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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND SEVENTY-FOURTH MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 31 October 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. von WECHMAR (Federal Republic of Germany)
(Vice-Chairman)

Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA-ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)

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- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
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- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): Let me say at the outset, Sir, that it gives me great pleasure to address the Committee under your chairmanship.

At the outset of our annual disarmament debate the delegation of the Polish People's Republic wishes to welcome with satisfaction the fact that the positive trends in international relations have led, since the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, to the further consolidation of the process of détente. The success of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, embodied in its Final Act -- the decalogue of principles governing relations between participating States of Europe, the United States and Canada -- proves that the practical realization of the concept of peaceful coexistence has become the basic tendency of present-day international relations to which there is no acceptable alternative. For the first time since the Second World War a situation obtains in the world in which there is no open armed conflict between States.

Indeed, the general debate in the plenary meetings of the Assembly which ended a few weeks ago again confirmed forcefully that the gradual process of political détente continues to be the fundamental premise of mutual relations between States -- and more, the primary factor in determining their future course.

But the climate of détente has not yet made an equal mark in all the regions of the world or in all the spheres of co-operation; nor can we complacently ignore factors which may work to undermine it unless strenuous efforts are continued by the international community.

First of all, it has not yet proved possible, notwithstanding measures already adopted, to halt altogether and reverse the arms race. That race, in both nuclear and conventional weapons, uses up resources throughout the world which the Secretary-General in his introduction to the report on the work of the Organization estimates at approaching \$300,000 million annually. Instead of assisting the socio-economic development of individual States, that staggering sum is spent to continue nuclear testing, procure increasingly sophisticated weapons and propel the technological arms race with its ever present promise, indeed I should say threat, of a new and deadly break-through.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

My Government is firmly of the opinion, therefore, that in order to make the political détente an irreversible and enduring fact of international life, meaningful for all regions of the world, it is imperative to seek tangible progress in halting the arms race and in disarmament. In other words, it is necessary to supplement and consolidate détente by translating it into the language of significant disarmament, arms control and arms-prevention agreements.

As we all realize only too well, the First Committee has before it an agenda of important disarmament items which is much heavier than ever before. I wish to reserve the right of my delegation to present its views on those matters at a later stage in our debate. Today, with your indulgence, I should like to address myself to items 122 and 126 concerning the new Soviet proposals.

In his statement in the general debate of 25 September, Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stefan Olszowski, welcomed and expressed our full support for the two important and timely initiatives of the Soviet Union, submitted in the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Andrei Gromyko, concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons. As recently as last week, speaking in the Polish Parliament, the Prime Minister, Piotr Jaroszewicz, said:

"Striving to consolidate peace and security in Europe, we shall continue, together with our Warsaw Pact allies, the efforts in favour of military détente. The problems of limitation of the arms race and of disarmament, both on a European and on a global scale, are now facing the nations of the world as an increasingly urgent task... Tangible progress in the field of limitation of the arms race and of disarmament would be promoted by the implementation of the Soviet proposals concerning the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. We give these proposals our full support."

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

In view of this, it is only natural that the Polish delegation is a sponsor of the draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.707 and A/C.1/L.711, the latter of which was so ably introduced in our Committee yesterday by the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Yakov Malik.

I should like to deal first with the proposal concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests whose timeliness and significance can hardly be overstated.

As will be recalled, the conclusion in 1963 of the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water had important political and environmental implications. While only three out of five nuclear-weapon Powers acceded to the Treaty, its signature meant the improvement of the political atmosphere which some years later was to lead to the conclusion of a number of well-known bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements.

It also meant a marked and welcome improvement of the world's physical atmosphere and the relief of world-wide anxiety about the ecological consequences of atmospheric tests due to the contamination of the environment by radioactive debris.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

Certain well-known reasons have prevented that Treaty from being extended to cover underground tests as well. Among them are inflexibility and over-reliance on technical considerations, as well as refusal to accept the postulate of a test ban applicable to all environments and to all nuclear-weapon Powers.

The next important step towards the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests --- holding out the prospects of further progress in the direction of a final solution of the problem --- came only in 1974 with the USSR-United States of America Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. Although, following the welcome decision of the French Government to discontinue its atmospheric test programme, only one nuclear-weapon Power is still adamantly opposed to the ideals of the 1963 Moscow test-ban Treaty, the situation is far from satisfactory. Indeed, world peace and security are not enhanced by the continuation of underground testing which, as we know, allows for the further sophistication of nuclear weapons and permits the technological arms race.

In the view of my delegation, the singular value of the Soviet proposal resides in the fact that it proposes to go much further --- in fact, all the way --- to put up an effective barrier to further technological development of the most lethal weapons of mass destruction known to man today.

Following the non-proliferation Treaty, a concerted action of all the nuclear-weapon Powers in erecting that barrier would significantly reduce the dangers inherent in the existing arsenals of nuclear weapons. Further progress towards the elimination of the scourge of nuclear threat from international life could then lead to actual disarmament, the physical reduction of those arsenals or the prohibition of their use. For this reason, we assess this Soviet initiative as a qualitatively new move in the field of disarmament efforts.

The question of a comprehensive test ban has for many years been one of the most pressing postulates on the disarmament agenda of the international community. The new initiative of the Soviet Government fully responds to these postulates. By providing for complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, it meets the two essential and, indeed, inseparable elements: comprehensiveness in scope and in application. In other words, the proposal concerns the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and by all States.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

In our view, the proposal to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests fully responds to the appeals of the recent Conference of Foreign Ministers of the non-aligned States held in Lima, as well as the latest session of the Inter-Parliamentary Union held in London. Aiming as it does at solving once and for all the question of a comprehensive test ban, it also corresponds to and meets the sentiments and opinions voiced during the non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference held in Geneva last May. In its Final Declaration, the Conference specifically recognized that

"... the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race."

(NPT/CONF/35/I, annex I, p. 8)

Since the concept of a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests fully accords as well with numerous General Assembly resolutions, it is appropriate for the Assembly to give this proposal the sympathetic and careful consideration which it clearly deserves. In that process we must keep uppermost in our minds that, notwithstanding the uncontested importance of partial solutions and unilateral restraints, as long as any nuclear-weapon testing is conducted there will be the ever-present risk the Pandora's box might just be cracked open one day.

Bearing in mind that the practical implementation of the initiative submitted in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707 depends on the concerted action of all nuclear-weapon States, it is only fitting and proper that operative paragraph 2 of that draft resolution:

"Calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations not later than 31 March 1976 with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to inform the General Assembly of the United Nations of the results of the negotiations at its thirty-first session."

In our view, such a procedure would be the most direct and purposeful approach to a final and complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests. For those reasons, the Polish delegation believes that the First Committee will extend its full support to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.707. This will be a major decision in keeping with the responsibility of all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, for world peace and security.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

By coming out with an initiative concerning the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons --- an idea which was originally put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, last June --- the Soviet Union has formulated a proposal which, in our view, can and should become the starting-point for the elaboration, through a process of appropriate multilateral negotiations, of an international juridically binding instrument.

While barring the emergence of new weapons, such an instrument --- as the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, states in the explanatory memorandum (A/10243) --- should not create obstacles to the economic, scientific and technological progress of the States parties. This new step towards the containment of the technological arms race would be fully consonant with the present philosophy of disarmament negotiations whereby the main thrust of disarmament efforts goes along two principal lines:

First, to limit and bring about meaningful reductions of the existing military potential, as was the case with the elaboration of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons, and what is at stake in the USSR-United States of America Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as well as in the Vienna talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Secondly, to prevent the arms race from spreading to new environments or regions, as was the case with such previously concluded agreements as the Antarctic, Outer Space, Non-Proliferation and Sea-Bed treaties, or the Draft Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, which is currently the subject of consideration in the Geneva Disarmament Committee.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

While the merits of the first approach are self-evident, we fully appreciate and welcome whatever progress can be made along the second line of approach. We find it plain common sense that in fire-fighting it is necessary also to prevent the neighbouring roofs from being engulfed by the fire.

If it is true that, as the saying goes, "war begins in the minds of men", then public opinion has good reason to be increasingly concerned by the threat to international peace and security inherent in the potential abuse of the achievements of science and technology for the purposes of war. We have to remember that according to some estimates there are as many as 400,000 first-class scientific minds employed in military laboratories around the world directly or indirectly involved in research and development work on new armouries of ever more lethal weapons. The fact that such pursuits are carried on in the secrecy of research institutes should not deter or discourage us from striving to erect fail-safe barriers against the abuse of science and technology for the purposes of war. What is uncharted and unexplored today may not be so in the near future. As we are only too well aware, when new technology is developed and a weapons system deployed, vested interests appear, and to halt and control the situation at that stage is as difficult as trying to stop the spinning wheel. After grappling for years with the arsenals of the known and firmly established weapons of mass destruction, we must not hesitate to act before weapons infinitely more dangerous than anything known today are developed and perfected and start rolling off the assembly lines.

In the view of the Polish delegation, the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons would be yet another important pre-emptive measure which would once and for all deny to the arms race a vast area of scientific and technological research. As proposed in the Soviet initiative such research should be reserved solely for man's welfare, not for his destruction.

It is quite clear that this Committee, in view of its primarily political character as well as of its heavy agenda of about 20 disarmament items, cannot be tempted to deal substantively with the intricate technical problems involved in a detailed examination of the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We believe, therefore, that in view of its recent positive experience of dealing, with the

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

assistance of experts, with the similar problem of the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) is the most suitable organ to be entrusted with the task of working out the text of an appropriate agreement along the lines of the Soviet proposal annexed to the draft resolution.

Thus we consider as fully justified the request in paragraph 3 of the draft resolution requesting the CCD:

"... to proceed as soon as possible to work out the text of such an agreement and to submit a report on the results achieved for consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session." (A/C.1/L.711, p. 2)

Not only does such a request outline the most logical course of action to be taken by the General Assembly, it would also be sui generis, a vote of sustained confidence in the CCD.

For those reasons Poland is prepared to work actively both at the United Nations and in the CCD to facilitate the adoption of the measures envisaged in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.711. Our support for that constructive and imaginative concept stems from our determination to promote positive processes on the international scene and to enhance the sense of security everywhere.

While a substantial contribution to that objective has already been made as a result of the Soviet-American negotiations and agreements worked out within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or within a multilateral framework, the special responsibility of those two big Powers for peace and security in no way diminishes or detracts from the obligation of other States, especially those possessing nuclear weapons, to contribute to and promote progress in the field of disarmament. The conditions for such concerted action are auspicious today and no State can or should abdicate its responsibility in that vital area.

By giving the two Soviet initiatives the full support which they certainly deserve, the members of this Committee will, we are convinced, be giving additional proof that they are entirely cognizant of their role in the historic progress of disarmament, which we are all helping to advance.

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

We are firmly convinced, moreover, that decisions of the current session of the General Assembly leading to the early implementation of the momentous Soviet initiatives would be conducive to the further consolidation of the process of détente throughout the world and would also facilitate progress in the limitation of the arms race and in disarmament. In a word, they would be in the vital interest of the whole of mankind.

Mr. NISHIBORI (Japan): Mr. Chairman, before giving the views of the Japanese Government on the items relating to disarmament I should like to offer my sincere congratulations to Ambassador Ghorra of Lebanon on his election to the chairmanship of this Committee. I shall take great pleasure in participating in the deliberations of the Committee under his guidance. I am convinced that the tasks confronting the Committee will be fully accomplished under his wise and outstanding leadership. I would ask you, Sir, kindly to convey my greetings to him. My hearty congratulations go also to you, Mr. Chairman and to the other Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

There is no need to recall in this Committee that this year marks the 30th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations. During the period since its foundation the Organization has played a markedly important role in the field of arms control and disarmament. That has been confirmed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Waldheim, who has stated in his introduction to this year's report on the work of the Organization that:

"Disarmament in all its ramifications has from the outset been a major objective of the United Nations and has represented, in terms of effort, perhaps the most continuous activity of the United Nations."

(A/10001/Add.1, p.4)

What, then, have been the achievements of what the Secretary-General called "the most continuous activity" of the United Nations during its first 30 years? We may have to admit that we are still only at the foot of the mountain we have to climb. That accords with the description of the present situation given by the

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

Secretary-General himself in the introduction to the report to which I have just referred, when he said:

"That no decisive breakthrough has been achieved can only attest to the extreme dangers which the crisis of confidence among States still constitutes for our global society."¹¹ (Ibid.)

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

However, we should not be discouraged or disappointed by the fact that no decisive breakthrough has been recorded despite our 30 years of effort. When we remind ourselves that the passage from arms control and disarmament to world peace is long and arduous, what we have accomplished in the past 30 years is not negligible. Rather, I believe that this is a time to redouble our efforts to remove the existing extreme dangers, as the Secretary-General urged, and to continue our steady and tireless progress towards the achievement of disarmament.

The statement that the most urgent task in the field of disarmament is nuclear disarmament will meet with no dissenting voices in this Committee room. I take it that there will also be no objection to considering nuclear disarmament under three headings; first, a nuclear-weapons test ban; secondly, a reduction in number, and ultimately the destruction of nuclear weapons; thirdly, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. While each of these aspects is independent, it should not be forgotten that each constitutes only one aspect of the broad question of nuclear disarmament, and that each of the three, therefore, should always be examined in conjunction with the others.

As for the first aspect, a nuclear-weapons test ban, we deplore most deeply the fact that as yet there is no certain prospect of its realization. I would call upon the States concerned to seek a sensible solution, based on a wider perspective and considerations of high statesmanship, for the problems of a comprehensive nuclear-weapons test ban, while bearing fully in mind the principle that all arms control and disarmament measures must be carried out under strict and effective international control.

It is also well known that, on the one hand, some of the States concerned say that the first requirement is the cessation of atmospheric nuclear-weapon tests by the States which are conducting those tests, and they are not ready to agree to a test ban unless all nuclear weapon States share the obligation equally, while on the other hand, other States concerned reply that they are not prepared to stop nuclear tests so long as the advance nuclear-weapon States are continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests. These diametrically opposed views leave us with little hope of ever achieving a comprehensive test ban. However, these arguments can hardly escape the accusation that each side

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

is assigning the responsibility to the other, simply to have an excuse for continuing to test nuclear weapons. I appeal to all the nuclear-weapon States to make a wise political decision, to stop putting the blame on each other, and to lay aside these arguments immediately. While I make this appeal to all the nuclear-weapon States, I feel constrained also to call upon the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union to realize the importance of their historic roles, since each of these Governments inevitably bears a tremendous responsibility in keeping with its strength.

On the other hand, I must confess my astonishment that the international standard set by the atmospheric test ban, which has been recognized as positive law for no less than 12 years, has failed to obtain universal acceptance. The voluntary acceptance of the atmospheric nuclear test ban by any additional State, however belated this step may be, would help enormously to restore the diminished confidence that international public opinion now has in that State's sincerity. For this reason, I urge those nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to accede to it as soon as possible.

As for the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, we note that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was concluded at the summit talks held between the United States and the Soviet Union in July 1974. Under this Treaty, both parties undertake to ban any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons, beginning 31 March 1976. I hope that this Treaty will be brought into force at the earliest possible date upon ratification by both parties. Furthermore, I hope that the two countries will take the initiative and expand what was agreed in the Treaty into a broader, multilateral instrument. While the underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to be conducted by both parties are to be governed by a separate agreement to be negotiated and concluded between them, I feel I am justified in expecting that an effective agreement will soon be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union which will not allow nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes to become a loophole in the Treaty restrictions on underground nuclear tests.

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

It is well known, of course, that the question of verification is the greatest technical obstacle to a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests. With regard to the detection of underground nuclear tests by seismological methods, the representative of Sweden at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposed during the summer session the holding of a meeting of experts in March next year, within the framework of the Committee. In matters relating to the problem of verification, experts from my country have been co-operating with those of such countries as Canada and Sweden in developing seismological verification methods. Against this background, we support the proposal made by Sweden, and look forward to the discussions by experts at that meeting.

In this connexion, we note that a draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests has been submitted by the Soviet Union at this Session of the General Assembly. My Government intends to study the draft treaty carefully, and will make known its views on an appropriate occasion.

(Mr. Mishibori, Japan)

Turning now to the second aspect of nuclear disarmament, that is, the reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons, we are all aware that Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are now being conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union. With regard to the much desired reduction in the number of strategic nuclear arms, a provision calling for further negotiations to this end, beginning no later than 1980 or 1981, is to be included in the SALT II agreement, according to the joint statement issued by the United States and the Soviet Union at Vladivostok. We desire earnestly that these negotiations be initiated before 1980, and that an agreement be reached as early as possible. Under the circumstances, we can only hope that a new SALT agreement will be concluded as soon as possible as a result of the further talks between the two Powers. My delegation believes that this is one of the aspects of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons which should be discussed actively in a forum in which all States are represented --- including the other nuclear-weapon States --- in the broad context of nuclear disarmament. In any case, we earnestly hope that statesmanship worthy of the highest leaders of the world will prevail in the coming talks.

The third aspect of nuclear disarmament is nuclear non-proliferation. The Review Committee of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, held in Geneva last May, was naturally very important. While the Conference ended with the adoption of the Final Document, the opinions expressed and the positions taken in Geneva were far apart. The Conference was finally able to reach a consensus, under the outstanding leadership of Madame President Thorsson, because the participants, without exception, recognized that it was absolutely necessary to work for the strengthening of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime by overcoming differences of opinion and position, and thus ensure its success. I believe that this was one of the most significant lessons of the Conference.

However, as I have indicated, the considerable differences of opinion on the best way to administer the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were undeniable. What is now most needed is the renewal of our efforts to maintain and strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime, taking as the starting point the situation at the end of the first Review Conference. I would urge this course in particular on the three nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

A number of the problems raised at the Conference -- including the promotion of disarmament, strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, assuring non-proliferation, peaceful nuclear explosions and so forth -- are not issues for which solutions can be speedily found. Only when the countries concerned redouble their efforts, in concert especially with the nuclear-weapon States Parties, towards the solution of these problems, will the Non-Proliferation Treaty be made more attractive and more universal, thus eliminating differences within the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime and further strengthening that régime.

During the general debate at the Review Conference I referred to the balance of obligations and responsibilities under the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, and pointed out that, in order to achieve such a balance, it was particularly important for the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil faithfully their obligations under article VI of the Treaty, and "through accumulation of these results, eventually to remove and destroy nuclear weapons". It is for this reason that the issue of nuclear non-proliferation should be dealt with as an aspect of nuclear disarmament.

My Government has submitted to the Japanese National Diet a bill requesting it to ratify the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Miyazawa, said in his statement in the general debate:

"The Government of Japan will continue its efforts to ratify this Treaty at the earliest possible date so we may participate in name as well as in fact in international efforts for nuclear non-proliferation".

As was pointed out by the Secretary-General in his Introduction to his annual report, "The danger of nuclear proliferation not only remains, but has increased". (A/10001/Add.1, p. 7) Attention has focused with good reason upon peaceful nuclear explosions; understandably, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held a series of discussions concentrating on this subject in response to resolution 3261 D (XXIX), adopted by the General Assembly last year.

As a result of our deliberations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, I believe that the following has become very clear.

The most fundamental characteristic common to devices optimized for peaceful applications, and those optimized for military purposes, is that both types release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light

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package in a period measured in millionths of a second. Because of this inherent characteristic, all nuclear explosive devices, whether in their crudest or most highly sophisticated forms, take on military significance. All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could also be employed in some fashion as weapons.

If we start from this premise that peaceful nuclear explosion programmes inevitably offer military benefits, their arms control implications become self-evident. First, in order to make a comprehensive test ban effective, there are only two options to choose from: either to impose a complete ban on peaceful nuclear explosions, or to authorize peaceful nuclear explosions under certain conditions, including strict international control. In other words, if peaceful nuclear explosions are to be incorporated into a comprehensive test ban, a verification system is required which ensures that no State can improve its weapons as a result of its peaceful nuclear explosion activities. This is a problem which must be solved prior to an agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

Second, it is clear that in a programme to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the proliferation of peaceful nuclear explosives is in no way different from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, therefore, it must be emphasized that non-nuclear-weapon States wishing to gain potential economic benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions should act in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the principle behind this article.

(Mr. Nishibori, Japan)

Accordingly, I consider it necessary that preparatory steps be taken promptly by the International Atomic Energy Agency and by the States concerned, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, with a view to concluding the international arrangement or arrangements for the concrete procedures of making available the peaceful-explosion services provided for in article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. I avail myself of this opportunity to appeal to all the non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce, of their own accord, the laissez-faire, so to speak, principle regarding peaceful nuclear explosions, and thus set an example by showing a noble spirit of self-restraint. At the same time, it must be emphasized that self-restraint on the part of nuclear-weapon States with regard to all nuclear explosions, including those for peaceful purposes, is equally required to maintain the balance between mutual responsibilities and obligations.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Mr. Miyazawa, mentioned the question of peaceful nuclear explosions in his statement in the general debate in the General Assembly. He said:

"I urgently request that the current session of the General Assembly instruct the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other appropriate international bodies to mobilize their expertise for the purpose of determining how the international community can control nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes." (A/PV.2358, p. 22)

I earnestly hope that the discussions in this Committee will take up this goal.

While I have now stated the views of my Government on three interrelated aspects of ways of achieving nuclear disarmament, I wish to discuss also the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in connexion with nuclear non-proliferation. Clearly, the keen international attention that this question has recently aroused originated in the desire of non-nuclear-weapon States to strengthen their security. Their earnest desire should be fully noted.

The special report, worked out by the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD in response to resolution 3261 F (XXIX), adopted at the twenty-ninth session, deserves

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careful attention as the first authoritative and comprehensive study of this problem. I wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the experts who carried out this difficult task, and particularly to the Chairman, Mr. Korhonen of Finland, whose able and judicious guidance contributed immeasurably to the work of their group.

As we see from the experts' report, they agreed that, in the regions where appropriate conditions for a nuclear-weapon-free zone exist, the establishment of such a zone would contribute to the achievement of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to halting the nuclear arms race and to strengthening international security, and also that the creation of such a zone should be effected in accordance with international law, the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the fundamental principles guiding the mutual relations of States. On the other hand, the fact that agreement was not reached on such important questions as the scope of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, what is to be banned, and the rights and the obligations of zonal and nuclear-weapon States, and that consequently the report simply enumerated the assertions put forward by various experts, showed that complicated and difficult factors are involved. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that many experts supported such important principles as the following: that nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes should be banned together with nuclear-weapons, and that nuclear-weapon-free zones should be set up in accordance with the principles of international law, including the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas. For our part, we submit with all emphasis that the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone not only should contribute to the strengthening of security within a specific region, but also should be compatible with the objective of strengthening international security on a global scale with the requisite peace-keeping mechanism. We are convinced, therefore, that any idea of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone, including the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, which was suggested by Fiji and New Zealand last August, should take these factors fully into consideration.

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Naturally, we should not underrate the urgency and the importance of disarmament measures other than those for nuclear disarmament. As for the question of banning chemical weapons, which are extremely dangerous to the security of the human race, we regret that there was no significant development in the CCD this year, despite the fact that steady efforts are being made there, as shown by the submission this year of relevant working papers from a number of countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, Canada, and my own. Japan sincerely desires that significant progress be made next year, and hopes and intends to continue to make as great a contribution as possible.

One of the most heartening events at the summer session of the CCD was the submission by the United States and the Soviet Union of their identical texts for a convention on the banning of the military use of environmental-modification techniques. In view of the implications of this question, my country will study the draft convention and will participate positively in the CCD's deliberations on it next year.

No less significance should be attached to the questions of the international comparison of military expenditures and of controlling conventional arms, in particular the transfer of such arms to other States. We welcome the fact that the United States delegation took the initiative on these questions in the CCD, and we look forward to follow-up action in the near future.

Disarmament questions have vast ramifications, and in recent years their technical aspects have become more and more complex. For this reason, negotiations on disarmament questions require highly specialized knowledge and analysis of some of the most advanced technical problems. This is a situation which, in view of the progress in technology, is unavoidable. It is probably inevitable that the importance of special and minor technical problems will increase. On the other hand, we should not become so engrossed in technical problems that we lose sight of our original political objectives. In other words, the more technically complicated the problems become, the more important will be the political judgements that are made regarding these problems. Since I believe that this is the most important factor in the solution of current disarmament questions, I shall conclude by repeating my appeal to world leaders to take these facts to their hearts.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank the representative of Japan for his kind words about the officers of the Committee, and particularly for those about our Chairman. I will not fail to communicate his congratulations to Ambassador Ghorra as soon as he is back in the Committee room.

Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): This has been a year of some landmarks in the disarmament field. It is the year of the first Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a year in which the Treaty was strengthened by a number of important new accessions and by a general affirmation by the international community of its continued relevance. For New Zealand it is a year, the first for some time, in which there has been no nuclear test explosion in the atmosphere in the South Pacific -- a development which has caused us no little satisfaction. It is a year in which, for the first time, the independent countries of the South Pacific have joined together to bring a regional disarmament initiative before the Assembly.

The principal part of my statement today will consist in an introduction and explanation of our regional proposal. Let me emphasize, however, that there is no lessening of New Zealand's determination to continue to press for universal disarmament measures or of our support for other valuable proposals for which we have worked at previous sessions and will work again with equal enthusiasm this year. Regional disarmament can be no more than a supplement to universal disarmament measures. In a sense it is a measure of the frustration so widely felt throughout the world at the slow progress of efforts to bring about disarmament across the board, and especially nuclear disarmament, that regional disarmament initiatives have developed their obvious present attraction.

The causes of this feeling of frustration are obvious enough. Small countries like New Zealand, without the capacity and still less the desire to make or acquire weapons of mass destruction, can do little to prevent the great Powers from piling weapon upon weapon on their stockpiles. Year after year the non-nuclear States, the great majority of the membership of this Organization, have looked on as powerless spectators while these stockpiles have increased to a capacity whereby they could destroy humanity several times over. We have followed the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the two super-Powers. It is a great disappointment that there has been little substantive progress made this year. In the meantime the super-Powers together with the other nuclear-weapon States are continuing their testing programmes and, with the impending coming into force of the threshold Treaty, seem even to be stepping up the pace of

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their programmes. Admittedly there has been some limited movement. We can accept that the stabilizing of strategic relationships between the two super-Powers is a complex and delicate process. We concede that it is not realistic to lay down time-tables for the various stages of these bilateral negotiations on disarmament and arms control. Nevertheless, given the scale and urgency of the problem, we are obliged to conclude that what is most needed is an additional infusion of the essential political will.

New Zealand continues to consider that, in attacking the problem of nuclear disarmament on all fronts, one major goal must remain the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The total prohibition of all nuclear-weapon testing, coupled with acceptable verification arrangements, is perhaps the single most important contribution which the international community can make at this stage to the halting of the arms race. We have therefore noted with interest the draft resolution submitted by one of the super-Powers about the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We are prepared to judge this or any other proposal for a treaty on its merits. It is our hope that no nuclear Power will treat this issue in a superficial way, as a means of scoring some kind of propaganda advantage. Equally, we hope that no proposal will either be put forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis or rejected out of hand because it does not meet a set of fixed preconditions. We shall be obliged to judge the sincerity of the nuclear Powers by their willingness to negotiate seriously on the points of difference which still remain between them. Those points of difference are not such, in our judgement, as to justify the indefinite continuance of an impasse on this issue.

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions is one which we consider particularly urgent. New Zealand has yet to be convinced that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions are likely to outweigh the immense health and environmental problems they create. Moreover, we note the view expressed in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) that all nuclear explosive devices, regardless of their particular design features or intended application, can be used as nuclear weapons. The discussion at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference indicated that in this controversial field more study and evaluation are urgently needed. We are pleased to note

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that this is being undertaken. But in our judgement more is required. In view of the urgency of the problem suggestions have been made that there should be a halt in experimentation involving peaceful nuclear explosions until it is possible for the international community to form conclusions on the basis of an impartial and responsible scientific examination on the value of such experiments. This is a realistic and practical approach to the subject and one which we hope will be actively supported by Member States.

While we continue here to debate disarmament proposals year after year, human beings continue to devise more terrifying ways in which to destroy or maim each other, not only with nuclear weapons but with new and horrible developments of so-called conventional weapons. The delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has drawn to our attention the possibility of radically new weapons and weapon systems of mass destruction, and has advocated the conclusion of a treaty to prohibit the development of such weapons. Moreover, there are already stockpiled in national armouries many weapons of an indiscriminate and inhumane nature which can cause unnecessary suffering both in their military application and when used in situations where civilian populations are present. Useful work directed towards limiting or prohibiting the use of such weapons has continued during the year, especially at the Conference on international humanitarian law in armed conflicts, which is to hold a further session in 1976. We welcome such positive steps as the ratification by three nuclear States and the entry into force of the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons. Our delegation will continue to support within the General Assembly all constructive measures that will prohibit or restrict the use of indiscriminate and unnecessarily cruel weapons and the development of new weapons of a similar character.

As we study the volume of material on the armaments situation we are struck by the part which commercial interests play in spreading over a wider area ever-increasing quantities of sophisticated conventional arms. It does not seem sufficient for Governments merely to deplore the increasing traffic in arms sales to areas of potential or actual conflict. We believe that the Governments of all States within whose borders such arms are produced must be

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prepared to take concrete measures to slow down the arms race and eventually bring it to a halt. Even more disturbing is the possibility that the search for commercial profit may lead to the greater spread of nuclear weapon capacity. We therefore welcome the passage in the Final Act of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference which proposes that the application of safeguards under the Treaty be extended to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not parties to the Treaty. Acceptance of this proposal by all the supplier States would be an important contribution to the containment of nuclear weapons.

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There is another way of tackling the problem of horizontal proliferation -- one in which the United Nations has been actively involved in recent years. That is the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. As the Secretary-General has commented in the introduction to his annual report,

"nuclear-weapon-free zones provide the best and the easiest means whereby non-nuclear-weapon States can, by their own initiative and effort, ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons from their territories and enhance their mutual security". (A/10001/Add.1, p. 9)

This year there are no fewer than eight agenda items concerning such zones, covering proposals in all stages of development. It is very timely therefore that one of the major disarmament documents before the Assembly should be a special report by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament containing a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This document brings together a useful body of material on the subject and will assist us in evaluating proposals before the General Assembly.

The growth of interest in a regional approach to disarmament has clearly been prompted by the disappointment of many States that there has been an absence of significant progress on a global scale.

We in New Zealand have a positive belief in the contribution that nuclear-weapon-free zones can make to world peace. In his general debate speech at the twenty-eighth session, the late Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Kirk, made the following statement:

"The small Powers may also wish to consider carefully the possibilities of partial disarmament or demilitarization on a regional basis where circumstances and geography make it appropriate. One of my Government's first acts after election last year was to change New Zealand's vote at the Assembly in order to express its sympathy with the concept of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. At a recent meeting of the Commonwealth Heads of Government, New Zealand joined in a unanimous endorsement of the action of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN in adopting a declaration to make South-East Asia a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. In the words of the Commonwealth communiqué, we regard that initiative as a positive contribution towards peace and stability in that region. New Zealand

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looks with favour also on the establishment by treaty of nuclear-free zones such as that accorded by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, and we intend to consult with our Pacific neighbours about the feasibility of establishing a similar kind of nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific region." (A/PV.2129, p. 32)

Since that statement was made, New Zealand has consistently supported every proposal of this type which has come before this Assembly. Some of these proposals go further than we ourselves at present envisage in our own part of the world. We believe, however, that every State in every region has the right to do what it can to free itself from the danger of nuclear conflict over which it can have no control. Every region whose Member States have a common approach has the right to formulate proposals for regional disarmament and to expect the most careful and sympathetic consideration of such proposals by the international community.

New Zealand's support for a regional approach is demonstrated by the fact that we have this year co-sponsored a draft resolution about the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The text can be found in document A/C.1/L.719. I should like at this stage to introduce the draft on behalf of the regional co-sponsors, Fiji, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, and also to make some comments about the way in which my Government views the proposal.

One point on which there seems to be a virtual consensus -- and which is stated as a principle in the study by the Committee on Disarmament -- is that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned. It is a principle to which we attach great importance and to which effect has clearly been given in this case.

In July this year the Heads of Government of the South Pacific Forum met to discuss, among other subjects, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The member countries of the South Pacific Forum comprise all independent and self-governing States within the area -- namely, Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Western Samoa. In the final communiqué issued at the end of the meeting the Heads of Government included the following statement:

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"The Forum reiterated its strong opposition to nuclear weapons tests in all environments and called for renewed international efforts towards a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and general and complete disarmament. In particular, the Forum emphasized the importance of keeping the region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict and commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim."

As other regions have done, the South Pacific countries considered that the first step towards the establishment of a zone in their area would be to secure the endorsement of the concept in principle by the United Nations. Since a number of members of the Forum are small countries which are not Members of the United Nations, the responsibility for putting the matter before the General Assembly has been assumed by three which are Members -- Fiji, New Zealand, and, I am glad to say, one of the newest Members, Papua New Guinea. It is significant that Papua New Guinea's first political act on being admitted to membership was to co-sponsor this proposal.

The draft resolution we have submitted in document A/C.1/L.719 is a simple one with a simple objective. The co-sponsors seek an endorsement by the General Assembly of the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific and ask the General Assembly to invite the countries concerned to carry forward consultations on the subject. We express the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, will co-operate fully, since we believe that their co-operation is essential for the full implementation of our objective. The co-sponsors conceive their initiative as being complementary to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by which almost every member of the South Pacific Forum is bound. We are encouraged by the fact that the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons declared that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone represented an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons and could contribute significantly to the security of those States.

We have been further encouraged by the positive approach which for the most part the nuclear-weapon States have adopted to the concept of nuclear-weapon-

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free zones. For example, at the twenty-ninth session the United States delegation put forward a number of criteria on the basis of which the United States would feel able to encourage the development of regional arrangements which contribute to non-proliferation objectives. First, the initiative should be taken by the States in the region concerned. Secondly, the zone should preferably include all States in the area whose participation is deemed important. Thirdly, the creation of the zone should not disturb necessary security arrangements. Fourthly, provision should be made for adequate verification. Fifthly, any regional treaty should not permit non-nuclear States in the area to develop peaceful nuclear explosive devices.

Very similar criteria have been advanced by the United Kingdom. My delegation sees no difficulty in meeting these criteria -- indeed, the first criterion has already been met. We should be more than willing to discuss with the nuclear-weapon States how reasonable criteria of these kinds should be put into effect.

In the informal discussions that my delegation has had with other delegations which have been kind enough to express interest in our initiative, and whose support we have solicited, a number of questions have been put to us, very natural and relevant questions, about the details of our proposal.

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In offering the following comments on some of the questions most frequently asked, I should like to make two things clear. The first is that I am speaking only for New Zealand. The countries of the region have so far talked about the concept only in general terms and there has been no attempt as yet to grapple with specific issues. We have envisaged -- and this point is reflected in our draft resolution -- that the detailed consultation on these issues should take place only after we have received the endorsement and backing of the Assembly. Individual countries may thus have different ideas on how the proposal should be developed. They will of course have complete freedom to express those ideas; indeed, we expect that the zone will take shape from the consensus of the views of the countries concerned as it emerges. The second thing I want to make clear is that our own ideas about the zone are neither fixed nor rigid. We realize that we are embarking on a process of exploration and we have no precise blueprint to lay before you. We realize too that, as the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) committee of experts has shown, some of the issues involved are complex and we do not delude ourselves that the process of consultation will be short or simple. We can look for guidance from the zones that have already been established in Antarctica and Latin America, but that does not mean that we shall be unwilling to consider new approaches that may prove more suitable to the particular characteristics of our region.

The questions we have been most often asked concern the geographical scope of the proposed zone, the means by which it will come into effect and, since the South Pacific contains a very high proportion of sea to land, the consequences of establishing the zone for traditional freedoms of the seas.

These are all highly relevant questions which will have to be worked out in future consultations.

As New Zealand sees it, a South Pacific zone is by definition in the South Pacific, that is, south of the equator. Its southern boundary would presumably coincide with the northern boundary of the Antarctic Treaty area, that is, 60 degrees south. As for its eastern and western boundaries, these would undoubtedly be a matter for discussion and negotiation. We note, of course, that there is already a nuclear-weapon-free zone Treaty area to the east, although that Treaty is not yet fully in force over the whole geographical area defined in the Treaty.

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I think that the most important point for me to stress is that, as we envisage it, participation in the zone would be a wholly voluntary and sovereign act by all the States concerned. Naturally, we would hope and expect that all the States situated wholly within the area would wish to participate. But, as to States on the periphery of the area, the question whether they would regard themselves as within our zone, or as part of another zone, or would not wish to regard themselves as in any zone would be entirely a matter for their own choice and decision.

Thus it is not possible to give any final or categorical answer now to the question of what would be the boundaries of a South Pacific zone.

The second question concerns the means by which the zone is to be established: what is to be its legal status. Although this is obviously a matter for determination in future consultations, we are naturally influenced by the fact that there are two nuclear-free areas bordering on the South Pacific which have been successfully established by international treaty. The Antarctic has been completely demilitarized in one of the most successful and faithfully observed treaty arrangements to have been concluded since the Second World War. It was, of course, relatively easy to demilitarize Antarctica because of its remoteness and the absence of a permanent population. We have been impressed, however, by the ingenuity with which the Latin American countries have pioneered the first inhabited nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Treaty of Tlatelolco makes what we see as essential provision for the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States, but at the same time allows the countries of the region to give effect to the provisions of the Treaty in their own territories while awaiting the ratifications by nuclear-weapon States necessary to bring the Treaty fully into force.

It is of course an unpalatable fact that the conclusion of a treaty, from the preliminary preparations to final ratification, is a lengthy and even cumbersome process. It is nevertheless a process that has stood the test of time. On the one hand, it produces binding commitments; on the other, those commitments are voluntarily given. No State is obliged to forgo any right that it now has under traditional international law, except by its own free and sovereign decision.

We would not be surprised therefore if the full establishment of a South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone took some years to implement. Nor would we be disconcerted or discouraged by that fact. Although work on it was begun

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12 years ago, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is not yet fully in force. Nevertheless, substantial progress has been made towards freeing the peoples of Latin America from the apprehension of nuclear conflict in their area. Even a partially ratified treaty brings a substantial deterrent to bear against nuclear ambition -- the deterrent of neighbourly opinion.

The third question which has frequently been put to us concerns the effect of the establishment of the zone on the traditional freedoms accorded to maritime nations on the high seas. Let me emphasize again that as far as New Zealand is concerned it is not our aim arbitrarily to abridge the sovereign rights of any State. I draw attention to the statement of the Deputy Prime Minister of Fiji in the general debate in the plenary Assembly, when discussing this issue, that:

"... it is not the intention of my Government to deprive any State, against its will, of its right to free and unimpeded passage in the high seas or the right of innocent passage in other waters." (A/PV.2380, p. 38-40)

That is also the position of New Zealand. Any treaty may, of course, involve acceptance of a restriction of the sovereign rights of the parties; but to attempt to impose such a restriction on unwilling third parties is, in our view, neither proper nor realistic. Our preliminary view, therefore, is that if it were decided to proceed with a treaty this could usefully take into account the Tlatelolco precedent and provide in the first instance for entry into force in respect of the territories of States ratifying the treaty. As to a further stage, in which no nuclear weapons would be stationed anywhere in the area, this would clearly require to be accepted by all the nuclear-weapon States before it could come into effect. We would therefore envisage a need for a separate but related instrument which would come into effect only when it had been ratified by those States. We do not consider it Utopian to suggest that, if negotiations among the nuclear Powers for the limitation of the numbers and types of nuclear weapons they possess continue and are extended, agreements should also be possible to limit their deployment in ways which meet the most earnest wishes of non-nuclear States in our and other parts of the world. Nor do we consider it Utopian to urge that, in receiving proposals such as ours for regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Assembly should attach the greatest weight to the clearly expressed wishes of the

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Governments and the peoples of the region in question. There can be no doubt that the peoples of every region -- not only the South Pacific -- desperately want to be rid of the looming threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war.

The then Prime Minister of New Zealand, addressing the General Assembly in 1973, put it like this:

"In the absence of a comprehensive agreement, accepted by all the nuclear Powers and backed by the overwhelming weight of world opinion, there must remain an acute and continuing danger that still more countries will seek to acquire nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons measurably advances the certainty of nuclear war, and only a universal ban on weapons testing can eliminate this grave threat. I am convinced that the people of every country are sick of war and the threat of war. They do not want nuclear weapons and their attendant threats. They want peace and they want more progress towards it. Is it impossible for Governments to be moved by the desires of ordinary people?" (A/PV.2129, p. 28-30)

It is timely to repeat that question now: Is it impossible for Governments to be moved by the desires of ordinary people?

The CHAIRMAN: I am confident that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution referred to by the representative of New Zealand will bear with and forgive the printers of the English version of today's Journal, which has a small typographical error in the listing.

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): The heavily loaded agenda of subjects to be discussed by the First Committee this year includes two new proposals: namely, item 122, on the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban; and item 126, on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons. Both items were included in the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union. It was no mere chance: the Soviet Union has for long years constantly put forward new proposals for consideration by the General Assembly in order to promote the cause of disarmament and to remove the threat of new world wars farther and farther away from mankind's daily worries. One of the two proposals is the focal-point of disarmament in our world of today, while the other seeks to block the way well in advance to the potential emergence of devices of mass destruction in the future.

It is not by chance that nuclear disarmament belongs high in the strenuous efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament. Most of the 19 items on disarmament -- 10, to be exact -- that are up for discussion in the First Committee are directly concerned with nuclear disarmament. As a first step, we are trying to get rid of nuclear weapons, already known to represent the most terrible destructive potential and to be available in stocks large enough to annihilate mankind several times over.

The partial nuclear test ban Treaty, signed at Moscow in 1963, was the first great step forward towards the cessation of atomic weapon tests by prohibiting test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. This Treaty, along with its favourable political effect, has served largely to reduce radioactive fall-out, which had increased during the period of atmospheric tests.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

After a series of long discussions in different forums, another step forward was made at the Soviet-United States summit meeting in 1974, when an agreement was reached under the 150-kiloton-threshold test Treaty. This was followed by exchanges of views on the regulation of test explosions for peaceful purposes.

However, the existing results do not add up to a complete solution, because: first, testing below the 150-kiloton threshold would be permissible even after the threshold treaty of 1974 becomes effective, secondly, because several States, including nuclear Powers and near-nuclear States, have not yet signed the limited test ban Treaty, nor does the threshold Treaty in its present form embrace all nuclear Powers.

As a direct consequence of this, the number of nuclear weapons does not cease to increase in our days. Quantitative stockpiling is accompanied by a no-less-dangerous perfection of weapons, which is going on without a moment's let-up. There is good reason for concern that in the wake of scientific-technological advance more and more countries will become capable of producing nuclear weapons. An indispensable condition for the development and perfection of nuclear weapons lies in studying the effects of the explosive power of existing weapons, that is, in the test explosion of nuclear weapons. Consequently, realization of a comprehensive test ban would be a decisive step in hindering the horizontal and vertical proliferation of these types of weapons and in the limitation of armaments, in addition to reducing the danger of nuclear war, and could be a point of departure for effective disarmament and the reduction of military expenditures, while it would also promote international détente and strengthen peace and security.

This is why we attach extreme importance to the Soviet initiatives to prepare and conclude an international treaty, with the broad participation of States, that would provide for the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests in all environments and by all States.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The Soviet draft treaty may provide a good basis for starting negotiations in the future. While I do not consider it my task to give a comprehensive analysis of the draft, I should like to make a special point of two of its implications.

First, the problem of verification has, over a long period of time, served, in most cases, as a pretext for some Member States to prevent a comprehensive test ban. On the other hand, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in other forums, there was a growing consensus that a comprehensive test ban could be adequately verified by national means of control, primarily by seismological methods. The international exchange of seismic data, as provided for in the draft, is particularly useful, because it implies a certain degree of collective control and collective confidence in regard to compliance with the treaty.

Secondly, the Conference on the Non-proliferation Treaty reflected the interest shown by a great number of States in the potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Another positive feature of the Soviet draft is that it reaffirms the admissibility of such explosions, while offering an appropriate arrangement for non-nuclear States, in keeping with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and provides for negotiations and the conclusion of a separate agreement in relation to nuclear Powers.

The Soviet proposal is particularly topical, for it has been made at a time when the peoples of the world demand with increasing insistence the discontinuance of the armaments race and the prevention of the further stockpiling of weapons as a physical threat of war. It is further topical because the prevailing international situation creates favourable conditions for carrying this highly important effort to a successful conclusion at long last. We believe that those who are really willing to take a successful step towards disarmament can hardly say no to the Soviet proposal.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

At the request of the Soviet Union, the General Assembly included in the agenda of its thirtieth session the item entitled "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and of new systems of such weapons". My delegation attaches equally great significance to the adoption of this second Soviet proposal, as was stated by the Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic in the general debate.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

Recent years have seen several agreements on arms limitation, but armament is still proceeding. The fear is therefore warranted that armament, while curbed in one field, might force its way in another field.

Present-day experience shows that, on the one hand, science has been put at the service of armaments in many countries, while, on the other, the results of scientific research have become the main lever for developing the technique of warfare. Scientific and technological advance opens up boundless possibilities for putting the forces of nature to work for the welfare of mankind. However, there is enough evidence to show that part of the research results, even those of a binary nature, which were originally sought for peaceful uses, are sooner or later added to the arsenal of armaments.

The types of weapons thus emerging are usually a source of even greater threat to mankind. Their destructive power may exceed manifold that of the conventional weapons, defence against them is difficult, if not impossible, their use is of lasting or incalculable consequences and has adverse or catastrophic effects on the fate of future generations.

The prohibition of these weapons is all the more justified, since most of them are offensive weapons apt to be used for aggressive purposes and can hardly, or only in very exceptional cases, be employed to halt the aggressor.

It holds true also in this case that preventive steps should be taken before these weapons come to form part of the established weaponry of States, because their producers, who have probably created them for purposes of war, are hardly likely to renounce the use or threat of use of such weapons.

An agreement prohibiting the development and manufacture of all new weapons of mass destruction, whenever the conditions arise to make it possible, would also promote the release of material resources and creative intellectual capabilities and capacities. There would evidently be less spending on research into the possibilities of their use in war if they could not, in effect, be used except by breach of a valid and internationally recognized treaty which would also enjoy the support of public opinion.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The establishment of new types of weapons and their systems would probably be within the possibilities of only a few countries with huge material resources and with an enormous research capacity. It is particularly heartening for us that the relevant initiative has been made precisely by a country which may itself come to possess such types of weapons. My country is not interested, of course, in the manufacture of such weapons, but it does have great interest in seeing that armaments will not be extended to include any new type of weapons of mass destruction or to systems of such weapons.

We similarly agree with the view that the development of science and technology for peaceful purposes should not be obstructed by the treaty and that research achievements should be made available to all countries.

This aspect must be emphasized all the more because a large part of the weapons to be created in future is likely to be of a binary nature, so that it will become necessary to reach an agreement that would raise an insurmountable obstacle to the use of such weapons for war purposes but would permit research for peaceful purposes and related co-operation in the stage of both development and utilization.

We support the provisions of operative paragraph 3 of the Soviet draft resolution as well, according to which the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to come to an agreement on the text of the treaty, all the more so since that Committee has on several occasions given ample proof of its competence on disarmament problems.

May I express the hope of my delegation that this new Soviet proposal will receive the same unanimous support from the First Committee and the General Assembly as did last year's Soviet initiative on the prohibition of environmental warfare, which in the course of one year was embodied in a Soviet-American draft treaty of the same wording.

I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to comment on other related items on our agenda at a later stage.

Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): It gives me great pleasure to participate once again in the important deliberations of this Committee.

The Pakistan delegation and I personally derive immense satisfaction at the election of His Excellency Edouard Ghorra as Chairman of this important forum. We are confident that his wisdom and sagacity, assisted by his collaborators and you, Sir, will enable this Committee to discharge its high responsibilities with efficiency and dispatch.

At this mid-point in the Disarmament Decade, the goal of general and complete disarmament remains the far-off divine event that it was at its beginning. Despite all the negotiations, whether bilateral or in international forums, the peoples of the world are less secure than ever before. Three hundred thousand million dollars are expended annually on weapons, and all this in a world two thirds of which is affected with various degrees of hunger and poverty.

Pakistan believes that the efforts of the world community to move towards disarmament must proceed on two converging planes. On the one hand, it is incumbent on the super-Powers, followed closely by other militarily significant States, to abate the intensity of the arms race. On the other, the non-nuclear States, particularly the countries of the third world, must lend strong impetus to the disarmament process by their own collective and regional initiatives.

The past year has witnessed developments which have heightened concern about the danger of nuclear proliferation through the diversion of peaceful nuclear programmes towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

Pakistan fully supports the general desire expressed at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for more effective safeguard and control procedures over peaceful nuclear programmes. But we are constrained to note that the Review Conference failed to face the realities of the new situation arising from the enlargement of the nuclear club.

The Non Proliferation Treaty Review Conference revealed, above all, that non-nuclear States are increasingly impatient with the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. While they themselves, by eschewing the nuclear option, have fulfilled their commitment, the nuclear Powers parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty have not met their obligation to pursue in good faith the objectives of general and complete disarmament.

It is now essential that the major Powers, and particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, undertake urgent steps in at least three areas: first, a significant, if phased, reduction in the size of their nuclear arsenals and strategic delivery systems; secondly, an agreement to refrain from the further sophistication of nuclear and other weapons; and, thirdly, an undertaking that they will refrain from the threat or the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

My delegation hopes that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements will result in a reduction in the level of nuclear armaments possessed by the two super-Powers and will not turn out to have been agreements for controlled expansion of their strategic offensive systems.

Some progress has been made this year in other areas of arms control and disarmament. Pakistan welcomes the ratification of the 1925 Convention on Bacteriological Weapons by the United States.

We have also examined with interest the identical draft conventions submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) by the Soviet Union and the United States on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. Our concern is that the provision in that draft treaty for the continuation of "peaceful research" may enable the development of means which could easily be turned to weapons use.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

The Pakistan delegation has also noted the initiative taken by the Soviet Union to prevent the development of new and more terrible weapons of mass destruction. This proposal merits careful study and extensive consultations. We look forward to its discussion in the current debate, as well as early next year in the CCD.

Pakistan has consistently held the view that the most urgent measure required to restrain both vertical and horizontal proliferation is a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. Therefore, my delegation supports, in principle, the proposal made by the Soviet Union this year for the elaboration of a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. We shall of course examine the provisions of the draft treaty with the care they deserve. For the present, I shall confine my remarks to a few preliminary observations in regard to some of them.

First, we presume that the term "nuclear-weapon States" in article III of the draft treaty connotes the five nuclear-weapon States referred to in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It would, however, seem to be necessary not to leave any doubt in this regard and to include this specific clarification in the draft treaty itself. Failing this, the present language of article III could conceivably allow the inclusion in its purview of any number of nuclear-weapon States in the years to come.

We are also concerned over the exclusion of peaceful nuclear explosions from the ban on underground nuclear testing. We agree with the proposal that national means of verification would be adequate to ensure compliance with a comprehensive test ban. However, this would be so only if peaceful nuclear explosions are also prohibited. National means of verification would hardly be able to ensure compliance with the ban if tests could be conducted in the guise of peaceful nuclear explosions.

My delegation is afraid that the stipulation in paragraph 3 of article VI of the draft convention, about the need for ratification by all nuclear Powers before the treaty can come into force, may delay its implementation. We believe that, like the partial test-ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a comprehensive test ban should not be made conditional on its acceptance by all nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

Another issue of equal importance for the prospects of disarmament is the need to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. As I stated last year, at the Committee's 2026th meeting:

"... measures to ensure effectively the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States which are not assured of a deterrent against the nuclear threat would be an important contribution to the improvement of the general climate for nuclear disarmament and in restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons." (2026th meeting, page 79-80)

My delegation was gratified by the unanimous adoption of resolution 3261 G (XXIX) by the Assembly last year, calling for the urgent consideration in all relevant forums of the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The acceptance of that recommendation by all five nuclear-weapon Powers inspired the hope that early consideration would be given to the concrete ideas which have been proposed in this regard. However, so far, there has been no positive response from most of the nuclear-weapon Powers.

The non-nuclear-weapon States have, during the current year, once again called for credible and effective assurances against nuclear attack or threat. This was apparent from the extensive nature of the assurances demanded in the separate Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty proposed by the non-nuclear States at the Review Conference. We regret that that call elicited no response from the nuclear Powers parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Perhaps the proposals were too ambitious in requiring the nuclear-weapon States to undertake obligations which they consider as too far reaching or contrary to their present defence strategies.

My delegation believes that if obligations of even a limited nature can be accepted by the nuclear-weapon Powers this would help to lessen the sense of insecurity felt by the non-nuclear-weapon States. There is a growing consensus that it should be possible for the nuclear-weapon Powers, without in any way prejudicing their own security interests, to extend undertakings not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

However, it has been pointed out that some of the strategic doctrines of the super-Powers, relating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact Alliances, do not rule out the possibility of a nuclear strike against a non-nuclear State of the opposing bloc. We regret that this should be so. However, in order to break the 10-year deadlock on the issue of "negative guarantees" by the super-Powers to the non-nuclear-weapon States, the Pakistan delegation would be willing to contemplate a formulation which would take into account the preoccupations of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries about their different strategies.

In this context, I should like to draw the attention of Member States to the formula for security assurances recommended by the Jeddah Conference last July, calling for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers not to use or threaten the use of nuclear weapons, in any circumstances, against those non-nuclear-weapon States which are not protected by treaty guarantees from a nuclear Power against nuclear threat or attack. I should like to explain that that formula is not an inducement to seek insurance against nuclear threat or attack by way of military alliances. On the contrary its aim is to find a measure of security outside such alliances. No non-nuclear State, whether situated in Asia, Africa, Latin America or Europe --- excepting members of the NATO and Warsaw Pacts and States enjoying similar nuclear guarantees under treaties or agreements --- would be excluded by the formula that I have mentioned. In commending that proposal for adoption, the Pakistan delegation is motivated by a sense of realism to aim for what is achievable in the matter of negative guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States in the existing circumstances.

At the same time, Pakistan believes that the non-nuclear-weapon States must not depend solely on the great Powers to ensure their security in the nuclear era. Acting in a spirit of self-reliance, they should themselves also take initiatives towards regional security measures against threats emanating from within or without their respective regions.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones has at last begun to receive widespread acceptance and support. That conclusion is the essence of the study on nuclear-weapon-free zones conducted by a group of governmental experts in response to resolution 3261 F (XXIX) adopted by the General Assembly last year. The study lends particular force to the recommendation by the Secretary-General in the Introduction to his annual report that:

"... the interested countries of the different regions ... consult together with a view to the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones in their respective regions"

and his hope that

"... the nuclear Powers would consider undertaking the measures necessary on their part to facilitate and promote the success of such zones." (A/10001/Add.1, page 9)

The principles which underlie that statement are unexceptionable and should be endorsed by the General Assembly.

Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 3265 A and B (XXIX) on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia, the two parts of the resolution proposed respectively by India and Pakistan. Read together, the two parts of the resolution, first, stipulated that the initiative for the creation of the zone in South Asia should emanate from the States of the region; secondly, endorsed the concept of such a zone in principle; and thirdly, invited the States of the region to initiate the necessary consultations for that purpose. Some consultations have taken place among the regional States in the search for ways and means of achieving the essential objective of the resolution: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia.

While there may be differences among the South Asian countries as to whether that should be achieved through the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone or in some other way, there is a common commitment on the part of each State that it will not acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. My delegation is not unhopeful that through further consultations the States of South Asia will find it possible to agree on the modalities and procedures

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

by which their common determination not to exercise the nuclear-weapons option can be jointly and formally expressed. We hope the Assembly will encourage them in that endeavour.

The importance of creating conditions of security in South Asia cannot be minimized. It is a measure of the preoccupation of the South Asian States with their security that, apart from Pakistan's proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone, Nepal has called for the declaration of its territory as a zone of peace and Sri Lanka has initiated the move for a peace zone in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan extends its full support to the realization of those goals. In line with our consistent approach to regional security and disarmament, Pakistan has emphasized that the proposed conference on the Indian Ocean must seek the simultaneous achievement of two basic and complementary aims: arrangements to establish conditions of security among the Indian Ocean States through the elaboration of a régime for the Indian Ocean and the elimination of great-Power presence and rivalry from the region. Hence we warmly endorse the view expressed recently by Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka that, to be meaningful, the concept of the peace zone in the Indian Ocean should be complemented by a commitment by the littoral and hinterland States of the region to a system of universal collective security, including the renunciation of the nuclear-weapons option.

The United Nations is an indispensable forum for harmonizing and concerting the disarmament negotiations that are being conducted in diverse forums. Disappointment at the largely sterile record of those negotiations has led certain non-nuclear States to propose the convening of a special session of the General Assembly to discuss disarmament measures. My delegation can support that proposal, but we would caution that, as in the case of the world disarmament conference, any decision to convene a special session must be related to the prospects of achieving concrete results. The same consideration would apply to the question of convening a world disarmament conference. It would be desirable, first of all, to identify the specific issues which would be ripe for agreement among the nuclear-weapon Powers. Consequently, my delegation would suggest that emphasis in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference should shift from the timing of the convening of such a conference to determining its agenda.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

The difficulty in establishing the agenda of the conference arises from the fact that a number of central issues are being considered either bilaterally between the two super-Powers or in other forums, such as the CCD, or in the mutual force reduction talks in Vienna. It is doubtful whether any break-through can be expected merely by changing the forum and bringing these matters to a world disarmament conference. However, we are conscious that a number of issues of primary importance, such as security assurances, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, a comprehensive test-ban treaty, measures of conventional and regional disarmament and other measures, are matters on which agreements might be possible in the foreseeable future.

Pakistan shares the universal disappointment that even though the United Nations has been in existence for nearly one third of a century its promise of peace and security for all nations is as far from fulfilment as ever. The nuclear era has brought a new and terrible peril of extinction to all States. It is time that all of us made a serious attempt to take a step or two to build on the basis of the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter, which recognizes the inherent right to individual and collective self-defence, a global security system transcending military alliances to forestall the threat of nuclear aggression or blackmail.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan on behalf of the officers of the Committee for his kind words to us and I will certainly pass on his congratulations to our Chairman, Ambassador Ghorra.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.