

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

Hugh Seton-Watson

**BRUTUS IN FOREIGN POLICY:
THE MEMOIRS OF SIR ANTHONY EDEN**

Martin Wight

FRANCE AND ALGERIA

Brian Crozier and Gerard Mansell

NEW FORCES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

William Clark

ISRAEL'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

Leo Kohn

THE QUESTION OF TIBET AND THE RULE OF LAW

Review Article
Zahiruddin Ahmad

BOOK REVIEWS

CORRESPONDENCE

SEVEN SHILLINGS

QUARTERLY

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
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SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

HUGH SETON-WATSON

ANY general survey of the nature of Soviet foreign policy must, I think, begin with the well-known fact that the Soviet Union is both a great territorial empire and the homeland of a world-wide revolutionary totalitarian movement. Let us not forget that it is an empire. The 1959 census showed 114,588,000 Russians in a total population of 208,826,650. To these we should add about 96 million people under indirect Soviet rule in Eastern and Central Europe. We have 115 million Russians out of 300 million subjects of the Soviet Empire. This empire has of course the usual strategic and economic interests that any great empire must have. Many of them are similar to those of the old Russian Empire of the Tsars. I need only mention Poland, the Black Sea Straits, Persia, Korea, and Manchuria to make this point clear. But of course all that the recurrence of these names, so familiar to Lord Palmerston or Lord Salisbury, proves is that the facts of geography remain facts, that Russia is the same piece of the earth's surface as ever.

Before the second World War, when the Soviet Union was rather weak, the Communist aspect of its policy received relatively more attention (though not necessarily well informed or intelligent attention) than today, when its status as one of the world's two giant Powers tends to obsess us to the exclusion of all else. This is, I think, unfortunate.

Communism is not just a political opinion like any other. Communists believe that Marxism-Leninism, as interpreted by the currently authorized ideological spokesmen of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, is a full scientific explanation of human history and social development. The ineluctable laws of human society ensure that all the branches of the human race will move through socialism to Communism, most but not all of them passing through the stage of capitalism. But the fact that this progress is certain does not mean that Communists should sit back and let history do their job for them. On the contrary, passivity is one of the worst of sins. The more convinced a Communist is of the inevitable victory of his cause, the more urgent is his duty to expedite it by all means in his power.

In the first years of the Soviet regime, pursuit of world socialist revolution was the manifest and unquestioned duty of those responsible for Soviet foreign policy. In the years of Stalin's rise to power in the mid-1920s, the revolutionary aim to some extent receded into the background,

partly because the general world situation was unfavourable, and partly because Stalin was preoccupied first with the elimination of his rivals in the party leadership and then with the epic tasks of collectivization of agriculture and industrialization. But the aim was never abandoned. Indeed Stalin always maintained that 'the *complete* victory of socialism' in the Soviet Union was possible only when 'capitalist encirclement' had been ended by socialist revolution in the most powerful industrial countries.

A new stage began about the end of the 1930s, when a great measure of success had been achieved in economic construction. At this point Stalin decided that what had been built in the Soviet Union *was* socialism. This is in fact stated in the Constitution which he introduced in 1936. If 'socialism' meant the Soviet system, then 'socialist revolution' could only mean the adoption of a regime designed from the Soviet blueprint. In 1936 this was an academic point, but between 1944 and 1948 the principle was put into practice in the most realistic manner in eight European countries, six of which had been occupied by the Soviet Army.

But Stalin has now been dead seven years. Has the doctrine not been scrapped, together with the adulation of Stalin?

The most authoritative recent pronouncement is the declaration of 16 November 1957, signed in Moscow by the representatives of the twelve ruling Communist Parties of Europe and Asia. One passage reads:

The processes of the socialist revolution and the building of socialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in all countries embarking on a socialist course. These laws manifest themselves everywhere, alongside a great variety of historical national peculiarities and traditions which must by all means be taken into account.

The first of these laws is:

guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist party, in effecting a proletarian revolution in one form or another and establishing one form or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

During the Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation of 1955-6 there was much talk on both sides of 'different roads to socialism'. But the limits were shown when the Government of Imre Nagy in Hungary, an overwhelmingly socialist Government supported by the working class, was suppressed by Soviet arms—not by Stalin but by Khrushchev. In the spring of 1958 there was a most illuminating controversy in connection with the Draft Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs had argued that it was possible to achieve socialism without a revolution, and that the struggle for socialism need not necessarily be led by a Marxist-Leninist party. They were probably thinking not so much of social democratic parties in Europe as of more or less socialist parties in Asia and Africa, for example the followers of U Nu in Burma. But the Soviet

publicists were inflexible. The struggle for socialism must be led by Marxist-Leninist parties, and there must be a revolution. However, they distinguished between 'violent' revolutions and 'peaceful' revolutions. In the first case the enemies of the Communists must be overthrown by force, and State power must then be used to suppress them. In the second case, if the enemies would yield without a fight, it would be possible to seize power peacefully, and force would be needed only to crush those who had surrendered. Mikoyan had made this clear already at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U. in February 1956, when he gave, as examples of a 'parliamentary road to socialism', the cases of Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany.

To sum up, socialist revolutions are revolutions made by Marxist-Leninist parties, operating according to principles and tactics approved in Moscow. Socialist revolutions may be 'violent'—in which case violence is used before and after seizure of power—or 'peaceful'—in which case it is used only after.

All this was made clear by Soviet ideologists writing in 1958, when Khrushchev was undisputed master of the Soviet Union. Has he changed his view? Mr Khrushchev rose to supreme power by his control over the apparatus of the Communist Party. His victory was the victory of the party machine, of its *apparatchiks* and its lay priesthood of ideologists. In Stalin's later years the Party was one of a number of instruments of power wielded by the autocrat: the most important other instruments were the police, the armed forces, and the industrial bureaucracy. Today there is no doubt that the Party is, as it was in Lenin's time, the supreme instrument of power. Party officials and propagandists have more prestige and power in the Soviet Union than they have had since the 1920s. Foreign policy is therefore likely to be more, not less, influenced by ideology than under Stalin.

And why should Khrushchev wish to abandon his Communist convictions? As he sees it, and as the leading people in the Party and State see it, Communist ideology has been a remarkably useful guide to action. Under its inspiration, the leaders of the Soviet Union have made their country immensely powerful. The same Moscow declaration of November 1957 gives the following description of the world political scene. It describes the 'forces of peace' in the world in six categories. They are:

the invincible camp of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union; the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa taking an anti-imperialist stand and forming, together with the socialist countries, a broad peace zone; the international working class and above all its vanguard—the Communist parties; the liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies; the mass peace movement of the peoples; the peoples of Latin America and the masses in the imperialist countries who are putting up increasing resistance to the plans for a new war.

These forces the Soviet Government is confident that it can mobilize for the world-wide victory of 'socialism'—that is, of the Soviet regime. Mr Khrushchev has never given any indication that he disagrees with the diagnosis or the exhortations put out by the most eminent spokesmen of the regime of which he is the double head—First Secretary of the Party and Prime Minister. We would, I think, do well to pay him the compliment of taking his convictions, and the resultant policy, more seriously.

The pursuit of these aims—the imposition, whether by force or by the capitulation of their opponents, of the Soviet type of regime on all nations not already subject or allied to them—places the Soviet rulers in a relationship to the non-Communist world which can only be described as permanent warfare. It differs in kind from the traditional relationship between States. England and France were enemies for centuries, because they were rivals for the control of Aquitaine, or the Low Countries, or North America, not because Englishmen wanted to destroy France as such, or the reverse. But the Soviet leaders are not primarily concerned with strategic problems such as the Black Sea Straits (though these may play their part at times), but with their duty as Communists to expedite the ineluctable process of history by destroying what they call 'capitalism'. It is not what we do, or what we want, but what we are, that marks us out as their victims.

I have used the word 'warfare', but this must be understood in a very broad sense. The Soviet aim is to destroy their chosen enemies, and their effort is systematic and permanent. But all sorts of methods may be used, of which 'war' in the traditional sense is only one. The methods include diplomacy, propaganda, the granting or withholding of trade and of economic aid, subversion, guerrilla warfare, open warfare by satellite armies or 'volunteers', open warfare by Soviet forces with conventional weapons, and thermo-nuclear war. The selection and admixture of the methods of struggle are a matter of expediency, depending on the concrete circumstances of each case. Questions such as, 'Should we rely on military or economic means?', so often asked in the West, must appear meaningless to a Soviet observer. In the conduct of Soviet policy, the availability of all the necessary political, economic, and military weapons all the time is assumed.

The Soviets' attitude to 'shooting war' is empirical. They have no trace of the romantic love of war proclaimed by Mussolini and practised by Hitler. They have also no trace of pacifism. Their military doctrine assumes that they must be capable of fighting any sort of war—with conventional weapons, with small-range atomic weapons, or with the full thermo-nuclear panoply. Hitherto the military force of the Atlantic Alliance has deterred them from military action. In the economic and political fields however they have, since 1945, shown themselves far more

successful than the West. Should the Western Powers now decide, not only to devote greater resources to the economic and political struggle—especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—but also to pay for this new effort by economizing on defence expenditure, then the opportunity for military action might appear favourable to the Soviet leaders. The West cannot in fact choose to meet the Soviet challenge in one field only—military or economic or political. It has to meet it in all fields, and pay the cost, or be driven from defeat to defeat and to ultimate destruction.

The picture I have presented is, I fully realize, unpleasant. It does not correspond to the general picture that emerges from the popular press and the statesmen's speeches in this country or America today. Surely, you will be thinking, there have been great changes in the Soviet Union in the last years?

Certainly there have been great changes. Let me briefly mention what seem to me to be the five most important points. First, the security police has less power, and exercises the power it has much more moderately, than in Stalin's time. Soviet citizens are far less afraid, and even speak freely to foreigners. However, the whole machinery of the security police is still there, to be used if and when the leaders need it. Secondly, both workers and peasants are earning more, and far more consumers' goods are available. However, the priority on heavy industry and war industry is still there. The Soviet economy is richer, the productivity of labour is higher, and as the cake grows everyone's slice is bigger. But economic policy is planned not by the consumer but by the party leaders. Thirdly, there are fewer troops under arms. But the armed forces, and especially the land army, are still far larger than ours, and the proportion of combat troops to total forces is higher. Fourthly, the managerial or technocratic element in Soviet society is extremely important. There are people in important posts in the administration for whom the principal criterion is not ideological orthodoxy but professional efficiency. This conflict between ideology and practical outlook is found even inside the Party machine. The pressures for normality in everyday life, and against ideological crusades whether at home or abroad, are undoubtedly growing. One might even say that the other-directed young executive, the 'organization man', of American society is beginning to appear in the Soviet Union. Finally, there is evidence that among the educated youth there is even a spirit of critical inquiry, which spares no political or economic dogmas, and which was strongly stimulated by the events in Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

All these trends undoubtedly exist, and they promise much for the future. But do not let us confuse the future with the present. The Soviet Union is not ruled by consumers demanding cars with fins or durable household goods, or by organization men, or by angry young students, but by the Central Committee of the Party led by Mr Khrushchev.

Unfortunately Western public opinion about foreign policy is still suffering from a hang-over from McCarthyism. There is no need for me to waste words on the late Senator for Wisconsin, and this is no place to consider the roots of McCarthyism in American society. But the effects of McCarthyism on Western attitudes to the Soviet Union are too important to be passed over. During the height of the anti-Communist hysteria in the United States (which McCarthy exploited without caring a cent about the issues involved), it was frequently asserted that the Russians were crude savages, incapable of civilized achievements, and that they were monsters of wickedness. But in the last few years tens of thousands of Americans have been to Russia, and have seen for themselves that Russians are charming people, that they lead virtuous (perhaps boringly virtuous) lives, and that their country is well ordered. At the same time the achievements of Soviet science have impressed the whole world. Indeed the enthusiasm with which, in the months after the first sputnik, Americans denounced their own system of education and extolled that of the Soviet Union could not fail to strike anyone who was living in the United States at that time.

But if all that had been said in the McCarthy era about the barbarism and the wickedness of the Russians was shown to be untrue, then, it was quickly assumed, everything that had been said about the implacable hostility of the Soviet Government to the rest of the world must also be untrue. It is one of the most widespread of democratic fallacies that a nation of enemies must consist of wicked men, and that a nation of decent and kindly men and women cannot be a nation of enemies. Unfortunately this is a fallacy. Russians have been intelligent and charming for centuries, but the Soviet leaders were implacably hostile to all non-Communist States long before Senator McCarthy was heard of, and remain so now that he is dead. But not the least of the damage that his lies did to the free nations was the uncritical revulsion which their discrediting produced. In fact there is today in the West, perhaps especially in Britain, an arrogant orthodoxy of anti-anti-Communism which inhibits clarity of thought no less than the preceding anti-Communist hysteria. One may even speak of a new McCarthyism of the left, with its own special smear words. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that anyone who today argues that the exercise of power plays an important part in the Soviet system of government, and still more anyone who tries to analyse the methods by which Communists have achieved power or the instruments by which they pursue their international policies, is bound to incur the reproach of being 'a professional anti-Communist', and to have his arguments dismissed, without rational examination, as 'just cold war propaganda'. This mentality is of course exploited by Communists in the West, but it was certainly not created by them. Senator McCarthy in two years did more for the Soviet

Communist cause, at least in the Anglo-Saxon countries, than their Communist parties had achieved in forty.

What are the main dangers to the West at present from Soviet policy? It seems to me that there are four.

The first is a technological break-through by Soviet science such as to convince the Soviet Government that it could destroy the retaliatory power of the Atlantic Alliance. As to the likelihood of this, I have no ability to form an opinion. If it should occur we should be placed before the choice, of which so much is made in various contemporary publicity campaigns, but which mercifully does not confront us today—the choice between annihilation or submission to Soviet rule. The only action against this danger is of course a sustained effort of scientific research and nuclear armament on the part of the West—certainly of the United States, perhaps of the other Western Powers, perhaps not. The only solution in the long term is of course a mutually accepted plan of nuclear disarmament, of whose efficacy both sides are confident.

The second danger is the superiority of the Soviet Union in conventional forces. This enables the Soviet Union or its satellites to intervene if war breaks out anywhere along the borders of the Soviet orbit, and place on the West the onus of resorting to nuclear war. Here I shall make only one point. The Soviet superiority is not a fact of nature, but a result of political decisions by Western governments and electors. The Soviet Union has 210 million people, the N.A.T.O. countries about 400 million. The peoples of the East European countries (with another 100 million) are a dubious military asset to the Soviet bloc. The West has the power, if it has the will, to match the Soviet capability in conventional weapons.

But it is of the third and fourth dangers that I should like to speak at rather greater length. These I will describe as 'encirclement' and 'demoralization'. The first of these consists of the unremitting efforts of Soviet policy to exploit the conflicts between the West and the Afro-Asian nations, to mobilize the Afro-Asians under their leadership, and so to transform the balance of political and economic power in the world that the West will in the end have no choice but to capitulate. The second consists of the no less persistent effort to exploit for the Soviet advantage those trends of Western public opinion about foreign policy which are favourable to Soviet interests (though in most cases in no way created by Soviet policy) in order to produce the same result—capitulation of the West before Soviet power, the equivalent in the international field of the 'peaceful revolution' of which I was speaking earlier in the field of internal politics, and which would be its direct and inevitable consequence.

I should like to develop these points by taking three problems which illustrate them, and which are, or ought to be, much in our minds at the present time—African nationalism, Persia, and Germany.

The great question of the next years in Africa is not, it seems to me, whether the African nations will make themselves independent of their Western colonial rulers, or obtain equality with, or power over, their white fellow-citizens. To me it seems beyond doubt that they will. I say this although I am fully aware of the terrible complexities and tragedies of South Africa and of the Rhodesias. I say it also without any pleasure, for I have the gravest doubts as to whether the triumph of the nationalist intelligentsias of the African nations will be a triumph for human liberty or human civilization. But it is what is happening. The great questions for Africa, to which we do not know the answer, are different. The first is, will independence be obtained in circumstances which make possible normal, mutually advantageous, and even, if you like, friendly relations between the independent States and their former rulers, and the allies of their former rulers, or will it take place in a climate of hatred, of desire for revenge, of a passionate obsession to humiliate the white man and to help his enemies? And the second question is, will the independent States preserve their independence or will they be enticed, deceived, or compelled into the Soviet or Chinese Empire? I cannot answer these questions, but I must stress that Soviet policy towards Africa is designed to ensure that the answers to both are favourable to its aims. And I must also insist that the Soviet rulers are putting into the study of Africa and the penetration of Africa a wealth of human ability, economic resources, and plain hard work which puts the nations of the West to shame, and which is still largely ignored by the African experts in Western countries.

Secondly, Persia. This is, I think, in relation to its international importance, the most underrated problem in world politics today—at any rate the question on which Western public opinion is least informed. Thanks to the CENTO alliance, the Soviet Union has no direct access by land to the Arab countries. This seriously restricts the scale of Soviet influence in Iraq and in Egypt. If, from the Soviet point of view, Egypt is the key to Africa, Persia is the key to Egypt. Persia is by far the weakest of the three Muslim members of CENTO. It suffers from almost all the weaknesses from which Nuri Pasha's regime in Iraq suffered, especially from the two most dangerous of them—the terrible contrasts of wealth and poverty in city and countryside, and the alienation of the educated class, the intelligentsia. The Shah is said to have a programme of social reforms. How sincere and how energetic a reformer he is, I do not know. But even if he were a genius, a hero, and a saint, he could not cure Persia's ills in a few years. Meanwhile the country must be governed, and this depends, to put it in the crudest terms, on whether his security service is more reliable than was Nuri's. If a revolution took place in Persia, even one in which Soviet agents had had no hand at all, the Soviet Government

could hardly refrain from exploiting it. In so large and mountainous a country as Persia, revolution in the capital might well lead to civil war in the provinces. The strategic importance of Persia, both for the Western defence of the Middle East and the Soviet penetration of Africa, is such that all sorts of frightening possibilities occur to one. In such a situation, the inferiority of the West in conventional forces, and the absence of an adequate, airborne strategic reserve might well force the N.A.T.O. Powers into the choice between nuclear war and a capitulation that would be likely to bring Africa, within a few years, under Soviet domination. This is a very dangerous situation. One might even argue that it is a common interest of the West and the Soviet Union to prevent the Persian situation getting out of hand. One might even hope that at the summit conference they would actually talk on these lines. But of course common action means a compromise. And the Soviet Union has no reason to compromise if it believes that it can get all it wants for nothing. And I can hardly believe that its study of Western public opinion on Persia has convinced the Soviet Government that it is likely to meet with much opposition, provided it avoids the crudest forms of direct aggression. The Western press shows a fairly complete indifference to Persia. The main exception to this statement are the periodical declamations in left-wing weeklies against Persian landlordism which, though largely justifiable in terms of the social facts, do not help to clarify the problem. The question is not whether Persian landlordism, which has existed for centuries, is a bad thing—it is—but whether Persia will become a means of Soviet expansion. Denunciations of the Shah in the British press merely make the Soviet leaders more inclined to take risks.

Thirdly, Germany. The aim of Soviet policy is perfectly clear. It is the unification of Germany under the Ulbricht regime. In East Germany an efficient system of political and economic power has been built up under a Communist Party which is much hated by its subjects but is fully backed by the Soviet Union. Unification is to be brought about by some form of confederation on the basis of parity between the two German Governments. A Government imposed by force on a quarter of the German people is to have as many posts in the confederal Government as a Government freely elected by three-quarters of the German people. Holding positions of power at the centre while denying to the democratic forces any influence in its own territory, the Communist Party could infiltrate and terrorize the whole of Germany in much the same way as the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia infiltrated and terrorized that country between 1945 and 1948, and with the same result.

Such is the aim, but it is still far from realization. The immediate aims are more modest. They are to make the Ulbricht regime internationally respectable, to undermine freedom in Berlin, and to destroy the confidence

of the German people in the Western alliance. This is no time to enter into the details of the Berlin question. But Soviet policy has, I think, three aims—to detach West Berlin economically from Western Germany, to create some machinery for interfering in freedom of speech in West Berlin, and to convince the Berliners that the West is abandoning them. The aim in fact is the demoralization of Berlin, and as its consequence the demoralization of the whole German people. At the summit conference various concrete proposals will no doubt be put forward by both sides. It seems to me that they should be judged by the extent to which they promote or hinder the realization of these Soviet aims.

The Soviet aim of demoralization of public opinion on foreign policy is not confined to Berlin or to Germany. And looking no farther than our own country, one cannot surely deny that the opportunities are excellent. The climate of capitulation is being built up more successfully and more consciously than in 1938. And it is certainly not the work of the Communist Party or of Soviet agents. When one finds articles in the same tone, and sometimes from the same pen, denouncing Dr Adenauer as the main obstacle to peace, appearing in the *Evening Standard* and the *New Statesman*, it is difficult to know what to think. In the months before Munich, at least there was a division in public opinion. Today the impression is created by a large part of the British press that Western Germany is ruled by the adolescents who scribble swastikas on synagogues, and that Eastern Germany is a democratic State ruled by progressive humanitarians. One wonders what our press would have said if a prominent German bishop had signed a letter to be handed to our Ambassador in Bonn protesting against the Notting Hill outrages. When refugees from beyond the Oder declare that the Oder-Neisse line cannot be accepted, this is treated by our press as a statement of the West German Government's intention to invade Poland. Personally I believe that the Oder-Neisse frontier has come to stay, and I would even say that on balance, taking everything into account, it is a just frontier. But I do not consider that I have the right to moral denunciation of an East Prussian who feels it is an outrage that he was driven from his home, and will feel so all his life. Nor do I equate such a man's words with the foreign policy of Bonn.

One last point on Germany. It was a commonplace of liberal writing on Germany for the last fifty years—a commonplace on which I was brought up, and which still seems to me true—that the sickness of Europe for the last century or more has been the sickness of its heart—Germany. Or, to use a different but equally familiar formula, that the great historical treason of Germany was that she betrayed her mission to unite Europe, preferring vainly to seek to dominate it. And another commonplace of the same kind was that the future peace of Europe depended on the healing of the ancient conflict between Germany and France. Well, now we have a

German Government that bases its whole policy on European unity, and in particular on Franco-German friendship, and actually does something about it. And we splutter with indignation, shout that we are being victimized, and talk about a Paris-Bonn Axis. The spectacle of the relations between the Western Powers at the present time must give great comfort to the Soviet leaders.

Finally, a few words about the summit conference.

Summit conferences are usually considered to be occasions for diplomatic negotiation. An enormous amount of nonsense has been talked about negotiating with the Soviet Union. In the McCarthy era it was widely held that it was in some way surrendering to the powers of darkness to have any dealings with Soviet diplomats at all. It was also widely believed that Soviet diplomats were so clever that they would always outmanoeuvre Western diplomats. These views were silly six years ago, and they are still silly today. But the opposite view, that negotiation is a sort of magic talisman which will cure all our troubles, is also silly. Obviously it has always been, and still is, desirable to negotiate with the Soviet leaders whenever there is something to negotiate about. Successful negotiations between Powers which are in conflict with each other end in compromises, with each side giving something and getting something. The trouble about the present situation is that though it is very easy to think of lots of things which we would like the Soviet Government to give us, it is rather hard to see what we can offer in return that is of the slightest value to the Soviet Government.

But summit conferences, if we may judge from the past, are not necessarily only, or even primarily, occasions for negotiation. They can also be propaganda tournaments. Propaganda-by-conference is indeed one of the forms of propaganda for which the Soviet leaders have shown the greatest aptitude. The object is of course to choose the right moment to end the serious negotiation, and to place the maximum odium on the Western Governments, in the eyes of Western electors and of Afro-Asian intelligentsias. Personally I do not see why the Soviet Government should always have the better of these propaganda battles. I do not believe that the West has a weaker moral or political case than the Soviet Union. But of course one does not get one's case accepted if one does not even put it. And that is what has happened at past summit conferences. One must hope that the Western leaders will go to this summit conference prepared both to negotiate and to make propaganda, ready for whatever turn events may take.

Certainly the Soviet First Secretary and Prime Minister will be in a strong position. His Government has an almost unbroken record of successes in foreign policy since 1945. The surrender of Persian Azerbaijan in 1946 and the survival of Yugoslavia after 1948 are the only notable

failures. Mr Khrushchev is in no hurry. Nobody demands quick results from him. He does not have to face a presidential or parliamentary election. He doesn't have to worry about his allies. We comfort ourselves by saying that the unanimity of the Soviet public is the result of police terror, and that free societies are morally healthier. But one should not make too much of this. Certainly the police terror is there, even if in the background. Certainly the forcible indoctrination of the masses with Marxist-Leninist cant is there. Personally I am convinced that the picture of the world that emerges from this cant is false, that their ideology misleads the Soviet statesmen more than it helps them. But the Soviet regime has other sources of strength—the serious-mindedness and self-righteousness of the Soviet urban citizens, their acceptance of discipline and hierarchy, their conviction that their country is getting more and more powerful, their sense of a world mission, their belief that they are on the side of progress. The successes of the Soviet Union in fact are due not so much to 'scientific' Marxism-Leninism as to the social processes which they have been through in the last thirty years and which the people of England and Scotland went through from a hundred and fifty to fifty years ago. Visitors to the Soviet Union understandably mock at the comic and pompous features of Victorianism in the arts. But the Soviet people have the Victorian virtues, and these are formidable. Victorian England was a force to be reckoned with, and so is neo-Victorian Soviet Russia. The affluent society, with its fin-tailed cars, waist-high culture, angry young men and all, faces a vast industrial and military power led by men who combine something of the outlook and the virtues of Lenin, Tsar Nicholas I, and Samuel Smiles. It is a rather formidable prospect.

*Address at Chatham House,
5 April 1960*

BRUTUS IN FOREIGN POLICY THE MEMOIRS OF SIR ANTHONY EDEN

MARTIN WIGHT

SIR ANTHONY EDEN'S *Memoirs*¹ might have been conceived as a sequel to the War Memoirs of Sir Winston Churchill. They will be an important example when the literary historian comes to trace Sir Winston's literary influence on politics, and to show how his language and cadences have affected Conservative writing and speaking for a generation. Apart from the special words like 'summit' which Sir Winston has given to international politics, Eden has the characteristic Churchillian vocabulary, 'disarray', 'sustain', 'crunch', the double verbs ('Communist power was thrusting and obtruding itself in many lands', p. 178; 'it had flashed and flared in our faces', p. 515), the indulgently dismissive climaxes ('All this did not matter very much', p. 184). But it would be quite unfair to suggest that his *Memoirs* are a pastiche of Churchill. They have a skill in construction, a terse, clean efficiency of style, and an occasional distinction of phrasing that are their own. It is difficult to think that reviewers' complaints that the book is dull are not due to political prejudice.

It is not only in literary influence that the shadow of Churchill lies over Eden's record. In an engaging sentence he refers to 'the long era as crown prince . . . a position not necessarily enviable in politics' (p. 266), and he sees himself as the agent and heir of Churchill's foreign policy. The identity of view and purpose is reiterated, perhaps with conscious skill. Returning to London from Paris in April 1954, revolving in his mind whether Dien Bien Phu could be saved, 'I found that Sir Winston and I, though physically separated by hundreds of miles, had formed exactly the same conclusion' (p. 104). The Anglo-Egyptian agreements of 1952 for giving self-determination to the Sudan were 'one of the rare occasions when I differed from Sir Winston Churchill on a matter of foreign policy. As he remarked on another occasion, you could put each of us in a separate room, put any questions of foreign policy to us, and nine times out of ten we would give the same answer. This was certainly true and I think Sir Winston was influenced on this occasion by his own memories of the Sudan many years before' (p. 247). What Churchill disagreed over is not made clear, but the impression is left that on this single recorded occasion of difference, Eden was the more liberal. One Sunday in October 1956, when 'the crunch' is beginning, Churchill invites himself to lunch at Chequers, discusses the military plans, and says as he leaves, 'I must look up and see

¹ *The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K.C., P.C., M.C.: Full Circle*. London, Cassell, 1960. 619 pp. Maps. Index. 35s.

exactly where Napoleon landed' (p. 534). When the crunch was over there was another lunch with Churchill, the score was added up, and Churchill concluded with 'What a magnificent position to fight back from' (p. 575). If Eden's judgment is to be censured, it seems, Churchill's must be censured too. The most sublimely self-assured sentence in the book comes when a concerted Anglo-American policy towards Musaddiq first appears possible: 'I felt that we had made a beginning which might check the "long, dismal, drawling tides of drift and surrender"' (p. 203). No reference for the quotation is given. Readers who matter will recall Churchill's sleepless night of 20 February 1938, and his vision of 'one strong young figure' standing up against the drawling tides and embodying 'the life-hope of the British nation'.¹ Yet Sir Anthony may not have intended to leave an impression that his confidence rests, not on his own judgment and experience, but on the Churchillian anointing.

Memoirs, Sir Llewellyn Woodward has said, 'are among the best and the worst of historical sources. They are more self-revealing and personal than documents of state; their evidence is less reliable'.² Eden's Memoirs, with their failure to afford new information on the Suez story, have had a worse press than his premiership itself did. The evasions and omissions are indeed remarkable in a book published so soon after events that are fresh in mind, on which a good deal has been written. The book will not be an important source for the domestic history of his administration. There is no mention of the Eden-must-go movement, of Eden's unprecedented announcement of 7 January 1956 that he did not intend to resign, and the effect of these upon his mind; of the private discussions with the Opposition from July 1956 onwards; of Cabinet dissensions about the Suez expedition and the ministerial resignations, least of all Mr Nutting's. The accounts of the removal of Mr Macmillan from the Foreign Office and Sir Walter Monckton from the Ministry of Defence are perfunctory and unconvincing. (The curious reader may note that Sir Anthony pays a decent tribute to the talents or success of every minister or official who served under him, with the single exception of the man who succeeded him.) In places the chronology becomes blurred, and speeches and documents are quoted without being dated. But perhaps criticisms of this sort are beside the point, because they mistake the kind of book it is. Some memoirs, like Cordell Hull's, verge upon the annalistic, and convey the inconsequential and desultory quality of political life; others, like Bismarck's, are unified by a single theme, selecting and subordinating the material for a didactic purpose. Eden's Memoirs stand at the latter end of the spectrum. Their value may well prove to be, not as a personal narrative of a dramatic failure in British policy, but as an essay in diplomatic theory. They claim

¹ *The Second World War*. Vol. 1: *The Gathering Storm* (London, Cassell, 1948), p. 201.

² E. L. Woodward, *War and Peace in Europe 1815-70* (London, Constable, 1931), p. 167.

to expound and illustrate the principles of foreign policy which inspired Churchill, Eden, and Bevin alike, and led Eden to the desperate decision of 1956. And here arise the central questions about the book. Did Eden's policy really show this continuity and consistency, and in what sense anyway is consistency a virtue in foreign policy? Were the principles of the Suez expedition indeed those of the opponents of appeasement? We can ask Eden, in the words the poet gives to Brutus,

Pacemne tueris
Inconscussa tenens dubio vestigia mundo? ¹

The earlier part of the book narrates a series of diplomatic successes, largely overlapping and simultaneously negotiated: the Korean armistice and the repatriation of prisoners, the partition of Trieste, the Geneva Conference of 1954 which ended the Indo-China War, the conjuring of Western European Union out of the ruins of E.D.C., and the settlement of the oil dispute with Iran, which at the end of 1954 he reckoned 'the toughest of all' (p. 219). Here we see classic diplomacy at work, and many of its principles get formulated by the way. Eden was a great diplomatist because of the capacity to understand the interests of the diplomatic adversary, even when he was the ideological enemy—to appreciate Soviet objectives in Europe, Chinese interests in Asia, the demands of Yugoslav prestige over Trieste. 'The best diplomacy is that which gets its own way, but leaves the other side reasonably satisfied' (p. 357). The true function of diplomacy is 'open covenants secretly arrived at' (p. 175). Do not humiliate your enemy before negotiating, nor threaten him militarily during negotiation. 'It was not that I minded "noises off". They could be helpful, but only under certain very definite conditions' (p. 120). 'In the most tangled diplomatic problems it seldom pays to snatch a short-term advantage, especially if this limits the area of manoeuvre' (pp. 178-9). It is best not to begin with a package proposal, but to move step by step, 'starting from small issues and working to the great' (p. 11). Hagglng over inessentials may lose the larger objectives as well as the world's goodwill. 'It is usually prudent to be conciliatory on matters of secondary importance, though in dealing with the Russians these can add up to quite a bill' (pp. 61-2). Avoid rigid time-tables: 'It is sometimes wise to order a train for departure, but one must have control of the train' (p. 291). Thinking aloud about the next move is a dangerous practice. It almost inevitably destroys the chances of success for the present move' (p. 469). And two fundamental principles: that foreign policy is always the choice of a lesser evil; and that it frequently demands the seizing of situations to alter them by injecting new elements into them, at the risk of war. 'Peace is not just something that happens. At times it is necessary

¹ Lucan, ii. 247-8: 'Are you the guardian of peace, holding your path unshaken in a tottering world?'—Brutus addressing his exemplar Cato.

to take risks and even to increase the immediate danger to win a lasting agreement' (p. 188).

These maxims may be accounted diplomatic wisdom because they accord with age-long experience, or truisms because they state generalities which nobody would want to dispute. Moreover, they furnish little guide to action. They are sparks struck off incidentally from a variety of international collisions, and their combined illumination is of the kind Coleridge meant, when he said that the light which experience gives is a lantern on the stern, which shines only on the waves behind us. Perhaps this is one of the essential differences between international politics and domestic. Just as international law has more difficulty than municipal law in framing general and uniform rules, because of the heterogeneity of its subjects and the disparateness of the legal situations that arise, so the combinations of international politics are so various, the regularities so tenuous, the conjunctures so unforeseen, the consequences of any course of action so speculative, each crisis is so marked by historical uniqueness, that it is extraordinarily difficult to organize diplomatic experience into a system, let alone a theory, of foreign policy. It is interesting, therefore, to see how the consummate diplomatic flexibility of the first half of the Eden Memoirs becomes congealed and rigidified, in the second half, into a political principle felt as having compelling force. 'To take the easy way, to put off decisions, to fail even to record a protest when international undertakings are broken on which the ink is scarcely dry, can only lead one way. It is all so much more difficult to do later on, and so we come full circle. The insidious appeal of appeasement leads to a deadly reckoning' (p. 579).

It has generally been recognized that there is a point of change from international fair weather to storm, where the art of political navigation must discard some methods and take on others, and diplomacy becomes occupied less with seeking agreement than with arranging coercion. It is the point, in Sir Harold Nicolson's precise language, 'where diplomacy ends and foreign policy begins'.¹ Grotius was concerned with it, when he sought to define the justifiable causes of war as defence, recovery of rights, and punishment; it was later described in terms of rectifying the balance of power; it was at the heart of the doctrine of collective security. That the point of change is difficult to define in general terms does not bear out those who deny its reality, asserting on the one side that all foreign policy is potential war, or on the other side that diplomacy is nothing but conciliation.

The scales of the balance of power [wrote Bolingbroke²] will never be exactly poized, nor is the precise point of equality either discernible or necessary to be discerned. It is sufficient in this, as in other human affairs, that the deviation be not too great. Some there will always be. A constant attention to these

¹ See Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna: A Study in Allied Unity, 1812-1821* (London, Constable, 1946), pp. 164-5; a book dedicated to Anthony Eden.

² *Letters on the Study and Use of History* (London, 1752), Vol. II, p. 47.

deviations is therefore necessary. When they are little, their increase may be easily prevented by early care and the precautions that good policy suggests. But when they become great for want of this care and these precautions, or by the force of unforeseen events, more vigour is to be exerted, and greater efforts to be made.

It is exactly the case that Sir Anthony urged on President Eisenhower for undoing Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal.

This is the principle he sees as the lesson of his lifetime. 'We are all marked to some extent by the stamp of our generation, mine is that of the assassination in Sarajevo and all that flowed from it' (p. 516). He heard of Sarajevo a few days after his seventeenth birthday, on the river at Eton; and looking back, he holds that Britain failed in that crisis 'by an inability to tell what we would do. . . . It is impossible to read the record now and not feel that we had a responsibility for being always a lap behind' (pp. 516-17). In the 'thirties the democracies showed the same fault. 'As my colleagues and I surveyed the scene in these autumn months of 1956, we were determined that the like should not come again. We had seen how insidious was the excuse, how difficult the action. There might be other mistakes, there would not be that one' (p. 518). There is, however, another lesson of Eden's lifetime. It is broadly true that the supporters of Munich were the supporters of Suez, that those who applauded him when he resigned from the Government in 1938 opposed him when he led the Government in 1956. Why was this? Had his old supporters grown softer? Had he himself grown less supple? His book does not notice that these questions can be asked.

The main threat to the balance of power came from Russia and China, but with the end of the Indo-China War this was reduced to manageable proportions. In several respects the Geneva Conference of 1954 marked the revival of normal diplomatic assumptions between Britain and the Communist Powers. Its success was largely due to Eden and Molotov having recognized a common interest in averting an American-Chinese conflict. It gave effect to Eden's plan for a 'protective pad' of States to halt Communism as far north of Malaya as possible, and this traditional policy was put forward as offering a measure of advantage and security to both sides. Moreover, it was the first international conference where Eden was conscious of the deterrent effect of the H-bomb. 'Too frightened to fight, too stupid to agree', as Talleyrand said of the Great Powers at Vienna, describes as healthy a state of international politics as can often be reached—and he was speaking of Powers not divided from one another ideologically. Aversion from nuclear war, along with Stalin's death, had given Soviet policy a new restraint and subtlety. The long-term implacable hostility could still be assumed, but when the Russian leaders came to England in April 1956 they showed themselves good listeners, and understood the warning that Britain would fight for Middle Eastern oil. When the attack on

Egypt began, Soviet technicians were discreetly withdrawn to Khartoum, and Russian help for Egypt, apart from skilful diplomatic propaganda, was limited to the Soviet consul stimulating resistance in Port Said.

The new Soviet methods were seen in the sale of arms to Egypt, which leap-frogged the Baghdad Pact. But the danger lay less in the intruder than in the nature of the region he broke into. In 1953 the Americans had been fearful of Soviet control over Iran, and had argued for coming to terms with Musaddiq lest he throw in his lot with Russia or actually give place to the Communists. Eden had replied that the choice did not lie only between Mussadiq and Communism. It was true that the longer Musaddiq stayed in power, the stronger the Communists became; but the Iranians had an elasticity that made an alternative government possible. Moreover, Mussadiq's foreign policy was to play the Great Powers off against one another. In this case the event vindicated Eden's judgment. But in the Arab world he saw a different picture. Here it was not Communism, but Nasser, whose industrious valour threatened

To ruin the great work of Time,
And cast the kingdoms old,
Into another mould,

particularly the Hashemite kingdoms. Hence the occasional uncertainty, in Eden's scheme of historical recurrence, whether Nasser is Mussolini to Russia's Hitler, or Hitler himself. Eden saw Egypt and Saudi Arabia as willing accomplices of Russia. 'The agents of King Saud, their pockets bulging with gold, were co-operating everywhere with the communists against Western interests. . . . ARAMCO money was being spent on a lavish scale to abet communism in the Middle East' (pp. 342-3). And he wrote to Eisenhower, 'I have no doubt that the Bear is using Nasser, with or without his knowledge, to further his immediate aims' (p. 452). The logic of the analysis led to the need for getting rid of Nasser, but without the reasonable assurance that there was a better alternative. All Eden can say, when wondering whether a more rapid advance down the Canal by the British and French would have toppled Nasser, is that 'Militant dictators have more enemies at home than the foreigner ever dreams' (p. 559), a thin and desperate hope.

The most remarkable weakness of the Eden Memoirs is the neglect of Arab nationalism. It shows the difficulty of breaking out of the mental framework of Britain's Middle Eastern policy. The Arab world has been probably the hardest part of the British Empire to let go; largely, no doubt, because of oil; but partly too perhaps because it was the latest field of imperial expansion and effort, and having escaped formal annexation it has escaped also the tranquillizing family intercourse of the Commonwealth. Egypt, moreover, shares with the United States and Ireland the distinction of being Britain's great imperial failures. Eden's Arab world

is dominated by his friend of thirty years, Nuri es-Said, whose regime in Iraq is painted in the brightest colours to contrast with Nasser's misgovernment in Egypt. It is a pre-revolutionary world of *douceur de vivre*, where King Faisal sends a cornflower from his dinner-table in Baghdad to his fellow old Harrovian at Chartwell, and Nuri is appropriately dining at Buckingham Palace and Downing Street in the week that Nasser seizes the Canal. Eden recalls discussing the Baltic States at Geneva between the wars with a foreign statesman who said, 'Malheureusement ce ne sont pas des états viables' (p. 392). He does not extend the judgment to the Arab political creations of the same peace settlement.

The villain of the Memoirs, on the other hand, remains curiously featureless. Eden meets Nasser once, on his way to the SEATO conference at Bangkok in 1955, but there is too little sympathy for a description or character-sketch of the man. (We must hope that the famous meeting with Mussolini in June 1935 will get better treatment in the next volume.) The only picture of Nasser here, vivid and hostile, is in a letter to Eden from Mr Menzies (pp. 470-3). As to Arab nationalism, Eden does not refer to it until Nasser has seized the Canal, and he mentions it only four times, the first two being in quotations from Nasser's own speeches. It is like an account of Sarajevo that leaves out South Slav nationalism. Hence much is imperfectly explained, and in the final crisis a good deal is omitted: Iraq's proposing the expulsion of Britain from the Baghdad Pact, Jordan's denouncing the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty, Saudi Arabia and Syria breaking off diplomatic relations with Britain, the Beirut meeting of the Arab States which talked of economic sanctions, the sabotage of the pipe-lines, and the riots and strikes in Bahrein and Kuwait. No doubt these did not make a great noise in the general hubbub from Port Said, New York, and Budapest, but they are not fairly covered by the sentence, 'Not a mouse moved in Arab lands' (p. 543).

The attentive reader will begin to notice where the limits come in applying the diplomatic maxims of the earlier part of the book, hints that Britain's relations with the Middle Eastern States proceed on principles a little different from those that govern the international community at large. The assumption about these countries is not that you must understand their interests so as to find an accommodation between your interests and theirs, but that they must be persuaded 'where their true interests lie', and that your proposals 'meet as far as possible their requirements' (pp. 203, 228). Nasser's argument, whether sound or unsound, that the timing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact would damage collaboration between the Arab States and the West is dismissed with petulance: 'I was familiar with this plea; it is never the right time for some' (p. 221). Package proposals have been deprecated in general as a mode of negotiating, but they are presented to Musaddiq in 1953 and to the Egyptian Government

in the talks of the same year about a new treaty. The latter negotiations broke down because the Egyptians on their side argued that an agreement on evacuating British troops must be reached first, and Middle Eastern defence as a whole could be discussed later. Similarly, the Menzies mission to Cairo in August 1956 is empowered only to expound the proposals of the London Conference and not to consider alternatives. With Iraq, indeed, 'it was important to get rid of any taint of patron and pupil' (p. 220); unanimity towards dependants is not difficult. It is clear that the independence of the Sudan was made easier for the British because they could continue the role of protecting the infant State against Egyptian encroachments. For the same reason, it was imprudent to punish Jordan for the dismissal of Glubb. 'It was an occasion for doing nothing. As a result of doing nothing, we were able gradually to pick up the pieces and to mend our relations with Jordan' (p. 353). But Nasser's activities were too seldom the occasion for doing nothing and picking up the pieces.

In dealing with Egypt, there is a deep-rooted assumption of inequality of rights. In the Suez controversy the word *collusion* has come to have a special meaning. The accusation it contains is not referred to in Eden's Memoirs, and the word itself appears only once, in an unexpected context. The main threat to British interests in the Middle East, he says, 'was the growing influence of Nasser with his anti-Western ideology and collusion with Russia, especially in arms supply' (p. 352). A strange sentence, revealing the doctrinal perversion of terms that the Americans have shown when they argued that trading with China was collusion with Communism. The question whether Nasser had a legal right to nationalize the Canal Company is never fairly considered. 'It was implicit in the Convention [of 1886] that the operation of the canal should not be entrusted to any single power' (p. 475). Possibly; but it is not admitted that the interpretation or infringement of the Convention had hitherto rested with Britain alone, and that if Egypt had blocked the Canal to Israeli ships she had the precedent of the British blockade against hostile shipping in the two World Wars. A casual sentence at the end of Eden's first long chapter on Egypt remarks that 'the 1936 treaty did not give us a right to a base in Egypt, nor to the large forces we maintained there' (p. 261).

There is some truth in saying that the Memoirs show Eden as having lost touch with the changes in the world since 1939. Not so much in respect of Anglo-American relations. He recognized that now there were only two Great Powers in the world, and that Britain was subordinate ally to one of them; and the consideration he asked for from the United States was only what he himself normally showed to Britain's weaker partners in the Commonwealth and outside. Possibly the Americans did have a juster appreciation of Afro-Asian nationalism, as the British on their side had a less emotional attitude towards the Communist Powers; but it is

difficult to see how any British Foreign Secretary could have dealt better with an ally so uncertain, equivocating, and unreliable as Mr Dulles. There is much more force in the charge against Eden as regards Anglo-European relations. Here Britain was the predominant partner, her initiative eagerly awaited, and W.E.U. was not the United States of Europe that Churchill had taught the Europeans to hope for when he was out of office. The most drearily uncreative speeches in the book are those rehearsing the argument that 'we are still an island people in thought and tradition, whatever the modern facts of weapons and strategy may compel' (p. 168; cf. pp. 36-7).

But Eden's lack of sympathy with Arab nationalism raises more complex considerations. It is possible to think it an intellectual fault rather than a moral one. It is possible to blame his actions without blaming his purpose, or to blame his purpose without blaming his analysis of the situation he dealt with. 'The dispute over Nasser's seizure of the Canal,' he says, 'had, of course, nothing to do with colonialism, but was concerned with international rights' (p. 499). We may question the first part of the sentence and still accept the second. There is a kind of crisis of international society more fundamental than threats to the balance of power; it is when the principle of international obligation itself deliquesces. Such a crisis has been endemic in international politics ever since 1776, with the slow fermenting of the doctrine that the only valid claim to membership of the society of nations is to have established a State expressing the popular will, and the slow exploration of the corruptions that the popular will is liable to. The revolution teaches [wrote the youthful Acton to a correspondent in 1861] that a government may be subverted by its subjects, irrespective of its merits; while that theory lasts, the Pope can never be safe against his own subjects except by force. Even good government is no security in a revolutionary age—see the cases of Louis Philippe, of Tuscany, in '59. While the revolutionary principle has power, therefore, the papal sovereignty must depend on the aid of its neighbours against its subjects. But the revolutionary theory has also an international application and teaches that a State may be absorbed by its neighbours even if it has not attacked them, when a wish of the kind is presumed on the part of the people, or expressed by insurrection, or ascertained afterwards by vote, or even for rectification of physical boundaries, or for the sake of ethnological connexion. Therefore . . . the same revolutionary doctrine which puts governments at the mercy of the people, prevents neighbours protecting it [sic] against the people. Therefore in an age where the duty of allegiance and even good government are no security, treaties, and international guarantees, and public law, can be no security.¹

These doctrines have been prevalent in widening circles of the world since 1918, and have found a great organ in the United Nations. In the Arab world they have been specially powerful. National self-determination has a gallant ring of freedom and fulfilment, but its methods are assassination and arms-running, insurrection against established governments, confiscation of foreign property, repudiation of agreements, dissolution of

¹ F. N. Gasquet, *Lord Acton and his Circle* (London, Allen, 1906), pp. 248-9. This letter was written the year before the essay on 'Nationality', when Acton was twenty-seven.

moral ties. King Saud was making a continuous attempt to undermine the Gulf sheikhdoms (whom the Americans anyway believed were rightfully part of Saudi Arabia) as well as to subvert Jordan. The Egyptian Government was planning revolutionary upheavals in Iraq and Jordan, intriguing against the Governments of the Lebanon, Libya, and the Sudan, arming the Algerian rebels, and inflaming anti-colonial passions from Aden to West Africa by means of Cairo Radio. Israel was keeping alive the memory of the indeterminately wider frontiers of Eretz Israel, and Egypt, after having been defeated in war, pursued a policy unprecedented in international law of refusing to make peace, and continued to proclaim that Israel must be annihilated. Eden's account of the famous Paris meeting of 16 October 1956, which describes the problem whether it would be the lesser evil if Israel were to break out against Jordan or Egypt (pp. 511-13), is concerned with an abiding problem that none of his critics have solved on paper.

Nor has this behaviour been by any means confined to the Arab world. In 1957 Indonesia confiscated the assets of Dutch companies, forcing thousands of Dutch citizens to flee and refusing compensation until the Netherlands should cede Western New Guinea. The United Nations, on which as an organ of anti-colonialism Eden has some of his justest words, has consistently refused to condemn breaches of international agreement. World sentiment regards colonialism as wrong and revolt against it as right; and in the same way, Western sentiment tends to regard any revolutionary nationalist government as progressive and virtuous. It has been shrewdly remarked that if the Suez Canal Company had been nationalised not by Nasser but by Farouk, the British people would have been much more united on the need for punitive action.

The difficulty of maintaining the rule of law and civilized international intercourse in a world of dissolving standards is perhaps the deepest theme of Eden's Memoirs. The phrases 'international agreement' and 'international interest' recur throughout the book as regularly as the historical parallels that have occasioned so much comment. True, that the breaches of agreement he was concerned with were so many stages in the liquidation of British power; but it is not the whole truth. Under the lee of British power many minor Powers had sheltered, and interdependent systems of order had grown up, and rights had taken root and gained acceptance. 'From the start, the Suez crisis was never a problem between Egypt and two, or even three, powers only; it concerned a very large part of the world' (p. 491). Some of Eden's critics seem to argue that the right policy is to grant independence to the rest of Asia and Africa as quickly as possible, and let the newly enfranchised members of international society settle down to industrialize themselves and practise democracy with only such benevolent help from the older Powers as the newer themselves will

ask. This may be a dream-transformation of the historical experience called Balkanization, which means a *Kleinstaaterei* of weak States, fiercely divided among themselves by nationalistic feuds, governed by unstable popular autocracies, unaccustomed to international law and diplomatic practice as they are to parliamentary government, and a battle-ground for the surrounding Great Powers. If it were clearer that this is not the future of the uncommitted world, it would be clearer that Eden's analysis was wrong, however much he may be blamed for not finding policies whereby a declining Great Power can mitigate the evil.

Already the Suez expedition seems remote and rounded-off, a failure of high drama but small historical effect, less consequential internationally than the Mexican expedition of Napoleon III, less consequential domestically than the failure to relieve Gordon at Khartoum. Both sides in the controversy promised calamities that have not come to pass. The Anglo-American alliance was restored to sufficient health for the joint occupation of the Lebanon and Jordan less than a year afterwards, the Commonwealth has not disintegrated, British prestige in the Middle East has not declined more steeply than it would have done if Eden had not attacked Egypt, the Conservatives remain in office; Nasser has shown himself able to run the Canal with no less efficiency or respect for its users than did the Company, and while the Canal was blocked the countries of Western Europe found that it was not as vital to their economic life as they had been persuaded. But Eden's moral dilemma has a lasting significance. In trying to preserve the political conditions of international life he became doctrinaire; in trying to enforce the moral conditions of international life he allowed himself to become unscrupulous. Was Brutus the hero of liberty, 'by awful virtue urg'd' to the last extremity in defence of principle, or a traitor in the senseless hope of restoring a regime past restoration? A clear-sighted resister against any power that set itself above the laws, or a blind rebel against the inevitability of monarchy? 'Events seemed to play with all the plans he had formed. His scruples about legality had caused him to lose the opportunity of saving the republic; his horror of civil war had only served to make him begin it too late. It was not enough that he found himself forced, in spite of himself, to violate the law and fight against his fellow-citizens, he was constrained to acknowledge, to his great regret, that in expecting too much of men he was mistaken.'¹ Reduce the heroic scale; make it international society and not the Roman Republic; and Eden explored the same region of the moral universe of politics, with similar high-mindedness and self-righteousness, blindness and clear-sightedness, misjudgment and courage.

April 1960

¹ Gaston Boissier, *Cicero and his Friends* (English translation, London, Innes, 1897), p. 357.

FRANCE AND ALGERIA

BRIAN CROZIER AND GERARD MANSELL

PROFESSOR KENNETH ROBINSON (*Chairman*): Mr Mansell will begin by discussing the major events over the last three years.

GERARD MANSELL:

Conflicts between Paris and Algiers are no new thing. It has, in fact, become a tradition in Algerian history that no measure regarding Algerian policies was ever passed if it was opposed by the active element of the European population in Algeria. To give you an example from pre-war days: in 1936 the Popular Front Government of M. Léon Blum attempted to get through Parliament a mild measure of reform in Algeria which was defeated in Parliament largely at the instigation of Deputies and Senators representing, or speaking for, or acting on behalf of European interests in Algeria.

In the last four years we have seen three examples of this long-standing conflict. The first was the visit by M. Guy Mollet, the newly-appointed Socialist Prime Minister, to Algiers on 6 February 1956. Then, for the first time in recent history, a French Prime Minister came into really brutal contact with Algerian realities in the shape of the crowds in Algiers itself; and he felt compelled to abandon his decision to appoint to the post of Governor-General the liberal-minded General Catroux. The 13th of May 1958 is the second of these recent challenges, and in this case the challenge succeeded. In May 1958 the Fourth Republic fell, essentially, because the Government in Paris—the French State, in other words—could no longer obtain any kind of response from the levers of power. No massive manifestation of republican feeling, such as did in fact take place in Paris during those very anxious weeks, could alter the course of events. A vast plot, with ramifications both in Algiers and in France, rendered the recently-installed Government of M. Pflimlin completely and utterly powerless.

It is doubtful if this particular plot, in which such people as M. Debré, the present Prime Minister, and M. Soustelle were to a greater or lesser degree personally involved, would have succeeded had it not been for the complicity and the active sympathy of important elements in the French Army both in Algeria and in France. There is a good deal of evidence to show that plans were ready for dropping parachute troops in the Paris area, and an armoured force at Rambouillet, little more than thirty miles from Paris, was standing by ready to march on the capital. It is an interesting sidelight on history, incidentally, that the Commander of this

armoured force was later appointed to a higher command in Southern Algeria, and he was one of the three Major-Generals in Algeria to be fired by General de Gaulle immediately after the uprising of last January in Algiers.

Although the movement which brought General de Gaulle to power had on the surface all the appearances of unanimity, it consisted of individuals and political groups acting from a vast variety of motives. There were, of course, the true Gaullists—a minority of them I should say—who had been followers of the General in wartime, who strongly believed that he could provide the kind of dynamic, stable leadership which they felt France needed. There were very few of those in Algiers during the war. As you know, the European population largely supported Marshal Pétain. Then there was the vast mass of French people, tired of continual Government crises, ready to give General de Gaulle the kind of blank cheque with which they felt he alone could be entrusted, and hoping—as many other people hoped—that, so far as Algeria was concerned, he would be able to work the miracle which no other Government before him had been able to work. Then there was the Army, of which the greater part—half a million men and the bulk of the regular officer corps and N.C.O. corps—was in North Africa, many of whose officers had been at war for roughly eighteen years, since 1940; an army which had suffered the humiliation of defeat in 1940, and then again at the end of the fighting in Indo-China in 1954; an army which felt itself the victim of vacillation, indecision, and mismanagement by successive Governments in Paris, and which was determined that no sell-out such as had happened in Indo-China would now take place again in North Africa. In de Gaulle they saw a guarantee of grandeur, of leadership; a guarantee that they would be led by a man who spoke their language, who understood their aims and who came from their own ranks. Finally, and not least important, there was the multitude of right-wing movements in Paris and in Algiers, ranging from war veterans' associations to movements for the defence of French Algeria and Fascist organizations with their roots in the troubled years before the second World War and in the Vichy period. Their aim was definitely to install an authoritarian regime in Paris under General de Gaulle or someone else, and more probably under someone else in due course.

Algiers with its teeming population of quick-tempered, rather hot-blooded Europeans, many of them humble folk—shopkeepers, taxi-drivers, and so on—proved the ideal breeding-ground for this sort of movement, especially in the light of the frustration, the bitterness, and the intolerable tension under which these people were living as a result of the war and urban terrorism. There is no doubt now, and there was very little doubt then, in May 1958, that many of these groups interpreted the return of General de Gaulle in their own terms. They regarded it in the way which suited their own particular aspirations, hopes, and fears.

The movement of 13 May 1958, with its undoubted undertones of hysteria and violence, was, nevertheless, essentially a patriotic movement—'l'Algérie Française' was the motto of the crowds which paraded every night on the forum in Algiers. Integration was their very limited and not always very well understood political doctrine; and in the extraordinary atmosphere of those days in May 1958, when the crowds were drunk with noise and speeches and heady slogans about 53 million Frenchmen from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset, they were at last prepared to accept what scarcely any Europeans had ever dared to envisage in the past—equality of political rights for French and Muslim alike. Thus for a moment it seemed as if a sort of miracle were about to happen; but it did not happen, and disillusionment crept in very quickly. This disillusionment had a number of causes. First of all, there was the fact that reality started obtruding. At the end of November 1958, in elections to the National Assembly, and again in April 1959, in municipal elections, all Algerians, whether Muslim or French, voted together equally. Although one cannot say that these were truly free elections—though technically they were—nevertheless for the first time 11,000 of the 14,000 municipal councillors elected were Muslims. For Algeria this was an enormous change.

The situation became more tense as the summer of 1959 drew on, until on 16 September the Europeans in Algeria were at last brought face to face with the stark reality of the future as General de Gaulle saw it. Up till then the General's very vague statements had left those who believed in integration a certain amount of hope, but his declaration of 16 September killed those hopes and started the very rapid process which led to the explosion of 24 January 1960.

Now, the General's proposals of September 1959 were that all Algerians should be offered a choice of three possible solutions. The first one, which he made quite clear he did not think possible, was what he called 'Francization'—in other words, what the Algerian French people called 'integration'. The second was a formula of association under some sort of federal structure which then, as now, has the favour of the General; he feels that this is the only workable solution. The third one, which he thought to be disastrous, was complete secession. This choice was to be exercised under certain conditions. First of all, peace must be re-established in Algeria, as a result either of a complete military victory or of a cease-fire arrived at in agreement with the rebels. But one thing General de Gaulle was not prepared to do was to hold any form of discussion on the future of Algeria with the F.L.N. rebels; he did not accept that they had any qualification to speak as representatives of the Algerian people.

From then on the pace of events accelerated. Plotting started in Algiers on a very large scale with a considerable amount of sympathy and active assistance from certain elements in the Army. A number of events

quicken the pace, including, during December, some particularly vicious terrorist attacks by the F.L.N in the area immediately around Algiers which incensed the European population in Algiers, always rather quick to react. The posting away of many officers whose loyalty to de Gaulle was suspect also caused increasing alarm among those who relied on army support in any uprising against de Gaulle.

Finally, there was the incident of General Massu, who, in his celebrated interview with the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* (19 January 1960), undoubtedly expressed the feelings of many French officers in the Army in Algeria, who could not accept that the work they were carrying out—a work of social and economic rehabilitation in Algeria at the same time as fighting the rebels—should be called into question in a popular referendum, as was planned by the General. This they could not face. The result, when General Massu was recalled, was the explosion of 24 January.

Finally, a few words about the reasons why the insurrection of 24 January failed. I think in the first place it failed because the civilian elements in the plot acted before they were ready, very largely because the French end of the conspiracy had not been properly prepared and its leaders were not ready to act. The insurrectionists in Algiers itself therefore found themselves isolated and not supported by any parallel movement in France. The second reason, I think, is that the Army realized that enough was enough. Following the General's very firm call to duty and to reason, they realized that a division of the Army would lead to an extremely dangerous situation. They also realized that the effect of their obvious sympathy for the insurrection had been to show General de Gaulle how far the Army was prepared to go and beyond what limits it would not be prepared to go. That much, they felt, had been gained. A third reason, perhaps, was the fact that the mass of the European population did not give the insurrectionists the same kind of massive support that they had given on 13 May 1958. The Muslim element was left out entirely. Oddly enough, during that extraordinary week in Algiers they seemed to be almost completely forgotten, although, of course, it was their fate which was in the balance.

PROFESSOR KENNETH ROBINSON: Mr Crozier will take over from there and bring us up to date on recent events and, in particular, on the attitude of the F.L.N.

BRIAN CROZIER:

My main purpose is to give you an account of some of the conversations that I had in February in Algiers and in Tunis, but I propose to begin rather illogically by referring to General de Gaulle's latest and most cryptic statements made during his tour of army installations in Algeria between

6 and 8 March. The burden of them seems to be that he wants the Army to remain in Algeria until final victory, and this final victory can take one of two forms. It can either be a decisive victory in the field, or it can be achieved as a result of cease-fire talks.

Now, there is nothing in these statements that is inconsistent, to my mind, with previous statements by the General. The only difference is that previous statements left a certain area of doubt, whereas the doubt now seems to have been removed. In his statement of 16 September 1959 the General had proposed cease-fire talks. He had made it clear that he did not intend these talks to become political—that is, to go on to a discussion of the political future of Algeria. But there is always the possibility that talks which began on the purely technical and military level of a cease-fire discussion could then go on to deal with other matters: for instance, the form and conditions of the referendum which the General had himself proposed. It seems now that even this possibility is excluded. In other words, the cease-fire in General de Gaulle's eyes would be the equivalent of a surrender by the F.L.N. and its army, the A.L.N.

Now, it was obvious from my talks with the F.L.N. leaders in Tunis that these conditions are quite unacceptable. I talked to two spokesmen of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, as it calls itself (or the G.P.R.A., using its French initials). Our conversation took place just three days before Ferhat Abbas, the Prime Minister of the G.P.R.A., made a statement on 9 February. In effect, they explained to me why they could not start cease-fire talks with General de Gaulle. Ferhat Abbas later pointed out that the talks, as far as the F.L.N. was concerned, would have to deal with the conditions of the referendum, and mainly with its supervision.

The G.P.R.A. had, in fact, retreated quite a long way from its initial position that there must be prior French recognition of Algerian independence before talks of any kind could take place. After the long meeting of the G.P.R.A. in Tripoli, which ended on 19 January, the F.L.N. modified its position and began to announce through its various spokesmen that it was now fighting for a ballot paper; in other words, its aim was to make sure that the referendum, if and when it was held, should be absolutely free and fair.

The primary condition, as far as the F.L.N. was concerned, was that this referendum should not be supervised by the French Army. The unfortunate snag in this condition was that General de Gaulle, in his speech of 29 January which brought down the barricades in Algiers, had said quite specifically that the Army would in fact supervise the referendum. When this argument was put to me, I asked: 'Why do you not start talks in any case, even if they are labelled "cease-fire only?"' Because there is bound to come a stage in the argument when you say to the French, "Well,

we cannot put our arms down until you give us guarantees about the referendum", and so cease-fire talks could imperceptibly turn into technical or political talks affecting the referendum.' They then explained to me that it was impossible for them to do this because they would be taking an enormous risk, a risk in the circumstance that the political leadership, from the very nature of this insurrection, is separated from the fighters in the field. The A.L.N.—the Army of National Liberation—in fact consists of various bands which are highly-organized but whose communications with the political leadership are bound to be rather tenuous. This army, from its initial groups of guerrilla fighters to its present strength, has been fighting since November 1954, and during that time there have been a great many brutalities on both sides: on the F.L.N. side many acts of terrorism, and on the French side, incontestably, a number of brutalities against the population.

The way the G.P.R.A. spokesmen put it to me was that if they started talks of any nature with the French great expectations would be aroused on the Algerian side among the Muslim population, and among the members of the A.L.N. In other words, if the political leaders went to Paris they would be expected to bring back something, and at the least a guarantee that the referendum would be internationally supervised. If they came back empty-handed there would be a collapse of morale and a disruption of the whole F.L.N. organization, because the authority of the political leadership would be undermined in the eyes of the fighters in the field. They went even further, in fact; their suggestion was that General de Gaulle was trying to bring about this very thing—that by proposing these cease-fire talks, he was trying to disrupt the political leadership and undermine the organization of the A.L.N.

That is one element—the attitude of the F.L.N. There are various other elements. There is, for instance, the attitude of people inside Algeria. I did not have a chance to move around Algeria, and even if I had I am not sure that it would have been of very great use, because I think unless you speak the colloquial Arabic or the Berber languages that are spoken in the remoter parts of Algeria you cannot properly inform yourself. On the other hand, the political centre and the determining element in the situation has largely been in Algiers itself, and there you get at least a cross-section of the elements that make up the Algerian population. Roughly they fall into two main sub-divisions and can then be further sub-divided. The two main sub-divisions, obviously, are the French (and the other Europeans) on the one side and on the other side the Muslims. But there, again, one has to make a distinction between the old-established French families and the mass of poor white migrants who have come from southern Europe—the Spaniards and Italians (and I would include the Corsicans in this group, though they naturally claim to be as French as

people from the French mainland). Together, all these make up the Europeans of Algeria who are called, very misleadingly, I think, *Français de souche*, or French by extraction (one wonders how French the extraction is, in fact). On the other side there are the Muslims, who can be subdivided into three economic groups. At the top level there are industrialists and business men who are well-off—as well-off as the top people among the European population. At the second level there is quite a large section of the population consisting of small shopkeepers, workmen, mechanics, taxi-drivers, and so on, who are competing with the hundreds of thousands of Europeans in similar occupations. Finally, there is the great mass of several million destitute Algerians who would be required to vote in a referendum. On the principle of one-man, one-vote, their opinions are obviously important, but, presumably because they are illiterate, they would take the opinions of the sector immediately above them.

Among these different sectors I have found roughly the following attitudes. The lower middle-class or working-class Algerian Muslims tended to say: 'We are for independence and for the F.L.N. We are for Ferhat Abbas. We love the French; they are like parents to us; but we want independence. We do not get on with the Spaniards and Italians who have come here, and who have made our lives a misery for the last sixty or seventy years.'

Among the top economic group of the Algerian Muslims I found, in general, the attitude that Algeria is not France, that it cannot be a province of France; but, on the other hand, if the French withdrew there would be an economic collapse, which was unthinkable, and therefore there must be some form of association. This top economic group obviously includes men who were elected in the elections of 1959 and have thus stuck their necks out, and these people are thoroughly bewildered. They have opted for France, and some of them were behind the barricades in Algiers; they have since been thrown into prison, and they do not really know what has hit them.

On the European side I found the attitude: 'This is our country; we have none other. We have been here for several generations. Our sons have died for France. We are French and we must stay French.'

Among the economically lower group on the French side, one found a fierce resentment of the Arabs and of the competition the Arabs offered, and a distinction—a rather artificial one I think—between the Berber, who is considered intelligent, and the Arab, who is not, and the attitude, once again, that Algeria must remain French, come what may.

PROFESSOR KENNETH ROBINSON: I will now ask Mr Mansell to turn back to some of the underlying problems and give us some sort of perspective about them.

GERARD MANSELL:

To understand the whole depth and complexity of this problem of Algeria, I think one ought to divide it up into three parts. In the first place one should consider the European element. There are just over a million Europeans in Algeria, many of whom have got their roots in the country, many of whom have been there for approximately four generations; not by any means the majority of them are what could be described as settlers, and only about 19,000 or 20,000 actually own land and cultivate it. The large majority are urban people—what has been described as 'poor whites'—the taxi-drivers, café owners, clerical workers, skilled labourers, technicians, lawyers, doctors, and so on.

This European population, ever since the conquest of Algeria, has in fact occupied all the leading economic posts in the country, and provides it with an economic infrastructure which is absolutely essential, as things are at the moment, to the normal working of a semi-modern country. They control industry, the bulk of trade, shipping, and the newspapers; they run the railways and the electric power system; they build the roads and maintain them, or at any rate organize their maintenance; all the things which are taken for granted in an ordinary twentieth-century country depend on that 1¼ million Europeans. Not only that, but the bulk of efficient farming in Algeria is carried out by the Europeans. The average yield of Arab lands in maize or in wheat is about half of what it is on European lands. The explanation is not only inefficient farming, but also the fact that the bulk of the best lands are in the hands of the Europeans.

I stress these points not only to indicate that this is an extremely powerful minority—a handful of which has in the past exercised almost complete control over the policies of successive French Governments in Algeria—but also to indicate that were this element in the population to be as it were neutralized, or were it to be compressed into a separate Algerian State and separated forcibly from an Algerian Arab hinterland, or were it to emigrate back to France where, in fact, many of them have never been, the country would go to rack and ruin; there is absolutely no doubt about that. If indeed the strength of Muslim feeling is such that war can go on for year after year without a solution, and if you are then faced with the necessity of conducting political negotiations with the leaders of the rebellion, how are you going to get this European population to accept a new and different status in a country which they call their own? That is the first element of the problem.

The second one is the purely economic problem of the standard of living of the Muslim mass. The population of Algeria is at present increasing at one of the highest rates in the world—2·7 per cent per annum, which means, in fact, a quarter of a million people every year. It has

been estimated that the population would double its numbers within the next thirty years or so. Two-thirds of that population lives on a virtually archaic economic level; it lives on the verge of starvation; its traditional economic and social structures have been completely broken up, and yet at the same time it has not benefited to any marked extent from its contact with twentieth century economic and industrial civilization. On the contrary, it is probably true to say that the standard of living of the mass of the Muslims is lower today than it was fifty years ago.

The reasons for this are obvious—increase of population, the breaking-down of traditional methods of agriculture, the vast pressure on what is basically poor land, the inability to cultivate the land in an efficient manner in spite of large-scale technical help and advice from the French authorities, the fall in the death rate due to the vast measures of hygiene and the fight against epidemics by the French authorities, and the natural fertility reaching just about the biological level in the average Algerian family. I remember very well when I was in Algeria going to a local dispensary in a village and talking to the French nurse in charge who showed me the card index containing details of all her patients. A number of these cards had several coloured tabs placed across the top—10, 12, 14 of them—and when I asked her what they were she said: 'Those are women's cards, and the tabs show the number of children they have had.' These women were being taught how to feed their children properly once they had been weaned, thus ensuring that more and more children were surviving.

But even this marginal living standard is maintained only because there are 400,000 Algerian workers in France itself, working in French industry. On the amount of money that these people send home, two million people in Algeria are barely maintaining a marginal existence, living on incomes of something like £25 to £35 a year. This is the real basic problem with which the Constantine Plan, which was announced by General de Gaulle at the end of 1958, is trying to cope. It is a very long-term plan, and to my mind the great dilemma in Algeria, as seen by General de Gaulle, is whether conditions can be created there which are going to enable the mass of the Muslims to be brought up to such a level—a level of education, of training for jobs, of standard of living—as will enable them to realize that their association with France is absolutely essential.

PROFESSOR KENNETH ROBINSON: Mr Crozier will now talk about some of the attitudes of the French Army.

BRIAN CROZIER:

The first point to emphasize is that, as the events of May 1958 and of last January demonstrated, a real challenge to the central authority of

France comes when there is an alliance between the settlers and the French Army. The attitude of the French Army is, therefore, very important, and it seems to me that it has been conditioned very largely by the theories of pacification which it has evolved over the past few years.

When the French Army was defeated at Dien Bien Phu and had to leave Indo-China there was a great deal of heart-searching among the officers, and it was decided to pay closer attention to the theories of revolutionary warfare that had been elaborated by Mao Tse-tung and later used by the Vietminh. In consequence, the works of Mao Tse-tung were translated into French and studied very closely among the officers for the next two or three years.

The Algerian crisis followed almost immediately on the Indo-China crisis, and during 1956, in particular, a theory of pacification was evolved, about which articles were published during 1957 and 1958 in various issues of the *Revue Militaire d'Information*, the organ of the French Defence Ministry. To explain the whole theory would take too long, but the main idea is to reverse the Mao Tse-tung theory, the basis of which was that the Army must identify itself with the population. Now the Chinese Peoples' Army—the Peoples' Liberation Army—was able to do that for fairly obvious reasons. It was, in fact, derived from the peasantry and was easily able to identify itself with them. In turning the theory upside down, it does not seem to have occurred to the authors of the counter-theory that this is not possible for the French Army in Algeria, for the French Army is not derived from the population of Algeria. The people of Algeria do not look the same, they have a different religion, they speak a different language, and although tremendous efforts have been made by the French Army to transplant the population to areas where it can be kept under control, to study its interests, to bring the population over to the Army's side, I do not think that in the long run these efforts can be successful, although in the short run they have yielded some rather striking successes.

But the fact remains that the theory is believed in, and the colonels and generals of the French Army believe they have found the answer to subversive war waged by the F.L.N. Incidentally, they identify this Algerian war in all respects with the Communist insurrection of Asia, and this, again, seems to me to be a fallacy.

The present attitude of the French Army after the events of 24-29 January is roughly as follows. The Fifth Bureau of the French Army, dealing with psychological warfare, has been abolished. As this was the Bureau which dealt with the theories of pacification and which attempted to apply them to the French Army's counter-war, its abolition has been a tremendous blow to the Army. It struck me, when I talked to a general and a colonel in Algiers, that the Army felt powerless, at least for the time

being. Nevertheless, it had its own ideas on the future course of the war. The main thing was that there must be no negotiations with the G.P.R.A., even on a referendum. The control of the referendum must, it was felt, remain in the hands of the French Army, although there could be international observers. Finally, the F.L.N. leaders could come back to Algeria *after* cease-fire talks, but they should not take part in any political activity for a long time. When I asked the general who told me this, 'How long?', he said: 'We cannot look further ahead than six months.'

During the subsequent discussion, in reply to a question whether it was true that under French rule far too little had been done to raise standards of culture and technology among the local Algerian population, MR MANSELL said:

I think this is generally recognized today by most thinking Frenchmen. There is no doubt that the need for a very substantial effort in terms of money, teachers, technicians, and so on began to be recognized in 1944, when General de Gaulle had the seat of his Government in Algeria and made his first speech in Constantine. This effort went on increasing slowly up to 1954, but if you compare the figures of expenditure in Algeria today on such things as education, road-building, investment in industry, and so on with those of the pre-1954 period you will find the relationship is probably four to one or five to one today. To that extent it can probably be said that the rebellion has been a successful one, in that it has drawn attention to the extraordinarily alarming needs of the mass of Algerians—needs which are, in fact, perfectly well realized by the French Government.

Asked about the special French mystique about Algeria, MR MANSELL said:

This is getting to the heart of the problem. There is no doubt that at the basis of the whole French attitude towards Algeria there is a sort of mystique. This mystique is really a product of history, of the fact that Algeria has a much longer history as a French territory than either Tunisia or Morocco. Both these latter countries were States in their own right, with reigning royal houses, however ineffective, before the French went there. There was no such state of affairs in Algeria, which was, basically, a Turkish province ruled in separate areas by a number of Turkish governors, but which was really, especially in the back areas, a mass of warring tribes. Now, the French, partly because of this and also because of the need to export a certain amount of manpower in the nineteenth century—troublesome elements in the population of the great cities, Alsatians who emigrated after 1871, soldiers who had helped in the conquest, and so on—created this tremendous mystique of Algeria as a part of France. It is a theory which dies very hard, because it is taught in the history books to all French children, and what one learns in childhood is extremely difficult to change.

Asked about the attitude of the rank and file in the French Army, MR CROZIER said:

It is very difficult to know what the rank and file is thinking, but I think in the case of certain élite groups, such as the paratroops, they have been completely permeated by these new doctrines from top to bottom. In some of the groups that have less prestige value than the paratroopers the attitude might be quite different.

Asked about the international aspect of the Algerian war, MR CROZIER said:

The Algerian problem is certainly an international issue, and it looks quite different according to whether you see it in Paris, in Algiers, or in Tunis. If you see it in Paris or even Algiers you tend to see it as a French problem. If you look at it in Tunis, you immediately realize that the basic attitude of the Algerian rebel movement and its government is, 'The Tunisians, our brothers, have got independence; the Moroccans, our brothers, have got independence. Why cannot we?' One has the impression that the F.L.N. leaders will go on fighting until Algeria gets its independence, and they will not settle for anything less. Although I think the scheme of association with France is desirable on economic grounds, I am extremely pessimistic about its ever being realized.

MR MANSELL, in agreement, added:

My impression is that the F.L.N.'s determination to fight on, and the support which they receive from the majority of the Muslim population in Algeria, are extremely important elements in this situation. I do not see the F.L.N. giving up the fight. What, then, are the prospects of the French Army succeeding in obliterating the rebellion?—because this is, politically, what the choice which is now proposed by General de Gaulle amounts to. In a country such as Algeria, which, away from the coast, is a very wild mountainous country in which the bulk of the population, by and large, will support those who fight on its behalf, it is extremely difficult to visualize a complete obliteration of the rebellion; it might be reduced to terrorist incidents after perhaps a year or two, but then terrorist incidents would suffice to carry out the objective of the F.L.N., because people cannot go on living for ever under the threat of bombs exploding in the backs of motor-cars in the streets of Algiers, or farmers being shot on their way to work. This can go on happening sufficiently often to make life for the average European or pro-French Muslim in Algeria absolutely untenable. Therefore, I regard the situation with a certain amount of modified pessimism, because I cannot believe that any French Government—whether it is under General de Gaulle or anybody else—is going to be prepared to go on with this sort of situation indefinitely.

Discussion at Chatham House,

8 March 1960

NEW FORCES IN THE UNITED NATIONS

WILLIAM CLARK

IT seems worthwhile discussing the new forces that are coming into play at the United Nations, if only because the United Nations is something of the very greatest importance to all of us. Without an understanding of those forces we shall not get a policy for this country, or for the Commonwealth, that really makes sense. And, above all, I want to emphasize that the United Nations does matter. It is still less than fifteen years old, and is just beginning to come to a sort of adolescence. We are beginning to be able to see now, at last, what sort of an institution it is going to be. It can be compared with the League of Nations, or with something like the Concert of Europe many years ago.

What struck me first of all was the great influence that its situation in New York City has had on the United Nations. One of the good effects has been to make the United States, in some ways at least, the most loyal of all the members of the United Nations. Another effect is that the United Nations today reflects many American ideas: for instance, the American idea of Americanism as a revolutionary force—the forerunner of the United States of Europe or the United States of Africa—in fact a general federating influence. Secondly, much of the American spirit of egalitarianism emerges in United Nations deliberations. And, perhaps even more important, the United Nations has picked up from America, and from the nature of its constituents, a very strong anti-colonialist flavour.

Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, the whole diplomacy of the United Nations is diplomacy with an American accent; it is open diplomacy in the old Wilsonian sense. Nobody who has been a journalist at the United Nations would care to say that there is not a great deal of private and indeed secret manoeuvring, but the whole shape of the United Nations is intended to be open. The debates are open debates, the delegates' lounge and bar is open to the press in a way that, for instance, is inconceivable in our House of Commons. There is a curious feeling that the delegates and the press are somehow working for the same ends—that is the encouraging thing about the United Nations. Of course, any country that happens to be faring badly at the moment—and in the 1959 Session of the General Assembly it was largely France—feels that the whole United Nations Establishment involves some sort of plot against it; but in general there is a rather pleasant feeling that the permanent delegates to the United Nations are trying to make the United Nations matter in world affairs, and the permanent correspondents are trying to make it matter to

their own public opinion back home. In this the correspondents have succeeded particularly well in the United States.

Some of the things that we tend to dislike about American foreign policy, such as its attitude towards the recognition of China, are based on the fact that the Americans are really frightened about the possibility of the United Nations getting out of control. It is easy to represent this as just the cynical use of an international organ. But that is not true; the fact is that America treats the United Nations seriously, not cynically. This showed up in two ways at the 1959 Session. One was the absolute determination of the American delegation to avoid having the Red Chinese Government recognized as the legitimate government of China and therefore entitled to a seat on the Security Council. There has been no change whatever in their position on this matter. The reason is their fear that with two Communist vetoes, and with another Communist vote on the Security Council, there would be a real danger that the Security Council would go over to the other side.

The second was America's attitude in the prolonged wrangle (beginning on 16 September, the day after the Session opened, and finishing half an hour before the Assembly finally rose early on the morning of Sunday, 13 December) about whether Turkey or Poland should be elected to the Security Council. With real fervour the United States supported Turkey because of her fear that another Communist satellite vote in the Security Council would be a threat to United States policy. The reason behind this policy—and this is important—is that the United Nations exerts a very powerful force on United States public opinion. United Nations debates can be heard on the radio in New York City, and in several other cities in the United States, as they are in progress. A certain amount of them can be watched on television. The United Nations is in fact something that has entered into the American blood-stream in a way that it has not into ours.

What are the actual forces that operate within the United Nations? First, there has been an enormous change in the relationship between the Security Council and the Assembly. When the United Nations was conceived in 1945 the idea was that the Security Council would be, in British terms, something like a cabinet. It would be a group of representatives of great Powers with great responsibilities who would decide what sort of things the United Nations should do; it would decide on general lines of policy and would keep in order the rabble in the Assembly. As a result, if one looks back, one finds that in the early days of the United Nations the meetings of the Security Council were at the centre of the drama—that is where Sir Gladwyn Jebb bearded Mr Vyshinski and so on. This is no longer so.

In 1959 the United Nations Security Council met for only four days,

though the Assembly met for its full three months. There has been a change from great Power domination to small Power pressure groups. It is important to realize that now it is the Assembly that matters rather than the Security Council. This fact has added significance to the nature and make-up of the Assembly; it has made it a very important group of people. There are now eighty-two member nations, that is, more than half as many again as when the United Nations began. All the nations that have joined since are, with the exception of a few from Europe, 'new' nations, i.e. ex-colonies, and there is a fairly constant trickle of what one might call 'older nations' to the anti-colonialist side.

Last year, for instance, Cuba in the Western Hemisphere and Iraq in the Middle East both for the first time revealed themselves as members of the anti-colonialist group. I do not recall that there has been any comparable shift back on to the other side. There is therefore the feeling in the Assembly that the tide is running towards anti-colonialism. Certainly what has happened has been that the Assembly has become more important than the Security Council, and that within the Assembly the new nations have become very much more important than they used to be.

As a result of these changes in the character of the Assembly the new character of the United Nations itself is emerging, though it retains some of its American flavour. One striking feature of the present United Nations is the extent to which the Assembly has become like the House of Representatives—rather than the Senate—of the United States Congress. By this I mean that there are a lot of individuals, with no strong party organizations (such as exist in the House of Commons), no effective Rules of Order, but with a very strong feeling of locality—that is to say, of speaking to the local newspaper back home—and with an enormous capacity for doing deals on issues that do not directly concern them but on which they have a vote, such as, for instance, the election of Assembly officers and committees.

Reported straight and unvarnished, the whole proceeding of bargaining for those posts would sound both ludicrous and rather unpleasant. It would smell of corruption, and it would shock the puritan conscience of this country. Yet I do not believe that that is the last word on it; it is not the ideal way of carrying out international relations, but it is just about as good as any that has so far been devised, because what is in fact happening on these occasions is that a number of small countries are balancing their interests so that there is a shift of power this way or that according to that balance. What is a little shocking to us who are trained in a more traditional diplomatic school is that it does not bear much relation to power as we know power politics. How many divisions has Guatemala, or San Domingo? But these are no longer the relevant questions. The United Nations does not carry on power politics in the ordinary sense of the word

—it is arrangement politics. This reflects something which is of considerable interest in the world today, namely, the decline of power politics, which goes with the decline of the Security Council.

The over-arching nuclear bomb, the fact that we all live under the shadow of the nuclear deterrent, means that underneath people carry on policies which are almost unconnected with ordinary power politics. The result is that there is a certain air of unreality about the whole affair: how can people behave in such an independent and self-important way when they are the representatives of such small countries? I am not certain that the absurdities are any more important than the clubroom absurdities of the House of Commons or the curious sort of atmosphere—so well described in Allen Drury's recent book *Advise and Consent*¹—of the Senate, or more particularly the House of Representatives, in the United States. The atmosphere of the United Nations is one in which it is generally assumed that there is no great danger of war, and where the 'rights' of new nations automatically prevail over the legal rights of established Powers.

Another striking feature about the General Assembly is that while it is in theory an assembly of equals, in practice the very small Powers are a good deal more equal than some of the big ones. There is a strong desire on the part of every country to have its say and to do so as loudly, as lengthily, and as clearly as possible. As a result, at this session there were forty-five Foreign Ministers present at the beginning, and each of them made a speech to the Assembly lasting at least half an hour, which was available in draft form beforehand (thereby slightly reducing the size of the audience that had to listen).

Looking back, I feel that, in spite of the tedium, one could get the mood of this Assembly, and even the mood of the world, by studying carefully what these representatives of all sorts of people had to say. I am not suggesting that all the Governments are an exact expression of popular will or, still less, that what Foreign Ministers say is an exact expression of popular common sense in their countries, but I think that one can get an impression of what interests the people of the world by listening to the general debate at the beginning of the United Nations General Assembly. I would suggest that in the future a good Foreign Secretary of a great Power will read those speeches much as a good Prime Minister will listen to his House of Commons. The Assembly, like the House, is not the place where decisions are really taken—as in the Cabinet—but it is the place where one can find out a great deal from these 'backbenchers' speeches about what is concerning peoples, nations, and Governments.

Judging from the speeches at this last United Nations General Assembly, what were the things that really concerned the people of the

¹ London, Collins, 1960.

world? First, disarmament; second, aid to under-developed countries; and third, political emancipation for those who are not politically self-governing. What is significant is that the agenda for the Assembly was in fact decided by the small Powers and not by the great. If the great Powers, or if the Security Council, had been asked to draw up the agenda, I do not believe that those three items would have been at the top. But the small Powers, by a good deal of manoeuvring, by arrangements within the Afro-Asian group, and so on, succeeded in making it impossible to overlook issues that it was not much in the interests of some of the larger Powers' Governments to discuss.

The reason why countries are so much concerned about disarmament is also interesting. It is not primarily because they are afraid that arms are going to start a war, but for two other reasons: first, the fear of nuclear tests and their effect on human health, which is very powerful indeed, perhaps more powerful than reason justifies; second, the belief that armaments are a wasteful way of expending the energies that go into capital goods which should be used for aid to the under-developed countries.

So we come down to what really, in my opinion, was the theme of this year's Session, namely, aid to under-developed countries to improve their standards of living. For the first time it was absolutely apparent that Nature is not doing this for us. Until recently there was a firm belief that the question was merely whether we moved fairly fast or rather slowly towards raising living standards; that it was inevitable that the standards would be raised. In fact, the lesson of 1958-9 (the years in which the 1957 and 1958 slumps were really felt in the under-developed world—in the primary producers' world) is that the rich countries were getting richer and the poor countries were getting relatively poorer. The standard of life in a country like India has hardly risen appreciably in the last two or three years, while the West has never had it so good. This is a situation which almost everyone in the United Nations, rich or poor, developed or under-developed, felt could not be allowed to continue.

The question is not *whether* the richer nations have an obligation to aid the poorer nations, it is *how much* they are going to help. This question of how much was not debated at the United Nations General Assembly. It was debated at the meeting of the World Bank in Washington—technically an agency of the United Nations—during late September, and there was no doubt whatsoever, at that meeting, that a much greater effort was going to have to be made. A new body was set up to try to provide something that was a good deal less onerous than a banking loan, while at the same time the United States began to urge her allies to play a much larger part in aid.

This is not the place to go into the shifts in the policy of the United States concerning aid, but perhaps the most important single shift in 1959

was the transformation of that policy as a result of the general panic about her gold losses. The United States, realizing that the Marshall Plan has succeeded and that Europe is now rich and competitive, has determined that the countries which she has rescued from economic disaster must play their part in helping the countries of Asia and Africa to save themselves from economic disaster. One result of this change, a crucial one, is that instead of American aid now being thought of primarily as a bilateral affair designed to get a country on to the right side in the cold war (e.g. Pakistan) it is now primarily thought of as an effort through multilateral aid to save the world from becoming divided into the very rich and the very poor (e.g. India). There has been this decisive shift, not yet fully comprehended in the United States and certainly not in the rest of the world, away from the cold war concept of bilateral aid and towards a different concept which is going to involve multilateral aid.

If aid is to be multilateral, the United States is almost certain to try to channel a great deal of it through the United Nations, either through organs of the General Assembly or more probably through the World Bank (which is, in fact, an entirely non-Communist body, whereas, of course, the Assembly is partly Communist).

In all this there is one consideration that has made the United States realize that she will have to act strongly and swiftly. In the past, the United States has always assumed that there would be a big automatic majority for the Western Powers in the United Nations; this is no longer certain¹. The voting on the question of the vacant seat on the Security Council, for instance, revealed that a majority of the Assembly, voting secretly, voted for Poland and against Turkey, though Turkey was the official Western candidate and Poland was the official Communist candidate. This was a great shock to the United States, and if she is going to give aid through the United Nations it is not likely to be entirely altruistic; it is going to be given with the idea of increasing her popularity within the United Nations, and in that way incidentally swinging votes in her direction.

There is one other occurrence in the area of the under-developed countries that struck me very much, namely the case of Guinea. We often imagine, and we have often ourselves in this country said in the past, that certain countries are not yet fit for self-government, and that they could not yet stand on their own feet. I am not suggesting that this is not often quite true, but the case of Guinea casts an entirely new light on what can be done about it. Guinea was certainly not by anybody's standards ready for self-government. She was certainly not what might be called an economically viable country. She had long been closely attached to

¹ See 'The Expanding United Nations—I. Voting Patterns', by Geoffrey Goodwin, in *International Affairs*, April 1960.

France, and France had given her—as she does to most of her African colonies—a great deal in economic aid. When all this was suddenly cut off by Sekou Touré's successful election cry of independence, Guinea was faced at first sight with economic disaster. M. Sekou Touré came to the United Nations and had a tremendous personal success. But long before he came, he had discovered that for a small country the United Nations is prepared to act as a kind of trustee.

Guinea has acquired, for instance, a large number of United Nations officials who are acting in the positions in the administration formerly held by the French, who had kept, for instance, the fiscal administration almost entirely in their own hands, as is the normal practice in colonies. When they withdrew there was virtually no fiscal administration. Guinea appealed to the United Nations, and officials were sent there to form a fiscal administration. Let me add that if a United Nations administration had not been sent there might very well have been a Russian one—this probably made the United Nations act just a little faster. Nonetheless, in all sorts of ways Guinea has shown that if a metropolitan country cuts off an ungrateful colony with a shilling, it can approach the United Nations and obtain a very great deal of what it needs in economic and administrative aid, and, incidentally, even a certain sort of sympathy. All this is done without any demand that there should be United Nations control, because there is a strong feeling in the United Nations Secretariat that they must not in any way cut across another country's sovereignty.

We are therefore now faced at the United Nations with a new force, namely that of the ex-colonial nations—the nations that are poor, many of which have come to sovereignty only in the last twenty years, though not all, for there are a number of South American nations which have a long record of sovereignty but are still under-developed. This large body of nations, regarding war as unlikely, is prepared to use the United Nations in all sorts of ways, some of them not particularly desirable, to try to get the things that they want: political emancipation for those countries that are still unemancipated, and aid for themselves. At the same time they will vote on a number of issues in a way that makes them left of centre in international affairs.

These nations are looking for leadership. It seems to me important that we in Britain should consider whether or not we could give more leadership than we do at the moment, and particularly that we should avoid alienating them. Britain, through the Commonwealth, is in an extremely good position to give some sort of lead to these poorer countries, but nearly all the good that exists through the Commonwealth is cancelled by our determination, for better or for worse, to pursue a line, particularly *vis-à-vis* the multi-racial parts of Africa, which seems to be a relic of the old colonialism. If Great Britain really were part of the old colonialist

world then it would be a different matter. But this is not a true picture of the situation. Great Britain has taken the lead in the world in producing newly self-governing countries, and has, in fact, won a great deal of friendship from them. It is very striking how much the British representative in the Trusteeship Committee is regarded as a sort of father-figure for all the Africans and, to a smaller extent, the Asians.

The point is that Britain is on the edge of being a very considerable influence in the United Nations because of her ability to give guidance and leadership to countries which do not really understand the intricacies of international affairs. In many cases, either Britain or the United States has given them the education which they need in these matters, and it is to Britain that they look for guidance just because she is not a giant like America. But at the same time they cannot get over the fact that she cast a lone vote on South-West Africa along with Portugal and the Union of South Africa. Is it really worth her while to gain the ill-will of so many people in return for the extremely luke-warm good will of the Union of South Africa?

To sum up, what I felt about the United Nations during the 1959 Session was this: that it is becoming a very considerable influence in world politics because it has things to give. It has aid, technical assistance, and companionship to give to countries which very often feel rather lonely in the world when they come newly on to the scene. Secondly, this influence of the United Nations is being organized and run by small Powers, not by the great Powers of the past. Thirdly, there is a certain danger that the small Powers are going to regard themselves as a bloc against the great Powers, and that there is going to be a real division, with France, Britain, the United States, and Russia all on the one side, and all the small Powers ranged against them. Lastly, I feel very strongly that Britain, which so often claims to be a bridge or a middle way, has a great opportunity in the future to try to establish herself as a sort of friendly housemaster who really does help the young boys to come to terms with this turbulent world, to organize their arrangements with other nations, and, above all, to understand how to fit into a diplomatic scene which bears little resemblance to anything that an ex-colony has dealt with in the past.

I feel that Britain has a great opportunity to step into this role, because the United Nations is going to be an influence in world affairs within this century that far transcends any of our present ideas of its potentialities. This will be so because there is not in fact any other alternative but to produce some sort of world organization if we are to escape from the present terrifying nuclear muddle.

*Address at Chatham House,
19 January 1960*

ISRAEL'S FOREIGN RELATIONS

LEO KOHN

THE foreign policy of Israel may be said to be moving within three concentric circles. The first is that of her relations with the neighbouring States of the Middle East, Arab and non-Arab; the second covers her fast-growing relationships with the new States of Asia and Africa which now play a very significant part in the context of her external affairs; the third is that circumscribing the place of Israel in the inclusive framework of world politics, that is to say, the place allocated to her, as to other small countries, by those who determine the overall alignment of forces on the international stage.

In putting it in this order I would not wish to suggest that the last sphere is the least important, for it is in fact the opposite. The destiny of Israel, like that of other small nations, is governed in marked degree by the policies of the great Powers, in both their co-operative and their divisive aspects. I do not propose here to enter into that complex issue. Let me confine myself to the broad observation that Israel is deeply interested in the maintenance of the peace of the world. We follow with profound and hopeful concern the recent developments in international relations, which seem to open up some prospect of a general *détente* in world politics. Many of us are convinced that a lessening of animosities in that larger realm will also benefit the Middle East and relieve it of those emotional tensions which have done so much to hamper its progress towards real freedom and economic well-being.

Coming now to our relations with the countries of the Middle East, I would limit my remarks essentially to our immediate neighbours, the Arab States. The Middle East, of course, is by no means an exclusively, or even predominantly, Arab area, such as Arab propagandists constantly imply that it is. In the kaleidoscopic ethnic picture of the area which is now commonly described as the Middle East, the non-Arab peoples—the Turks, Persians, Copts, Jews, Armenians, Kurds, Ethiopians, and other national groups—hold no less important a place than the peoples which are now loosely referred to as 'Arabs', though in many of them, such as the Egyptians, the Arab strain is, anthropologically speaking, very thin. Israel has positive relations with several of the non-Arab States in the area, and these counterbalance in some measure the hostility which the Arab States still maintain against her. It is to that hostility, its principal manifestations and its underlying causes, that I shall devote the major part of this address.

There was a time when professionals of Middle Eastern affairs in the West were in the habit of regarding Israel as the 'troublesome child' of the area, as the basic source of the fierce animosity towards the West which has become almost endemic in the Arab world. The political developments of the past few years, in particular the aggressive policies of the Egyptian dictatorship all over the Middle East, have revealed the unreality of this concept. A mere summary of the major conflicts which kept the Middle East in ferment during the last four years will suffice to show that most of these had little, if anything, to do with Israel. There was for years the tension between Egypt and Sudan over the utilization of the Nile waters. There was the acute conflict between the Hashemite regime in Iraq and the Egyptian monarchy. For many months the international community was disturbed over the strained relations that prevailed between Turkey and Syria. There were the tensions in the area of the Persian Gulf—Kuweit, Yemen, Saudi Arabia. There was the great conflict between Egypt and the Western world over the control of the Suez Canal. The fall of the Hashemite regime was followed by a new hostility between the rulers of the Euphrates Valley and those of the Nile—no less, if not indeed more, bitter than that which existed under the preceding regime. There were the troubles in the Lebanon and in Jordan, where in the end the Western Powers intervened to stop Egyptian power-political designs. There was the conflict between Nasser's Egypt and Bourguiba's Tunis. In all these tensions—some of them pregnant with acute danger to the area and to the peace of the world—Israel had no share.

But even more telling proof of the secondary character of the Israel issue in the overall picture is provided by significant incidents connected with the birth of Israel herself. It is no secret that when in the autumn of 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted in favour of the establishment of the new State, the British Government of that time did not look with any favour on that decision. On the other hand, the Russian Government frankly supported the establishment of Israel. Yet there is no evidence to show that the negative attitude of the British Government has won for it the gratitude and sympathy of the Arab world, or, on the other hand, that the outspoken support which Soviet Russia gave to the emergence of Israel has precluded her from assuming the role of the friend and protector of Arab nationalism. In the light of all this it can hardly be maintained that it was the rise of Israel, as we were and often still are told, which has generated the bitter anti-Western feeling that is shaking the Arab world. The roots of that bitterness lie elsewhere. It might, indeed, be affirmed that, far from being the cause of this antipathy, Israel is in marked degree the victim of tensions which have their sources in other spheres, and which antecede her very emergence.

The hostility of the peoples of the Middle East towards the Western

world is not of recent origin. It goes back to the days of the Crusades, if not, indeed, to earlier periods. The conflict has assumed many forms and phases. There were the Turkish wars of the Hapsburg monarchy, the struggle between the 'Christian League' led by the Pope, Venice, Austria, and Spain, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire on the other; the long-drawn-out power-political struggle around the bed of the 'Sick Man of the Bosphorus'; the British occupation of Egypt, and, in the end, the destruction of the Ottoman Empire by the British and French Armies in the first World War. For the peoples of the Middle East, whose political heritage has now been taken over by Arab nationalism, the enemy was sometimes Hapsburg, sometimes France, sometimes Britain, and sometimes the Russian Tsar, for in those days Russia, too, was part of the 'West'. These century-long encounters have left deep scars on the mind and political consciousness of the Middle East. To military conquest were added economic penetration and social privileges such as the regime of the capitulations and the foreign administration of the Ottoman public debt and—even more painful—the domineering ways and the wounding condescension of not a few of those who represented Western power and the Western 'way of life' in the Middle East. A great deal of the almost hysterical hatred of the Arabs for the West has to be written down to these psychological irritants.

But there is much more to it than this. In the language of modern psychology the attitude of the Arab world towards the West can hardly be described as other than neurotic. It is afflicted by deep emotional tensions and frustrations which have made the Arabs oblivious to the very real benefits they have derived from their contact with the West. Like all peoples which have fallen on bad days, the Arabs are intensely conscious of their great past. They remember how a small desert tribe succeeded in the course of a brief space of time, under the influence of a great and inspired leader, in building up a vast empire stretching from the borders of India to Spain, and that in the wake of that astounding military achievement there sprang up a remarkable civilization. Although that civilization was not entirely the creation of the Arabs (Persians, Jews, and others, such as Avicenna and Maimonides, having contributed significantly to its rich treasure), there can be no doubt of their outstanding merit: the creation of a *lingua franca*, next in rank only to Latin, in which in the course of a brief period a great scientific, philosophical, medical, and mathematical literature came to be produced.

This remarkable adventure of the spirit was, however, of short duration. For centuries now the Arabs have not given anything of note to the advancement of culture. The great spiritual and social movements which convulsed the Western world—the Reformation, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Napoleonic era, the industrial

revolution—all these left the Arabs practically untouched. In the making of the new civilization of our age they have had hardly any share. They are deeply and painfully conscious of this. They appreciate and enjoy the advantages and amenities of Western civilization, but know they are not among its builders. They have a feeling that the Western world has somehow cheated them of their heritage. Here lies one of the deep-seated reasons for that sense of inferiority which is the cause of the virulent xenophobia that mars Arab nationalism in our day. To what depth this resentment goes may be gathered from a remark made by a high Syrian Government official who, talking a few years ago to a Swiss journalist, declared in all seriousness that if the Mongols had not burned down the Baghdad libraries in the thirteenth century, the Arabs would long ago have invented the atom bomb.¹

These subconscious resentments extend also to the political sphere. The Arabs are now very vociferous in proclaiming their nationalism and in claiming for it, as Colonel Nasser has lately been doing, a peculiar quality of its own. Yet in their heart of hearts they know that they owe even their political independence to the West. Their liberation from Ottoman rule was not the consequence of a great national effort like that of the Greeks or the Irish, but of the destruction of that Empire by the Anglo-French armies, as a result of which the Arab peoples were set free.

The destruction of the Ottoman Empire, while it liberated the Arabs from Turkish rule, had a profoundly unsettling effect on their political mentality. The Ottoman Empire, badly governed and administered though it was, had for centuries been the central political power in the Muslim world. It was for the peoples that lived under its rule the established order of their political world—and for its Muslim citizens also the divinely sanctioned order of that world—just as the Holy Roman Empire had been for the peoples of Europe in the Middle Ages and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in the modern era. When it disappeared almost overnight, and when that disappearance involved also the abolition of the Caliphate, the Middle East lost its traditional political equilibrium. The new rulers who took over the government of the Middle East—the Hashemite family, the Egyptian monarchy, the nationalist leaders, the *Wafd*, and the military and political dictators—possessed neither tradition nor the authority that went with it. When the Reformation destroyed the authoritative position of the Papacy and the rise of the national states undermined that of the Holy Roman Empire, Europe entered into an era of political throes which lasted for two centuries until the Treaty of Westphalia established a new international set-up. The Arab world has not yet evolved effective forms of democratic self-government or a stable

¹ *Swiss Review of World Affairs* (published by the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*), May 1957, p. 14.

system of inter-State relations to replace the former order. The efforts made in the decade following the first World War to introduce the traditional forms of Western democracy into the new Arab States have ended in failure. These States possessed neither the civic maturity and educational standards nor the minimum of economic security without which no democratic regime can exist.

No sooner [writes Professor Majid Khadduri] had democracy begun to operate, with its complicated procedural problems of electioneering and parliamentary debates (to say nothing of the endless quarrels that developed among rival parties and politicians), than the people began to learn how scandalously its processes could be misused by unscrupulous leaders. . . . Further, democracy as practised in the West seemed to emphasize liberty, not equality. But to peoples who for centuries have been accustomed to authoritarian regimes, liberty could not possibly be as much appreciated as equality, since it permitted the enrichment of the few at the expense of the exploited masses.¹

The Islamic political tradition is authoritarian and egalitarian rather than democratic and libertarian. The tensions and pressures of present-day Arab society have, if anything, intensified this basic trend. After numerous revolts and *coups d'état* the Arab Middle East now lives under the solid domination—openly or barely veiled—of military and political dictatorships.

This general unsettlement has also extended to the religious sphere. The disappearance of the central religious authority of the Caliphate and the impact of Western civilization have in their several ways contributed to weakening the spiritual bonds of Islam. This has affected also the moral standards and codes of behaviour of present-day Arab society, more especially of its upper strata and governing classes. Islam is still a powerful political weapon in their hands, but they do not derive from it the spiritual strength or the moral restraints which their ancestors drew from their sturdy faith. The picture which Lord Cromer drew some fifty years ago of the young Egyptian who had drifted away from Islam—'having cut himself loose from his creed, no barrier, save that of cynical self-interest, serves to keep him within the limits of the moral code'²—may be said to apply to a not negligible section of the present-day Arab intelligentsia and ruling strata. A Christian breaking with his ancestral religion may yet maintain in his personal life the ethical standards associated with it. It is not so in Islam.

The psychological malaise produced by all these factors has inevitably left its imprint also in the economic field.

The introduction of Western commercial and financial techniques has made possible the accumulation of fortunes on a scale impossible in the more rudimentary economy of earlier times. . . . The gulf between the rich and poor, no

¹ Majid Khadduri, 'The Army Officer: His Role in Middle Eastern Politics', in *Social Forces in the Middle East*, ed. S. N. Fisher (Cornell University Press, 1955), p. 165.

² *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 232.

longer bridged by a common pattern of life and by mutual religious and ethical obligations, yawns wider and deeper than before. The poor are more numerous, and in many areas are actually poorer than they were. What is more to the point, they are more conscious of their poverty. . . . Thanks above all to the cinema, but also to other mass media, the poor man in a Middle Eastern country has a fairly good, or at any rate a fairly detailed idea of what he is missing, and is more and more inclined to resent it. . . . Even more discontented—and far more dangerous—is the up-and-coming young craftsman or technician, the half-educated, half-trained, but boundlessly self-confident and ambitious artisan or mechanic who is appearing in all centers where industrialization has begun; his grievances are naturally directed against his Western superiors, whose authority and salaries he resents. Each new center of economic development is thus a new focus of dislocation, of discontent and, therefore, of anti-Western feeling.¹

The Arab economy has undergone a fundamental transformation as a result of the oil boom. The Arabs had been wont to regard themselves as a poor people, down-trodden and under-privileged. Overnight they have become rich. Half a century ago Western engineers constructed the internal combustion engine, and as a result oil came into its own. Some twenty years later Western geologists discovered the existence of vast resources of the precious liquid in the Middle East. It has become the source of unfathomed wealth to the Arab rulers. Both the use of oil and the knowledge of its existence in the Middle East were thus the result of Western ingenuity and research. Western scientists discovered the oil; Western engineers built the pipelines; Western companies brought over tankers, shipped the oil, and sold it all over the world, and rich royalties flowed back into the coffers of the Arab States and their rulers. It was essentially unearned money, and it shared the dubious value of that kind of wealth. With the exception of the Iraq Development Board, set up by Nuri-es-Said, which made a serious attempt to use this money for constructive purposes, the oil wealth of the Middle East has been largely squandered, either on the personal luxuries of its rulers, or the power schemes of its politicians, or the arms purchases of its military chiefs.

This has been the great tragedy of the Arab Middle East. The Arabs have sought power and prestige by investing their new wealth in a huge accumulation of instruments of warfare. That did not give them any real strength, such as they might have derived from economic development and social reconstruction. It merely gave them the illusion of strength. It has increased their power to destroy and thereby provided an outlet for the psychological tensions previously described. In fact these new weapons have added to the instability and insecurity of the area, for they have enabled its autocratic rulers to repress opposition by force, thereby provoking revolt, while externally they have exacerbated the struggle for hegemony in the Middle East between its dynasties and dictators.

Such are the elements of the social, political, and moral crisis which at

¹ 'The Middle East Reaction to Soviet Pressures', by Bernard Lewis, in *Middle East Journal*, Spring 1956.

present engulfs the Arab world. Here is the fount of the hatred of the West from which Israel is the prime sufferer, because she is on the spot, because she is small and, therefore, can be bullied. How is this hate complex to be overcome? There is only one solution: constructive achievement. It is the way which Ataturk followed when he took over the ruined and defeated Ottoman Empire, made peace with his neighbours, abandoned any ideas of reconquering the lost provinces, and set about building up a new national Turkish State in Anatolia by the efforts of his own people. Colonel Nasser has gone the opposite way. His regime has from the beginning been built on external conflicts—with Sudan, Tunis, Israel, Jordan, Iraq. It brought him quick glory; it enhanced his position in the Arab world. But while he climbed from rung to rung on the precarious ladder to Middle Eastern hegemony, his native Egypt remained sunk in poverty, illiteracy, and disease. If the Arabs are to find a way out of their complex situation, they must go the way along which Ataturk led the new Turkey. They must discover by their own achievements that they are as good as any other people.

This impetus, of course, must come from within. The great tragedy of the present situation in the Arab world is that it lacks leaders imbued with the courage to face realities, to tell their people the truth about their condition, and to make them realize that their problems can be solved only by their own constructive efforts and not by venting their bitterness against others. True, external help is needed, both financial and technical, but it can be effective only if it is rendered on a sound economic basis. If the loans and grants-in-aid are extended on terms which, as the recipients well realize, are nothing but a veiled form of *baksheesh*, the result will be the reverse of that expected. It will deepen their sense of weakness and inferiority, and in the end produce in them more hatred of the benefactors, however readily they may accept the gift. Goethe once said: 'If you want to improve a man, treat him as though he was already what you want him to become.' I am afraid that the very opposite treatment has often been accorded to the Arabs, and the results are evident.

Seen from this wider angle, the case of Egypt is singularly instructive. The geopolitical structure of modern Egypt has been a standing temptation to her rulers to go in for power-political designs which are beyond her capacity to realize. Egypt has now a population of 25 million, which is increasing every year by half a million. This is a demographic basis on which her rulers might well conceive a powerful state could be built. It is a country with a great past and an ancient history. It was a cradle of human civilization. Modern Egypt, moreover, has the oldest contacts with the Western world. She has an intelligentsia which speaks and thinks in French and English. Egypt further has a very important strategic position on the crossroads of three continents. She now also controls the Suez

Canal. Here are elements on which, it might seem, a powerful political position could be established.

Behind the impressive façade, however, there reaches an appalling void. The bulk of the 25 million live on the margin of the subsistence level, a great many of them below it. The half million born every year are a burden and not a blessing. Egypt's long-standing contact with Western civilization has not revealed to her the real sources of its strength. That contact is, moreover, limited to a small stratum of her upper and middle classes, while the mass of her population, illiterate and disease-ridden, lives in conditions as primitive as those of other Arab countries. This dilemma has led the leaders of the new Egypt to seek ways and means of strengthening their position by drawing the fertile and oil-rich countries of the Middle East into the sphere of their political control, using the slogans of Arab nationalism, of which the Egyptian regime has now constituted itself the foremost protagonist. The object has been pursued by a vast propaganda and subversion campaign in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the countries of the Persian Gulf, at times also in Saudi Arabia. A further step in this direction was to exploit the cold war and enhance Egypt's position by mobilizing support and assistance from outside—arms from the Soviet Bloc and financial aid from the United States and Western Europe. A third step was to exploit Arab hostility to Israel by claiming leadership in the crusade for her annihilation. It is political adventurism at its worst, but as long as the cold war continues it is not likely to be abandoned.

It is in this turbulent atmosphere that the State of Israel has for the past eleven years endeavoured to build up a stable and progressive society. Peace clearly is an essential pre-condition for that reconstruction. For years Israel's representatives in the United Nations and elsewhere have offered to meet the Arab leaders in order to negotiate an agreed settlement. The reply has invariably been negative. Yet peace with Israel is a necessity also for her Arab neighbours, however unwilling they may be to admit it—at least in public. It would re-establish freedom of movement and communications throughout the Middle East. It would mean the end of the wasteful and senseless arms race which compels both sides to squander their limited resources on the purchase of modern armaments that require constant replacement. It would open up the expanding Israel market to Arab produce. It would render possible a speedy and effective settlement of the Arab refugee problem. It would win for the Arabs friends throughout the world who hold aloof from supporting their aspirations because of their nihilistic attitude towards Israel. It would also contribute to the evolution of democratic freedom and social progress in Arab countries. It may be that there are people in the Arab world who realize this, but no one dares to say so. Possibly another generation may have to grow up before a bridge can be built for peace.

It is a most unfortunate conflict, because it is utterly absurd. Israel does not constitute any danger to the Arab countries. We are sometimes told that Israel's military strength is such that it could conquer the neighbouring countries by force. But suppose even that were true, could such a military victory give her dominion over a Middle East inhabited by some sixty million Arabs? Does not the fact that Israel has for the last ten years urged that the armistice be implemented by the conclusion of a peace settlement, while the Arab States have consistently rejected such an agreement, belie the allegation of Israel's 'expansionism'? It is easy to charge Israel with having driven a wedge into the Arab world, but it might well be claimed that that 'wedge' had more than once precluded overt hostilities between Egypt and Iraq during their long-drawn-out struggle for the control of Jordan and for hegemony in the Middle East.

Israel is emphatically not an 'intruder' in the Middle East, as Arab propaganda tries to persuade the world. It is one of the most ancient nations of the area, a chip off the great bloc of the ancient East. By a curious and strange fate this people has been scattered all over the world. It is now returning home, loaded with the experience, meaningful and tragic, of a two thousand years' exile. It could play an important part in the reconstruction of the Middle East, and if the Arabs were not beset by the psychological inhibitions which I have tried to analyse, they would seize upon this unique asset in their midst, as the peoples of Asia and Africa are now beginning to do. The policy of ignoring the existence of Israel which is pursued by the Arab States is utterly unrealistic. As the Israel spokesman in the United Nations once pertinently observed, 'The Arabs can have peace with Israel or they can have war with Israel, but whatever they choose they can only have it with Israel such as it exists.' The Arabs have been trying to avoid this dilemma by creating a situation which is neither war nor peace, and which enables them to maintain the strange fiction that there is no such thing as the State of Israel.

When we come to the relations between Israel and the new States of Asia and Africa an entirely different picture emerges. In the course of the past six years close and friendly relations have grown up between Israel and a number of countries, in particular some of the new States of South-East Asia and of West and Central Africa. This has come about after an initial period of considerable misunderstanding, because many of these people, to whom the Bible is not a book of sacred record, knew little of the spiritual and political history of the Jewish people in the land of its origin. They also knew little of the tragic story of the Jews since their dispersion, as most of it was enacted in the Western world. It was, therefore, easy for Arab propaganda to paint Israel as an alien intruder and an aggressive agent of 'Western imperialism'. This propaganda reaped its harvest at

the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung in 1954. Since then, however, a significant change has taken place. The first of the new States of Asia to establish closer relations with Israel was Burma. These relations have found expression in an ever-expanding co-operation in various fields of economic and cultural effort. Burma's example has been followed by other States of South-East Asia—Ceylon, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and the Philippines—and subsequently of Central and West Africa—Ghana, Liberia, Guinea, Ethiopia. Co-operation with these States, particularly in the sphere of social and economic development, has assumed three forms. First, Israel has placed at the disposal of the Governments of these countries the services of technicians, scientists, and specialists in various fields. Secondly, students and civil servants from these countries have come to Israel to obtain theoretical and practical training in numerous subjects. Finally, a number of economic enterprises have been set up jointly by Israel and several of these States.

To give a few typical examples. Burma has invited some seventy Israel specialists on contracts of varying length—engineers, town-planners, agricultural technicians, veterinarians, aircraft maintenance personnel, and others. Advisers from Israel have assisted in the planning and execution of drilling and irrigation projects in Burma's dry zone. Ghana has appointed two lecturers of the Haifa Institute of Technology to teach at the Kumasi College of Technology, one of them as head of the School of Engineering. She has also engaged Israel experts for her public health, statistical, and economic services, financial advisers to assist in the establishment of her co-operative bank, instructors in mechanical farming, statisticians, and public health engineers. Other Israel experts have rendered service in Nigeria, the Sudanese Republic, Liberia, India, South Vietnam, Ceylon, and the Philippines. In a recent analysis of foreign aid to developing countries Mr Hugh Tinker, after describing several types of foreign advisers, writes:

Perhaps the most sympathetic figure among these rival experts is the Israeli. Sunburnt, stripped for action, he too comes from a poor land which is making itself richer by sweat and ingenuity. Many in Asia and Africa would prefer to go into partnership with Israel, whose problems are more nearly related, and who, therefore, sees solutions in more realistic terms.¹

The second form of this co-operation has been the training in Israel of Asian and African students and civil servants. A notable effort in this sphere was the organization of a three months' seminar on co-operativism held at Tel Aviv in the winter of 1958-9 under the auspices of the Israel Federation of Labour. Many of the participants, who hailed from Japan, India, Ceylon, Thailand, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Chad, and the Republic of Sudan, were graduates of French, British, and American universities

¹ 'The Name and Nature of Foreign Aid', by Hugh Tinker (*International Affairs*, January 1959, pp. 50-1).

and colleges. Most of them possessed practical experience in Government services or in agricultural and industrial enterprises. Theoretical lectures and seminars on the various aspects of co-operativism were followed by visits to various types of agricultural settlements and co-operative enterprises in industry, building, marketing, transport, and health services. During the same winter a group of thirty Burmese Government officials came with their families for a prolonged stay in Israel co-operative villages.

In addition to these two special groups, a considerable number of students and trainees from Asia and Africa have visited Israel, ranging from Japanese scientists doing advanced research at the Weizmann Institute of Science to research fellows in Jewish and Oriental history and religion at the Hebrew University, post-graduate students of mathematics, medicine, architecture, and economics, as well as veterinary surgeons, poultry farmers, and village instructors.

The third form of co-operation between Israel and some of the new States of Africa and Asia has been the establishment of joint economic enterprises. Among the more important of these are the 'Black Star Line', an Israel-Ghana shipping company, established in 1957 by the Government of Ghana in association with Zim, Israel's principal shipping company, and the Ghana National Construction Company, a Ghanaian firm of civil engineers and general contractors, founded in co-operation with Solel-Boneh, Israel's leading construction and contracting company. In both enterprises the majority of the shares is held by Ghanaian interests. In both, one of the principal objects is the training of Ghanaian personnel which is gradually to take over the functions of the technicians lent by the Israel companies. Negotiations are on foot for the establishment of additional joint companies of this kind in the canning and pharmaceutical branches, in the lumber trade, and in other commercial enterprises.

The basic motive which has led these new States to seek advice and help from Israel is their urgent need for technical, economic, and educational development. They are all deeply concerned, as one of their spokesmen put it, 'to make their newly-gained political sovereignty real and valid by the attainment of economic independence'. The example of Israel is of special interest to them for a number of reasons. Israel is a small country with limited economic resources, but possessing a significant reservoir of skill and experience, such as is generally to be found only in more highly developed and powerful States. Israel has to struggle with climatic, physical, economic, and demographic problems which are to some extent similar to theirs. Association with Israel does not expose them to the danger of falling under the sway of some great Power, an ever-present fear in the minds of these newly emancipated nations. Israel's small dimensions are more akin to their own. They require the superior techniques of the highly developed States of the West to be translated for them

into smaller coin which they can handle. To quote Mr Kermit Lansner, General Editor of *Newsweek*, in that magazine's issue of 23 March 1959:

Frightened by the ruthless planning of a Soviet society, bewildered by the prodigal improvisation of many Western countries, a growing number of Afro-Asians are quietly exploring a middle way to a planned, democratic life—the way of Israel. The director of South Vietnam's Public Works Department, Pham Minh Dvong, put it like this: 'I spent two months in the United States on a study tour. I went to many towns. At the end they asked me what I thought of America and I answered that it was Wonderful! Fabulous! Fantastic! Then they asked me what I had learned and I said: Nothing! You see, America is too big for us. The smallest project I saw cost millions. Israel is closer to the problems we're up against.'

Israel is for them a 'pilot plant', an instructive example in the art of improvisation. Israel is, moreover, an intensely democratic community which has shown that technical and social problems can be solved even under present-day conditions without sacrificing personal freedom and political liberty. Again to quote Mr Lansner, reporting what he was told by an African official from Senegal:

Naturally many of us are overawed by the Soviet experiment. It's a very tempting road to rapid modernization for an under-developed country. But we couldn't stomach the forced labour that goes with it. We don't think parliamentary democracy as it is practised in certain Western countries can work in Africa, yet most of us are anxious to retain the basic principles of a democratic society. In Israel we see a whole nation working hard for the same goals under a democratic system of government.

An African participant in the Tel Aviv seminar on co-operativism put the same idea in slightly different language. He explained that these new countries 'could not trust the colonialist Powers who had only recently left them'. On the other hand, they were afraid of following the Russian model. In this situation, they had found in Israel an alternative—'the only valid alternative for us', as he put it: 'You have achieved,' he said, 'outstanding social and technical progress without sacrificing human values.' The significance of Israel's effort of national reconstruction for the brave new world of Africa and Asia has perhaps never been summarized more aptly than in these telling words.

Address at Chatham House
26 January 1960

REVIEW ARTICLE

THE QUESTION OF TIBET AND THE RULE OF LAW. Introduction by Jean-Flavien Lalive. Geneva, International Commission of Jurists, 1959. v + 208 pp. Map. No price given.

THIS is the preliminary report submitted to the International Commission of Jurists in July 1959 by Mr Purshottam Trikamdass (an Indian member of the Commission) and 'a small team of experts which was responsible for collecting such evidence as was available' (p. ii).

The result is divided into four parts. Part I (pp. 1-15) gives a short account of the land and the people of Tibet, a map of Tibet, a chronology of events from 1947 to 4 July 1959, and a brief history of the Tibetan uprising of March 1959.

Part II (pp. 17-74), the central part of the Report, examines the charges brought against the People's Republic of China of having violated: (i) the 17-point Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 23 May 1951 (Articles 3 and 4, 7, 13, 11);¹ (ii) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December 1948; and (iii) the Genocide Convention of 9 December 1948.

The evidence cited for the violation of Articles 3 and 4 of the 17-point Agreement consists, on the Tibetan side, of (i) a 'Manifesto', accompanying a letter to Mr Nehru, written in the summer of 1958, by (among others) Situb Lokangwa, former Prime Minister of Tibet, Shakob-pa, head of the 1950 Tibetan delegation to India, the United States, and elsewhere, and Thundup, brother of the Dalai Lama; (ii) an undated 'Memorandum' prepared by the same persons; and (iii) the statements of the Dalai Lama at Tezpur (18 April 1959) and Mussoorie (20 June 1959). On the Chinese side the principal evidence consists of (i) the speeches of Chang Ching-wu (Head of the Military and Administrative Committee and of the Military Area Headquarters in Tibet) and Chang Kuo-hua (Head of the Military Area Headquarters) on 22 April 1958; and (ii) the New China News Agency Reports of the third anniversary of the Preparatory Committee and of the first session of the second National People's Congress, at Lhasa and Peking respectively, on 23-24 April 1959.

After examining this evidence, Mr Trikamdass and his colleagues arrive at the conclusions that the personal authority of the Dalai Lama—which 'lies at the very heart of the Tibetan way of life' (p. 21)—was undermined; and that it was sought to alter the constitutional structure of Tibet by the attempt to set up a Military and Political Committee in 1953-4 to supersede the Tibetan Government, and by the setting up of the Preparatory Committee on 22 April 1956. It has not been clarified whether the Military and Political Committee was in any way different from the Military and Administrative Committee agreed upon in Article 15 of the 17-point Agreement. Neither do the authors point out in this context (though they mention it elsewhere, on p. 98) that the Preparatory Committee was set up after the Dalai Lama's visit to Peking (September 1954-March 1955) and therefore, presumably, after consultation with

¹ English translation of official text in Tsung-Lien Shen and Shen-Chi Lin, *Tibet and the Tibetans* (Stanford University Press, 1953), pp. 191-3.

Articles 3: '... the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government', and 4: 'The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet...'; *Article 7:* 'The policy of freedom of religious belief... shall be carried out...'; *Article 13:* 'The People's Liberation Army entering Tibet shall abide by all the above-mentioned policies, and shall also be fair in all buying and selling, and shall not arbitrarily take a single needle or thread from the people'; *Article 11:* 'In matters related to various reforms in Tibet, there will be no compulsion on the part of the central authorities. The local government of Tibet should carry out reforms of its own accord'.

him. Whether the Dalai Lama's consent, explicit or implicit, was forced or freely given is another question.

Objection might also be raised to the all too summary dismissal of the credibility of the Chinese evidence on the ground of 'the amazing *volte-face* from praise of the loyal and co-operative Tibetan Government in 1958, to the violent allegations in 1959 of secret obstruction' (p. 22). There is nothing in the printed record to indicate that Chang Ching-wu and Chang Kuo-hua, when they spoke on 22 April 1958 of 'the unity between the Tibetan and Han working personnel' (p. 33), meant specifically unity between the Preparatory Committee and the Tibetan Government. It is at least arguable that what was meant was the unity between the Tibetan and Han personnel of the Preparatory Committee, and that it was not thought fit to mention, in 1958, the opposition which the Preparatory Committee was facing from the Tibetan Government. Chang Kuo-hua did in fact mention—without naming any persons—'the reactionary lies, spread by the imperialists and pro-imperialist deviationists, who slandered the Preparatory Committee as an "agency of Han nationalists"' (p. 34).

On the alleged violation of Article 7 of the 17-point Agreement, some convincing evidence has been quoted from a Tibetan-language daily newspaper, the *Karzey Nyinwey Sargyur* (12–22 November 1958), published in the Karzey district of Eastern Tibet by the Chinese authorities (pp. 40–3). Very telling, also, is the admission by Fan Ming, a member of the Chinese Communist Party's Tibetan Work Committee, in October 1951, that as a result of 'Great Han chauvinism' in Tibet, 'cases have occurred where . . . the freedom of religious belief and the customs of the Tibetans were not respected' (p. 43). On the question of reforms—Article 11 of the 17-point Agreement—it is clear to Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues that '(the) socialization policy was decided upon in Peking and not in Lhasa. This makes nonsense of Article 11' (p. 49).

The section headed 'Violations of Human Rights' (pp. 58–67) is based on the Tibetan sources mentioned, and on the statements of Tibetan refugees in India. The conclusion is reached that there is in Tibet today 'a denial of almost everything that contributes to the dignity of man' (p. 58). One point seems unsatisfactory here. Blame is fixed on the Chinese authorities for having subjected the Tibetans to forced labour (p. 61)—in violation of Articles 4 and 23 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the existence of compulsory unpaid labour (as a feudal service) under the pre-Communist regime in Tibet, and the attempt of the Preparatory Committee (by its resolution, passed at the suggestion of the Dalai Lama, at its 23rd meeting on 30 December 1957) to curtail it, is not mentioned in this context, though evidence for it is quoted on pp. 28 and 33. On the question of genocide no definite conclusion has been arrived at, but 'the Commission will recommend to its Legal Inquiry Committee (on Tibet)', which is to be set up to continue the work of Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues, 'that (the) existing evidence of Genocide be fully checked, that further evidence, if available, be investigated, and that unconfirmed reports be investigated and checked' (p. 71).

In Part III (pp. 75–99), 'the position of Tibet in International Law' is examined. Coming from the International Commission of Jurists, it will inevitably be this Part which will arouse the closest interest. Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues have taken as the starting-point of their investigation the year 1873, 'when the British representative in Darjeeling'—in fact, Mr (afterwards Sir) John Edgar, Deputy Commissioner (i.e. District Officer) of Darjeeling District—'was deputed to investigate the possibility of re-establishing Indian trade with Tibet'. A very brief (pp. 75–6) history of Sino-Tibetan contacts from the eighth to the nineteenth centuries is indeed given, but both the brevity of this account and the selection of the year 1873 as the starting point of an investigation into the status of Tibet must be regarded as unsatisfactory. A more valuable estimate of Tibet's position must, it seems, begin in the late

seventeenth/early eighteenth centuries, when Chinese authority began to be felt in Tibet. Moreover, a body such as the International Commission of Jurists might surely have been expected to have drawn upon official Chinese sources such as the Annals of the Ching Dynasty (*Ta Ching li chao shih lu*) or the Records of the Board of Tributary Peoples (*Li fan yuan tse li*) of the Imperial Chinese Government, in order to arrive at a definition of the relationship which existed between China and Tibet before, and at the time when, the British came upon the scene.

Few will quarrel with the conclusion reached by Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues that after the Tibetan uprising of 1911-12, leading to the expulsion of the Chinese Resident and Chinese troops from Lhasa in (January) 1913, Tibet re-emerged as 'a fully sovereign state, independent in fact and in law of Chinese control' (p. 85). The difficulty is posed by the 17-point Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951. Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues put forward two lines of thought:

(1) That, while treaties imposed by the victor upon the vanquished are not *ipso facto* invalid, they are invalid if 'concluded as a result of intimidation or coercion exercised personally against the (signing) representatives (of the vanquished State)'.¹ The 17-point Agreement, having been concluded as a result of mental coercion exercised against the Dalai Lama and his representatives, is therefore invalid, and Tibet did not, as a result of the Agreement, lose the full sovereign status which she acquired in 1912-13.

(2) Assuming that the 17-point Agreement was valid, it is demonstrable that, by dividing Tibet into three parts for military and administrative purposes, and by setting up the Preparatory Committee, China violated the Agreement. A number of international lawyers are agreed on the point that the violation of a treaty by one party entitles the other to repudiate it. 'It is essential . . . that the treaty be actually repudiated' (p. 99). The Dalai Lama did so repudiate the Agreement in his statement at Mussoorie on 20 June 1959. Therefore Tibet, having lost her full sovereign status in 1951, regained it in 1959. That Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues are not unaware of Lauterpacht's further requirement that 'the right to cancel a treaty on the ground of its violation must be exercised *within a reasonable time*'² is evident from footnote 90 on p. 97. But what, they ask, if continuing duress prevented repudiation? Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues are therefore apparently prepared to regard the space of eight years as the 'reasonable time' within which a treaty violated by one party can be repudiated by the other.

Part IV (pp. 101-208) is a collection of documents. All students of Tibetan affairs will be grateful to Mr Trikamdas and his colleagues for bringing together, from the *British and Foreign State Papers* and C. U. Aitchison's *Treaties*³ (Vol. XIV, Part II, for the Simla Convention of 1914), treaties and conventions relating to Tibet from 1890 to 1914 (Documents 1-8). These are followed by the Sino-Indian correspondence of October-November 1950 (Doc. 9), the much-discussed 17-point Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951 (Doc. 10), the Manifesto (Docs. 11-12) and Memorandum (Doc. 13) referred to above, the Dalai Lama's statements at Tezpur on 18 April 1959 and Mussoorie on 20 June 1959 (Docs. 17 and 19), etc.

The map on p. 5 is wholly unsatisfactory. One would have liked to have seen published with this preliminary Report the map appended to Article 9 of the Simla Convention (p. 126), in which the borders of Tibet and the boundary between Outer and Inner Tibet were shown in red and blue respectively.

ZAHIRUDDIN AHMAD

¹ See H. Lauterpacht, *Oppenheim's International Law*, 7th ed. (1947), Vol. I, p. 802.

² *Op. cit.*, 8th ed. (1955), Vol. I, p. 948.

³ *Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, compiled by C. U. Aitchison. 5th ed., 1929 (Calcutta, Government of India, Central Publication Branch).

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

MONISTIC AND PLURALISTIC INTERPRETATIONS IN THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: A Methodological Examination. By Risto Hyvärinen. Helsinki, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1958. 157 pp. Tables. Maps. Index. (Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum XXIV. 1.) *Mk.* 900.

SMALL States 'cannot afford mistakes'. For them, therefore, 'the mastery of the art of foreign politics is particularly important'. But is it possible to plan in foreign politics at all? On the analogy of what is normal in military situations this 'would not seem to be impossible'. 'Fruitful ideas' for 'the training of foreign office personnel' may be provided by 'military education and practice'. So may decisions concerning foreign politics come to be more objectively made rather than 'on the grounds of, for instance, ideological dilettantism' (pp. 135-6).

This is not a book about education. Except once, as quoted above, the word does not occur. It is about a science, or potential science, of international politics. And to this it may well be about the best short introduction ever attempted. One passage, on 'necessary' and 'sufficient' conditions as 'grounds of explanation in the study of international politics' (p. 122), does in truth seem to invite some re-wording. Also the author, conceiving States, for so he does, simply as 'social groups', finds it 'irrelevant whether international politics be regarded as an independent academic discipline or as part of political science'. The first alternative, he observes however, 'has gained increasingly wide acceptance' (p. 132). There has in short occurred a not necessarily unhealthy division of labour based on a difference of angles of examination. Not that there has yet, even in the social sciences generally, been progress 'beyond the level of ambiguous laws and vague terminology' (p. 131). And, as for international politics, this, 'as a systematic study', is 'so far—evident rather as a definite tendency than as a fact'. The flow of merely 'descriptive general textbooks of international politics' the author finds 'rather futile' (p. 103). They represent a stage at which an independent academic discipline is only 'about to be established'. The various monistic interpretations, too, of international politics—if scientific at all—may also be seen as at best a stage in scientific development: race theories, geopolitics, Marxism are examples of this. For all its difficulties it is rather to causal pluralism that men must look, if ever they are to chart the

morrow's world-political weather. On this possibility Dr Hyvärinen apparently preserves an open mind. One trouble, he recognizes, is that the very results of the social sciences may, when published, themselves make for changes in that behaviour which it is theirs to study. As if, but for this, such changes might be few! Still, an admirable book, abounding in helpful references to the literature and a model of straightforward presentation—albeit bearing only indirectly upon international relations as a branch of humanistic study and medium of education, in the sense of a processing of the thinking and appreciating processes of thinking, and appreciating, man. C. A. W. MANNING

ALLIANCE POLICY IN THE COLD WAR. Ed. by Arnold Wolfers. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. ix+314 pp. Map endpapers. Index. \$6. 48s.

IT is perhaps indicative of the change which has taken place in the American outlook that this timely symposium is able to concentrate upon the practical problems arising from the acceptance of a policy of alliances, instead of having to debate the age-old issue of whether alliances as such are desirable. The 'Fortress America' idea, a once widely discussed alternative to alliances, in fact receives but a passing mention—in Mr W. L. Miller's chapter on the 'American Ethos and the Alliance System', where the writer considers certain 'patterns of principle opposition' to present policy.

If there are highlights in the book—which has been written by a number of distinguished authorities on international affairs, all of whom have at some time been connected with the Washington Centre of Foreign Policy Research—they are perhaps to be found in Chapter 5, in which Mr James E. King examines the nature and extent of America's practical military commitments, and in Chapter 10, where Mr William Welch gives an illuminating account of the arrangements and policies which the Russians have devised to promote Soviet security. Comparisons between individual sections of the book would, however, be invidious. The book itself forms an organic whole, and one must read Mr Paul Nitze's initial chapter on 'Coalition Policy and the Concept of World Order' if one is not to overlook the broader objectives of any conjunction of Western resources in opposition to Soviet-Communism; just as one must ponder those later sections which deal with the evolution of present collective security arrangements in relation to the provisions of the United Nations Charter and with the impact of colonial problems upon Western unity, if one is not to ignore the major difficulties which have confronted the N.A.T.O. partners. In so doing, however, the reader may be tempted to question Professor Hans J. Morgenthau's assertions that, from the proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine to the attack upon Pearl Harbour, Great Britain and the United States 'acted, at least in relation to other European nations, as if they were allied' (p. 185) and that a 'genuine' alliance exists between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic (p. 207).

Professor Arnold Wolfers, who contributes both the introduction (on the stresses and strains of 'going it with others') and Chapter 3 (in which he indicates some of the 'dilemmas of the two-track policy' confronting the United States by virtue of its 'simultaneous commitments to collective defence and collective security'—p. 67), is to be congratulated upon his excellent job of editing, which combines with the talent which he has enlisted in his contributors to make this an authoritative study of current Western defence policy. C. J. C.

THE NEXT FIFTEEN YEARS. By Pierre Mendès France. Cambridge at the University Press, 1960. 24 pp. 3s. 6d.

THE challenge in science, technology, and economic development posed by the pace of Soviet progress and its connexion with the problem of East-West relations and the under-developed countries is the broad theme of this somewhat

pessimistic lecture. M. Mendès France's main proposal is that 'each of the industrialised countries should solemnly undertake to earmark a certain percentage of its national income' (p. 21) to provide aid for the under-developed countries.

RICHARD BAILEY

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS

THE AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLITICS: Its Origins and Conditions. By Bernard Crick. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959. xv + 252 pp. Index. 28s.

THE honour in which the academic study of society and government is held in the United States and the extent and diversity of the teaching and research which are carried on in universities, colleges, and schools in that country would of itself merit careful examination and description. But there is also a distinctive method and style to this American preoccupation; it is as a *science*, potentially if not actually comparable to the natural sciences, that it enjoys its peculiar esteem and makes its largest claims, both qualitatively and quantitatively. It is to this aspect of the matter that Mr Crick's book is addressed, the first full-scale, properly rounded assessment to offer on either side of the Atlantic.

His treatment is partly historical, in that it traces the sequence of thought by which this American 'scientism' developed from the specifically American derivatives of Herbert Spencer; partly philosophical, in that he analyses the successive manifestations of the concept with a view to laying bare the assumptions and implications which most expressions of it conceal. He finds that there are almost always underlying presumptions about the validity of American democracy, social progress, and human perfectibility, not to mention the familiar illusion about the evolution of an intellectual élite, unbiased, disinterested, and yet in possession of power. Finally he shows how the supposed 'scientific' model is in fact a 'technological' model.

It is a lively, challenging, fresh, and important book, whose large merits deserve serious attention by all practitioners of political and social studies.

H. G. NICHOLAS

MAN, THE STATE AND WAR: A Theoretical Analysis. By Kenneth N. Waltz. New York, Columbia University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. viii + 263 pp. Bibliog. Index. 44s.

Is war simply mass malevolence? Is it any easier to root war out of a world society 'than it is to root adolescent frustration out of ours?' (p. 55). If States displayed the morality of Englishmen and Americans in their dealings with one another, would that be sufficient? How does a policy scientist begin to change even a single society? And so on. Two books, in effect, in one, each worthy of a prize. On the one hand, the author's own portrayal of man's inherited predicament, on the other hand his exposure of other historically consequential ways of seeing what the world was like. Good, really, that the two are here combined. Otherwise, beguiled by the obviousness of Professor Waltz's own account of conditions in the social universe, the reader might suspect that it must all have been common knowledge before. But evidently not. The Copernican theory may well have struck some as obvious when once understood. Yet it transformed the then current picture of the cosmos. One thinks too of Machiavelli, of Darwin, of Freud—of E. H. Carr. Will men, in future, think of Waltz? Certainly the students will—those beginners in the Structure of International Society who for so long have been waiting for just such a book. If it does not tell them 'where . . . from here', it does at least specify the 'here'. For 'to explain how peace can be more readily achieved requires an understanding of the causes of war' (p. 2), and these we find to be implicit in the structure of world society as still it is.

Given all that war has meant, it is odd that men should still be considering how it comes about. And odder that the answer should seem in a way so new. What, asks Waltz, 'is the relevance of the thoughts of others, many of them living far in the past, to the pressing and awful problems of the present?' (p. 2). Awful warnings, if nothing more. But certainly also something more. What, on these matters, did the orthodox Marxists have to say: and what did they presuppose? What, respectively, the 'revisionists', and the optimistic non-interventionist liberals, and their cousins the messianic interventionists (American liberationists)? What Spinoza and Kant, Hobson and Lenin, Bismarck and Woodrow Wilson? What, in our day, Morgenthau and Niebuhr? It is all here. And pretty vulnerable, some of it.

'So fundamental are man, the state, and the state system in any attempt to understand international relations that seldom does an analyst, however wedded to one image, entirely overlook the other two. Still, emphasis on one image may distort one's interpretation of the others' (p. 160). 'Every prescription for greater peace in the world is . . . related to one of our three images . . . or to some combination of them' (p. 14). 'To understand war and peace political analysis must be used to supplement and order the findings of psychology and sociology' (p. 81).

As though to illustrate his argument, the author himself seems unwittingly to lapse a little, on the subject of State behaviour, into ambivalence. Though maintaining that a particular way of speaking 'does violence' to common sense (pp. 175-6), he nonetheless himself employs it, as needs he must: 'The international political environment has much to do with the ways in which states behave' (pp. 122-3). Need he himself insist that his own reference here to State, as distinct from human, behaviour does violence to common sense? Or would such insistence savour of that very 'psychologism' against the 'error' of which he has warned us elsewhere? (p. 28).

Why, then, war? 'Rousseau's answer is really that war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it' (p. 188). Not for our comfort, the author, and herein lies part of his originality, rubs the message home. The need for something to prevent war is apparent: but 'demonstrating the need for an institution does not bring it into existence' (p. 228). And 'the fear of modern weapons . . . is not sufficient to establish the conditions of peace' (p. 236). 'The peace-strategy of any one country must depend on the peace and war strategies of all other countries' (p. 222). And if 'balance-of-power politics is risky; trying to ignore it is riskier still' (p. 221). A foreign policy based on this image of international relations 'is neither moral nor immoral but embodies merely a reasoned response to the world about us' (p. 238). A shade negative perhaps, but true enough of the past, if not equally of the present. Presumably we can take it: or, can we? It is a matter in which Lowes Dickinson 'was blasted by liberals and socialists alike for reversing the dominant inside-out explanation' (p. 10). May Waltz have better luck. And the world a deeper and more inventive wisdom, in the future.

C. A. W. MANNING

EUROPE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER. By J. P. Corbett. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff for the Council of Europe, 1959. 188 pp. (European Aspects: A Collection of Studies relating to European Integration. Series D: Social Studies, No. 1.) Fl. 9.25.

THIS is the first volume in the series 'European Aspects', in which will be published studies carried out with the help of research fellowships awarded by the Council of Europe. The theme of the book is the effect on society of the acceptance of 'systematic innovation' as a dominating principle and feature of its life. The significance of this principle and the way in which it differs from earlier innovating processes are well explained in the opening chapter. There follows a survey of the destruction wrought by 'systematic innovation' among

the ideas and beliefs which have guided previous generations; among the casualties are natural law, automatic progress, the free market economy, the general will, and arbitrary moral codes.

What is to take their place? Clearly 'systematic innovation' may stimulate revolutionary movements, eager to use it to the full and ready to employ the instruments it puts into their hands to establish authoritarian rule over the minds and the bodies of men. But, argues Mr Corbett, this is not the only solution. For liberalism, too, can in a very different way absorb 'systematic innovation' into its body of principles, and master it, and make it serve the ends of a free society. Among the most important means of achieving this result are the behavioural sciences used, not to teach rulers how to deceive their subjects, but to enable men better to understand their institutions and their non-rational motivations, and education used, not to indoctrinate, but to inspire with a desire to learn and to judge objectively.

It will be seen that the book is not concerned in any direct way with European unity. It is an essay in political philosophy and an exposition of the applicability of the liberal faith to the contemporary Western world. It has the merit of being lucid and readable.

T. H. MARSHALL

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND THE DILEMMAS OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Kenneth W. Thompson. Foreword by John J. Hallowell. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press for the Lilly Endowment Research Program in Christianity and Politics, 1959; London, Cambridge University Press, 1960. viii + 148 pp. Index. 28s.

This is a very worthwhile little book. The author begins with the proposition that 'one of our supreme tasks in foreign policy is to bring moral purpose and political realities into line and to understand their relationship more deeply' (p. 4) without either cynical nihilism or hypocritical moralism. He writes as a Christian but in the belief that 'the history of politics discloses that no people have completely divorced politics from ethics without, however grudgingly, coming to see that we are required to conform to standards more objective than those of success' (p. 47). After a brief historical note, he examines the writings of de Visscher, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Winston Churchill in the context of the relationship between ethics and international politics.

He warns against the good-evil approach to international politics, and suggests that a sense of awareness of the human predicament is a more suitable basis for discussion of the current dilemmas of armaments, of colonialism, and the new diplomacy. He indicates guiding lines within which policy might be formulated, but adds that 'the beginning of wisdom' is the knowledge that there are persisting dilemmas. This is his main theme. In reviewing contemporary comments on the place of morality in economics, history, and diplomacy, he concludes that 'the importing of religious precepts into the political arena may be more mischievous than constructive' (p. 124) because policy, which must be adaptable, cannot be equated with principle; nor can foreign policy be the application of a single principle, it is the balancing of several. Nevertheless ethical standards do have a part to play in international politics: in the recognition of a common humanity; in patient acceptance of the fact that foreign policy problems cannot be resolved once for all; in the unremitting search for the concurrence of national interest and general welfare—'the world needs partners far more than patrons' (p. 129); in personal relationships abroad; and in the fuller realization that all men live under God. Historically there has always been tension between the Christian and society but one must work to improve international relationships in the humility of knowing they will never be perfect.

This thoughtful analysis summarizes much of contemporary writing on morality and foreign policy, and expresses the author's own views on the

Christian approach to present international problems. It is a useful addition to existing literature on the subject.

RACHEL F. WALL

THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL SYSTEMS. By Douglas V. Verney. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959. 239 pp. Index. (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction.) 28s.

'Now that American textbooks are so widely used by social scientists throughout the world it is more necessary than ever to beware of the implicit and often radical assumptions which they make about politics and society' (p. 212); thus Mr Verney. And indeed the teacher of politics in Britain may welcome a textbook which is not American and which consequently—and that is Mr Verney's main point—concentrates on forms of government and their differences, and not merely on political 'participation'. Mr Verney begins with the 'structure of government', where he distinguishes between the parliamentary, the presidential, and the 'convention' systems, rather uncomfortably equating Soviet institutions with the last of these; goes on with 'the political process'—pressure groups, parties, and all that; and ends with some conclusions about the respective importance of these modes of analysis, and some reflections, inevitable given current intellectual fashions, upon the application of his views to the under-developed countries. Although Mr Verney has a wide range of knowledge to draw on, the book is perhaps rather too ambitiously designed; and space given to recapitulation would have been better devoted to further elaboration of some points where compression makes for total obscurity, as in what he has to say about contemporary France. Switzerland gets rather a raw deal too under Mr Verney's scheme, and the period of election of the Federal Council is wrongly given as three years (p. 62), instead of four. There is always for writers of text-books on comparative government the problem of totalitarian regimes; but dispassionate understatement can go too far, as when Mr Verney writes: 'The Hungarian Communist Party leadership after the rising of 1956 owed much of its support to its international connexions' (pp. 181-2). Indeed it did.

MAX BELOFF

GOVERNMENT BY CONSTITUTION: The Political Systems of Democracy. By Herbert J. Spiro. New York, Random House, 1959. xv+496 pp. Bibliog. Index. \$6.75.

THE American output of text-books on comparative political institutions must be significantly higher than in any other field of political science. Mr Spiro's book has this difference: that it is not simply a descriptive country-by-country analysis, but it purports to inquire into the effectiveness of democratic political institutions and procedures, and from this to deduce general rules useful to constitution-makers of the future. The book therefore has a rather unorthodox arrangement. Only one of its seven Parts is devoted to a description of political systems; the remaining Parts deal with general problems of political style, institutions and procedures, and representation, culminating in a discussion of the conditions of constitutional success.

This book was worth writing, and Mr Spiro has done it rather well. It takes the analysis of political institutions a stage further, and it should help students and practitioners of government to understand their own and emergent political societies. For an English reader there is too much ponderous Germanic jargon—for instance, 'the rule of anticipated reaction' (p. 348)—much of which simply disguises platitudes. And a more modest writer might hesitate blandly to lay claim to a deep knowledge of the political systems of eight countries on the strength of a bibliography almost exclusively written in English. This probably accounts for the fact that, while admiring Mr Spiro's general sweep and purpose, one is uneasily conscious of errors of detail, and suspicious of his evaluations and judgment.

BRIAN CHAPMAN

CONSTITUTIONS DES ÉTATS DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ. By P.-F. Gonidec. Paris, Sirey, 1959. 185 pp. Frs. 2,000.

PROFESSOR GONIDEC has collected in convenient form the texts of the Constitutions of the Fifth Republic of France, the twelve autonomous States of the Community, the Federation of Mali, and the Republic of Guinea. In a brief introductory essay he sketches the historical background and analyses the common features of these Constitutions. D. H.

HISTORY

DOCUMENTS ON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1919-1939. First Series. Vol. IX: German Affairs 1920. Ed. by Rohan Butler and J. P. T. Bury assisted by M. E. Lambert. London, H.M.S.O., 1960. lxvi + 744 pp. 70s.

The subject-matter of this latest volume of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy* is unusually homogeneous. The volume is concerned exclusively with Britain's relations with Germany during the first six months after the entry into force of the Treaty of Versailles, and the large majority of the documents reproduced are dispatches from British representatives in Germany, giving factual accounts of events there; the most important of these being the Kapp *Putsch*, the unrest in the Ruhr evoked by the *Putsch*, and the suppression by the German Government first of the *Putsch*, then of the rising. The far less numerous dispatches going out are, as a rule, unsensational; the most interesting feature in them is the difference of opinion between Britain, on the one hand, and France and Belgium, on the other. A very interesting dispatch from Lord Kilmarnock (then Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin), to which the editor rightly draws attention, sets out, in language which could have been used unchanged twenty-five years later, the dangers and advantages in a policy of conciliation, which might allow German militarism to revive, or of pure repression, which would kill that danger but would produce chaos from which the rest of Europe would not escape (pp. 57-8). It is a pity that Lord Curzon never seems to have answered this letter; Mr (as he then was) Headlam-Morley complains that he has 'completely failed to get any indication as to what is the attitude of the Government' towards helping Germany to recover (p. 76).

The last chapters show the graceful and grateful retreat of the Allied Governments before the refusal of the Dutch Government to allow them to Hang the Kaiser.

The editing is as meticulous as ever, with the usual austere (*sic*) drawing attention to any slip in spelling perpetrated by an unfortunate diplomat or typist. C. A. MACARTNEY

POWER, PUBLIC OPINION, AND DIPLOMACY. Essays in Honour of Eber Malcolm Carroll. By his Former Students. Ed. by Lillian Parker Wallace and William C. Askew. Foreword by William T. Laprade. Durham, N.C., Duke University Press; London, Cambridge University Press, 1959. xiv + 421 pp. Index. 65s. 6d.

THIS volume of essays presented to Eber Malcolm Carroll of Duke University by former pupils contains eleven miscellaneous essays on European diplomatic history during the last century, ranging from Palmerston's relations with Pope Pius IX in 1846-49 to an adverse judgment by William R. Rock on the negotiations conducted by the British Government with the Soviet Union on the eve of the second World War. 'The British', the author concludes (p. 336), 'were more determined to keep Russia out of Poland and the Baltic states than to secure her aid against Germany.' Equally critical is J. Bowyer Bell's judgment on French policy during the Spanish civil war. The danger of a European war was 'mostly bluff', and 'with only a minimum of risk' the French 'could have allowed the legal sale of arms to Madrid and insured a Republican victory' (p. 294). These

are probably the two most widely useful essays in the volume. There are also contributions from Sir Edward Grey and his critics, Austro-Italian relations between 1896 and 1914, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, Egypt as a factor in European power politics (1875-78), and the British attitude to Belgian neutrality during the war scare of 1887. In a concluding essay John Clinton Adams, reconsidering the old question whether Soviet foreign policy is 'the diplomatic expression of Marxism-Leninism' or 'only a continuation of the traditional policy of the Russian emperors', argues that there is a real continuity which is 'the product of two constants: geography and the Russian character' (p. 369).

G. BARRACLOUGH

DER SCHWIERIGE AUSSENSEITER: Erinnerungen eines Abgeordneten, Emigranten und Ministerpräsidenten. By Wilhelm Hoegner. Munich, Isar Verlag, 1959. 344 pp. Index. DM 24.50.

THIS volume of memoirs is more satisfactory than the author's *Die verrätene Republik* which appeared a year earlier (reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1960, p. 114). In the present volume the former Social Democratic Prime Minister of Bavaria looks back on his long political career, which began with a seat in the Landtag at Munich in 1924 and comprised a fateful three years as S.P.D. member of the Reichstag until he was expelled by the Nazis in 1933. Hoegner is rightly proud of acting according to his own individual judgment. He was never servile to the State, even under the Nazis or the American occupying power, or to his party, with which he had many a tussle. The most interesting contribution of the book is perhaps in the light it throws on developments within the Social Democratic Party and the trade union movement in the years from 1933 onwards. Hoegner scorns the meticulous surrender of party and union funds to the Nazis and generally feels that his party could have played its cards more skilfully in 1933. The book is full of the tragedy of the refugee, and it is only right and proper that some attention should now be focused on the suffering of the 'Aryan' opponent of the Nazi regime who had his home smashed by the storm-troopers and had to leave the country stealthily by night. After a further phase of persecution—this time in Austria, at the hands of the Dollfuss regime—the author and his family found a haven in Switzerland.

Hoegner's tenure of ministerial office in Bavaria unfortunately occupies too short a part of the book. This may be due to a reluctance on the author's part to go too much into the question of personalities which provides most of the content of *Land* politics. The events of the book—and the author's active political career—end on the curious note of the Social Democrat Premier of Bavaria accusing his coalition partners of *Verrat* (which means both betrayal and treason) when they destroyed the anti-C.S.U. Government in 1957.

FRANK EYCK

MEINE DANZIGER MISSION 1937-1939. By Carl J. Burckhardt. Munich, Verlag George D. W. Callwey, 1960. 366 pp. Map endpapers. Index. DM 24.

PROFESSOR BURCKHARDT'S long awaited account of his Mission to Danzig on behalf of the League of Nations makes an important contribution to the history of the Nazi period. The wealth of documentary material is not always handled with precision and clarity; much of it has already appeared in the *Documents on British Foreign Policy*, not always in exact translation.

Professor Burckhardt's greatest gift is perhaps a brilliance of personal perception. He is quick to observe, when he visits Colonel Beck at Whitsun 1939, that—at that of all periods—the signed photographs of Hitler and Mussolini have been moved from an ordinary sitting-room to the Polish Foreign Minister's private study to which even his wife might not penetrate (p. 299). Above everything, one feels, Professor Burckhardt is fascinated by the problem of

Hitler. 'Beinah möchte man versuchen, anstatt "er lügt" zu sagen, "es lügt aus ihm." Was dieses "es" ist, dies festzustellen wäre die Aufgabe der psychologischen Wissenschaft, die sich bis jetzt mit seinem Fall noch nicht wirklich auseinandergesetzt hat' (p. 268).

With regard to Professor Burckhardt's two and a half years in Danzig itself he reminds his readers of the interesting fact that the elections which fell due in the Free City during 1939 had not been held by the time the Germans attacked Poland. Originally a Nazi triumph had been expected which would have made possible a constitutional cancellation of the constitution guaranteed by the League of Nations: by 1939, however, Forster—or Hitler—was not certain that elections would strengthen the Nazi position. ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

THE FORMATION OF THE BALTIC STATES: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. By Stanley W. Page. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. ix + 193 pp. Index. \$4.50. 36s.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE BALTIC STATES 1918-1940. By Albert N. Tarulis. Introduction by Oscar Halecki. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. xii + 276 pp. Index. \$5.50.

SERIOUS scholars are now at last clarifying the history of the Baltic States from their foundation in 1918-20 to their annihilation by the Soviets in 1940. Mr Page gives a detailed account of the circumstances in which the three independent nations came into being when their powerful neighbours, Russia and Germany, were in a state of 'momentary prostration'. Dr Tarulis, on the other hand, covers every aspect of Russian policy towards the Baltic States between 1918 and 1940. Both Page and Tarulis show us that the Soviet Communists never really wanted Baltic independence even if at certain times they paid lip-service to the idea of national self-determination. To the young Russian Communist State the Baltic countries were the 'wall separating Russia from Germany'. This wall, so they argued, had to be broken down so that the Russian working class could both exercise a direct influence upon the course of the German revolution and make an impact on the Scandinavian countries (Tarulis, p. 47). The first Soviet attempt to capture the Baltic States was undertaken by revolutionary means in keeping with the general Communist outlook of the period. Mr Page pays much attention to this 'Red Interlude', namely, the temporary establishment of Soviet regimes in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. He contrasts the rejection of Bolshevism by the Estonians with its alleged acceptance by the Latvians. It would be equally true to say that the Hungarians accepted Bolshevism in 1919, since a short-lived Soviet Republic was then established in their country.

When the Soviet Union finally annexed the Baltic States in 1940 it no longer adhered to the ambitious revolutionary aims which the Russian Communists originally harboured. The annexation was primarily dictated by strategic considerations in the restricted military sense. What Dr Tarulis says about the events of the summer of 1940—the Soviet ultimatum to the Baltic Governments, the complete military occupation of the three countries, the faked elections to the Baltic 'People's Diets' and their vote for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.—makes fascinating reading. As a Lithuanian, Dr Tarulis is naturally better informed about the destinies of his own country than about those of the two other Baltic nations. However, the Soviet approach towards the three States was of a monotonous uniformity, and what the author says about Soviet behaviour in Kaunas equally applies to Riga and Tallin. The Soviets were determined to conceal their true intentions to the very last moment. Despite being in full military control of the Baltic countries, they still tried to convey the impression that Baltic independence was not endangered and Sovietization not envisaged. The demand for the incorporation of the Baltic States into the

U.S.S.R. was to be 'spontaneous', it was to come from the peoples themselves and from the deputies of new Baltic 'People's Diets'. The semblance of legality was to be preserved even if all speeches delivered during the 'incorporation sessions' of the Diets were either drafted or censored in Moscow. All this is clearly brought out in Dr Tarulis' well documented account. WALTER KOLARZ

THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN LITHUANIA. By Alfred Erich Senn. New York, Columbia University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. x+272 pp. Map. Bibliog. Index. (Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.) 48s.

MR SENN tells the somewhat extraordinary story of the foundation of the Lithuanian State, which nobody really wanted at first. He confines his narrative to the period 1918-20, when the future of the State was in the balance and when the Western Powers only grudgingly reconciled themselves to the existence of a new republic wedged between Germany, Poland, and Russia. Drawing on a vast range of material, mostly of Lithuanian and Polish origin, the author guides us safely through the confused situation existing in Lithuania immediately after the first World War, the struggle for recognition conducted by her political leaders, and the intrigues carried out by Lithuania's neighbours to undo the efforts of the Lithuanian nationalists.

Of particular interest is the short account which the author gives of the first Lithuanian Soviet Government established in January 1919, a Government which showed a total neglect of Lithuania's national peculiarities and refused even to recognize Lithuanian as the State language. 'The Lithuanian communist state,' says Senn, 'had no real basis for life. As a workers' state it lacked a proletariat, as an agricultural state . . . it incurred the enmity of even the poor peasants' (p. 81). Ultimately the Communists saw themselves compelled to abandon the idea of a separate Lithuanian Soviet State and decided to merge Lithuania with Byelorussia. The first Lithuanian Soviet Government was only an episode, but it goes far to explain why Communism had virtually no appeal for the Lithuanian people throughout the period between the wars. Mr Senn's work also shows us the roots of the unhappy relations between Poland and Lithuania in the inter-war period, but the author says with great fairness that, despite her hostility to Lithuania, it was Poland that saved the Lithuanian State. Had it not been for the 'miracle of the Vistula' in August 1920 the whole of Lithuania might have been taken by the Red Army, not in 1940, but twenty years earlier (p. 220). Without the Polish victory in the fight against the young Soviet State the great period of national rebirth which national independence brought to the Lithuanian people and to their culture might never have come about. It seems a pity that Mr Senn has not continued his account of the emergence of the Lithuanian State beyond the initial period. The Lithuanian State was not yet complete by the middle of 1920 and the struggle for the defence of the nation and its territory continued, as exemplified by the Polish coup in Vilna, the foundation of the Polish puppet state of Central Lithuania, and the Lithuanian incursion into the originally autonomous Memelland.

WALTER KOLARZ

WAR AND STRATEGY

NATO IN THE 1960's: The Implications of Interdependence. By Alastair Buchan. Foreword by Sir John Slessor. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson for the Institute of Strategic Studies, 1960. xii + 131 pp. Diagrams. 12s. 6d.

SINCE N.A.T.O. was founded, the Soviet challenge has become much more various. It is no longer exclusively military nor confined to Europe. The members of N.A.T.O. will increasingly find it necessary to divert resources to other areas. At the same time the development of Russian inter-continental

ballistic missiles and other atomic weapons has made the basic strategic problem of defending the N.A.T.O. area more complicated and more expensive. N.A.T.O. strategy must be reconsidered, and when it is, an increasingly prosperous Europe will almost certainly have to take a larger share of a larger burden.

From these premises Mr Buchan considers the military future of N.A.T.O., and concludes that interdependence must be carried much further than hitherto, in order to achieve efficiency, economy, and mutual trust. His theme is carefully developed over the whole range of N.A.T.O. military activity—in a small space he has achieved a *tour de force*—and it would be absurd to try to summarize. Necessarily, much of what he says is controversial. The Ministry of Defence has yet to accept his view of the role of conventional forces; his scheme for a mobile N.A.T.O. task force is still unorthodox; what he says about the weaknesses of such bodies as the Standing Group is naively mechanistic; but he has put a remarkably accurate finger on the important problems.

Undoubtedly the core of the book is Mr Buchan's suggestion for a deterrent force based in Europe and under the control of the alliance. That last phrase means, of course, that each separate member of the alliance would have to consent to its use. The political difficulty of achieving that needs no emphasis. But Mr Buchan's deterrent will have specific qualities that seem to him to make its use credible. First, it must be completely 'hard'—incapable of being destroyed before use. Second, it must be clearly and overtly directed against Soviet cities only, and not against military targets. It will thus be seen to be retaliatory, and so deterrent, but by no possibility offensive. And since it will only be used when much of Western Europe has already been destroyed, it should be possible, Mr Buchan thinks, to get advance agreement on the conditions of its use.

To this proposal Mr Buchan's other suggestions are subsidiary. He makes it in the first study of what may well become an important series from the Institute for Strategic Studies. Professor P. M. S. Blackett, a member of the Council of the Institute, in a dissenting opinion included in the book, rejects the proposal for reasons which are essentially political. His postscript is a salutary reminder that the difficulty of strategic forecasting is as nothing to that of political forecasting—and that N.A.T.O. is no more than an alliance.

In this field it is worth noting that Mr Buchan's book is terse and well written, and that he is still fighting, though hardly winning, against military jargon. (Language is surely too serious to be left to generals.) He knows that a simple and controversial point is not made simpler or less controversial by turgid repetition. And since his object is to persuade, that is much.

A. E. CAMPBELL

NATO AND AMERICAN SECURITY. Ed. by Klaus KNORR. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. v + 342 pp. Index. 48s.

MR KNORR and the ten contributors to this book offer a most sincere study of the complex problems affecting the strategy of Western defence, problems to which only practical solutions can give any hope of a stable peace.

Primarily their concern is to discover the most reasonable policy available to the United States for the defence of the West, and this policy must provide a credible deterrent against all-out war and at the same time prevent minor aggressions. The implications of Russia's lead in rocketry and the changing role that N.A.T.O. must play in the strategy are discussed in great detail. If the threat of suicidal nuclear retaliation is only credible when used in defence of vital interests, other means must be found effectively to deter small-scale attacks and subversion or nuclear blackmail of N.A.T.O.'s weaker partners.

Detailed consideration is also given to possible ways of lessening the advantages of surprise attack, to the desirability of 'counterforce' capability as opposed to, or in conjunction with, 'countercity' capability and the value of protected

launching bases, and to the implications of arming the N.A.T.O. allies with tactical and medium range nuclear weapons.

The book is well indexed and annotated, but the whole subject is of course limited by the cloak of security, which forbids access to much needed information. Mr Schelling's contribution on *Surprise Attack and Disarmament* is weakened by his basing his arguments too much on the use of aircraft, and the British reader may share my irritation at the authors' love of parenthesis, their trick of writing in the negative, and their tendency to cloud important passages by an unnecessary resort to high-sounding jargon.

However, the book deserves the widest audience for the excellence of its logical exposition and its sincere attempt to elucidate a complex question which concerns public opinion throughout the N.A.T.O. alliance. E. D. CARTER

STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL: First Steps in Nuclear Disarmament. By Wayland Young. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1959. 94 pp. (A Penguin Special.) 2s. 6d.

WAYLAND YOUNG argues, somewhat angrily, for the abolition of nuclear weapons on moral grounds, and that the West's willingness to use such weapons degrades our culture to such an extent that we may lose all claim to survival, and become not worth defending. He presents the case for the formation of the non-nuclear club, with the difference that the club members should allow Russia or America to station missile bases on their territory in return for guarantees that missiles so based 'would in no circumstances be used first' (p. 64).

Unfortunately his arguments are too superficial, and party political bias creeps in unnecessarily; there are too many half-truths, too much panic, and too much wishful thinking for the book to be convincing. Almost no consideration is given to Soviet aims or strategy, and on flimsy arguments he seriously wishes his reader to adopt the 'better red than dead' philosophy, without regard for the possibility that, with care, both may be avoided. E. D. CARTER

THE LOGIC OF DEFENCE: A Short Study of the 'Nuclear' Dilemma. By Patrick Lort-Phillips. Forewords by Sir Norman Angell and Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Purley, Surrey, Radical Publications, 1959. 95 pp. 4s. 6d.

As stated in the author's preface, this book was originally intended for private circulation and discussion in the Liberal Party, and its political intent is undisguised. The author's central thesis is that as no defence against the ballistic missile exists or can be hoped for, the policy of seeking protection by arming ourselves with similar weapons is one of pure revenge, and can only result in suicide. It is a bluff which one day is bound to be called. The primary task of our policy should therefore be to win the allegiance of the Communist peoples to the Western cultural and economic way of life by creating an atmosphere of trust in which the deadlock between East and West can be broken.

Colonel Lort-Phillips is perhaps most lucid in his discussion of the Nuclear Threat in Chapter 5 (p. 55), but the book as a whole contains too many 'ifs' and too many astonishing contradictions to withstand logical criticism.

E. D. CARTER

SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS ORIGINS

THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE: Vol. II. By W. N. Medlicott. London, H.M.S.O., and Longmans, Green, 1959. xii + 727 pp. Maps. Tables. Index. (History of the Second World War. United Kingdom Civil Series, ed. by Sir Keith Hancock.) 50s.

THIS second volume concludes Professor Medlicott's monumental history of the economic blockade in the last war. He takes the story from the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. (June 1941) and the Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbour

(December 1941) down to the summer of 1945. In this period the blockade became a joint Anglo-American concern, whereas until 1941 it had been a matter of British effort only. The immediate aims of Allied strategy were to prevent blockade-running between the vast areas under Axis domination and to exert pressure upon neutrals to reduce their aid to Germany. This patient and ultimately successful pressure took many forms, ranging from Allied controls over foreign funds, freezing arrangements, black lists, pre-emptive purchases, and compulsory rationing to contraband control. The use of these methods is brilliantly described as, for instance, in the intense struggle over iron-ore and ballbearing exports from Sweden, chrome from Turkey, and wolfram from Portugal and Spain.

Blockade was however only one of the 'economic warfare' weapons to defeat the enemy's economic effort. The others were to outproduce the enemy and to destroy by direct attack his ability to manufacture and move goods. 'No one expected the blockade to win the war single handed', says Professor Medicott (p. 630), and indeed 'at no stage of the war was Germany decisively weakened by shortages due to the blockade alone' (p. 631). However, it limited the rate of Axis output expansion and often made available for Allied use the resources of which the Axis Powers were deprived. These effects of the blockade were reinforced by attacks on German centres of production and communication, thus contributing to the softening of the enemy before the decisive military onslaughts could be carried out by the Allied armed forces.

Basing his account of the blockade on official Allied and Axis documents, Professor Medicott brilliantly succeeds in merging detailed facts into the broad outline of rapidly changing strategical requirements. It is an exciting and well-balanced history and most certainly will remain to be the principal standard work on this aspect of the last war.

H. C. HILLMANN

THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST. Vol. III. (September 1941 to September 1942.) British Fortunes reach their Lowest Ebb. By Major-General I. S. O. Playfair and others. London, H.M.S.O., 1960. xix + 482 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Index. 50s.

The third volume of the history of the war in the Mediterranean and Middle East covers a period of ten months (November 1941 to September 1942) which superficially appeared to end with little change in the balance of forces. Taking the theatre in isolation, the position of the front line in North Africa when General Auchinleck relinquished his command was not very far from where it had been when he took it up, though the shift back to the Egyptian frontier represented a grave defeat following upon an indecisive victory. The major events of the war in this period took place elsewhere: in Russia, where the German advance threatened the Caucasus and consequently also what is now called the 'northern tier' of the Middle East; in the Far East, where Japan and the U.S.A. entered the war; and at sea, where victory over the U-boats was still not in sight. General Auchinleck's year of command in the Middle East was as unlucky and frustrating a period as could have been chosen.

The official historians' careful and exhaustive survey shows that behind the façade of stalemate (which was if anything apparently in favour of the enemy), there were in fact decisive changes to the advantage of the British. The latter were able, in spite of everything, 'to hold their vital bases' (p. 392). (Tobruk was neither vital nor a base, and the authors believe that the fall of Tobruk, by encouraging Rommel to press on for Alexandria, in fact saved Malta from being overrun.) The build-up of supplies to the Eighth Army was growing every day, though General Auchinleck was denied the final triumph of exploiting them. On the possible shortcomings of the higher command the authors are fair but cautious. High praise is awarded to Auchinleck personally, and Churchill's own testimony is adduced in support; but some of his measures in

June and July 1942 'seemed to the men in the ranks inconsistent with a firm determination to fight' (p. 333), and the historians are by implication on their side.

C. M. WOODHOUSE

AUSTRALIA IN THE WAR OF 1939-1945. Series One. Army. Vol. v. South-West Pacific Area—First Year: Kokoda to Wau. By Dudley McCarthy. Canberra, Australian War Memorial; London, Angus & Robertson, 1959. xiv+656 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Index. 30s.

THIS volume, in the series of Australian Official Military Histories, tells a story which is not widely known in this country. It is well produced and well mapped and the lessons and facts it discloses are unlikely to be found elsewhere. It opens in the spring of 1942, when the Japanese, having taken all their planned objectives, undertook further operations to seize Milne Bay and Port Moresby in Papua and the whole of the Solomon group of islands. It ends a year later with the failure of both these thrusts and with the Japanese reeling from their first defeats. During this period, General MacArthur, after his withdrawal from Corregidor, was the Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area with his headquarters in Australia and with General Blamey in command of the Allied Land Forces under him. His system of exercising such a command was scarcely a happy one for his Allies, and the Australians did not find him easy to work with.

Though the author is primarily concerned with the fighting in Papua, he includes sufficient detail of the battle for Guadalcanal, in the Solomons, to show the interrelation of these two campaigns, for to some extent the sea and air forces available were common to both. The operations in Papua, in almost virgin jungle, are well described and the accounts well supported by the sixty-six sketches included. Under such conditions the forces actually in contact could never be large and the fighting consisted of a series of local engagements of varying size.

At Milne Bay the Japanese plans miscarried. Torrential rain bogged down all quick movement on land and the R.A.A.F. destroyed the invasion barges, which might have made sea-borne manoeuvre possible. At small cost to the Australians more than two thousand Japanese were killed. In the main thrust from Buna, across the Owen Stanley range, by the 'Kokoda Rail', larger forces were deployed and the Japanese were approaching Port Moresby before they were halted and forced to retreat. Assisted administratively by an air-lift, the Australian-American forces followed up comparatively quickly, but heavy fighting took place along the northern seaboard before the last remnant of the Japanese invaders was exterminated in the Sanananda area. A further twelve thousand Japanese had perished and if the Allied casualty lists were not light, there can be little doubt now that MacArthur was right in forcing this campaign to its bitter conclusion. Two reasons probably dominated his thoughts: the need for a resounding Allied victory, and the establishment in security of the big air bases he required for his further advance. H. LATHAM

THE POWER OF SMALL STATES: Diplomacy in World War II. By Annette Baker Fox. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press; London, Cambridge University Press, 1959. ix+212 pp. Bibliog. Index. 4ts. 6d.

MRS FOX here gives a brief, clear, and careful account of how the Governments of Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain responded to the pressures of great Powers during the second World War, and managed with varying degrees of success to prove that small and militarily weak States are by no means automatically reduced to being helpless pawns in international politics, even in times when the capacity for violence seems to determine events everywhere. By keeping the book short and to the point, despite her extensive reading and

research, she has produced a work that will not only inform and refresh the minds of those already versed in the diplomatic history of this period, but also—and, perhaps, above all—help the less experienced student of international politics to understand and use the concept of ‘power’ with more discrimination than is shown by all too many writers on ‘power politics’. It could most profitably be put in the hands of those university students whose enjoyment and comprehension of the variety of opportunity in most international situations is dulled by crude visions of a world of dominant and dominated States, super-Powers here, and ‘satellites’ there, with ‘bi-polarization’ to boot. Today, with such terms becoming ever more misleading, in a world of more and more small States, and of one-time great Powers discovering what it is like to feel smaller, this is an opportune lesson to learn, or, if learned already, to pass on. Moreover, it is a pleasure in itself to read so complicated a story of changing circumstances, seized opportunities, timely manoeuvres, and dramatic miscalculations, so concisely and lucidly told, with the author’s general conclusions and propositions about the power of small States not too obtrusively presented, and with enough evidence either recorded or noted for reference by which to test them. Especially so, when the nations concerned are ones about which we talk with respect but read rather less than we like to admit.

ALAN DE RUSSETT

THE HOUSE BUILT ON SAND: The Conflicts of German Policy in Russia 1939–1945. By Gerald Reitlinger. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1960. 459 pp. Map. Index. 36s.

The House Built on Sand is a further analysis of the German invasion of Russia in 1941 and its appalling consequences. As an expert on the Nazi SS Mr Reitlinger’s approach is slightly different from that of Mr Dallin,¹ but the essential character of the story remains the same. It is that of Hitler’s supreme folly and crime, his attempt to exterminate any loyal subjects of Stalin according to the instructions he gave to the chiefs of his army on 30 March 1941. ‘It may be,’ Mr Reitlinger writes of the Commissar Order, ‘that in March 1941 Hitler hoped to enslave the High Command to his will by incriminating them in something which would make it impossible for them to sue for peace over his head, if the campaign failed.’ But it is difficult to suppose that Hitler contemplated German failure: indeed he was at the same time planning the German colonization of Russia with here and there fragmentary Russian states managed along primitive socialist lines.

Millions of Russians and other Slavs were killed or left to starve as the result of Hitler’s orders and their faithful execution by men like Erich Koch, whose trial took place in Poland only two years ago. Other millions were, however, saved by the need for labour in the German Reich at war, and small numbers escaped, at least temporarily, into volunteer formations organized by the Reichswehr. The tragedy of General Vlasov completed the circle.

Mr Reitlinger’s book undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution to recent history though it is technically marred by misprints such as *Entkreisung* instead of *Einkreisung*, by inaccessible notes, and by a chronology which begins at least three months late. It is surprising, too, that he makes no reference to the material collected by the Institut für Zeitgeschichte in Munich and refers to *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941*² rather than to the fuller collection of *Documents on German Foreign Policy*³ for the period.

ELIZABETH WISKEMANN

¹ *German Rule in Russia 1941–1945: A Study of Occupation Policies*, by Alexander Dallin (London, Macmillan, 1957). Reviewed in *International Affairs*, January 1958, pp. 83–4.

² Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1948.

³ Series D (1937–45) (London, H.M.S.O., 1949–).

LAW

INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE CASES. 2nd ed. By L. C. Green. London, Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs, 1959. xxix+885 pp. Index. (Library of World Affairs, ed. by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger.) 75s.

THE present edition of Mr Green's case book contains some useful additional cases, and the choice of authorities as a whole is unexceptionable. The 'bias', apart from decisions of international tribunals, is in favour of English case law, as indeed is proper in a case book intended mainly for students reading international law at English universities. That being so, however, it would have been preferable to adapt all headnotes to the system used in English law reports, rather than adopt an entirely different system. It is disconcerting to find in some instances that the Court of Appeal has decided a case in a certain way and then to be confronted with the bare statement that the House of Lords has reversed the Court of Appeal. Where a case ultimately reaches the House of Lords the most suitable way surely is to state the proposition laid down by the House of Lords in the headnote in what lawyers call the 'Held'. The system adopted here puts a heavy burden on students. This may well have been the intention in order to force students to read the judgements and not merely the headnotes, but to expect them to read a case book of about 900 pages without being tempted to rely to some extent on headnotes only is wholly unrealistic, and once this is recognized, it follows that the headnotes should be as complete in themselves as is humanly possible. The field of international law is well covered except for modern case law on the extraterritorial operation of foreign legislation, and in particular the nationalization and confiscation of private property, a subject of considerable practical importance in the law reports of practically every western country.

F. HONIG

DICIONNAIRE DE LA TERMINOLOGIE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL. Tables in English, Spanish, Italian, German. Preface by J. Basdevant. Paris, Sirey for the Union Académique Internationale, 1960. xi+755 pp. *Frs.* 5,200

WHEN the preparation of this important work was first undertaken in 1938 the editors envisaged its publication within about five years. This, even apart from the suspension of work necessitated by the outbreak of war, would probably have proved a somewhat optimistic forecast. In fact, it has taken about ten years to complete this vast undertaking.

The *Dictionnaire* does not set out to compete with or duplicate such publications as the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts und der Diplomatie*—the second edition of which is now in course of preparation—but adopts what the French call the *méthode lexicographique*. It is thus not an encyclopaedia of international law but a dictionary which defines and explains the terms current in international law and relations by reference to treaties, diplomatic correspondence, the decisions of international tribunals, and the minutes of international conferences. The editors decided to omit references to archaic terms and to take as their point of departure the Paris Declaration of 1856. Occasionally reference is made to older treaties, such as the Acts of the Congress of Vienna and the Conference of London.

The names most prominently associated with the *Dictionnaire* are those of Judge Basdevant, the late Arnold Raestad, and Professors Hudson and De Visscher. There are many others whose scholarship and devoted work have contributed to its successful completion. The work will go far to reassert the claim of French as the traditional language of diplomacy, and its value to those more familiar with languages other than French is enhanced by four alphabetical tables (in English, German, Italian, and Spanish) giving in each case the French equivalent of the relevant entry. All that is then required is to turn to the main part of the dictionary for an explanation of the term in French.

The suspension of work during the war has proved to be a blessing in disguise because it has enabled the editors to include references to recent events and in particular the case law of the International Court of Justice and developments in the United Nations and other international organizations. F. HONIG

JAHRBUCH DES ÖFFENTLICHEN RECHTS DER GEGENWART: Neue Folge/Band 8.
Ed. by Gerhard Leibholz. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1959. 482 pp. Index.
DM 56.

It is virtually impossible, within the compass of a short review, to do justice to all the extremely interesting and topical contributions contained in the present volume which is again published under the erudite editorship of Professor Leibholz. Their range is extraordinarily wide and covers different aspects of constitutional law in eleven countries.

The position which the Constitutional Court occupies in the constitutional framework of Italy is the subject of a critical analysis by its President—Azzariti—who places the Court on an equal footing in the constitutional hierarchy with the Italian Parliament, because as much as the latter it performs the function of a guardian of the Constitution. Professor Cole, of Duke University, has contributed a survey of the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court between 1956 and 1958. This period covers such important decisions as the question of the legality of the Communist Party and the issues of the *Concordat* case. The latter case threw into prominent relief the peculiarity of German constitutional law which assigns education to the competence of the *Länder*. One of the most interesting contributions is that of Kovar and Bloch on the Executive and the Legislature in the Fifth Republic (pp. 216-63). Appended to it is the important address of General de Gaulle on 4 September 1958 which introduced the French people, as it were, to the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic. Also of considerable interest—because otherwise virtually inaccessible—are the surveys of constitutional development in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland since the end of the war. One of the contributions in this volume goes slightly beyond the customary scope of the *Jahrbuch* and deals with a problem of constitutional *cum* international law. This is Professor Friedrich's paper on Puerto Rico as an Associated State of the United States of America (pp. 463-75). Those fortunate enough to possess the entire series of the *Jahrbuch* will require little—if anything—more to provide them with a complete survey of the development of constitutional law and theory since the end of the last war. F. HONIG

RECOGNITION IN THE LAW OF NATIONS. By Satyavrata Ramdas Patel. Bombay, N. M. Tripathi; London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1959. ix+122 pp. Rs. 24. 30s.

THE doctrine of international law has been so dominated by the traditions of Europe and America that contributions from other parts of the world are always especially welcome. Mr Patel, an advocate of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, could hardly have chosen a more interesting subject on which to write than Recognition. Unfortunately he scarcely rises to the occasion. This is because in a volume of modest proportions he has attempted to do too much. It would have been really worth while and original if he had analysed the practice of the newly independent Asian States in the matter of Recognition since the end of the second World War. Instead he has preferred to engage, without giving proper references, in the somewhat arid doctrinal controversies which have divided European writers on the subject for a number of years. Thus, he discusses both the declaratory and the constitutive theories of Recognition; the view of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht (of whom he is especially critical) that, while Recognition may be constitutive of legal rights, it must be granted as a matter of law when the appropriate conditions exist; the retroactive effect of Recognition;

premature Recognition; *de jure* and *de facto* Recognition; Recognition of Belligerency and Insurgency; Implied Recognition; the withdrawal of Recognition; and the Principle of Non-Recognition. These chapters are competently written, though with little originality. Also, the author's approach is inclined to be too theoretical and to pay insufficient attention to State practice and the decisions of tribunals. Finally, it is a pity that neither a bibliography nor an index has been provided.

D. H. N. JOHNSON

DIE VORZEITIGE ANERKENNUNG IM VÖLKERRECHT. By Hans-Herbert Teuscher. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1959. 125 pp. Bibliog.

THE author shares the view of those who believe that the act of recognition of States, Governments, and insurgents is a political act not governed by firm and ascertainable rules of law. This view is indeed borne out by State practice, as the examples of China, Germany, and Israel show, and the question whether premature recognition constitutes an international delinquency giving rise to a duty to make reparation does not arise in practice. It also reduces to an academic exercise the controversy between the advocates of the constitutive and declaratory doctrines which has exercised the minds of academic lawyers for over a century. On the other hand, as far as the specific problem of premature recognition is concerned, the question still remains whether such recognition can rightly be regarded as intervention by third States in the internal affairs of a country which has fallen victim to insurgency, civil war, or secession. Here again it would seem that as recognition is a matter for the executive of the recognizing State whose decision is binding on the courts, the problem has never been resolved by judicial means. The two best known cases of premature recognition—that of the United States by France and of Panama by the United States—were, it is true, the subject of protests by Great Britain and Colombia, but they were never the subject of judicial determination.

The author's approach to the problem, while it may not always commend itself to legal purists, is realistic and well documented and has undoubtedly merit as a survey of State practice which, whether one likes it or not, is far more important than legal doctrine.

F. HONIG

BERICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN GESELLSCHAFT FÜR VÖLKERRECHT. Heft 3. Verhandlungen der Tagung der Gesellschaft in Frankfurt am Main am 9. und 10. April 1959. Karlsruhe, Verlag C. F. Müller, 1959. vii+150 pp. DM 11.

THE report covering the sixth session of the Gesellschaft für Völkerrecht contains four contributions on public and private international law and a survey of the resources of the Federal Republic for the study and teaching of private international law. In recent years the Society has conducted comprehensive inquiries at German universities to discover how far their resources in manpower and library facilities are capable of meeting the increasing demands of a country in the midst of European and international integration. The general feeling seems to be that not enough has been done to train lawyers in subjects formerly outside the scope of the average practising lawyer. Yet German universities and research institutes are more richly endowed with resources to meet the demands of specialized studies in international and comparative law than those of most other countries, and the monographs produced by many of the institutes in the course of the last ten years bear witness to their remarkable industry. What apparently exercises the minds of those who teach these subjects is the fear that their numbers are at present inadequate to ensure that the rising generation of lawyers will be sufficiently versed in the new disciplines.

The curricula of universities, both here and abroad, are becoming more and more overloaded, and one may doubt the wisdom of increasing the burden of students even further. What will eventually have to be faced is the need to provide entirely separate facilities for those who intend to practise law in the

traditional sense at home, and those whose interests are centred on subjects transcending national frontiers. It will be interesting to see how other countries intend to solve this difficult problem, and the survey contained in this report may help towards this end.

Of the papers read at the conference covered by the report special mention may be made of Professor Bülck's *Systematik der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaften* (pp. 66-115) which contains a comprehensive account of the legal and economic aspects of European integration. F. HONIG

DER SCHUTZ VON KULTURGUT IM KRIEG: Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Konvention zum Schutze des Kulturguts im Falle eines bewaffneten Konfliktes vom 14. Mai 1954. By Karl-Heinrich Buhse. Hamburg, Hansischer Gildeverlag, Joachim Heitmann, 1959. 150 pp. Bibliog. DM 16.40.

ATTEMPTS to provide for the protection of cultural property in time of war have not been lacking in the course of the last half century. None of them, however, produced tangible results. Although certain provisions of the Hague Regulations contained oblique references to the subject they were wholly inadequate to secure the object of preserving the cultural heritage of the world in time of armed conflict. The bitter experience of the first and second World Wars has at last brought forth a comprehensive convention which may achieve the desired result. As in the past, however, the protection of cultural property is conditional in the sense that it is subject, to all intents and purposes, to the requirements of military necessity. This concept, as experience has shown, is sufficiently wide to justify measures which go far beyond what would normally be regarded as lawful means of war. Nevertheless, such provisions of the present Convention as article 28, whereby the Contracting Parties undertake to take all necessary legislative measures to punish persons acting in violation of the Convention, may result in more effective protection of cultural property than has been the case so far. It is also important to observe that the Convention applies in the case of 'armed conflict' as well as war, and special provision is also made for 'armed conflicts not of an international character'. This accords with the provisions governing the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.

The author traces the history of the Convention from its rudimentary beginnings in 1899 and deals fully with its provisions. He also sets out in full the German translation of the Convention and the draft Declarations of 1933 and 1938, which, as a result of the outbreak of the second World War, were never adopted. F. HONIG

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL

THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES: Essays in Honor of Bernard Francis Haley. By Moses Abramovitz and others. Stanford University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. 244 pp. Tables. Diagrams. \$5. 40s.

IN matters of subject and of analytical treatment this is a very varied collection of essays. They cover problems relating to the working of the monetary system, the interpretation of national income statistics, and a wide variety of matters relating to various aspects of the pricing system. Some are mathematical, some are literary. But they have a unifying feature in their high quality. There can be no doubt that this is an interesting volume into which to dip.

It is hardly practical in a brief review to comment on all the essays; but some remarks on one or two may be permissible. A good deal of contemporary discussion of economic growth is conducted on the assumption that increases in output per head are synonymous with growth. The merits of alternative economic systems are debated purely in terms of how much they contribute to higher output per head. It is thus particularly refreshing to read Abramovitz's

discussion of what output trends mean in terms of economic welfare. One hopes that his essay will be widely read and give pause to some who regard output changes as a sufficient measure of growth in economic welfare.

At least two of the essays, those by Arrow and Scitovsky, turn on aspects of the question of how far the price mechanism provides adequate information for output and investment decisions. Arrow draws our attention to some possible limitations of perfect competition as an allocative mechanism. Unfortunately he does not really give much guidance on the practical significance of the limitations. Scitovsky is concerned with some of the problems of balanced versus unbalanced growth. At root the matter is one of the information at the disposal of the private entrepreneur.

Throughout the book, the essays have something interesting and significant to say. A. D. KNOX

THE COMMON MARKET. By J. F. Deniau. London, Barrie and Rockliff with Pall Mall Press, 1960. iv + 139 pp. Index. 15s.

The author is Director in charge of relations with 'third' countries in the Directorate-General of External Relations at the European Economic Community headquarters at Brussels. His book is partly a commentary on the provisions of the Rome Treaty and partly a dissertation on the theory of the large market. To some extent the book has been overtaken by events, and it is probable that M. Deniau would now like to revise chapter XI, 'The Case of France', which was written before the devaluation and quota liberalization of 1 January 1959. Even so, this is an important book, not so much for what it says about the Rome Treaty, interesting as this is, as for the attitude of mind it reveals. This is the unquestioning, uncritical view of six-nation European integration written by a dedicated member of the group who wanted, in M. Spaak's words, to go 'faster and farther'. 'Other approaches to the necessary expansion of markets are doubtless possible in other circumstances', M. Deniau writes (p. 7), but 'the Treaty of Rome has not come about merely through the vagaries of negotiations' (p. 7). Those countries that are disturbed at the new developments 'fail—unwittingly or not—to appreciate the benefits which the Common Market brings in its own field' (p. 131). M. Deniau believes that the solution arrived at is the only possible one. This, rather late in the day, is seen by people in this country to be the view of the Commission as well. All of which is going to make the search for a rapprochement between the Six and Seven very difficult indeed.

RICHARD BAILEY

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND ITS MEANING TO THE UNITED STATES. A Statement on National Policy by the Research and Policy Committee, Committee for Economic Development. Foreword by T. V. Houser. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill, 1959. 151 pp. Illus. Tables, Diagrams. 37s. \$4.75.

ISSUED in May 1959, this publication falls into three parts. The National Policy Statement itself stresses first of all the need for a realistic philosophy which would provide guiding principles to judge the rights and wrongs of departures from multilateral non-discriminatory world commerce and finance. As to the European Common Market and the economic problems it creates for the rest of the world, the Committee considered (i) that in the European context a Free Trade Area or something like it should be supported, (ii) that in the world trade context barriers should be reduced substantially, and (iii) that in the context of United States commercial policy gradual and selective tariff reduction be accompanied by U.S. support for G.A.T.T. through membership in the proposed Organization for Trade Cooperation. Adequate measures in the field of aid, international monetary co-operation, and world commodity trade which would truly encourage world-wide economic development are also recommended and

their relevance is shown. There follows a contribution by C.E.P.E.S., an organization of French, German, and Italian business men, on the problems of the Common Market. Finally, some appendices include extensive statistical documentation. This is an informative report and although events have moved on there is material here that remains of interest. MARIANNE GELLNER

L'ASSOCIATION DES PAYS D'OUTRE-MER À LA COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE EUROPÉENNE. By Pierre-Bernard Cousté. Preface by Maurice Byé. Paris, Librairies Techniques, 1959. xvi+286 pp. Frs. 1,500.

THIS represents, in effect, a concise, extensively documented, and well organized presentation of the case for an integrated 'Eurafrica' in which Europe stands for the Six and Africa for the overseas countries associated with them. Part I deals with the theoretical and practical problems of development as they exist in the overseas countries, examining the characteristics of economic development, the terms of trade, the effect of pre-war colonial rule and of post-war development plans, and the extent of present economic integration between the African dependencies and the metropolitan countries. Part II is devoted to the anticipated impact of the Rome Treaty. An early chapter in this section makes short shrift of the wider Free Trade Area proposals as contributing nothing to development prospects of the African territories associated with the Six and bringing possible disadvantages which might completely defeat the purposes of the association if, by any chance, British and Portuguese overseas territories were included. There follows a commodity-by-commodity examination of the possibilities under the Rome Treaty for export expansion of cocoa, coffee, bananas, and so on, notably from French Africa to France's five Common Market partners, and at the expense of existing sources of supply. The price aspect is not neglected and there is a separate chapter on the problems created by price levels higher than world prices in the hitherto highly protective franc zone. Another chapter deals with investment prospects in the overseas territories, and a final part with the mutual advantages of 'Eurafrican' integration and the '*organisation du grand espace Europe-Afrique*' for the full utilization of the economic development potential of French Africa and the Belgian Congo. The author argues that the association would not be narrow, exclusive, and protectionist but a necessary step towards achieving world-wide economic integration. Extensive footnote references to source material are given, though the annotations are sometimes incomplete and occasionally lack the publication date. An unfortunate, rather obvious and, one is tempted to think, psychologically-founded error appears in a table on aid to under-developed countries which reproduces rather rough-and-ready estimates from a Council of Europe report. The estimated totals for the fifteen members of the Council of Europe are erroneously designated as the totals for 'Europe of the Six' (p. 112). Nevertheless, the book may be studied with profit by many in this country and gives much food for thought. MARIANNE GELLNER

TARIFFS AND TRADE IN WESTERN EUROPE. London, Allen & Unwin for Political and Economic Planning, 1959. 119 pp. Tables. 30s.

THE tariff structures in Western Europe have for some years been an important focal point of policy discussion yet this is the first time that any comprehensive comparative tables of national tariff rates have been made available in published form, though at least one other tariff study, that of the Iveroth Committee of the European Industrial Federation, is reported to be in preparation. The present publication has emerged as part of P.E.P.'s Ford-subsidized study programme on 'Britain and the European Market'. It presents some 1,000 customs items selected from the United Kingdom import statistics to cover nearly 90 per cent of Britain's imports in 1956. The rates of duty charged by Britain are compared with those of the other members of the European Free Trade Association

and with those that serve as bases for calculating the ultimate common external tariff of the European Economic Community, i.e. the duties in force in the six Common Market countries on 1 January 1957. (The unilateral German tariff reduction enacted later in that year is thus disregarded.) Alongside are given estimates of the proposed common tariff of the Community, on which negotiations determining its precise level were then still in an early stage. The data are arranged to convey at a glance the different rates which apply to individual import items together with the sources of imports for Britain of each of these items as divided between the Six, the other O.E.E.C. countries, the Commonwealth, and the rest of the world. Four summary trade tables give an indication of the trade pattern as it obtained in 1958 within and between the trade groupings formed by the Six and the Seven, both for total trade and for manufactures.

The material is admirably produced and of evident value, particularly for the study of tariff harmonization as a possible means of facilitating an association of the two groups. It is a pity that no attempt was made to include some analysis of the data or, at least, to provide more explanatory information. A timely piece of work for all that, inevitably handicapped by the difficulty of keeping up with events.

MARIANNE GELLNER

ÉTUDE DES INITIATIVES INTERNATIONALES EN VUE DE LA STABILISATION DES MARCHÉS DES PRODUITS DE BASE. By Harold François Wilkinson. Geneva, Librairie E. Droz; Paris, Librairie Minard, 1959. 162 pp. Tables. Diagrams. Bibliog. (Études d'Histoire Économique, Politique et Sociale XXVIII.) *Sw. Frs.* 15.

DR WILKINSON repeats several generalizations about primary products which can be accepted only with considerable qualification. For example, he elaborates the view that the demand for them is very inelastic. How does this square with the marked upward trend in the consumption of certain commodities, for example sugar? If it applies only to the short run, and leaves out the effects of changes in incomes and tastes, is it a good basis for long-term policy? Such considerations throw doubt on the assumption that stable prices are always desirable. Suppose that the trend of costs is downward, owing for example to the growing use of higher-yielding planting material, should not this be reflected in a downward price trend? If there is room for a marked increase in consumption, would not this be hastened by lower prices?

What may be accepted, however, is that large price fluctuations, first in one direction and then in the other, are harmful. Dr Wilkinson discusses possible ways of damping down such fluctuations, and gives an account of the working of the international commodity agreements on wheat, tin, and sugar. He favours international buffer stocks, rather than export quotas, as a stabilizing mechanism. But the costs would be heavy, probably too heavy for the exporting countries alone; there might well be bitter disputes about the price-limits to be adopted and whether they should be changed as time goes on; and if a buffer-stock scheme should collapse through unwise management or lack of finance the consequent fall in price might be disastrous.

One can agree with his conclusion (p. 151) that the greatest contribution which the industrialized countries could make to the problems of the countries relying on exports of primary products would be to reduce their own agricultural protection.

F. BENHAM

EUROPEAN TRADE CYCLE POLICY. By F. Hartog. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff for the Council of Europe, 1959. 55 pp. Diagrams. Tables. (European Aspects: A Collection of Studies relating to European Integration. Series B: Studies in Economics, No. 1.) *Fl.* 2.90.

THIS publication is one in a series on European economic integration problems by holders of research fellowships awarded by the Council of Europe. The

present volume was written by a young Dutch economist, the head of the International Section of the Netherlands Central Planning Bureau and a teacher at the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague and at the College of Europe in Bruges. Completed as far back as July 1956, it argues for co-ordinated European action to maintain monetary stability. It is linguistically awkward for the English reader and its treatment of the subject is somewhat cursory and remote from the practical problems of today.

MARIANNE GELLNER

COMMUNIST ECONOMIC STRATEGY: Soviet Growth and Capabilities. By Alec Nove. Foreword by Henry G. Aubrey. Washington D.C., National Planning Association, 1959; London, Oxford University Press, 1960. xi+82 pp. Tables. \$2.25. 18s.

MR NOVE's study is a contribution to the project on the economics of coexistence and he addresses himself to an investigation of Soviet potentialities in the 'co-existential' competition with the West. As the Director of the project, Professor Aubrey, notes, while detailed studies have been written on various specific aspects of the Bloc economy, Mr Nove was asked to write an essay that 'passes over the detail in favor of a broad impression' (p. x). It is indeed imperative to have a look from time to time at the Soviet Union's wood as well as her trees.

The author's point of departure is an evaluation of the Soviet Union's and her Bloc's growth in the past, with a projection into the future. The central tenet which emerges is that severe strains in capital resources would be inevitable if the Bloc's high rate of industrial expansion were to be combined with other objectives now pursued. Few independent students would question Mr Nove's predictive conclusion that a slow-down of the pace is therefore most probable, though at least one Soviet commentator took exception to it. (Whether, as the author believes, the Bloc economy will continue to grow 'considerably faster' than that of the West is, I think, a controversial point and depends largely on the time-horizon one adopts for one's argument.) Not only will the pace be slower, but the growth, in the author's well-justified view, is bound to be accompanied by mounting difficulties. These will be partly physical—connected with the need for tapping resources with decreasing yields; and partly economic and political—because the leaders will have to bribe the citizenry, in terms of better living, for support of their growth programmes. There is also the question '... how long will it be before the leadership is itself "infected" by the ideas already predominant among its own bureaucracy and technicians? ... Cassius, it will be recalled, had a lean and hungry look' (p. 65).

From such premises the writer draws inferences which more directly pertain to co-existential competition, to trade and aid. The Bloc's interdependence, he expects, is certain to grow and availability of goods for the outside world may be correspondingly curtailed. What we know about intra-Bloc trade arrangements for the first half of the 'sixties, made since the study was written, seems to bear out the forecast. As to the Bloc's aid for outsiders, a relative scarcity of capital goods for export must be expected to be the major limiting factor because the output of capital goods must be largely earmarked for the Bloc's own capital projects.

Continuing on Mr Nove's line, one could suggest that the scale of priorities itself may give rise to serious dilemmas. The amount of capital—actual as distinct from pledged—currently supplied by the Communist Bloc to retarded economies may be estimated to equal no more than 7-8 per cent of that coming from the West, net influx of private investment included. Much as its aid may remain selective once it is engaged in this field in competition with the West, the Bloc has to try to keep up with the Joneses: its moves are best analysable in terms of 'games of strategy'. Some of the Bloc members are already affected by a serious crisis due to the petering out of Soviet assistance, while at the same time the U.S.S.R. offers more and more aid to outsiders in Asia, Africa, and

Latin America. It is not unreasonable to foresee resultant economic stresses, and perhaps even some political stresses within the Bloc.

This is only one of the many ramifications of argument prompted by Mr Nove's brief study. It is a fruitful, thought-stimulating work on which the author should be complimented.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

DER AUSSENHANDEL IN DEN OSTBLOCKSTAATEN: Theorie und Praxis. By Theodor Hermes. Hamburg, Cram, De Gruyter, 1958. 178 pp. DM 9.50

As promised by the subtitle, this book deals with both the theory and practice of the Soviet Bloc's foreign trade. There is little original or new in what it has to say about the theory. But the reader's interest is likely to grow as he moves to the description of foreign trade organizations, methods, and techniques. He may find still more useful information on such practical matters as how the Bloc Ministers prepare trade negotiations, how they select their delegations, and how they instruct their delegates on both the political and commercial plane. The writer has some advice to offer as to how to go about establishing good commercial relations with Eastern Bloc trade partners: there are even hints as to whom and how to contact, how to maintain the contacts, and what is the accepted etiquette ('under no circumstances address your letters to the director or the departmental head personally!'—p. 129). This kind of guide in *savoir vivre* with their Soviet opposite numbers may be invaluable to officials or business men engaged in East-West trade. The writer gathered his material while serving in an executive position with a foreign trade organization of one—you may only guess which—of the Eastern Bloc countries: he took part, as a member of delegations, in some working sessions of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. In a word, this is an inside story.

ALFRED ZAUBERMAN

TAXATION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND IN UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMIES: A Survey and Guide to Policy. By Haskell P. Wald. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. xiii+231 pp. Index. (Harvard Law School International Program in Taxation.) \$4.50. 36s.

In most high-income countries, farmers are a privileged class. Through measures such as protection against competing imports and deficiency payments, they receive incomes considerably higher than they would get under free competition. Whether or not this is good economic policy, these countries can afford to follow it, for they are comparatively wealthy and their farmers form only a small proportion of their population. The so-called under-developed countries cannot afford to do the same. They are too poor, and most of their people are engaged in agriculture. On the contrary, therefore, they have to tax their cultivators in one way or another, thereby keeping down their incomes.

Mr Wald considers that this process should be carried further. He is interested by 'the large potential contribution a more effective system of land taxation might make to the financing of economic development in many countries' (p. vii). At the same time, he believes that 'taxes should be distributed so that low-income families are taxed lightly, if at all' (p. 160), which would seem to rule out much increase in taxation on land in countries where land is mainly divided into tiny family farms; and he is well aware of the dangers, such as the danger of discouraging improvements to land and weakening incentives to effort, of various types of land taxes.

As he points out, some kinds of taxation fall upon the cultivators but are not land taxes. In mainland China, for example, a half of the grain harvest is taken by the Government as tax payments in kind (p. 64). This he classes as a land tax; but he does not include in land taxes the levy on rice-growers made by the State Agriculture Marketing Board in Burma, which pays prices about half the equivalent export prices, or the levy on coffee-growers made, for example, by Brazil in the form of low exchange-rates for their exports.

Subject to these limitations, Mr Wald has written an interesting and valuable book. He surveys the characteristics of the land taxes prevailing in a number of countries and sets out the ways in which they could be revised to be made less inequitable, less harmful to economic growth, and administratively easier to collect. His own summary of his recommendations, to be pursued at as fast a pace as local circumstances permit, is 'to reform the tax base and to improve the methods of assessment, so that the tax rests on a sound land classification system and accords as closely as possible with presumptive net income; second, to make the tax yield responsive to changes in prices and production; and third, to relate the tax liability, to the extent practicable, to the personal circumstances of the taxpayer' (p. 208). F. BENHAM

A COMPARISON OF NATIONAL OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES. By Deborah Paige and Gottfried Bombach. Introduction by Milton Gilbert. Joint study by the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the Department of Applied Economics, University of Cambridge. Paris, O.E.E.C., 1959. 245 pp. Tables. Charts. 21s. \$3.50. *Frs.* 1,400.

THE usual method of comparing national products is by measuring the various components of final expenditures. An alternative method is to measure the value added by the various industries. The latter method is adopted in the present study; the results agree fairly well with those obtained by the former method, as the two countries are in a comparable stage of development, so that their national outputs have more or less the same composition by industry of origin.

The main value of this study lies in its detailed comparisons, industry by industry, but it is the broad conclusions which will be of most interest to the general reader. The United States in 1950 had a real product per head of population about 50 per cent (at United States prices) or 80 per cent (at United Kingdom prices) greater than the United Kingdom. The United States labour force formed a smaller proportion (41.3 as against 46.1 per cent) of its total population, and it had more unemployment, hence output per worker was about twice that of the United Kingdom. The difference was greater (two-and-a-half to three times) in manufacturing and less in fields such as agriculture, construction, distribution, and services (p. 55). From 1950 to 1957 the American total real product increased by about 28 per cent and the British by 20 per cent, but there seems to have been little change in output per worker from 1954 to 1957 (pp. 27-8). F. BENHAM

OXFORD ECONOMIC ATLAS OF THE WORLD. 2nd ed. Prepared by the *Economist* Intelligence Unit and the Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press. London, Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press, 1959. viii+152 pp. Maps. Tables. 42s.

THE second edition of this comprehensive reference work incorporates revisions and improvements in presentation together with some new data, notably on nuclear energy and on trade and production of the Soviet bloc. As in the earlier edition (1954), maps showing the world production of primary commodities and certain industrial products are accompanied by notes, charts, and statistics to describe the essential characteristics of the commodities and their world supply position in the mid-1950s compared with the pre-war days. Key statistics for individual countries are given in a separate section, and there is coverage also of world population, communications, and certain basic aspects of physical geography. The statistical basis for most of the post-war information is the 1953-5 annual average. Visual aids are skilfully used to convey a wealth of information in convenient form, though the commodity maps are on a small scale and, taken by themselves, their usefulness is in some cases very limited.

Also, the inevitable compression of information and the rapid rate at which conditions can change, as for instance in the world fuel situation, may occasionally cause the unwary uninformed user to be misled. Less excusable in a publication of this standard are minor imperfections such as the choice of the post-Suez year 1957 to show oil movements by sea. A surprising piece of information revealed by a random sampling of the Atlas is that Czechoslovakian boot and shoe production equals that of Western Germany and exceeds that of France (p. 96); reference to the country section shows that there must have been a slip in preparing this map.

MARIANNE GELLNER

THE UNIVERSITY TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES: Public Administration. A report prepared for UNESCO at the request of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences. By André Molitor. Paris, Unesco, 1959. 192 pp. \$2.75. 14s.

THIS is one of a series of monographs prepared under the auspices of Unesco on teaching in the various Social Sciences (which include also Economics, Statistics, Political Science, Sociology, etc.). This one, on teaching public administration, has been written by M. André Molitor, Professor at the University of Louvain, and himself a distinguished member of the Executive Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences, which was commissioned by Unesco to undertake this survey. It is based on reports supplied by *rapporteurs* in twenty-seven different countries. To boil down this voluminous information into a book of less than 200 pages is a remarkable achievement, but M. Molitor has a clear and analytical mind. There are chapters on the origin and development of the university teaching of public administration; on trends, organization, methods, and the material facilities for such teaching; on scientific research in this field; and on the influence of the establishments providing such teaching. This is followed by forty pages devoted to typical curricula used in selected establishments in Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Turkey, the U.K., and the U.S.A. For the U.K., the examples chosen are provided by the Administrative Staff College at Henley-on-Thames; and by the London School of Economics and Political Science of the University of London.

EDWIN SAMUEL

THE LITERATURE OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: An Introductory Survey and Guide. By Peter R. Lewis. London, The Library Association, 1960. xx+222 pp. Index. 28s. \$4.20.

THIS guide to the literature of the social sciences, modestly aimed at 'students preparing for the final examination of the Library Association', should find a much wider public. The author has very thoroughly studied and described all the bibliographical tools including certain standard textbooks that he has run to earth. Each chapter also includes information about libraries and organizations providing the material: in this way the guide is, to some extent, also a location list.

There are inevitably a number of omissions in a survey of this kind, and it is only in the hope of a fuller second edition that the reviewer indicates some of them. From the Sociology and Social Science sections Criminology is noticeable for its absence. The Home Office, the new Institute at Cambridge, together with many university departments and libraries, the works of Radzinowicz, Mannheim, Wilkins, and Wootton, and a *Survey of Criminological Journals* published by the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency would go some way to fill this gap. In the International Affairs and Political Science sections a little more space might be given to the Commonwealth. Hancock's and Mansergh's *Surveys of British Commonwealth Affairs* might be added to Toynbee's *Surveys of International Affairs*; and Martin Wight's *British Colonial Constitutions* added to the other collections listed.

BARBARA KYLE

THE COMMONWEALTH AND BRITAIN

THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ERNEST BEVIN. Vol. I. Trade Union Leader 1881-1940.

By Alan Bullock. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Heinemann, 1960. 672 pp. Illus. Index. 50s.

It has been said that a Foreign Secretary need not be expert in international affairs. Expertise he can get from his advisers. He must, however, be a rock of a man, powerful in decision, and able to command the respect of adversaries and the loyalty of allies.

The first volume of Mr Bullock's brilliant biography of Ernest Bevin, which stops at the moment when he entered the Cabinet in 1940, explains, against a fascinating background of trade union history, how Bevin came to acquire just these characteristics. The picture is of a life of unremitting negotiation and conflict in industry and of constructive organization. After reading it, one has no need to wonder why Foreign Office officials, trained in a different school of negotiation, recognized in Bevin a shrewd judge of power and a more experienced judge of men than any of themselves.

To many, the extent of Bevin's international experience will come as a surprise. Starting with a visit on trade union business to New York and San Francisco as early as 1916, he was constantly abroad, in Prague, Vienna, Paris, or Geneva, often on the business of the I.L.O. or the International Transport Workers Federation, whose work came steadily closer to international politics as the Nazi threat to trade unionism developed. Later, Bevin's interests widened to include the concept of an independent Commonwealth, stimulated on one occasion by a visit to Australia and New Zealand with a delegation from Chatham House.

Even more striking than the extent of his foreign travels is the breadth of his views on world affairs, publicly expressed quite early in his career. Mr Bullock tells, for instance, how Bevin in 1919 astonished the Bristol Rotary Club by discussing 'Over-production and the Inevitable Revolution' in terms not of trade unionism but of international trade. It emerges that international organization always fascinated him. His thinking on the subject usually took its starting point in economics, especially after he had served on the Macmillan Committee in 1930. In the pre-war T.U.C. and Labour Party conferences he was for years one of the most formidable speakers in international debates.

Like most fighters, Bevin reacted violently to opposition, his anger with his adversaries sometimes deepening into a personal resentment which affected his judgment. This was later to be of significance when he was Foreign Secretary and was also a reason for his relative lack of success in the House of Commons.

But this is to anticipate Mr Bullock's second volume. The present book is only marginally concerned with the foreign scene, though it is full of little known details of Bevin's life, without which his later performance on the world stage cannot be fully understood. If this first instalment is any guide, the sequel will not only tell an absorbing story but will also be a major work on international affairs.

KENNETH YOUNGER

LORD LOTHIAN (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940. By J. R. M. Butler. London, Macmillan; New York, St Martin's Press, 1960. xiii+385 pp. Illus. Index. 42s.

Few men knew Philip Kerr better than Lionel Curtis; and, therefore, Curtis's comments on him come to mind as we read this book. Writing to Lord Brand in 1910, he said (p. 41), 'Philip would have trained himself far better for the work in hand if he had gone more slowly, taken more time to think, aimed at making fewer acquaintances and more friends . . . he has so nearly all the qualities needed for the fulfilment of a great purpose and I am wondering whether he will develop the stability of character necessary, unless all his other gifts are to

be thrown away.' To Lothian himself he wrote in 1927 when he hoped to have him as his chief partner at the Honolulu Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 'You know what I have always said, that I am only one blade of the scissors, and cut nothing unless I am hinged with you' (p. 38). Another very different witness said of him, '*Le lord Lothian, oui, c'est un homme d'état, bien sûr, un peu enfantin, et, par dessus le marché, féminin.*' The words are Clemenceau's, spoken in 1921; and, between Curtis and Clemenceau, you have the main outlines of a recognizable portrait.

Philip Henry Kerr was born in April 1882, the son of Lord Ralph Kerr and, therefore, a scion of a Scottish Roman Catholic house. Educated at the Oratory School and at New College, his first aim was to become a Catholic priest, but he relinquished the idea when, in 1905, he was invited to join what was known as the 'Milner Kindergarten' in South Africa. This led to an alliance with those who were to become the mainstay of the Rhodes Trust, the *Round Table*, and other ventures of a like kind in London. His outstanding work thereafter was found in two fields: first, as Private Secretary to Lloyd George when Prime Minister, from 1916 to 1921, and later, as British Ambassador in Washington whither he went in 1939. The reader will doubtless feel that Sir James Butler might have provided a fuller account of Lothian's service at 10 Downing Street which, even more than his years in Washington, gave him, in a real sense, his closest contact with public affairs. At one time he was suspected of having 'sold himself to Hitler'; and when he went to Washington his critics declared that his purpose was to align the United States with what was then called 'appeasement'. Their prediction proved entirely false; for, as the event showed, the Destroyer-Bases deal of 1940 demonstrated his real purpose. Such was the effort that this crisis demanded of him that he never was the same man again and died not long afterwards.

Sir James Butler's book is a pertinent footnote to contemporary history. It is not, in the strict sense of the word, a biography, but is rather to be taken as the raw material of the portrait of a remarkable man, that, some day, one hopes, will be drawn.

A. F. WHYTE

WHITE AND COLOURED. The Behaviour of British People toward Coloured Immigrants. By Michael Banton. London, Jonathan Cape, 1959. 223 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 21s.

DURING the last ten years more coloured Commonwealth citizens have come to Britain than ever before. There are at least 220,000, mainly from the West Indies, Pakistan, and India, and they are now a familiar sight in many inland cities where formerly few coloured people lived. This is a new experience for Britain and, as Dr Banton shows, the relationships between white and coloured people are fluid; no set patterns of behaviour have yet been evolved to govern their contacts either at work or during leisure. In some situations the coloured man is accepted, in others he is rebuffed.

Earlier studies of coloured minorities in Britain have mainly dealt with their sociological structure, and the importance of this thoughtful book is that it is concerned with white reactions and behaviour—in dockland, among students, and in the industrial cities. There is a useful analysis of the differences between prejudice and discrimination and an historical sketch of changing conceptions of the coloured man in this country. The book ends with a discussion of ten principles which the author considers can most help to promote inter-group harmony.

White and Coloured is an invaluable book not only for those who have professional dealings of any sort with the coloured population but also for the general reader who is finding, as it were, the Commonwealth on his door-step.

DONALD WOOD

EUROPE

EUROPEAN ASSEMBLIES: The Experimental Period: 1949-1959. By Kenneth Lindsay. New York, Praeger; London, Stevens, 1960. xxi+267 pp. 35s.

LAST year a Round Table Conference on European Assemblies met at the Hague, of which Mr Kenneth Lindsay was the Director. This book is the result. The first part is a Report, based on the discussions between the thirty-five delegates who were a mixture of parliamentarians, administrators, officials of European organizations, and academics. Six assemblies are analysed from the point of view of their relationships with national Parliaments, with Governments, and with political parties, their impact on the public, and their organizational problems. The Assemblies described are the Council of Europe, Western European Union, the Nordic and Benelux Councils, the European Parliamentary Assembly, and the N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians' Conference. Chapter 5, 'The Role of Political Party Groups', sheds light on the way in which these groups have influenced the development of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, and on the difficulties that the British Conservatives, unlike the Labour Party, have in joining international party groups. The report ends with proposals for rationalizing and streamlining the Assemblies.

The second half of the book consists of background papers specially written for the Conference by political scientists and others, with first-hand experience of the organizations they describe. These papers give an account of the way in which national delegations are chosen and operate in the Netherlands (by H. Daalder), United Kingdom (J. Blondel), France (Mattei Dogan), Western Germany and Austria (both by U. W. Kitzinger), Sweden (G. Petrén), Norway (E. Lochén), and Denmark (Frantz Wendt). Three rather longer papers describe the working of the former Common Assembly of E.C.S.C., the Nordic Council, and the Benelux Council. These background papers, taken together, contain a great deal of valuable and interesting information not readily available elsewhere.

RICHARD BAILEY

ANNUAIRE EUROPÉEN. Vol. VI. Preface by W. Horsfall Carter and B. Landheer. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff for the Council of Europe, 1959. xiii+530 pp. Index. *Fl.* 31.

WITH the issue of this latest volume, the editors of the European Yearbook have substantially caught up on their material and they hope henceforth to cover events regularly by calendar year with a time-lag of under twelve months. The present volume covers 1958 and follows the pattern established in previous ones. The articles in the first part deal with the integration efforts of the Six (Walter Hallstein), the problems of economic development in Africa (Arthur Gaitskell), the European Convention on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (J. P. A. François), the Assembly of W.E.U. (F. Humblet), the N.A.T.O. Parliamentarians' Conference (J. J. Fens), the development of a 'European civil service' (A. Daussin), and European cultural co-operation (R. Crivon). A substantial part of the documentary section is devoted to the texts of the agreements concluded by Euratom with the United Kingdom and the United States plus related documents. But there is, of course, a wide range of other material under the different organization headings, much of it in the technical field, such as, for instance, documentation of the work of the European Conference of Ministers of Transport, a description of the European Organization for Nuclear Research, and the proposals for a European Conference of Posts and Telecommunications. Since it was in 1958 that the Free Trade Area negotiations reached a crescendo and deadlock, it is curious to find only casual references to them scattered through the book, while entries for that year in the O.E.E.C. section are confined to the dates of meetings of the Maudling Committee without a word of further explanation. The bibliographical section is longer than usual. The so-called abstracts

of books and pamphlets do not altogether fit this description, since they are generally neither terse in language nor free of the reviewers' own opinions.

MARIANNE GELLNER

EUROPEAN ORGANISATIONS. London, Allen & Unwin for Political and Economic Planning; Fair Lawn, N.J., Essential Books, 1959. xvi+372 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 30s. \$5.40.

THIS report represents, in effect, a survey of techniques of co-operation developed since the second World War among the European nations. It describes the origins, anatomy, and work of the eight principal regional organizations: the E.C.E. (which alone draws its membership both from Western and Eastern Europe), the O.E.E.C., the Council of Europe, N.A.T.O., W.E.U., and finally those that represent the six-nation break-away into 'supra-national' institutions, i.e. the E.C.S.C., the E.E.C. (Common Market), and Euratom. The preparation of the report centred on regular meetings between September 1956 and December 1958 of a Research Group. The result is a carefully phrased and dispassionate account which, though it has sometimes shied away from delving too deeply, will prove a welcome aid to the student or anyone else who may need reliable guidance to the organizational tangle in post-war Western Europe, or who may simply want to check on a point of detail. The aim of the report is to indicate the concepts that went to mould the various institutions, to examine their formal structure and procedure, to analyse working methods as they evolved in the day-to-day life of the institutions, to show something of their work, and to assess their strengths and weaknesses, their successes and failures. Each of the organizations is examined and judged solely with reference to its own aims and purposes. In the case of the Common Market and Euratom, coverage is confined to summaries of the Rome Treaty provisions, but the chapter on the E.C.S.C. gives a good insight into the working of this their forerunner. In the final chapter a few general conclusions are drawn. At the same time the book strictly avoids entering into the Common Market-Free Trade Area controversy. A minor blemish is that there is not enough explanation of the role in the picture of wider organizations, notably G.A.T.T.

MARIANNE GELLNER

BRITISH POLICY WITH REGARD TO THE UNIFICATION EFFORTS ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT. By Hans Joachim Heiser. Leyden, A. W. Sythoff, 1959. 121 pp. (European Aspects: A Collection of Studies relating to European Integration published under the Auspices of the Council of Europe. Series C: Studies on Politics. No. 3.) *Fl.* 8.40.

THIS study by the late Dr Heiser describes the British attitude to the various efforts towards European unification, from the British offer of Union to France in 1940 up to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in March 1957. It analyses Britain's part in setting up the Council of Europe and her relations with the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community, and the Western European Union.

The latter part of the book is concerned with events since the Messina Conference of 1955. This section is of particular interest in bringing together reports and comments on the work of the Spaak Committee and the part played by Britain in the meetings at the Val Duchesse in Brussels. The speculations about the possibilities of a wider free trade agreement in the final chapter are, alas, no nearer realization than they were when the book went to press.

RICHARD BAILEY

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC: France's New Political System. By Nicholas Wahl. New York, Toronto, Random House, 1959. 130 pp. Index. 95 cents.

MR WAHL is an American Professor of Politics who for some years now has made the origins and nature of Gaullism his special study. When the Fifth Republic came along, nobody was better prepared than he to discuss its ideological back-

ground, and some of his contributions on that subject have been extremely valuable. This new work is both more and less ambitious than Mr Wahl's specialized articles; it sets out to describe the essence of the new system but, since the description is compressed into less than 100 pages of text, can do so only in the simplest fashion. Inevitably also, Mr Wahl's simplifications, though factually accurate, are coloured by their author's Gaullist predilections (only slightly qualified by the mild doubts which unexpectedly close nearly every section of the book), just as other and equally accurate accounts are coloured by doubts as to the validity of the basic theses of Gaullism or regrets about the manner in which the General manoeuvred himself back into power in 1958.

Mr Wahl's chapter on parties in the new Republic is an excellent summary, as, in the main, is his outline of the new constitutional order, though this is marked by at least one error of fact; the Constitutional Committee of the Fourth Republic, far from being 'made up mainly of parliamentarians' (p. 43), contained in fact no members of Parliament at all. Mr Wahl's accounts, in this chapter, of the role of the Senate and of the working of the rule forbidding proxy voting have become inaccurate since the book was written.

Two other criticisms are more serious. To say that 'a strong hand constantly remains on the policy tiller' (p. 77) is to overlook both the lack of cohesion in the areas of policy in which the President is not interested and the vast areas left, not only to 'les petits barons', to whom Mr Wahl refers indirectly, but also to well-meaning and highly efficient but unsupervised and unco-ordinated bureaucrats and technocrats. Mr Wahl is on equally uncertain ground when he classes the Fifth Republic, along with Vichy, the Napoleonic dictatorships, and the constitutional monarchies, as typical of an 'administrative tradition', which involves 'governing through an élite, supported by a powerful and centralized bureaucracy' (pp. 27-8). Against this, Mr Wahl sets the 'representative tradition', under which he classes the first four Republics. Awkward problems like the regimes of 1791, 1793, and 1795 are neatly got rid of by extending the *ancien régime* to 1792 and the First Republic to 1799. This remarkable example of the excesses into which a mania for over-simplified classification can lead appears to serve no purpose, except to provide a respectable adjectival cover for the present regime. Since the Fifth Republic is in fact rapidly transforming itself into a Presidential system, Mr Wahl's ingenuity would appear to be misapplied.

WILLIAM PICKLES

LES FINANCES EXTÉRIEURES DE LA FRANCE (1945-1958). By André De Lattre. Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1959. 391 pp. *Frs.* 1800.

THIS work, by an author whose official position carries high authority, is a valuable contribution to our information on the subject. For the years 1948-58 with which it deals, it covers a wide range.

The first of the two parts into which it is divided is concerned with exchange control, import restrictions, encouragement of exports, invisibles (current and capital), rates of exchange.

The second turns to the position of France in relation to other countries: the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank, G.A.T.T., American aid, O.E.E.C., and the European Payments Union. An important chapter tells the story of various projects for customs unions, the European Coal and Steel Community, and finally the Common Market with West Germany, Italy, and Benelux.

An interesting statistical analysis of the French balance of payments with countries other than Western Europe, divided into the Franc Zone and the Rest of the World, is followed by a forecast of the balance as a whole for the years 1959-70.

French financial policy since 1945 has been a series of expedients and devices, and M. De Lattre has supplied a lucid exposition of its complexities. Particular mention may be made of his account of rates of exchange in the troubled period

of multiple rates and compromises with the free rate in the years 1948-9 (pp. 103-11) and of the successive stages of the Common Market and the negotiations between the Six and the Seven.

The book is perhaps open to the criticism that it has little to say about the relation of the country's external finances to inflationary tendencies generated from within.

R. G. HAWTREY

LA CONDUITE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES EN FRANCE. By François Le Roy. Paris, Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Centre d'Étude des Relations Internationales, 1959. 43 pp. (Série D: Textes et Documents pour l'Étude des Relations Internationales. No. 1.)

THIS collection of documents, one in a series for students of international relations, contains extracts from French Constitutions since 1791 and other legal documents. The extracts are concerned with such items as French citizenship and the authority of the legislature and of the executive in foreign affairs. There are further sections dealing with the negotiation of treaties, foreign trade, and representation abroad. The last includes details of the special position of the French Ambassador in Western Germany, and of the special position of the French representatives in Tunisia and Morocco until March 1957.

RACHEL F. WALL

DOCTOR GOEBBELS: His Life and Death. By Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Heinemann, 1960. xiii+329 pp. Illus. Index. 30s.

THIS is a fascinating and attractive book about a fascinating and largely repellent character. The authors have drawn not merely on the published material about their subject, but also on the microfilms of those parts of his diary which are in American hands (the greater part of the diary has either been destroyed or is in the Soviet Union and not accessible). One of them has also had long and revealing conversations with many of Goebbels's associates—friends, relatives, colleagues, mistresses. They have welded this huge mass of material into a clear, well-documented whole.

Much of the evidence is of course suspect. It comes from interested parties who may want to twist the past in their own favour. Goebbels's own diaries are a case in point. They were written day by day, in the heat of the events recorded, they were shown to nobody (much of them was typed by Goebbels himself rather than being entrusted to a secretary), yet they were meant for post-humous publication and represent Goebbels as an actor rather than a man.

Still, Goebbels *was* an actor and threw himself with compulsive vehemence into everything that he did. He was bitter, ruthless, radical, opportunist, warped, and—Hitler's slave. His loyalty to Hitler carried him to heights of achievement (when he dealt with the revolt of the Generals) and even of nobility (during the last days in the Bunker) which make one feel that if only the object of his worship had been worthy of it Goebbels might, just might, have been a force for good instead of being, after Hitler himself, the most evil influence in the Third Reich. This book would be worth reading as a study in morbid psychology alone.

LINDLEY FRASER

COMMANDANT OF AUSCHWITZ: The Autobiography of Rudolf Hoess. Trans. from the German by Constantine FitzGibbon. Introduced by Lord Russell of Liverpool. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959. 252 pp. Index. 25s.

THE author was Commandant of the concentration camp of Auschwitz (Oswiecim) in Poland from May 1940 to December 1943. After an account of his childhood and early life, Hoess describes his apprenticeship first as an SS leader and then as an officer in two other concentration camps before he was transferred, on Himmler's orders, to take charge of Auschwitz, in which three million people, the majority of them Jews, were exterminated in the gas chambers.

Throughout the gruesome narrative, one can detect hardly any sign of remorse or emotion on the part of Hoess for the sufferings or death of these victims; for him, they were mere subjects of a vast experiment of destruction, mere joints of a conveyor belt, his only unquestioned duty being to keep it rotating, crushing the victims in the process. When Himmler visited the camp on a tour of inspection, Hoess took him to witness the flogging of a woman prisoner, as if he was showing the distinguished visitor his garden. He also describes the numerous scenes of execution when he himself gave the signal to fire, and the scenes inside the gas chambers: all this is recalled in a sardonic spirit, as if it was part of his job—as indeed it was.

And yet, human feeling does sometimes make its appearance. Describing the first flogging witnessed by him, Hoess says: 'The whole thing . . . made me shudder. Later on, at the beginning of the war, I attended my first execution, but it did not affect me nearly as much as witnessing this corporal punishment. I am unable to give an explanation of this' (p. 66). When he was in captivity himself, Hoess was of course worried about the fate of his own family, as any average man would be. 'I am concerned no longer about my personal fate, but only about that of my wife and children, for what will happen to them?' (p. 180). The *coup de grâce* to the narrative is given in the concluding words of the autobiography: 'Let the public continue to regard me as a blood-thirsty beast, the cruel sadist and the mass murderer, for the masses could never imagine the commandant of Auschwitz in any other light. They could never understand that, he, too, had a heart and that he was not evil' (p. 181).

Aptly does Lord Russell warn in his Introduction: 'That a little bureaucrat like Hoess could, as he himself has written, have become a "cog in the wheel of the great extermination machine created by the Third Reich" is a reminder, never to be forgotten, of the appalling and disastrous effects of totalitarianism on men's minds' (p. 26).

P. G. PENSAY

YEAR BOOK IV. Ed. by Robert Weltsch. London, East and West Library for the Leo Baeck Institute of Jews from Germany, 1959. xxvi+380 pp. Illus. Bibliog. Index. 35s.

THIS fourth edition of the year book on the history of German-speaking Jewry contains, like its predecessors, a number of interesting essays. Professor Rotenstreich, who gives a careful analysis of the controversy on the emancipation of German Jewry which was associated with the writings of the anti-Semitic theologian Bruno Bauer, resuscitates a well-nigh forgotten episode of nineteenth-century history. Dr Liebeschütz deals lucidly with Judaism in the ideology of Jacob Burckhardt. Rabbi Geis contributes a most interesting essay on Hermann Cohen. Two outstanding personalities who were of Jewish origin, but had separated themselves or been separated from it, are treated by Dr Reissner in his article on the composer Felix Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and the philosopher-jurist Eduard Gans. Dr Cahnmann's article on Fischhof and his Jewish followers leads the reader into the intricate maze of Austrian politics before 1914. Perhaps the most important and certainly the most attractive of these historical essays is Dr H. D. Schmidt's study on anti-Western and anti-Jewish tradition in German historical thought. The learned author traces the origin and development of one of the most scurrilous of all Nazi legends, i.e. the alleged conspiracy between Britain and World Jewry. This article is accompanied by some telling illustrations demonstrating the intensity with which this legend was spread.

There is a most unwelcome innovation in that some of the contributions appear in German, instead of in English. This is excused by the plea that most of those who are interested in the history of German thought know enough German to peruse articles in that language (see p. vii). The story of German-Jewish symbiosis is however of considerable interest to many who are primarily interested not in Germany or German history but in the fate of cultural or

religious minorities in general, or in German-Jewish history as a part of Jewish, not of German, history. The Institute is, in fact, publishing a number of scientific studies in Germany and in German. It would therefore seem to address itself in growing measure not to an international readership, but to German readers and to the older members of the German-Jewish emigration. This is in the long run, there can be little doubt, a disastrous policy; in the interest of scholarship and of those scholars who publish under the Institute's auspices it should be remedied before further harm is done.

E. J. COHN

DIE AKTUELLE KRIEGSDIENSTVERWEIGERUNG: als beachtliche Gewissensentscheidung. By Manfred Hinzmann. Hamburg, Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, 1959. 159 pp. Bibliog. (Hektographierte Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsstelle für Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg. No. 37.) *DM* 14.50.

It would appear that the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is unique in elevating to a constitutional principle the right of citizens to refuse service in the armed forces in a combatant capacity (cf. Article 4 (3) of the Basic Law). The Basic Law accords this right, as do the laws of other countries, only to persons prompted by reasons of conscience. The author traces the history of freedom of conscience—in its generality and apart from the right to refuse combatant service—in Germany before and during the Weimar Republic and then considers in detail the history of Article 4 (3) of the Basic Law and its legal significance. When compulsory military service was introduced in the Federal Republic the Basic Law was amended, and Article 12 (3) now provides that those refusing to perform combatant service may be compelled to render 'subsidiary' services. The author takes the view that this provision and section 25 of the Compulsory Military Service Law of 21 July 1956, while making conscientious objectors liable to some kind of service, do not compel him to render such service—even in a non-combatant capacity—in the armed forces of the Federal Republic. He has the choice of non-combatant service in the forces and 'subsidiary' service in a civilian capacity.

The right of German citizens to refuse service only in respect of certain types of warfare, such as by the use of atomic weapons, has been denied by the Ministry of Defence who take the view that 'the soldier's obedience is indivisible'. These are questions which are of more than purely national significance, and the book under review can be read with profit by those who in countries other than Germany are puzzled by a problem which, one may hope, will remain academic.

F. HONIG

DUITSLAND 1945-1955: Object en subject van internationale politiek. By H. W. Sandberg. Amsterdam, 1959. 248 pp. Bibliog. Index.

THIS book, a thesis for a Doctorate, describes Western Germany's negotiations with the West, and her very different relations with the U.S.S.R., between the unconditional surrender to the Allies in 1945 and the Federal Republic's entry into Western Union in 1954 and to N.A.T.O. in 1955.

In the author's view, West Germany played for safety, preferring certain freedom for herself to the possibility of freedom for all Germany. This is an accurate study, and at the end there is a short summary in English.

MARJORY TAYLOR

AUFGABE UND VERANTWORTUNG DER POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN. By Günther Willms. Karlsruhe, C. F. Müller, 1958. 26 pp. *DM* 1.90.

IN this lecture the author expresses concern at the current state of party politics in Western Germany where 'Parties are not popular and one cannot say that even democracy is really popular with us' (p. 5).

Although greater stability had been obtained by the exclusion of anti-constitutional parties on the right and left and by the steps taken to prevent splinter groups, the author points out that the 'external stability' (p. 16) is not a total gain since it has not resulted from a natural development. He points to the failure of the party machinery to secure popular support for its decisions, and the tendency for the latter to become 'the monopoly of an established leadership which fills its ranks by co-optation' (p. 19); and suggests that, as a consequence of the exclusion of ordinary people from political responsibility, a 'reservoir is building up from which one day a new "Movement" could rise to sweep away the party mummies' (p. 21). As evidence he points to developments in France which show that such a possibility is not imaginary. RACHEL F. WALL

RETTET DIE FREIHEIT: Gründungskongress am 20.2. 1959 in Köln. West Berlin, Rettet die Freiheit a.V., 1959. 94 pp.

THIS pamphlet is a report of the proceedings of the foundation congress of the 'Rettet die Freiheit' movement, held at Cologne in February 1959. It contains reports of speeches by Theodor Litt, Paul Henri Spaak, and the historian Otto Stolz, and of the subsequent discussion. The declaration put out by the constitutive committee is directed against 'Soviet imperialism', and asserts that 'the attack on Berlin is directed at the subjugation of the whole of Germany and of Europe' (p. 88). However Theodor Litt warned the conference that 'it would cause the greatest injury not only to the Church and Christianity but also to our people, if the representatives and servants of the Word believed they ought to take political decisions from their standpoint as believing Christians' (p. 85). He also pointed out that visitors from the East put their finger on a sore point when they said: 'You possess freedom but you appear to place no value at all on it' (p. 87). RACHEL F. WALL

DIE GEGENWÄRTIGE AUSSENHANDELSVERFLECHTUNG DER SOWJETISCHEN BESATZUNGSZONE DEUTSCHLANDS. By Erich Klinkmüller. Foreword by Dr Karl C. Thalheim. Berlin, Duncker & Humblot for the Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität, Berlin, 1959. ix+196 pp. Tables. Bibliog. (Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Veröffentlichungen, ed. by Karl C. Thalheim. Band 8.) DM 25.80.

THE Institute of East European Affairs has followed two earlier reports on legal and organizational questions of Soviet zonal and bloc trade with another thorough analysis, this being on East Germany's foreign trade relations. The principal function of trade in this centrally directed economy is 'to close gaps in domestic production, to compensate for errors in planning, and to meet deficits by under-fulfilment of the internal plan' (p. 2).

Whilst the text of the book gives a theoretical interpretation of Communist foreign trade policy, the appendix provides a detailed statistical presentation of East Germany's exports and imports from 1951 to 1957, i.e. for the crucial period during which reparations and other types of Soviet sanctions were replaced by more normal forms of international relations.

Whereas, before the war, one-fifth only of the East German area's trade was with the countries which now form the Soviet bloc, in the 'fifties nearly four-fifths of its total trade was with the bloc. By now East Germany has become the most important source of the Soviet bloc for machinery and plant equipment.

Foreign exchange is invariably scarce in this economy, but foreign payments are generally kept in balance. Bi-lateralism is of the essence in foreign economic relations. Until 1956 the terms of trade were kept much in favour of the Soviet Union, but thereafter East Germany was able to improve her bargaining position in bloc trading relations. A price equalization fund amounting to almost 7 per cent of the net national product was required until 1956 to even out differences between internal and external price levels. W. K.

ITALY AND THE UNITED NATIONS: Report of a Study Group set up by the Italian Society for International Organization. Foreword by Giuseppe Sperduti. New York, Manhattan Publishing Co. for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959. xiii+208 pp. Index. \$3.

THE period covered in this study ends in December 1955 with Italy's acceptance as a full member of the United Nations. It is therefore, perforce, limited to Italy's part in such bodies as the Trusteeship Council, Unesco, and E.C.E.

The most interesting chapters are those dealing with the former Italian colonies and the administration of Somaliland. There is a useful analysis of Italian public opinion which, in spite of a few nostalgic references to Italy's 'presence' in Africa, admits that 'many people associated the dissolution of colonial problems with the dissolution of problems left by the war and hoped for a speedy end to both' (p. 55). The description of the political changes in Somaliland is interesting not only in itself but also as a contrast to what has been achieved in British Somaliland.

The book suffers from the authors' need to pad out with a chapter on the Council of Europe, W.E.U., and E.D.C., and another quite general chapter on International Economic Co-operation.

It is sad to find Colonel Stevens, one of the B.B.C.'s best known war-time commentators on Italy, described as an American. S. C. HOOD

CYPRUS GUERRILLA: Grivas, Makarios and the British. By Doros Alastos. London, Melbourne, Toronto, Heinemann, 1960. 224 pp. Illus. Map. Index. 21s.

THIS is an interesting but incomplete account of the Cyprus Emergency suitable for the general reader. Mr Doros Alastos is a Greek Cypriot long resident in England, who thirty years ago was himself regarded by the British authorities as an incipient revolutionary. It is not easy for any Greek to rise above the barrage of criticism against the British which the subject of Cyprus usually provokes in Greek circles. Mr Alastos has courageously written a book which is remarkable for its fairness towards all the protagonists, including the Turks. His criticisms of British policy are on the whole valid, and expressed with characteristic moderation. And although he admires the Cypriot rebels, he has not hesitated to draw attention, if only briefly, to the more sinister aspects of EOKA. Much of his material is drawn from Cypriot sources, and conversations which the author has had with members of EOKA since the Agreements signed in Zurich and London are widely quoted.

Yet despite his extensive knowledge of Cypriot affairs Mr Alastos tends to stop short at the crucial points in his narrative. He mentions EOKA's 'execution' of Samaras but ignores the barbaric circumstances of his death and the fact that this atrocity took place many months after the settlement. He refers to the Left-wing Patriots, but fails to mention that their organization was merely a satellite of EOKA, with little, if any, real connection with the Cypriot Left. He leaves the reader in doubt as to the authenticity of the Grivas Diaries, yet it is unlikely that anyone so well informed as Mr Alastos believes that they were forged. NANCY CRAWSHAW

TURKEY AND THE WORLD. By Altemur Kilic. Introduction by William O. Douglas. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1959. 224 pp. Bibliog. Index. \$4.50.

MR ALTEMUR KILIC, who is now Head of Information, Broadcasting, and Tourism at Ankara, was when he wrote this book Press Attaché at the Turkish Embassy in Washington. As he explains (p. 202), when the Turks failed to adopt measures for economic stabilization in 1954 Washington tightened the purse-strings and a cloud came over American-Turkish relations. It was evidently to gain support for Turkish policy that Mr Kilic wrote his book. It is

an interesting sketch of Turkish history and recent policy—e.g. about Cyprus (p. 163)—as seen by a Turk. Although generally accurate, Mr Kilic makes no claim to complete objectivity. He has plenty of criticism for British policy, especially in the Middle East, but he expresses it moderately. He ignores or glosses over awkward things like Armenian massacres (p. 18), Greek deportations, the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire (p. 31), and the annexation of Alexandretta (p. 63), and he quotes freely from Sir H. Knatchbull-Hugessen and von Papen to justify Turkey's treaty of friendship with Germany of 18 June 1941 and her failure to fight alongside her Balkan and British allies in the second World War (pp. 84-6).

Two themes are interwoven throughout the book: first the menace of Russia; secondly the affinity of Turkey to the West and her incalculable value as a bulwark against that menace. The author gives a good account of Russo-Turkish relations since 1918 and of the Straits question (p. 118). He says that Turkey's chief concern in the second World War was neither to be conquered by Russia nor to be 'liberated' by her. He mentions the Turkish belief that if you stand firm when the Russians threaten, nine times out of ten they won't attack. He sympathizes with Arab nationalism but insists that if the Middle East is not to fall to Russia, the West must hold on to its positions of strength (p. 210).

W. S. EDMONDS

TURKEY: An Economy in Transition. By Z. Y. Hershlag. The Hague, Uitgeverij van Keulen, 1959. xv+340 pp. Map. Tables. Graphs. Bibliog. Index. 55s.

For our understanding of Turkey's economic development we have hitherto had to rely mainly upon the International Bank's Report¹ and the study made for the Twentieth Century Fund by Thornberg, Spry, and Soule.² Neither of these useful books was primarily a work of scholarship. Their authors were concerned more with policy prescription than with developmental analysis and did not have a very thorough acquaintance with source materials. Moreover, as both reports date from the late 'forties and early 'fifties, they do not cover the latest and in some respects most interesting phase. Everyone interested in Turkey will therefore be grateful to Dr Hershlag, who has gathered together and worked over all—or nearly all—the material in several languages (including, of course, Turkish) and presented a well-documented and connected account of Turkish economic development since the establishment of the Republic.

Does he tell us anything new? Not, I think, for the inter-war, second World War, and immediate post-war periods. The general lines of development up to about 1948 are already well known to students of Turkey, and Dr Hershlag is mainly concerned with filling out the information and giving it some degree of statistical precision. On the 'fifties, however, he has things to say which may compel some of us to modify our preconceived ideas. Perhaps his most important discovery is that the average rate of real growth in the first half of the 'fifties, when Turkey was receiving considerable foreign aid, was no greater than in the later 'thirties, when her development was being overwhelmingly financed from internal resources. The statistics upon which this conclusion is based are admittedly very defective, and Dr Hershlag's attempt to explain it does not carry complete conviction (see pp. 268-9). But it opens up a very interesting line for further inquiry and tends to support the rather severe—but, in my view, justified—criticisms that he makes of the economic policies of the Menderes Government.

Dr Hershlag also confirms a conclusion to which independent inquiries had led me: that the much-criticized *etatiste* policy of the People's Republican Party was essential for laying the basis of a more developed economy, and that the

¹ *The Economy of Turkey* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press for the I.B.R.D., 1951).

² *Turkey: an Economic Appraisal*, by Max Weston Thornberg and others (New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1949).

Democrats' ambition to demolish the *étatiste* structure is doomed to frustration. Undoubtedly, there are far better opportunities for private enterprise now than there were under the previous regime, but the State sector of the economy has become more essential than ever. Returning to Turkey last year after an absence of nearly five years, I found not only that well-established public enterprises had continued to expand but that a large number of new enterprises had been created. None had been sold to the private sector, in accordance with the Democrats' original intentions. The only visible effects of anti-*étatisme*, apart from the provision of more elbow-room to the private entrepreneur, were adverse ones, i.e. neglect of economic planning.

Dr Hershlag's book, which is very largely statistical, does not make exciting reading; but no student of Turkey or of economic development can afford to neglect it.

A. H. HANSON

IN THE SHADOW OF RUSSIA: Eastern Europe in the Postwar World. By Nicholas Halasz. New York, Ronald Press, 1959. x+390 pp. Bibliog. Index. \$5.

RATHER over half this book is a sort of historical guidebook, or set of potted histories, of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania, up to the period 1945-7. This part is competently written, from what might be called a moderate left-wing point of view, with only slight traces of the bias natural to one who is of Hungarian origin, reared in Slovakia.

The rest of the book is less satisfactory. There is a long and rather unwieldy chapter on 'The Cold War Years', which does not help towards a clear interpretation of this confusing and often contradictory period of East European history. The confusion is if anything heightened by unnecessarily long digressions on the Berlin blockade and the Korean war. Mr Halasz tends to seek rational economic motives for actions by the various Communist Governments which could probably be more accurately ascribed to simple thirst for power or fear of opposition.

The final chapter, 'The Ice Breaks', covers briefly and rather sketchily the period from Stalin's death to 1958. Here Mr Halasz gets trapped into rash or misleading generalizations, for example, 'Khrushchev has rolled up the Iron Curtain and compelled the West to discard its own' (p. 376).

ELISABETH BARKER

AS OSZTRÁK-MAGYAR MONARCHIA SZÉTTÖRÉSE ÉS A NEMZETKÖZI ERŐVISZONYOK. (Offprint from *Századok*, 1959.) UNGARN UND DAS MÜNCHNER ABKOMMEN. (Offprint from *Acta Historica*, VI. 3-4.) KÉT DÁTUM MAGYARORSZÁG HAN-DÜZENETÉNEK (1941 Június 27.) (Offprint from *Történelmi Szemle* 1958, 1-2.) By László Zsigmond. Budapest, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 1959.

THESE three essays deal respectively with (i) the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the international force-relationships, (ii) Hungary at Munich, and (iii) Hungary's declaration of war on Russia in June 1941 and the occupation of her by Germany in March 1944. They promise well, for they are abundantly supplied with references, including some to documents of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Unfortunately, the author is not concerned to relate what happened, but to glorify the name of the Soviet Union. He uses dubious evidence, such as the 'confessions' produced by the Russians at Nuremberg, in support of his theses, and suppresses facts which would tell against it; thus the whole of Hungary's efforts to obtain the support of the West at Munich are simply passed over without a word. The interest of these articles is thus limited to their quality of examples of how history is mistaught in Communist countries. Even the hitherto unpublished material quoted adds very little to what has already been published by the present reviewer.

C. A. MACARTNEY

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE NAGY AFFAIR: Facts, Documents, Comments. Preface by Alfred Camus. Paris, Plon, 1958; London, Secker and Warburg for the Congress for Cultural Freedom, 1959. ix + 215 pp. 35s.

THIS is a useful analysis of the indictment of Imre Nagy and his associates, compiled during the summer of 1958 by Hungarian émigré journalists who, as former Communists, seem to have a reliable knowledge of both facts and background. In order to prove their fallaciousness, the official documents are broken up and commented on paragraph by paragraph. This does not make the book altogether readable. Attached are extracts from the reactions of the international press, both in the East and in the West. Some of the Communist comments are revealing, such as one from China which makes it evident that Nagy had to be executed as a warning against 'revisionism'. The Western comments make depressing reading, as they seem to be outdated even after eighteen months. However unanimously the murder of Imre Nagy was condemned in all the countries of the free world, today it already seems to have had no lasting effect on East-West relationships.

ANDREW RÉVAI

U.S.S.R.

THE SOVIET IMAGE OF FUTURE WAR. By Raymond L. Garthoff. Introduction by General James M. Gavin. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1959. xii + 137 pp. \$3.25.

THIS book represents Dr Garthoff's third major contribution to the study of the Soviet armed forces and their military thought. Like his earlier *Soviet Military Doctrine* and *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*,¹ this work is a carefully documented and detailed presentation of the evidence from which we can learn the basic tenets of Soviet military thought in the light of the existence of nuclear weapons. As explained by Dr Garthoff, these are: that no one weapon, however terrible, can win a war between great Powers possessing vast territories, and that therefore the conception of an all-out 'blitz-krieg' launched either by the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R. is no longer possible; secondly, that wars are still won by a clash of armies, navies, and air forces, resulting in the destruction of the armed might of one side or the other, and therefore a future global war is more likely to be long than short, and to require more men in the forces than ever before.

The book also discusses the problem of the 'first strike', and concludes that while the full-scale 'preventive' war, prepared beforehand as an act of foreign policy, has been decisively rejected, there is evidence that Soviet military doctrine still envisages circumstances (which the author examines carefully) in which a 'forestalling blow' might be struck at a potential enemy on the point of launching a major attack on the Soviet Union.

In support of these conclusions, the author includes appendices with translations of three key articles written by Soviet military theoreticians on the character of modern war, the factors which decide its outcome, and the way in which Soviet military planners are tackling its problems. In general, this is a highly convincing presentation of a difficult and specialized subject, to which General James M. Gavin has added a useful and thoughtful introduction.

MALCOLM MACKINTOSH

CAHIERS DU MONDE RUSSE ET SOVIÉTIQUE: I. Mai 1959. Paris, Mouton for the École Pratique des Hautes Études, Sorbonne, sixième Section. Sciences Économiques et Sociales, 1959. 198 pp. Fl. 8.

It is a great pleasure to welcome this admirable new review in the field of Russian studies. The articles in this first issue (especially those dealing with contemporary Soviet affairs) are distinguished by a high level of sober scholarship and all are extremely well written. It is the intention of the editors to approach Russian problems from a broad humanistic viewpoint, avoiding

¹ Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1959, p. 211.

narrow specialization, and to consider 'les Russies d'hier et d'aujourd'hui' as a historical unity. Thus, in this number attention is divided between articles on contemporary Soviet problems such as juvenile delinquency, the 'family' in the Muslim areas of the Soviet Union (which in fact covers much wider ground), the Soviet use of economic space (by Father Chambre—a first-class piece of research), and problems of Russian history, e.g. Franco-Russian relations at the end of the nineteenth century and the origin of the Franco-Russian alliance.

Many who use Dahl's great dictionary of the Russian language will be glad to read Professor Pascal's interesting biographical article about this half-forgotten linguistic genius. The two articles on Soviet Muslim affairs by M. Bennigsen and Mme Quelquejay are important contributions to regional scholarship; they contain much new detail brought to light by a close scrutiny of Soviet-Russian and vernacular source materials, some seldom or never seen in this country. Finally, there is a fascinating survey of Soviet mechanical methods of translation which apparently promise some very useful practical results especially in technical translations. C. G.

THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN THE 19TH AND 20TH PARTY CONGRESSES 1952-1956. By G. D. Embree. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. ix+365 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. Paper bound *Fl.* 22.80.

THE best that can be said about this work is that it contains a reasonably complete summary of the events that took place in the Soviet Union between 1952 and 1956 and of much that was written about them by observers in the West. The book's weakness from the point of view of the student of Soviet affairs (and its 365 pages of colourless writing do not appear to be addressed to the general reader) is that it is based entirely on secondary sources and contains no original or independent views or interpretations of the events covered. The author himself does not appear to have any direct knowledge of Soviet affairs or documents, with the result that his work emerges as a rather uncritical hotch-potch of other people's comments and analyses.

When the author does venture an opinion the results are sometimes surprising. Thus, of Stalin's publication of his *Economic Problems of Socialism* on the eve of the nineteenth Congress, he says: 'In one deft stroke he had reduced it in stature from an important Party gathering to a mere backdrop for what he intended to be his last major contribution to the Communist ideology' (p. 6). The assumption that Stalin knew in October 1952 that his end was near is not one that can be made without some supporting evidence. It is possible that he had already suffered a stroke in 1952, that the nineteenth Congress was intended to prepare the succession, and that, by leaving the main report to Malenkov, Stalin was announcing his retirement. But this is not certain. It can also be argued that the nineteenth Congress marked the beginning of new changes and fresh purges and that Stalin was, though perhaps mad, full of plans for the future. Mr Khrushchev certainly seems to have thought so.

A minor but disturbing feature of the author's writing is his curious handling of the English language. It is not clear whether the new word 'lackness' which occurs frequently is a misprint for 'slackness' or is derived from 'lack'. References to Italian and Yugoslav troops being 'on their respective boarders' (p. 215) and to the 'desperateness boardening on panic' (p. 176) of Soviet agricultural measures seem to be more than spelling slips. The bibliography is long and complete, gathering together for the first time most of what has been written about the period.

DAVID FLOYD

TROTSKY'S DIARY IN EXILE 1935. Trans. from the Russian by Elena Zarudnaya. London, Faber & Faber, 1959. 176 pp. Index. 21s.

IT must often have occurred to Stalin to regret his decision to allow Trotsky the freedom of exile, and Trotsky was aware of this. Twelve years after the decision

was taken, the unspoken death sentence was carried out by an assassin. The years of exile began in Turkey and ended in Mexico. In between he spent some years in France and Norway, and this diary covers part of his stay in both countries; in neither did he enjoy freedom of movement or activity. The French Government would not allow him to live in Paris, kept him under police supervision, and restricted his movements; the Norwegians were, by comparison, hospitable.

The entries are both political and personal in character, and the latter are more interesting since his political ideas have been given full expression in writings published before and after his death. In some degree, the diary helps to clear up the enigma of his failure, after Lenin's death, to retain the position he had won by his services to the Russian revolution and the Soviet State. He was not a politician in a narrow sense, and found it virtually impossible to accept battle on the despicable terms established by his rivals. In so far as he attempted to do so, he was unequal to its demands. He recalls a conversation with Kamenev, who tried to persuade him that Stalin was not concerned with answering Trotsky's arguments, only with destroying him 'morally, and if possible, physically as well' (p. 37).

Trotsky sensed quite early the approach of that outbreak of terror that was to become known as the Great Purge, in which his name was to be associated with every villainy his enemies could fabricate to dishonour his past; it was a political sixth sense, sharpened by his intense concern and sorrow for the fate of those of his family left behind in the Soviet Union, persecuted, imprisoned, hounded to a self-inflicted death, or executed.

But never for a moment did he question the political assumptions which had shaped his actions. Indeed, it was in the effort to preserve and perpetuate them that he saw the value of his life. Had he not been in Petrograd in 1917, he wrote, the revolution would still have taken place, provided that Lenin was there and in command, but 'There is now no one except me to carry out the mission of arming a new generation with the revolutionary method' (p. 54).

JANE DEGRAS

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION AND RELIGION: A Collection of Documents Concerning the Suppression of Religion by the Communists, 1917-1925. Trans. and ed. by Boleslaw Szczesniak. Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1959. xx+289 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. (International Studies of the Committee on International Relations, University of Notre Dame.) \$6.75.

MUCH has been written about the suppression of religion in the Soviet Union. Dr Szczesniak's purpose in compiling the present book is to make available, in the English language, a selection of the most important primary sources of information on this subject. The translated documents include Soviet laws governing the rights and obligations of religious bodies, press reports of court cases against those of the clergy who failed to conform with these laws, and Epistles of Russian church leaders giving instructions to the faithful under their care. A running commentary on the situation as it develops is provided in the reports on Russian church affairs sent by the U.S. Legation at Riga to the State Department, and reactions of foreign Governments to the persecution of the clergy are indicated in documents translated from several European languages.

While seeking to provide an overall view of the strategy employed by the Soviet authorities in their anti-religious campaign, the author gives pride of place to the treatment accorded to the Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches. In the latter case, the picture presented is clear and full. Dr Szczesniak has had access to the papers of Fr Walsh, S.J., the former Papal delegate in Moscow, and also to those of Archbishop Cieplak, the last Catholic Metropolitan-Administrator in Russia who was himself condemned to death for 'counter-revolutionary' activities but later released and banished from the country.

In presenting, through the media of available documents, the story of the Orthodox Church during and immediately after the revolution, the author's task has been more difficult. Much valuable material is assembled, but in the latter part of the book, after the arrest and 'confession' of Patriarch Tikhon, the story becomes rather blurred and there are lacunae.

In his introductory essay the author summarizes and comments upon the events referred to in the documents. An extensive bibliography is provided and the appendices include lists of Soviet legislation concerning religious bodies (1918-26) and short biographies of leading prelates.

This volume is primarily intended as a book of reference for specialists and as such it will be found invaluable. But it deserves to be more widely studied if only for the remarkable insight which the documents provide into Soviet techniques of ideological warfare.

ELAINE LINGHAM

PUBLISHING IN THE U.S.S.R. By Boris I. Gorokhoff. Bloomington, Ind., Indiana University Press, 1959. 306 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. (Slavic and East European Series. Vol XIX.) \$3.

THIS is a most useful and at times fascinating compilation of statistics and other known facts on book production in the Soviet Union, with the emphasis on trends after the second World War. The material about the economics of publishing and the sections on Soviet copyright and the organization of Soviet documentation centres will be of interest not only to professional librarians but to every student of Soviet affairs. The total of books and pamphlets published in the Soviet Union is enormous—some 63,000 titles in 1958. Whether it is the largest in the world is difficult to establish, for the Soviet statistics do not differentiate between books and pamphlets or between those that are for sale and those (perhaps a third, or even more, of the total) that are free of charge. It is of some interest that as far back as 1913 the Russian total of publications was already very high: 34,000 for that year. It emerges from other statistics that it is not so easy as Mr G. Zhukov has claimed (in a letter to *The Times*, 4 December 1959) to maintain the principle of reciprocity in the foreign trade of books. Mr Zhukov, quite accurately, drew attention to the fact that the Soviet Union buys five or six times more books from this country than Britain purchases from Russia. From the Soviet statistics it appears, however, that the discrepancy between Russia and East Germany in this connection is even greater. In 1957—the last year for which figures are available—Russia bought books from East Germany to a value of 54 million rubles, and sold Russian books to East Berlin to a value of about 4 million. Nor is it very surprising to learn that Soviet book exports to Mongolia are about a hundred times the value of Soviet book imports from that country. Which goes to show that the principle of 'equality' in this particular field is a more complicated problem than might appear at first sight.

WALTER LAQUEUR

GOVERNMENT LAW AND COURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. 2 vols. Ed. by Vladimir Gzovski and Kazimierz Grzybowski. London, Stevens (Atlantic Books); The Hague, Mouton, 1959. xxxii + xv + 2067 pp. Bibliog. Index. 168s.

IN these two volumes the authors set themselves the enormous task of surveying and analysing the legal systems of the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Democracies of Eastern Europe. The sections dealing with the different countries are written by émigré lawyers, who have studied and practised law in these countries. As is inevitable in a joint work of this magnitude, the individual contributions vary in quality and in treatment.

The survey is subdivided into broad subject headings, each of which is then considered country by country. Part I describes the transfer of power to the Communist regimes, gives an outline of the resulting Constitutions, and de-

scribes the gradual sovietization of Eastern European law. This process was completed in the early 'fifties. Soon afterwards, internal changes and a slightly more liberal attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R., following Stalin's death, led to a reversal of the process in such countries as Poland and, for different reasons, Yugoslavia. The reversal from the extreme form of 'socialist legality' has been slight, but is nevertheless significant.

In Part II changes in the legal systems are traced and the resulting administrative framework described. Part III gives a brief outline of the changes in judicial procedure introduced by the advent of the Communist regime and describes the procedure now in force. Volume II deals with the application of criminal, civil, labour, and land tenure laws.

Covering, as they do, a little known field in such an exhaustive manner, these volumes will retain their usefulness for many years to come, but as a description of the laws now in force they may cease to be accurate in the very near future. A new Soviet code of Criminal Law and Procedure has been included in the appendix, but already, within the last few months, there have been important changes in the treatment of petty offenders and a comprehensive labour code is now under discussion in the Soviet Union. Some repercussions are already apparent in the countries of the Soviet bloc and others are bound to follow.

The work is well indexed and contains over 1,000 bibliographical references.

L. BOTT

RUSSIANS AT LAW. By Lionel Daiches. London, Michael Joseph, 1960. 208 pp. Illus. Index. 21s.

UNFORTUNATELY this is not the book it was meant to be. The author went on a fourteen-day trip to the Soviet Union as a member of a delegation of professional people with the express object of studying the practice of Soviet Law. However, it took his hosts ten days to make arrangements which would enable him to attend the sittings of law courts, and access to Soviet lawyers also proved to be difficult. Thus the information he got at first hand is somewhat scanty. His comparison of Soviet law with that of the Russian Empire is interesting, and he also quotes some relevant documents and speeches. But more than half the book is a straightforward travelogue of no special interest. The author's admitted ignorance of Soviet background leads him to some strange misconceptions. For instance, a collective farm in which the annual family income is 40,000 rubles is hardly 'typical'.

L. BOTT

DIE SOWJETISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK AM SCHEIDEWEGE. By Erik Boettcher. Foreword by Heinz-Dietrich Ortlieb. Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1959. xvi+307 pp. Tables. Index. (Die Veröffentlichungen der Akademie für Gemeinwirtschaft, Hamburg.) DM 26.50. Paper bound DM 22.50.

THIS is one of the few books on the Soviet economy which never loses sight of the wood in spite of a good deal of loving attention to the trees. Dr Boettcher's analytic survey of the Soviet situation owes much of its coherence and lucidity to his reliance on a single fruitful thesis which is firmly held in focus throughout the work. He argues that the Soviet system, so far from being *sui generis* in the absolute sense of the term, merely acts as a forcing house for institutional responses which are equally basic to capitalist societies, even though they accomplished their work there more gradually and earlier in history. The great metamorphosis we are now witnessing is the belated demise of the 'extensive' phase of economic development, in which labour could be recklessly used for conversion into a stock of physical capital (of which there had been such a perennial backlog). Up to the early 'fifties there was no overriding need to husband manpower in any sense of the word; nor was it necessary to coax it into peak efficiency by providing consumer goods adapted to individual tastes. Hence the

problems of welfare, personal security, and distribution in general could be allowed to recede into the background, leaving the field to that exclusive preoccupation with the volume and growth of production which was the hallmark of the Stalinist period. But this was no different from the situation which characterized the early industrial revolutions of the West. Here also, Dr Boettcher argues, production was largely shielded from the inhibiting effects of welfare requirements, and could continue to be so, as long as manpower was released in a broad stream by agricultural innovation and population growth which effectively disfranchised the consumer. It was only when this stream diminished and abundance began to turn into scarcity that consumer sovereignty came into its own. This is the beginning of the 'intensive' phase in which labour has to be carefully tended and in which both production and distribution of goods acquire an equal claim on our attention. The Soviet Union, overtaken by the demographic catastrophes of war and its aftermath, is at present being wafted into this intensive phase with dramatic suddenness, and the complicated manoeuvring of its leaders must be interpreted as a series of probes and reconnaissances to find their bearings in a situation which they had not adequately foreseen. It marks the beginning and not the execution of a new policy.

The thesis is not, of course, entirely original; nor would Dr Boettcher claim that it is. He merely wishes to examine the relevant facts of the Soviet economy as they bear upon it, and does so with considerable powers of persuasion. After a preliminary survey of the ideological origins of economic planning he gets down to a detailed analysis of recent population trends, with particular reference to war and post-war losses, and traces their effects on social structure, employment, and labour legislation. The recent improvements in personal and social security and the milder climate in the consumer goods sector are well summarized and convincingly linked to these developments. There follows a chapter on the bottleneck of agricultural production which is, perhaps, unexpectedly concise, but nonetheless well-rounded and informative. Chapter iv deals with the pre-history and rationale of the recent spate of administrative and planning reforms in the field of industry and construction. The book closes with a searching chapter on the role of ideology in Soviet economic policy. This contains much that is illuminating and aptly put, and is particularly successful in laying bare the tenuous links between the abstruse verities of Marxian metaphysics and their latter-day exegesis in search of higher sanction for the tergiversations of economic policy.

I think it is no detraction from Dr Boettcher's work to say that, like most good books, it suffers a little from the defects of its own virtues—which are those of logical cogency and devotion to a single comprehensive principle of historical explanation. Indeed, his book comes perhaps as near to a *roman à thèse* as a work of scholarship can venture without losing the odour of truth. Dr Boettcher's outstanding success in this form of brinkmanship is due in part to the beguiling nature of his thesis (the kinship and future convergence of the two opposing economic orders is of course a relatively optimistic doctrine), and in part to his consummate skill in pursuing its implications into so many nooks and crannies of Soviet economic life without doing violence to those aspects which must still remain unexplained.

F. SETON

LET US LIVE IN PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP: The Visit of N. S. Khrushchov to the U.S.A. September 15-27, 1959. Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959. 406 pp. Illus. 9s.

THIS book covers the story of Mr Khrushchev's trip to the U.S.A. from its official announcement on 4 August 1959 to his concluding Tass interview on 29 September. It includes every document, telegram, speech, and interview, both from the American and Soviet sides, in preparation, during, and after the trip, and is certainly the most comprehensive record available in a single volume.

There are, however, some omissions. Some questions, as for instance that of the editor of *Look* at the Economic Club of New York (p. 131), are only mentioned as being 'of an obviously provocative nature', others are summarized more to fit in with Mr Khrushchev's replies than with their original sense as reported by the Western press (p. 135). There is little editorial comment, except in the section covering Mr Khrushchev's meeting with the T.U. leaders. On that subject the editors write: 'To restore the truth, the Press Group of the Chairman of the Council of the U.S.S.R. presents an account of the discussion in question, the main points of which have been withheld from the public or distorted in the tendentious accounts given by some U.S. newspapers'. The account that follows (p. 218), however, is somewhat incoherent, a mixture of comment, quotation, and summary. Some questions are dismissed as 'smear' or 'provocation' with the barest indication of their content. Mr Khrushchev's replies are either given in full or summarized.

These, however, are exceptions and, where passions are not involved, the book gives equal prominence to American and Soviet speeches. L. BOTT

PEACE WITH RUSSIA? By Averell Harriman. London, Gollancz, 1960. 174 pp. 12s. 6d.

THIS is a frightening little book, for it shows how useless good intentions are when people do not talk the same language. Mr Harriman travelled 18,000 miles around the Soviet Union in six weeks, and must have sorely tried and puzzled his hosts. Why, he wanted to know (p. 157), does chess (which the Russians appear for collectivist reasons to have 'organized into clubs') come under the sports committee? 'What would you put it under,' his hosts not unnaturally replied, 'the Ministry of Health?' More disturbing (and no doubt to the Russians equally puzzling) is the materialism which, with the usual lip-service to abstract, undefined 'freedom', sets all Mr Harriman's standards: refrigerators, W.C.s, lawnmowers (p. 151) are his indices of civilization, in which the U.S.S.R. is lacking and the U.S.A. triumphant. Writing from a village in which (though one certainly sees a few crockety lawnmowers) not one house in four possesses the second and not one in ten the first article, the present writer may perhaps be pardoned if he wonders whether Mr Harriman's standards have universal validity. And it is perhaps not only Russians who may doubt whether (p. 17) it is the essence of democracy and free election for the voters of New York State to have the privilege of choosing between a Harriman and a Rockefeller. The present reviewer, who travelled 16,000 miles in wildest North America at the time of this historic contest, discovering *mores* as engaging anthropologically as anything encountered by Mr Harriman, would have thought that the one valid lesson of such a journey was to keep one's mouth shut. There are plenty of causes of international misunderstanding without adding clumsy good will.

G. BARRACLOUGH

THE SOVIET CITIZEN: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society. By Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Bauer with the assistance of David Gleicher and Irving Rosow. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. xx+533 pp. Tables. Index. \$10. 50s.

THIS work presents the main body of statistical data from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System and is produced by the Director and co-director of the Project. The evidence offered, therefore, is taken largely from the elaborate questionnaires applied to 3,000 Soviet refugees, and the first three chapters are devoted to explaining the efforts made, by normal techniques of statistical analysis, to correct some of the inevitable bias in this evidence.

The authors have to a large extent been successful in integrating the statistical information with information derived from standard sources and from a brief visit which two of them paid to the U.S.S.R. Their chapters on the popular

evaluation of Soviet education (VI), on sources of support for the regime (X) and of hostility (XI), and on class cleavage (XIII) are of particular interest. They rightly suggest that the results of the questionnaire are especially valuable in indicating some of the differences between the attitudes of old and young, and of workers, peasants, and intellectuals to such matters.

The English reader may find some of the authors' attitudes oriented rather unnecessarily towards comparisons with American society. Personally I think the role played by social solidarities other than family solidarities has been underrated, and the strength of the 'consumption ethic' (p. 381) has been much exaggerated. It seems much too early to evaluate how far the Soviet consumer is buying for pride of possession or social status, and how far merely for use.

However, the great value of *The Soviet Citizen* lies in its presentation of Soviet society as an industrial society which in many respects resembles other industrial societies and experiences many of their difficulties. The authors conclude that the future of the Soviet political system (p. 384) lies neither in a rock-like stability nor in the 'inevitable' democratization sometimes hoped for in the West. Even among their refugees they found 'only about a third believed people should be permitted to say things against the government' (p. 247.)

WRIGHT MILLER

FROM STALIN TO KHRUSHCHEV. By Goronwy J. Jones, Foreword by Dame Kathleen Courtney. London, Linden-Press, 1960. 206 pp. Index. 12s. 6d.

THIS book attempts to cover Russia's relations with the West from 1930 to date in two hundred pages. But the author neither keeps exclusively to his theme nor deals adequately with international events in general. Collective security appears to be his main interest, but there is no attempt to analyse what the phrase meant in the 1930s, or its possible change in meaning with changes of perspective in international affairs.

The book appears to rely exclusively on secondary authorities (there is no source list), but the author has decisive opinions about most of the events he describes. This, together with a certain looseness of style—Jap for Japanese, four 'of course's in as many pages, etc.—gives many easy targets for criticism. In general, one wonders what thought was given to the difficulty of connecting the European-centred '30s with the extra-European minded '50s; or to the change in the diplomatic position of the Soviet Union after the second World War, which passes unnoticed except for castigation of its 'aggressive designs'. In short, this book is rather thin.

RACHEL F. WALL

EASTERN EXPOSURE. By Marvin L. Kalb. London, Gollancz, 1959. xv+332 pp. 21s.

MR KALB, a student of the Harvard Russian Research Center, spent 1956 in the Soviet Union, where he pursued researches on Uvarov, Minister of Education under Nicholas I, and also worked in the press section of the American Embassy. *Eastern Exposure* is, substantially, the diary which he kept during the year of the Twentieth Party Congress and the revolt in Hungary. His reports on popular opinion about Hungary, Poland, and Dudintsev, as expressed at public meetings or in private conversation, are of much interest (pp. 244-8, 255-6, 261, 264-5, 277-8).

Mr Kalb visited Soviet Asia and Russian cities outside Moscow, and reports conversations which he had everywhere with people both critical of the regime and favourable to it. Although he conveys some lively impressions of Soviet citizens the whole picture seems a little too near the stereotype which one has come to expect of the average educated American visitor. He says of the Kievans, for instance, that 'Communism was very far away from them this morning', merely because they were enjoying themselves swimming, fishing

and drinking vodka on the Dnieper beaches (p. 111). The transliteration of Russian words and names has been very carelessly done. WRIGHT MILLER

THE FIFTEEN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TODAY AND TOMORROW. London, Soviet News, 1959-60. Illus. (Soviet Booklets). 6d.

THE *Soviet News* is publishing a series of booklets in English dealing with the fifteen Constituent Republics of the Soviet Union. These booklets give geographical and historical notes and are illustrated with some photographs. Both in photographs and text the accent is on the achievements of the Republics in all fields of human endeavour and on the glorious future which awaits them when the targets of the Seven-Year Plan have been fulfilled. L. B.

RACIAL PROBLEMS IN SOVIET MUSLIM ASIA. By Geoffrey Wheeler. London, New York, Bombay, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1960. xii+66 pp. Maps. Tables. 6s.

THE Institute of Race Relations must be congratulated for extending its interest beyond the conventional limits of West European colonial empires, and taking a look at the problems of Russia in Asia under Communist rule. In Colonel Wheeler the Institute has found an expert guide through this unfamiliar country. This short book will be very useful to students of the Soviet Union. But its principal value will be to persons generally interested in colonial and imperial problems. To experts on British and French Africa, who are so seldom aware of Soviet colonial experience and of present-day Soviet interest in Africa, Colonel Wheeler's booklet should be 'required reading'.

It briefly examines in turn the historical background and the administrative, social, cultural, and economic policies of the Soviet regime in Muslim Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaidjan. It contains an appendix on population statistics which unfortunately does not incorporate the results of the 1959 Census, but is still useful. Three points which emerge from the book may be mentioned at random, as illustrating the range it covers. One is the historical role played in Central Asia by a Russian urban proletariat, as the hard core of Russian domination: the analogy with the 'poor whites' in South Africa, the white workers of the copper belt, or the *petits blancs* in French African cities is striking. The second is the increasing number of Russian and Ukrainian settlers on the land in many Muslim areas: here the comparison is rather with small French landowners in Algeria than with gentlemen-farmers in Kenya. The third point is that the growth of industry in Central Asia and Azerbaidjan, though achieved by brutal political methods and hostility to Muslim culture, has undoubtedly raised the general standard of living to a level well above that of neighbouring Persia or Afghanistan. HUGH SETON-WATSON

MIDDLE EAST AND MEDITERRANEAN

THE ARABS IN ISRAEL. By Walter Schwarz. London, Faber & Faber, 1959. 172 pp. Illus. Map. Index. 21s.

MR SCHWARZ's book is a deft piece of *reportage* on a delicate problem: Israel's treatment of her 220,000 Arab minority. His approach has been to test Israel's record in the past eleven years against the highest principles set by her own leaders: that Israel should be a model State and the Arab minority a pilot plant for her ambition to bring technical and social progress to the Middle East. By these exacting standards, Mr Schwarz believes Israel has failed. Her Arabs are *not* the luckiest Arabs alive (p. 141), they continue to be pushed to the back of the queue in the scramble for jobs and land (p. 169), and everyday life for 80 per cent of them is still subject to the harsh restrictions of military rule (pp. 83-95). 'Security reasons' have turned Israel's Arabs into second-class citizens. Improvement in their material welfare is no adequate compensation.

Mr Schwarz is never guilty of arguing an *a priori* case. His conclusions emerge from a mass of particular evidence, snatches of conversation recording in different tones of voice a great many shades of Arab opinion. 'Arab reactions to the experience of being Israelis have been as varied in practice as they have in theory' (p. 121). (He also uncovers some illuminating details: because of the absence of public transport on the Sabbath in a country with a six-day working week, thousands of Jewish settlers have never even visited Arab villages within a ten-mile radius; Israeli Arabs spend more than twice as much money *per capita* on cigarettes as Jews. Hospitality or nervousness?)

But the central dilemma has nothing to do with security, President Nasser, or Arab nationalism, Mr Schwarz concludes. It lies in the moral question whether Israel will have the courage, stamina, and wisdom to treat all her citizens alike (p. 169). He makes some practical suggestions: abolish military rule; rely on the secret service to apprehend spies and saboteurs; treat the problem of Arab unemployment with the same urgency as the finding of jobs for new immigrants; return as much expropriated land as possible to Israeli Arabs; and allow them to form their own parliamentary party. For a start, 'Israel might begin by being frank about her minority' (p. 167). PATRICK SEALE

THE ARAB REFUGEES: An Abnormal Problem. By Devorah Kaplan. Trans. from the Hebrew by Misha Louvish. Preface by Rev. Per. Faye Hansen. Jerusalem, Rubin Mass, 1959. 230 pp. Tables. Bibliog.

THIS book is a frankly partial study of the Arab refugee problem based almost exclusively on United Nations documents. Its conclusions are that responsibility for the problem lies in 'the collective action on the part of the Arab states and the impotence of the United Nations to prevent the revolt' (p. 210). As for the future, 'repatriation is not only unrealistic and not even a humane solution for the Arab refugees themselves, but also an impossible solution' (p. 219). But the arguments on which these conclusions are based are often less than rigorous. Whatever one's view of this difficult problem, one wonders whether the kind of hair-splitting (e.g. 'Are the Arab refugees really "refugees"?) to which Miss Kaplan is driven by her partiality, her legalistic approach, and the narrowness of her sources will win many readers to her position. But there can be no argument with the appropriateness of her final quotation from Nietzsche in justification of Israel that the right to self-preservation is beyond good or evil. PATRICK SEALE

THE ARABS OF THE MIDDLE EAST: Population and Society. [Text in Hebrew]. By Gabriel Baer. Tel Aviv, Hakibbutz Hameuchad Publishing House, 1960. 267 pp. Maps. Bibliog. Index.

THE author, who lectures at the Hebrew University, combines accepted academic methods and standards with a doctrinaire Marxist approach, and deep emotional sympathy for Arab nationalism in its Nasserite forms with concern at many of its effects. The study under review has been built up from three distinct sources: Dr Baer's lecture-course at the Middle Eastern Studies Department of the Hebrew University; his lectures at the Israeli Government Political Staff College; and his course at the extreme left-wing *Kibbutz Hameuchad* seminar for cadres. In places it suffers from the split-personality which sometimes seems to be an occupational disease of left-wing academics.

The book contains a vast amount of material on social, economic, and demographic developments in the Arab world, but its conceptual framework is unsuited to its interpretation. The usual Marxist categories of 'feudalism', 'bourgeoisie', 'working-class', and Hobsonian-Leninist schema of imperialist economics leave the author unable to explain the emergence of radical-nationalist military regimes. His conclusion that the old social forms broke down before

the new ones had emerged, thereby creating a vacuum which 'left-wing nationalist' regimes filled, only begs the question.

The book is written in Hebrew: those who can read it will find it of value for its source material; those who cannot will find the scope and character of its bibliography instructive.

ALFRED SHERMAN

THE MIDDLE EAST IN WORLD POLITICS. By J. K. Banerji. Calcutta, The World Press, 1960. xii+390 pp. Maps. Map endpapers. Diagrams. Bibliog. Index. Rs. 20.50. 32s.

DR BANERJI'S book tells us at least as much about India as it does about the Middle East. It reflects Indian thinking on Asian affairs in its transition from the old-fashioned 'out with imperialism and leave the rest to take care of itself' attitude, to the quest for an empirical understanding to help to guide Indian policy-making through the intricacies of the Middle Eastern scene.

The book's level of scholarship leaves a good deal to be desired. Dr Banerji makes controversial and often patently incorrect assertions without adducing any sources to back them. Furthermore, his use of sources is indiscriminating and unselective: for instance, his main source for the Palestine War and its antecedents is, *mirabile dictu*, John Kimche's *Seven Fallen Pillars*. But he manages to combine emotional 'anti-imperialism' with considerable scepticism as to the capabilities of nationalist movements, and the use of current vulgar-Marxist terminology with competent analysis of Soviet aims and methods.

Dr Banerji argues that the only solution to the region's problems—and to the danger that great-Power rivalries there might set off a world conflict—is some form of disengagement or 'neutralisation' recognising that Soviet propinquity to the area brings both rights and duties. He believes that a solution is possible, and that 'the elimination of Western bases in the Middle East along the borders of the Soviet Union may prove to be an advantage for which the Soviet leaders might be willing to pay a commensurate price in the form of a mutually acceptable system of guarantee against aggression' (p. 333). He also believes that if the region could be disentangled from the cold war, the Israeli-Arab dispute would be settled 'in the course of time', with minor frontier revisions in Arab favour and the return of part of the refugees.

The study gains interest from the author's perspective—to the East of the region—but suffers from his deep anti-Pakistani bias, particularly where it discusses the Baghdad Pact (now CENTO) and SEATO. But, of course, this is true of present Indian foreign policies in general, which makes Dr Banerji representative if not always convincing.

ALFRED SHERMAN

A POLITICAL STUDY OF THE ARAB-JEWISH CONFLICT: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study). By Rony E. Gabbay. Geneva, Librairie E. Droz; Paris, Librairie Minard, 1959. xvii+611 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. (Études d'histoire économique, politique et sociale No. xxix.) Sw. Frs. 50.

THERE is a world of difference between a painstaking D.Phil. and a good book. The first can take a legitimate pride in long footnotes, straight out of Oppenheim, on the difference between a truce and an armistice, or in giving references to seven Jordanian newspapers, where one is proof enough of some small point. Before such work reaches book stage, much pruning and some re-arrangement is usually desirable. It is a pity that no one gave Dr Gabbay this advice.

As its title suggests, his thesis amounts virtually to two books. The one ranges widely enough over Middle Eastern politics to discuss such topics as the Allied Middle East Command and the reasons why Nasser decided to shout down the Baghdad Pact. This general picture of Middle Eastern politics adds little to what is in other books, with one important exception. Dr Gabbay was born and educated in Iraq, but later lived in Israel. He knows both Arabic and

Hebrew, and provides an unusual range of quotations from books and newspapers in both these languages.

His work on the refugees is immense, and provides material on the motives for their flight, the efforts made to organize them and compensate them, and the resistances applied to this process. The weakness of this 'case study' is that its author, being Jewish, cannot cross the frontier and has never been able to see the 'cases' for himself, so that anything not recorded in reports and documents escapes his notice. For instance, a full case history of the Arab refugees ought to include an account of those who have rebuilt new lives, and of the important contribution that this twentieth century Dispersion has made to the life of the more backward Arab countries. It is, or has so far been, ten to one that the air-ways counter clerk, the hospital almoner, and the teacher in the Persian Gulf town will all be Palestinians. Or again, Dr Gabbay, basing himself on information obtainable in Israel, gives a long and interesting account of the operation whereby, with the assistance of Barclay's Bank D.C.O., Israel has been repaying blocked Arab balances. But he does not mention the repugnance, adverse propaganda, and delay caused in the early stages of this process when owners of the balances now in Syria and Jordan received forms to fill in, part of which was printed in Hebrew. Presumably he does not know of this, for wherever he thinks that Israel made a psychological mistake, he says so.

His book is too long for the amount of new material it provides. Its table of contents is copious, but does not do service for an index, which the book lacks. As he tends to repeat himself, it is only by luck that one turns at once to his best account of—say—the attempts by outsiders to prolong the first truce in the Palestine War. Another drawback of his work is that he omitted to have it read by someone whose native language is English. His translations from Hebrew and Arabic are clumsy; he is sometimes at fault over past tenses, and sometimes picks the wrong word for what he obviously means to say. His bibliography is exhaustive, and one must admire the amount of work he has put into his thesis.

ELIZABETH MONROE

MIDDLE EAST DIARY 1917-1956. By R. Meinertzhagen. London, Cresset Press, 1959. xi+376 pp. Index. 35s.

THIS is a collection of selected extracts from the seventy volumes of diary kept by a regular soldier, now over eighty. He was a friend and admirer of Dr Weizmann and an ardent Zionist from the early days of the Balfour Declaration. His mystical belief in the mission of the Jews and his hatred of what he calls 'hebraophobia' did not always fit in with his official duties as successively head of Allenby's military intelligence section, a member of the British Delegation to the Peace Conference, Chief Political Officer in Palestine, and Military Adviser to the Middle East Department of the Foreign Office. For example, Colonel Meinertzhagen's fearless expression of his unpalatable views, through unorthodox channels, led to his being sent home by Allenby.

His views, in general, are erratic: he expresses widely divergent opinions at various times on Colonel T. E. Lawrence and on (the then) Sir Herbert Samuel, and at one time was even an admirer of Adolf Hitler. ('My own view' (he says—p. 158) 'is that the German has a perfect right to treat the Jew as an alien and deny him German citizenship. He even has the right to expel him from Germany; but it must be done decently and with justice.')

This volume contains only a small selection of his private opinions and it is difficult from these alone to get a full idea of the range of Colonel Meinertzhagen's political views. It is doubtful in any case whether much can be gained by the publication of isolated extracts from private diaries in the author's lifetime, even when annotated by him subsequently, with hind-sight. Diaries are part of the raw material of history and must be used judiciously especially when, as in this case, the author deliberately says (p. 323), 'I find that my diary

is a great safety valve.' Occasionally Colonel Meinertzhagen's utterances have a prophetic ring which is now seen to have been justified. But it is difficult to know what actual influence he had on the course of events at the time.

The book is marred by several uncorrected errors in the spelling of proper names, some by the author, others apparently by the editor.

EDWIN SAMUEL

DIE ALGERISCHE FRAGE: Rechtlich-politische Studie. By Thomas Oppermann. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer, 1959. xvi+225 pp. Index. (Untersuchungen zur auswärtigen Politik. Herausgegeben von Dr Herbert Krüger, Band 1.) DM 18.

AFTER so much heated argument on both sides of the Algerian war one turns with relief to a cool and detached examination of the questions over which this war arose and which it has raised.

Dr Oppermann bases his book on the theory that growing national consciousness in the modern world has profoundly disturbed the co-existence of different ethnic groups that used to live more or less peacefully side by side under the same rule. Empires were the first to break up, and colonial territories came close behind. If, as in the case of Algeria, strong forces act in opposite directions from outside, complications of an external as well as an internal character have to be reckoned with, and the international issues do, in fact, constitute *die algerische Frage*.

But before the author feels he can properly discuss them, he makes, in Part I, a clear and up-to-date survey of French Algeria's constitutional and political history, from its beginnings, in 1830, to the *Loi-cadre* of 2 February 1958, giving a particularly lucid account of the *Statut* of 1947, the ideas that went into its formulation, and the failure of its application. He deals with the international side in Part III, dwelling at length upon questions of international law, such as what actual or potential status the Algerian rebellion has, whether the material support of the insurgents by Arab or other nations is defensible in international law, or if recognition of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic should not raise 'serious doubts' (p. 181). There are also carefully written chapters on Algeria and the United Nations and on practically all other international aspects of the Algerian 'question'. It is evident that in this field the author is on his home ground.

The social and economic problems, so very weighty in the case of Algeria, are treated shortly (pp. 20-33), and here his steps are less sure. His overall picture is quite fair; but his statistics are very incomplete and some of his sources questionable, while other more authoritative publications—e.g. J. Despois's *L'Afrique du Nord* (Vol. IV of *Géographie de l'Union Française*)—seem to have escaped his attention. On the other hand, his account of the Algerian war which fills the middle section of the book (Part II, pp. 69-155) is well documented and as liberal and neutral as it is possible to be.

Bibliographies are arranged at the head of chapters and there is no comprehensive reference list. The disadvantages of this method far outweigh, in the opinion of this reviewer, any advantages it may have. E. A. ALPOT

ALGERIA IN TURMOIL: A History of the Rebellion. By Michael K. Clark. New York, Praeger, 1959; London, Thames and Hudson, 1960. xvi+466 pp. Maps. Map endpapers. Bibliog. Index. \$6. 35s.

THE publisher's blurb claims that this is 'the first comprehensive account of the Algerian rebellion to appear in any language', and the author's sub-title is 'a history of the rebellion'. Neither the claim nor the description is quite justified; Charles-Henri Favrod's *La Révolution Algérienne*¹—though not mentioned in

¹ Paris, Plon, 1959.

the bibliography—was a comprehensive account, and Mr Michael Clark's own account is far too partisan and emotional to qualify as history.

This is not, however, to deny its value in several respects. It is a painstaking and accurate presentation of a great mass of facts; it is, as a journalist's book ought to be, very easy to read; and there was surely room in English for a presentation of the Algerian tragedy from the viewpoint of the European settlers. For that is what Mr Clark has done. His book is a passionate defence of the position that has come to be known as 'ultra' (though he rejects the unpleasant implications of the word). In defending this position, he has swallowed, quite uncritically, every argument used not only by the settlers themselves, but by the French Army in Algeria, and also by successive French Governments whose spokesmen have not always believed the things they were called upon to say. For them all, and for Mr Clark, Algeria is a position which France is holding on behalf of the Western world as a whole; the rebellion was launched by criminals and political opportunists; President Nasser is one of the responsables; Arab nationalism is the consequence of envy after centuries of sloth; if France fails in Algeria, the whole Arab world will sink into a dangerous state of anarchy that will give the Soviet and Chinese Communists their opportunity to take over. Mr Clark, who was a correspondent of the *New York Times* in North and West Africa for several years, clearly intends his book to awaken the American public and Government to the dangers of the situation as he sees it.

To his honour, the author does not shirk the unpleasant facts of the more or less recent past, such as the faking of elections to the advantage of the settlers, and the brutality of General Massu's suppression of terrorism in Algiers. But where his condemnation of rebel atrocities is unequivocal—as well it may be—he is always ready with excuses to justify French lapses. And he is singularly blind to the protracted Muslim frustrations that were bound, sooner or later, to break out into insurrection. There is, of course, a valid case for continued association between Algeria and France, if only on economic grounds. But Mr Clark is so carried away by moral indignation that he almost entirely overlooks it.

BRIAN CROZIER

MER ROUGE—AFRIQUE ORIENTALE: Études sociologiques et linguistiques. Préhistoire—Explorations—Perspectives d'avenir. By M. Albospeyre and others. Preface by Hubert Deschamps. Paris, J. Peyronnet, 1959. 342 pp. Bibliog. (Cahiers de l'Afrique et l'Asie. V.) *Frs.* 2,500

EARLIER volumes in this series include the *Naissance du Proletariat marocain*, prepared under the direction of the late Robert Montagne, and Pierre Rondot's *Les Chrétiens d'Orient*. The present volume, consisting of eight essays dealing with the Horn of Africa and the Aden Protectorate, is worthy of its predecessors, so far as the diversity of subjects treated permits. The essays discuss the pre-history of Ethiopia and various sociological subjects. Two are of direct interest to the student of international affairs. One is a description of the Somali people, by R. Lamy; the other a study of the tribes of South Arabia, by R. Bernier. Both are clear, concise, and informative. The British reader may perhaps consider that the treatment of South Arabia is more objective than that of the Somali territories where French interests come into play. It is in fact somewhat provoking when British sympathy with the Somali case, often disinterested and involving us in great difficulties with the otherwise well-disposed Ethiopia, has to be explained by the supposed British desire to unite all Somalis under some sort of British protectorate. This does not however mean that the article is not both instructive and informative. Both writers add brief but extremely interesting notes on probable future developments. But M. Bernier seems unduly certain that oil does in fact exist in the Aden protectorate in worth-while quantities.

NEVILL BARBOUR

SULTANATE AND IMAMATE IN OMAN. By J. B. Kelly. London, Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1959. 20 pp. Map. (Chatham House Memoranda.) 3s. 6d.

THIS memorandum makes a formidable addition to Mr Kelly's valuable Persian Gulf studies. It traces the complicated history of the Ibadhi imamate and its eventual fission, and shows the sultanate and the imamate as representing roughly religious tolerance or laxity versus fanaticism, commerce versus country and desert life, the coast, with its power to exact customs dues, versus the hinterland. Mr Kelly considers the limited purpose of the treaty of Sib, signed in 1920, and shows that it has ceased to be valid. He describes the recent quarrels between the Sultan, supported by the Government of the United Kingdom, and the Imam, supported by Saudi Arabia and represented by the Arab League, as rightly struggling to be free.

The memorandum concludes with an interesting passage on the position of the United States, tied to Saudi Arabia by oil and the Dhahran air base, but probably unwilling to be dragged into Saudi quarrels with the Gulf shaikhs, the more unwilling because there is not, as many believe, a conflict between British and United States oil interests: the Americans are interested in the Oman concession as well as in the oil of Saudi Arabia.

R. W. BULLARD

AFRICA

FIVE ELECTIONS IN AFRICA: A Group of Electoral Studies. Ed. by W. J. M. Mackenzie and Kenneth Robinson. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1960. ix + 496 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Index. 55s.

THIS book is the first of its kind. Each of the five long essays in it describes the state of constitutional development and party politics in a different African territory. Each study is built round an election which the writer has witnessed; as one of the two editors has written elsewhere, during elections, when public attention is concentrated for a short time on the major issues which confront a nation, certain aspects of political life are seen in sharper focus than they are at other times.

The choice of territories was a matter of convenience. Elections were held in all five within the same period of twelve months (May 1956–May 1957), and people were available to study them. The five territories are the Eastern and Western Regions of Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Kenya. In the last case only the election of African representatives is described, and this was somewhat anomalous since the Kenya Government sought to conduct elections while effectively proscribing parties.

Each study gives an account of constitutional development in the country in question (none was self-governing at this time), of the political parties, of the extent of communication possible through the press and broadcasting, and of press treatment of political questions. Then the elections are described in detail, from the point of view both of administration and of the conduct of party campaigns.

The book will be read with equal interest by those concerned with the technique of elections and those who want to know what becomes of Western parliamentary institutions when they are exported in pre-fabricated form. The first category will be able to compare different ways of making it easy for illiterates to record their choice, and to consider whether elaborate precautions against irregularity may defeat their own object if they are not understood by the people charged with administering them. The second will look to Professor Mackenzie's summary of the findings. He does not seek to be a political barometer, but he does comment that the African voters and parties described here appear to have learnt to play the electoral game more quickly than some

thought they could, and that, since elections are conceived of as a sign of political maturity, the new independent States may keep to this way of choosing their government. But he also remarks that 'in the West the system has never been able to stand the combination of intense localism with universal suffrage' (p. 485), and quotes the example of Ireland. This is a more fruitful way of looking at Africa's problems than talking about 'tribalism' as if this was a disease peculiar to that continent.

Professor Mackenzie's most important conclusion is that an election study is one of the best ways of assessing the state of politics in any of the new nations, and that we need many more of them. Certainly we should welcome more studies as good as these.

LUCY MAIR

AFRICAN NATIONALISM. By Ndabaningi Sithole. Foreword by R. S. Garfield Todd. Cape Town, New York, London, Oxford University Press, 1959. 174 pp. 12s. 6d.

MR SITHOLE is an African schoolmaster in Southern Rhodesia. The opening chapter of his book is a fascinating and splendidly forthright autobiographical sketch which, in its combination of pride and modesty, brings to mind (for all the differences of milieu) many an account of their struggle to achieve education written by men of humble origins in nineteenth-century Britain.

His book seeks to explain African nationalism to non-Africans. The essence of his message could be put in Leopold Senghor's comment (to the French Parliament in 1952): 'You know, we Africans have a mystique of equality.' While describing the part played by the second World War in the African awakening, Mr Sithole emphasizes, in many different contexts, the major role of doctrines of white superiority and, still more, white supremacy in determining its character. He is also at pains to underline that African nationalism is directed against European domination and not against the white man and tries to do justice to the positive aspects of colonial rule and the part of Christian missions in providing the basis on which an African nationalism could emerge.

What strikes one in comparing this book with such works as Mr Awolowo's *Path to Nigerian Freedom* (1947) or Dr Nkrumah's *Autobiography* (1956) is its much greater emphasis on 'racial' feeling, though this is certainly no more than might be expected in the very different circumstances of Southern Rhodesia. Secondly, experience all over the world suggests that if such a demand for equality and acceptance is not in some measure met, it is soon followed by much more violent reactions of rejection and demands for total supremacy on the part of the dominated group. Mr Sithole's book provides further evidence that the hour is already very late (it was written three years ago) and the prospects of accommodation on the African side likely to diminish.

KENNETH ROBINSON

ECONOMIC SURVEY OF AFRICA SINCE 1950. New York, U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 1959. xi + 248 pp. Tables. \$3. 21s. *Sw.Frs.* 13.

SUBMITTED as the main background document to the Tangier session in January-February 1960 of the Economic Commission for Africa, this report is likely to become an essential tool to anyone concerned with the economic problems of Africa. It contains the most complete and up-to-date record now available of general trends and developments over the whole continent, data for which are too often scattered and cast in forms not readily comparable, apart from remaining regrettably scanty and sometimes highly unreliable. The report examines in turn the structural aspects of the African economies, growth trends in recent years, developments in trade, and the question of capital formation in its various aspects. The approach is constructive and thought-provoking, and much hard work has obviously gone into preparing the document. Among the many comparative tables the summary presentation of available national income estimates

typifies those that will be of particularly wide interest. A discussion of the findings contained in this Survey is beyond the scope of a short review. Suffice it to quote three conclusions: that availability of investment funds from external sources, whether from governments, official international institutions, or private sources, is bound to acquire increasing importance; that 'among the most urgent problems . . . especially in tropical Africa, are those which relate to transport, to specific knowledge of natural resources in situations most promising of immediate development, and to training both for government service and in other fields' (p. 2); and that 'given the lack of conditions necessary for a more spontaneous growth, many African Governments have no choice but to perform the functions of an entrepreneur in diverting domestic savings into productive investment and even in assuming responsibilities of management' (p. 3).

MARIANNE GELLNER

AN ATLAS OF AFRICA. By J. F. Horrabin. London, Victor Gollancz, 1960. 126 pp. Maps. Index. 12s. 6d.

THIS little book achieves its objective of presenting some of the key background facts required for an understanding of Africa today. The author sketches a brief history of Africa which is amply illustrated by fifty maps, only two of which show minor inaccuracies. He gives some significant information about the comparative wealth and size of Africa—for example, we learn that French Africa alone covers an area about twice as large as the U.S.A.; and he presents the challenge of tomorrow in terms both of settlers and of science. In short, a useful handbook for anyone who wants to know where's where in Africa today.

RACHEL F. WALL

THE INDEPENDENT SUDAN. By Mekki Shibeika. New York, Robert Speller, 1960. xix + 506 pp. Bibliog. Index. \$7.50.

DR SHIBEIKA is Professor of History at the University College of Khartoum and this book is substantially an American reprint of his *British Policy in the Sudan 1882-1902*¹ which was based on the thesis for his London doctorate. He has added three introductory chapters summarizing the ancient and the Turkish periods, and several chapters covering the political evolution from 1900 to Independence Day in January 1956. The author is anxious that the reader shall draw a sharp distinction between these additions and the main part of the work, which was based on his own extensive and original research. Nevertheless the later chapters give a useful picture of the rise of Sudanese nationalism and of how Egypt and Great Britain reacted towards it at various times, until finally the two flags of the Co-dominion were pulled down. It is a remarkable story, and Dr Shibeika is probably the only Sudanese who could have successfully compressed it into such small space so objectively without access to the archives. English readers will wish that there had been more reference to the administrative and economic development of the country under the half-century of British rule, but this would have unduly widened the scope of the work. If they want a monument, surely Dr Shibeika and his colleagues at Khartoum University are sufficient evidence of what was achieved in that half-century.

P. BROADBENT

GEZIRA: A Story of Development in the Sudan. By Arthur Gaitskell. Preface by Margery Perham. London, Faber & Faber, 1959. 372 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Index. (Colonial and Comparative Studies ed. by Margery Perham.) 42s.

THE story of one of the greatest co-operative ventures of this century has been written by the man best qualified to undertake the task, and we are indebted to Miss Margery Perham and to Nuffield College, Oxford, for making this possible.

¹ London, Oxford University Press, 1953.

In the Sudan Plantations Syndicate Mr Gaitskell graduated from Field Officer in 1923 to General Manager in 1945, and before he left the Sudan in 1952 he had combined his work as Chairman and Managing Director of the new Sudan Gezira Board with membership of the Executive Council of the Sudan and the Chairmanship of the University College of Khartoum.

Those who followed the fortunes of the Gezira Scheme from 1926, when water from the Sennar Dam first flowed over the vast Gezira plain, to 1950 when the Syndicate's lease expired and the Sudan Gezira Board took over, will be fascinated by this book. Each chapter leads on to the next with just the right amount of detail, and with all the facts and figures that are necessary. Others who would like to see similar development schemes initiated in under-developed territories will learn many useful lessons. One is that capital is only the first of the factors; brains, courage, and incredible tenacity over a long period of years have to be pitted against the vicissitudes of nature and the vagaries of the world market. In 1951 the combination of high price and high yield produced a cotton crop worth £54 million, with an average profit per tenancy of £800.

Twenty years before, in 1931, from nearly the same acreage the crop was worth only £750,000 and the profit per tenancy was nil, and in the two years following 1951 profits dropped first to £300 and then to £200 on the average tenancy. Mr Gaitskell examines sympathetically and with deep insight the social effects of sudden wealth and equally rapid disillusionment on the 25,000 Sudanese tenants. In his account of the planning of the scheme in the first years of this century many great names stand out, beginning with Lord Kitchener, General Wingate, and Leigh Hunt. The primary concern of the Sudan Government was always the welfare and future security of the Sudanese, and the men of commerce who had faith in the venture—Sir Frederick Eckstein, Lord Lovat, and General Asquith—met all those requirements more than half way. Throughout the book the assessment of the sometimes conflicting views of Government, Syndicate, and tenants is scrupulously fair. Only modesty has prevented the author from giving adequate space and praise to that glorious body of Syndicate Inspectors (and their charming wives) who brought the highest ideals of duty and gracious living to the harsh Gezira plain. At the end Mr Gaitskell reviews the principles that made the Gezira experiment a success, the mistakes that might have been avoided, and the relevance of this form of partnership to the much wider field of Western world relationships with the African continent.

P. BROADBENT

THE ETHIOPIANS: An Introduction to Country and People. By Edward Ullendorff. London, Oxford University Press, 1960. xvi+232 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. 30s.

PROFESSOR ULLENDORFF sets himself the task of giving in a shortish book to the general reader (as distinct from the small circle of expert Ethnologists, in which his own place is one of the highest distinction) 'a balanced picture of Ethiopia . . . sufficiently full and rounded to cover many of the principal aspects of country and people and . . . general enough to be intelligible to the non-specialist' (p. vii). His account includes a survey of the course of Ethiopian exploration in all periods: of the territory itself and its extremely diverse ethnic groups: of its history, religions, and languages: of its literature, arts, customs, and daily life: and of the Ethiopian polity, scene, and services today.

The task, in which, as ever, dullness and superficiality must be the Scylla and Charybdis to be avoided, has been carried out with remarkable success. Few indeed of the 'general reader's' probable, and even searching, queries here remain unanswered; the survey is as comprehensive as it is readable and enjoyable; and the great weight of erudition in almost every by-path of Ethiopology which this book in fact represents is carried with a refreshing and friendly lightness. Professor Ullendorff has, it is clear, a keen but not an indiscriminate sym-

pathy with this attractive—though highly individual and at times baffling—people, and much admires the services to it of the present Emperor; and his pages will convey to all but the dullest of his readers a similar feeling. A pleasing feature of the author's style and outlook is his generosity to other and earlier scholars, whose devoted work, unknown to the wider public, is so familiar to him; and his own years of residence in the territory carry an even livelier conviction. The photographs are admirably chosen, the (select) bibliography fully sufficient, and the map helpful in spite of its failure to show railways or main roads.

S. H. LONGRIGG

DIE FESTUNG DER LÖWEN: Äthiopien von Salomon bis zur Gegenwart. By Hermann Neubacher. Olten, Freiburg im Breisgau, Walter-Verlag, 1959. 272 pp. Illus. Map endpapers. Index. *DM* 19.80.

HERR HERMANN NEUBACHER, a former Bürgermeister of Vienna, was invited by the Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia to come to Addis Ababa in 1954 in order to act as adviser on the administration of that city and to reorganize the Ethiopian electricity corporation. In the intervals of these duties he made the journeys, observations, and researches which are the basis of this charming and original book. His quite profound study of the country 'from Solomon till today' is presented in a series of sketches dealing with the most varied aspects of the country's religion, social and economic life, scenery, and history. Far from giving the effect of a collection of disconnected articles, the reader has the impression of turning the pages of an album of charming vignettes, illustrating the various aspects of Ethiopian life. When the author implies criticism, he does so with the greatest delicacy. In this unusual way Herr Neubacher has succeeded in the space of 270 pages in giving a many-sided and remarkably comprehensive account of a fascinating and almost unknown world. There are forty-nine splendid illustrations and two simple but clear maps, one being of the country itself while the other shows its setting in the African continent. An appendix contains chronological tables and the text of certain significant laws and documents. There is an index; and the beautiful printing and presentation do credit to the Swiss firm which published the work.

NEVILL BARBOUR

HISTOIRE DU TOGO. By Robert Cornevin. Preface by Hubert Deschamps. Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1959. 427 pp. Illus. Maps. Bibliog. Index. (*Mondes d'Outre-mer.*) *Frs.* 1,950.

So substantial an addition to the scanty literature on Togoland is particularly welcome at a time when its future status seems likely once again to become a subject of international controversy in which the position of Great Britain will be complicated by the rival policies pursued by her N.A.T.O. ally, France, and her fellow member of the Commonwealth, Ghana. But this is in some respects a disappointing book. It contains a mass of useful information but its presentation is fragmentary and its general effect is that of a handbook rather than the historical monograph the editor's preface leads one to expect. Too much detail of limited significance has been included (e.g. the number of telephone boxes opened 'since the war' (p. 354)), little attempt at appraisal of the material is attempted, and sources of statistics are seldom indicated.

M. Cornevin spent many years as an administrative officer in Togoland and his feeling for the country and its people are in the best tradition of his service. A substantial part of the book is rightly devoted to the peopling of the country, the ethnography of its peoples, and their history in pre-colonial times, on which the author has done much research. There is a sympathetic and scholarly assessment of the German occupation and administration. In addition to a general survey of the inter-war years (in which the author makes considerable use of

Governor Pechoux's doctoral thesis¹) there is a particularly interesting chapter on the demography of the country and a useful account of mission activities.

The more recent political history of the territory, unfortunately, is not very informative. The account of African political activity is slight and suggests no great interest on the part of the author. It certainly does not add to what is already known and is less instructive than Professor Coleman's admirable study *Togoland*² to which M. Cornevin, rather surprisingly, makes no reference. Throughout the book, the British figure in the role of *perfidie Albion*. They are accused, for example, of deliberately conferring senior rank on the commander of their forces in the first World War in order to secure the command of the allied forces (p. 208), while the lion's share of the former German territories in Africa which they obtained in 1919, 'if in proportion to their military participation in the conquest', was 'without relation to the size of the human and material loss suffered by France in the war' (pp. 215-16).

More serious is the author's acceptance of the view that the British authorities at the end of the last war supported, if they did not inspire, a campaign to bring French Togoland under British rule. He repeats the assertion made in Professor Luchaire's *Le Togo Français de la tutelle à l'autonomie* that petitions addressed to the British Government in 1943 for the attachment of French Togoland to British Togoland and the Gold Coast 'had at least the agreement of the British administration' (p. 382). Like Professor Luchaire, he adduces no evidence for what is obviously regarded as self-evident, though he adds the confident assertion that the British 'regarded with a favourable eye' the possible addition of the rich cocoa-growing areas of French Togoland. Similarly, in 1951, after Dr Nkrumah's assumption of office, 'it was a question of not losing the rich cocoa and coffee lands of Kpandu and Ho (in British Togoland) . . . for the greater stability of the West African pound, cocoa pillar of the sterling area' (p. 386). It would be tedious to instance other examples which hardly inspire confidence in the author's objectivity as a historian, but it would be wrong to pass over in silence his statement that the campaign preceding the plebiscite in British Togoland was 'assez violente' (p. 393). The United Nations Commissioner, on the contrary, recorded (U.N. Document T/1258) that it was held 'in an atmosphere of absolute freedom, impartiality, and fairness' and that 'there were practically no incidents'.

The complexity of the issues relating to the separation of the two Togoland areas, the basic disagreements of different groups of the African peoples concerned, and the potentially serious implications of recent events is sufficiently great to demand a conscious effort to achieve greater objectivity.

KENNETH ROBINSON

THE BELGIAN CONGO: Some Recent Changes. By Ruth Slade. London, New York, Cape Town, Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, 1960. 55 pp. Maps. 5s.

A GREAT deal is to be learned from this little book on recent changes in the Belgian Congo, particularly as regards the outlook and attitude of the *évolués*, the fifty thousand or so better educated Congolese (out of a population of thirteen million), far more of them from Leopoldville province than from elsewhere. To the *évolués*, at the time of writing, everything the Belgians had done appeared to be wrong, although the Round Table Conference of last January and the fixing of 30 June 1960 for the granting of independence has since served to modify this opinion. We are told of the paternalism of the Belgian Government, of the missions and companies, and there is stress on the absence of foresight, especially regarding the lack of higher education. But it was the financial recession of

¹ *Le mandat français sur le Togo* (Paris, Pedone, 1939).

² *Togoland* (New York, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (*International Conciliation*, No. 509), 1956).

1958 and the resulting unemployment, coming after more than a decade of almost continuously rising prosperity, which brought home to the Congolese urban workers, and not only to the *évolués*, the great disparity between African and European salaries and standards of living. This economic background receives little attention from the author.

The right spelling is *Bourgmestre*, not *Bourgemestre* (pp. 25, 48, 50, and 52); and Kibangim and Kibangists, not Kimbangim and Kimbangists (pp. 34, 43, and 50).

MARJORY TAYLOR

SOUTH AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA

INDIAN MUSLIMS: A Political History (1858-1947). By Ram Gopal. London, Asia Publishing House, 1959. 351 pp. Index. 42s.

MR RAM GOPAL, although a doughty controversialist of the type which made Indian journalism a powerful factor in the success of the nationalist movement, has written some excellent books on historical subjects with considerable objectivity. The work under notice is about as stiff a test of this quality as could be devised; because a U.P. man who can write objectively about Muslim politics while belonging to the other community can probably write objectively about anything. The author has taken the greatest possible pains to maintain impartiality; and since this book is the product of much industrious research and is exceedingly well written, it deserves—and will no doubt receive—careful study. Perhaps the main criticism to which it lays itself open is this: in detail, it is accurate, but in general it avoids censuring the Muslims by the familiar means of attacking the British. Mr Ram Gopal firmly believes that it was not religion which created political division, first in the ranks of the nationalist movement, and finally in the sub-continent, but rather the insistence of middle and upper class men, who happened to be Muslims, on a place in the sun side by side with Hindus, who were leading the nationalist movement and also, favoured by competitive tests, were entering the administrative ranks in large numbers. The author holds, like many Hindu writers before him, that the British aggravated an essentially unreal cleavage by using Muslim communalism as a shield against nationalism; while the nationalist movement itself was untainted by communal considerations and animated only by a praiseworthy secularism. Mr Ram Gopal ingeniously argues that the refusal of the Congress after its victory in the 1936 elections to form coalitions with the Muslims—a refusal which, as he justly remarks, antagonized Muslim communalism for good and finally led to the demand for Pakistan—was, in effect, a triumph for high-minded secularism as against ignoble expediency. This argument, like certain of the other considerations urged by the author in support of the conclusions he has reached as a result of this study, is somewhat novel. There is now room for a book of comparable thoroughness and ability from the Muslim side.

L. F. RUSHBROOK-WILLIAMS

SOURCES OF INDIAN TRADITION. Ed. by Wm. Theodore de Bary and others. New York, Columbia University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. xxvii+959 pp. Bibliog. Index. 55s.

It would seem far-fetched to most people to be told that the foreign policy of a European nation cannot be wholly grasped without reference to the roots of European tradition. There is, however, a growing recognition of the political utility of intellectual and cultural history, of the unexpected light that ideas and attitudes may sometimes shed upon events and policies. This is even more effectively shown in the case of Asian countries such as China and India, with their distinctive national traditions and a cultural history markedly different from that of Russia or Germany, for example. Asian studies have in the past been hampered by an excessive classicism, an acute sense of distance in time as well as space that has hindered as much as it has helped understanding.

It is, therefore, just as well that the 'Records of Civilization' series of Columbia University gives due attention to the more recent cultural history of Asian nations. The volume on India is particularly valuable for its section on Modern India and Pakistan, edited by Stephen Hay.

The omnibus phrase 'Indian tradition' covers a teasing variety of things at all times, thus presenting a more severe challenge to a team of anthologists than the catchphrase 'the Greek Experience'. The earlier part of the volume contains the plea of a Jain writer, Somadeva, that 'the force of arms cannot do what peace does. If you can gain your desired end with sugar, why use poison?' There is a telling extract on the Buddhist conception of a Universal Emperor who 'conquers by righteousness'. There also co-exist Asoka's idealistic axioms and Kantilya's cynical injunctions. The concluding section includes extracts from Abu Taleb on the 'evils of Western materialism' and the gospel of Progress; from Dayanand Saraswati, an even more extreme critic of Europe, on the virtues of Europeans; from Vinekananda on the 'spiritual conquest' of the world by Indian thought; from Iqbal on the religious justification of a separate state for the Muslims; from Tagore on the evils of nationalism and from Gandhi on the message of Asian universalism. Particularly interesting though inevitably misleading are the closing extracts, entitled 'Six Paths to India's Future'. Hindu revivalism and activism are to be found along with secular humanism and socialist optimism. Nehru's own secularization of Indian universalism and Vinoba Bhave's vivid contrast between Communism and *Sarvodaya* are also represented here.

This volume could clearly prove to be profitable to readers of *International Affairs* provided the limitations of any such anthology are recognized.

R. N. IYER

SOVIET RUSSIA AND INDIAN COMMUNISM: 1917-1947. With an Epilogue Covering the Situation Today. By David N. Druhe. New York, Bookman Associates, 1959. 429 pp. Bibliog. Index. \$8.50.

THE title of this book is misleading. Mr Druhe's account of the policies of the U.S.S.R. is hardly adequate for an understanding of the activities of the Indian Communist Party. The book is basically an account of Indian Communists between 1917 and 1947. As such it invites comparison with the massive work of Overstreet and Windmiller (*Communism in India*, University of California, Cambridge University Press, 1959¹), which apparently Mr Druhe had not seen. Apart from a superficial account of Russian policy in the Indian borderlands, his subject matter is the same as the first part of *Communism in India*. The verdict must be that anyone with access to *Communism in India* may safely disregard this book.

Mr Druhe argues that Russian policy aimed at the establishment of 'a disguised Russian Raj' (p. 13) in India through the agency of the Indian Communist Party, and that changes in the Communist line were dictated solely by the interests of Russia. Some curious logic goes to support this—e.g., 'It was manifest that he (Stalin) was just as much in control of the Comintern as he was in control of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and thus Stalin must have played a major role in the formation of Russian policy towards India' (p. 193). Yet the whole book demonstrates that Russia was not greatly interested in India in these years and, although frequently she directed the policy of the Communist Party of India, nevertheless at critical times control passed to Indians in Europe, to the Communist Party of Great Britain, or was the subject of struggle between elements within the C.P.I. The most striking impression is of the lack of reliable information about India available to the Soviet leaders in this period. They might have been arguing about the moon.

¹ Reviewed in *International Affairs*, April 1960, p. 266.

The writing is clumsy and often careless. On p. 286 we are told both that the Pakistan Communist Party operated as a technically legal organization from 1948 to 1958 and (correctly) that it was banned in 1954. We are informed that in 1936 the Communists entered Congress in strength, later that they entered the Congress Socialist Party in the same year, and only subsequently that it was through the C.S.P. that they entered Congress. This despite the fact that the same reference serves for all. There are mistakes in quotations and in the bibliography, and Mr Druhe apparently thinks a lakh equals 10,000 instead of 100,000 rupees (p. 247). The choice of phrases ('minions of Moscow' *passim*) is depressing.

M. E. YAPP

INDIA AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS (1917-1947). By Chattar Singh Samra. Foreword by Richard L. Park. London, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1959. xi+186 pp. Bibliog. Index. 19s. 6d.

THIS is a serious and praiseworthy attempt to examine the reciprocal interactions of Anglo-Soviet relations and the Indian independence movement. (Afghanistan, though missing from the title, necessarily occupies a significant place in the book itself, since it was traditionally an area where Anglo-Russian strains and conflicts found an outlet.) After an introductory chapter which puts these countries, and the Ottoman Empire, in a broadly-outlined strategic and diplomatic context, Dr Samra analyses the impact in India of the Bolshevik seizure of power, Soviet anti-colonial propaganda, and British efforts to counteract it. He carries the story down to 1947; it reflects little credit on either Moscow or London. Whitehall seemed incapable of grasping the depth and magnitude of the forces confronting it, while Communist efforts to stir up trouble in India were invariably an adjunct to the Kremlin's foreign policy, never illustrated more clearly than in the years 1941-5, when the Communist Party of India swallowed and re-wrote its platform, the war, 'Imperialist' till then, suddenly having become a 'people's war', and the British Government worthy of all-out support. This was a policy which the Party was reluctant to adopt, but it did so, and unquestioningly, when the order was received. It is ironical to think that the British sought and welcomed the C.P.I.'s support, while imprisoning the consistent Congress leaders. As Dr Samra says: 'With rivals behind the bars, the Communists built up in the "people's war" period a considerable following, and a powerful party apparatus and propaganda organs' (p. 159).

Dr Samra's approach to his sources (which he has investigated very thoroughly) is perhaps not always as critical as it should be; he appears to treat with equal seriousness the kind of public statement which any government makes for the record, and the real considerations which influence their actions. Too much weight seems to be given to the automatic, unending, and unintermittent outcry in Moscow about the danger of war on the U.S.S.R.; similarly, it is out of keeping with the solid work and balanced judgment shown in this book to take as a significant reflection of British policy the pronouncements of the diplomatic correspondent of the *Daily Express*.

JANE DEGRAS

INDIA, MIXED ENTERPRISE AND WESTERN BUSINESS: Experiments in Controlled Change for Growth and Profit. By Daniel L. Spencer. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. xii+252 pp. Tables. Diagrams. Index. *Fl.* 15.75.

AFTER introducing the reader to the Indian economy (Part I) and defining his terms, the author describes the progress made with each 'mixture' (Part II). He shows, with examples, that *mixed enterprise* proper, i.e. the combination of public and private domestic capital, has proved unstable at the Centre, more stable at the states level. Unfortunately, he makes no attempt to explain why (Chapter VI). Similarly, although *composite enterprise*, i.e. the combination of public with private foreign (and domestic) capital, was initially envisaged as a

method of enlisting both foreign funds and know-how, the know-how aspect has tended to predominate and foreign capital to fight shy. Again, no reasons are adduced (Chapter VII). The author then analyses official data to point a trend towards growing dominance of large *joint enterprises* (combinations of domestic and foreign private capital) by the foreign component, paralleled by its steady withdrawal from small joint enterprises. No attempt is made to square these findings with a counter-trend observed from other data, viz. a radical reduction in the foreign capital component in new joint enterprises and its translation into a more or less necessary adjunct to technical aid (Chapter VIII).

The author then reveals his main purpose—a plea for more mixed enterprise (Part III). He delineates the benefits that are likely to accrue to the partners and casts the whole in the large mould of a solution to the 'tensions in human relations'. This is a pity. The space might have been used to better effect were it devoted less to a description of potential benefits and more to an analysis of the actual areas of conflict between the partners hinted at in Part II.

Nevertheless, if readers are willing to excuse this special pleading and indulge the author's weakness for prestidigitating with economic theory and 'economics', they will find the book informative in a badly under-documented field.

MICHAEL KIDRON

PUBLICATIONS OF THE CEYLON PLANNING SECRETARIAT. Colombo, Government Publications Bureau for the National Planning Council, 1959.

1. POPULATION PROJECTIONS FOR CEYLON, 1956-1981. By S. Selvaratnam. 57 pp. Tables. Bibliog. No price given.
2. MANPOWER RESOURCES OF CEYLON 1956-1981. By R. M. Sundrum and others. 33 pp. Tables. Rs. 1.40.
3. REPORTS OF COMMITTEES AND TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS. 102 pp. Tables. Rs. 3.60.
4. PAPERS BY VISITING ECONOMISTS. By J. R. Hicks and others. 123 pp. Rs. 4.45.
5. THE TEN-YEAR PLAN. xxi+490 pp. Map. Tables. Diagrams. Index. Rs. 5.

SUCCESSIVE Governments of Ceylon have for some time been interested in economic planning, and in 1955, when Sir John Kotelawala was Prime Minister, the Planning Secretariat prepared a 'Six-Year Programme of Investment'. This was however not very much more than a collection of departmental estimates within a somewhat sketchy general framework, and it was one of the few positive achievements of the Bandaranaike regime to witness the preparation of the thoroughly co-ordinated scheme of development set out in the Ten-Year Plan now published.

Certain studies preparatory to the plan proper have also been published (Nos. 1-4 in the list above). Of these, Nos. 1 and 2 go together, and are interesting documents. No. 1 arrives at a projection for Ceylon's population in 1981 which varies from 18,424,000 to 20,701,000 according to the assumptions made (the 1953 Census recorded 8,097,895 persons, and the expected population growth between 1953 and 1981 is one measure of the grave economic situation that confronts Ceylon). No. 2 is based on No. 1, and concludes that the working force in 1981 will be of the order of 5½ million. No. 3 records the findings of a number of groups which considered in detail what might be done about specific problems, ranging from private investment to air transport.

No. 4 records the thinking of a number of distinguished foreign economists whom Ceylon called in to help. Most of their papers are highly condensed and not all are easy to read: the most stimulating are those by Mr Kaldor, Mrs Robinson, and the Polish economist, Oskar Lange. It is interesting that most of the experts, including Lange, stress the vital part that must be played by agriculture in general and the export sector in particular if Ceylon's economy is to grow. Mrs Robinson, for example, sees agricultural exports as the potential

equivalent of heavy industry, a means whereby capital equipment can be purchased abroad. (In fact, in the pages of many of the experts the plantation agriculture of Ceylon, much maligned by some nationalists, comes into its own.) So far as industry is concerned, Lange sees it as the main dynamic factor to stimulate growth; and Kaldor envisages it, in this phase, mainly as a matter of industries that are both power-intensive (to utilize hydro-electric power), and possessed of export potential (cement and fertilizers are specially mentioned).

Most of these ideas are taken up in No. 5, the Plan proper, which is an admirable document, clearly and cogently argued and apparently based for the most part on a sound strategy: the Ceylon Planning Secretariat are to be congratulated. The strategy, broadly, is to achieve progressive industrialization, not by first building up a heavy industry to produce capital goods, but by importing these goods, the requisite foreign exchange being obtained by increasing agricultural exports (this involves the expansion of tea, rubber, and coconut production) and by partially replacing imports of food and of consumer goods by home production. The selection of particular industries for development is sensible and realistic. One believes, however, that certain basic assumptions are too optimistic, e.g. that yields of paddy can be increased by 50 per cent in five years, that tea, rubber, and coconut yields can be increased by 104, 167, and 54 per cent respectively, and that State-run industries will in future be more successful than those in the past.

More cannot be said here, but perhaps enough has been said to show that much thought has been expended on these documents, and that whatever lack of responsibility has beset Ceylon politics, a sense of urgent purposefulness has possessed those concerned with economic planning. Now it is up to the politicians.

B. H. FARMER

PUBLIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR THAILAND. Report of a Mission organized by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Government of Thailand. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. xv+301 pp. Maps. Tables. Index. 48s.

THIS is not a World Bank Report of the usual kind. Prepared by a Mission which worked for a year in Thailand with a group of Thai civil servants, and addressed primarily to the Thai Government, it needs reading between the lines.

Everywhere deficiencies in the organization of government are apparent; but the implied explanations are charitable to the point of ineffectiveness. Lack of extension workers in agriculture handicaps the improvement of rice, the necessary change in the crop pattern in the north-east, and the development of rubber in the south. Budgetary inefficiencies waste money spent on irrigation (leaving schemes uncompleted) and on highways (where maintenance is inadequate); lack of sound management has led to large debts on Government industries and discouragement of private industry; lack of engineers makes it necessary to cut down port and highway development so that dredging can be done and feeder roads built.

The Thais are largely literate and sophisticated. The inadequacies which hamper all development are related to grossly inefficient selection procedures, and civil service salaries far below the market price for independent, competent men. For reasons well known to every educated Thai, it seems unlikely that steps will be taken to get independent, competent men in responsible positions or to make the administrative situation more transparent.

This Government is being maintained by unusually generous aid as a bulwark against Communism. It is understandable that American foreign policy should not wish to risk stimulating anti-American nationalism by exerting much pressure for reform. But this Mission, though it had an American chairman, was

international, and ultimately answerable to world public opinion. It should not have been necessary to allude so gently to corruption in high places.

T. H. SILCOCK

MALAY KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE IN SINGAPORE. By Judith Djamour. University of London, The Athlone Press, 1959. 151 pp. Tables. Diagrams. Index. (London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 21.) 25s.

APART from the work of Winstedt, Firth, Freedman, and Gullick, very little anthropological research has been carried out in Malaya. Dr Djamour's study is welcome as a further contribution in a neglected field, and as a scholarly, clear, and unpretentious report which can be read with profit by her colleagues and by those concerned with social problems in Malaya. She spent two years in Singapore in 1949-50, dividing her time between a fishing village and a selected urban district, and did intensive field work on kinship, marriage, and the frequency of divorce, with particular reference to its economic and social effects. In this book she confines herself rigorously to these topics, apart from a brief summary of the structure of Malay society.

Malay kinship is bilateral in the sense that almost equal importance is attached to the close kin of both parents. It is to this grouping of kin that the individual turns for support and security throughout his or her lifetime. In law, ties with paternal relatives are the stronger; in fact, the frequent practice of matrilocal residence and the close bond between children and their mother ensure more contact with her kin. Women enjoy considerable social and economic independence. They usually manage their husband's earnings, and they have rights to property which they have brought to their marriage or acquired subsequently through their own efforts. The divorce rate is high—fifty per cent of registered marriages. Dr Djamour examines the hypotheses put forward by anthropologists who have sought to relate divorce rates to the amount of bride price or kinship organization, and she suggests that the data from her own area do not support them. But she points out that in Singapore there are several factors which are congruent with marriage instability: the ease with which divorce can be obtained under Islamic law, its social toleration, the absence of strong economic deterrents to divorce or to remarriage, the prevalence of adoption, the support offered by kin to divorced wives, and the high value attached by Malays to harmonious personal relations. There is no information to warrant the assumption that broken homes are damaging to children, whose personal happiness is always considered by Singapore Malays in deciding on their residence or the access of parents to them.

P. M. KABERRY

FAR EAST AND PACIFIC

FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS: Number Two. Ed. by G. F. Hudson. London, Chatto & Windus, 1960. 139 pp. (St Antony's Papers No. 7.) 16s.

THE new volume of St Antony's Papers maintains the high standard set by its predecessors. The present volume contains six essays by well-known scholars. Mr Story provides a useful, though some might think over-sympathetic, study of Konye Fumimaro, who was Prime Minister in Japan for two periods prior to the outbreak of the Pacific war and who committed suicide in 1945 when faced with a trial as a war criminal. Dr Rose writes on 'Constitutions in South-East Asia', pointing out and commenting on the character of the institutions which the countries of this region have adopted. Mr Luard contributes a paper on the Chinese co-operative farm, though this has been rendered slightly out-dated by the subsequent adoption of the policy of creating People's Communes. Mr Hudson's essay on 'The Nationalities of China' presents a valuable comparison between the nationalities problem in China and that in the Soviet Union. Mr

Carnell, in writing on 'South Asian Nationalism and the West', advances some stimulating ideas about the conflict between Westernizers, Revivalists, and Synthesists in the politics of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon. Mr McAleavy's fascinating paper, 'Tseng P'u and the Nieh Hai Hua', sheds light on the odd episode of Field Marshal Waldersee and his friend Sai-chin-hua, and on the literature which the latter's career inspired. The volume well merits the attention of all students of Asian affairs.

B. R. P.

CHINA AND THE UNITED NATIONS: Report of a Study Group set up by the China Institute of International Affairs. Preface by Joseph E. Johnson. Foreword by Tse-Hsun Kwok. New York, Manhattan Publishing Co., for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959. xi + 285 pp. Index. \$3.

THIS is one of a series of National Studies on International Organization sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It was compiled by a study group in Formosa, which included members of the China Institute of International Affairs, an unofficial body, whose Secretary-General, Mr Tse-Hsun Kwok, contributes a preface. The book is written throughout from the Chinese Nationalist standpoint, but it does give a factual account of the contribution of Nationalist China to the founding of the United Nations and of the subsequent work of the Chinese Nationalist delegates to that body. The authors do not disguise the anomalous position of the Chinese delegation, but they make out a good case for saying that its contribution to the general activities of the U.N. has nevertheless been valuable. It is naturally their contention that the Chinese Communist Government does not have the real allegiance of the Chinese people and that therefore the Chinese Nationalist delegation is not as unrepresentative as a mere comparison of the population of mainland China with that of Formosa would suggest.

F. C. JONES

DIW WIRTSCHAFTLICHE VERFLECHTUNG DER VOLKSREPUBLIK CHINA MIT DER SOWJETUNION. Bearbeitet im Institut für Asienkunde, Hamburg. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Alfred Metzner, 1959. 150 pp. Map. Tables. (Band III der Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde, Hamburg.)

THE record of Sino-Soviet economic relations is clouded by uncertainties and ambiguities, and not all writers on this important subject have troubled to sift the scanty information available from Chinese and Soviet sources. The Institute for Asian Research at Hamburg University thus deserves to be congratulated on this volume of source material and its interpretation. K. Müller and D. E. Gross have done a commendable piece of research for the Institute.

Some Western observers tend to underrate the importance of China's economic relations with the Soviet Union. It is true that only two long-term credit agreements were recorded in 1950 and 1954, but if one is to believe Soviet trade returns, China accumulated between 1950 and 1955 an import surplus of close on \$1,000 million in her trade with the Soviet Union, of which only half had been repaid by the end of 1958 by way of export surpluses. Unless China's earnings of foreign exchange from trade elsewhere and from remittances of overseas Chinese exceed greatly what are generally believed to be Chinese resources, the Soviet Union must have given some substantial medium-term assistance to China's industrialization programme.

Since the Chinese revolution the Soviet Union has occupied a leading position in a trade the turnover of which has been rising, almost without a break, from \$575 million in 1950 to \$1,500 in 1958. Side by side with trade has gone an exchange of technicians and know-how, none of which appears however to have been given free of charge. In fact, China has had to pay a heavy price for Soviet assistance. The authors estimate that, as a result of a special exchange rate, China has been underpaid to the extent of 40 per cent for her exports and over-

charged to the extent of 70 per cent for her imports within the Sino-Soviet bloc. Even so, China owes its industrialization substantially to Soviet assistance.

The book deserves to be published in English.

W. K.

CHINA'S POPULATION: Census and Vital Statistics. By S. Chandrasekhar. Hong Kong, University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. 69 pp. Map. Tables. Bibliog. *HK\$* 4. 6s.

THE author, who is Director of the Indian Institute for Population Studies in Madras, obtained during a visit to China in 1958 what information was available from official and semi-official sources on the first nation-wide population census ever held in China.

No previous Government of China had undertaken so vast a task. There is thus every justification for reproducing and reviewing the measures applied during the census, which lasted for more than a year, 'though the final count was given as of June 30, 1953' (p. 28). The author emphasizes that the figures which he presents are factual in the sense that they are official; he is aware that they are 'fragmentary and sometimes even contradictory' (p. 5).

The census results have been published in two slim documents only; this seems meagre in comparison with India's hundred volumes issued on the results of her decennial census. Whereas India takes about three years to prepare it, China's preparations were limited to a few months. There is thus 'no way of estimating the exact magnitude of the error involved' (p. 34). The statistical division between rural and urban population was crude, to say the least, and so was the equation of rural population with persons employed in agriculture and related occupations.

The two lectures delivered by the author at Hong Kong University, which provide the contents of this book, were supplemented by two articles published at the same time in the *Far Eastern Review* (Hong Kong, 4 and 11 June 1959).

W. K.

DIE WIRTSCHAFT CHINAS: Dogma und Wirklichkeit. By Werner Handke. Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Alfred Metzner, 1959. 337 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. *DM* 24.50.

THIS is the first book in German in which the economic 'miracle' of Communist China has been reviewed by one of the new crop of Sovietologists rather than the old China hands. The author has been in the unique position of watching Chinese developments at close range, i.e. from the window of the German consulate on Hong Kong Island. West German trade returns reveal that he has been successful as a consular official besides collecting material for his book.

The author is impressed by the similarities of Chinese and Soviet development rather than the differences inherent in historical and geographical circumstances. China has her own way of implementing Communist doctrine, but there is no 'Chinese road to socialism'. Nationalization of private property, collectivization of agriculture, and industrialization of the heavy type are the familiar ingredients of Communist economics as practised in China as in other countries of the Soviet bloc.

Although plenty of mistakes can be discerned in planning and many setbacks may occur in economic performance, the author does not underestimate the dynamic of the Chinese experiment. Today China may be where the Soviet Union was at the end of the 'twenties. This provides little reason for comfort to Western traders, as self-sufficiency is not the result of a strategic embargo but a matter of political policy. In any event, the bulk of China's trade lies within the Soviet orbit. The price of China's experiment is paid by her people. When she has surpassed Great Britain in the production of steel and the like, 'China will be a mighty economic unit, but even then the Chinese are likely to be a poor people' (p. 284).

It is surprising that so close an observer of Chinese affairs as Herr Handke

should have accepted uncritically the greatly exaggerated and meanwhile drastically revised official harvest claim for 1958 (pp. 200 and 206). Although the author's theoretical armoury is light on occasion, it is never blunt. The journalistic style at times does not do justice to the contents of the book. W. K.

DE CABOUL À PÉKIN: Rythmes et perspectives d'expansion économique. By Gilbert Étienne. Geneva, E. Droz; Paris, Minard, 1959. 268 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. (Publications de l'Institut Universitaire de hautes études internationales. No. 34.) *Sw. Frs.* 20.

THE purpose of this book is to give some measure of present levels of living and some estimate of the prospects of economic growth in the Asian countries which Dr Étienne has visited: Afghanistan, Thailand, Cambodia, the Federation of Malaya, Ceylon, Pakistan, Indonesia, India, and mainland China. Over half the book is about India and China. This whole area, he concludes (p. 229), is experiencing a growing political, economic, and social disequilibrium. Levels of living are low, although there are considerable differences between countries, and it will be difficult to raise them in the face of various obstacles, including in some countries the rapid growth of population. He is impressed by the 'leap forward' made by China but doubts whether this could be reproduced in other countries, such as India, if they were to become Communist, since it is due largely to the ability and industry of the Chinese peasants and other workers. F. B.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA: The Politics of Field Operations, 1947-1950. By Leon Gordenker. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. xiii+306 pp. Bibliog. Index. *Fl.* 18.75.

THE author of this book, who is at present Assistant Professor of Politics at Princeton University, was formerly in the service of the United Nations and had first-hand experience in Korea. He is therefore able to speak with authority about the composition and activities of the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea and its successors, the U.N. Commissions on Korea. This book is based on U.N. archives, on the personal reminiscences of some members of these Commissions, and on numerous secondary sources. As Professor Gordenker shows, there was from the outset practically no prospect of the Commissions' being able to bring about the unification of Korea in view of the hostile attitude of the Soviet Union, the refusal of the North Korean authorities to co-operate, and divided counsels in South Korea. But he also brings out very clearly the defects of the Commissions themselves, especially of U.N.T.C.O.K. The member countries, with some exceptions, appointed representatives of junior grade, who were, moreover, frequently changed. They were rarely united on policy and they got little clear guidance from the U.N. itself. The author concludes that a single U.N. representation of high standing might have done better, and he thinks that this is a lesson to be learned from the unhappy events which he chronicles. F. C. JONES

LOCAL, ETHNIC, AND NATIONAL LOYALTIES IN VILLAGE INDONESIA: A Symposium. By William G. Skinner et al. Preface by Karl J. Pelzer. Yale University Cultural Report Series, Southeast Asia Studies distributed in cooperation with New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959. 64 pp. Map. \$2.

ONE of the myths supporting false views of Indonesia is that villages are little republican democracies enshrining the virtue of spontaneous and uncontrived co-operation. The only people who really know anything systematic about village life in present-day Indonesia are the anthropologists, and six of them have collaborated in this symposium. What a relief it is to read them, and what a pleasure to see reality crystallized by trained intelligence.

Mr Skinner begins with some thoughtful remarks on 'The Nature of Loyalties

in Rural Indonesia' and is followed by P. R. Goethals, H. Geertz, C. Geertz, A. W. Palmer, and E. M. Bruner on the Sumbawan, Balinese, Javanese, Sundanese, and Toba Batak village respectively. By virtue of their professional bias and the nature of their field methods, anthropologists are better on villages than on wider social units in a complex society; too much expectation should not be raised by the words 'ethnic and national loyalties' in the title, for these are matters which the authors deal with only in so far as they can be detected and analysed at the local level. But, after all, one wants to know what being an Indonesian and, say, a Balinese means to a villager, and these brief papers, while not satisfying our curiosity completely, go further than the earlier literature.

One is tempted to raise anthropological questions (what exactly do the authors mean by 'corporate'? why has the kinship theme been muted? . . .) but this is to say that one takes the papers seriously from a technical point of view, even as one welcomes them as a contribution to the general body of writing on Indonesia.

MAURICE FREEDMAN

AUSTRALASIA

PROMISES AND PERFORMANCES IN AUSTRALIAN POLITICS. By Russell H. Barrett.

New York, Institute of Pacific Relations in cooperation with Department of Political Science, University of Mississippi, 1960. 126 pp. Tables. \$2.50.

In substance, this is an account of the promises which Australian political parties have made at Federal elections between 1928 and 1959 and of the extent to which promises have been kept by the Governments produced by those elections. It is customary in Australia for each party leader to make a set 'policy speech' at the beginning of an election campaign, including in this speech a number of commitments which his party will hope to honour if returned to power. Australians thus expect a rather more specific performance of election promises than British people, because the promises themselves have been more specific. Mr Barrett's conclusion is that the parties have been remarkably successful in keeping their promises, and that, where they have not done so, the reasons are often to be found in 'limited government', i.e. in the extent to which a Federal Government in Australia is restricted by the operations of the Constitution. He also shows, as one might expect, that a good many promises are so vague as to make it difficult to decide whether they have been kept or not; but this is inherent in the nature of electioneering.

Mr Barrett has done his work carefully. It provides a useful summary of political issues in the Federal sphere in Australia, and also of the principal legislation introduced by the Governments of the past thirty years. The only drawback of the book is that it starts with a slightly pretentious account of what is meant by 'responsible party government' in the abstract, and does not effectively apply this concept to the general analysis of promise and performance. This is a case, like many others in political science, in which the factual cake would have been better without the theoretical icing.

J. D. B. MILLER

NORTH AMERICA

THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET. An Analysis in the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower. By Richard F. Fenno Jr. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. viii+327 pp. Index. \$5.50. 45s.

THIS pioneer study, embodying the fruits of much research, is based largely upon the experience of the last half century, although there are illuminating allusions to the Cabinet practices of earlier Presidents, notably Washington and Lincoln. The period is well chosen, not only because it coincides with the emergence of the United States as a leading world Power, but because it begins with the President who in his earlier academic writings argued most cogently for the 'reform' of the Cabinet in principle (Wilson) and ends with the one who, with

less reference to theory, has done most to transform it in practice (Eisenhower). What Mr Fenno has to say about the development of the Cabinet during the terms of office of these and of the five intervening Presidents is not so much a constitutional treatise as a factual analysis of a lively and important period of political growth. In this the emphasis is on the role of the Presidents in choosing and using their Cabinets and upon the interplay of Cabinet personalities, working within or without the nexus of the Presidential 'official family', and the forces, including those created or controlled by the political machines, which influence the American body politic as a whole. From this there follows a critical consideration of various proposals for Cabinet reform, none of which, as Mr Fenno shows, seem calculated to make much headway in the face of what he calls the 'basic pluralism of the American political system' (p. 271), i.e., the wide variety of factors which in these times make for success or failure in the practical task of government.

If there is a lesson, and there are in fact many, for those more familiar with the British system, it lies perhaps in the extent to which the whole idea of a Cabinet in the United States tends to break down by virtue of the 'extra-mural' activities of Cabinet members: 'In matters of prestige, partisan politics, and legislative relations alike, the Cabinet as a collectivity has only a symbolic value. . . . In the day-to-day work of the Cabinet member, each man fends for himself without much consideration for Cabinet unity' (p. 247). C. J. C.

PRIDE OF STATE: A Study in Patriotism and American National Morality. By Joseph P. Morray. Boston, Beacon Press, 1959. xvii+173 pp. \$4.

This book apparently began to take shape in Mr Morray's mind during the McCarthy era: the excesses committed in the name of 'patriotism' during that unfortunate period have certainly had an important impact upon his thinking. One cannot, however, help feeling that in leaning backwards to be fair to the late Senator's victims—especially the Communists (who probably suffered less than many honest liberals)—he has lost his balance completely.

While the central topic of the book is patriotism—which forms the subject of a penetrating analysis in Part I—the main theme is that 'it is fear of freedom which destroys freedom' (p. 45). This is a tenable proposition, on the basis of which Mr Morray argues that 'if we noncommunists will be hard on ourselves we can safely be soft on our communists. . . . To keep our state whole and healthy policy must aim at integrating the communists, rather than discriminating against them' (p. 95). He fails, however, to consider whether the Communists themselves are willing to be integrated, just as, in suggesting that Mr Khrushchev's repudiation of Stalinism offers an occasion for the reconsideration of our attitude towards Communism, he overlooks many of the harsh realities of the post-Stalin era, among them the lesson of Hungary.

Mr Morray is eloquent and patently sincere, but he is also naïve: he believes, for instance, that the Dean of Canterbury 'is denied the accolade of "patriot" because he is obedient to his Christian conscience' (p. xiv) and he professes to be impressed with the 'peculiar realism of the French communists on the colonial question' (p. 82). C. J. C.

THE TRUMAN-MACARTHUR CONTROVERSY AND THE KOREAN WAR. By John W. Spanier. Cambridge, Mass., Belknap Press of Harvard University Press; London, Oxford University Press, 1959. xii+311 pp. Illus. Map. Bibliog. Index. \$6.50. 52s.

THIS is an extremely lucid, well-documented, and authoritative account of the events which led up to the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman in April 1951. As Dr Spanier makes clear, it was not a case of the civil authority versus the military, of the simple soldier bedevilled and frustrated by the politicians, although MacArthur liked to put it that way. MacArthur himself,

who believed that Europe was 'a dying system' (p. 67) and that the future lay in Asia and the Pacific, was thinking in political terms as much as military. He insisted that Korea was not a sideshow but a vital theatre, and that the Chinese intervention should be made the opportunity to deal the Chinese Communists a fatal blow. He was not supported in this by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but he did have the backing of the right wing of the Republican Party and it was his incursions into domestic politics which impelled Truman to dismiss him.

It is the author's thesis that this episode shows that in the case of a limited as opposed to a total war, the traditional principle of civilian supremacy over the military may be endangered through the latter's resentment at the restrictions placed upon their operations. But this seems hardly likely to happen except in the case of a man like MacArthur who thinks himself infallible, and such cases are fortunately rare. Moreover the upshot of the controversy was the downfall of the recalcitrant general and the triumph of the policy of the Administration, which seems a good augury for the future.

F. C. JONES

MASSIVE RETALIATION: The Policy and Its Critics. By Paul Peeters. Chicago, Regnery in cooperation with the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, 1959. xii+304 pp. \$5.

MR DULLES suffered a good deal from his apologists during his lifetime, but never so acutely as he does in this book. According to the dust-jacket it is 'both a history and an analysis of American foreign policy under the Eisenhower administration'. In fact it is merely an attempted justification of the notion of massive retaliation, inadequate and confused even in its presentation of the arguments that can be made for that policy, and unfair and incoherent in presentation of the arguments that can be made against it. There is no real effort at a study of the historical and political origins of the idea, and the whole book is ill-organized and repetitious. The only valuable element in it is the stock of quotations it provides from those whose 'corrosive intellectualism' (p. 81) Mr Peeters rebukes and whose arguments he hopes to demolish—a formidable company, including Stevenson, Acheson, Humphrey, Lippman, Fulbright, Kennan, and Reston. The general style and spirit of the book may be best illustrated by two quotations: 'The sputnik has indeed awakened us to the need of silencing the old bagpipes of a decadent liberalism' (p. 144), and 'What genuine difference is there between the nihilistic slogans upon which the liberal intelligentsia feed and the assumptions with which Marx and Lenin started?' (p. 253).

CORAL BELL

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS: 1953-1955. By Donald C. Masters. Toronto, Oxford University Press for the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1959; London, Oxford University Press, 1960. vii+223 pp. Index. 28s.

In this volume of the biennial series, *Canada in World Affairs*, we discern the emergence of doubts in Canada about the wisdom of the leadership provided by the United States in international politics. But the doubts were never converted into opposition. Canada doubted Mr Dulles' wisdom in the matter of Indo-China, but steered clear of any commitment. Canada was happy to co-operate in the termination of hostilities there after Sir Anthony Eden, M. Mendès-France, and Mr Chou En-lai had achieved something like a settlement in defiance of Mr Dulles. A similar disposition to doubt but do nothing manifested itself in the matter of relations with the Soviet Union. Mr Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, was a pioneer traveller to the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. As a result of his visit he appears to have concluded that the Soviets possess both power and something of a moral case, but these conclusions did not influence Mr Pearson to regret in the slightest the re-armament of Germany and her incorporation in N.A.T.O. Quite the contrary. The principal factor in the intransigence of the Soviet Union and her satellites remained for

Mr Pearson, as it still remains for the State Department, a matter of the greatest merit and urgency.

Not surprisingly, the Canadians reacted more vigorously in their own case than in the cases of third parties. When the McCarthyites in the United States attempted to twist Canada's arm in the matter of Gouzenko the Canadian Government was very firm in resisting this attack upon its sovereignty and independence. Likewise in the matter of the St Lawrence Seaway the Canadians refused to be obstructed and bullied by American pressure groups.

In an unfortunate introductory chapter Professor Masters has endeavoured to explain the ideological foundations of Mr Pearson's foreign policy. Some very great religious leaders and some very great liberals have denied the possibility of being both a liberal humanist and a Christian at the same time. This feat of self-contradiction presents no difficulties for Professor Masters. The fact is that Mr Pearson is an able public servant and a good diplomat, but he is no philosopher or theologian. His understanding of the human dilemma is no better than the next man's. Professor Masters would have done well to say nothing on this subject.

H. S. FERNS

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP SINCE 1783. By H. C. Allen. A rev. and enlarged ed. of Part I of *Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, 1783-1952*. London, Adam & Charles Black, 1960. 247 pp. Map. Tables. Index. 18s.

THIS is a revised edition of the first part of Professor Allen's monumental history of Anglo-American relations, *Great Britain and the United States, 1783-1952*, published in 1954 and now out of print. It covers economic, social and political, cultural, and emotional relations between the two countries, and a final chapter summarizes the remainder of the original book, dealing with Anglo-American diplomatic history, and brings it up to the time of the Suez crisis. The new edition is essentially a book for the general reader, and a valuable one; for this purpose it makes in many ways a better balanced study of the subject than the original, two-thirds of which considered Anglo-American diplomatic relations in considerable historical detail.

MARGARET CORNELL

LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

PROBLEMAS DE UN MERCADO COMÚN EN AMÉRICA LATINA. By Sidney S. Dell. Mexico, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, 1959. 219 pp. Tables.

THIS is a series of seven lectures given during 1959 at the Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos in Mexico City. Dr Dell is a United Nations official who has worked in the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America in Santiago, Chile, and he is thoroughly familiar with the economic problems of Latin America in general, and those of integration in particular.

The lectures are sound, painstaking, and comprehensive. Every aspect of Latin America's possible economic integration is dealt with, and the European model is carefully examined. In his concluding lecture Dr Dell shows himself to be cautiously in favour of a free trade area as being more suitable to Latin America's particular circumstances than a common market. He also brings in the E.C.L.A. case for a payments union, which European experience suggests as a necessary adjunct to a free trade area.

The lectures were given before the Montevideo Treaty was signed, but Dr Dell has ingeniously caught up with events by including as an appendix the text of the draft agreement for a free trade area which was drawn up in Montevideo in October 1959. The final treaty signed in February of this year differs from the draft in some details, but not in substance.

The book is excellent background reading for any student of Latin American

economic integration, and far more digestible than the enormous and frightening tomes on the subject that the E.C.L.A. has published. DAVID HUELIN

ECONOMIC POLICY REVOLUTION AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA.

By Pedro C. M. Teichert. Bureau of Business Research, University of Mississippi, 1959. xviii+282 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. Photo-offset. \$8.

PROFESSOR TEICHERT believes that Latin America is right to disregard static considerations of comparative costs and to press ahead with industrialization, including her establishment of steel industries. 'Industrialization is a by-product in the struggle for human and national self assertion' (p. 214).

For the past two decades, Latin America has had a tremendous development boom' (p. 122). The author says this has taken place 'on all fronts', and does not mention that the output of agricultural products in general, and of foodstuffs in particular, remains below its pre-war level per head of population. He gives some interesting historical case-studies, especially of Mexico and Uruguay, and a useful bibliography. F. B.

A COMMUNITY IN THE ANDES: Problems and Progress in Muquiyaayo. By

Richard N. Adams. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1959. xiv+261 pp. Maps. Tables. Bibliog. Index. (The American Ethnological Society.) \$4.75.

THE TOWN of Muquiyaayo in the Peruvian Highlands has the reputation of being outstandingly progressive. In this book Dr Adams sets out to provide a description of life in this Central Sierran town populated by *mestizos* and Indians and to examine the cultural and social developments that have brought about its special fame.

Muquiyaayo differs from other towns in the valley in various ways. The pattern of local government has undergone a radical change. It no longer adheres to the centralized type of government traditional in Peru, and the town now enjoys a degree of local autonomy almost unknown elsewhere in the country. Characteristic, too, is the gradual abolition of the caste system and the redistribution of church and Indian communal lands. The town's attitude to education is likewise advanced, keen interest being taken in the schools, in correspondence courses, and in higher education. But perhaps the most spectacular achievement of the people of Muquiyaayo is the fact that they constructed the first hydro-electric power plant in the region. All these changes, Dr Adams claims, are due to the different ways in which the people have tackled the various problems that faced them.

The author has spared no pains in his search for material. The detailed account of this community is fully documented. Dr Adams gathered much of his information on the spot, spending a year in Muquiyaayo observing contemporary life and reading local records. He draws no hasty conclusions and his findings are to be relied on. The book is a worth-while contribution not only to the study of life in the Peruvian Highlands but also to the study of the processes of cultural change in a small community. ENA DARGAN

BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCE

EVERYMAN'S UNITED NATIONS: The Structure, Functions, and Work of the Organization and its Related Agencies during the Years 1945-1958. 6th ed. Foreword by Alfred G. Katzin. New York, Office of Public Information, United Nations, 1959. xiii+607 pp. Diagrams. Index. \$3.50. 25s. *Sw. Frs.* 14.

Everyman's United Nations will be increasingly referred to as the structure of the organizations grows in complexity. The sixth edition of this handy reference book summarizes the political and legal questions which have come before the United Nations up to the end of 1958 and describes its work in the economic field. The functions of the committees, commissions, and agencies are briefly

described and their origins and inter-relations explained. The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice are printed as an appendix. V. S.

BOOKS ON COMMUNISM. A bibliography ed. by R. N. Carew Hunt. London, Ampersand, 1959. x+333 pp. Index. 15s.

THIS very useful bibliography gives all too brief descriptions of some 1,500 books on Communism in the English language (including translations into English) published between 1945 and 1957, as well as revised editions of earlier works. It is questionable whether the listing of more or less worthless writings is justified, though this does at least help the librarian to answer the inquiries of the uninformed.

Mr Carew Hunt's untimely death has left a sensible gap in the ranks of students of Communism, and it is to be hoped that an equally skilful expert will keep the bibliographical record up to date, correct the few errors (on p. 186 Petkov is called a Hungarian), and fill in some omissions; two that occurred to this reviewer were Truman Capote's account of the 'Porgy and Bess' tour, and the Hungarian Government's version of the trial of Rajk and others.

JANE DEGRAS

THE WORLD OF LEARNING 1959-60. 10th ed. London, Europa Publications, 1960. xiii+1221 pp. Index. 140s.

THE fact that this reference book has reached its tenth edition and has continued to expand with each issue is sufficient proof of its value to all those who require detailed information about the learned societies, museums, libraries, universities, and other centres of intellectual life in every part of the world. The chapter on Unesco gives in compact form a survey of its scope and activities. D. H.

THE COMMONWEALTH YEAR BOOK 1959. 3rd ed. London, Europa Publications, 1959. xvi+1150 pp. Tables. Bibliog. Index. 120s.

THIS is an excellent reference work for the general enquirer who wants all his information in one volume. Nevertheless, the user should be cautioned that the facts are not all equally up-to-date. This should be particularly borne in mind at a time when the Commonwealth is changing so rapidly. D. H.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES DEALING WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. III. 1955-1958. Preface by Z. Y. Hershlag. Jerusalem, The Economic Research Institute, The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, The Hebrew University, 1959. x+65 pp. Index. 10s. 6d.

THIS bibliography is mainly intended for students in Israel and it therefore restricts itself to periodicals available in the libraries there. As however the majority are in English or French it will be of considerable value to others. The classification is by region with subdivisions for subjects. An addition to this latest issue is a section on Israel-Arab relations. D. H.

STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH, Berlin, 1959. Berlin, Kulturbuch-Verlag, 1959. 336 pp. Tables. Index.

THIS is a most useful and comprehensive small statistical year book on West Berlin—small because it deals with a city of only 2½ million inhabitants and not because it leaves out any relevant data. In most of the tables the period covered is the year 1958 with some comparative figures for earlier years. H. G. L.

EAST GERMANY, A Selected Bibliography. Compiled by Fritz T. Epstein. Washington, Library of Congress, 1959. vii+55 pp. Index.

THIS is a useful classified list of books and articles in periodicals on conditions in the area now known as the German Democratic Republic between 1947 and 1958. Although the foreword says that preference has been given to material in English, a great deal of literature in German has also been included. D. H.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

ALLEN, H. C.: *Bush and Backwoods: A Comparison of the Frontier in Australia and the United States*. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press; London, Sydney, Wellington, Melbourne, Angus & Robertson, 1959. xv + 153 pp. Index. \$3.50. 25s.

An application of F. J. Turner's frontier thesis to another continent and society than the North American, namely Australia.

BENTWICH, Norman: *The Religious Foundations of Internationalism: A Study in International Relations through the Ages*. 2nd ed. with additional chapter. London, Allen & Unwin, 1960. 303 pp. Bibliog. \$5. 21s.

1st ed. published in 1933, reviewed in *International Affairs*, July 1934. This revised edition contains an epilogue summarizing the changes up to 1957, which, in the words of the author, 'have shaken the foundations of internationalism'. As he states in his preface, it is to be regretted that he could not rewrite the book and put those changes into a proper perspective. But it remains an interesting historical study.

BERGER, MORROE: *Military Elite and Social Change: Egypt Since Napoleon*. Princeton, N.J., Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson Hall, Princeton University, 1960. 35 pp. 50 cents.

Britain: An Official Handbook. London, H.M.S.O. for the Central Office of Information, 1960. ix + 584 pp. Illus. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Bibliog. Index. 25s.

BROWN, F. Delbert: *The Growth of Democratic Government*. Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1959. viii + 117 pp. \$3.25.

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A skeleton outline, with illustrations, of the main political and economic facts about the thirteen states of the new French Community.

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An answer from the Zachodina Agencja Prasowa to the pamphlet issued in 1958 by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis on *Die deutschen Ostgebiete jenseits von Oder und Neisse im Spiegel der Polnischen Presse*.

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CORRESPONDENCE

POLISH-GERMAN FRONTIER FROM THE STANDPOINT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

To the Editor, *International Affairs*

DEAR SIR,

Dr Frederick Honig's review of Boleslav Wiewióra's *Polish-German Frontier from the Standpoint of International Law* (*International Affairs*, January 1960, p. 115) induces me to voice various scientific objections. Five of these I would like to set forth here in the form of theses:

(1) If it is being affirmed that in Potsdam a 'pactum in favorem Poloniae' legally valid for Poland was effected—an affirmation which actually has to be denied—this at the same time also would amount to a pactum to the debit of a third party (i.e. Germany). According to valid international law, however, treaties can 'not validly impose obligations upon States which are not parties to them' (Oppenheim, *International Law*, vol. I, Art. 522a).

(2) The purely military event of Germany's surrender was not meant to and could not be a substitute for Germany's consent to the transfer of the territories beyond Oder and Neisse to Poland.

(3) Wiewióra's assertion—which was approved by Dr Honig—that in Potsdam the Western Powers had definitively determined the Oder-Neisse as the German-Polish border is plainly incompatible with the meaning as well as the text of the Potsdam protocols. This fact has been confirmed by such personages as Churchill, Roosevelt, Bevin, Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson, and McCloy.

(4) In view of this state of affairs, the treaty of Goerlitz between Poland and the Government of the German Democratic Republic of 6 July 1950 is without significance (*res inter alios acta*) for the Western Powers as well as also for the Federal Republic of Germany.

(5) The assertion that the taking over of the concerned territories by Poland amounts to a 'reintegration' is in contradiction to established historical facts.

Yours faithfully,

HERBERT KRAUS

Der Göttinger Arbeitskreis e.V.

Sternstrasse 2,

President of the Göttingen Research Committee

Göttingen.

11 March 1960.

THE SYRIAN CRISIS OF 1957—FACT AND FICTION

DEAR SIR,

I have received, very late, your January issue, from which I see that I, like a much more illustrious Philby, have attracted the unfavourable attention of Mr George Kirk.¹ It is impossible not to be flattered by such notice, but may I reply?

Mr Kirk quotes from an article I wrote for the *Middle East Forum* of April 1959. After six lines of somewhat heavy-footed irony he remarks: 'The only weakness in this version of the (Syrian) crisis is that it is not history.'

It is true that I am not accustomed to writing history, but rather to commenting on contemporary events. In this case, however, I am perfectly happy to let history decide between Mr Kirk and myself.

Let us start in the middle. Mr Kirk asks: 'What was the Syrian situation which the U.S., Turkish, Iraqi, and Jordanian statesmen were constrained to discuss in August? This, for Mr Philby and his readers, is a great mystery . . .' Leaving aside the obvious prejudice imported into the argument by the word 'constrained', I must contradict Mr Kirk on his last eleven words. The situation in Syria during 1957 was fairly well known to me, as I spent much of that troubled year in Damascus. As for my readers, I flatter myself that they owe me a debt of gratitude for having so consistently tried to soothe their fears about the so-called situation in Syria.

Oddly enough, I find little to dispute in Mr Kirk's statement on Syria, granted the fact that it is one-sided, shows only the black shades of the picture, and thus constitutes a rather sour echo of the 'sustained propaganda campaign', which I mentioned in my article and which Mr Kirk quotes. But what of the 'Syrian situation' *outside* Syria? Mr Kirk must know very well that millions of Western words were spilt to the effect that the Syrian nationalists were allied to the Communists, that the Communists would outmanoeuvre the nationalists, and that the country would slide over the brink into Communism. Some said it had actually gone over. To quote only one eminent authority, Mr Anthony Nutting: 'Damascus, when I was there, had the sinister atmosphere of a typical Communist satellite.' That was the view that I steadily contested. And what has 'history' got to say about that?

Mr Kirk proceeds to quote the Washington correspondent of *The Times* to the effect that President Eisenhower (in late August 1957) did not know exactly what was happening. That does not in the least surprise me. But it may well surprise Mr Kirk to know that many of the President's representatives in Damascus had a very good idea what was happening; and that the event proved them right. 'The result of this unpreparedness,' Mr Kirk continues, 'was, apparently, undue haste.' Quite correct! But I am surprised that he goes on to quote (apparently with approval) the remark of the very able ex-correspondent of *The Times* in Beirut about 'hysterical reactions in the West'. I at least gave the West the benefit of the doubt by using the phrase 'near-hysteria'—at which Mr Kirk sneers in inverted commas.

Mr Kirk's next paragraph, though confined mainly to stating well-known facts, nevertheless requires some comment. He says: 'It is probable that (as Mr Philby asserts, relying on evidence dished up in Colonel Mahdawi's "people's court" in Baghdad!) the statesmen conferring in Turkey had discussed what action they might take against Syria in certain eventualities.' Here, I am afraid, Mr Kirk's well-known passion for polemics has triumphed over his scholarship. It is not true that I rely on 'dished up' evidence. Mr Kirk's own quotation from my article shows that I relied on 'documents produced at the recent Baghdad

¹ See 'The Syrian Crisis of 1957—Fact and Fiction', by George Kirk, in *International Affairs*, January 1960, pp. 58-61.

trials'. The authenticity of those documents was admitted by their distinguished signatories, even though they stood in the dock. Further, it is quite unnecessarily pedantic for Mr Kirk to say that 'it is *probable*' that the statesmen were discussing action against Syria. If not, what on earth were they discussing?

Mr Kirk goes on to say: 'For some time the thunder continued to roll [why does he trouble to refer his readers to Mr Walter Laqueur at this odd point?] but there was no downpour; and the Russians and Colonel Nasser vied with one another, hurrying to succour Syria with an un-needed umbrella.' Here again, Mr Kirk has over-reached himself. This is definitely *not* 'history'. Mr Kirk knows as well as all your readers that it was not President Nasser who hurried to succour the Syrians. It was the Syrians who hurried.

Once more, Mr Kirk quotes the Beirut correspondent of *The Times*: 'The Governments of Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan would have been happier if the United States had not again indulged its tendency to conduct diplomacy by advertisement . . .' I am grateful to Mr Kirk for using *The Times* so exhaustively to support my argument (though I think *The Times* was rather unfair to aim the dart only at the United States). One might go further and point out that, in substantial part because of these Western 'tendencies', the Governments of Iraq and Lebanon are not what they were. Let us hope that a happier fate is reserved for King Hussein.

Having started in the middle and gone on to the end, let us revert to the beginning. 'Events in the Arab world,' says Mr Kirk, 'have moved at so dizzy a pace during recent years that even specialists have difficulty in recalling the details of the Syrian war-scare of the late summer of 1957.' There is a moral there for at least one distinguished 'specialist'. It is not enough, for the assessment of any Syrian situation, to rely on *The Times*, *The New York Times*, Mr Walter Laqueur, and Lord Birdwood (*vide* Mr Kirk's footnotes—I will not bother you with any).

Yours faithfully,

H. A. R. PHILBY

Beirut, Lebanon.

31 March 1960.

Mr Kirk replies:

I welcome Mr Philby's statement that in 1957 he steadily contested the view 'that the Syrian nationalists were allied to the Communists, that the Communists would outmanoeuvre the nationalists, and that the country would slide over the brink into Communism'. He will not of course deny that the Syrian nationalists were receiving large quantities of arms from the U.S.S.R. and that their propaganda was virtually indistinguishable from Soviet propaganda. There is no doubt that because of this some Western commentators did exaggerate the immediacy of the Communist threat to Syria then, just as some Western commentators have exaggerated the immediacy of the Communist threat to Iraq in 1958-9. Was Mr Philby also among the prophets on this occasion? And will he deny that by the end of 1957 the Ba'ath Party (which is what he means by 'the Syrian nationalists') *did* fear that they were being outmanoeuvred on the Left and consequently renewed their requests to Nasser for federation with Egypt? Has Mr Philby forgotten the role of Colonel Bizri?

My phrase about Nasser 'hurrying to succour Syria with an un-needed umbrella' did not refer to his setting up the 'United Arab Republic', but to his earlier sending a small Egyptian force to the North Syrian frontier in October 1957, ostensibly to stand up to the terrible Turks! Has Mr Philby forgotten that detail?

Harvard Center for Middle Eastern Studies,
Boston, Mass., U.S.A.

15 April 1960.

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