (953rd meeting), that those Powers should immediately discontinue their tests pending the establishment of the essential system of control.

12. Of the two draft resolutions before the Committee, the twenty-four-Power draft was the more complete and more logical, since it called, not only on the nuclear Powers, but on all the other States to desist from tests. The disastrous effects of such tests on the evolution of the disarmament question, on international tension and on the health of mankind did not vary according to the country carrying out the explosion. For that reason, his delegation would vote in favour of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. But it would also vote for the three-Power draft resolution, which had the same purpose and contained no provisions contradicting those of the other draft.

13. Mr. MOCH (France) noted with satisfaction that the representative of the Ukrainian SSR had acknowledged that the discontinuance of nuclear test explosions was not the beginning of disarmament and that it was necessary first of all to limit the production and development of nuclear weapons. It should be added that the prohibition of such weapons should be controlled: that had always been the argument of the French delegation.

14. Without involving the representative of Sweden directly, he wished to use the arguments used by the Swedish delegation (1057th meeting) to put members of the Committee on guard against misinterpretations of scientific facts. He would give three examples.

15. First of all, some persons tended wrongly to consider the word "unknown" as a synonym for the word "dangerous". But when the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress stated^{1/} that the biological significance of low levels of radio-activity was still largely unknown and that no resolution had been reached on whether or not a threshold level of radiation exposure existed below which effects such as cancer and leukaemia did not result, that only

^{1/} See United States Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, *Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests: Summary-Analysis of Hearings, May 5-8, 1959*, 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1959).

meant that, if there was no threshold, any dose of radiation could have ill effects, whereas, if there was a threshold, unfortunate consequences would be noted only if the dose exceeded that threshold level. It should be recalled that the international authors, like the French experts, had precisely chosen, systematically, the most pessimistic working hypotheses. Therefore the facts could belie those hypotheses only by reducing, not by increasing, the effects attributed to small doses of radiation. The Joint Committee had itself acknowledged in its report that all the conclusions given were based on the effects obtained for high levels of radiation. In addition, it mentioned recent discoveries which seemed to prove that a dose slowly applied—which was the case that concerned the First Committee—had a much weaker effect than the same dose applied instantaneously, such as the one used to calculate the maximum effects announced. According to the Joint Committee, those new discoveries would suggest that the estimates made hitherto of the genetic effects of radiation might have been overestimated by a factor of at least four, and that that no doubt applied to the other effects as well.

16. Secondly, as to large particles, the experts had acknowledged that there was no new type of risk, or any increased risk, involved. It should be recalled, in considering the collision between a large radioactive dust particle and a cell, that there were many hundreds of millions of cells in every organism among the more highly developed species, and that very many of them died naturally every minute.

17. Thirdly—and perhaps most important—what would happen if nuclear tests were continued without a time limit at the same rate as from 1955 to 1958, i.e., at the rate of tens of millions of tons of TNT annually? The representative of Sweden had shown that the current situation was far from being dangerous since, if explosions were continued indefinitely at an excessive pace and with excessive power, the permissible dose, which was in itself one hundred times less than the dangerous dose, would still not be reached. At the end of many years, the dose of strontium would, under those conditions, reach 48 units, whereas the permissible dose was 67 units. Although firmly convinced that it was unthinkable to continue nuclear tests at the 1958 rate, he wished to recall the essential and reassuring fact that, even if that excessive pace was indefinitely prolonged, the danger limit—according to the most pessimistic of all hypotheses—would be far from being reached. By that statement, he wished to constitute himself the defender, by no means of an increased number of nuclear explosions, but only of truth in the face of exaggerations and misinterpretations.

18. His delegation would abstain in the vote on the three-Power draft resolution for the simple reason that that draft was addressed only to the States which were now engaged in negotiations at Geneva. On the other hand, it would vote against the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, which would have the effect of giving official recognition to, and dramatizing, alarm that now seemed unfounded and which contained an appeal addressed to France without specifically naming that country—an appeal that could not be heeded for the time being.

19. Mr. BUDO (Albania) said that it was vital to reach an agreement on the final termination of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests, and that all the peoples

of the world urgently demanded the total and permanent cessation of test explosions with a view to eliminating once and for all the danger they created. The conclusion of such an agreement would represent a very important step forward towards the relaxation of international tension and would pave the way for the destruction and elimination of all nuclear devices, as well as for the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

20. It was, of course, gratifying to note the progress achieved by the Geneva Conference and the temporary suspension of tests which polluted the atmosphere. However, it was regrettable that serious differences of opinion persisted because of the position taken up by the Western Powers and particularly because of the claims of the United States regarding the detection of underground nuclear explosions, despite the fact that the Conference of Experts to Study the Possibility of Detecting Violations of a Possible Agreement on the Suspension of Nuclear Tests and the group of scientific experts of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had proved that it was perfectly possible to detect any nuclear tests of whatever nature. Certain divergencies—for example, that concerning the composition of control posts—were, thanks to the constructive efforts of the Soviet delegation, on the way to being resolved, and the three Powers had already agreed to institute inspection teams which would make on-the-spot visits whenever a suspect explosion had been recorded. But it was regrettable that the United States and the United Kingdom had insisted upon requirements which were unacceptable to any sovereign State seriously mindful of its security. It was to be hoped that those two countries would accede to the Soviet Union's proposal to fix in advance the number of annual inspections to be carried out on the territory of each of the three nuclear Powers, particularly as the Soviet Union had proposed the constitution of a technical working group entrusted with the task of studying, within a fixed period, the data relating to that question of making appropriate recommendations.

21. Although the United States and United Kingdom delegations had not always shown the good will and understanding necessary for the expedition of the negotiations, the progress already achieved proved that it was perfectly possible to reach a mutually acceptable agreement on the final cessation of tests. Despite the erroneous assertions of certain people, it was impossible to doubt the sincerity of the Soviet Union, which had often shown its desire to achieve the final and complete cessation of nuclear and hydrogen weapons tests. It should not be forgotten that it was the Soviet Union which had undertaken not to resume nuclear tests provided that the Western Powers did not resume theirs. Therefore, if the three nuclear Powers made a similar demonstration of the necessary good will, an agreement would soon be reached on the cessation of tests under an appropriate international control system guaranteeing strict respect for the obligations assumed by the parties. The final and complete cessation of tests would help to check the armaments race by preventing countries from perfecting new types of nuclear weapons which were even more destructive and also by prohibiting any increase in the number of States capable of manufacturing such weapons.

22. Mr. CORREA (Ecuador) said the present debate clearly revealed that the General Assembly should

take an unequivocal stand in favour of maintaining the universal suspension of nuclear tests. The various statements heard by the Committee confirmed the danger of such tests for the human race. On the political level, the statements of the nuclear Powers, which were negotiating at Geneva, showed how important the present suspension of tests was for the creation of the psychological atmosphere indispensable for the progress of the talks. Moreover, an analysis of the statements which had just been made by the representatives of countries belonging to the various regions of the globe demonstrated that world opinion was absolutely opposed to a resumption of the race to explode nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

23. Thus, pending the conclusion of a legal agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons tests on a permanent basis—the first step along the path of disarmament—the moratorium on tests should be continued and should be observed, not only by the present nuclear Powers, but also by other countries which were scientifically, industrially and economically capable of becoming nuclear Powers.

24. His delegation congratulated the authors of the two draft resolutions which, far from being mutually exclusive, were complementary, their aims and intentions being the same. The three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) concerned only the negotiations at Geneva, but it was precisely because its aim was more limited that it was more important. By adopting it, the General Assembly would give the nuclear Powers, which were now negotiating, all the support they deserved.

25. The scope of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution was broader, since it was addressed not only to the States negotiating at Geneva, but also to those who might subsequently become nuclear Powers. The approval of the former text thus in no way excluded the adoption of the latter. The Ecuadorian delegation would vote for both texts.

26. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) wished to condemn, as he had already done during the debate on the question of French nuclear tests in the Sahara (1043rd meeting), the continuance of nuclear tests, and to repeat the hope that the Geneva conversations would achieve the desired results. His delegation had joined in sponsoring the twenty-four-Power draft resolution, because the latter complemented the resolution on nuclear tests in the Sahara adopted by the Committee at its 1053rd meeting.

27. He would also vote for the three-Power draft resolution because, while it did not express all his delegation's views on the matter, it nevertheless represented a positive contribution to the desired solution. The text was certainly unsatisfactory because it was too short, and it did not allay the concern voiced by the Moroccan delegation. It did, however, express a hope with which Morocco wished to associate itself.

28. Mr. MICHALOWSKI (Poland) thought it unnecessary to stress the undoubted dangers of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons testing, which could not seriously be compared with the effects of radiation given off by the dials of wrist-watches or the risks of living at high altitudes.

29. Besides strontium 90, there was today knowledge of barium 140, iodine 131 and carbon 14. The latter radio-active substance could produce very serious genetic effects over a period of a thousand years. It

was also known that radio-active fall-out was not deposited uniformly. As far as the genetic consequences of radiation were concerned, scientists more and more frequently voiced the opinion that there was no such thing as a safe radiation level. As far back as 3 November 1956, thirteen professors from Yale University had stated that the effects of radiation were not reversible. According to a statement recently published by Mr. V. G. Bogorov, head of the Soviet Hydrographic Expedition in the Indian Ocean, the dumping of radio-active waste into oceans caused a high degree of water pollution and the poisoning of plankton and fish. In its report, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress stated clearly that the concentration of radio-active materials in food and man had increased rapidly since 1957 and would probably increase still more.

30. Moreover, the question of the suspension of nuclear tests was bound up with the basic problem of disarmament. As many delegations believed, the cessation of nuclear explosions might constitute the first step towards disarmament. It was therefore important to put a stop to the creation of "faits accomplis" which could only hinder the efforts made in search of an agreement.

31. Now that the question of the cessation of nuclear tests was being examined in a more favourable international atmosphere, everything should be done to ensure that the present moratorium resulted in the conclusion of an international agreement binding upon all. Any resumption of tests would constitute a step backwards. The statement made by Mr. Kuznetsov, the USSR representative, at the 1057th meeting had clarified the problems being discussed at Geneva and would certainly facilitate their solution.

32. The resolution which the Committee was to adopt must support all the efforts aimed at the conclusion of an agreement at the Geneva Conference. The three nuclear Powers should receive a clear mandate from the United Nations to that effect.

33. For those reasons, the Polish delegation would vote for the twenty-four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2). It would also vote for the three-Power draft (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1), because it expressed more or less the same ideas, although in a less effective and complete manner.

34. Mr. SANDLER (Sweden) wished to make a clarification for the benefit of the French representative and in order to remove any misunderstanding. When he had stated at the 1057th meeting that the risk for the population of the whole world might continue for a certain period, he was merely quoting the summary records of the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress.

35. He agreed with Mr. Moch about the uncertainty which still reigned regarding many of the important aspects of the problem, but did not draw the same conclusions. The question was how man, when he knew more about it, could be sure of neutralizing the harm which he might be doing today. So far, that question had remained unanswered.

36. He agreed with the Austrian delegation that the two draft resolutions should be put to the vote. In the present circumstances, all members of the Committee should have the opportunity of announcing unequivocally their position on the subject, for there

was no question of choosing one particular aspect of either of the draft resolutions. Moreover, delegations were probably unanimous in desiring the United Nations to adopt a resolution appealing seriously for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests.

37. In those circumstances, in order to give an equal chance to both draft resolutions and to avoid any question of prestige, the best procedure was to follow the normal rule, i.e., to vote first on the three-Power draft resolution and then immediately afterwards on the twenty-four-Power draft resolution. In that way, a clear picture would emerge of the degree of unanimity within the Committee and of the extent to which there might be certain differences of opinion.

38. For its part, the Swedish delegation was ready to vote first for the three-Power draft and then for that sponsored by the twenty-four Powers.

39. Mr. SASTROAMIDJOJO (Indonesia) said that no amount of warnings or pleas could ever fully express the anxiety and dread now weighing upon peoples at the thought of the chaos which might result from continued nuclear tests: those pleas should accordingly be reiterated until the States concerned were convinced of the need to end such tests.

40. Moreover, the General Assembly should have that question before it on a continuing basis, particularly when it was the subject of negotiations at Geneva; the States concerned at Geneva should know that the United Nations, which had the ultimate responsibility in the field of disarmament, was following their proceedings with keen interest and concern, and with high expectations of concrete results.

41. Those two aspects of the item were appropriately set out in the twenty-four-Power draft resolution whose operative paragraphs were entirely in keeping with the spirit and letter of the draft resolution unanimously adopted by the Committee on the question of general and complete disarmament (1042nd meeting).

42. In that connexion he recalled the statement made by the representatives of India at the 1057th meeting and requested the Committee to reaffirm the hope and conviction expressed in the resolution on general and complete disarmament by giving unanimous support, or at least the support of an overwhelming majority, to the twenty-four-Power draft resolution.

43. With regard to the three-Power draft resolution, it was, although rather limited in scope, complementary to the other text. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of it.

44. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) said that the United States would vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1).

45. The United States had voluntarily refrained from conducting nuclear weapons tests since 31 October 1958. It had recently announced its intention to continue that suspension at least to the end of 1959. The purpose of that voluntary action was to provide the best possible circumstances for the success of the Geneva negotiations. Although it was obviously impossible at that juncture to know what stage those negotiations would have reached by the end of the year, the Committee might rest assured that the United States would continue to do everything in its power to

enhance the prospects of that success. Its voluntary moratorium might be continued, depending upon circumstances which had yet to develop.

46. On the other hand, the objective which the United States was striving to achieve was the ending of nuclear weapons tests under an agreement providing for effective international control. An indefinite continuation of a voluntary uncontrolled suspension of tests would not contribute to that objective. In such circumstances, further efforts to reach agreement on a suspension of tests with proper safeguards would probably be fruitless.

47. Furthermore, a suspension of tests which was not subject to verification was incompatible with the requirements of national security. Since nuclear tests could be conducted in such ways that, in the absence of controls, they were impossible to detect, it was clear that, without controls, there would be no assurance that tests had in fact been stopped. For example, nuclear tests conducted underground left no telltale fall-out.

48. The United States continued to believe that a system of agreed controls was an utterly indispensable prerequisite to a permanent cessation of nuclear tests. In that connexion, the Geneva negotiations were a test of whether it was possible to move forward in the quest for mutual arms control agreements. The objective of the United States was not just the ending of nuclear weapons tests.

49. The second draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2) was more far-reaching than the first and included language with which the United States delegation was not in accord. The considerations which he had just set forth regarding the position of the United States also applied to that draft resolution.

50. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said it was gratifying that the Geneva Conference had already made considerable progress and that agreement had already been reached on several articles of the proposed treaty, which gave grounds for hope that the remaining difficulties could be overcome in due course. It was heartening also to note that the Soviet Union had agreed to the proposal for convening a conference of technical experts to study the question of underground tests, concerning which there had so long been an impasse.

51. Moreover, there seemed to be a growing realization among the nuclear Powers that something must be done to prevent nuclear wars if human rights and civilization were to survive. In that connexion, he quoted a speech delivered by Mr. Herter, and reported in The New York Times of 17 November 1959, in which the United States Secretary of State had spoken of the basic will to survive shared by free men and communists alike, and had said that, unless the course of events was changed soon, both sides faced unacceptable risks of general nuclear war which would approximate to mutual suicide. Mr. Herter had added that the one area in which a common language had the best chance to grow was that of "rules of the game" for the great competition which dominated the present time.

52. In the opinion of his delegation, those "rules of the game" must eventually include the cessation of nuclear tests and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The growing sense of responsibility shown by the two great Powers of the world would substantially con-

tribute to general agreement on the subject. Those Powers could not but be praised for the recent constructive trends in their thinking. If they succeeded in attaining their object they would have performed a feat for the advancement of peace such as no country had hitherto achieved.

53. The two draft resolutions before the Committee truly reflected the feeling of world public opinion concerning the suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests. They were not mutually exclusive, but complementary; yet the twenty-four-Power draft resolution had one specific advantage over the other in that it sought to prevent States which were not yet in possession of nuclear weapons from complicating the Geneva negotiations by conducting tests. His delegation hoped that no Member State would have any difficulty in supporting both draft resolutions, which urged that the parties to the Geneva negotiations should pursue their efforts to reach agreement and should agree to continue their voluntary suspension of tests.

54. Mr. PLIMSOLL (Australia) said that he would support the three-Power draft resolution. However that draft left open the further question of the position of other countries while the present three nuclear Powers were refraining from tests. The Australian Government was hoping, as the Prime Minister and the Minister for External Affairs had stated on several occasions, that the number of nations manufacturing nuclear weapons would not increase. That was not principally because of fears of the danger of fall-out, as it was known that proper precautions could avoid that danger, but because of the belief that the greater the number of nuclear Powers there were the greater the danger of war would be and, also, the more difficult it was going to be to achieve and maintain disarmament.

55. Paragraph 3 of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution covered the situation of other countries while the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR were refraining from tests. His delegation would vote for both draft resolutions, but wished to stress that it regarded the reference to international control as an important element in those texts and that, moreover, its vote in favour of the twenty-four-Power draft resolution should not be taken to mean that it accepted the statements in the first two paragraphs of the preamble.

56. Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) believed it beyond question—the debates on the French nuclear tests had demonstrated it—that world opinion held that nuclear tests were inadmissible, wherever and in whatever form they were conducted, since they constituted a serious threat to mankind both now and in the future. An immediate agreement on their discontinuance was therefore essential. The tests themselves involved extremely serious risks; moreover they created a potential threat of mass extermination and constituted one of the most dangerous forms of the armaments race, which could, at any moment, involve the world in an atomic war. Every attempt to minimize these dangers had failed.

57. The most authoritative scientists had been categorical concerning the dangers inherent in radioactive fall-out. Many delegations had submitted on the subject data which could not be refuted. But there was another aspect of the question which his delegation wished to emphasize, namely that nuclear weapons tests caused difficulties in the disarmament negotiations. In point of fact, the issue of the tests was, as

it were, the crux of the disarmament question, and it acquired an even greater importance in that States which were not taking part in the Geneva conversations were proposing to conduct their own tests. Moreover, in certain countries appeals were being launched for a resumption of nuclear tests. If the tests were resumed, all the efforts which had so far been made and all the progress towards disarmament which had been achieved would be brought to nought.

58. In the circumstances it was essential for the United Nations to do everything in its power to prevent the resumption of tests and to contribute, with all its authority, to the success of the negotiations. Progress had been achieved at Geneva, but so long as an agreement had not been concluded fresh difficulties might well arise. It was known that at the request of one of the parties a re-examination of questions on which the experts had given a definite ruling had had to be undertaken. New scientific data had been made an excuse for holding up the progress of the negotiations. Another question arose: would the United States resume its tests once the time limit laid down had expired? Unfortunately, a definite reply to that question could not be given. The Soviet Union had made a very clear statement on the subject. The way in which the position of various countries had changed and the general desire to succeed, which had been given practical expression in the unanimous resolution on general and complete disarmament, created conditions favourable for the success of the conversations in Geneva. The United Nations should not miss the opportunity to make its views known. That was why the Bulgarian delegation would vote for the draft resolutions.

59. The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee wished to continue the meeting after 6 p.m., so that the two draft resolutions could be put to the vote.

60. Mr. JHA (India), seconded by Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), proposed that the discussion should continue.

61. Mr. MOCH (France) did not feel that to be necessary, as there was to be a meeting the following afternoon.

62. The CHAIRMAN put the motion for the continuation of the discussion to the vote.

The motion was adopted by 56 votes to 2, with 14 abstentions.

63. Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) recalled that his delegation had supported the efforts made to persuade France to reconsider its decision to explode an atomic bomb in the Sahara, and that it had supported the Irish draft resolution (A/C.1/L.235/Rev.3) on measures to prevent the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons. The two draft resolutions before the Committee were complementary, and he would vote for both of them. By adopting them, the General Assembly would give expression to the deep anxiety felt by all mankind.

64. Mr. MATSUDAIRA (Japan) stated that, after having heard the statements of most of the delegations, his delegation felt more convinced than ever about the opinion already stated by his delegation (1057th meeting), namely that the two draft resolutions, which had the same objective and were couched in more or less the same language, should be approved by the Committee. He expressed his delegation's view that, although the twenty-four-Power draft resolution had

greater scope than the three-Power draft, the two drafts were not only compatible but also complementary. He appealed to the members of the Committee to ensure that both drafts obtained the widest possible measure of support.

65. Mr. SULAIMAN (Iraq) observed that he had stated at the 1057th meeting, his regret that he could not support the three-Power draft resolution. He had believed, at the time, that the Committee would adopt only one draft resolution. If the two draft resolutions were put to the vote, he would vote in favour of both.

66. Mr. JHA (India) fully approved the idea of putting the two draft resolutions to the vote; his delegation was ready to support both of them.

67. Mr. PAZHAWAK (Afghanistan) said he had stated that he would not be able to support the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden; but in view of the explanations given by the Austrian representative, who had asserted (1058th meeting) that the two draft resolutions were complementary, and since they would both be put to the vote, he would abstain in the vote on the three-Power draft resolution.

68. The CHAIRMAN said he would put the draft resolution submitted by Austria, Japan and Sweden (A/C.1/L.236/Rev.1) to the vote.

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Thailand, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden.

Against: None.

Abstaining: Afghanistan, France.

The draft resolution was adopted by 76 votes to none, with 2 abstentions. 2/

69. The CHAIRMAN said he would put to the vote the draft resolution submitted by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Yemen and Yugoslavia (A/C.1/L.237/Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2).

A vote was taken by roll-call.

Nepal, having been drawn by lot by the Chairman, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania,

2/ See the 1060th meeting, para. 1.

Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federation of Malaya, Finland, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Japan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco.

Against: France.

Abstaining: Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Belgium, Brazil, China, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Italy.

The draft resolution was adopted by 60 votes to 1, with 17 abstentions.^{3/}

The meeting rose at 6.25 p.m.

^{3/} Idem.