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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEMS 73 AND 72

Continuation of suspension of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and obligations of States to refrain from their renewal (A/4801 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.283)

The urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control (A/4799, A/C.1/L.280)

1. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that his delegation wished to make a special, preliminary statement concerning the emergency confronting the Committee and the world as a result of the testing of nuclear weapons being carried out by the Soviet Union. Unless action was taken quickly, the Soviet testing would necessarily result in further testing by the United States, and perhaps by other nations. There was still time to halt the trend towards the further refinement and multiplication of nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal was the control and destruction of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons; a ban on tests was only the first step, though it was an indispensable one.

2. In the present circumstances the United States was obliged, in self-protection, to reserve the right to make preparations to test in the atmosphere, as well as underground. On the other hand, it stood ready to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union for a test-ban treaty without delay, either in New York or in Geneva; if the Soviet Union agreed to such a resumption and stopped its tests, a treaty with effective controls could be signed within thirty days. But unless a treaty could be signed promptly, the United States had no choice but to prepare and take the action necessary to protect its own security and that of the world community.

3. His Government had done its share and more to save the human race from the menace of nuclear annihilation; indeed, if its proposals had been accepted by the Soviet Union in 1946, no State would now have nuclear weapons. He personally had proposed that nuclear tests should be stopped almost six years ago, at some sacrifice to his political future; if the nuclear Powers had agreed even then, the world would be a healthier and safer place today. He hoped that they would not lose another chance to meet the challenge of the time and halt the present "death dance".

4. He deplored the fact that while so much had been done to improve man's capacity to destroy his world, so little had been done to improve his control over the means of his own destruction. The attempt to control the nuclear bomb cut to the core of political ideas and mechanisms and, just as the bomb itself represented a revolution in science, so the control of the bomb might in the end mean a revolution in politics. However, the world should not be daunted by the immensity of the problem: the abolition of nuclear testing, although it would constitute only a small beginning in the assault on the institution of war, would be a hopeful first step, and should be diligently sought through effective international arrangements.

5. That view shaped the United States position with regard to the Indian draft resolution (A/C.1/L.283). The United States shared India's abhorrence of nuclear testing and was just as determined to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the contamination of the atmosphere and the threat of nuclear war.

6. The nations of the world had learned from bitter experience that an uninspected moratorium on testing would not secure the results sought by India. After three years of negotiation between the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union at Geneva, during which significant progress had been made, the Soviet Union had reversed its position, and shortly thereafter had resumed nuclear testing. Yet, the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests had been characterized by serious and determined attempts to reach agreement; it had adopted a preamble, seventeen articles and two annexes of a draft treaty banning tests. The United States Government was issuing a history and analysis of the Conference as a white paper which would be circulated by the United States to all delegations.

7. Following a review of United States policy ordered by President Kennedy in order to overcome the remaining obstacles to a final agreement, the United States representative to the Conference had in March 1961 presented a new set of proposals designed to meet all legitimate Soviet reservations. The United States and the United Kingdom had submitted comprehensive treaty proposals aimed at ending the fear of tests and radio-active fall-out through a pledge by all signatory nations to cease all tests of nuclear weapons under effective international inspection. However, the Soviet representative had rejected the proposals, reversing the positions he had already taken and renouncing agreements he had already made.

8. The reasons for that Soviet change of heart were now abundantly clear: the Soviet representative at Geneva had by then long ceased to negotiate in good faith, for while he had been fighting his delaying action at Geneva, Soviet scientists, engineers and military experts had been secretly laying plans for the resumption of testing in the atmosphere. A sequence of tests of the kind in which the Soviet Union was currently

engaged required many long months of preparation. In an open society like that of the United States, such preparation could not be undertaken in secrecy, but in a closed society like that of the Soviet Union, preparations had been possible without publicity or disclosure. The announcement of the Soviet decision to resume testing had been made two days before the unaligned nations had convened at Belgrade; and not until now, seven weeks after the resumption of testing by the Soviet Union and the explosion of more than twenty nuclear devices, had the Soviet Government finally told its people that nuclear testing was under way. In order further to cushion the shock to its people, the Soviet Government had announced the end of the current series instead of its beginning. The series was to culminate, according to Mr. Khrushchev, in the explosion of a 50-megaton bomb, though he had boasted in the earlier announcement, with no apparent motive except intimidation and terror, of 100-megaton bombs. Surely, the world was not expected to be grateful that the Soviet leader had decided not to reach his announced goal of the 100-megaton weapon at a single bound. There was no military purpose whatever in such gigantic weapons; the United States could have built them long ago, but it was not interested in intimidation or bigger blasts. By exploding its 50-megaton bomb the Soviet Union would create more radioactivity than that produced by any series of tests since 1945. From that one test, the band of the world in latitude 30 degrees to 60 degrees North, where 80 per cent of the people of the world lived, could expect to receive two-thirds as much new fall-out as had been produced by all the fall-out from all the tests since 1945. When the current series of tests had been completed, the Soviet Union would no doubt piously join in the movement for an uninspected moratorium, which would serve the cause neither of peace nor of international collaboration nor of confidence between nations, but would constitute another trap. The world could not afford to enter that trap again, and the United States would not do so.

9. Nuclear testing would be abolished not by exorcism, but by action. A treaty banning nuclear weapons tests would slow down the arms race, eliminate the danger from fall-out in the atmosphere, check the proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons and discourage their dissemination, thus reducing the hazard of accidental war. Such a treaty would create mutual confidence and produce the tested procedures and concerted policies which might make it possible in addition to abolish all the manifold weapons of human self-destruction. The United States was fully prepared to sign a treaty outlawing tests; but until such a treaty was signed it had no choice, as a responsible nation, but to reserve its freedom of action.

10. The only safe and sure way to stop nuclear weapons tests and to stop them quickly was to complete a treaty prohibiting all tests under effective controls. If the three countries which had achieved such marked progress at Geneva were to devote their skill and ingenuity to achieving agreement, not to evasion, deceit and equivocation, a test-ban treaty with controls could be signed, he wished to repeat, within a month. An uninspected moratorium would only lead the world into confusion and deceit; a test-ban treaty was the way to peace. He challenged the Soviet Union, if it really wanted to stop nuclear testing, to sign such a treaty forthwith.

11. Mr. SHAHA (Nepal) said that while his delegation did not minimize the urgent need for a treaty to ban nuclear weapons tests under effective international control, agreement on such a treaty could be reached only among the nuclear Powers themselves and was therefore outside the scope of effective action by the Committee. On the other hand, the non-nuclear Powers, concentrating their efforts on what they could achieve immediately within the framework of the United Nations, should seek to exert all the influence they could muster to bring about a new suspension of nuclear testing pending the conclusion of a test-ban treaty.

12. His delegation had been gratified to hear the United States representative's statement that a test-ban treaty could be signed within thirty days. If that was so, it wished the nuclear Powers success in their enterprise and urged them to persevere in their efforts. It could do no more, for in the absence of the report to the General Assembly or the Disarmament Commission required under General Assembly resolution 1577 (XV), it was not fully conversant with the proceedings of the Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapons Tests. It would welcome an expression of opinion from all the Powers concerned regarding their readiness to resume negotiations.

13. In any event, so long as nuclear testing represented a present and continuing danger, a threat to the well-being of present and future generations the impact of which was not yet fully known, the nations conducting tests were morally responsible for discontinuing them. The small and defenceless Powers, while they did not presume to evaluate the security considerations invoked by the nuclear Powers, could testify that the resumption of nuclear tests increased their sense of insecurity and increased the dangers to world peace. The professions of the leaders of the nuclear Powers regarding the need to destroy nuclear weapons if total annihilation was to be averted were not borne out by their actions. His delegation deeply regretted the resumption of atmospheric tests by the Soviet Union and the subsequent resumption by the United States of underground tests, not only because they did incalculable harm to man and his environment, but because they poisoned the atmosphere for negotiations aimed at the settlement of all outstanding international political questions, including a test-ban treaty and a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

14. It had been argued that the recent resumption of nuclear testing had demonstrated the danger of relying on a voluntary test suspension. Admittedly, a voluntary moratorium was not the same as a test-ban treaty, and nobody could object to the early conclusion of such a treaty. But agreement on a treaty was likely to take some time, and pending its conclusion it was the duty of the non-nuclear Powers to prevail upon the great Powers to refrain from testing. They could not afford to ignore such an appeal because it reflected the anguish of trembling humanity. While it was true that a voluntary suspension would carry with it only a moral guarantee, even a treaty would depend for its observance on good faith, given the prevailing state of international relations.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.