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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
 on Monday, 10 November 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
 - Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
 - Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
 - Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
 - Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)
- /...

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 11 NOVEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 14 NOVEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament /41/ (continued):
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- Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General /42/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /43/ (continued)
- Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /44/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /45/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific /120/ (continued)
- Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests /122/ (continued)
- Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons /126/ (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 AND 126 (continued)

Mr. BERGE (Norway): Our annual discussions on disarmament items reflect the important function the United Nations has and should continue to have in the efforts to promote progress in arms control and disarmament. My delegation has noted with positive interest the idea expressed by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his annual report to the General Assembly this year on the need to undertake a basic review of the role of the United Nations in the disarmament field. We will give our support to measures designed to strengthen the capacity of the Organization in this area.

I believe that we should recognize the growing sense of urgency with which world public opinion is demanding that substantial advances now be made towards disarmament. Despite all efforts and long-drawn out negotiations, the concrete results achieved since we last met are almost non-existent in terms of disarmament and arms control measures.

We have earlier stressed the view that all real progress in arms control and disarmament depends on the extent to which motives for acquiring and developing weapons can be reduced and, ultimately, removed. In our opinion, therefore, proposals and measures in this field must be firmly based on realistic assessments of the existing political situation. Above all, they must enhance or at least not reduce security for all the States involved. Not until nations feel confident enough to put greater emphasis on peaceful means to promote their national interests will it be possible to lower the level of military armaments. At the same time, we must not relax our efforts to limit the role of military weapons in international relations.

The issue of nuclear weapons is an urgent matter which should be given first priority in our deliberations. We are facing the potential danger that countries other than the present nuclear weapon States will also be in a position, if they so decide, to acquire nuclear weapons. In the next few years we shall clearly be faced with the growing problem of how to prevent proliferation of materials for nuclear weapons. With the increasing demand for nuclear

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power to provide additional sources of energy, the risks of such proliferation are obvious. Once the nuclear explosion capacity is achieved, the question of developing nuclear weapons is one of political intentions. We agree with the view that it is difficult, if not impossible, to ensure distinction between a nuclear explosion intended for peaceful purposes and one for military purposes, since there is no essential technological difference between them.

In the present-day world, to seek to attain a national nuclear capacity reflects dangerous concepts of security. It also represents a misuse of resources and a continuous danger to the human environment.

We take a very reserved attitude towards nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Their practical utility and economic rationality are today highly questionable. Given also the inherent dangers of nuclear proliferation, we are prepared to support a moratorium on such explosions.

If, at some future date, peaceful nuclear explosions should prove their usefulness, any benefits deriving from them must be obtained in a way which does not lead to nuclear-weapon proliferation. It is therefore necessary that the safeguards system set up by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) be broadened and strengthened and applied universally. An international régime for peaceful nuclear explosives should be established.

It is essential that nuclear technology for civilian purposes be provided only to States having accepted the IAEA safeguard regulations. These regulations must be applied to all the civilian nuclear activities of States, especially their reprocessing facilities, whether they are parties or non-parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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We support the initiatives outlined by other delegations to attain a higher measure of international safeguards. There is a need to protect the physical security of nuclear materials and to establish multinational regional fuel-cycle centres to ensure a more effective application of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials to military use.

We attach great importance to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which we regard as a central instrument in the efforts to prevent the further spread of such weapons. We strongly urge all States, particularly all nuclear-weapons States, to accede to the Treaty. Its effectiveness depends decisively on the universality it can attain.

In conformity with the provisions of the Treaty, we once again call on the nuclear-weapon States to take more effective action in order to curb the nuclear arms race and to contribute to nuclear disarmament. In the long run it is hard to envisage that horizontal proliferation can be prevented if vertical proliferation continues at a high speed. The limited progress we have witnessed so far in this field cannot, on the other hand, justify a non-nuclear State acquiring nuclear-weapons capacity.

We support the Limited Test Ban Treaty and continue to urge the widest possible adherence to it.

My delegation hopes that the nuclear-weapon States concerned may attain a community of interests politically strong enough to find a solution to the problems connected with verification procedures that have continued to impede the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. It is our view that the realization of such a ban is basically a question of political determination.

For its part, Norway will continue to contribute to the detection and verification efforts on a world-wide basis through the seismic-array installation on its territory, NORSAR, data from which are available for use by all nations. My Government welcomes co-operation with seismologists from other countries as a part of the efforts aimed at improved verification techniques.

My delegation regards the Soviet proposal concerning a comprehensive test-ban treaty as an initiative which we hope will contribute positively to the realization of a complete test ban in all environments. At this stage I shall not enter into details. However, my delegation finds it difficult to see any

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basis for the exemption made in the draft concerning peaceful nuclear explosions. Nor do we feel that the differentiation on this point between nuclear and non-nuclear States will advance the cause of nuclear arms control. Finally, the proposed treaty text underlines the problems which emerge in connexion with other efforts towards nuclear arms control, namely the need for active participation by all nuclear Powers. At the same time, given the urgency of the matter, we feel that a total ban should be introduced even if, for the time being, it did not include all the five nuclear Powers.

The major Powers have the primary responsibility and obligation to promote effective regulation and reduction of armaments. No real progress can be expected unless those Powers agree on joint action. Also, it must be assumed that their ability to adopt effective measures will affect positively the willingness of other States to accept restraints on their own policies.

In my delegation's view, the talks on the limitation of strategic arms between the United States and the Soviet Union are also significant as a manifestation of the community of interests between the two States. The Norwegian Government welcomed the initiation of those talks, and we take a positive attitude on the agreements already achieved. We have stressed the great political significance of the strategic arms dialogue between the two Powers which has already contributed positively to strategic and political stability. It is of supreme importance that the two Powers continue the development of constructive co-operation and expand their efforts to reach agreement on concrete limitations of strategic weapons systems.

The Norwegian Government has actively supported all constructive efforts to promote further relaxation of tensions and expanded East-West co-operation. My Government attaches great importance to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We regard the provision concerning the military aspects of security as important elements in the continued multilateral efforts for arms reductions. We would have liked to see more extensive and binding commitments. Still, the results achieved are an important first step, and we hope for the widest possible application of the various confidence-building measures in the Final Act.

My Government also hopes that the conclusion of the European Security Conference will give new impetus to the negotiations on mutual and balanced force

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reductions in Central Europe. The talks in Vienna represent a necessary extension of political détente with the aim of adopting concrete measures in the military sphere in that region. Norway is participating in the talks because force reductions in Central Europe will have direct implications for our security also.

As other speakers have pointed out, our agenda contains a long list of items related to nuclear arms control. On one of them I should like to make a brief comment. The Norwegian delegation supported the proposal advanced by Finland -- at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly for a comprehensive study concerning the question of nuclear-free zones. The study carried out by the Ad Hoc Group clearly reveals the many conflicting viewpoints and evaluations and demonstrates how controversial some of the basic issues still are. At the same time it represents a useful survey of the various aspects of the problem.

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Nuclear-free zones can, in our view, help to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and be a useful supplement to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The creation of such zones must be in conformity with certain basic requirements set out in the study.

In our discussions we are forced to recognize that arms reductions remain a remote goal: nuclear weapon systems are subject to continuous qualitative improvements; the conventional arms build-up in many parts of the world also gives cause for great concern; the accumulation of war-waging capacity involves a shocking waste of resources in a world with economic problems and widespread poverty.

At the same time, we note with satisfaction that the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons has finally entered into force. There is a pressing need for a similar ban on chemical weapons, and we urge an early initiative by the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to achieving a convention dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare, as announced by the two Powers. My delegation welcomes the fact that a draft text of a Convention on the prohibition of military use of environmental techniques has been submitted, and hopes that early action can be taken with a view to concluding such a convention.

I have referred to the obvious need to remove motives for arms build-up as a prerequisite to any real slow-down of the arms race. We have given our active support to the efforts to strengthen the basis for further relaxation of tensions and we hope that the process of détente will pave the way for significant reductions. To reduce and, ultimately, to eliminate the political role of military force is a vital and common interest of all States.

Mr. MERENNE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): The General Assembly offers us the opportunity to undertake an over-all review of disarmament problems and to determine whether new events have occurred in the year that has gone by. If they have, we then consider whether the efforts we have made during this period have been fruitful and give grounds for hope. Some maintain that the many negotiations and activities undertaken in 1975 at the regional level, as well as at the world-wide level, have not been productive in terms of concrete results.

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results. We recognize that the path to disarmament is often marked by trials of our impatience and lost illusions. The year 1975 was no exception to this rule. Yet the events, the debates and the positions taken lead us to think that there has been a change in attitude and an increasingly clear perception of the ever-growing gravity of the problems which the international community should and must face with regard to security and disarmament.

For the European States this year will have been the year of the conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which was begun in 1973. It was a conference designed not to consider concrete disarmament problems but rather to undertake a thorough review of the various aspects of détente on our continent. The debates, however, showed how inseparable the political facts were from the hopes of security and an increase of mutual confidence.

Mr. Van Elslande, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, said at a plenary meeting of the present session of the General Assembly that genuine détente is conceivable only if the improvement in political relations goes hand in hand with an improvement in military security. Accordingly Belgium attaches the utmost importance to the speedy application of the measures of confidence approved at Helsinki, as well as the conclusion of the negotiations on a reduction of forces and armaments in Europe now being held in Vienna. Each of these two concepts is an innovation, in a different sense. The first reflects a code of good conduct, the voluntary and moral nature of which is above all the proof of political will. The Vienna negotiations, on the other hand, constitute perhaps the first real regional disarmament enterprise. They are intended to achieve security on the continent at a lower level of military effort for each participant. They also seek, by a combination of elements of weighting and equity, to eliminate disparities which are sources of uneasiness and distrust among neighbouring States.

It is no mere chance that I have taken as a point of departure two negotiations which affect my country politically and geographically, and which, above all, reflect the concern, which we believe should never slacken, to make the subject of negotiation real and familiar for those who originally inspired them, and those most affected, that is, the general public.

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Beyond this first circle, my country intends to continue to participate actively in all negotiations that in various ways are directed towards disarmament and arms control.

For Belgium the results of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are thus of special importance. Its conclusions must be considered not so much a set of rigid recommendations as a point of departure for an evolution which can acquire credibility only if, in close co-operation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, it is deepened and extended by new, precise and concrete decisions which will provide the framework for our joint security.

I have deliberately used the word "joint". Faced with possible catastrophe there are in fact no longer any individual considerations. Public opinion is aware of sharing the same fear, but it desires to replace this negative awareness as soon as possible by a positive solidarity. It is rightly impatient with the slowness and often piecemeal nature of negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

But this does not mean that public opinion today is any less concerned about security requirements. In fact there is no conflict between the need for security and hopes of disarmament. The attainment of disarmament is often closely linked to the confidence derived from the guarantee of security.

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Several agreements already concluded corroborate this reasoning: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which we hope will be continued and will lead to measures to reduce arsenals, the Moscow Treaty and the 1974 Agreement on the partial halting of underground nuclear testing, constitute a series of instruments where the feeling of assured security among the States concerned has made possible the conclusion of modest disarmament measures which, albeit too fragmentary, have the great merit of being specific. As regards the threshold agreement, Belgium hopes that the negotiations under way will lead to its entry into force and that, by reason of its provisions, it will become the starting point for a measure which, if generalized, could open the way to a total halt to nuclear tests.

My country will ratify the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and, at the same time, adapt its legislation accordingly, a procedure already under consideration.

Other negotiations have been held within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). There is a feeling of frustration -- and several delegations have mentioned it -- following the relative slowing down in the work but that situation should not make us forget an achievement which is not negligible. The work started must be continued and diversified. Along this line of thinking, Belgium participated in the work of the Ad Hoc Group on nuclear-weapon-free zones, the report of which presents diverse points of view leading to further thinking which will enable us better to identify the conditions required at the outset for establishing such zones.

Having thus departed from the focal point of our own concerns, I now come back to the pressing matter of a total halt to nuclear tests. This choice implies the need to arrive at restrictive provisions and to a control based, inter alia, on what has been accepted in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The total halt of nuclear tests would be a decisive step towards the control of nuclear arms and nuclear disarmament. Belgium has always considered that when that step is taken real possibilities will be opened in disarmament negotiations, regarding both nuclear and conventional weapons, with these negotiations taking place on an international level, with the participation of all States. But this objective

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of the total halting of tests will only become credible when a certain number of conditions are fulfilled in respect of verification and the co-operation of all.

The nuclear dimension cannot lead us to forget that, surrounding these arsenals, vast stockpiles of conventional weapons have been set up which call more urgently for a stand on our part.

In reviewing the items before us, we are tempted to believe that our approach to problems as vast and yet as immediate is too abstract, too enmeshed in negotiations which tend to become hermetically sealed, although they concern us all to the utmost degree.

For some time, however, this aspect of the question has been recognized and suggestions have been made here and elsewhere to remedy the situation. The proposed convening of a world disarmament conference, among other things, is a response to this concern. Belgium on several occasions has expressed its views on the subject and has pronounced itself in favour of this idea, as long as the conditions of preparation, content and participation are settled.

In 1975 we have had another manifestation of that same concern possibly to seek a new framework for negotiations. My Government wishes to pay a tribute to those countries which have studied this question, and so many other questions, from a new and original standpoint. Belgium is therefore prepared to envisage every hypothesis that takes into account the aforementioned need for concrete and effective action without which -- as I am sure everyone will agree -- any negotiations would be problematical to say the least.

We find ourselves at a critical phase in our common cause. Modern technology has narrowed the universe to a vast agglomeration. Diversified interests disappear and we can therefore no longer be satisfied with negotiations in abstract terms. Specialization or de facto nuclear monopolies cannot lead to the consolidation of military or scientific privileges, nor create a hierarchy tied to the potential of deterrents, nor above all to the potential of technological knowledge and its application which should be accessible to all. In this respect Belgium has always considered that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is a mere transitory stage towards an organization of States and weapons from which any situation of privilege or monopoly would be excluded. It is

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also obvious that the quantitative measures which we are called upon to take cannot in themselves be sufficient and must receive the necessary qualitative complement. Horizontal non-proliferation cannot be completely satisfactory to us if it is not accompanied by its obligatory vertical complement.

It would be superfluous and no doubt useless to repeat that disarmament will only have credibility in so far as it is controlled. This technical control in turn will find its counterpart in the more immediate control which public opinion is called upon to exercise. Negotiation does not exist unless controlled by public opinion, and our constant concern must be to discuss our collective security in comprehensible terms. Everyone yields to the temptation of being esoteric, particularly in a subject which is increasingly falling within the domain of science and the computer. But we have a moral responsibility towards the civilization which we have inherited and which we hope we can pass on -- altered and improved, it is true -- to our descendants.

We may say that we shall not have failed in so far as the agreements which we hope to conclude tomorrow satisfy legal requirements rather less than they do the aspiration of all to invest more in confidence and less in fear, which is so costly, and to make use of the resources which have become available for positive ends which are infinitely more beneficial to the world community.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The work of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly has been taking place in circumstances of a noticeable improvement in the international climate, where the policy of détente among States is becoming ever more widespread and winning wider support is coming to embrace ever newer spheres of international relations and is exerting a favourable influence on finding solutions for important and urgent problems of the day. There are grounds for noting positive improvements in relations among States and in the general political atmosphere.

Both public opinion and the Governments of the majority of States have become more convinced of the possibilities and the need for the peaceful coexistence of States with different social and political systems and of the possibility of solving existing problems on that basis. This phenomenon was particularly marked at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which made a start on a new stage of détente, which was a very important step towards the consolidation of the principles of peaceful coexistence and the organizing of relations of equal co-operation among States with different social systems.

Now the most important task in foreign policy has become the materialization of détente, its expression in concrete terms and the supplementing of political détente with military détente.

The Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, in his statement in Helsinki said: "We give pride of place in this to the task of halting the arms race and bringing about genuine results in disarmament". All the necessary objective conditions exist for solving the problem of disarmament. Member States of the United Nations supported the idea of complete and general disarmament, they have concluded and are putting into effect a number of treaties limiting or halting the arms race and preventing its further expansion. They have taken decisions to prohibit the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

I should also like to remind members that in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe we find the following statement:

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"The participating States will refrain in their mutual and international relations ... from the threat or use of force."

Further, with respect to questions relating to disarmament, the Final Act states:

"The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world."

Accordingly, political will and new efforts in the field of disarmament should now be aimed at limiting and eliminating existing forms of weapons and should be combined with effective measures designed to prevent the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the use of the advances of science and technology to the detriment of mankind. It is precisely these requirements which are met by the new important proposals of the Soviet Union submitted for the consideration of the thirtieth session of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and the proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon testing.

As is shown by the results of the general political discussion in the General Assembly and also the discussion of disarmament questions in the First Committee, the new Soviet initiatives enjoy wide support among Member States of the United Nations.

The Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the development and production of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is timely and relevant because there is a serious danger of the creation of weapons even more destructive than nuclear weapons and if a halt to this process is not called in time, the creation of such weapons may indeed spell our doom.

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Human reason and conscience require us to take immediate measures to prevent the emergence of such weapons and to put an end to a situation where the latest and most brilliant achievements of human thought and talent may be used to create means of mass destruction. It has often occurred in the past that the most brilliant achievements and discoveries of the human mind have been used primarily not for creative purposes but for the development of means of destruction. It is paradoxical, but a fact, that as a result of the splitting of the atom, nuclear weapons were created first, and it was only subsequently that nuclear power stations were built.

There are many other examples in human history of cases where important scientific and technological discoveries, although used for peaceful purposes, were also very widely used for military purposes. The question of the prevention of the development and creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is now becoming ever more acute and urgent.

In the Introduction to the report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in speaking of the adverse effects of the arms race, also expressed serious concern at the fact that:

"... weapons are increasingly sophisticated and deadly, and the technological arms race continually promises new and more horrible developments". (A/10001/Add.1, p. 7)

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These apprehensions are entirely justified because at the present time throughout the world, every year, the sum of \$25 billion is being spent on military research and development; every fourth scientist and engineer on earth is working on military research and development. This regrettable situation is not the fault of the scientists themselves, but results from the fact that the forces of imperialism have been using scientific discoveries for aggressive military purposes, and have thus been imposing upon the world an arms race of mass destruction, and forcing peace-loving countries to develop similar forms of weapon for purposes of defence.

The exclusively peaceful use of scientific discoveries in the field of atomic physics and chemistry would make it possible for the world to solve practically all the fundamental problems of economic development and social progress, and to eliminate the acute energy problem.

Today it is clearer than ever what harm has been done to mankind as a result of the fact that at one time, because of the position of Western countries, the proposals of the USSR on the prohibition and elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction were not adopted. Now the political situation has changed, and there is every reason to believe that there now exists a genuine opportunity to eliminate war from the life of mankind and to avert the danger of the use of new scientific discoveries for military purposes and for the creation of even more destructive types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The implementation of the Soviet proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons would have the effect of channelling the energies and labours of the vast army of scientists, engineers and specialists to creative goals and thus solve the problems which are of such vital concern to all peoples. Halting the creation of weapons of the future would mean curbing the arms race today and blocking the escalation of this arms race to an even higher level. We all know that it is easier to achieve agreed decisions in fields which have not yet become the subject of the arms race than to eliminate already existing forms of weapons and weapon systems.

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The new proposal of the USSR fully takes into account the positive experience of the United Nations that has yielded practical results. We have in mind the treaties and agreements that have been concluded on the prohibition of the use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. I should like to remind the Committee too of the United Nations decision concerning the need to prepare a convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military purposes. All this was done before the actual development of the aforementioned systems of weapons of mass destruction, although nuclear weapons already existed.

The prohibition of the development of new weapons of mass destruction is in keeping with the interests of all the peoples of the world, because it is one further step towards a reduction of the danger of the emergence of a global military conflict, with its ruinous consequences.

As we know, the Soviet Union has submitted a draft agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. It provides a good basis for achieving agreement on a final text of an appropriate international agreement on this question. The Soviet draft agreement provides for the taking of effective measures to prohibit the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Under the agreement, States would assume the obligation not to develop or manufacture these types of weapons or to help others to do so or to encourage any action to that end.

While banning the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the agreement proposed by the Soviet Union does not prevent, but rather encourages, economic, scientific and technological development. Nor does it encroach on the right of States to use scientific research and discoveries for peaceful purposes for the good of mankind. The Soviet draft agreement not only provides for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons

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of mass destruction but also encourages States to make further efforts in the field of disarmament. It provides for the adoption by States of clear-cut and unambiguous undertakings, in a spirit of goodwill, to hold talks on effective measures to limit and halt the arms race in all types of weapons and to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

In the view of the Byelorussian SSR delegation, implementation of this Soviet proposal would raise a substantial barrier to the arms race and open up additional opportunities for using man's energies and wisdom for his good only.

The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, as one of the sponsors of the draft resolution on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, calls upon all delegations to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711.

In that regard, we should like to draw the attention of the members of the First Committee to the fact that, on the proposal of a number of delegations, including that of the Byelorussian SSR, the Third Committee has already adopted at this session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft declaration on the use of scientific and technological progress in the interests of peace and for the benefit of mankind. That document, which received no negative votes, states:

"The General Assembly,

"...

"Noting with concern that scientific and technological achievements can be used to intensify the arms race ...

"...

"Solemnly proclaims that:

"...

"All States shall refrain from any acts involving the use of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other States, interfering in their internal affairs,

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waging of aggressive wars, suppressing national liberation movements, or pursuing a policy of racial discrimination. Such acts are not only a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, but constitute an inadmissible distortion of the purposes that should guide scientific and technological developments for the benefit of mankind." (A/10330, pp. 12 and 13)

We expect that the plenary General Assembly will approve that declaration today.

It is noteworthy that, together with the proposal to ban the manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, the Soviet Union proposes to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and thus to take decisive measures to call a halt to the further improvement of the most powerful and destructive type of weapon of mass destruction at present -- that is, nuclear weapons -- and to make a beginning on the taking of effective measures towards the prohibition of that weapon.

As we know, for many years the Soviet Union has consistently favoured the halting by all States of all types of nuclear tests, including underground tests in August 1963 in Moscow, with the active participation of the USSR, the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was prepared and signed, since because of differences in the positions of States at that time, it

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appeared impossible to reach agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon testing. Hence, in the peace programme approved by the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the task was laid down of achieving the cessation everywhere and by all of the testing of nuclear weapons, including testing underground. An important step towards the achievement of the goal of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons testing was the Soviet-American Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon testing signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974.

In submitting to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly a proposal on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and a draft treaty to that effect, the Soviet Union considers it very important internationally for measures to be taken for the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by means of the preparation and conclusion of an appropriate broad international treaty that would completely ban the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments by all States. Such a treaty would represent a decisive measure towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and would radically limit the practical possibilities of the further escalation of that race. Moreover, it would promote the speedy achievement of agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a whole and would have a favourable effect on the further expansion of international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, for the good of mankind.

Of course, all nuclear Powers should take part in the preparation and conclusion of such a treaty. That would be an extremely important condition for the treaty's effectiveness and ability to function. In the view of the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR, the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons is an indispensable condition for the entry into force of such a treaty.

With regard to the remarks made by various representatives on the question of control, the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR would like to point out that the system of control proposed in the draft treaty has already proved its

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

First of all, the arms race proceeds apace, whether in nuclear or conventional armaments, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This remark has become banal because it is obvious: every year the great Powers develop new weapons of mass destruction which are more accurate and perfected; they improve conventional systems as well; they keep millions of men under arms. New States vie with one another in various parts of the world and in turn have access to the most sophisticated weapons.

This determination to over-arm entails a considerable squandering of manpower, intelligence and resources of all kind, at a time when the world is suffering from serious economic difficulties and when development and nutrition problems require urgent solutions.

I believe it is a good thing to repeat these truths and it is not unreasonable that many voices should be raised to denounce what, from a world point of view, is a scandal and a dangerous absurdity, at a time when unquestionable progress is being made in the field of political détente.

The President of the French Republic, in the course of his recent trip to Moscow, reminded us of this. Mr. Valéry Giscard d'Estaing said:

"It is desirable that détente in political relations among States be extended in due course to two levels: détente in the field of armaments which can only be validly achieved on a world-wide level and under effective control, while respecting the capacity of the countries concerned to ensure their security independently, and détente in ideological competition to ensure that the rivalry between economic and social systems which are different by reason of the nature of the peoples and objective facts does not lead to undue tension."

And now, let us look at our agenda. At the present session we shall have to deal with 19 disarmament items. Within a few weeks we shall probably have added about 30 new resolutions to the hundreds which our Organization has already adopted on the subject.

I cannot help asking myself a number of questions: is there not a close correlation between the lack of concrete results in the field of disarmament, and this disturbing proliferation of items and resolutions? Further, what is the impact of our work on the ongoing arms race? In what way can we relate and articulate all of the reactions and counter-reactions in our deliberations with

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reality? In a word, to what extent is our Organization, by its procedures and methods, responsible for the almost unanimously recognized failure of disarmament?

To these questions, the replies one might give are likely to give rise to lengthy disputes.

Nevertheless, I should like to submit some considerations to the Committee. First of all, our Organization cannot be held responsible for our failure to control the arms race; we must blame the selfishness and lack of foresight of States, and also the prevailing sense of distrust in international relations. I do not believe that this is the place to go into details on this subject. What I wanted to stress before going any further is that the responsibility of our Organization -- if responsibility there is -- is due not to action, but to omission. We might perhaps be criticized for not having done either exactly what should have been done or all that should have been done.

This criticism in itself is grave because disarmament constitutes one of our essential preoccupations under the Charter. In the case of the General Assembly, does not Article 11 require it to study this problem in particular?

There are but three possible attitudes:

Some say that our Organization adequately fulfils its role and exercises both a positive and beneficial influence. Last year the representative of the Soviet Union endorsed this view with eloquence and conviction, by listing the agreements and the treaties in the preparation of which our Organization co-operated, presenting these as so many successes, and considering them to be evidence of effectiveness. I do not share this optimism, which, unfortunately, seems to me to be contrary to the facts. If we are to pronounce judgement, it must be global. Disarmament is in bad shape. If we wish to be indulgent, let us say that it would be in even worse shape without action by our Organization. Is that any consolation?

Others are more severe. They feel that our Organization exercises no influence, either good or bad. Going even further, they maintain that disarmament has not even begun. While States continue to arm in line with their interests, we continue useless discussions, viewed with indifference and scepticism of world public opinion, cynical theologians of a Byzantium expanded to cover the dimensions of the whole earth.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

I rather fear that in certain circles that is the impression we give, and the reason for it lies in our refusal to give issues the importance they deserve and to take up the only item which should be on our agenda: the limitation, the reduction and finally the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Compared with this problem, the others lose much of their significance: however desirable partial measures may be, and sometimes they are indeed desirable, in studying them we are not taking up genuine disarmament, which would really deliver mankind from nuclear terror and this omission deprives them of effectiveness and meaning, measures which in another context might be positive.

Actually, we are going round in circles, ignoring the central problem of nuclear disarmament without which there cannot be genuine and complete disarmament, and all our attempts boil down to trying to proceed by oblique means and biased methods which are doomed to failure.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty will perhaps prevent some States from acquiring nuclear weapons. It does not mean that there will be a single nuclear missile less in the arsenals, nor that States will refrain from increasing the number of weapons and from perfecting them. The prohibition of nuclear tests will have no impact on delivery systems of Powers which have already fully mastered the techniques involved.

Herein resides the weakness of our work. For many years my Government has expressed its concern on this point. It is our firm conviction that by refusing to consider this fundamental problem of nuclear disarmament, our Organization and our Committee remain condemned to paralysis. It may be that this problem cannot be dealt with because of the opposition of certain Powers or because of considerations of world balance. If that is so, should we not state it clearly?

Others, finally, believe that the partial measures which we have been seeking for 15 years have helped to create an erroneous impression of progress, thus distracting our attention from the true problem. The balance sheet of our efforts is therefore not non-existent but negative.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

I would not go that far, but, frankly, I fail to understand how we can be pleased at the multiplication of agenda items. On the contrary, this trend seems to be dangerous and likely to accentuate the short-comings from which our system is supposed to be suffering. Ultimately, we cannot escape a judgement of conscience. Action must be assessed in terms of the results. Despite the multiplication of our resolutions, and despite the signature of new agreements on partial points, and despite the implementation of new regulatory measures bearing on certain conventional weapons, we have not accomplished and we are not going to accomplish, in the immediate future, the mission entrusted to us, and inevitably we shall be judged severely.

Now, Marcel Proust, in his book, "A la recherche du Temps Perdu" -- a title which would inspire us to do some serious thinking -- wrote: "The 'notwithstandings' are, after all, only the 'because'". I feel that under this formula we will be blamed for having rendered more difficult the solution of the problems which we ought to solve.

While this analysis is obviously arguable, none can challenge the fact that the disarmament is blocked and that chances for global settlement have never seemed more remote. What are the consequences of that stagnation?

The two most important military Powers continue conversations between themselves so as to arrive at a balance in the field of strategic weapons. The results obtained are certainly positive because nothing would be more dangerous than a disorderly and uncontrolled escalation of nuclear weapons. We must be pleased and wish success to these Powers for their decisions of principle arrived at during the Vladivostok talks in November 1974, setting ceilings to their nuclear delivery systems and expecting to go on to a reduction of the atomic stockpiles, as they have indicated that they intended to do.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

However, how can we not consider that the SALT talks, because of the very balance that they established, are the negation of nuclear disarmament? These balances by definition require maintaining nuclear strategic weapons at a high level.

Faced with this situation, a number of less powerful States have decided to acquire, in turn, their nuclear deterrent force. As regards my country, the limited character of this force removes all offensive meaning from it and makes it an instrument solely intended to discourage a possible aggressor and to preserve the independence of our nation.

There is a third category of countries which are suffering directly from the effects of this situation. I am speaking of States which, because of their natural resources, or their industrial development, have mastered the basics of nuclear technology, or are about to do so, and are therefore able, or will be shortly, to acquire nuclear weapons.

How can these countries not be tempted also to acquire a nuclear deterrent force? What valid reasons have been given them so far to divert them from their choice? What advantages and what counterparts have been offered them? I see none. The continued nuclear arms race, on the contrary, constitutes for these States an encouragement to proliferation. The scope of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would certainly have been different if the commitments entered into by the nuclear Powers had been carried in a manner more in keeping with the letter and the spirit of that treaty.

In this connexion, I should like to state that my country has always complied with the principle which it set for itself, not to encourage nuclear-weapon proliferation in any way even though we have not signed the Treaty because of its discriminatory character. In regard to the criticisms that have been made in respect to this judgement, I shall simply point out, so as to avoid vain and useless polemics, that the criticisms seem to be groundless. Furthermore, since in the course of this debate questions have been raised regarding the sale by France of nuclear equipment to South Korea, I wish to make it clear that these deliveries were subject not only to all IAEA controls, but also to even stricter additional provisions.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

One cannot in this field claim both one thing and its opposite. The developing countries are anxious, and rightly so, to benefit from nuclear technology for peaceful purposes so as to promote the economic and social progress of their populations. One cannot envisage excluding them, South Korea no more than the others, from these benefits, it being understood that every precaution must be taken to prevent the diversion of techniques and fissionable materials for military purposes.

Other States, to solve the problem of their security, seek to become isolated from the nuclear peril. They believe that they will thus exorcise it. This is the view that has led to the proposals on denuclearized zones, which have increased substantially since last year. In due course, I shall state my Government's position regarding them.

May I today refer to them merely in the context of a conflict between great Powers. It is true that such a conflict does not appear to threaten the world at present, but it is on such an assumption that we must base ourselves to be able to appreciate the nuclear peril. The experience of the last two world wars has taught us that armed confrontation between great Powers knows neither limits nor boundaries. The barriers which some thought they had raised, by proclaiming their neutrality, were less respected in the course of the Second World War than in the First. Why believe that they would be more protected in the future when the range of modern weapons is such that they can reach any part of the world?

And what would remain of the countries which believe themselves to be neutral if the thousands of missiles which the great Powers possess, raise hundreds of tons of radioactive dust, which will be carried by the winds and the waters to the four corners of the world? In reality there is only one solution and everybody knows it: world security can only come about through the implementation of general and complete disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament carried out under effective international control.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

Removal of obstacles to this enterprise does not depend upon us. My country is always prepared to join with any reasonable effort which it deems likely to lead to a resumption of the search for real and effective disarmament. Thus, when it was proposed, we indicated our support for the idea of having a meeting of the five nuclear Powers to discuss nuclear disarmament among themselves. We favourably viewed and supported the idea of a world disarmament conference which could define new objectives and new procedures for action. In this connexion, I shall quote from the Franco-Soviet Declaration of 17 October:

"The two parties pronounce themselves in favour of convening a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all nuclear Powers in the preparation and work of this conference, which is to make an essential contribution to progress toward general and complete disarmament and to freeing mankind from the burden of armaments."

Were new initiatives to be proposed in this spirit and with this determination, my country would consider them with the same interest and the same will to help make them a success.

Those are the general considerations which I wished to develop before this audience. My delegation, in respect of certain specific agenda items, will have an opportunity to make more detailed observations.

To some, this statement may seem excessively pessimistic. I shall proffer no apologies. I think that nothing could be more dangerous in present circumstances than an optimism by command, which is regularly denied by facts.

(Mr. Taittinger, France)

Only a clear-sighted pessimism, an impelling doubt, with full regard for the demands of realism and based on analysis without complacency, can enable us to arrive at this awareness, which remains the prior condition for the necessary renaissance of a genuine disarmament enterprise.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I thank the representative of France for the very kind words he addressed to me.

I should like to remind members that the list of speakers for the general debate will be closed at 12 noon tomorrow.

Also at 12 noon tomorrow the General Assembly will hear an address by His Excellency Mr. Olaf Palme, Prime Minister of Sweden. We shall therefore have a very short meeting tomorrow morning, and I invite members to arrive a little earlier than usual.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.