



CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda items 17 and 66:	
Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (<i>continued</i>)	
Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (<i>continued</i>)	229

Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3047, A/C.1/L.149, A/C.1/L.150, A/C.1/L.152) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1, A/C.1/L.151) (*continued*)

1. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) recalled that, at the Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers, held at Geneva, the President of the United States, addressing himself principally to the representatives of the Soviet Union, had on 21 July 1955 (DC/71, annex 17) proposed a practical plan to be put into effect immediately and to include the exchange of a complete blueprint of the military establishments of the United States and the USSR; in addition, each country was to provide the other with facilities for reconnaissance and aerial photography. The world could thus be convinced that the United States and the Soviet Union were acting together to provide against the possibility of large-scale surprise attacks, thus helping to lessen the danger of war and to relax tension by facilitating the attainment of a comprehensive and effective system of inspection and disarmament. Those measures would be but a beginning.
2. The people of the world had seen in President Eisenhower's proposal a means of breaking the deadlock and of providing a safeguard against the danger of a surprise attack.
3. The Eisenhower plan would operate thus: the information to be exchanged would include, first, the identification, strength, command structure and dispo-

sition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces; secondly, a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations, with their positions. Comparable information would be furnished simultaneously, and freedom of communication for inspecting personnel would be assured.

4. The main point of the plan was unrestricted but monitored reciprocal aerial inspection. Personnel of the country being inspected could be aboard the inspecting aircraft. Aerial reconnaissance offered phenomenal possibilities. Countries like the United States and the Soviet Union could be photographed in their entirety in less than six months. Accurate results were possible at night and under adverse weather conditions. The cost of the operation would be slight compared with the boon which it would confer. The expense for a whole year could be compared to the cost of only two or three days of the Second World War.

5. The United States had offered to extend the plan to other States and to bases abroad, if acceptable to the States involved, and had agreed to add to it the plan for ground observers proposed by Mr. Bulganin, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. The United States regretted that the USSR had not yet approved the plan, but it hoped that further discussions would lead to recognition of its value and importance.

6. Inspection was the crux of any international agreement on disarmament. History had shown that disarmament undertaken without adequate reciprocal inspection increased the dangers of war instead of guaranteeing peace. The Heads of Government at Geneva had been unanimous on that point. In fact, on 14 August 1955, Mr. Bulganin had stated before the Supreme Soviet in Moscow that the essence of any disarmament plan was the question of control and inspection. By "control" and "inspection", however, the Soviet Union did not mean the thorough, permanent and preliminary inspection which the other members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission regarded as necessary to ease the arms burden and to permit the utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

7. The issue of control had become steadily more difficult. The production of atomic energy had been under way for a decade, during which it had been possible to conceal atomic bombs. The tell-tale radio-activity of nuclear materials could be shielded by containers beyond the range of any detection device at present known.

8. As the stockpile grew, the danger mounted. Because of the margin of error in accounting, with each year that passed the amount of material available for hidden weapons had increased. A crucial point had now been reached at which the margin of error represented an obvious potential danger.

9. That was the scientific background of the Eisenhower project. The older plans for inspection of

nuclear material based on total accounting of production were unrealistic. The situation thus required a review of the inspection problem and some new conception which would offer the world time, security and confidence while it dealt with the problem as a whole.

10. For those purposes the President of the United States had mobilized a number of scientists, military men and industrialists to work on the technical aspects of the problem, under the direction of Mr. Stassen. It was intended that such studies should be the subject of appropriate consultations between Governments.

11. The President had also put forward proposals to meet the second requirement, that of increased international security.

12. The aerial inspection was designed primarily to provide against surprise attack by controlling the means for delivering nuclear bombs.

13. In its proposals of 10 May 1955 (A/2979, annex I),¹ the USSR, too, had recognized the danger of atomic stockpiles. It had likewise drawn the conclusion that surprise attack must be guarded against. Yet the Soviet Union prescribed no new remedy and continued to call for measures of disarmament which could not be effectively controlled by the only kind of inspection which it would permit. In spite of the repeated inquiries addressed by the members of the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission to the USSR representative, the latter had given no assurance that inspectors would be in the field ready to operate before disarmament began. He had not specified what was to be inspected. Finally, the USSR would allow inspection from the air only at the end of a disarmament programme.

14. To continue to call for the elimination of nuclear weapons as an immediate objective, as did the USSR, was to ignore the cardinal principle that any disarmament programme must be fully supported by effective control.

15. The USSR representative had implied that the United States was less eager for disarmament because it had some reserve about some of the ideas it had contributed in the past. It was true that the United States was appraising past theories in the light of changing political and scientific conditions. It was true that whatever might be agreed with respect to the levels of armed forces or the reduction of conventional weapons would have to be calculated in relation to what could be done about nuclear weapons. In a field so complex and dangerous, the United States could not afford to be doctrinaire.

16. From 1946 to 1954, the USSR had constantly demanded that the United Nations should ban atomic weapons by mere declaration, with inspection second. On 30 September 1954 (484th plenary meeting), however, the USSR representative had apparently changed his position when he had stated that the USSR would accept as a basis for discussion the French-United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954,² which had stipulated real inspection from the outset and throughout each stage of a progressive programme of arms reduction.

17. In 1955, during the Sub-Committee's meetings, the USSR had proposed (DC/71, annex 1) the immediate destruction of all nuclear weapons, without in-

spection. That scheme bore no relation to disarmament. On the contrary, it would have led to a nuclear arms race, because it did not propose that the production of those weapons should cease. Then, in mid-March, the USSR had suddenly switched back to its previous position, confirming its agreement in principle with the French-United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954. Finally, on 10 May 1955, it had adopted a position in some ways close to the Western suggestions, but on the issue of inspection the USSR still did not state in any useful detail what was to be inspected, what the powers of the inspectors would be, or when they could begin their task. Thus, in spite of a shifting back and forth in Soviet ideas, there had been little progress in the vital matter of inspection and control.

18. The reserved attitude of the United States towards its previous views on disarmament was, of course, preliminary and provisional. Even where effective controls could be devised, international distrust might block their application. But the solution to the problem was not to jettison all attempts to establish effective control. On the contrary, efforts should be made to reach agreement on measures to dispel distrust and to create conditions for a more fruitful discussion of disarmament. President Eisenhower had declared at the Geneva conference that the United States was ready to proceed in the study of reliable systems of inspection and, when that system was proved, to reduce armaments with other States to the extent that the system would provide assured results.

19. The Eisenhower plan would provide practical experience in the control measures which an agreement on disarmament would involve. The United States earnestly desired a comprehensive, progressive, enforceable agreement for the reduction of armaments under effective international control so that no State would be in a position to launch sudden aggression, while every State would have the strength to assure its internal security, to meet its international obligations, and to discourage predatory designs.

20. If agreement could be reached to eliminate or limit nuclear weapons within the framework of an effective system of disarmament under proper safeguards, there should be corresponding restrictions on the testing of such weapons. A general disarmament agreement should affect broad elements of the armed strength of the various States, including military bases—both those which had been placed at the disposition of the United States abroad at the request of other countries and Soviet Union bases at home and abroad.

21. History showed the readiness of the United States to reduce its armaments and to increase the prosperity of its own citizens and its friends elsewhere in the world. It had reduced its armed forces from 12 million men in 1945 to 1.5 million in 1950. The USSR could not produce comparable figures and, more particularly, it was impossible to fix any base line for Soviet strength against which to measure the arms cuts recently reported by the Soviet Union. Whatever the composition of the United States armed forces might be in the future, the world could rest assured that the United States would not use atomic weapons or any other weapons in any way except in accordance with the Charter and in defence against aggression.

22. The USSR had expressed five objections to the Eisenhower plan. First, it had held that the plan had nothing to do with disarmament. In fact, however, the proposal had been made as a prelude to the reduction in

¹ See also DC/71, annex 15.

² See *Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for April, May and June 1954*, document DC/53, annex 9.

armaments, after nine years of futile discussion of other methods.

23. The USSR had also objected that the plan was limited to the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union. It was, in fact, logical to begin with those two countries, but the United States was ready to negotiate for the extension of the Eisenhower plan and the Bulganin plan to include the territory of other countries, with their consent.

24. Thirdly, the USSR had held that the Eisenhower plan would be very costly. It was true that the implementation of the plan would involve some expense, but the countries concerned could afford it and it would be a trifling premium to pay for an insurance policy against war.

25. The USSR had complained that the plan did not provide for ground observers at key points. In his letter of 11 October 1955, however, President Eisenhower had told Mr. Bulganin that he had not forgotten his proposal and that he was prepared to accept it.

26. Finally, Mr. Molotov, at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Geneva, and Mr. Krushchev, in India, had argued that the Eisenhower plan would increase the risk of war because it would give each country access to information which it might put to use in launching a surprise attack. In that connexion, Mr. Dulles had pointed out at the Geneva Conference that lack of information was not what inhibited hostilities. If the plan was put into effect, it would deprive the aggressor of the benefit of surprise.

27. Consequently, the Soviet Union objections did not appear to be final, and it was to be hoped that they would not be insuperable.

28. The outlook would be much brighter if the USSR would answer the following four questions.

29. First, when would the Soviet Union join other States in a policy of openness which would advance the cause of disarmament?

30. Secondly, why did the Soviet Union continue to advocate elimination of atomic weapons as an immediate objective when it had told the world that that was impossible?

31. Thirdly, why would the Soviet Union commit States to actions affecting their national security without providing the means of inspection and control to ensure that they were carried out equally by all States?

32. Fourthly, why was the Soviet Union not willing to join in an immediate practical programme to proscribe surprise attack by either side?

33. Despite the discouraging developments in Soviet Union policy, the United States had not lost the hope that the USSR would eventually realize that the Eisenhower plan was in the world's interest and in its own interest. It was gratifying to note that understanding had been reached at least on some points. All were agreed that nuclear material could be concealed in significant quantities and that there must be new emphasis upon preventing surprise attack. Moreover, the USSR, after having rejected aerial inspection for ten years, now accepted it, at least for the concluding stage of a disarmament programme. He hoped that it would agree that such inspection should occur as a beginning step, when it would serve to lessen world tension and open the path to further measures of inspection and control.

34. It was to be hoped that the USSR would choose the platform of the General Assembly at its present

session to announce an advance in Soviet thinking on the problem of disarmament. Mr. Krushchev had recently told an Indian audience that it was difficult to imagine Soviet planes flying over the United States and United States planes flying over the Soviet Union, but the Government and the people of the United States did not regard that as a fantastic picture. They believed, on the contrary, that such "sentinels of peace" would be a reassuring sight to the peoples of all the world.

35. The United States hoped that the United Nations would endorse the plan for aerial inspection and that the endorsement would lead to its being put into effect.

36. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) drew attention to the close connexion between disarmament and world tension. The armaments of a country resulted from world tension. The primary cause of distrust, tension and, ultimately, war was the violation of basic human rights and the principles laid down in the United Nations Charter. One of the most important of those principles was the right of self-determination.

37. Among the numerous examples of world tension was the situation in the Middle East where, since their liberation from Ottoman rule, the States created there had been engaged in a new struggle to free themselves from the grip of foreign Powers, to attain independence and to achieve unity in an Arab federation.

38. Friendship with the United Kingdom was solidly established in many parts of the Arab world, but the struggle for the liberation of North Africa, particularly of Algeria, as well as of the Baltic countries remained a source of world tension. The United Nations could use its influence to contribute to the cause of national freedom in those countries.

39. Mr. MOCH (France), speaking on a point of order, recalled that the question of Algeria had been eliminated from the Assembly's discussion.

40. The CHAIRMAN pointed out to the Iraqi representative that any reference to the Algerian question was out of order.

41. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) speaking on a point of order, said that there was no item on the agenda relating to the Baltic countries.

42. The CHAIRMAN requested the speaker to restrict his statements to the item on the agenda.

43. Mr. AZKOUL (Lebanon) said that, if the tense situations in certain countries could not be cited by way of example, reference to any part of the world where there was tension should also be barred. He therefore requested that the Chairman should not rule such comments out of order and should not bar reference by the Iraqi representative to specific examples of world tension.

44. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) pointed out as another cause of world tension the exploitation of a country's natural resources by others. Oil in the Middle East was such a cause of tension.

45. Mr. MENON (India) pointed out that the oil of the Middle East was not on the agenda.

46. The CHAIRMAN said that the questions of Algeria and the Baltic countries were certainly not within the scope of the item. He called upon representatives to exercise discretion in determining how far they might go in their discussion.

47. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that, if world tension was to be reduced, the domination of one people

over another must be prevented and colonial exploitation must be brought to an end.

48. Another cause of tension in the Middle East was the activity of world Zionism. By adopting resolution 181 (II) on the partitioning of Palestine the General Assembly had violated the United Nations Charter. The Palestinian Arabs, acting in accordance with the right of self-defence, had resisted the partition scheme and had been massacred by the Zionists terrorists.

49. Mr. HARARI (Israel), speaking on a point of order, said that, if the Iraqi representative was permitted to continue, he would have to reserve the right to reply.

50. The CHAIRMAN again appealed to the moderation and wisdom of the Iraqi representative and asked him not to embark upon a detailed discussion.

51. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that Israel was not satisfied with the territories allotted to it by the General Assembly resolution and, supported by contributions from the Zionist movement in the United States, it refused the internationalization of Jerusalem and the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes.

52. The CHAIRMAN ruled that the Iraqi representative's statement was out of order.

53. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that international communism, which denied men the right of self-government and freedom of religion, was another source of tension.

54. The CHAIRMAN said that the allusion was inadmissible.

55. Mr. AL-JAMALI (Iraq) said that the USSR was indoctrinating the inhabitants of the Middle East to induce them to destroy the free institutions of their countries.

56. The USSR representative had criticized (798th meeting) the Baghdad Pact. The Pact, however, was essentially defensive. It was founded on the principle of legitimate collective defence. It was designed to favour the economic development of its members and had not been concluded in the interests of the great Powers. Iraq had taken over again the military bases which it had ceded to the United Kingdom. Moreover, no objection could be raised to a purely defensive agreement.

57. To lessen international tension and to reduce armaments levels, means must be assured to every State for freeing itself from Communist threats and infiltration. Disarmament was possible only in a world of peace and an atmosphere of freedom and justice. The Disarmament Commission should not take any decision until complete safeguards for control and inspection had been worked out.

58. His delegation endorsed the Eisenhower plan and the four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150).

59. To consolidate peace and contribute to the reduction of international tension, seven principles would have to be observed:

(a) Liberation from Western colonialism and Soviet domination;

(b) Cessation of Communist infiltration and subversion;

(c) The elimination of the "iron" and "bamboo curtains";

(d) The ending of "cold war" propaganda;

(e) Restoration of the unity of divided countries under the auspices of the United Nations.

(f) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes;

(g) The implementation of a gigantic programme of development in cultural and economic fields for the under-developed countries.

60. Mr. CORNER (New Zealand) regretted that the Disarmament Commission, in which his delegation was represented, had been compelled to transmit hurriedly its Sub-Committee's second report (DC/71), which was an undigested collection of proposals plus several thousand pages of verbatim records.

61. It would be desirable for the Commission to direct the Sub-Committee's work more effectively, perhaps by asking it to report every two or three months on the progress accomplished. The Commission, whether it was holding public or private meetings to review the interim reports, would thus exert gentle pressure on the Sub-Committee to make practical progress rather than to argue interminably. The Commission would also be able to suggest compromises. For, although the prime burden for drafting a comprehensive scheme rested upon the great Powers, the Disarmament Commission illustrated the fact that the small countries were no less interested in preventing war. The Sub-Committee's work should be so organized as to give both the Commission and the General Assembly time to reflect upon its yearly report.

62. All the same, in its present form the Sub-Committee's report constituted an essential complement to the First Committee's general debates; it might in particular serve as an antidote to the declaration of the Soviet Union representative on 30 November 1955 (798th meeting) and shed light on the position suddenly adopted by that delegation in the Sub-Committee on 10 May 1955. It was true that the report included long repetitive stretches when it described the Western Powers' patient efforts to obtain clarification from the Soviet Union on a position which it did nothing but reiterate in the same terms. But it afforded an opportunity for comparing the evasive diplomacy of silence or mystery, punctuated by recourse to propaganda or calculated leaks, with the flexible and good-humoured diplomacy of the West, which refused to accept dead-lock.

63. It was discouraging to see the Soviet representative propose an entirely new formula when his delegation had agreed in November 1954 to accept the French-United Kingdom draft as a basis for discussion and when the General Assembly had expected the Sub-Committee to work on that solid foundation. And though there were occasional encouragements when the Soviet Union suddenly abandoned a position it had maintained rigidly for weeks, it was always the case that each new position was defended as if it embodied absolute truth.

64. Although boredom was distilled by those long records, the reader was sometimes rewarded by examples of penetrating wit: for example, Mr. Moch's method of exposing the weakness of the Soviet Union's position in proposing a one-third cut in armed forces but refusing to supply any figures. That had not, of course, prevented the Soviet Union from accusing the Western Powers, which had revealed their strength, of holding up progress in the negotiations.

65. For years the constant theme of Soviet policy had been the determination to deprive the West of its nuclear weapons and, in the second place, to cripple the United States Air Force by disorganizing the system of

bases which made it capable of operating with nuclear weapons in any part of the world; in the General Assembly, in the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission, in Geneva, and in the Stockholm appeals, that theme had been played with endless variations.

66. In reality, the Soviet Union was playing on the fear with which nuclear weapons inspired humanity to cloak that essential objective. In the abstract, the whole world agreed that such weapons should be prohibited, but the truth was coming to be seen; the hydrogen bomb had made the Soviet Union as vulnerable as any other country and it was only seeking to promote its own interests in maintaining an artificial distinction between nuclear weapons and all other weapons, which should all equally be brought under control.

67. Nuclear weapons alone made it possible for the West to stand on a basis of equality with the Soviet Union, which had a superiority of conventional armaments, particularly with the support of China: that was the balance which the prohibition or elimination of nuclear weapons would destroy unless there were a comprehensive disarmament system. The Western Powers were likely, therefore, to accept such a sacrifice only on three conditions: the creation of a healthy international political situation, the reduction of armed forces to a point so low as to make aggression impossible, and a foolproof system of inspection and control to ensure that the forces stayed low.

68. New Zealand, which had no nuclear weapons, thought that the period when it was appropriate to talk of nuclear superiority had ended. The fact that the United States had once had overwhelming superiority and that it had not used that superiority was sufficient proof that the West had no aggressive intentions. The West probably still had a greater stock, but when a single bomb could ravage an area of 35,000 square miles and when each side had a stock sufficient to obliterate the other, there was *de facto* equality, even if one side had 10,000 more hydrogen bombs than the other.

69. That fact, added to the impossibility of detecting the existence of stockpiles of nuclear weapons, had perhaps convinced the West both of the urgency of disarmament and even more of the vital importance of inspection and control in any disarmament scheme.

70. The Soviet Union leaders had obviously taken note of the destructive powers of hydrogen bombs and of the necessity for accepting a *de facto* state of balance—that was apparent, for example, from their declaration of 10 May 1955. That might have been a reason for the apparent improvement in international relations which had been dramatized in the spring and summer of 1955. How, then, could the Soviet leaders' knowledge of those facts be reconciled with their representatives' efforts in the Sub-Committee to upset the present state of balance to the disadvantage of the West?

71. From 1 March 1955 onwards, the Soviet Union representative had continually pressed the West to destroy all existing stocks but to allow production to continue: in other words, to enable the Soviet Union to catch up. Why was so transparent a plan being proposed? The proposal that all States should immediately renounce the use of nuclear weapons, in the absence of certain conditions which the Soviet Union did not propose to fulfil, would clearly mean suicide for the West. Similarly, to ask the West to agree that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons would, in the absence of a comprehensive disarmament system, de-

prive the Western Powers of their only real defence. As for the idea that nuclear weapons could be used if the Security Council decided that aggression had been committed, the Soviet Union knew full well that the veto was no secret to the West.

72. The Soviet Union's "new" proposal might be less illogical if there were a world government and a world police force. However, the Soviet Union supported the concept of unfettered national sovereignty, in terms of which full disarmament was perhaps merely a utopian vision.

73. Such manoeuvres used by Soviet diplomacy were incompatible with a sincere desire to work out a practical and comprehensive system of controlled disarmament. In fact, many of the Soviet Union's proposals were made only for propaganda purposes and to mobilize public opinion to induce the West to commit suicide by immediately renouncing its nuclear weapons. It must also be borne in mind that the equality in nuclear weapons had contributed to the present relaxation of tension.

74. The West was likely to sacrifice its nuclear weapons only in return for security and real disarmament. The Western Powers had disarmed after the Second World War, but the Berlin blockade, the Czechoslovak coup and the aggression in South Korea had demonstrated that Soviet power knew how to profit from any opportunity. The West had gradually restored its strength behind the protective shield of its atomic weapons, which it was being asked to abandon in return for purely verbal assurances. In the field of conventional weapons, the West was hardly in a position of strength; at most it was capable of resisting aggression, thanks to the contributions of the United States and Canada, which had restored the balance of power in the old world. The balance of power had improved the chances of peace, and the efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve superiority would, if successful, endanger the world.

75. As long as only Powers with a sense of realism possessed nuclear weapons, the restoration of Western strength and confidence, together with equality in nuclear weapons, would make progress towards disarmament possible in an atmosphere of relaxed tension; balance should therefore be preserved at every stage of disarmament until nuclear weapons were finally removed from national armouries.

76. Neither the West nor the East could be bullied. The Soviet Union would continue to grow in strength and prosperity and the West had neither the strength nor the desire to dictate to a Power which was not subject to dictation.

77. The four-Power draft resolution (A/C.1/L.150) paved the way to comprehensive balanced disarmament, in that it applied to all the elements of a State's military power and at every stage increased the security of all parties and not the security of only one at the expense of the others. Inspection would become more strict as it applied to the more vital spheres. An adequate control organ should be ready to function whenever a new phase of disarmament was undertaken. Such was the realistic plan the Western Powers had advocated for many years, despite the delaying tactics of the Soviet Union, which had only sought to undermine the West's nuclear defences.

78. An act of faith seemed necessary to break the present dead-lock over disarmament. The Soviet Union

wanted the destruction of nuclear stockpiles or an undertaking that nuclear weapons would not be used. No Western statesman could subscribe to such an act of faith in the absence of adequate safeguards, which science could not provide at the present time, and in the absence of a state of full international confidence.

79. However, present obstacles might be overcome by two other acts of faith, namely, the Eisenhower and Bulganin proposals for inspection. President Eisenhower had stated that his country could accept the Bulganin proposal and on 10 November 1955 Mr. Molotov had promised that the Eisenhower proposal would be regarded favourably if it were viewed in indissoluble connexion with the solution of the problem of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, a condition that was met in the draft resolution.

80. The Bulganin proposal to establish control posts at strategic centres could be a valuable part of any scheme. President Eisenhower had proposed an exchange of military information checked by aerial inspection and by ground parties. An exhibition being held at the present time showed the effectiveness of an inspection and early warning scheme. First, aerial reconnaissance could greatly reduce the number of inspectors required; for instance, a crew of three could photograph one million square miles of territory in three hours. Secondly, less direct interference with sovereignty and less friction with the local population was likely under the Eisenhower plan than under any other so far proposed. The Eisenhower system would be part of a comprehensive scheme as well as an act of faith that would help to get a disarmament programme under way.

81. Confidence was greatly needed. The memory of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea, whose work had been frustrated by its Communist members, would have to be blotted out by a better example

of inspection before any Western statesman was likely to agree to abandon his security system.

82. An inspection and early warning scheme was not an end in itself. However, confidence must be restored before progress would be made in eliminating weapons of mass destruction such as bacterial weapons. Means of detecting nuclear stockpiles still had to be devised. No margin of error was permissible in that connexion: only full confidence or watertight control would suffice. In the case of conventional armaments, a 30 per cent margin of error might not be disastrous, but in terms of nuclear weapons it could mean 30 or 300 hydrogen bombs; it would be better to place hope in the belief that none of the great Powers would commit aggression and thus surely bring down upon itself a nuclear bombardment, than to accept such a disastrous margin of error.

83. Other Powers could in due course possess nuclear weapons. However, for those who did not wish the world to continue to live under that threat, the draft resolution before the Committee opened the road to agreement on practically the whole field of conventional weapons. The first step could be made on the basis of President Eisenhower's proposal, supplemented by that of Mr. Bulganin. If the Soviet Union substituted negotiation for propaganda, the way could be open—as science advanced and as confidence was created—to full disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. That road must be taken because, as President Eisenhower had stated, there was no longer any alternative to peace.

84. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation's position had been inaccurately described by the United States representative and he reserved the right to reply in due course.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.