

Access strategy in the accelerator complex and experimental areas

Rui Nunes GS-ASE
For the Access Team

thanks to P. Ninin, E. Sanchez-Corral, T. Ladzinski

Overview


- PS
 - PS Primary Areas Project (PS PSS)
 - PSPSS Main features
 - PSPSS Installation planning
 - PS Secondary Areas news
- SPS
 - SPS Primary Access Control Project
 - SPS Secondary Areas news
- LHC
 - LACS/LASS Main updates
 - LHC Access Improvement Programme

PS PSS – PS Personnel Safety System

- Main difference from LHC is the different layout of the machines involved
- LHC has 5 chains & 12 EIS-f/m
- PS has 17 chains & ~100 EIS-f/m

	LHC	PS
Access Points	36	28
Doors	265	~ 100
Patrol Boxes	330	~ 110
EIS-f/m/ext	13	~ 100
Interlock "Chains"	5	17

Figure 4-1: Schematic overview of the PS Complex zones and their relationship from




PS PSS Main Features

- Main differences wrt LHC Access System
 - Although Radiological risks covered, some other risks considered
 - External interlocks in special cases (ventilation, laser, etc...)
 - New Modes
 - *Special permit* mode - Magnet testing for specialists only
 - *Test EIS-f* mode - Testing of all EIS of a Zone by interlocking the upstream chain
 - Public Address
 - *Mini-MAD* “drawer” in Access Point for small material
 - Maintenance doors
- Main similarities
 - Biometrics (2 eyes)
 - MAD / PAD (improved unicity check)
 - Keys (trapped keys & improved key-taking sequence)

PS PSS Design Status

- Functional Specification & Sectorisation
 - Sectorisation documents under final approval
- Risk analysis
 - Safety functions defined
- Technical Specification done
- System design completed
 - Architecture design
 - Equipment selected & validated
- Test platform
 - Factory Acceptance tests completed
 - System validation on CERN platform 2012 Q2
 - PS0 test platform in building 271
- Integration studies ongoing
 - Area 3D scans done
 - Integration Studies
 - Difficulties due to lack of space for cables and access points



PS PSS Work in Progress





Synthèse sectorisation, relevés laser, intégration, localisation et photos des EIS-accès

	INTEGRATION (Secteur + EIS-accès ou EIS)	SCANS (Tours/MS)	PHOTOS DES EIS-ACCÈS	INTEGRATION	REALISATION / STATE CIVIL
PS ALLIANT RENOUVELON	YEA01-00000				
COMPLEXE PS	YEA01-00000				
UNAC 2	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone UNAC 2	YEA01-00000	
UNAC 3	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000		YEA01-00000	
UNAC 4	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	voir EIS-CL	YEA01-00000	
BOOSTER	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone BOOSTER		
PS RING	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone PS RING		
SWITCH YARD	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone SWITCH YARD		
SWR	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone SWR		
BOULE - TITO	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone BOULE		
EAST HALL	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone EAST HALL		
DRAC	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone DRAC		
T2 - T20	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone T2-T20		
AD RING	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone AD RING		
AD TARBET	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone AD TARBET		
STDF	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone STDF		
CTF3 - UNAC	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone CTF3		
CTF3 - BARRAGE	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone CTF3		
CTF3 - GEA	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone CTF3		
CTF3 - CTF3	YEA01-00000	YEA01-00000	Image Zone CTF3		
UNAC2 (+ 2015)	YEA01-00000				
271		271	Image Zone 271	Abandon Zone 271	

DOCUMENTS & LIENS UTILES

Information des points de la zone Privée du PS
 EIS Privés et EIS Machine de PS/SE : Approuvés des EIS Privés de système actuel
 Convention de change des EIS Privés
 Convention de démarrage EIS
 Le PSJ, maintenance
 Equipement et son emplacement. Type et son point d'accès

- Installation of Rack Control Room
 - Building 271
- First functional tests on test platform
- Civil engineering preparations for LS1
- New Buffer Zones
 - integrated with access points
 - DGS/RP & EN/MME collaboration
 - Optimize installation works
- Preparation of technical infrastructure for Installation
 - Support from EN/MEF
 - Optical fiber network
 - Cabling for Power, Controls and I/Os
 - With EN/EL & IT/CS
- Cabling galleries
 - Cable tranches or new galleries have to be made with EN/EL, GS/SE
 - Major effort to clean existing cable trays and install new cables



PS PSS Installation planning

- **Constraints** for planning during LS1
 - Requirements for Machine run
 - Linac3, CTF, ISOLDE ? - Operation dates still to be confirmed
 - Current system must be kept fully operational for these zones, including interlocks
 - Requirements to give Access
 - Current system must provide full access control functionality (but not interlock)
 - RP Constraints
 - ALARA working conditions, decay time for some areas
 - DIMR Procedure
 - Coactivity Management
 - Coordinated via EN-MEF (e.g. route Goward shielding)
- **Objective**
 - Installations **starting** in 2012 Q4
 - **Install all zones during LS1** starting with zones in the LHC injector chain
 - 2-4 months per zone - 2 zones installed in parallel
 - System Commissioning & Testing (BE DSO & OP) – 2 months – **Jan&Feb 2014**
 - LHC injectors operational by April 2014
 - Linac4 must be ready for HwC in 2013 Q1

PS Secondary Areas

- Works during LS1 (AD & East Hall)
 - Add dosimeter badge readers & access control to restrict patrol mode to “trained” users
 - Similar to new North Area system
 - New Layout to include ELENA in AD
- Depending on the East Area Renovation project ([cf. East Area Day Workshop](#))
 - Change Secondary Access System Layout
 - Spin-off command of EIS-f to “CESAR-type” control
 - Install building access control to the Hall 157
 - Like 193 (AD) and EHN1 (North Area)





SPS Primary Access

- 2011-2012
 - Upgrade of SCADA supervision
 - Non-supported FactoryLink → WinCC
 - “Usual” modifications
 - HiRadMat & other resectorisations
- During LS1
 - No special actions are foreseen
 - IMPACT tool can be used if needed
- **New System Deployment during LS2 (when?)**
 - Complete rebuilding is necessary
 - Obsolete safety & control architecture
 - Rapidly diminishing support for PLCs (S5)
 - Risk analysis phase started
 - Similarities with PS&LHC shall be explored
 - Development to start back-to-back with PS PSS project



SPS Secondary Access

- 2011-2012
 - Access control completely rebuilt in 2011
 - Aligned with PS AD and East Hall Secondary systems
 - Good performance
 - Access control to the NORTH Hall (EHN1) in 2012 Q2
 - Enforce use of dosimeter
 - Reduce vehicle parking on “Salève side”
- During LS1
 - Project for High Intensity Proton Beam
 - LOKN refurbishing
 - Safety Study ongoing
 - Additional access points for EHN1 galleries
 - tbconfirmed



LHC Access Main Updates 2011

- Updates done in 2011-2012
 - Integration of access with Impact
 - Automatic Key Distribution – New sub-mode
 - [ECR LHC-Y-EC-0006](#)
 - Deployed, useful during Xmas Break
 - 11 new key distributors
 - For some UJ areas
 - 2 new PADs in PM54 (CMS) installed
 - Biometry upgrade (2 eyes)
 - 9 oo 36 access points installed

LHC Access Improvement Programme

“Improve availability but don’t compromise on safety”

consultation with main stakeholders in BE-OP & EN-MEF


LHC Access Improvement Programme

1. Interlock more than just Beam \leftrightarrow Access
 - He₂ / Air-tightness / Cryo / Powering
2. Performance Improvements
 - Access point improvements
 - Sectorization improvements
 - Maintenance improvement
 - CCC improvements
3. R2E-motivated relocations

Interlock more than just Beam ↔ Access

- Access doors interlock the beam
- Other types of doors do not interlock the beam... **should they ?**
 - e.g. Ventilation & Overpressure doors
 - i.e : *Should a LASS-type system contribute to the risk reduction of personnel exposure to Cryo risk, ODH risk or activated air ?*
 - Acceptable impact on machine availability?
 - Should the beam/powering be stopped immediately ?
 - Should the patrols be lost if external envelope is not breached?
- Should a LASS-type system also **interlock the power converters ?**
 - e.g. using any type of available doors
 - i.e. : *Should a LASS-type system interlock the PIC to reduce the risk of exposure to a He2 discharge during powering tests?*
 - A safety HW interlock to be deployed in LS1, replacing current SW interlocks
 - Technical solution is available and agreed with PIC
 - Acceptable impact on the machine availability?
 - Increased number of elements that firmly interlock the powering.
 - Impact of safety constraints on availability for powering tests ?
 - Impact on maintenance of the power converters ? (bypass for tests?)

Interlock more than just Beam \leftrightarrow Access









INTERLOCK = HW Safety-type interlock




LHC Access Improvement Programme

- Access point improvements
 - PAD : Avoid spurious patrol losses
 - MAD : Improve performance by alternative solutions
 - Human supervision in case of difficulty
 - Improve exit procedure
 - No green button
 - Improve information to users on refusal reasons
 - No biometry underground ?
 - if same access right
- Sectorization improvements
 - Improve sectorization (ALARA) of LHC3 and LHC7
 - New Zone/sectors for TZ32 pre-alignment tests for CLIC
 - Provide RP veto for TI2, TI8 and Dumps
- Maintenance improvement
 - Bypass of the ToP access points
 - Allow maintenance during beam
 - ECR in draft
- CCC improvements
 - Upgrade LASS servers
 - Closely integrate ADaMS and IMPACT
 - Improve monitoring of “really closed” doors in CCC

Curtain @ ToPit for Access Maintenance



Drawings and layouts S. Di Luca




08/02/2012

B. Nunes GS/ASE - Chamomix 2012

R2E-related Relocations

- Complete Access Point
 - UJ14 → UL14
 - UJ16 → UL16
- Controls racks relocation
 - UJ56 → USC55
 - UJ76 → TZ76



Thank you for your attention