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PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO THOUSAND AND EIGHTY-THIRD MEETING

Held at Headquarters, New York,
on Tuesday, 11 November 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. GHORRA (Lebanon)
Rapporteur: Mr. ARTEAGA ACOSTA (Venezuela)

- Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security /31/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3254 (XXIX): report of the Secretary-General /34/ (continued)
- Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: reports of the Secretary-General /35/ (continued)
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/ (continued)
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/ (continued)

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AS THIS RECORD WAS DISTRIBUTED ON 12 NOVEMBER 1975, THE TIME-LIMIT FOR CORRECTIONS WILL BE 17 NOVEMBER 1975.

The co-operation of delegations in strictly observing this time-limit would be greatly appreciated.

- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3258 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/ (continued)
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/ (continued)
- General and complete disarmament /41/ (continued):
 - (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
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- Mid-term review of the Disarmament Decade: report of the Secretary-General /42/ (continued)
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /43/ (continued)
- Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /44/ (continued)
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3262 (XXIX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General /45/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East: report of the Secretary-General /46/ (continued)
- Prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes, which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /47/ (continued)
- Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia: report of the Secretary-General /48/ (continued)
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific /120/ (continued)
- Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests /122/ (continued)
- Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons /126/ (continued)
- Organization of work

The meeting was called to order at 10.55 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 120, 122 and 126 (continued)

Mr. NIKOLOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from French): Mr. Chairman, since this is my first statement in this Committee I should like to congratulate you on your election to your post, which you occupy with distinction. I wish to pay you a tribute for the very able manner in which you have been conducting our deliberations.

The General Assembly's agenda this year once again confirms the fact that disarmament has become one of its primary concerns. The reason is well known. The maintenance of international peace and security, a fundamental objective of the United Nations, is linked to disarmament. However, there are many obstacles to disarmament.

Every session of the General Assembly provides us with an opportunity to review the work being done in various international bodies on disarmament problems and gives us an opportunity to consider the measures necessary to resolve those problems.

As we know, the negotiations that have taken place over many years within the various institutions of the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament have led to the conclusion of a number of international instruments such as the Moscow Treaty on a partial nuclear test ban, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed, the Convention banning bacteriological weapons, the Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on the prevention of nuclear warfare and the limitation of strategic arms, together with other agreements, are all of great importance and should not be ignored. All these agreements have had a great influence on the world situation and most definitely are a major asset. They represent an important stage in our efforts to promote disarmament, but they leave standing the major problem of our times, which is the elimination of the terrible danger of nuclear warfare.

We share the view that over the past few years negotiations in the area of disarmament have not been very productive. This state of affairs arouses

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

the legitimate concern of the international community. A number of serious questions relating to disarmament have for many years now appeared on the agenda of the United Nations without being resolved, and other problems are being added all the time. It is the duty of Governments to remedy that situation.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

Generally speaking, the progress of disarmament is closely connected with the development of the international situation. For this reason it is reassuring to note that the favourable trends in international relations are becoming even stronger, and the successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe is the most recent illustration of that. By subscribing to the commitments contained in the Final Act of that historic conference, in particular to the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations and to the Document on Confidence-building measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament, the participating States have contributed in a tangible way to the strengthening of security in Europe, to the lessening of international tension, and thus to the creation of better political conditions for further progress in the area of disarmament. In the circumstances it would be logical to view with greater confidence the prospects for the current negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and arms in central Europe. Their success, which is so ardently desired by the Bulgarian Government, would give a new dimension to détente in Europe and in the entire world, which would be in the interests of all peoples.

I should now like to turn to a few of the problems which have been submitted to us for consideration. It is undeniable that the problems of nuclear disarmament deserve priority attention. They have been of concern to world public opinion ever since the emergence of weapons of mass destruction three decades ago. This concern is growing, because although the danger of nuclear warfare has receded in recent years as a result of the international agreements that have been signed, the arms race has not stopped. The accumulation of nuclear weapons has continued, the threat that they may be used has not yet been removed, and military budgets are increasing.

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which was held last May in Geneva, while it welcomed the recent progress towards the signing of the treaty by more States, nevertheless noted with concern that the treaty was not yet acceded to by all States. The representatives of the States that took part in the Conference stressed the urgent need to strengthen the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons set up by the treaty by ensuring universal support for it.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

Shortly before the Review Conference, and immediately after it, more than 10 countries, including five belonging to Euratom, became parties to the treaty. That is a favourable development. Nevertheless, the danger of further dissemination of nuclear weapons remains as acute as ever. The Secretary-General of the United Nations refers to this in specific terms in the introduction to his annual report. A considerable number of States are still not part of the non-proliferation system. Thus the constant increase in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, inevitably involving an increase in the production of plutonium which can be used in the production of nuclear weapons, automatically increases the danger of the proliferation of such weapons of mass destruction. Certain complete installations for nuclear fuel cycling have been delivered or are being delivered to countries that are not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and this has given rise to well-justified fears. Everyone knows that it is not difficult for States that are industrially and technologically advanced and that have stayed outside the non-proliferation system to adapt the nuclear technology they acquire to military purposes if they so desire. There are political forces at work in some of these countries that are not averse from such intentions. All this suggests that further action should be considered to provide additional guarantees to ensure that fissionable material and nuclear equipment made available to States that are not parties to the Treaty are used solely for peaceful purposes. Everyone understands that further dissemination of nuclear weapons in the present circumstances would entail very serious consequences.

We do not need convincing that it would seriously endanger international stability, make world peace and security even more precarious and demolish any prospects of success in promoting nuclear disarmament. We must therefore do everything we can to ensure the accession of all States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and thus prevent any increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, in the interests of world peace and the security of all peoples.

The horizontal non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is today a prior condition not only for international stability and security but also

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for progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The Member States of the United Nations must work together to bring about universal support for the system of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and in other international bodies there has been much discussion about the need to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is undeniable that specific action is needed in both these areas.

However, it should be noted that vertical non-proliferation, or the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons, presupposes horizontal non-proliferation.

The renewed interest which has emerged recently in the United Nations and elsewhere in the creation of nuclear weapon-free zones is part of the efforts to prevent horizontal proliferation. That is also a reflection of the concern that the danger of further dissemination remains quite real. The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones would automatically contribute to the strengthening of regional security and to the non-proliferation régime because more areas of the world would not then be affected by the nuclear arms race.

The Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones, which was created by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), met last summer in Geneva to study comprehensively the question of nuclear weapon-free zones, under the mandate given to it by General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX). My country was very happy to be part of that Group, which discharged its task by preparing the study in question, a study we have all considered to be of interest. A number of general considerations and principles relating to the creation of such zones are set forth therein. We share the view of most of the experts that nuclear weapon-free zones should not be considered as an alternative to the universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Instead, those zones should be viewed as entirely compatible with the objectives of the Treaty.

It was agreed that the part of the world concerned should take the initiative in proposing that it become a nuclear weapon-free zone. It was also agreed that participation in such a zone should be voluntary. Quite obviously no one on the outside should be allowed to impose nuclear weapon-free zones on others.

As conditions vary from one region to another, an approach taking into account the specific problems of each case would be most appropriate. It goes without saying that the provisions of any agreement setting up a nuclear weapon-free zone should be in keeping with the principles of international law.

At the end of our discussion here, we must reach decisions on what should be done to follow up the study on nuclear weapon-free zones and on the specific proposals which relate to the creation of such zones in various parts of the world. The study in question was prepared by a small group of experts, and

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it might perhaps be useful to complete that study by taking into account observations by countries which did not participate in the work of that group.

This year the CCD, in accordance with the task assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 3261 D (XXIX), also discussed the implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and how those explosions might affect arms control. That question is part of the whole complex range of issues involved in nuclear disarmament. Another group of experts within the framework of the CCD held a number of meetings to discuss that issue.

The deliberations of the CCD failed to bring out any new factor likely to challenge the conclusions contained in the General Assembly resolution I have just mentioned which says, inter alia:

"... that it has not yet proved possible to differentiate between the technology for nuclear weapons and that for nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes".

The soundness of that conclusion is confirmed by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. That Conference provided for the supplying to non-nuclear States, and States which are not signatories of the Treaty of services in the area of peaceful nuclear explosions in accordance with the terms set forth in Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Thus, States which are still outside the system of non-proliferation can still enjoy the potential advantages of peaceful nuclear explosions without having to acquire an independent national capacity to carry out such explosions. In its Final Declaration, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stressed that it considered:

"... the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State." (NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, p. 7)

The Conference also stated that:

"... access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (should) not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability." (Ibid, p. 6)

The Bulgarian delegation is of the opinion that future arrangements on the carrying out of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should complete and strengthen the present system of non-proliferation.

Today we see a paradoxical situation in international relations. On the one hand, international détente is continuing thanks to the settlement of a number of important problems which earlier had caused acute tension among States. On the other hand, positive developments on the international scene notwithstanding, the conventional and nuclear arms race is continuing. It has been pointed out that these trends are not necessarily incompatible. It is difficult to understand, though, how they can coexist for very long.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

The military industrial complex in certain Western countries is not exactly opposed to that kind of "peaceful coexistence". Everyone realizes that the arms race cannot continue for ever without endangering world peace. Increasingly, mankind finds itself confronted with the imperative of our times, that is, the imperative need to put an end to the arms race and completely eliminate the threat of nuclear warfare. Productive negotiations should quietly take place among the nuclear-weapon States in an effort to reach further international agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament and in particular, first and foremost, to conclude a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, as proposed by the Soviet Union, which at this session of the General Assembly has presented a draft treaty on this matter. The Bulgarian delegation in its first statement said that it gave its full support to that proposal.

The prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests would be a decisive step towards ending the nuclear arms race. It would pave the way to further results in nuclear disarmament. The special significance of such a development must be clear to all, especially if one bears in mind the fact that the development of further nuclear weapons would be accompanied by test explosions.

There is a great deal of literature on the qualitative aspects of the nuclear arms race. Experts in this area have been speaking and writing about these subjects for a long time.

In this hall, the former representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, whose statements on the problems of disarmament come readily to mind, dealt with this question on 7 November 1973 and said:

"I have a strong conviction that it is more imperative to achieve qualitative disarmament even before quantitative disarmament. This is so because the destabilizing factor is first and foremost the competitive element in the armaments race. To counteract that which may be labelled a 'technological imperative', which now seems to force a continued spiralling upwards of new generations of nuclear weapons, would therefore mean a gain in terms of security much more considerable than what could be achieved through some reduction of the excessive stockpiles." (1950th meeting, pp. 27 and 28-30)

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The complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests advocated by the Soviet Union and urged for many years now by world public opinion would put a brake, qualitatively speaking, on the nuclear arms race. In actual practice it would help impede the further development of a certain form of military technology and new generations of nuclear weapons. Stopping all test explosions of nuclear weapons in all States is of vital importance for all mankind. This problem requires a radical solution as a matter of urgency. Certain delegations have recommended a "selective" approach here. For our part, we do not believe that such an approach provides the key to the solution.

Thanks to the progress of science, remote control of the observance of the nuclear-weapon test ban is now technologically possible. That also applies to underground tests. Distinguished scientists throughout the entire world have provided ample proof of that, as have various international symposiums which have discussed this matter. I shall not go into this matter any further so as not to take up the time of the members of this Committee. In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, many delegations have also said that it is possible to control observance of a nuclear-weapon test ban without having to carry out on-the-spot inspections.

The use of national technological means of control and the international exchange of seismic data provided for in the Soviet draft treaty would provide sufficient guarantees that the ban is actually being respected. Consequently, for us the problem of verification is actually a false one. Reasons other than technological difficulties are impeding the conclusion of a treaty completely banning nuclear-weapon tests. Solution of the problem of putting an end to all nuclear-weapon tests depends solely on a political decision. Without a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests there might very well be a further upward spiral in the nuclear arms race, which would make it even more difficult and complicated to find a solution for the problems of nuclear disarmament. If we are all conscious of that, there can be no hesitation about where our duty lies.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

It is hardly necessary to stress here the very special role which the United States and the Soviet Union have played in the search for solutions to the problems of nuclear disarmament. Their bilateral agreements, in particular those already reached within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations, have gone a long way to reducing the danger of nuclear warfare; however, it should not be forgotten that a halt to the nuclear-weapons race and the complete elimination of the nuclear threat cannot be achieved without the constructive efforts and co-operation of all the nuclear Powers. Similarly, all non-nuclear States, great and small, must make their own contribution -- and the best proof of that is provided by the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has been ratified by 96 States.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

The lack of such co-operation by certain Powers is a serious obstacle which it would be wrong to disregard. The adherence of all the nuclear-weapon Powers to the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would introduce a positive element in the context of the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The halting by the French Government of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere is a measure that we very much welcome. There is now only one nuclear Power that has not yet given up testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. It is high time that this problem was pursued to the end so that we may be sure that man's contamination of the environment with radic-active substances has been eliminated once and for all.

The efforts to promote nuclear disarmament would take on their full meaning if all the nuclear Powers participated. With every passing year the need for such participation and for universal adherence to the existing treaties in the nuclear realm becomes ever more obvious. In our opinion, in the present circumstances the convening of a world disarmament conference would make a considerable contribution to the attainment of these goals. It is to be hoped that the United Nations General Assembly will finally succeed in overcoming the obstacles to the holding of that conference.

In the absence of appropriate international agreements on disarmament the dizzying progress of science and technology today has led to a constant increase in military arsenals, to increasingly sophisticated weapons. The race in nuclear and conventional armaments has two principal aspects, the first qualitative and the second quantitative, with all the harmful consequences that that entails for world peace and security and also for the lives of the peoples, which must bear the heavy burden of enormous military expenditures.

Without forgetting that general and complete disarmament remains our basic goal, we believe that in present conditions two sets of specific measures are required. The first set of measures should make it possible to put a brake on the arms race, to limit and reduce existing nuclear and convention weapons, to strengthen the system for the non-proliferation

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of weapons of mass destruction, and to prohibit chemical weapons. Those objectives could be attained, as we have already said, on the one hand by the adherence of all States to the international treaties that have already been signed, and on the other hand by the conclusion of further agreements, beginning with the signing of a treaty on the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, in all environments.

The second set of measures, which could be called preventive measures, might have as their aim the elimination of any possibility that in future the arms race would be extended to new areas. Experience has shown that once a weapons system is created it is very difficult to establish control and limitation in regard to such weapons. Hence, the best time to act is not after but before new weapons systems are developed. Certain recent scientific discoveries have made a new danger obvious -- that is, that one day they will be used to change the environment for military purposes. Everyone admits that the techniques for changing atmospheric conditions and the environment can be developed and perfected to the point of becoming extremely deadly weapons. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, said the following on this question in his statement to the United Nations General Assembly on 24 September 1974:

"These are not the conjectures of science-fiction writers, but an actual threat that is assuming an ever-more realistic shape. It is in the interests of all peoples to nip this threat in the bud".

(A/PV.2240, p. 71)

Hence, we welcome the presentation by the Soviet Union and the United States to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva in August last of identical draft conventions on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. That initiative encourages us to believe that there could be an agreement on this problem in the Committee on Disarmament next year, which would give new impetus to the negotiations taking place there.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

Still in the framework of preventive measures, it is important to prevent the future development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, weapons even more deadly than those existing today. There is already before us a USSR draft treaty on those lines.

The Bulgarian delegation has already set forth, in its first statement, the reasons for its support of that Soviet initiative and for its decision to be a co-sponsor of the Soviet draft resolution of 2 October 1975, contained in document A/C.1/L.711, which provides among other things for the drafting by the Committee on Disarmament of the text of an agreement on the question.

We are half way through the Second United Nations Development Decade. This decade has also been proclaimed the Disarmament Decade. That coincidence is not merely fortuitous. The General Assembly had in mind emphasizing the very close link between development and international security. Genuine economic and social progress cannot be conceived of without a stable world peace, which presupposes disarmament. The reduction of military expenditures is part of disarmament.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

That is precisely why reference has been made in the Charter of the United Nations to the "least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources ..." (Article 25). Hence, efforts must be intensified to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly resolution on a 10 per cent reduction in military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council. If that initiative were carried out, then part of the resources thus released could be used for assistance to developing countries.

The gravity of the problems of peace and security in the world in this nuclear age demands a great sense of responsibility on the part of Governments in their international relations and demands a positive, constructive approach to disarmament problems. It would be wrong to think that disarmament concerns only two or more States. In today's world it is a problem which concerns all States. There has been a break-through as a result of the partial disarmament agreements concluded thus far. Now, on the basis of those early results, further steps must be taken to add military détente to political détente.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Nikolov of Bulgaria for his kind remarks addressed to me.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee may recall that we took a decision to close the list of speakers at noon today. As I look at the list of speakers for the next few days, I see that we will have enough speakers to carry us through 19 November. We have not yet taken a decision on the closure of the general debate. I do not wish to take a decision at this stage. I would not suggest that the Committee take a decision now; but, seeking your co-operation, I should only like to present the situation so that the Committee may reflect on it.

So far we have eight speakers listed for 20 and 21 November, unless we have any additional speakers inscribed by noon. That means we have only eight speakers for four meetings on 20 and 21 November. I would kindly ask whether the delegations inscribed for those days could speak on 20 November in order

(The Chairman)

that we might perhaps gain a day. Naturally, if they wish to speak earlier we could also accommodate them. We could accommodate some speakers for tomorrow, for instance, because we have only three speakers listed.

But without taking any firm decision on the closure of the debate, I ask the co-operation of those delegations listed for 20 and 21 November in order that we might arrange two meetings for 20 November and thus conclude the general debate provided, of course, that we have no further speakers.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.