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Chairman: Sir Leslie MUNRO (New Zealand).

AGENDA ITEMS 17 AND 66

Regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments; conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction: report of the Disarmament Commission (A/2979, A/3704, A/C.1/L.149, A/C.1/L.150) (*continued*)

Measures for the further relaxation of international tension and development of international co-operation (A/2981 and Add.1) (*continued*)

1. Mr. LODGE (United States of America) observed that the Chairmen of delegations had been invited to the opening of an exhibit in the Carnegie Endowment Building. The exhibit was to show what the science of aerial inspection could do. The limitation of the invitation only to the Chairman and one guest of each delegation had been made necessary by the insufficiency of facilities.

2. Mr. NUTTING (United Kingdom) said that the speech of the representative of the USSR (798th meeting) had revived serious doubts in his mind as to whether the Soviet Union genuinely wished to move forward towards a disarmament agreement. The speech had been largely concerned with putting the blame for disagreement on the Western Powers. The speech, instead of showing a realistic approach to the real problems, had exemplified a familiar technique recently revived by the leaders of the Soviet Union—the technique of diplomacy by accusation. It had shown, among other things, that Mr. Kuznetsov's views as to who was going to unleash the next war were as warped as Mr. Krushchev's about who had begun the last.

3. Mr. Nutting recalled General Assembly resolution 808 (IX), which had requested the Disarmament Commission to reconvene the Sub-Committee in order that it could continue its search for a solution. The unanimous vote on the resolution had been a historic oc-

casional. There could not have been anyone who had not hoped that the resolution marked the end of a decade of fruitless debate. At last it had seemed that the Powers were prepared to agree on doing something about disarmament. Although the agreement had been only on procedure, nonetheless it had been an agreement. Moreover, during the debate the then Soviet representative, the late Mr. Vyshinsky, had taken the encouraging step forward of accepting the disarmament plan (DC/53, annex 9) submitted by the United Kingdom and France in June 1954 as a basis for a disarmament treaty. It had been hoped that the Soviet Union was prepared to talk business on the same basis. Those hopes remained largely unfulfilled.

4. In view of Mr. Kuznetsov's one-sided account of the proceedings of the Sub-Committee in London, Mr. Nutting was obliged to review them also. When the Sub-Committee had begun in February 1955, it had been expected, from the late Mr. Vyshinsky's statement in the Assembly (484th plenary meeting) that disarmament would be discussed on the basis of the Anglo-French plan. However, on the very first day, the Soviet representative had presented a demand for a prior agreement upon the destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Under questioning by the other representatives in the Sub-Committee, Mr. Gromyko had admitted that it was his Government's intention that that measure should actually be carried out before any other aspect of disarmament was to be even discussed. He had further admitted that, while the destruction of stocks was taking place and pending agreement upon other measures of disarmament, the production of nuclear weapons would continue. For three weeks Mr. Gromyko had insisted upon his proposal. Eventually, the Soviet representative had been induced by Western insistence upon a balanced disarmament programme to bury his extraordinary proposition. However, even after that, the Soviet representative had continued to adopt an entirely negative attitude in the discussions during the following two months. He had opposed and condemned every concrete Western proposal, whether on the principles which should govern the reduction of all armed forces, the specific levels to which they should be reduced, or the timing of nuclear disarmament.

5. The complete untenability of Soviet position must have become clear to the authorities in Moscow, for on 10 May 1955, the representative of the Soviet Union had introduced new comprehensive proposals on disarmament (A/2979, annex I).¹ It was a significant advance, for they had adopted many of the views and some of the specific Western proposals, including the very proposals which the Soviet representative had mocked only a few days before. But in the self-same proposals, the Soviet Union stated that, even if there was a formal agreement on international control, there were possibilities beyond the reach of international

¹ See also DC/71, annex 15.

control for evasion and for organizing clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The proposals thus appeared at one and the same time to be saying that nuclear disarmament should begin after three-quarters of the conventional disarmament had been carried out, and that it was impossible to ensure that nuclear disarmament was carried out. Moreover, they avoided including any adequate provisions for effective international control even over controllable disarmament, that is to say, reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments. The Soviet Union had even tried to justify that omission by arguing that the necessary conditions for the institution of a control system which would enjoy the trust of all States did not exist at present. But, Mr. Nutting emphasized, it was precisely because international trust was lacking that States must have a control system in order to carry out any disarmament with safety. The less trust, the more controls there must be.

6. In spite of all their inadequacies, Mr. Nutting said, the proposals contained some encouraging features. They had narrowed points of disagreement on certain measures of disarmament; they seemed to exude a refreshing air of realism; they spoke of international trust and settlement of political issues as being necessary forerunners of comprehensive disarmament. Besides, the atmosphere at that time had been charged with a new hope.

7. Soon after the proposals had been submitted, the Geneva Conference of the Heads of Government of the four great Powers had been called. At long last there had seemed to be a chance to embark upon a new common endeavour to clear out of the way the political divisions of the preceding decade and to lay the foundations for general disarmament.

8. Despite the admission of the Soviet Union that it was impossible in present circumstances to guarantee with safety the elimination of nuclear stockpiles, the advance of science had been such that Mr. Nutting utterly refused to admit that means of breaking the scientific impasse would not ultimately be found.

9. One of the most encouraging features of the Conference had been the common realization of the infinite dangers of nuclear warfare. It had been naturally hoped that, in the disarmament talks in Geneva, the Heads of Government would have been able to address themselves to the question of guaranteeing with safety the elimination of nuclear stockpiles and to the general problem of how to control disarmament.

10. Thus when the Sub-Committee had resumed its work in New York in August, it had met in an atmosphere of renewed hope and expectation. But it had soon become clear that the Soviet delegation was still not prepared to reach an agreement upon the problem of control. The Western representatives had pointed out repeatedly that control was the cardinal point. They had appealed to the representative of the Soviet Union to approach it in the spirit of realism. He was reminded of Prime Minister Bulganin's own statement on 4 August 1955 that every disarmament plan boiled down to the question of inspection and control. The Western representatives had drawn attention to the proposals of the Western Heads of Government at Geneva for inspection schemes and pilot plans for international control. The West had submitted proposals setting out the attributes of the control organ. They had pointed out that the Soviet proposals for merely setting up control posts at railway junctions and airports were in

themselves completely inadequate to guarantee against surprise attack, let alone to supervise and ensure that measures of actual disarmament were carried out. They had also considered measures to break through the scientific problem of nuclear control. But the Soviet representative would not discuss those matters. He had refused point-blank to discuss with the Western Powers how effective international control could be carried out. He had declined to comment on any of the Western proposals, save to seek, as Mr. Kuznetsov had done, falsely to depict them as designed to lead to inspection without disarmament.

11. The story of the Sub-Committee meetings which he had just depicted had been a bitter blow to the hopes which had been raised earlier in the summer, but there had been worse to come. The Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference had shown beyond all doubt that the Soviet Union Government was not yet ready to make such political settlements as would create the atmosphere of confidence which was one of the essential foundations of full-scale disarmament.

12. Referring to Mr. Kuznetsov's declaration that the announcement of the Soviet Union's intention to give up Porkkala and Port Arthur was a significant contribution to the relaxation of international tension, Mr. Nutting said that he would be the first to welcome all Soviet contributions to that end. Yet one could not help recalling recent Soviet transactions in the Middle East and the refusal at Geneva to contemplate any settlement of the German problem which, because it would result from the free expression of the will of the German people, might have the effect of disrupting the existing Communist system in East Germany. Mr. Nutting wished to ask whether the Porkkala and Port Arthur bases were the only ones the Soviet Union occupied on foreign soil. Mr. Nutting knew that in East Germany alone there were twenty-two Soviet line divisions. There were also Soviet divisions in Hungary, Poland, and Romania. He presumed that all those divisions must have their bases. Besides, a glance at a map of the world would show that the Soviet Union and its allies in Europe and Asia formed a single great land mass and as such enjoyed the benefits of interior lines of communication. The position of the Western Powers and their Allies was, on the other hand, very different. They were separated by vast stretches of ocean, and in such a situation, bases had a very different significance.

13. If real progress was to be made towards reducing tension, creating settlement and carrying out disarmament, more was needed than Soviet withdrawal from a couple of bases on their own doorstep.

14. What, then, was to be done? Should all hopes of reaching agreement on a disarmament plan and removing the political divisions be abandoned? Mr. Nutting said that that would not be the wish of the peoples whose representatives were sitting in the Committee. For one thing, the world would expect the United Nations to continue its efforts to stop the arms race and lighten the burden of armaments. For another, the terrifying march of science made it more essential as each day passed to go on searching for some disarmament agreement.

15. It had been said that the awesome knowledge of the power of devastation of the weapons the so-called nuclear Powers possessed had infused into them a sense of responsibility. Despite the accusations of Mr. Kuznetsov that the Western Powers sought to unleash a nuclear war, Mr. Nutting believed that such a sense of

responsibility existed; and he hoped Mr. Kuznetsov would note that he, Mr. Nutting, had included the Soviet Union in that description. The point was not the undeniable deterrent value of the nuclear weapon as one of the principal preventives of world war in recent years, but what guarantee there was that the nuclear Powers of today would be the sole possessors of the ghastly secret in a few years' time. It was said that hydrogen bombs were very expensive to make and the smaller countries could not afford them. But how could one know that the techniques of making hydrogen bombs would not cheapen with experience and would not spread with time? Thus it seemed that for every reason it was becoming more than ever imperative to act before it was too late.

16. There were two possible approaches to the problem: one could merely go on working for a general disarmament scheme which would, as suggested by the Soviet Union, come with the solution of the major outstanding political issues. That was what Mr. Nutting called a comprehensive disarmament in a "white world". A second method of agreement would be to start on some measures of disarmament in the immediate future, or in other words, partial disarmament in what Mr. Nutting called the "grey world" of today. If there were a reasonable prospect of getting to the "white world" fairly soon, there might be something to be said for concentrating solely upon the first alternative. But after the latest Geneva Conference and in the light of recent Soviet pronouncements and activities elsewhere, surely no one could say that the world of today was any better than grey. Therefore, while continuing to discuss comprehensive disarmament one must try as a first instalment to work out some disarmament for the "grey world" of realities and hard facts. That was the purpose of the draft resolution which was being submitted that day jointly by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States (A/C.1/L.150).

17. Mr. Nutting believed that it was neither safe nor wise to delay all action while one searched for answers to various disarmament problems. The more he studied the problem, and the more he saw and heard of scientific development, the more he was convinced that a start must be made now. It was because of that very real sense of urgency that he wished to reiterate a suggestion that he had made at the 48th meeting of the Disarmament Commission that, when the Sub-Committee reconvened in the new year, it should study as a matter of urgency: first, a plan for such disarmament as could be safely carried out in the immediate future and as would bring real security to the world; secondly, a system of control which would support that scheme at every stage; and thirdly, a pilot plan or plans which could be put into effect promptly and which would be guaranteed in advance to lead to actual disarmament. Early action on those lines would not only be without prejudice to the continued search for a comprehensive disarmament agreement; it would, in his view, assist in bringing about that agreement. Mr. Nutting welcomed the support of the representative of Belgium for that concept (799th meeting) and noted that the representative of Sweden also considered it (799th meeting) to represent encouraging progress.

18. The Soviet Union Government had accused the Western Powers of going back on their former engagements and of retreating from positions recently taken, now that the Soviet Union had advanced to meet certain of those positions. But of course those accusations were

quite untrue. It had been always the view of the United Kingdom Government that plans for a comprehensive disarmament, while they could be agreed at any time, depended for their complete execution on the necessary confidence being created by a settlement of at least some of the major world issues. It had also always made clear that all disarmament must be subject to effective control. It had not withdrawn from those positions. It had been the Soviet Government which had proclaimed so bluntly in its 10 May proposals that complete control over nuclear disarmament was at present impossible to achieve. It was understandable that Mr. Kuznetsov had avoided reference to that all-important passage, since it did not fit his argument. What Mr. Nutting was now proposing was that the parties concerned should advance from those positions. On the other hand, while the Soviet Union also recognized that the necessary confidence between States had not yet been sufficiently developed to make possible the immediate carrying out of full-scale disarmament with a full-scale control system, what it was offering as the most practicable next step was more talk on a comprehensive agreement. It was offering paper pledges condemning the use of nuclear weapons, and it was proposing and indeed asking other States to disarm before any agreement on control had been reached. But that was not good enough. That approach boiled down to talk, paper pledges, and unilateral disarmament with no control. It would simply create that very "false sense of security" against which the Soviet Union itself had warned in the 10 May proposals. What was needed now was a willingness to take action together.

19. The first steps might be only a beginning. But if they started the process of disarmament, if they brought into existence even the nucleus of an international control system, if they helped to give protection against the danger of surprise attack, they would mark a historic step forward and would certainly lead to bolder advances in their turn.

20. There was no question in the minds of the Western Powers of inspection without disarmament. What they were proposing was both inspection and disarmament as soon as possible.

21. The Soviet Union itself had stressed the importance of increasing international confidence as a forerunner to comprehensive disarmament. It had also stressed the importance of providing security against surprise attack. For both reasons, Mr. Nutting expected the Soviet Union to agree to carry out as soon as possible such a confidence-building scheme as President Eisenhower's proposal at Geneva, coupled with the simultaneous establishment of Prime Minister Bulganin's scheme for establishing control posts in strategic centres. He further suggested that the Soviet Union examine with the Western Powers, the proposals of the United Kingdom and France for pilot schemes for actual disarmament which had been proposed at Geneva, and that all those steps should be inseparable parts of an actual disarmament operation.

22. He hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to examine with the Western Powers, when the Sub-Committee resumed, a disarmament plan capable of early operation and thus help, in the words of Mr. Bulganin, to move the problem of disarmament away from dead centre. He was convinced that if the Sub-Committee and then the Disarmament Commission and the General Assembly could reach agreement upon the three practical proposals which he had put forward, the

United Nations would have been able to strike the most significant and effective blow toward the creation of international confidence in all the last ten years of fruitless and frustrating negotiation.

23. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) wished to make two brief observations in connexion with the statement made by the representative of the United Kingdom. First, Mr. Nutting had said that the Soviet leaders now favoured positions which he did not like. Mr. Kuznetsov noted that, as the Press had made quite clear, official spokesmen of the United Kingdom Foreign Office had addressed attacks against one of the Soviet leaders. That was all the more difficult to understand in view of the traditional courtesy of British Foreign Office spokesmen. Pending further developments, he could only note that the British official spokesman had begun to use language which was quite out of line with the relations normally prevailing between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Secondly, Mr. Nutting had asked a question about alleged bases which, he said, the Soviet Union did not talk about. Mr. Nutting had observed that the Soviet Union maintained armed forces in Germany. In that respect, Mr. Kuznetsov observed that his country, as well as the Western Powers, maintained armed forces in East and West Germany in accordance with the Occupation Statute adopted upon the termination of the war against Germany. He further observed that his

Government maintained troops in East Germany at the request of the Government of the German Democratic Republic. However, the principal point which he wished to make was that the Soviet Union had proposed that all occupation troops, Western and Soviet alike, should be withdrawn entirely from Germany. His Government continued to adhere to that position, but it had been repeatedly rebuffed.

24. Mr. MOCH (France) wished to ask one question. He said that the representative of the Soviet Union had spoken of Soviet garrisons in Germany, but he had studiously refrained from answering Mr. Nutting's question about Soviet troops in Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. Would Mr. Kuznetsov be in a position to give some information about those troops and the bases from which they operated?

25. Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) believed that Mr. Moch was fully informed about the circumstances and conditions governing the maintenance of troops in Germany and certain countries of Eastern as well as Western Europe. Mr. Moch knew that the Soviet Government had proposed, and continued to propose, that all troops should be withdrawn from all countries of Western Europe. As was well known, however, the Western Powers had not accepted the Soviet proposal.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.