

THE RUSSIAN REVIEW



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Past and Present*

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Contributors to This Issue

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN, Foreign Correspondent in Soviet Russia for the *Christian Science Monitor*, is the author of well known works on the Soviet Union and international affairs.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pennsylvania, and is the author of articles on Soviet policy in the United Nations; at present he is serving as an officer in the U.S. Navy.

ALBERT PARRY is Professor of Russian Civilization and Language at Colgate University and author of *Whistler's Father*, 1939, *Russian Cavalcade*, 1944, and numerous articles in the field of Russian-American relations.

SYDNEY D. BAILEY, formerly Secretary of the Hansard Society (London, England), as well as Editor of *Parliamentary Affairs* and *National News-Letter*, is at present a representative of the American Friends Service Committee at the United Nations in New York.

IRINA SABUROVA is a journalist and writer, who lived in Latvia after the Bolshevik Revolution and witnessed the Soviet and Nazi occupations in World War II.

A. LEBED is a refugee Soviet scholar, at present connected with the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R. in Munich, Germany.

B. YAKOVLEV is a refugee Soviet scholar, at present Director of the Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the U.S.S.R. in Munich, Germany.

HELEN A. SHENITZ, a student of Russian folklore, is Librarian at the Historical Library and Museum, Juneau, Alaska.

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

Dimitri von Mohrenschildt
Editor

William Henry Chamberlin

Warren B. Walsh

Michael Karpovich

Alexis Wiren

The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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Three Designs for Checkmating Communism

BY WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

THE United States and other free nations at the present time face what might well be called an agonizing dilemma. Every civilized and rational human being is shocked at the thought of an atomic war, with its uncertain consequences, political, economic and social as well as military, and its appallingly certain toll of destruction.

Yet the philosophy and the governing methods of Communist totalitarianism, which has now acquired a grip on one-third of the manpower and one-fifth of the natural resources of the world, are not compatible with genuine peace. Such aspects of Soviet policy as the creation of an enormous international fifth column, in the shape of Communist parties throughout the world, the persistent efforts to promote espionage and subversion all around the world, from Sweden to Australia, the swift military build-up of every new conquered area as a base for further aggression are without precedent in the history of peaceful relations between states.

This is a generation that can and should still remember the disastrous end of the policy of trying to appease another type of aggressive dictatorship in the thirties. Sometimes the line between discredited appeasement and the seductive Soviet slogan of "co-existence" becomes so dim as to be almost obliterated. The distinguished British expert on Russia and other Slav countries, Dr. Hugh Seton-Watson, put this point very clearly and forcefully in *The Manchester Guardian*:

"The trouble about 'peaceful co-existence' is that it means different things on different sides of the Iron Curtain. Unfortunately Western public opinion does not yet understand that when the Stalinists say, 'peaceful co-existence' they mean war without shooting, in preparation for war with shooting and with hydrogen bombs. When the Western public hears the phrase, it understands peace, and even the prospect of friendship. There is an alarming parallel between the mood of Britain to-day and at the time of Munich. Whatever they may now think they thought in 1938 the men of

Munich really believed that they could trust Hitler. To-day similar illusions are growing up about Malenkov and Mao."

With atomic war and a long series of one-sided concessions, retreats and surrenders that would not, in the long run, avert war, but only produce it under very unfavorable circumstances, ruled out as desirable alternatives it is natural that attention should be focussed on the possibility of subverting Communist régimes without large-scale war. There would seem to be three main possibilities in this field.

(1) There can be an attempt to stimulate discontent, short of actual armed revolt, and passive resistance in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe which were brought under Soviet control during and after the war: Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Albania. There is general agreement among political exiles and American experts in the field that incitations to armed revolt, even if successful, could only lead to a useless and disastrous slaughter of the more courageous and active anti-Communists under present circumstances.

An advocate of active political warfare, aimed at the liberation of the Soviet satellite countries, as opposed to the policy of merely checking the further spread of Soviet imperialist Communism by so-called "containment" is Mr. James Burnham, author of the hard-hitting little book, *Containment or Liberation?* (John Day). Burnham's thesis, summed up in his own words, is as follows:

"If the Communists succeed in consolidating what they have *already* conquered, then their complete world victory is certain. . . . The simple terrible fact is that if things go on as they now are, if for the time being they merely stabilize, then we have already lost. That is why the policy of containment, even if one hundred percent successful, is a formula for Soviet victory."

Mr. John Foster Dulles, in *War or Peace* (Macmillan), a book written before he became Secretary of State, suggests that consolidation of the present Soviet empire would carry a grave risk of war:

"The great danger of war would come if and when Soviet leaders successfully combined Eastern Europe and Asia into a vast political, industrial and military unity and completed the 'encirclement' phase of their strategy. They would then be so strong that they might well plan to finish their conquest by war."

Mr. Burnham's concrete recommendations included withdrawal of diplomatic recognition from the Moscow-sponsored governments,

admission to NATO of representatives of the Polish and other governments-in-exile, recruiting of military forces among refugees from the Iron Curtain countries, intensive cultivation of educational projects among these refugees.

An organization, the Free Europe Committee, has been in existence for several years and is trying in various ways to support the spirit of resistance among the peoples in the countries which were annexed to the Soviet Union, in fact if not in name, after the end of the war. It has encouraged and helped to sustain national councils, composed of leading political exiles from various East European countries.

The Free Europe Committee has subsidized the research efforts of many émigré scholars. Its most spectacular effort in psychological warfare is located in Munich, where more than a thousand people are employed in the imposing headquarters of Radio Free Europe. I visited this headquarters last August and was able to attend several meetings at which the strategy of broadcasts to such countries as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary was worked out.

The offices in charge of these broadcasts are manned by nationals of the various countries, many of them publicists, professors, and formerly active political figures. Official broadcasts of the state radio organizations of these countries are monitored; newspapers are read; newly arrived refugees are interviewed and are often given the opportunity to deliver broadcast messages to their countrymen.

Messages beamed from Radio Free Europe emphasize the kind of news that would not be considered fit to print in Communist newspapers: escapes of refugees, exposures of Soviet spies, constructive achievements in the free world. Head of the Polish desk is Jan Nowak, an energetic young man with a glamorous record of adventure in the Polish underground during the war.

Recognizing that "you cannot liberate a people by radio" Nowak expressed the conviction that the broadcasts of Free Europe were slowing down the process of Sovietization and attracted a wide audience. When Poles escape to the West by various means, by stowing away in Polish merchant ships, flying jet planes out of the country, making the dangerous voyage across the Baltic in small ships, they usually get in touch immediately with Radio Free Europe. A surprising number of letters of commendation and comment, sent to "cover" addresses in Europe which are frequently changed, reach the Free Europe Committee.

Czechoslovakia, directly across the frontier from Bavaria, has

been blanketed with anti-Communist leaflets contained in balloons. Forty-two million small pieces of literature have been scattered over Czechoslovakia to date. There is no appeal to active violence, but the Czechs and Slovaks are exhorted to resist the speed-up demands of their Communist rulers. Most of the messages are based on ten demands, related to the most pressing immediate grievances of the people and end with the slogan: "Today concessions, tomorrow freedom."

Angry attacks by government organs testify to the effectiveness of the Free Europe Committee propaganda offensive. But Nowak's statement, "You cannot liberate a people by radio," remains true. Desirable and effective as this propaganda effort to pierce the Iron Curtain is, only a very optimistic observer could expect that governments with unlimited military and police power can be overthrown by such means.

(2) There can be an effort to drive a wedge between the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Communist rulers. This is the main objective of the Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism, an organization of Americans of anti-Communist views, most of them with some firsthand knowledge of Soviet conditions. New chairman of this organization, which has been headed in succession by Eugene Lyons, author and journalist, and Admirals Alan Kirk and Leslie Stevens, respectively former Ambassador and naval Attaché in Moscow, is Mr. Howland Sargeant, who has been for some years identified with the Public Affairs division of the State Department.

A spirited plea for regarding the peoples of the Soviet Union as allies, not enemies, in the struggle against Communist totalitarianism was voiced by Mr. Lyons in his recently published book, *Our Secret Allies: The Peoples of Russia* (Duell, Sloan and Pearce-Little Brown). Mr. Lyons marshals a good deal of evidence to show that Communism was never freely and voluntarily accepted in Russia, that it was imposed after prolonged and bloody civil war and has always rested on a foundation of intensive espionage and terror.

Mr. Lyons also brings out such points as the cordial welcome which the German army received in many occupied regions of Russia, until the systematic brutality of Nazi administrators disillusioned the Russians and Ukrainians of the idea that liberation might be obtained with the aid of Hitler, and the extreme unwillingness of large numbers of Soviet war prisoners and wartime laborers in Germany and Austria to return home after the end of the war.

Recently there has been a gradual but perceptible change in the policy of the Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism. In the first years of its existence (the Committee was organized early in 1951) the emphasis was on trying to promote a united organization of Russian and non-Russian émigré groups (Communists, Fascists, and extreme reactionaries excluded) which could carry on radio broadcasting and other anti-Communist activity in the name of a united politically conscious emigration.

This attempt was frustrated by the atmosphere of suspicious hostility which prevails among the Russian and non-Russian political groups and also by personal feuds among leaders of the groups. A "Co-ordinating Centre" which was announced in 1953 quickly split into two rival "centres." The present trend is to emphasize functional activity, to support special practical projects and not to worry unduly about forming shadowy coalitions of small exile groups which are, in the main, cut off from real contacts in the Soviet Union.

"Radio Liberation," with headquarters in Munich, now employs a staff of some two hundred people and broadcasts by short wave in Russian, in Ukrainian, and in some of the languages of the Caucasus and Central Asia. An Institute for the Study of the History and Culture of the Soviet Union, also located in Munich, has expanded to a point where it has become an important centre of Soviet studies. Most of the scholars connected with this Institute, which issues magazines and special publications and holds periodical conferences, have lived under the Soviet régime and possess the advantage of being able to check their studies of Soviet publications against a background of personal knowledge.

As an example of the special projects which the Committee hopes to support more and more in the future one may cite the visit to Mecca and other Mohammedan centres of two fugitive Soviet Moslems who were able to expose and denounce propaganda, circulated by a few selected Soviet Moslem pilgrims that Mohammedanism is fully tolerated in the Soviet Union.

There can be little doubt as to the desirability of reaching the peoples of the Soviet Union with messages from the West. What is doubtful is the possibility of making these messages very effective. "Radio Liberation" has to overcome a highly developed jamming campaign of stations in the satellite countries and in the Soviet Union itself. And there is some factual support for a view suggested by George Fischer, in his *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Harvard Uni-

versity Press) that opposition and discontent in the Soviet Union are passive, rather than active, and are likely to find expression only after the régime of dictatorship has been subjected to some powerful shock.

There remains a third method of undermining the huge Communist empire, which may be practically more effective than radio appeals or leaflets, although its potential value in the anti-Communist struggle is not universally recognized. This is the rearming of the German Federal Republic, within the framework of a Western alliance.

This has been a cardinal aim of United States policy for more than four years. The United States strongly favored and supported the EDC, or European Defense Community, a project which, although originally a French suggestion, was neglected by various French Cabinets and finally defeated by the French parliament on August 30, 1954. A looser form of West European association, with a German military contribution, backed by a British promise to keep British military units on the continent so long as they may be needed, in the judgment of the co-signatories of the enlarged Brussels Treaty (France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, and the Benelux countries) was agreed on at London early in October.

The familiar arguments in favor of German rearming are that without German participation there can be no effective defense of Western Europe and that, as Germany cannot be kept disarmed indefinitely, it is wise to restore sovereignty and the right to participate in Western defense to Germany while it is under the leadership of pro-Western, moderate Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The unpleasant probable alternatives to such a step are a German relapse into sullen neutralism or an attempt by Germany, following the discrediting of Adenauer's foreign policy, to seek understanding with Moscow.

Both the above-mentioned arguments are sound. But there is another possible consequence of German rearmament which is of interest from the standpoint of weakening the Soviet empire. There can be little doubt that the Soviet Zone of Germany is the weakest link in this empire. Since the end of the war almost two million inhabitants of the Soviet Zone (about 10% of the population) have fled to West Germany. During a visit to Berlin last summer I found fugitives arriving in West Berlin at the rate of 300 a day. Movement in the opposite direction, from West to East, is negligible, almost non-existent.

In June, 1953, there was a surprisingly widespread spontaneous outbreak against the Soviet puppet régime in the Soviet Zone. The German Communist military and police forces proved completely unreliable and ineffective. Order could only be restored by the use of Soviet troops with tanks and other heavy weapons.

So long as there is no German armed strength on the other side of the zonal border discontent and resistance in the Soviet Zone may remain passive. But the magnetic effect of the appearance of well-equipped German divisions, flying the old flags, playing the old military marches, across this border may be very considerable. The Soviet occupation authorities may have occasion to remember Talleyrand's axiom that one can do anything with bayonets,—except sit on them.

Perhaps the degree of Soviet reaction to each of these three methods is significant. The activities of the Soviet exile groups and of the Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism have been almost completely ignored in the Soviet press and in Soviet public statements. The resources expended in jamming the broadcasts of Station Liberation are, of course, a tribute. Kidnapping and murder attempts against some members of the NTS, or Solidarists, indicate that this group is at least a minor thorn in the side of the Soviet occupation régime in Germany. A Ukrainian émigré who went back to the Soviet Union, apparently of his own volition, has been encouraged to denounce the activity of anti-Soviet Ukrainian organizations abroad. But on the whole, reaction to direct propaganda attacks in Russian has been meagre.

There have been many more public attacks by the satellite régimes on the Radio Free Europe broadcasts. The Czechoslovak government has sent diplomatic notes to the United States Government, demanding cessation of the broadcasts from Munich. The Polish official radio goes in heavily for attacks on the Polish broadcasts. A book has even been published in Poland, a novel with a propaganda purpose, designed to paint these Polish broadcasts in the darkest colors.

But the Soviet government has concentrated primary attention on trying to prevent the rearming of the German Federal Republic in alliance with the West. No device has been overlooked, mobilization of the fifth column Communist parties (it was actually the hundred Communist votes that defeated the EDC in the French parliament), official and semi-official threats and blandishments.

This feverish activity, deployed against the rearmament of Ger-

many in the Western camp, can hardly be inspired by military fears. No German army that is feasible within any near future could very much affect the purely military balance of power. So it seems a reasonable assumption that what Moscow most fears is that the appearance of a German army as part of a Western coalition will have an inflammable effect on the mood in the Soviet Zone. And any new serious disturbance in the Soviet Zone is very likely to produce repercussions throughout the other satellite states.

The U.S.S.R. and the I.L.O.*

BY ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

THE decision of the Soviet Union, in June, 1954, to participate in the activities of the International Labor Organization has implications far transcending the scope of this specialized agency of the United Nations. Constituting an abrupt reversal of a policy of fifteen years duration, the Soviet move is significant in two ways. First, it throws light on the motivations behind Soviet foreign policy; second, it affords insights into the current direction and emphasis of that policy. Calculated for immediate as well as long-term advantages, the maneuver represents the latest in a series of Soviet diplomatic decisions aimed at exploiting the growing evidence of disunity among the leading powers of the NATO coalition, and between them and the under-developed areas of South Asia. Not only does Soviet membership in the International Labor Organization presage a further extension of the East-West struggle, but it renders less likely the prospect of any lasting settlement in these crucial areas. Rather, the conflict of power and ideology has been joined on a new front.

Upon preliminary examination no completely satisfactory explanation for the sudden about-face of the Soviet government is readily apparent. Indeed, there is an obvious inconsistency between this policy and the previous postwar Soviet attitude toward the International Labor Organization, an attitude characterized by repeated vilification and denunciation. However, there is a definite rationale behind the seemingly confusing nature of Soviet policy which emerges quite clearly from a study of present Soviet behavior in the United Nations. This rationale has a twofold purpose.

First, Soviet membership is designed to disrupt the effectiveness of the International Labor Organization. As such it marks the critical crossroads in the development of the organization. Henceforth, the prevailing atmosphere will more closely reflect the antagonisms of the East-West conflict; existing differences within the I.L.O. will be increasingly invested with an ideological rigidity hitherto unknown. The future of the I.L.O. and its prospects for

*The opinions expressed in the article are my own and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.

continued and useful endeavors are in jeopardy. I.L.O. efforts to undertake modest programs of achievement may flounder in the currents of grandiose but ill-conceived projects. For if past Soviet behavior is to serve as a criterion, the suggestions offered will fall victim to the reality of Communist antipathy despite a strong flavor of Marxist idealism. The postwar period of relatively friendly discussion and criticism is over for the I.L.O.

There were manifestations of a typically Soviet nature at the I.L.O. conference held in Geneva in June-July, 1954. Here, for the first time, accusations based on ideological dogma dominated the proceedings. In addition to the noticeable tendency toward bloc voting according to Great Power allegiance, the tenor of the discussions changed perceptibly. The ideology of moderation and negotiation appeared, if not abandoned, to have been ignored. A heightened frequency of political polemics over-shadowed consideration of vital economic problems and the East-West antagonism permeated much that was said and done.

In the past the Soviet record on economic and social matters in the United Nations has been woefully inadequate. The limited Soviet participation in supposedly non-political discussions has sought to impede the pace of U.N. progress. Soviet failure in this area can largely be explained by the absence of the veto in U.N. bodies concerned with economic and social problems. The primary aim of Soviet policy in these agencies has centered on the desire to extend Soviet influence or, similarly, to thwart the influence of others. Soviet behavior at the recent I.L.O. conference was in this tradition.

Second, the Soviet decision to join the I.L.O. signifies an intensified effort to promote the alienation between the under-developed countries and the industrial nations of the West. This is especially true with respect to the uncommitted countries of South Asia. Now independent or engaged in a transitory process with independence as an objective, they are in the process of establishing new relationships with the rest of the world. Circumstances of geography and economics have accelerated this development and propelled them into the forefront of the Great Power struggle. Within the developing pattern of international political alignments, the aspirations and actions of these under-developed countries assume a special cogency. It is in this context that the motivations behind the Soviet decision to become a member of the International Labor Organization will be found.

The changed Soviet attitude constitutes the latest in a series of

developments designed to facilitate the spread of Communist influence in South Asia. Increased signs of Soviet interest started to crystallize soon after the outbreak of the Korean war, although it had always been a factor in long-term Soviet strategy. Signifying a shift in tactics, they testify to the importance of South Asia in Soviet strategy. Prior to the Korean aggression, the Soviet Union had been preoccupied with internal difficulties and the consolidation of its hegemony in Eastern Europe. However, at present, the virtual acceptance by the West of the Stettin-Trieste line as the status quo in Europe enables the Soviets to engage in a wider area of political excursions. Previously, the Soviets were content to support the *principle* of aid to under-developed areas. Within the U.N. this seemed to align the U.S.S.R. with Asian aspirations. In practice, however, the Soviets contributed not "a red ruble." Perhaps more than in any other areas of U.N. activity Soviet policy toward the under-developed areas was distinguished by an obvious discrepancy between what it said and what it did. Soviet policy made no effort to support in practice that which it favored in principle. Throughout the Stalinist postwar era the U.S.S.R. persisted in a policy of non-participation and opposition to the work of those specialized agencies of the United Nations primarily engaged in furthering the economic development of under-developed areas.

Thus the Soviet Union did not join the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, U.N.E.S.C.O., or the I.L.O. Nor did it participate in the U.N. technical assistance programs established in 1950. The real reasons for this policy were never revealed and the explanations given were garbed in a mantle of self-righteousness hardly pertinent. It is not certain whether the lack of participation reflected a basic mistrust of the United Nations, a measured move to hinder its successful operation, or an inherent antipathy predicated on an inability to control the organizational apparatus of the respective agencies. Possibly it was a combination of all three. If action may be regarded as reflecting desire, then any genuine Soviet concern over the future of the under-developed areas remained a fiction of Soviet speeches.

At no time during the postwar period has the U.S.S.R. cooperated with U.N. efforts to promote economic growth and stability in the non-Communist countries of South Asia. On the contrary, it has often opposed concrete programs to aid these areas. Though professing concern for the working classes of Asia the U.S.S.R. did not,

with one exception, attend any of the U.N. sponsored conferences occupied with such problems. The important conferences held under the aegis of the I.L.O. in New Delhi in the fall of 1947, in Ceylon in January, 1950, and in Tokyo in September, 1953 were ignored. These dealt with urgent problems common to the free countries of South Asia. Numerous non-political missions conducted investigations of Asian agricultural and industrial needs, submitted recommendations, and provided limited amounts of technical assistance. The Soviets continued to be conspicuous by their absence and apparent lack of interest.

The U.S.S.R. did attend the meetings of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the Far East, but its record in the commission and its subsidiary bodies was no less negative. However, of late the Soviets have shown a more pronounced interest in the activities of the U.N. agencies dealing with the problems of under-developed areas. The decision to join the International Labor Organization, and a few months before that U.N.E.S.C.O., characterizes this new political approach. Soviet strategy now appears primarily concerned with intensifying the estrangement of the newly emergent countries of South Asia from the West. It has long been an accepted tenet of Soviet thought that such a course was a pre-condition for an eventual Communist victory in Europe. This strategy of alienation demands time and a concerted effort on a wide front. Joining the I.L.O. is the latest aspect of this pattern of overall Soviet policy.

Admittance of the Soviet Union to full membership in the International Labor Organization climaxed a sharp internal struggle, which ultimately may curtail the effectiveness of the organization as a constructive agency of economic development and technical assistance. Denied membership at the November, 1953 conference because of its reservations to certain clauses of the I.L.O. charter, the Soviet Union removed its stipulations at the June, 1954 session and agreed unconditionally to accept all the charter's provisions.

Opposition to full Soviet membership was led by the United States, which based its position on the need to maintain the tripartite structure of the I.L.O. The machinery of the International Labor Organization remains unique among the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Predicated on a threefold division of power, labor, government, and management are regarded as distinct interest groups and each is accorded an equal voice. The level of accomplish-

ment depends upon the continued cooperation and willingness of these diverse elements to compromise.

Organically, there are three main bodies. First, the General Conference, which convenes annually and acts upon submitted recommendations, labor codes, and budgetary issues; second, a Governing Body or "Executive Council" of forty members, which meets quarterly, conducts the actual groundwork for the Conference, and supervises the activities of the Secretariat; finally, there is a permanent Secretariat headed by a Director General, who is elected by the Conference. The present Director General is an American, David Morse.

The distinctive feature of the I.L.O. is its system of representation. Each nation is permitted four delegates to the General Conference. Two represent government, one, management, the other, labor. As a matter of practice most governments appoint delegates acceptable to both management and labor organizations. This tripartite system of representation extends to the Executive Council. There, twenty seats are apportioned among the various governments with labor and management groups each receiving ten seats. Since each member votes as an individual representing an independent interest group rather than a national unit, a delegation may be split three ways.

Strongly supported by the leaders of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the American delegation opposed full Soviet membership. They argued that Soviet labor and management delegates were not independent agents representing definite interest groups. Rather they were, in fact, but additional representatives of the Soviet government. However, the Credentials Committee demurred from this interpretation and voted to accept Soviet labor and management delegations without any regard to their possible subservience to the state. This consideration was held to be irrelevant since the I.L.O. charter does not contain any stipulation that management interests must represent private ownership or a similarly independent interest group. Thus was the complex and broader problem of nationalization of industry raised. Western labor and management groups, a decided minority, argued that this constituted a deliberate denial of the philosophy inherent in the founding of the I.L.O.

In the final vote before the Conference the balance of power was wielded by members of the delegations from the under-developed

countries. They refused to oppose the seating of the Soviet delegations on the ground that countries with nationalized industries were still entitled to send separate labor and management delegations to the I.L.O. It is important to note that the American effort to keep the Soviets out collapsed because of the inability to convince the under-developed countries of the salient differences between the practice of Soviet totalitarianism and the theory of a democratic system relying heavily upon the nationalization of industry to achieve its ends. This failure to divorce the practice of one country from a theory which holds a great attraction for the under-developed countries must become a cardinal concern of American diplomacy. To criticize or condemn indiscriminately the principle of nationalization and not to appreciate adequately the potency of its appeal would be a crippling handicap in the quest for the friendship of non-Communist Asia. In many respects the key to the antagonism and misunderstanding between the United States and these countries awaits the outcome of the dialogue over the problem and future of nationalization.

The success of the Soviets at the June, 1954 Conference of the I.L.O. in no way erases their lamentable record of opposition to all I.L.O. activities during the 1946-1953 period. Although not a member, the U.S.S.R. regularly denounced the organization in the various organs of the United Nations. Not too surprisingly, Soviet criticisms did not focus on specific phases of I.L.O. activity but on imagined and exaggerated shortcomings of the organization. The Soviets held the I.L.O. to be an instrument of capitalist exploitation and maintained that it operated to the detriment of the working class. They also insisted that the failure to advance the interests of labor stemmed from the archaic tripartite structure and recommended that labor be accorded a larger representation. Their view of the I.L.O. was dogmatic, ideologically discolored, and bore little resemblance to the actual functioning of the organization. This aspect of Soviet policy was related to its overall opposition to all U.N. efforts seeking to alleviate the incidence of unemployment. The Soviets belittled the importance of the I.L.O. reports, holding them to be insignificant and biased. They made no offer of any alternative approach.

The Soviet-conjured image of a ruthless coalition of government and management arrayed against labor proved a figment of Marxist metaphysics. In the complex organizational system of the I.L.O., government did not always side with management. On the contrary,

Labor governments, as in Britain and Scandinavia, tended to side with the interests of labor. The voting alignments were complicated and did not, in reality, approximate the class stereotypes pictured by the Soviets.

During the sessions of the Economic and Social Council the Soviet delegation persistently demanded a series of far-reaching I.L.O. reforms. At one particular meeting the Danish representative inquired whether the Soviet Union would join the I.L.O. if the Soviet proposals were adopted. No reply was ever given. Significantly, the subsequent Soviet decision to participate in the I.L.O. was in no way contingent upon any of these changes being effected in the charter. More weighty policy considerations were controlling.

Within the scope of I.L.O. operations, which covers a diversity of activities, the technical assistance programs are becoming increasingly important. In cooperation with the other specialized agencies and the Technical Assistance Administration of the United Nations, the I.L.O. has been allocating a progressively greater share of its budget to aiding under-developed areas. It seeks to raise standards of industrial and agricultural productivity, combat unemployment, promote land reform in collaboration with the efforts of the Food and Agriculture Organization, and improve labor conditions. To prevent the realization of these efforts is the concern of Soviet policy.

Through the intimate contact with labor groups from the under-developed countries afforded by its I.L.O. membership, the Soviet government works to weaken the already unsteady prestige of the West and, correspondingly, to establish itself as the champion of Asian ideals. In this respect it should be realized that Soviet imperialism is not as evident in South Asia as it is in Europe. Consequently, the Asian countries, understandably but irrationally influenced by their past, are apt to be more sensitive to imagined attempts by the West to regain its former position than to concrete instances of Soviet expansionism.

Of immediate import to the Soviets is the report on forced labor due to be presented to the General Assembly this fall. Prepared by the I.L.O., it contains many passages critical of Soviet labor practices. Judging by past behavior, the Soviets will try to mitigate their impact and shift attention to the sections unfavorable to the West. It is unfortunate, but nonetheless true, that these latter portions will probably be more carefully scrutinized by the Asian delegations than those relating to the U.S.S.R.

Herein lies the challenge. The economic achievements of the Soviet experiment have made an indelible impression upon important segments of Asia's intellectual élite, and the influence of Marxian stereotypes, even among those apathetic to its philosophy, must not be underestimated. Soviet membership should not be viewed with despair or pessimism by the West. Rather, the West must make every effort, notwithstanding Soviet intransigence, and in a fashion acceptable to the under-developed countries, to expand the technical assistance programs of the International Labor Organization. Only by deeds can the West convince the growing nationalism of Asia of its friendship.

More on General Turchin

BY ALBERT PARRY

IN the nearly 13 years since my study of General John B. Turchin was first published,¹ a number of inquiries have reached me on certain points of the amazing warrior's career. Judging from the interest shown by my correspondents, a full-length book rather than that article of mine should have been done on the "Mad Cossack" in Lincoln's service!

In fact, following the appearance of my original essay I did learn that a book on Turchaninov-Turchin was in preparation in the early 1940s. Its author was Louis Rubin, then on the staff of the Cleveland Public Library, and we finally met, but the manuscript has not yet been published, and I do not know Mr. Rubin's further plans for it. From my conversations and correspondence with him I recall that he had found rare data on Turchin in the family letters or reminiscences of those Ohioans who in the 1860s fought under the Russian general. This alone should make Mr. Rubin's book most valuable.

Another researcher on Turchin's life and work, Alexander Doll of Los Angeles, writes to me that in May, 1954, while crossing the continent, he stopped in Illinois and at the national military cemetery of Mounds City found and photographed the grave of General and Mrs. Turchin. A copy of the photograph which he kindly sent me shows a neatly cut and well-maintained tombstone with this inscription:

John B. Turchin
Brig. Gen'l U. S. V.
Dec. 24 1822 - June 18 1901²

Nadine A.
his wife
Nov. 26 1826 - July 17 1904

¹"John B. Turchin: Russian General in the American Civil War," *The Russian Review*, New York, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1942, pp. 44-60. Reprinted with a few minor changes as Chapter 5, "Abe Lincoln's Cossack General," in Albert Parry, *Russian Cavalcade: a Military Record*, New York, Ives Washburn, Inc., 1944, pp. 91-109.

²We note here a discrepancy with other sources which give General Turchin's birthdate as January 30, 1822.

In the second line of the tomb inscription, the initials U. S. V. stand, of course, for United States Volunteers.

As for my own further researches on Turchin, certain additional items on the subject have come to light in the course of my work on various other historical themes.

Thus, while looking through *Krasnyi Arkhiv* in another connection, I discovered that Baron Edouard Stoeckl, Tsar Alexander II's envoy in Washington, was rather surprised by the news of Turchin's participation in the American war. On September 9 (August 28 o.s.), 1861, Stoeckl wrote to Prince Alexander Gorchakov, minister of foreign affairs in St. Petersburg:

"Also from the newspapers I have learned that a certain Turchaninov, a former Russian officer, is in command of a regiment of volunteers from the state of Illinois. I do not know who he is and for what reason he is here."³

This reference to Turchin was again encountered by me in yet another Russian source—in a Soviet book of 1939 on relations between the United States and Russia during the American Civil War. From this Soviet work (reaching me after my essay on Turchin was published) we can see that Red Moscow was on the other hand not puzzled but quite proud of Turchin's memory. To quote the Soviet statement:

Representatives of the Russian people fought in the ranks of the Federal army. Among the first volunteers responding to Lincoln's call in April 1861 were also Russian subjects who struggled against slavery together with those democrats and socialists who had participated in the German revolution of 1848. Turchaninov, a former Russian officer, commanded a regiment of Illinois volunteers.⁴

However, foremost among my post-1944 finds on Turchin has been an American source—a curious old book by Alf Burnett, the self-styled "comic delineator, army correspondent, humorist, etc. etc." Published in Cincinnati at the mid-mark of the Civil War, it is largely a collection of articles sent by him from army camps to the Cincinnati *Press*, *Times*, and *Commercial*. As Ohio troops constituted an important part of Turchin's command, it was inevitable that Burnett and his readers back home would be intrigued by this strange Cossack leading their "Buckeye State" sons, brothers and husbands into the battle against the rebels. Thus the book has

³*Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Moscow, 1939, No. 3 (94), p. 119.

⁴M. M. Malkin, *Grazhdanskaya voina v SShA i tsarskaya Rossiya*, Moscow and Leningrad, OGIZ, 1939, p. 222. Malkin refers to Stoeckl's dispatch in a footnote without giving the text of that dispatch.

indeed something worthwhile to add to the story of Turchin—and of his wife, too.⁵

It presents Mrs. Turchin in a fuller light than provided by other sources. The general knowledge was that she accompanied her husband on most of his Civil War campaigns, and that in doing so she was a compassionate and able nurse to his sick and wounded soldiers. But Burnett tells us that she herself was a soldier. In her husband's campaign through North Alabama in 1862 she rode horseback weeks at a time, forty and fifty miles a day, sharing in "all the hardships incident to a soldier's life." On the march from Winchester to Bellefonte, made by the Nineteenth Illinois (her husband's first regiment, to which Ohio units were later added), "she is said to have taken command of the vanguard, and to have given most vigorous and valuable directions for driving off and punishing the infamous bushwhackers who infested the road." The men worshipped Mrs. Turchin. Carried away by his own enthusiasm Burnett hints that they regarded her as something next to "the Maid of Orleans."

Burnett also ascribes to Mrs. Turchin an important rôle in setting her husband free in the celebrated episode of his trial by a Union court-martial. According to Burnett, she "suddenly disappeared" right after her husband's arrest. She was next heard of in Washington, then in Chicago, where she "enlisted the sympathies of noble-hearted men in the cause of her husband, prevailing upon a delegation of noble Illinoisans to accompany her to Washington, and, with their assistance, secured the confirmation of the Colonel [Turchin] as a brigadier-general of volunteers."

This was, then, the clever strategy which outwitted Turchin's enemies in the Union Army who thought that he had treated defeated Southerners too harshly. The court's verdict of guilty had to be set aside as most of Turchin's judges were colonels who could not legally sit in judgment on a general. "Truly," exults Burnett, "in the lottery matrimonial, Colonel Turchin had the fortune to draw an invaluable prize."

Several pages are devoted by Burnett to proving that the charges against Turchin were ridiculous anyway; that the Illinoisans and Ohioans under him were not really rough with the inhabitants of

⁵Alf Burnett, *Incidents of the War: Humorous, Pathetic, and Descriptive*. Cincinnati, Rickey & Carroll, 1863. Material on the Turchins is to be found on pp. 64-67 and 278.

Athens, Alabama—not after the insults they had to endure from those rebels. As others of Turchin's admirers, Burnett is harsh on the anti-Turchin witnesses and judges. He quotes an Ohio captain present at the trial as saying that "the noble Russian . . . looked like a lion among a set of jackals." Burnett sums up the whole affair in these words:

"General Turchin was basely persecuted. He came out of the ordeal unscathed."

Most people in Ohio and Illinois agreed with Burnett wholeheartedly. Soldiers of the Union Army, particularly in Turchin's regiments, laughed jubilantly and sang the newly composed Turchin Ballad. Therein the Cossack leader's triumphant liberation of negro slaves and other rebel property—especially of mules so sorely needed by the Union Army—was duly recorded and praised. We find the Ballad reproduced by Burnett in his book. We know that Burnett gave humorous recitals in camps and towns along his war-corresponding way; chances are that "Turchin's Got Your Mule" was in his repertory.

And here it is—the only American folk song about a Russian hero:

TURCHIN'S GOT YOUR MULE

A planter came to camp one day,
 His niggers for to find;
 His mules had also gone astray,
 And stock of every kind.
 The planter tried to get them back,
 And thus was made a fool,
 For every one he met in camp
 Cried, "Mister, here's your mule."

Chorus—Go back, go back, go back, old scamp,
 And don't be made a fool;
 Your niggers they are all in camp,
 And Turchin's got your mule.

His corn and horses all were gone
 Within a day or two.
 Again he went to Colonel Long,
 To see what he could do.

"I cannot change what I have done,
And won't be made a fool,"
Was all the answer he could get,
The owner of the mule.

Chorus—Go back, go back, go back, old scamp, etc.

And thus from place to place we go,
The song is e'er the same;
'Tis not as once it used to be,
For Morgan's lost his name.
He went up North, and there he stays,
With stricken face, the fool;
In Cincinnati now he cries,
"My kingdom for a mule."

Chorus—Go back, go back, etc.

Stalin's Falsification of History: the Case of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty

BY SYDNEY D. BAILEY

IN 1938 there was published in Moscow an official history of the Russian Communist Party. It was immediately translated into many languages and issued in large editions at subsidized prices.

The distinctive thing about this book is that it attempts to *make* history—not the history of the future but the history of the past—by the simple device of rewriting it. Its purpose is to demonstrate that Lenin's chief lieutenant at the time of the October Revolution was Stalin, though in fact Stalin was a relatively unimportant and little known figure at the time. Lenin's best known disciples in 1917—men like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and Radek—were eliminated in the various purges after Lenin's death. This rewriting of history seeks to reduce the rôle of all Lenin's friends except one, to portray them as stupid, weak, vacillating, men of no substance, opportunists, foreign spies. The book is full of such phrases as: "political double-dealers," "counter-revolutionary conspiracy," "dregs of humanity"—used not of Lenin's enemies but of his closest friends. Stalin is shown in a very different light. "Of great importance was Comrade Stalin's report." "Comrade Stalin's speech made a profound impression." "Comrade Stalin's article was of the utmost political moment."

It was not until January, 1946, that it was revealed that the author of this book was Stalin himself.

Stalin's attempt to falsify the recent history of Russia can be illustrated in many ways, but the case of the Brest-Litovsk treaty negotiations is as good an example as any. The diplomacy was "open" and the proceedings were fully reported day by day in the press of the world; most of those who took part published memoirs soon afterwards; the attitude of the differing groups within the Bolshevik Party can be discovered from the published minutes of committees and the reports of speeches. From these contemporary sources it is not difficult to reconstruct the course of events, to discover who advocated a particular course of action at any particular

moment. The impression received from a study of contemporary sources is quite unlike Stalin's version published 20 years after.¹

There were, broadly speaking, three points of view within the Bolshevik Party in 1918. Lenin, ever a realist, wanted to stop the war as soon as possible on the best terms they could get. He no longer believed, as he had done a few months before, that the Russian Revolution would inevitably collapse unless it were supported by revolutions in Germany and elsewhere. He now realized that the Bolshevik régime would have to be planned on the assumption that it would exist in a hostile world for some time to come. He had promised the people peace, and in the last resort this could only be secured on the enemy's terms. "If I accept peace when the army is in flight," he told the seventh Bolshevik Congress in March, 1918, ". . . I accept it in order to prevent things getting worse . . . I say again that I am ready to sign, and that I consider it my duty to sign a treaty twenty times, a hundred times more humiliating, in order to gain at least a few days . . . As every sensible man will understand, by signing this peace treaty, we do not put a stop to our workers' revolution."² "The question is the fate of the revolution . . . At the moment our revolution is the most important thing in the world."³ Lenin was supported in his view by Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sokolnikov, and Smilga.

The leading spokesman of the opposite view was N. I. Bukharin, "the most valuable and biggest theoretician of the Party" as Lenin described him in his "Political Testament."⁴ Bukharin wanted to resume hostilities and wage what he called "a revolutionary war." He believed that the Central Powers were on the point of collapse and that the proletariat in those countries would never fight to suppress the Russian Revolution. To sign a humiliating treaty would, he felt, demoralize the revolutionary will of the Russian people and impede the spread of revolution to other countries. He wanted to arm the masses and let them fight a guerilla war. He was supported by Dzerzhinsky, Joffe, Uritsky, Alexandra Kollontai, Bubnov, Ryazanov, Krestinsky, and Lomov.

But it was Trotsky's agile mind which hit on a third course.

¹The actual course of negotiations, which started on December 3, 1917, is described in J. W. Wheeler-Bennett's book *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, 1938 [Ed.].

²Lenin, *Selected Works*, 1946 ed., vol. vii, pp. 301-303.

³Trotsky, *Lenin*, 1925, pp. 134, 130; *My Life*, 1930, p. 327.

⁴Trotsky, *The Suppressed Testament of Lenin*, 1946, p. 7.

Trotsky rarely saw things in terms of black and white; his was a subtle character—though Stalin called him a waverer. Trotsky outlined his plan in a letter to Lenin. "It is impossible to sign their peace . . . My plan is this: We announce the termination of the war and demobilization without signing any peace. We declare we cannot participate in the brigands' peace . . . The Germans will be unable to attack us after we declare the war ended."⁵ Trotsky's idea was to delay the final capitulation as long as possible in order to arouse the workers of Germany and Austria-Hungary to as great a revolutionary activity as possible.

Trotsky elaborated his plan at a meeting of Bolshevik leaders on January 21. Bukharin and Radek put the case for a revolutionary war. Lenin urged acceptance of the German terms. An informal vote showed 32 for Bukharin, 16 for Trotsky, and 15 for Lenin.

At the Bolshevik Central Committee the next day a decision had to be taken. Bukharin's plan for a revolutionary war was voted down by 11 votes to 2 (Bukharin and Dzerzhinsky), with one abstention. Lenin proposed that the negotiations be dragged out as long as possible and this plan was adopted by 12 votes to 1. Then Trotsky put his formula: "We terminate the war, we do not conclude peace, we demobilize the army." This was carried by 9 votes to 7.

Trotsky now returned to Brest in order—as Lenin put it—to hold out until the Germans presented an ultimatum;⁶ he was accompanied this time by a delegation of pro-Bolshevik Ukrainians. This led, as Trotsky intended, to a lengthy but fruitless debate between the two Ukrainian delegations, which only came to an end on February 9, when the Central Powers signed a separate peace treaty with the anti-Bolshevik delegation from the Ukrainian Rada. "I wonder if the Rada is still sitting at Kieff?" wrote Czernin in his diary.⁷ As a matter of fact it was not.

On February 10 Trotsky produced his trump card. "We declare to all peoples and governments that we are dropping out of the war. We are issuing orders for full demobilization of all our troops that face the armies of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria. We wait and trust that all nations will soon follow in our steps."⁸ "The whole congress sat speechless when Trotsky had

⁵Magnes, *Russia and Germany at Brest-Litovsk*, 1919, pp. 122-123; Wheeler-Bennett, *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace*, 1938, pp. 185-186.

⁶Lenin, vol. vii, p. 308.

⁷Czernin, *In the World War*, 1919, p. 329.

⁸*Proceedings of the Brest-Litovsk Conference*, 1918 (hereafter cited as *Proceed-*

finished his declaration," wrote Hoffmann. "We were all dumb-founded."⁹ Kühlmann's legal adviser, Krüge, after some hasty research, announced that the only precedent for this had taken place over one thousand years earlier between the Greeks and the Scythians.¹⁰

Trotsky and his colleagues returned to Petrograd and reported to the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. Sverdlov moved a resolution, which was adopted unanimously, approving the action of the Russian delegation.

The Central Powers were in a most difficult situation. Hoffmann wanted to resume hostilities, but Kühlmann and Czernin were afraid this would have an unfortunate effect on world opinion. But Hoffmann had the support of German G.H.Q., and on February 16 the Germans announced that the armistice would end two days later and hostilities would be resumed.

The next day the Bolshevik Central Committee met to consider the ultimatum. Lenin proposed that the terms be accepted and was supported by Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, and Smilga. Trotsky proposed that negotiations be delayed until a German advance had actually begun and its influence on the workers' movement was revealed; he was supported by Bukharin (who still hankered after a revolutionary war), Joffe, Uritsky, Krestinsky, and Lomov. Thus the forces were ranged—5 votes for acceptance of the terms, six for delay. Then Lenin put the crucial and practical question: if the German advance becomes a fact and yet no revolutionary upsurge occurs in Germany and Austria, should a peace treaty be concluded? Lenin's motion received 7 votes, including Trotsky's; Joffe cast the single vote against; Bukharin, Krestinsky, Lomov, and one other abstained.

The next day the Germans resumed hostilities, and the Bolshevik Central Committee met and remained in session virtually throughout the day. Lenin again urged immediate acceptance of the German terms, but his motion was lost by one vote. As the day went on reports of the rapid German advance reached Petrograd, and in the evening a second vote on Lenin's motion was taken. This time

ings . . .), pp. 169-173; W. Astrov and others, *An Illustrated History of the Russian Revolution*, 1928, vol. ii, pp. 516-517; Bunyan and Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution*, 1934, p. 510; Degras, *Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy*, 1951, vol. i, pp. 43-45.

⁹Hoffmann, *War Diaries and Other Papers*, 1929, vol. ii, pp. 218-219.

¹⁰Price, *My Reminiscences of the Russian Revolution*, 1921, p. 239.

Trotsky supported Lenin because he believed that further resistance was useless. The motion to accept the German terms was thus carried by 7 votes to 6: in addition to Lenin and Trotsky, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Stalin and Smilga voted for the motion; Bukharin, Joffe, Uritsky, Krestinsky, Dzerzhinsky, and Lomov voted against.

Lenin and Trotsky communicated the decision to the Central Powers: "The Soviet of People's Commissars finds itself forced to sign the treaty and to accept the conditions of the Four-Power Delegation at Brest-Litovsk."¹¹ General Hoffmann replied that a wireless message could not be regarded as an official document because the original signatures were absent. Accordingly, the Russian communication with the actual signatures of Lenin and Trotsky was sent by special messenger to Dvinsk.

While a reply was awaited, Trotsky communicated with the representatives of Great Britain, France, and the United States to find out whether they could expect help if they had to continue the war. Trotsky told Bruce Lockhart, the British representative, that if the Allies would send a promise of support he would sway the decision of the Russian government in favor of war. Lenin told Lockhart: "I am quite prepared to risk a co-operation with the Allies, which should be temporarily advantageous to both of us. In the event of German aggression, I am even willing to accept military support."¹² Lockhart passed all this on to the Foreign Office but apparently received no reply.

The Bolshevik "Lefts," however, opposed accepting Allied help. The question was considered at the Central Committee on February 22. Lenin could not be present, but he sent a note favoring acceptance of "the assistance of the brigands of French imperialism against the German brigands."¹³ A motion to this effect was approved by 6 votes to 5, Bukharin still maintaining his opposition.

At this point Trotsky offered his resignation as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. He no longer felt able to accept full responsibility for the conduct of Russia's foreign affairs. "It seems to me it would be politically wise if I resigned," he told Lenin. "My resignation would imply, for the Germans, a radical change of policy and would

¹¹*Proceedings . . .*, pp. 174-175; Magnes, p. 150; Bunyan and Fisher, p. 513; Degras, vol. i, p. 46.

¹²R. H. B. Lockhart, *Memoirs of a British Agent*, 1932, pp. 229, 231-232, 239.

¹³Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 333.

strengthen their confidence in our willingness to sign the peace treaty this time."¹⁴ His resignation was accepted and on March 13 he became Commissar of War and Chairman of the Supreme War Council.

On February 21, Kühlmann despatched a reply to the message of acceptance from Lenin and Trotsky. This reply contained terms even more onerous than those proposed on January 18. Acceptance within 48 hours was insisted on. Russia was to be stripped of about 300,000 square miles of territory, inhabited by more than 50 million people. She was to lose one-third of her railway mileage, three-quarters of her iron production facilities, and ninety percent of her coal production.

Again the Bolshevik Central Committee met. Lenin insisted that the new terms be accepted at once. Stalin seems at this point to have favored a further period of delay, but Lenin was adamant and threatened to resign. Bukharin still wanted a revolutionary war, but Trotsky pointed out that this was mere theorizing: it was impossible for a divided party to wage a revolutionary war. When a vote was taken, Lenin was supported by Sverdlov, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Smilga, and Elena Stasova; Trotsky, Joffe, Krestinsky, and Dzerzhinsky abstained; the irreconcilable "Lefts" (Bukharin, Uritsky, Bubnov, and Lomov) voted against Lenin's motion. Seven of the fifteen present thus favored acceptance; it was not an absolute majority, but the abstentions enabled the motion to go through. Bukharin, Lomov, Bubnov, Pyatakov, and Smirnov resigned from the Central Committee and from their government posts.

On February 24, Lenin and Trotsky telegraphed acceptance of the new terms. It was with the utmost difficulty that the Bolsheviks found anyone willing to go to Brest to sign the treaty. The Russian delegation which finally went consisted of Sokolnikov, Joffe, G. V. Chicherin (Trotsky's successor as Commissar of Foreign Affairs), Karakhan, G. I. Petrovsky (Commissar of the Interior), and a number of military and naval specialists. The Central Powers proposed that negotiations for the fulfilment of the new terms should begin. Sokolnikov said there was nothing to negotiate about. They had come to sign a dictated peace, not to negotiate. The Russian delegates, wrote Ludendorff, displayed dignity in misfortune.¹⁵ The treaty was signed on March 3.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 333; *Lenin*, p. 138.

¹⁵Ludendorff, *My War Memoirs*, 1919, vol. ii, pp. 561-562.

Now let us see how Stalin describes these events in his *History*:

In order to finally consolidate the Soviet power, the war had to be ended. The Party therefore launched the fight for peace from the moment of the victory of the October Revolution.

The Soviet Government called upon "all the belligerent peoples and their governments to start immediate negotiations for a just, democratic peace." But the "allies"—Great Britain and France—refused to accept the proposal of the Soviet Government. In view of this refusal, the Soviet Government, in compliance with the will of the Soviets, decided to start negotiations with Germany and Austria.

The negotiations began on December 3 in Brest-Litovsk. On December 5 an armistice was signed.

The negotiations took place at a time when the country was in a state of economic disruption, when war-weariness was universal, when our troops were abandoning the trenches and the front was collapsing. It became clear in the course of the negotiations that the German imperialists were out to seize huge portions of the territory of the former tsarist empire, and to turn Poland, the Ukraine, and the Baltic countries into dependencies of Germany.

To continue the war under such conditions would have meant staking the very existence of the new-born Soviet Republic. The working class and the peasantry were confronted with the necessity of accepting onerous terms of peace, of retreating before the most dangerous marauder of the time—German imperialism—in order to secure a respite in which to strengthen the Soviet power and to create a new army, the Red Army, which would be able to defend the country from enemy attack.

All the counter-revolutionaries, from the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries to the most arrant White-guards, conducted a frenzied campaign against the conclusion of peace. Their policy was clear: they wanted to wreck the peace negotiations, provoke a German offensive, and thus imperil the still weak Soviet power and endanger the gains of the workers and peasants.

Their allies in this sinister scheme were Trotsky and his accomplice Bukharin, the latter, together with Radek and Pyatakov, heading a group which was hostile to the Party but cam-

ouflaged itself under the name of "Left Communists." Trotsky and the group of "Left Communists" began a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding the continuation of the war. These people were clearly playing into the hands of the German imperialists and the counter-revolutionaries within the country, for they were working to expose the young Soviet Republic, which had not yet any army, to the blows of German imperialism.

This was really a policy of provocateurs, skilfully masked by Left phraseology.

On February 10, 1918, the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk were broken off. Although Lenin and Stalin, in the name of the Central Committee of the Party, had insisted that peace be signed, Trotsky, who was chairman of the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk, treacherously violated the direct instructions of the Bolshevik Party. He announced that the Soviet Republic refused to conclude peace on the terms proposed by Germany. At the same time he informed the Germans that the Soviet Republic would not fight and would continue to demobilize the army.

This was monstrous. The German imperialists could have desired nothing more from this traitor to the interests of the Soviet country.

The German government broke the armistice and assumed the offensive. . .

On February 18, 1918, the Central Committee of the Party had approved Lenin's proposal to send a telegram to the German government offering to conclude an immediate peace. But in order to secure more advantageous terms, the Germans continued to advance, and only on February 22 did the German government express its willingness to sign peace. The terms were now far more onerous than those originally proposed.

Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov had to wage a stubborn fight on the Central Committee against Trotsky, Bukharin, and the other Trotskyites before they secured a decision in favor of the conclusion of peace. Bukharin and Trotsky, Lenin declared, "actually *helped* the German imperialists and *hindered* the growth and development of the revolution in Germany." . . .

On February 23, the Central Committee decided to accept

the terms of the German Command and to sign the peace treaty. The treachery of Trotsky and Bukharin cost the Soviet Republic dearly. . . .

Meanwhile, the "Left Communists" continued their struggle against Lenin, sinking deeper and deeper into the slough of treachery.

The Moscow Regional Bureau of the Party, of which the "Left Communists" (Bukharin, Ossinsky, Yakovleva, Stukov, and Mantsev) had temporarily seized control, passed a resolution of no-confidence in the Central Committee, a resolution designed to split the Party. . . .

At that time the real cause of this anti-Party behavior of Trotsky and the "Left Communists" was not yet clear to the Party. But the recent trial of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites" (beginning of 1938) has now revealed that Bukharin and the group of "Left Communists" headed by him, together with Trotsky and the "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries, were at that time secretly conspiring against the Soviet Government. Now it is known that Bukharin, Trotsky and their fellow-conspirators had determined to wreck the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, arrest V. I. Lenin, J. V. Stalin, and Y. M. Sverdlov, assassinate them, and form a new government consisting of Bukharinites, Trotskyites, and "Left" Socialist-Revolutionaries.

While hatching this clandestine counter-revolutionary plot, the group of "Left Communists," with the support of Trotsky, openly attacked the Bolshevik Party, trying to split it and to disintegrate its ranks. But at this grave juncture the Party rallied around Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov and supported the Central Committee on the question of peace as on all other questions.

The "Left Communist" group was isolated and defeated. . . .

It will be noted that this version of Stalin's perverts the facts in several important particulars. It is impossible here to consider all the discrepancies and verbal tricks used by Stalin but some of the more outstanding are worthy of comment.

In the first place, Stalin does not regard the disagreements within the Bolshevik high command as genuine differences of view between honorable men; Trotsky and Bukharin had committed the unforgivable sin of having been "against Lenin," against the in-

fallible high-priest of Bolshevism and architect of the Soviet state. Such conduct could only have been inspired by disreputable motives, and it was Stalin's view that their purpose was to "provoke a German offensive and thus imperil the still weak Soviet power." His reasoning seems to have been something like this: Russia and Germany were at war: Lenin favored one course, Trotsky another: Lenin was opposed to German imperialism, therefore Trotsky was acting in the interests of German imperialism. But the evident absurdity of this line of reasoning is clear when we remember that it was *not* Trotsky or Bukharin, *but Lenin*, who favored unconditional acceptance of Germany's cruel terms.

Stalin, as we have seen, invariably ascribes the most despicable motives to Lenin's opponents. They were guilty of "treachery," of "secretly conspiring against the Soviet Government," of hatching a "clandestine counter-revolutionary plot." Lenin had certainly held that both the Bukharin position and the Trotsky position were mistaken, but he never for one moment doubted their sincerity or their devotion to Bolshevik principles or the Bolshevik government. Stalin, on the other hand, describes them as being "hostile to the Party . . . clearly playing into the hands of German imperialists . . . really a policy of provocateurs, skilfully masked by Left phraseology."

Another device of Stalin's is to lump all Lenin's opponents into one category and label the whole lot of them as counter-revolutionaries and traitors. Bukharin and his "revolutionary war" group, Trotsky and his "no peace, no war" group, the Mensheviks, the left-wing Socialist Revolutionaries, and even what he calls the "arrant White-guards"—all these people are put in one category and written off as enemies. There is no attempt to distinguish their different viewpoints. It is like saying "Sir Winston Churchill and Harry Pollitt are both opposed to the British Labor Party: therefore, Churchill is Pollitt's accomplice." Indeed, Stalin does describe Bukharin as Trotsky's accomplice, though it is beyond question that Trotsky and Bukharin took quite distinct and independent positions; when in the end Trotsky decided to abandon his own position for the sake of agreement, it was to support Lenin, not Bukharin. Stalin even manages in one sentence to refer to "Bukharin and the group of 'Left Communists' . . . together with Trotsky and the 'Left' Socialist-Revolutionaries." To confuse Trotsky and Bukharin is bad enough, but to bring in the Socialist Revolutionaries—a party

that both Trotsky and Bukharin despised and opposed—is tendentious in the extreme.

Stalin states that Trotsky “treacherously violated the direct instructions of the Bolshevik Party.” This is quite untrue. Trotsky did, of course, oppose Lenin on the issue within the inner councils of the Bolshevik Party for a time; it may even be that he was influenced in his decision to resign as Commissar of Foreign Affairs by a wish not to be saddled with responsibility for actually signing the Brest treaty. But he always carried out his instructions loyally and faithfully; this is confirmed by the independent accounts of the negotiations by the German and Austrian participants.

Another trick of Stalin’s is to report an actual incident quite correctly but in such a way as to leave a false impression. Stalin’s statement that the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party sent instructions to Trotsky that the Treaty must be signed is quite true, but it does not prove that Trotsky was planning to defy his colleagues in the government.

Finally, Stalin alleges that Bukharin, Trotsky, and others decided to arrest Lenin, Stalin, and Sverdlov, “assassinate them, and form a new government.” Stalin does not say why this plan never materialized, but the fact is that Stalin was of only minor significance in the Bolshevik hierarchy in 1918. Even if Bukharin and Trotsky had wanted to eliminate Lenin and Sverdlov, it is hardly conceivable that it would have occurred to them *in 1918* that Stalin was worth eliminating. But the truth about the alleged plot to assassinate Lenin was very different from Stalin’s version. Lenin’s opponents were in a difficult situation in 1918. They had a majority in certain sections of the Party—Stalin admits this. Yet Lenin’s prestige in the Party was so great that it was difficult for the government to put through a plan which Lenin was known to oppose. One of Lenin’s opponents on the Brest issue—not Trotsky or Bukharin—apparently suggested, not very seriously, that they arrest Lenin, pass a resolution attacking his position, then release him next day and let things take their course. Radek had even boasted in public: “If there were five hundred courageous men in Petrograd, we would put you [Lenin] in prison.” Lenin had replied: “It is much more likely that I will send you than you me.” Lenin little realized that Radek was to disappear in the Stalinist purge twenty years later. Certainly, the notion of arresting Lenin was fantastic and nothing ever came of it. In any case, there was never any talk of *killing*

Lenin, and it is unlikely that anybody ever thought of arresting Stalin.

One of the interesting things about the Stalinist revision of history is that a leading rôle in the process was played by Stalin's fellow-Georgian, Beria. Shortly before Stalin's *History* appeared, Beria had delivered a long address—it took two days—entitled "On the History of the Bolshevik Organization in Transcaucasia." This was designed to show that Stalin had always been a good Bolshevik and had played the leading rôle in building up the party in Transcaucasia. The leading Georgian historians were fiercely attacked and told to "revise" their works, which had not given sufficient credit to Stalin. The lecture was later translated into many languages and was regarded by orthodox Stalinists as basic source material on Stalin's early life.

Now that Stalin's friend Beria has been unmasked as a foreign spy, will it be necessary to rewrite history once again?

The Soviet Occupation of the Baltic States

BY IRINA SABUROVA

THE fate of the Baltic States—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—both before and during World War II is of special interest to Russian readers as well as to foreign students of contemporary Russian history.

The Baltic states, which became independent after the February revolution, were formed out of the former Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire. For as long as two centuries they had been a part of the Empire; as a result they contained, next to the indigenous Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and so-called "Baltic Germans," a numerous native-born Russian population. Moreover, in some cases the establishment of the new states was accompanied by the inclusion of purely Russian territories. Estonia, for instance, incorporated Pechera, Isborsk, Ivangorod, settled mainly by "Sets," an ancient Slavic tribe. The monasteries of Pechera, the fortresses of Ivangorod and Isborsk are monuments, respectively, of the early feudal period of Russia and of the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Latvia absorbed part of the provinces of Pskov and Vitebsk. Thus it happened that a native Russian population, not newcomers (*émigrés*), found itself outside the borders of the Soviet Union. The Baltic Russians represented a peculiar historical and political phenomenon, inasmuch as they belonged neither to the Soviet population nor to the "old emigration," since up to the end of World War II they never migrated anywhere. Politically and economically, they formed an integral part of the new free democratic states, while preserving their full cultural autonomy.

Until 1934 the Latvian Diet contained representatives of several Russian parties. In addition to Latvian and German, Russian was one of the three official languages whose knowledge was required of all civil servants dealing with the public, and even street names were given in the three languages. The Greek Orthodox Church was independent of the Moscow Patriarch, and Orthodox churches and monasteries carried on their activities without interference. The system of compulsory universal education provided free six-grade

elementary schools for Russian children; the larger towns, moreover, had state-supported Russian high schools in addition to the many private institutions. Since 1922-23 Riga, the Latvian capital, had the only permanent Russian theatre outside the Soviet Union, with daily performances throughout the season. This theatre developed a whole new generation of Russian actors, while at the same time offering opportunities to famous veterans of the Russian stage. It taught the young people of the country, by no means Russians alone, to appreciate the classic masterpieces of Russian dramatic literature as well as modern foreign and Soviet plays. A Russian daily newspaper, the *Segodnia* (Today), with the widest circulation of any Russian newspaper outside the Soviet Union, was brought out in Riga both in a morning and an evening edition. *Perezvony* an art review, was published there for several years, and so were many other Russian periodicals. There were several Russian publishing houses, and Russian artists, musicians, and singers maintained well-attended studios. Finally—and this is a unique phenomenon outside the U.S.S.R.—Latvia included purely Russian agricultural areas. After the land reform of 1922, these areas were divided into individual farms settled and worked by Russian farmers, neither under the conditions of tsarist Russia (since here the former landlords were allowed to keep only the core of their estates with a small allotment of land), nor under those of the Soviet collective farms; here the farmers enjoyed full ownership of their homesteads and could pass them on to their children. They also had their full share, to the same extent as Latvian farmers, in government aid to agriculture, such as dairy subsidies, state-organized marketing of flax, promotion of horsebreeding, etc. Thus, in comparison on the one hand with the “rootless” Soviet citizens deprived of any kind of freedom in their homeland, and on the other hand with the “rootless” émigrés living in small isolated colonies among alien nations all over the world, the Baltic Russians represented a “third force” with special characteristics, and their life and evolution offer considerable interest not only historically, but as a portent of the future.

After 1934, with the coming to power of the Premier, Dr. Ulmanis, the Diet was abolished and Latvian was declared the only official language. In all other spheres—church, economic, and cultural life—nothing was changed for the Russians. During the war, which began with the first Soviet occupation of the Baltic states, the Russian population of Latvia, both natives and émigrés, shared the

fate of all other citizens of the country and actually suffered even more than the Latvians.

Almost simultaneously with the occupation of Poland, in the fall of 1939, the Soviet Union pressed the demand for the occupation of military and naval bases in the Baltic states. The latter were presented with a kind of ultimatum and could do nothing but submit. Latvia was the leader among them, both as to size of territory and number of seaports. Riga, the capital, a member of the Hanseatic League in the Middle Ages, was a major commercial port at the mouth of the Dvina (which at this point is almost a mile wide) and accessible to ocean-going vessels. Libau had been an important open-sea naval port in tsarist Russia; Vindau, in Latvian *Kuldīga*, was of secondary importance. The population of Latvia numbered about 1,900,000 and included, as has been indicated above, Latvians, Germans, and Russians, both native-born and émigrés.

Despite the fact that Latvia maintained a peacetime army far exceeding her normal capacity, her armed forces barely added up to 300,000 men. The armies of Estonia and Lithuania were still smaller. The Baltic states possessed neither motorized divisions nor naval and air forces of any importance. The Latvian Navy, commanded by Count Keyserling and later by Captain Spade, former officers of the Russian Imperial Navy, consisted of the warship "Virsaitis" (formerly a Coast Guard ship) and two or three submarines. The number of light aircraft was negligible, and there were no bombers at all. Plainly, with these forces Latvia was powerless to defend herself against her giant neighbor.

In the fall of 1936, the three Baltic states entered negotiations with a view to forming a defensive alliance. The alliance was actually concluded, but its combined fighting capacity still remained too insignificant for effective resistance to such an enemy as the Soviet Union. The military potential of this alliance is best illustrated by a story widely circulated at that time. The Latvian commander-in-chief, General Balodis, wired the Estonian commander-in-chief, General Leidoner, saying, "Send me your heavy artillery immediately." The reply was, "Both cannon?"

Early in June 1940, the Baltic Foreign Ministers held urgent consultations among themselves and made several flights to Moscow to confer with the Kremlin. The press reported these flights and conferences in vague and restrained terms. The population was unworried, being engrossed in preparations for the annual choral festival to be held in Dunaburg. This festival, in which giant

choruses attired in national costumes participated, was scheduled for Saturday, June 15. The absence on this occasion of the President, Dr. Ulmanis, who usually opened such celebrations, was explained by an indisposition. The Sunday papers of June 16 were filled with descriptions of the festival and pictures of the participants. Few people probably paid any attention to a short small-print item in the Russian paper *Segodnia*, which read approximately as follows: "This morning at the village of Maslenki on the Soviet-Latvian border a skirmish occurred, and shots were fired. Several Latvian frontier guards have been taken prisoner, as well as a young village shepherd. The incident is being investigated."

Yet even prior to the appearance of the Sunday papers, Igals, former Latvian consul in Paris, on duty that night at the Foreign Ministry, had been alerted by a strange wire from the Latvian envoy in London, who wanted to know whether it was true that Soviet troops had crossed the border, and why the Latvian lat no longer was quoted on the Stock Exchange. The Foreign Minister, roused from sleep, irritably grumbled: "Wire in reply, 'This is old wives' gossip.'"

Nevertheless, the commanding officer of the frontier brigade, General Bolstein, early that morning left for the frontier in his car. He found that the brigade had been smashed by the onslaught of Soviet troops. That same day General Bolstein shot himself.

On Monday morning, June 17, Riga was buzzing with sinister rumors, and in the afternoon Soviet tanks rolled into the city. Except for a few clashes with the police (actually street fights between the police and Latvian Communists who had suddenly emerged from the underground) the Russians met with no resistance in the Latvian capital. The President, standing upright in his car, slowly drove through the streets, telling the populace to keep calm. The next day the President and the commander-in-chief of the army, General Balodis, were under house arrest, and a few days later both were taken to the Soviet Union, and nothing has been heard from them since.

During the first days of the occupation, several thousand people were arrested in Riga and throughout the country—members of the government, army officers, heads of government departments, industrialists, clergy of all denominations, publishers and editors, civil servants, and civic leaders, both Latvian and Russian. Milrud and Khariton, editors of *Segodnia*, were arrested and later deported to the Narym region with thousands of others. A third editor,

Levin, was temporarily left in his job in order to instruct the new editor-in-chief, the Communist Rappaport, just released from prison, but soon, he too, was to share the general fate. For a short time the paper was brought out under various names, but it was finally established as the *Proletarskaya Pravda* (Proletarian Truth). More than half of the contributors to the former *Segodnia* were either arrested or fired. A former contributor, Kira Verkhovenskaya, now revealed as an agent of the N.K.V.D., the Soviet secret police, played a conspicuous part in the arrests. She had been in charge of the local news section of the paper, and in the capacity of a reporter she knew everyone of importance in the Russian circles. Soon promoted to a more responsible post in the N.K.V.D., she did not remain long on the staff of the *Proletarskaya Pravda*.

After the first wave of arrests had swept away all prominent leaders, arrests of plain people went on uninterruptedly throughout the thirteen months of the Soviet occupation. Night after night, the "Black Raven" would stop in front of this or that house, and the N.K.V.D. men would carry off their victim after a thorough search of the premises. If they met with no resistance, they would behave with reasonable courtesy. But sometimes they were fired upon, or else the prospective victim would commit suicide by shooting himself or jumping out of the window; in such cases all other members of the family would be taken away.

In Riga the arrested persons would be taken to the building of the former Ministry of the Interior, now headquarters of the N.K.V.D. Here they were submitted, according to some reports, to a preliminary procedure: they were kept standing motionless on their feet in a room packed with people for up to 48 hours before being called up for questioning. The Central prison was filled to overflowing. It took months of effort for relatives to be allowed to visit the prisoners, and when at last permission was given, it happened more often than not that the prisoner had been removed to some unknown destination. In a suburb of Riga a house called the "White Villa" was occupied by a special department of the N.K.V.D. in charge of tortures and executions; residents of the neighborhood often heard shots in the night behind the strictly guarded high fence of the Villa; and many corpses mutilated by torture were later found in the adjoining woods. The cellars of the N.K.V.D. headquarters in Riga also contained torture chambers. After the departure of the N.K.V.D., tiny "coffins" were discovered there, one-man cells so

small that their inmates had no room except in a bent position. A system of pipes kept the temperature of these cells unbearably hot. There was also one room with soundproof walls, a drain for blood, and special torture equipment.

The whole life of the country underwent a radical change. This was especially marked in the towns, for in the countryside the organization of collective farms moved at a very slow pace, obstructed by the passive but stubborn resistance of the rural population. The system of individual farmsteads had taken root. Old-type villages were left only in the Russian area of Latvia, and even here they usually consisted of a series of individual farms located around a center—the former village. The size of the farms varied between 30 and 240 acres.

Thanks to the state-organized export of dairy products, flax, and fruit, as well as to the confectionary industry, for whose needs several sugar refineries had been set up, the farmers in Latvia were prosperous, and in peace-time the market was glutted with cheap food of every kind. In Latgalia, the Russian part of Latvia, many farmers interested in horsebreeding used to keep one or two racing horses, half-breeds of the famous Orlov stock, which were used only for light work on the farm but would win prizes in the winter "Latgalia races" in Dunaburg. On the race course of Riga, the races were also managed by Russian horsebreeders, the brothers Moskalenko. In the rural areas there used to be a shortage of farm labor, and every summer would see an influx of migrant workers from Poland and Lithuania. With the arrival of Soviet troops prices increased 100 per cent. The lat was made equal to the Soviet ruble and for some time both currencies were in circulation, but within a few months first Latvian silver coins and then Latvian banknotes disappeared.

At the same time wages and salaries remained unchanged, despite the decrease in the purchasing power of money and the increase in taxation. Shop owners were compelled to keep their shops open but were treated only as managers and had to deliver the proceeds to government agencies. The shops, once richly stocked, quickly emptied of merchandise. The Soviet military and their families, helped by an invading army of Soviet office workers, within a few weeks bought up all stocks of watches, radio sets, shoes, dress fabrics, etc. Prices of all these wares soared. Formerly a man's suit of medium quality had cost 50-60 lats, and an expensive one,

custom-made by a first-rate tailor, 300-350 lats. Now the cheapest suit cost 800-1000 lats, and six months later few people could afford to buy a handkerchief.

The only trade that flourished under the Soviet occupation was the liquor trade. The price of vodka remained low. Formerly vodka had been sold only in specially licensed stores which closed Saturdays at noon. Evenings and on Sundays and holidays, to be sure, one could buy vodka at any restaurant, but this was expensive. Now, vodka was being sold at all food stores, and the stores were kept open at night in rotation. Since in the Soviet Union the price of vodka was much higher, this leniency probably had a special purpose. At any rate, hard drinking increased.

Russian libraries and bookstores were closed down. Russian books were confiscated wherever they were found, and the bulk of the scrap-heap was then shipped by the N.K.V.D. to a paper factory to be reprocessed into pulp. Riga possessed several large Russian libraries in addition to the school libraries and to the municipal library, with its huge and extremely valuable newspaper archives. The Ivanov library, the oldest Russian book collection, possessed all Russian pre-war classics, both originals and translations, and many bookstores had lending libraries containing both Russian classics and émigré Russian literature. Books that in some way had escaped destruction were eagerly bought up by the Soviet occupiers.

After the *Segodnia*, the weekly magazine *Dlya Vas* (For You), which for eight years had provided entertaining reading to wide circles of the Russian public, was suppressed. Political parties no longer existed among the Russian population of Latvia. Except for charitable organizations, only a few societies, mainly of a professional kind, such as the athletic league "Sokol," the associations of physicians, engineers, seamen, etc., were left. All these, of course, were dissolved, and their leaders and prominent members arrested. The well-known journalist, Piotr Pilsky, avoided arrest only because he suffered a paralytic stroke when the N.K.V.D. men came to fetch him. He died a few months later at his home. One of the first victims was P. S. Yakobi, a Russian lawyer and member of the Latvian Senate. He and his family were extremely popular and beloved by all Russian Riga; one of his sons was an artist, another a journalist, and a daughter was a prima ballerina of the Latvian National Opera. Yakobi was arrested together with one of his daughters. But a list of all those who perished would take up too much space. With the exception of the Theatre of Russian Drama,

whose personnel remained almost intact (only one-third-rate actress was charged with espionage and shot), Russian Riga was wiped out.

All private institutions were, of course, suppressed. Government agencies were being reorganized. Many Latvian Communists, who years before had gone to the Soviet Union, now reappeared in their homeland. Admission of the public to the government offices was under strict control, working hours were increased from six to eight, and office workers a few minutes late were sternly reprimanded and warned of dismissal—yet their performance deteriorated from day to day.

With respect to meetings and demonstrations, labor displayed an inarticulate, passive resistance. Resolutions, of course, would be adopted “unanimously,” but discontent was growing. It should be remembered that the standard of living, as well as the educational level of the Latvian population, had always been high. Even under the tsarist régime the Baltic provinces had enjoyed special privileges, serfdom disappeared here long before it was abolished in the rest of Russia, Latvian peasants were used to being hereditary tenants and not serfs of their landlords, compulsory universal education was introduced earlier than elsewhere in Russia, and there was no illiteracy in the Latvian republic.

Under the Soviet occupation, from a salary of 300 lats about 80 would be withheld for various dues, loans, and contributions, and the simple and convenient sick funds were replaced by polyclinics where doctors often were compelled to treat sixty patients or more in the course of one day. Sanatoria were available only to Communists and “activists,” foreign patented medicines disappeared, and doctors were forbidden to prescribe expensive treatments.

In July preparations were started for the election of a new government that was to express “the will of the people”—the people’s most ardent desire being, of course, the incorporation of the Latvian republic into “the family of Soviet peoples.” At first the voters were given a choice between the Communist party and a “non-partisan bloc,” but a week before the election the bloc was liquidated. At the voting places ballot boxes were set up among blatant decorations, and booths were provided for voters who might wish “to write in any corrections” on the ballots. Security agents were on duty at every polling place, and the passport of every voter was stamped to certify that he had fulfilled his civic duty. For several days before the election, police stations had been swamped by people claiming to have lost their passports. Since the issuance of a new

passport would have taken three weeks, and a simple certificate of the loss did not entitle the loser to vote, this device was used by many to avoid voting altogether. However, the Soviet authorities soon caught on and introduced heavy fines for the passport losers, who in addition were registered as unworthy of citizenship.

"The vote for the inclusion of the Latvian republic into the Soviet Union was 113%!"—joyfully announced one paper, fumbling its arithmetic in its zeal. The rejoicing, however, was confined to the press. The 18th of November, on the other hand, the anniversary of Latvian independence, was marked by a truly national demonstration. Early in the morning the pedestal of the Liberation monument in Riga was covered with flower wreaths in the national colors, secretly deposited there during the night, and in the evening, after working hours, unusual crowds filled the streets. Men and women attired in national costumes slowly and silently moved through the streets, expressing their grief over the ruin of their country with this solemn march. The police, of course, understood what it was about, but did not interfere.

At Christmas time the people fared worse. All factory and office workers were notified that they were expected to come to work on December 25 and 26. Yet a few days before the holiday the workers of several big plants declared their determination not to work on the holidays. "They can't arrest us all!" they told themselves. The authorities showed themselves ready for a compromise. Since Christmas in the Latvian language is *Ziemas Swetki*, which means literally "Winter Yuletide," on Christmas Eve the "winter yule" days were officially declared non-working days. This, however, proved a Pyrrhic victory. New Year's day was followed by a wave of arrests among the factory workers.

In January a second repatriation of Germans was announced. All those who for some reason had not been included in the first repatriating operation in 1939 were allowed to leave now, but under drastically changed conditions. In 1939 a declaration of the desire to leave had been all that was needed, the German repatriation commission did not look closely to see whether the applicant desirous of escaping the Bolshevik threat bore a German, a Latvian, or a Russian name, nor did the Latvian government take any interest in those who were leaving. As a result, a considerable number of Russians and Latvians, who all too well remembered Bolshevik rule, departed together with the Germans. Now, after six months of Soviet occupation, the German commission was literally besieged

by people eager to escape from the Soviet paradise. This time, however, the German officials shared a room with a Soviet commission which insisted that every applicant submit documents to prove his German descent. Quite often an applicant would be arrested and taken away, with the German Consulate powerless to help. It was then that the Russian writer Galich perished (the former Russian general Galich-Goncharenko). His daughter was married to a German and had left with the first party of repatriates in 1939. For some reason he stayed behind. Now some N.K.V.D. men called on him and proposed that he collaborate with them. Given a short time in which to make up his mind, he used this respite to rush to the German Consulate, but the Consul could do nothing for him. When the N.K.V.D. men came back for an answer, he took poison.

Correspondence with residents of foreign countries, reading of foreign papers and periodicals, listening to the radio—all this, of course, was strictly forbidden. The latter prohibition was difficult to enforce; most people owned excellent radio sets which were not yet confiscated as automobiles, boats, and other private means of transportation had been.

During this occupation the Soviet conquerors kept rigidly aloof from the local population. The soldiers were lodged in barracks and were seldom seen on the streets, and then only in groups. Officers and office workers with their families occupied the many apartments abandoned by the repatriates. Soviet people were never seen on the streets in the company of local residents. As a rule, both Latvians and local Russians avoided contacts with the occupiers. Their attitude was one of secret hostility. The occupiers on their part kept to themselves and behaved with great restraint.

In the spring of 1941 a general registration of the population was ordered; new passports were to be issued. The passports had been printed in the Soviet Union, and many of them bore stamps of the Oriental republics—Kasakhstan, Tadjikistan, and others. This was a new cause for alarm among the population.

The soldiers of the former Latvian army and those who were doing their military service at the time of the Soviet invasion were not demobilized, but regiments were broken up into small units, which were incorporated into the Soviet army, chiefly the troops stationed in Lithuania.

The iron grip of Communist rule became ever tighter. Night after night people were arrested in their homes. No one returned from prison. Parties of prisoners, one after another, were deported

to the north. When Easter came, people no longer dared to celebrate it openly. Services, to be sure, were still held in the churches, often attended by Soviet people trying to keep out of sight in far corners, but the ringing of church bells was forbidden.

"We are still handling you with kid gloves, comrades!" remarked a N.K.V.D. man, and this was true. To avoid open rebellion, the Soviet authorities acted with great caution for a time. Only after a year of occupation, when most prominent leaders had been liquidated, did they strike. In the night of June 14 a gigantic raid was carried out in all the Baltic states. All local N.K.V.D. organizations and their auxiliaries were engaged in the operation. According to a statement made a few years ago in Germany by a former N.K.V.D. man involved in the raid, the secret police had been given a definite assignment—to round up no less than one and a half million prisoners. The operation took place simultaneously in all towns and villages. Whole families were snatched from their homes and loaded on deportation trains prepared in advance. Ever since, the 14th of June has been a day of mourning for Latvian émigrés. The number of arrests in Latvia alone exceeded 100,000 (the total number of those who perished reached 600,000). In Estonia and Lithuania there were as many.

Strictly guarded freight trains, packed with people, slowly moved eastward. All the attempts of local inhabitants to get through to the trains waiting their turn on the sidetracks, in order to pass at least a jug of water to the unfortunate people, were of no avail. The sufferings of the deportees were intensified by the unusual heat. Inhabitants of the frontier villages saw hundreds of corpses thrown out of the cars all along the route of the trains.

According to reports of former Soviet prisoners who are now émigrés, it appears certain that the overwhelming majority of those hundreds of thousands of Balts deported to the slave labor camps of northern Russia, perished within a short time. Some died on the journey, others in the camps, and still others made up the "death parties." Immediately after their arrival (as could be inferred from their still decent clothes) they were sent by the hundreds to the *taiga*, where they were shot, and then buried in mass graves dug for them by other prisoners. The ground was then leveled by heavy trucks.

On June 22, a week after the raid, war with Germany was declared. To the Baltic population this meant a hope of salvation, and no wonder. Soldiers as well as men in civilian life fled to the woods

to await the arrival of the Germans. The German armies advanced impetuously. Five days later the Soviet authorities were in a state of panic. Railway stations, trains, and all the highways were filled with retreating troops, fleeing Soviet officials, Latvian Communists, and also Jews dreading Hitler's Nuremberg laws. Everywhere the fugitives were waylaid by an embittered population. There was no actual fighting around Riga. German airplanes, above the city and the seashore, confined themselves to reconnaissance. The Soviet authorities had ordered the inhabitants to paste paper over the windows, the air alarm was sounded almost continuously. The Germans, however, spared the city. At the very last, on June 29 and 30, artillery fire destroyed half of the Old Town located on the shore of the Dvina. Some of the ancient buildings crumbled, others burned down. Two precious monuments of medieval architecture perished in the fire—the so-called "House of the Blackheads" and a Petrine church with a three-storied open-work oaken belltower, considered the tallest wooden building in Europe and the symbol of Riga.

The retreating Soviet troops blew up the big railway bridge across the Dvina. On June 30, German troops entered the still smoking city and were enthusiastically greeted by the population. There was a rush to the prisons, but it was too late. Part of the prisoners had been transferred from Riga to Dunaburg and many had died on the way; others had been executed by N.K.V.D. agents. Dead bodies were stacked high in the prison yards. The central N.K.V.D. building was filled with corpses; torture chambers were discovered in its cellars. Hardly a family was left in Latvia that had not lost one or more of its members. A solemn service was held in the Greek Orthodox cathedral by the surviving clergy in commemoration of the victims. Salvation had come too late for many, and there was no joy.

The thirteen months of Soviet occupation were more than enough to cure everyone not only of any trace of "neutral" or "loyal attitude" towards Communism, but also of the illusion cherished by some, notably by Russians, who thought that Soviet Russia should not be judged by the N.K.V.D. and the torture chambers, that it would be possible to live and work under Soviet rule if one just kept quietly to oneself. Neither the ghetto immediately set up by the Germans, nor the Nazi treatment of the population met with approval, but the Balts had no choice. It was not for the first time in its history that the Baltic area had become a bridehead. After

having experienced a period of Soviet occupation, the inhabitants were ready to make common cause with any foe of Bolshevism. This explains the origin of the so-called Baltic Legion, formed of volunteers, both Latvian and Russian, which fought in the ranks of the famous Nineteenth Division in 1944-1945, even later—defending literally every inch of ground with the courage of despair, so as to allow more people to escape west before the Soviet reoccupation. Mitau, a small town about 25 miles from Riga, changed hands eight times until nothing was left of it, but this made it possible to hold Riga for several months. Riga finally was taken on October 13, 1944. But Libau, the last piece of Baltic ground, held out until June 8, 1945, that is, one month after the armistice. And all the while vessels of any kind that could float on the water, were leaving the port, crammed with wounded and refugees.

As might have been expected, the reprisals against the population, of which some information has reached the West despite the Iron Curtain, were ruthlessly cruel. In Lithuania, for instance, in 1952 the regular secret police was supplemented by some 30,000 so-called "exterminators," a term that speaks for itself. It would be no mistake to state that no less than a third of the population has been deported to the extreme north. The story of the guerillas' operations in the woods has been told by Gunno Heino, an Estonian seaman, who in 1952 crossed over to Sweden's shore in a rowboat, after having spent all the years since 1945 in the woods, until he became convinced of the hopelessness of the struggle and decided to escape. The resistance of the partisans was broken when the authorities let it be known that for every Communist killed by them ten hostages from the local population would be shot; later this number was increased to a hundred, and finally to a thousand. These were by no means empty threats, and all partisan activities came to an end.

Today the chief target of persecution is, of course, the Church, especially in Lithuania where the majority of the population are Catholics. The observance of religious holidays is forbidden. In Riga the Novo-Gertrudinskaya Church has been transformed into a Komsomol club, at Dunaburg a church has been turned into a silo, the Nikolaevsky cathedral at Tallin has become a fish-canning factory, the cathedrals and monasteries of Vilno are closed, and the Church of Christ's Resurrection is a Komsomol dormitory with a cinema. On Christmas Eve in 1952 Radio Riga announced: "God has never existed. . . . God is an invention of the capitalists. . . ."

The obituary list of clergy of all denominations includes over a thousand names, among them nine bishops.

Economic conditions, according to data in Soviet newspapers, continue to be deplorable, despite all the measures of the Soviet authorities. Collectivization has been completed, but agricultural production is only a fraction of what it used to be. The Five-Year Plans, whether in agriculture or in light industry, remain unfulfilled. Yet in the past Riga was a center of light industry, famous for its candy, knitwear, canned food, textiles, radio sets, etc. The Communist press blames lingering "bourgeois individualism" for the situation, but this does not improve things. However, the importance of the Baltic area to the Soviet Union is chiefly strategic. Military bases have been erected all along the coast. Libau is enormously important as a rebuilt military port. The town is surrounded by a triple belt of forbidden zones, and part of the inhabitants have been removed. Military bases, secret forts, and airports are scattered over the whole Baltic area. The genocide of the Baltic population has been nearly completed.

The Angarstroy*

BY A. LEBED AND B. YAKOVLEV

HYDROTECHNICAL construction, a part of the government's policy ever since the beginning of Soviet rule, has lately shown a remarkable growth. The new canals and hydroelectric stations in the Ukraine as well as the complex system of hydrotechnical installations on the Volga and in Siberia are significant instances of this expansion.

A highly original and interesting project in this field is the so-called "Angarstroy"—a vast multiple-purpose hydrotechnical development destined to generate huge quantities of electric power as well as to solve various problems of water transportation. It is geographically linked with immensely rich coal and ore deposits.

We propose here to give an outline of this vital ganglion in the nervous system of the Soviet state.

For a better understanding of the significance of this project, it is necessary to dwell briefly on the characteristic features of Lake Baikal—the center, as it were, around which the gigantic enterprise has been planned and is now being built.

Lake Baikal is located in Central Asia, some 44 miles from the town of Irkutsk. It is 395 miles long, with a maximum width of 49.3 miles, and occupies an area of 13 thousand square miles—equal to that of Belgium or the Netherlands. The depth of Lake Baikal reaches 5,712 feet; owing to this depth, the volume of water in the lake adds up to 30,084 billion cubic yards.¹ The average level of its surface is 1,502 feet above, and that of the bottom 4,265 feet below sea level.

Lake Baikal is surrounded by high mountain ranges. To the south rise the Eastern Sayansk mountains, with the glacier-covered peak Munku-Sardyk (11,453 feet); to the east are the Ulan-Burgas, the Ikatsky and Bergusinsky ranges, with peaks up to 9,186 feet; along the western shore stretches the Baikalsky chain with peaks up to 8,858 feet; on the north loom the spurs of the north-Baikal highlands. This mountainous border either towers steeply above

*This is an excerpt, translated into English, from the authors' forthcoming book on the rôle of hydrotechnical projects in the waterway system of the U.S.S.R. [Ed.]

¹M. M. Kozhov, *Lake Baikal and Its Life*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 3-4.

the shores or else recedes to a distance of 6.2-12.4 miles from the lake.

More than 300 tributaries rising in the mountains, many of them big and deep, flow into Lake Baikal. In the course of a year 72 billion cubic yards of water are discharged into the lake, while only one river, the Angara, issues from it to carry away most of these waters. The river Angara is about 3,281 feet wide when it leaves Lake Baikal and carries off 2,281 cubic yards of water every second. It has numerous tributaries. Forcing its way through rapids impassable to ships, the Angara, at the end of a course of 1,157 miles, empties into the river Yenisei. At this point the level of the Angara is 1,181 feet below that of Lake Baikal. Thus there is a drop of nearly .66 feet in the river's level for every .62 miles of its length. The velocity of its flow is very great, and the river represents a mighty potential of energy, whose utilization can produce over 60 billion kilowatt-hours² of electric power annually. The availability to the power plants now under construction of a permanent water store with a non-sinking level in Lake Baikal makes it possible to maintain a uniform pressure of the upper waters throughout the whole year. It has been computed that if the discharge of water into Lake Baikal were theoretically stopped, it would take about 400 years to empty the lake through the river Angara; this conveys an idea of the magnitude of the store of water it contains.

In addition to cheap electric power from Lake Baikal, the territory adjacent to it and to the river Angara is prodigiously rich in valuable minerals. The area has attracted the attention of numerous explorers. According to V. A. Obruchev, Soviet academician and expert on Siberia, during the period 1918-1940 alone there were published no less than 830 scientific books, treatises, and reports devoted to the geological investigation of Lake Baikal and the adjoining region.³

Most notable among the natural resources of the territory are coal, mineral oil, gold, iron, manganese, copper, silver, lead, mica, pyrite, gypsum, molybdenum, and wolfram.

Coalfields, known as the Cheremkhovsky deposit, stretch for hundreds of miles along the Angara. The coal forms a seam 19.7 feet thick and is tapped by the open-pit method.⁴ The mining operations

³*Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1937, Vol. I, p. 358.

⁴V. A. Obruchev, *History of the Geological Exploration of Siberia*, Leningrad, 5 v. 1931-46.

⁴Radio Moscow, August 18, 1953.

are well organized, with an extensive use of earth-moving machinery, excavators, and bulldozers.

Close to the rivers Angara and Ilim, some 310 miles from Lake Baikal, lies the Angaro-Ilimsky iron-ore zone, which contains eleven separate ore deposits. The ore (magnetite) occurs in steeply descending veins. At the Rudnogorsky deposit the vein has a length of 2.5 miles, a thickness up to 115 feet, and contains up to 66% iron. The contents of this vein alone, according to estimates made in 1932, would provide 250 million tons.⁵ Even these few data suffice to illustrate the great natural wealth of the Baikal region. It goes without saying that the Soviet government is eager to exploit these rich resources.


Ever since 1931, additional explorations and surveys have been in progress and plans have been in the making. The outcome is the hydrotechnical project now under construction on the river Angara—the so-called Angarstroy. Since the end of World War II, and in particular of late, the Soviet government has shown an exceptional interest in this undertaking. The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party resolved: "To start work on the investigation of the power resources of the river Angara, in order to develop various branches of industry—aluminum, chemical, metallurgical, and others—on the basis of cheap electric power and local sources of raw materials."

It may seem puzzling that the Congress should resolve "to start work on the investigation" at a time when the actual construction on the site was already under way. However, the explanation of this discrepancy between the resolution and the facts, as well as of the heightened official interest in the Baikal region, is simple: as early as 1924 the occurrence of uranium and thorium-bearing ores in pegmatite veins in the Sludianka area had been reported by the geologists V. G. Khlopin and G. Cherniak, who had explored the territory.⁶ Uranium-bearing ores were also found near the upper part of Lake Baikal. Also, in the Baikal region, some 124 miles from the Sludianka, there occur, according to Obruchev, deposits of graphite, a material indispensable in the construction of atomic furnaces.

Let us now turn to the hydrotechnical project, in part completed, on the river Angara and its tributaries. The plans for the Angarstroy drawn up in 1936 called for the erection on the river Angara

⁵*Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1937, Vol. I, p. 358.

⁶V. A. Obruchev, *History of the Geological Exploration of Siberia*.



alone (not counting the tributaries) of six huge hydrotechnical structures, providing special arrangements for navigation and including a series of power plants with a total generating capacity of 9 million kilowatts and an annual output of 61.3 billion kilowatt-hours.⁷ The tributaries included, a total of 13 hydroelectric stations were envisaged, with an estimated capacity of 12 million kilowatts. The first to be built was a power station on the Angara at the point where it issues from Lake Baikal. The work was started, but the war put a stop to it, and the operations were resumed only in 1948.⁸ Instead of the two upper hydroelectric stations originally planned, the Baikalsky and the Barkhatovsky, the post-war program provides for only one, which is now under construction near the town Barkhatovo. The site of the construction is called "the fall"—here the difference between the highest and the lowest point of the river's level reaches 98 feet.⁹ Exact data regarding the scope of the building operations are not available, but some idea of the dimensions

⁷*Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1937, Vol. I, p. 359.

⁸Radio Moscow, January 29, 1954.

⁹*Ogoniok*, December, 1953, pp. 3-4.

of the project may be gained from the fact that the work has been going on for four years, with excavators, scrapers, bulldozers, tractors, and other mechanical equipment used on a large scale.

Our assumption that the Angarstroy is a development of the first magnitude is corroborated by the following facts and figures. The dam across the channel of the Angara will raise the water level in the river and will create a continuous reservoir, the "Sea of Angara," which will merge with Lake Baikal and raise the latter's level by 4.9 feet.¹⁰ The rise of the water will also affect the level of the river Kitai. The relocation of industrial plants and collective farms from the prospective reservoir area has already begun. The early completion of the Angarstroy is apparently considered a matter of prime urgency; it is known that manpower and heavy equipment have been transferred to its site from the main Turkmen canal. Within the building zone, the town of Angarsk has arisen and already has new houses with 84 thousand square yards of floor space, not counting temporary huts.¹¹

Once completed, the project will solve many problems of water transportation. The construction of a series of hydroelectric stations on the river Angara will result in linking Lake Baikal with the Arctic Ocean through the river Yenisei, thus connecting it with the Northern maritime route. And within the total Soviet system of canals, mapped out or under construction, Lake Baikal will have a deep-water connection (deep enough to raise sea-going vessels) with the Sea of Aral, the Caspian Sea, and all the seas surrounding the European part of the U.S.S.R. Plans are also afoot to link Lake Baikal with the Pacific Ocean through the river Amur, whose navigable depth would be increased by means of various engineering measures.

It should be clear from the above that the Baikal region is on the way to becoming a major industrial center. Foreigners are strictly forbidden to enter the area and it may safely be assumed that not all Soviet citizens are allowed access to it.

¹⁰*Small Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1937, Vol. I, p. 358.

¹¹Radio Moscow, January 29, 1954.

The Vestiges of Old Russia in Alaska*

BY HELEN A. SHENITZ

RESEARCH on Russian customs and language, as they are practiced in Alaska today, cannot be done at a desk in a library, as there is almost no recently published material on this subject. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that there has been any research done in this field since the purchase of Alaska in 1867.

The information upon which this paper is based comes chiefly from two sources: Mrs. Laura Jones' book, *Heart in the Snow*, published in 1952, and my own observations. In Mrs. Jones' book, because of the fact that she is a careful observer, we find a good report on customs and life in the Aleut-Eskimo village, Pilot Point, in Bristol Bay, where she was a teacher. Little did she know, when she was writing her book, how valuable her observations would become to those who have a Russian linguistic and historical background. Her book, which provides delightful reading, is the first recently published account of some of the old Russian customs and folklore still in force in Alaska.

It was in October, 1867 that Old Glory was raised in Sitka and the Russian flag came down. Shortly after, the majority of Russians went back to Russia. Today, 87 years later, we still find tangible and intangible marks left by the Russians on the Alaska soil.

The first and most obvious Russian marks are, of course, Russian churches with their eastern domes. Some of these churches are falling apart; some are closed on account of lack of priests willing to come to this "snow and icebound" country. To the majority of people in the continental United States, Alaska is still the land of dog sleds and polar bear. But a few Russian churches are functioning. Although those priests who have been sent from the States do not know the native tongues, and although the English of these priests is more than limited, and in spite of the fact that the Church services are conducted in Church-Slavonic, a language understood by no one but the priests themselves, the congregations are devoted

*A paper read at the Fourth Alaskan Science Conference, Juneau, Alaska, October 1, 1953 [Ed.].

to their little churches and are proud of them. This devotion is one of those intangible marks about which I am going to speak later on.

Other tangible marks of the Russian heritage are: old Russian peasants' customs, Russian folklore, and the Russian language.

In *Heart in the Snow*, Mrs. Jones, speaking of the way the women in Pilot Point carry water from the lakes to their homes, describes "a wooden yoke across the shoulders with a bucket on each side." This method of carrying water has been used for centuries in central and northern Russia.

"Sara, the Aleut woman," Mrs. Jones writes, "played her accordion, chanting an ancient Aleut song, for no group was long together without music." Not knowing the words of the song, I am not prepared to state that it was a Russian song, but the fact that it was a chant is rather significant. In Russia, in the old days, a chant was the customary form of singing, based, of course, on Church singing, which in the early period of the development of Church music was chant only. Accordions were originally introduced to Russians by craftsmen who came to Russia from Italy. Russians were pleased with accordions and eventually they became Russian folk instruments. It is impossible to visualize a Russian village without a few accordion players. Usually the best player was the most popular man and the conqueror of hearts. Even in the Soviet Union people still sing songs about the irresistible charm of men who excel in playing accordions.

Describing the bear hunting technique observed in Pilot Point, Mrs. Jones says: "Willie's was the most unique and the safest method of bear hunting. When he located a vent, which is always present over the location of a bear den, Willie would make a large, firm snowball and roll it over the vent. Sooner or later the bear would stick his head out for air. The moment he did, Willie would shoot him." This method, though unique at present, used to be a standard method of Russian peasants to hunt bear, though in early times, when firearms were not plentiful among the peasants, spears were used instead of guns. I would not be at all surprised to learn that Siberian peasants still use the same method.

"Beewock," a drink made in Pilot Point, is described as produced by "throwing together anything handy and allowing it to ferment, though not for long, as the brewers hadn't the patience to wait." The meaningless name "Beewock" is a corrupted Russian word, *bivac*, bivouac in English. Drinks that were made with little time to spare for fermenting, while a group was on a bivouac, was called

in the old days *bivuachnoe pit'e*, which means a bivouac drink, hence the Aleutian "Beewock."

Tying a piece of red yarn to prevent the spreading of swelling on legs or arms, as was practiced by Sara of Pilot Point, is a common Russian peasants' remedy.

An Eskimo ball game called *Miatchee* is played at Pilot Point. "Miatchee" is a Russian word, *miachik*, meaning handball. Handball was and still is one of the favorite games in Russia.

In pre-Communist Russia, the celebration of Christmas continued for twelve days, three days of Church holidays, December 25-27, and nine days of merriment, December 28-January 5. These dates, of course, are those of the Julian calendar. In Laura Jones' book we find that the Aleuts in Pilot Point celebrate Christmas exactly the same number of days and in the same way, even to the point of carrying the six-pointed Russian Christmas star, going from house to house, and singing the Russian Christmas songs, as it has been done for centuries in Russia.

Masquerading is one of the favorite Russian forms of Christmas frolic. The Aleuts masquerade at Christmas time. Mrs. Jones tells us about a masked figure called "muskrat." It only sounds like "muskrat" to an ear not attuned to Russian sounds. "Muskrat" is not a muskrat but a mask, in English, *maska*, in Russian. In Russia it is customary to address a masked person as *maska*.

Going into an unlighted bathhouse, or into an unlighted church at midnight, during one of these nine days of merrymaking, is an old Russian superstitious custom. One does it in order either to learn one's future, or to get in touch with "little people," who must be appeased from time to time. A bathhouse is the usual place for meeting those little spirits, although in the same bathhouse, if one places a mirror so that it faces the door, one has a chance to see one's future spouse. Mrs. Jones has observed the same superstition in Pilot Point, where she herself was selected to go into an unlighted church at midnight.

The Russian language can be easily traced in Alaska. Russian geographic names, in correct or corrupted form, can be seen on every map of Alaska. In the Aleutian Islands, such words as sugar, tea, bread, matches, flour, milk, teapot, overcoat, kerchief, button, steamship, hammer, store clerk, and names of certain edible wild plants such as parsley, cow parsnip, ptarmigan grass, etc., are used not in the Aleut or English language, but in Russian, though mostly in a corrupted form. In Pilot Point the Russian form of greeting on

holidays, *s prazdnikom*, has been corrupted into *blaznikom*; and the Russian word for Christmas, *Rozhdestvo*, has become *Arosistwock*. In the same village there is an Eskimo girl whose name is *Izba*, which means a peasant's house in Russian.

I was told by quite a few people, old residents of Kodiak, that before World War II one who knew the Russian language could get along in Kodiak without knowing any other language.

The intangible vestiges are demonstrated by natives of the Eastern Orthodox faith in their devotion to their Church and in their proud persistence in calling themselves Russian. The Russian Church in Alaska has little to offer to her disciples. It is a poor Church, and it is greatly neglected by the Church authorities in the States. The spiritual needs of congregations are not taken care of, and a good, active Russian priest in Alaska is rather the exception than the rule. Yet, these people, actually forgotten by their Church, support it to the best of their ability. They are united in their love for the ritualistic services of the Eastern Orthodox Church. Although they have every opportunity to join other denominations, which would offer them a great deal more than the Russian Church would ever care to, they still remain within the fold.

What impressed me most when I came to Alaska was the fact that a family which can claim a Russian ancestor, even three or four generations back, invariably calls itself Russian. I have met families in which there is much more Norwegian or Swedish blood than Russian, but they consider themselves Russian. I have been invited to their homes. They still display the famous Russian hospitality, and they serve dishes which, though modified, are Russian dishes. On occasion they make an attempt to speak a language that they believe is Russian, but which really is a language of their own.

The interesting part of these phenomena is that the self-styled Russians have no interest in old Russia, and the Soviet Union, according to most of them, is not Russia. They are perfectly loyal Americans. On one occasion I knew that the family I was visiting was American born for generations back. Pretending that I did not know it, I asked them when they had come to the United States. They were almost indignant in their reply. No, they were not foreign born; they were American born. Yet they are Russian. It all goes back to the time of Russian America, as Alaska was called when she belonged to Russia.

During the early period of Russian domination, natives of Alaska

had neither social nor legal status in their relations with Russians. As time went on, marriages between Russian men and native women became more frequent. The offspring of these marriages were officially known as Creoles, and their legal and social status became somewhat higher. Creole offspring were accepted by the Russians as Russian, and as such they became people of distinction among the natives. Eighty-seven years later it is still a mark of distinction in Alaska to be a Russian.

The vestiges of old Russia in Alaska are not only in the names of places and people, but also in the customs and traditions of the people. The Creoles, the offspring of Russian men and native women, were accepted by the Russians as Russian, and as such they became people of distinction among the natives. Eighty-seven years later it is still a mark of distinction in Alaska to be a Russian.

Book Reviews

FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T. *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*. New York, Macmillan, 1953. 2 vols., 628 pp. and 1511 pp. \$15.00.

The two volumes of Russian history by Professor M. T. Florinsky represent a solid work, designed not as a concise textbook but as a rather comprehensive course of study. As indicated by its title, the purpose of the book is to present not only a pragmatic history of Russia but also an interpretation of it. The work covers a long period and contains a wealth of material. It explores the internal policies of the Russian state as well as its foreign relations, its social-economic conditions as well as its cultural development—although not every aspect is treated with equal thoroughness. In this respect the second volume seems better organized than the first. The reader of M. T. Florinsky's two volumes will find in them a vast fund of knowledge, sound opinions, and interesting appraisals. In his interpretation of Russian history the author does not always follow the path beaten by the great masters of Russian historiography—Kliuchevsky, Solovyov, Platonov, and others—but frequently shows considerable independence in his views and evaluations. Thus, for instance, he attempts a new interpretation of the activities of Peter III and, to some extent, those of Paul I. In several other instances the author displays an independent mind. This is one of the positive and indeed commendable features of Florinsky's work, which make it a valuable addition to the literature

in this field. The book, nevertheless, has its shortcomings.

It shows, for instance, a striking lack of balance in the distribution of the material. Only 300 pages are devoted to the history of Kievan and Muscovite Russia, a period of about eight centuries. The eighteenth century is treated in somewhat greater detail in 320 pages. The entire second volume is devoted to the history of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The cursory treatment of the Kievan and the Muscovite periods cannot be explained by a dearth of material. During the last decades a number of historians both inside and outside the Soviet Union have been devoting much attention to the study of Kievan Rus and Muscovy, and abundant material has been collected (see, for example, the works of Rostovtsev, Vernadsky, Struve, Grekov, Rybakov, Navrodin, the symposium *History of Culture of Ancient Russia*, 1951, and others).

As regards M. Florinsky's method of exposition, it would seem to this reviewer that he lays too much stress upon the activities of individuals—emperors, ministers, tsarist favorites—and accords too little attention, while not neglecting them entirely, to the social factors of the historical process. As to his interpretation of events—emphasized in the title of the book—it quite often fails to carry conviction. This is especially true of the first volume. In some cases the author's arguments are insufficiently developed; in other instances his conclusions appear doubtful. Let us cite a few examples.

In dealing with the origins of Russia, the author, after a brief reference to the Bertinian annals, attributes the creation of the Russian state to the Scandinavian Norsemen (pp. 9-15). He fails to mention the different views held by historians of the "anti-Norman" school. M. Florinsky further asserts that "Rus," the original name of the country, was derived from the name of the Norman bands that were operating along the Russian waterways (p. 9). The author does not tell us how these Norman bands had come by that name. Yet the problem of the origin of the name "Rus" is still a highly controversial issue in historical science. All the attempts of Schloezer, Tunman, Kunik, Thomsen, and Shakhmatov, to solve the riddle have been unsuccessful. A. A. Shakhmatov spent years trying in vain to find a Scandinavian root-word for the name "Rus." Shortly before his death in 1920, in summing up his labors, he wrote: "The origin of the name 'Rus,' despite the persistent efforts of many scholars, remains obscure. . . ." His advice was to go on looking for a root-word in the Scandinavian languages ("Early Fortunes of the Russian Tribe," 1919, 52 pp.). After Shakhmatov's death some historians of the Norman school have followed his advice (for instance, Brim: *drotsmen*, 1923); others have given up hope of finding a Scandinavian root and have turned elsewhere trying to discover some place-name from which "Rus" may have been derived (Belyaev, *Frisia*, 1927; Vernadsky, *Rustringen*, 1943); to still others the Scandinavian origin of "Rus" is just a matter of faith. This being the situation, it is natural that the reader should be curious to know the reasons upon which M. Florin-

sky bases his assertion. But he fails to disclose them.

As to the problem of feudalism in ancient Russia, the author cites two views of it current in historiography: the one admitting, the other denying the existence of feudalism in medieval Russia (p. 108). His exposition suggests that he ranges himself with the second group. We are well informed of the reasons that impelled Kliuchevsky, Miliukov, and Struve, to deny, wholly or partly, the existence of a feudal system in Russia; Florinsky, however, fails to make it clear what features of the historical development of medieval Russia prevent him from admitting a Russian feudalism. It is not enough to express contempt for "the pedantic minds that firmly believe in the universality of historical and sociological schemes" (p. 108)—one has to prove one's right to despise them. Professor Florinsky confines himself to repeated allegations of profound differences and lets it go at that. He fails to contribute any material to the solution of the problem.

In dealing with the trial of Patriarch Nikon, the author points out that his judges, the eastern patriarchs, had renounced "the proud Byzantine tradition of the primacy of the ecclesiastical power over the secular" and had obsequiously recognized the obligation of the Patriarch "to obey the tsar in all political questions" (p. 292). The author is mistaken. It was by no means a "proud Byzantine tradition" to put the Church above the state but a Roman-Catholic one. After all, in 1077, Emperor Henry IV went to Canossa, barefoot and clad in sack-cloth, to do penance imposed by the Pope, not by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Byzan-

tium, in theory, recognized a certain equilibrium between the ecclesiastical and the secular power, each master within its own sphere ("render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's"). In practice, however, as early as the ninth century, the primacy of the emperor was acknowledged in all matters of administration, including Church administration (yet excluding matters of faith), a situation which, in its extreme form, gave rise to serious objections. It was for this that Nikon was brought to trial—for having followed the Catholic example in putting the authority of the Patriarch above that of the Tsar. What the judges did was to apply to him the Byzantine tradition that the Patriarch was to subordinate himself to the Tsar in political matters.

Professor Florinsky has a particular dislike for Peter I. As a matter of fact, neither Kliuchevsky nor Miliukov liked Peter, yet they did not dispute his achievements. Professor Florinsky goes much farther and reaches the conclusion that "the flimsy and fanciful temple of Petrine greatness crumbles into dust" (p. 431). But 25 pages farther ahead we read that the Northern War won for Russia the position of a great European power (p. 457). This alone would entitle Peter to recognition by posterity. Nor should one forget that Peter provided Russia with an army and a navy. They were inferior, say Peter's detractors. Against this there is the indubitable fact that Russia owed to them the victories of Poltava and Hangö. Peter also created a merchant marine, established industries, founded schools, etc., and much of what he called into being did survive. There

is no need to regard Peter as a demigod, a genius, a man of destiny; yet he does not deserve to be held up to scorn. He is entitled to a fair, objective treatment—which the author denies him. He condemns Peter for a great many things and goes so far as to blame him, "at least partly," for actions of his remote successors—the conduct, for instance, of Peter III during the Seven-Years' War (p. 480), or the interference of Catherine II (and Frederick of Prussia) into Polish affairs (p. 517) which led to the partition of Poland. He forgets that Peter I himself had been definitely against such a partition. Fifty years after Peter, Catherine II and Frederick ought to be allowed to answer for their actions themselves.

The author devotes little attention to the cultural life of ancient Russia, in particular to the development of art. While such experts as Kondakov, Ainalov, and Grabar have much to tell us about various schools of painting, sculpture, and decorative art during that period, Professor Florinsky finds there little more than a wasteland. Notwithstanding the author's unqualified denial (p. 150), sculpture did exist in ancient Russia—witness the remarkable miniature sculpture of the school of Ambrosy in the fifteenth century, the decorative carving of the elder Arseny and his "school," and others.

Vol. I contains not a few factual errors and inaccuracies. On page 5, for instance, the author states that the Avars "emerged from Asia in the second half of the ninth century." This is incorrect. Avars had been known in Europe as early as the sixth century. They had conquered some of the Slavic tribes and had reached the Danube by 562;

here they established a state, fought against Byzantium in the sixth and seventh centuries, etc. On the same page we find the assertion that the Khazar empire was destroyed by the Pechenegs in the tenth century; on page 8 we read that the power of the Khazars was brought to an end by a Pecheneg onslaught in the first half of the ninth century, and on page 17 the author makes the same thing happen in the middle of the ninth century. According to Evers, Frähn, and Harkavy, the Khazar empire perished in the eleventh century, after 1016, when the Khazar ruler, the Kagan Tsula, was defeated in battle by Greek and Russian troops led by Mstislav Tmutarakansky. It is quite possible that the Pechenegs completed the destruction of the Khazars, but in the eleventh, not the ninth century.

On pages 6-7, the author states: "The Eastern Slavs reached the Dnieper, probably in the seventh century . . . They failed, however, to establish themselves on the shores either of the Black Sea or the Sea of Azov." Jordanes, however, who wrote in the sixth century, recorded that the Antes were dwelling along an inlet of the Black Sea between the Dniester and the Dnieper (*De Origine Actibusque Getarum*, XXIII). And the Russian Chronicle mentions the fact that Ulich and Tivertsy were settled along the Dniester down to the seashore, and not as transients. They built towns "and their towns exist to this day" (*Povest Vremennykh let*, ed. 1950, p. 14).

The footnote on page 9 states: "The last reference to the Varangians appears in the Chronicle under the year 1043." This is not correct. In the Chronicle of Novgorod, Varangians are mentioned

under the years 1188, 1201, and elsewhere. Other transcripts of the Chronicle contain references to the Varangians under the years 1240 and 1380. On page 14 we find: ". . . the year 854, the first year mentioned in the Chronicle. . . ." The first year mentioned there is 852. On page 22 we read that the sons of Vladimir made use in their internal struggles of the Poles and the Polovtsy (Cumans). Actually, they made use of the Pechenegs; the Polovtsy made their appearance in the Black Sea steppes at a later time, in the second half of the eleventh century (see the Lavrenty Chronicle under 1061). On page 65 the author calls Mamay a *khan*; yet he was a *murza*, a general. On page 68 it is stated that Vasily II organized "the kingdom of Kasimov" on the lower Volga. Kasimov was located on the middle Oka, not the lower Volga. On page 113 it is said that the merchants of Novgorod seldom went abroad, but used to attend fairs at the nearest Baltic ports—Dorpat, Riga, Reval. This is inaccurate. Novgorod belonged to the Hanseatic League and carried on a lively trade with Wisby. The Novgorod men maintained there a community house, a warehouse, and a church (see document published by Karamzin, *History*, III, note 243). Its last sentences indicate that eastern wares were brought to Wisby by Russian merchants. Trade with Denmark is mentioned in the same work, Vol. II, note 256; see also the Novgorod Chronicle under 1130 and 1142. The old Scandinavian language adopted such Russian words as *torg*, *kleti* (warehouse), *besman* (an instrument for weighing merchandise), *lad'ya*, *pechat*, etc. The name of the ancient capital of Finland—Turku—is derived from

the Russian *torg* (Syromyatnikov). All this proves that Russian merchants did travel to Denmark and Scandinavia to trade with the West.

On page 114 the author writes that the Novgorod *Veche* had no control over the appointment of the *posadnik* (burgomaster). This was true up to the year 1136; after the events of that year the *Veche* did appoint the *posadnik*. On page 200 we read that the correspondence between Kurbsky and Ivan the Terrible consisted of four letters; actually there are six of them (four written by Kurbsky and two by the Tsar). On page 245 we are told that after his election to the tsardom, Mikhail Romanov "was discovered" with his mother in a monastery at Kaluga; as a matter of fact, he was found at his own house on the grounds of the Ipatievsky monastery at Kostroma. The Romanov family owned an ancestral estate in the district of Kostroma as well as the "Romanov House" within the compound of the Ipatievsky monastery. On page 408 we read that "seventeen fellows from Germany" were made members of the first body of the Academy of Sciences. To be exact, only nine of the seventeen foreigners were Germans: three were Swiss, one was French, and the nationality of four is unknown. On page 425 the author states: "The Bashkirs, a people of Mongol descent. . . ." The Bashkirs belong to the Ural-Altaic ethnic group, but to its Turko-Tatar, not its Mongolian branch.

To be sure, an extensive work like the book under review cannot entirely avoid factual inaccuracies. Nevertheless, the first volume would gain much from a careful revision.

The second volume of M. T. Florinsky's history is elaborated

more thoroughly and in greater detail. Here again, one cannot always agree with the author, but, as a rule, in this part of his work he develops his arguments carefully, without the vagueness and sketchiness that sometimes mars his first volume.

Let us record a few objections. The author, in our opinion, exaggerates the importance and political influence of N. P. Ignatiev ("the formidable Ignatiev," pp. 990 and 1007) and the whole Panslavic trend. Neither the Chancellor Gorchakov nor the War Minister D. Miliutin nor Tsar Alexander II shared this view. Panslavism had no influence on Russian foreign policy. It was made much of by the governments of England, Germany, and Austria, mainly to justify some foreign policies of their own. Little fuss, on the other hand, was made over Pangermanism. The practical results are known. Russian Panslavism proved too weak to achieve anything, while Pangermanism ultimately gave rise to Hitler.

Let us further point out what seems to us an omission of some importance. The author, true to his method of stressing the activities of prominent personalities as the motive force of the historical process, draws detailed character pictures of Tsar Nicholas II, the Tsarina, Stolypin, Goremykin, and some others. It should be obvious, however, that their actions and the events during their rule, including the war with Germany, taken alone, do not account for the collapse of the monarchy and the subsequent events. The social causes of these phenomena lie deeper. M. T. Florinsky is right when he writes: "The process of social disintegration that

set in must be viewed against the background of discord, bitterness, and lack of national unity that had accumulated *for generations*" (p. 1375, our italics). The author would do well to expound this statement in greater detail and to devote a special chapter to an analysis, at least in general outline, of the social factors that caused the fall of the monarchy.

Factual inaccuracies are not many in Vol. II. Let us note a few. The Kirghiz are not a Mongol tribe, as stated on page 743, but a Turko-Tatar one; the name of count Miloradovich, mentioned on page 747, was Mikhail and not Nikolai; the Bespopovtsy (the Priestless) are incorrectly defined as a sect refusing to pray for the Tsar and to recognize the hierarchy of the Church and the sacrament of marriage (p. 798). They are a branch of the Old-Believers which includes several subdivisions or sects, all of them denying the hierarchy but only a few opposing the sacrament of marriage and refusing to pray for the Tsar. On page 895 we read that peasants were subject to corporal punishment until 1904, while other social classes had been exempt from it since 1863. Actually, the nobility had been granted exemption from corporal punishment by the "Charter to the Nobility" of 1785.

In conclusion, this reviewer is of the opinion that the merits of the work by far outweigh its shortcomings. We hope that a second edition will provide the author with the opportunity to take into consideration some of the points we have made above.

V. A. RIASANOVSKY
San Francisco, California

VERNADSKY, GEORGE. *The Mongols and Russia* (A History of Russia, by George Vernadsky and Michael Karpovich, vol. III). New Haven, Yale University Press, 1953. 462 pp. 5 maps. \$7.50.

One hails every new volume of this voluminous project which, when completed, will become the most important presentation of the history of Russia ever written in a non-Russian language. Also, under present circumstances, when historians within the U.S.S.R. are restricted in their scholarly conclusions by an overall doctrine publicly enforced, this history of Russia promises to become a most authoritative survey, objectively offered by the two outstanding non-Marxian historians under the conditions of an absolute scholarly freedom. Not since the beginning of the 1930's, when P. Milyukov, C. Seignobos, and L. Eisenmann published their *Histoire de Russie* in 3 volumes (Paris, 1932-1933), has an attempt of such crucial value been undertaken by the students of Russia outside the U.S.S.R.

Still, Professor Vernadsky's *The Mongols and Russia* has been, for this reviewer, a major disappointment. Instead of the history of Russia during a most important period (from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century) a history of the Mongol world is offered to us, primarily, with the underlying understanding that the Mongol rule represented the key factor of Russian historical development during these centuries. A key factor of such overwhelming importance, in Professor Vernadsky's eyes, that fewer than 50 pages (in a book of 390 pages of text) have been devoted by him to Russian economic, institutional,

social, and intellectual history (pp. 338-385, of chapter 5: "The Mongol Impact on Russia"). The rest is either exclusively Mongol history (the first 213 pages) or represents a minute description of the military and diplomatic relations between the Mongols and not only Russia (Muscovy and Lithuania) but the whole of Eastern Europe and the Near East. An important subchapter deals with the Mongol administration in Russia (pp. 214-232).

The result of Professor Vernadsky's plan is an optical deformation, similar to the one which would arise if a historian of Greece should describe Greek history between 1453 and 1832 as mainly an upshot of the Ottoman conquest (other analogies would also be in order, but this one seems to be the most appropriate). Professor Vernadsky himself admits this deficiency of his plan, when in his foreword he says: "The disadvantage of my plan, of which I am well aware, is that no room has been left, within the framework of this volume, for a balanced picture of Russian social, economic, and cultural life under the Mongols." However, not only does he under-rate this deficiency, when, in continuing, he says: "This is especially true of West Russia and Novgorod" (it is true, almost to the same degree, of North Eastern Russia!), but he certainly does not give full justice to the complexity of Russian medieval development, when he hopes "to make up for the deficiency in the next volume of this series, by means of retrospect." This reviewer even submits that a retrospect might take the development out of its chronological context, and thus produce a new, dangerous, optical deformation. What would be necessary is a new study of the problems

treated by Professor Vernadsky in chapter 5 of this book from factors other than the Mongol impact, and especially from the point of view of domestic factors. There is a place for such a book, and there is a necessity for it; without it, this history of Russia will be incomplete. It is entirely legitimate to deal in a special volume with the Mongol factor in Russian history, but it should not be at the cost of other essential developments. I must express my regret that the author did not plan for this period, instead of one book, two books, the second of which would be devoted to Russian history *per se* in its economic, social, institutional, and cultural aspects during its "Medieval period."

It is hardly possible, within the narrow limits of this review, to discuss, one by one, all the essential points of this remarkably informative volume. This reviewer, moreover, lacks special knowledge to deal with the chapters of the book where Mongol history is specifically treated (and they represent the larger part of the book). The number of problems raised by the chapters dealing with Russia is so great and of such complexity, that it would be presumptuous to attempt to give them even a most casual consideration; besides, a casual treatment would only be misleading. Knowing this difficulty, this reviewer will refer those of the readers of *The Mongols and Russia* who might be interested in a point of view on the Mongol impact different from that of Professor Vernadsky, to the excellent analysis of this problem in V. I. Riasanovsky's *Obzor russkoi kultury*, part 1, chapter IV, pp. 381-411 (Eugene, Oregon, 1947). As to a more thorough pic-

ture of Russian internal development during this period, where *all* factors have been taken into consideration, there is so far no better book available than Alexander Eck's *Le Moyen âge russe* (Paris, 1933) as an overall summary. V. I. Riasanovsky's appraisal is particularly valid in view of his knowledge not only of Russian history, but also of Mongol institutions.

As in all his works, Professor Vernadsky has added to this volume detailed and valuable bibliographies, genealogical tables, and indices. These, together with numerous footnotes, offer to a student of Mongol or Russian history, splendid leads toward independent study. This critical and bibliographical apparatus also testifies to the enormous work performed by the author of this volume. In spite of this reviewer's disagreement with the author's conception of this period of Russian history, he is aware of the importance of Professor Vernadsky's remarkable contribution, which will undoubtedly be of great usefulness to future students of Russian and Mongol history.

MARC SZEFTEL

Cornell University

GUINS, GEORGE C. *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1954. 457 pp. 27.50 gu.

HAZARD, JOHN N. *Law and Social Change in the U.S.S.R.* Toronto, Carswell Co., 1953. 310 pp. \$4.50.

Two important books on Soviet law have recently appeared: one by Professor G. C. Guins, a distinguished Russian scholar who studied with Leo Petrazhitsky in St. Petersburg and is now teaching at the

University of California in Berkeley, and another by Professor John N. Hazard, who gained complete command of the Russian language, studied for a year at the Moscow School of Law, and is now teaching at Columbia University. Both authors attempt to cover the whole range of legal phenomena in the Soviet Union, and both strive to correlate Soviet law with some aspects of Soviet society, as is evidenced by the very titles of the books. One might expect, therefore, that there would be a striking similarity between the two works; but there is none. It is, in fact, a fascinating experience to read one book after the other and to see how different the interpretation of the same material can be.

For Guins, Soviet law appears primarily as a system of coercive norms derived from principles diametrically opposed to those of the law of the modern democratic state. Soviet ethics is based on the denial of "eternal and basic ethical principles" and may be conceived as revolutionary utilitarianism: good is what helps promote the Communist revolution. The Soviet conception of law identifies it with coercion exerted by the dominant class against its foes. With this background, the individual phases of Soviet law—civil law, labor law, criminal law, constitutional law, and so on—are passed in review and contrasted with the institutions of a democratic society. Special emphasis is laid on the abuse of the term "democracy" by the Soviets, on the cruelty of Soviet penal law, and on the iron discipline imposed by Soviet law on the workers.

For Hazard, Soviet law is primarily a system which may be logically derived from the Marxian

premise that he who has economic power has also political power. The base of the new society, he holds, has been laid by nationalization of production resources and centralization of control over their use. Rules had to be established to make the new economic system work and to "reserve political leadership for a selected few." Contrary to most recent investigators (for instance, W. W. Rostow and Barrington Moore), the author does not emphasize that this "reservation of power" has become the leading principle of the whole system.

Hazard shows that a peculiar status had to be given to authors and inventors; that a certain amount of social security had to be granted to the people; that tort liability, preserved in Soviet law, is there to assure better efficiency on the part of the managers. Family law underwent two revolutions, one dissolving and another restoring it, both serving the general purposes of the régime. A new conception of international law had to be created, again to help the "selected few" preserve the fruits of the "October victory." The individual topics are presented in an interesting, but always pragmatic way, without any reference to moral judgments, sometimes covering repugnant aspects of Soviet law by euphemisms. Thus, according to the author, the Russian peasants have been "encouraged" to join collective farms while it is common knowledge that they were compelled to do so and that resistance, actual or imaginary, has cost the Russian people approximately five million lives.

Neither of the authors has actually succeeded in showing Soviet law as a factor or product of Soviet society. Guins has good chapters on

social stratification and on the peculiarities of social life; but, from his presentation, one sees that it is not so much the law which has been responsible for these transformations as it is the collective hand of "the selected few." As to Hazard's presentation, the enactment of drastically new laws and their later modification coincides with social change; in other words, Soviet law has been a form of social change. This, to a certain extent, is true of every society whose laws are enforced.

There is a good reason why the two attempts have partially failed. Law may be an important and semi-autonomous component of the total social system; then the activities of the courts, of the lawyers, and even jurists (teachers of law) may play the rôle of a factor of social change. But, in the U.S.S.R., nothing like that exists: the courts, the lawyers, and the jurists are mere servants of "the selected few," and the latter arbitrarily make and unmake the law, which is merely a technical instrument in their hands. (This point has been emphasized by Stalin himself in his "work" on linguistics.) In consequence, one cannot separate the law and the institutions regulated by it from the rest of the society which has been "dissolved in the state."

This failure with respect to the secondary objective is not of great importance. The main objective, the presentation of the legal status of the Soviets, has been achieved by both authors. Guins' book is important as a solid refutation of the view that Soviet law is just another manner of solving problems arising before men, especially lawyers, in every society (such was the implicit contention of many of Hazard's

earlier writings) or that it is a challenge, perhaps a model, for American legislators (such has been the main thesis of the earlier writings of H. Berman). Hazard's book is valuable in that it contains a number of sketches of little known aspects of Soviet law (such as "the authors' certificates" which replace, *de facto*, the patents) and includes short accounts of some hundred cases from Soviet practice, which display (perhaps contrary to the author's intention) the helplessness of Soviet courts and other agencies in dealing with legal problems of even moderate difficulty.

N. S. TIMASHEFF

Fordham University

SETON-WATSON, HUGH. *From Lenin to Malenkov (A History of World Communism)*. New York, Praeger, 1953. 377 pp. \$6.00.

Professor Hugh Seton-Watson's book is an effort to embrace the history of World Communism for the past thirty-seven years in one volume, and deserves, therefore, serious attention. It is an impressive piece of work, and one is little less than astonished at the author's ability to thread his way through the maze of Communist diplomacy and intrigue in all sectors of Communist activity. It undoubtedly will provide a useful guide for students of Communism throughout the world, being adequately documented and accompanied by a bibliography that seems to embrace the fundamental works.

It might seem ungenerous to question the soundness of some of his conclusions. At the same time this reviewer feels it incumbent on himself to scrutinize rather carefully

his treatment of some subjects. His judgments on the purges of 1937, which appear to be drawn from Deutscher's *Stalin*, strike one as a very inadequate explanation of them. Enough is known of the treatment of accused persons by the M.V.D. in the Soviet Union and the brain washing in Soviet China to know that alleged confessions that are utterly false can be wrung from the most innocent persons and have little to do with reality.

His treatment of Chinese Communism seems to leave something to be desired. After tracing the political evolution of China from 1917 to 1927, he, curiously, omits the hostilities that opened between China and the Soviet Union in that year and proceeds to the opening of Japanese hostilities against China in the thirties. On one point his statements are open to very serious question, those concerning the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek by Chang Hsueh-Liang at Sian in 1936. In recounting this incident, he purports to give the results of the agreement reached at this time. This runs counter to accounts generally received that almost nothing is known of the results of this meeting.

A further statement which appears misleading is found on page sixty-seven, where it is implied that the treaty of Rumania with Germany in 1918 provided for the annexation of Bessarabia by the former.

One serious omission is the author's failure to point out certain basic trends that would render elaborate explanation of incidents unnecessary. On page 172, he remarks on "the extensive capacity for pursuing a thought to its logi-

cal conclusion, . . . which has long been a characteristic of the Russian mind"; this is a statement that, if given greater prominence, would render exhaustive generalizations on Russian politics unnecessary.

Another criticism has to do with the Soviet collective farms. There appears to be some confusion between the *sovkhoz* which is analogous to the factory, where the workers are paid a daily wage and the *kolkhoz*, which is a cooperative undertaking managed independently by the peasants, who are required to turn over to the government the largest share of their products in taxes of various forms. But it is to be noted that the peasants, not the state, take all the risks, and any remuneration they receive comes only after the government has taken its fixed share. If this is socializing of agriculture, it is a form of socialization quite distinct from the socialization of industry.

In the last chapter the author advances certain recommendations with regard to the attitude we should maintain towards Communism. He does so as a reasonable person attempting to give counsel to reasonable people, and his advice will appeal to all of moderate views. At the same time, there is an implied assumption (which may or may not be true) that in the last analysis victory will go to the side that is moderate and that is able to rally the moral forces of the world in its defense. One passage is particularly striking and, we think, worth quoting: "There are two divisions in the world today. One is between the Communists and the rest. The other is between those who regard slavery, torture, and massacre as permissible methods of political struggle and those who do

not. The first division is the more publicised, the second the more fundamental." One may question his claim that the two divisions are distinct. Actually, to this reviewer, it would seem that there could, perhaps, be no better summary of the issue that today divides the Communist from the non-Communist world.

STUART R. TOMPKINS

University of Oklahoma

HAINES, C. GROVE (Editor). *The Threat of Soviet Imperialism*. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. 402 pp. \$5.00.

Since 1939, the Soviet Union has annexed 684,300 square kilometers of territory with almost 25,000,000 population and has acquired control of satellites, by force, purge, penetration, and puppet governments, embracing roughly twelve and a half million square kilometers and 600,000,000 people. During the same period the Free World has withdrawn from or given freedom to India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, the Philippines, Burma, and Israel, an area of over six and one half million kilometers with a population of over a half billion. Yet the Soviet Union's spokesmen call their process of economic penetration, political domination and conquest "liberation"; and call the process of increasing liberation of former colonies "imperialism." "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean," said Humpty-Dumpty. And many of the Alices among Asian intellectuals wandering in the bewildering wonderland of propaganda echo Humpty-Dumpty's topsy-turvy semantics.

In the Summer of 1953 the School

of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins called a conference of scholars and specialists in business and government to discuss the problems raised by Soviet Imperialism and the cultural lag among intellectuals of several continents which prompts them to accept some aspects of Soviet semantics. A list of the participants in the resultant symposium is sufficient to indicate the scope and seriousness of the discussion: George F. Kennan, George A. Morgan, Mose L. Harvey, Willis C. Armstrong, Frederick Barghoorn, Cyril Black, Jules Menken (England), Robert N. Carew Hunt (England), A. Rossi (France), Admiral Stevens, John Campbell, Harry Schwartz, Conway Zirkle, D. Vernon McKay, Hobart A. Spalding, T. Cuyler Young, Merrill R. Goodall, Gerald F. Winfield, U. Alexis Johnson, Paul H. Nitze. And those who led the discussions and participated in the discussion from the floor were many of them specialists of similar stature.

The resulting work is informative, comprehensive, somber, and serious. It covers Soviet military, scientific and economic strength and weakness, internal morale, ideological pretensions, diplomatic and propaganda techniques, methods of subversion, penetration and conquest, the impact and successes and failures of Soviet penetration and propaganda in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Some of the papers make informed guesses on what goes on inside the Kremlin since Stalin's death. Others warn of the fatuous wishful thinking that would make Mao into another Tito. Many contain constructive suggestions on what the United States should be doing to check the spread of Soviet Imperialism and the accompanying

semantic poison. Whether the participants agreed or disagreed with each other, all the papers serve to stimulate clear thinking and informed policy. All in all, a highly useful, and—unlike so many such collected papers—a highly readable symposium.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

*Russian Institute,
Columbia University*

BROWDER, ROBERT P. *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy.* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953. 256 pp. \$5.00.

Professor Browder's book, while entitled *The Origins of Soviet-American Diplomacy*, deals cursorily with the years between 1917 and 1929 and intensively with the years from 1932 to 1938. It is in essence a study of the elements which entered into the eventual recognition of the Bolshevik régime after years of diplomatic boycott and of the manner in which this recognition worked out in practice. On this phase of our relations with the Kremlin it is suggestive and authoritative, and is based upon Russian as well as American sources.

The foreign policy of the United States is powerfully affected by what is often called public opinion, but which might often be more accurately described as public sentiment. The accent is often on certain emotional prepossessions rather than on a cold-blooded and rational assessment of this or that particular problem. It is an interesting question whether Soviet diplomacy, always granting its initial presuppositions, is not on the whole more intellectual and wisely calculating than that of our own country.

The question of Russian recognition was usually seen by American public men in rather extreme terms. On the one hand, there was the natural detestation of a régime which had shown a cavalier attitude towards private property, which made little effort to restrain radical propaganda, and which was dictatorial in its internal order. On the other hand, on the part of the advocates of recognition, there was usually a very romantic view of what recognition would do to stimulate trade, and a very naïve view of the standards of good faith in international intercourse that prevailed in the Kremlin. Rarely, in the debate over recognition, was the simple fact recognized that there is a strong basis in the American precedents for the recognition of any *de facto* régime, however odious its principles. Against an argument of this kind, however, there might always be pitted the contention that Russia had shown contempt for her international obligations, and that in such circumstances its government, no matter how firmly established, ought not to be acknowledged out of hand.

In Moscow the question of recognition assumed very little importance for many years. Trade in the '20's flourished without it, and there was no other important interest to be satisfied by the establishment of formal relations. With the advent of the Japanese militarists to power, however, Moscow warmed towards the idea of closer relations with the United States, in the hope that an understanding between Washington and the Kremlin might restrain the "war-mongers" of Tokyo. In basing its action on this assumption, Litvinov and his colleagues showed very little understanding of the

strength of isolationist sentiment in the United States and of the traditional policy of no entangling alliances.

Recognition came easier in 1933, says Professor Browder, partly because of the "surface aura of respectability" that now characterized the Soviet régime, partly because of a genuine willingness in Moscow to work with other countries, partly because of the idea that greater trade would open up at a time when it was badly needed, and partly because of the temperamental optimism of Franklin D. Roosevelt. There is another factor that might, I think, be mentioned. The breakdown of our economy had induced a somewhat greater tolerance towards the Communist experiment. The degree to which this tolerance, and even active approval, penetrated American society in the '30's has never yet been authoritatively studied. But it surely was a factor in giving to the Roosevelt administration more freedom of action than it would otherwise have enjoyed.

The negotiations themselves were successful only by glossing over unpleasant facts on both sides. Litvinov agreed to commitments which, honestly construed, would have curtailed the activity of the Third International. Roosevelt, on his part, seems to have held out the bait of a loan in exchange for the recognition of the debts and gave this assurance well knowing that the Johnson Act, forbidding loans to defaulted debtors, might pass and tie his hands.

The result of the recognition of 1933 was disillusionment on both sides. As the Russians became more self-sufficient, the hopes of far-reaching trade advantages for the United States grew dimmer and

dimmer. By 1935 the Third International was acting up again, and developing new tension between Moscow and Washington. The Russian hope of closer political association with the American government in the Orient had been virtually extinguished. The attempt to settle the debt question had failed. Relations grew worse rather than better. And the disillusionment of William C. Bullitt, our ambassador in Moscow, was virtually complete.

None the less Professor Browder believes that recognition was wise. No vital American interest was endangered, and it is "extremely questionable whether normal intercourse with Russia increased the strength of Communism in America." The positive advantage lay in the possibility of learning more about the Soviet Union at first hand, and of gaining practical experience in dealing with the Kremlin. And this, indeed, seems to the reviewer to be the very heart of the matter. Recognition is not a matter of moral judgment; it is a matter of international convenience. Where, as in the case of China, a government has defied international authority, there may be a case for not admitting it to the very international body it has defied. But regular relations with such a government is a very different matter. And there is a strong case for it.

Professor Browder's book ought to be useful in bringing into clear perspective a question which has too often been discussed in so emotional a way as to hamper sound judgment as to the wise course of action.

DEXTER PERKINS

Cornell University

GRANICK, DAVID. *Management of the Industrial Firm in the U.S.S.R.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1954. 346 pp. \$5.00.

To students of the Soviet Economic System, the tribulations of Soviet managers of industrial firms have been fairly well known since numerous references as to their plight and problems have frequently been and are continuously discussed in the Soviet press, and several articles in American periodicals have been devoted to them. Dr. Granick, in his study *Management of the Industrial Firm in the U.S.S.R.*, has systematically and painstakingly surveyed this field and came out with an interesting analysis of the problems confronting Soviet management of industrial enterprises. Though the author emphasizes the limitations of his study, that is, the fact that it applies to heavy industry only and that it covers the period 1931-1941, there is enough evidence to suggest, on the basis of present-day Soviet writings, that the problems which plagued Soviet management in the past are still prevalent in the present, and, generally, appear throughout the whole Soviet industrial system. Moreover, it would not be far-fetched to assume that the plight of Soviet managers in the consumers' goods industry is in some respects even worse because management in this industry is generally blamed for all the shortcomings of this much neglected segment of the Soviet industrial system.

The study consists of 14 chapters, including conclusions, 4 appendices, and an extensive bibliography. After an introduction, chapters 2 and 3 provide a background to the rôle of management according to Soviet

concepts and describe the environment in which management has been operating. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with national plans and the rôle and contributions of the firm personnel to these plans. The next topics discussed are the criteria according to which plant management has been evaluated, followed by a description of controls over management and the incentives offered them for proper behavior. The next two chapters are devoted to the rôle of the Communist Party and of workers' participation in management of industrial firms, and in supervision of their managers' behavior. A chapter with conclusions ends this study.

Whether the Soviet industry is less bureaucratic than some of the giant firms in capitalist society may be true as Dr. Granick asserts. There can be little doubt, however, that Soviet society has developed a most complex and cumbersome administration to operate its industrial system, which the Russians themselves call "bureaucracy." Year after year this Soviet "bureaucracy" has been blamed for the hardships of Soviet life. Nevertheless this system of administration continues to expand regardless of measures taken. It is possible that such expansion is inherent in a system in which the state attempts to operate the economy and regulate economic activity, or one might say, the whole society. This expansion of controls is partly based on the general distrust of the individual—no matter how long he has been a member of the Party, regardless of how high his position is and no matter what services he has rendered to the state. The system is flooded with a hodgepodge of loose regulations and directives, is inefficient and is immersed in red

tape. As a result Soviet authorities are forced to tolerate a great number of evasions of the law and of administrative regulations on the part of the management, of various kinds of shady dealings into which management is forced in order to produce according to plan, and of other managerial activities inconsistent with Soviet dogma. Under these conditions, it appears remarkable that the ponderous economic administration developed by the Soviets is able, in spite of continuous interferences by the authorities, to operate the way that it does the gigantic economic machine developed by the state.

It is rather unfortunate that the author mars the end of his study with the following conclusion: "Throughout this study, we have seen the great powers granted to directors and the considerable autonomy left to them. From the point of view of practical independence in making concrete decisions, the Soviet director may be conceived of as an entrepreneur. But the director's entrepreneurial activity is restricted to one field—that of developing better methods for carrying out the existing Party line. The successful director must look at his work with the eyes of the Politbureau, so far as possible interpreting his problems in the same way that Stalin would. The guide to his entrepreneurial activity must still be, in Commissar Ordzhonikidze's words, 'Party activity and belief—above all and before all!'" The Soviet director of a firm is essentially an agent of the government and as such he has limited rights and powers for making certain economic and political decisions on the spot without waiting for his superiors to approve them. But it would seem to

be rather misleading to apply the term "entrepreneur" to a Soviet plant director since this term, as referred to Western economic thought, denotes essentially a business man of imagination and initiative.

M. V. CONDOIDE

The Ohio State University

LAVRIN, JANKO. *Russian Writers: Their Lives and Literature*. New York, Van Nostrand Co., 1954. 363 pp. \$6.00.

The English professor Janko Lavrin, author of many and varied volumes on Russian literature, had assembled some of his University lectures, articles, and chapters from a previous work entitled *From Pushkin to Mayakovsky* (1948) in a new book which makes an excellent introduction for college students and general readers who begin their exploration of Russian poets and novelists. *Russian Writers* does not present a systematic survey or a strictly chronological sequence but offers a series of brief and suggestive portraits of individual authors, mostly of the nineteenth century. Some of the essays are more on the expository side, such as that on Goncharov; some are devoted to a specific aspect of a writer's activity, such as the chapter on Chekhov which analyzes only his plays but does not deal with him as a story teller. Periods preceding the nineteenth century are merely sketched in chapters on "The Lay of Igor's Campaign," on Avvakum and on Fonvizin, while the post-revolutionary era is described in chapters on Essenin and Mayakovsky. As a matter of fact the concluding essay of the volume—"A Pattern of the

Soviet Novel"—is the least satisfactory: while in his nineteenth century portraits Mr. Lavrin gives sharp and at times brilliant characterizations (those of Gogol, Tiutchev, Lermontov, and Leskov are particularly successful), his survey of Soviet letters never goes beyond cut and dried informative notices and resembles articles one usually finds in reference annuals. He avoids expressing definite opinions about the value of various Soviet novels and his "assessment" is therefore reduced to a lifeless enumeration. Is it because Mr. Lavrin, like so many historians of literature, is afraid to pronounce a critical judgment on his contemporaries and feels more at ease with the dead than with the living?

Whatever the reason, Mr. Lavrin is certainly much more at home in the last century. Most English surveys of Russian literature of the past either are filled with clichés taken from pre-revolutionary second-rate text-books, or abound in highly subjective and irresponsible evaluations which are rather amusing when they come from the pen of such a brilliant and witty person as D. Sviatopolk-Mirsky, but sound hollow or pretentious when attempted by less gifted and less intelligent writers. Mr. Lavrin fortunately escaped these pitfalls, and his analytical insight—rooted in solid scholarship and sustained by the good use of recently published literary materials—is well balanced, honest and often refreshing. I found particularly rewarding his treatment of Russian Romanticism, his profound study of Gogol's warped genius, his description of Lermontov's contradictions or his vivid outline of Tiutchev's poetry. This does not mean that I subscribe

to all of Mr. Lavrin's opinions, but in most cases they are well argued and candidly presented. As one instance when I certainly part company with the author of *Russian Writers*, I should quote his praise of *The Life of Klim Samghin* by Gorky which he defines as "a masterpiece of critical realism." I believe that this endless chronicle, even though it contains a number of excellent descriptive passages, is no masterpiece at all; it is formless, dull and flat and does not occupy a prominent place in the history of modern Russian fiction.

I have but two reservations to make about this highly readable and highly commendable work: one concerns its method and the other the place allotted to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. It seems rather paradoxical that in a book on Russian great literary figures by a scholar who wrote separate works on Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, those two most important Russian classics are not even given a chapter each but are only dealt with in a comparative essay which is not doing justice to either of them. These 24 pages seem too parsimonious indeed in a volume of 360 pages. No wonder that Mr. Lavrin's strongly critical—I am tempted to say, outright negative—attitude toward Tolstoy is not sufficiently explained and is not

backed by convincing reasoning. I wonder why Mr. Lavrin reduced his interpretation of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky to such capsulized form.

Mr. Lavrin knows perfectly well that any organic picture of Russian literature requires some notions of its general historical background, and he tries to squeeze them in by summarizing a few data at the end of one portrait and at the beginning of another. These few sentences have to serve as "conjunctive tissues" between the chapters and are supposed to make the reader aware of the historical sequence and the social and political environment. Such a method, however, proves totally inefficient, and one wonders whether a simple succession of individual portraits, even in the manner used by such impressionistic critics as Yuli Aikhenwald, would not be preferable to a frustrating mixture of critical analysis with fragments of historical descriptions. The use of this hybrid form is probably responsible for the fact that some very significant phenomena of Russian literature, such as the Pushkin's "pleiade" or the Symbolist movement at the turn of the century, have not found an adequate place in Mr. Lavrin's otherwise valuable work.

MARC SLONIM

Sarah Lawrence College

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