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m/Tcn.:(A)o: L ary-^o ccrao t
Politick DISCOURSES;
Written in ITALIA:]^ B y
PAOLO PARUTA
A Noble Venetian,
Cavalier and Procurator
■'^-~~-^~~— — Tin- mii-i
Whereunto is adde^J, A fliort
S O L r L O Q U Y,'
In which the A u t h o r biicfly examines the whole Courfe of his Life*
r-JT^ti
Rendred into E:^GLIS H
By the Right Honorable,
HENRY
LOtiDON^
Printed for H. Meftlej/y and arc to be fold at the Trincis Arms in S^F<fWV Church- yard, i 6 ^ y:
PZ^bP
THE CONTENTS
Of the Several
DISCOURSES-
The Firft BOOK.
w
Discourse I.
Hat was the true and proper Form of Government ob- ferved in the Commonwealth of Rome j and whether jhe could be better ordered in Civil affairs^ having Armed people on foot. pag • i»
II.
What fnccefs the Roman affairs w:nld have hady if Alexander the Great had turned with his viBori&Hs Army into Italy. i^
III.
Whether was the better and merelandahle advice ; that of the Csn- thsigm'uns iit offering toafpjithe Romans againf King Pyrrhus • Or that of the Romans in refufxng their offer. »3
IV.
Which of the two famous Roman Commanders , Quintus Fabius Maximus, orP.Scipio Africanus, brought more of advantage to the Commonwealth of Rome in managing their War. a^
(b)
V. Whether
The Contents of the Difcourfes.'
V.
Whether war being to be wade againft the Romans, Hannibals connfel ypos goed to carry it into Italy. 34
VI.
Whether it was well done by the Romans, to carry the War againft the Carthaginians, into Sicily and Spain ; and into Macedonia and Greece, againU King Philip 5 rphilft Hannibal waged War with themin\i2L\y» 39
VII.
Whether the defiruSliott f>/ Carthage was the rife of the mine of the Roman Kepteblici^. 4$
VIII.
Why Rome could not regain her liberty after the death ofJuVimCxCiT asjhe had formerly done^by driving the T ^rquim firjl mty and then Appius Claudius and the other Decemviri. 50
IX.
Which isthefafer way to be ta^en, to arrive at Honor and Glory in a Commonwealth ; that which was held by Cato, or that which was purfued by Caefar, $ 5
X,
To what Age of the City o/Rome the grtatefi praife and merit k to be gtveuy fof the profperity and greatnefs whereto /he arrived. 5 9
XI.
How the Roman Empire^ though it fell oftentimes into tU hands of bafe and wicked men, was notwithfiandiag able to maintain itfeif in the Reign of many Emperors, and how it came to be finally de- fir ojed. ^7
Why
The Contents of the Difcourfes'
XII.
my the Common^ialth of Rome, though p^e frfferedmany Defeat! in divers Battels, y^t did fitU froi;e 'viSioriOjiS at lafi . 78
XIIL
Whither the City of Rome could have maintain d herfelf hnger in the glory and tnajeBy of her Command, if /he had preferred her Li- hrty, and Form of Commonwealth, then fie did under the Go'vern- ment of Emperor/* o^
XIV.
fVhy the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of their dominion, as dtd the Romans j and how Greece came to lofe her liberty. ^ 2
XV.
fVhether Oftracifm nfed by the A ihcnians,^^ ajufi thing, cr no j a,^d ■ whether it be ufefulfor the frefervation of a Commoanealth. 1 04
The Second BOOK,
Discourse L-
Wf^y »^* Commonwealth of Venice h»th not fo far enlarged her Precin^s^ as did the Roman Commonwealth, 1 1 1
II.
Whether or no the Commenwealth »/ Venice be to be blamed for having takfn upon her the defence of the City */Pifa, tPhen tt was oppuaned ^jr lib* Florentines, \
III.
that the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate f^c cejfes of War, after the routing of the Venetian Army in the atUoti of Giaradada. ^ j
(ba) Wbethir
The Contents of the Difcourfes.
IV.
whether the Prinecs 0/ Italy dtdwell^orno, to ajfault the Army of Charls the Eight, King o/France, tvhen after having gotten the Kingdom of Naples, he haUed topafs cz/er the Mountains. 140
V.
Whether or no the Forces of Leagues befit for great Enterprifes. 146
V I.
Why modern Princes have not dom anions equal tothofs which rrere done by the Antients. i 5 6
VI J.
What the caufe is xphy Italy hath enjoyed fo long pence and quiet in thefe latter times, 564
VIII.
Whether Citadels and Strong-holds ^much ufedby our modern Princes^ be commodious y and of true fafety to a State^ or w. 1 5$
IX.
Whether the OpiniokofPope Leo the tenth were good^ or no^ and his counfel fafcy of driving Foreign Nations out Of Italy by the help of other Tranfalpine Forces, 179
IVhether the Counfel tah^u by the Ewperdr Charls the Fifth, and by his Commanders, of not parting from the walls of Vienna, wheu Soly man was come with very great firength from Conftancinople to ajfault it^ deferve praifsy or blame. i ^ 5
A
A TABLE
\)f all the more notable Things contained in the prelent
Politick Difcouries.
Drian the Emperor, why he refolved to go on progrefs overall his
States, and to vific every part thereof Pag. ji-pi. Where
he fet the bounds of his Empire ibid.
i^geftUtis^ though he were King in Sparta, was obedient to the Lap?s
of the Country 48
AkibUdes^ by too much defire of glory, ruined his Country — 10. Had higher
thoughts then the reft of the Greek Commanders — 95 AUxinder the Great, the greatncfs of his enterprifes — 19. His Militia — 20-83 An Indian Gymnofophift {hews him how in a large Kingdom infurreftions fall
out — 71. How far he extended his Empire, and in how little time 157
and how — -159. His artifices, and laudable way, for opening the way more cafily tohis gieatatchisveinents, and greater glory — 162 \^mbiticn precipitated Rome into very grievous diforders — 1 5-1 6-51. When difcovcred, makes men diftaftefull — 58. It, and Fear raife in Princes minds a defire of innovation — 164. The important mifchief of it, if once gotten iaro mens hearts - 1 c6. How it is to be cured in States- men —ibid. An Arm-^ keeping the field, how greatly beneficial — 169 Arviits, maintained by the Romans to carry on the war in divers parts, taken only
out of Italy 64
>4rr/i^^w/d» Kings of Naples, what they did for fearofthe French forces — 138 Artillery^ op what ufe in war - 1 5o. That in their ftcad the Antients had mi- raculous Engines, C2\\ed Tormcitta 173
Affaalting tre Enemy in his own State, how advantagious 54
Attalaricus King of the Goths dcfcends into Italy — 76. is afterwards emertain'd
for a Stipendiary to the Empire ibid.
Jttila content to lofe the day, Co the Roman Commander might be flaio irt£he battel — 8^
i^thens^ why fhe foon loft her liberty 5- 1 J.-54
Athenians
A Table of the principal Matters,
i^tkcnuns of great power in Greece 94. By what people followed and
fivnur'd — ihid. Too h;ird for the reft in Sea-forces — ibid. Hinder'd by
the Spart?ns fiom takir.g in Sicily, and from aflaulting Perfia 95. Why
ihey could not enlarge tl.eir Dominion — 98
c^ NgujUts Cefar^ in many places enlarged the Empire — 68. Remained fole Lord of the whole World — 71. Reduced it all to Peace, though he was troubled with fome Infurredions — 72. See OfUvianus.
BAttails^ fubje(5t to divers unexpefted accidents 3 1 When they are to be adventured upon 192
Brutus, Junius Br. how he ftirr'd up the people to Liberty — 51. Whyhecoit-
demned his own fons to death — 52 Brutus^ Marcus Br. why he could not preferve the liberty of Rome, recover'd by Cxfais death — 51. That he endeavored it when 'cwas too late — 53
C- .
CArthaginians, why they came to aid the Romans againft Pyrrhus 25 For a long time friends to tlie Romans — ibid. Should rather have been'
afraid of the Romans then of Pyrrhus 25. Were ftronger at Sea tlicn-
thcy 36. Often fubdued 45
Qato A/4J or, caufing figs to be brought irom Carthage Into the Scnate-houfe, gives counfel that that City (hould be deftroyed — 45. How fuch counfel n.ighc
be ufcful 49
CatoUticenfis^ what things they were which ingratiated him with the Senate and' the People — 55. Did many times prevail againft CcEfar — ibid. Founded his greatnefs upon nobler courfes — 57.- What demonftrations he received from the People of their Angular favour 10 him — 58, Becaufe his manners were not fuitable to the form of that Republick, he could not hold out hi^ repu- tation among them to the utmoft — 59 Charts the Great, having freed Italy from the flavery of the Northern Barbarians,
made his fon Pipin King of Italy — 183 Charh the Eighth, King of France, his paffage into Italy for the conqueft of,
. Naples 140. At his return afTaalted by the Italian Princes •, and whether
they were well advis'd in it, difcourfed upon at large — ibid.
Chirls the Fifth,Empcror, compared with Solyman 22. His great wars with
Francis the F.rft, King of France, and his famous expeditions -—157. Why his enterprifes againft the Kingdom of France proved vairi — 158. Why he fhunn'd
hazarding a fet battel with Solyman 162. How the State of Milain fellto
him — 165. Whether he was wtU advifcd in not parting from before the walls - of Vitona, when Solyman was com^ to aflauU it — 185
A city well ordered, how it (hould be qualified 1 o. For preferving of unity
among the Citizens, whether tl>e courfes which Caefar took, or thofe ufcd by
Cato, were more available 56. When it is grown to a great height, 'tis a
hard matter to order it aright — 14. That which afpires to a large Dominion,
^uft have two t4ngs- 1:11. What is moft neccfTary for its long con;ifiu-
nnce, efpeoally fuch a one as is caftinto iheform of a Republick — IC4. Of how great importance the fituatioH is -^;;^ 114
Citi:{ff!
A Table of the phnctpal Matters]
Ciiiz e;7s of (ingulnr quality barifli'd from Athens for ten years — — 5—^104 To make them vcrtuous, three things necelTary — 7. By what means they may acquire grcatnefs — 55. That quietncfs and concord between them is ot main
importaiict: for the felicity of the State, and how it may be pr.fervcd ti>:ii.
^ — izi
A Citi'i^en very potent, how to be correded , that he diftuib not the common Quiet 9)
Cleomines King of Sparta, accounted the riches of the Perfians not worth the trouble they would (bnd his SolJicry 98
Cdories^ when firft ufed by the Rorvans, and how beneficial to them — 63 ^ i'j% Of the Venetians why k x inco C^indy — ihid.
Co^fijtntine the Great divided the Empire betvVeen his three Sons 67. Why
he transferred the Empire to Coniiantinople — 71
Ce»jiantine fon to the above-na 1 ed, wh it part of the Empire fell to his fhare — 6j
Confaho Ferranie^ why kept under by Kin^; Ferdinand 106
Confuls^ of what autho' ity m Rome — 2-4-5
Cliff 0ms ^ bow profi:a'oIe good ones are to Cities 10
DAlmatiins^ with much difficulty fubdued by the Vencfans 1 ij> Decemvirate, held the formof aRepublick 50. Why Rome was able ;(J free herfclf from ics tyra:.ni-: — 51. Why driven ou' from thence — 52 Decit*s Emperor of Conita, t noplc, routed by che Guths, fl.cth, aad is drown 'd in
a Fen 75
Difcerds fprung up in Rome from W -r, not from Peace — 4S
jDi£f'itor, upon what occafi'tns chokn by ile Romans 12. Cf what relief to
Rome, and who was the ftr^l — 62. Efteeraed nccefTury in times of gre?c danger, and what his dignity was — S6
£.
EDucation good , hoV ufcful to a City or State 9 ilefhants iipployed by Pyrrhus in h,s wjrs againft the Romans — 26
ijf/petdrs of Rome, favour'd, alTifled, and maintained by the Soldiers and »he People 69-72-73. Thirty at one time rdTum'd th.it title 70, Why fome were chofen to bi their Companions in their lives, and theii SucoefTors
after their deaths 72. Whf n thofe of Csefars r ice ended ihid. Which
wcit fliin by the Soldiers, ford, fi ing to reduce them to good difciplne ^75
Etnpire of the Romans, when ir began ~ (: 8. WiH n it be^ati to decline 59
The caufes of its declination and ruine — 7 1 . Wher^ i, was void of worthy men and Valiant Commanders— - 8.. became tributary to the Go- hs—— -76
iqualitj or parity of goods, why obferved in Sparta 3, Of all the Citizens in povcrnment, is not good — 6. What equality is convenient toraCommoa- V. eaUh, that it may bfl long — — 104.
Event, the furefl way to know what is likely to follow 1 9. That War is far
more f bjedl to divers uncxpcdcd even'.s, then any other adt ons of ours 31
That it is the mnftcr of Fools 38. Not the event of things, but tl^e advice
wherewith they were done, makes them either praife-wcrihy,orb]ame3ble--i 51
Fihim
A Table of the principal Matters',
F.
I;j Ahitu Mixinttn^ his aftion and worth ap, &c. DderveJ to be praifed noc . only for prudence, but for Courage 3 1 . \ eared by Hannibal ibid,
overcomes Hannibal when Conqueror <*/'^. Why he took a contrary
coDrfe tothat of Scipio's- 23
Fame and Reputation, of great importance in all our aL^tions, but efpeciilly in
War 85
/■^r^/wrfW King, brother to Ch^.rls the Fifth, why it would have been far better for him quietly to have fuffered John King of Hungary to be his neighbour, then to
pull upon hiaifelf the Turks forces 196
Ferdt/tand Kins. oF Spain, why he kept under Confalvo 106. Not juft in his
league with the Venetians — — 152 Florence., why (h;: could not keep herfelf in a frm ftate of Government free from
civil difientions^ 54
The Florentines fuccoring the Dukes of Milain and Ferrara with men and monies,
hindrcd the Venetians in thofe enteipnfcs 124, Not wd! thought of, and
' in Jeed hated by the Italian Princes, tor the correfpondLnce which they held with the French — 1 28. How their Fortrefles put them to much trouble ^nd da- mage, whrnthty were fc fed upon by the i rench brought in by their King Charls
the Eighth 171
Forts or Furtreffes, ot how great furtherance to a State 148, 1 he doubts for
which it may feem they are not available -168. Other more certain, and
no left grievous 171. Why called ;' cefp delU Tofcarta. ihid. Argu- ments and reafons to demonftrate the great benefit of Forts- i ; a. How to
be rightly ciifpofed and regulated 176. The defence and praife of rearing
Forts ihid. The doubts and arguments againft them refolved ibid.
Fortune^ wFat is to be underftood by that name - — 18
The Fortune of the Romans overborn by H.mnibal^ 41 . Why (he eafily rofe
np agair, changing for the better 45. When flie proved crofs, they ftiU
kept the fame minJs — 48 Fortune very crofs to the Venetians — ic6
France^ the Romans put fore to it ere they could take ic in 48. Whence the
late troubles and dit'cords arofe 106
The French oftentimes alTaulted Rome 6i-6^. How timorous they fhewed
themfelve; when the wars in Italy grew unlucky 138. Why they have
not been able to make great atchievcments in Italy, nor to ftay long there — 1 66 FfAttcefco Fofcari Duke of Venice, faid. That the Republick could not much in-
creafe in power, iinlefs fhe made fome enterprifes by Land 1 1 5
FrAncU the Firft, King of France, how he palter'd in the League with the Italian Princes - — 152. For endowments of the mind, and other qUvilines, moil emi- nent ibid. Though his fortune gave wry to that of Chails the Fiftb,whoni
yet he put to much trouble 157. ^ hy hi*; furious endeavor to a{l;ai;t Spain
prov'd bootlcfs 159. and as much in vain his entcrprifes in Italy -161
q,
GEnoefes conquer'd by the Venetians 41. Whereupon it was that at firft they entrcd into competition, and afterwards into a deadly fewd with the Venetians ^118 . . The
A Table of the principal Matters*
The Geths^ famous for the deftru6lion of the Empire,and of many Provinces — 76 Their original, and why they fell down into Italy- — ibid. Other anions of theirs under divers Conoraandcrs 77. They alfo took pay under the Em- perors ibid.
Ccvernment, how the quality of every one may be known — 1-2 . What the right Form of it is — ibid. What it was in Rome — 2. What in Sparta — j^i</.
What in Venice 54. Every Form is not convenient for every State — 2
The Form of the Government is, as it were, the foul of the Stace 131
From a Popular govtrnment mencometoTyrannie- 54. The Change
thereof in Rome, occafioned fo much the fooner the end of her Empir<i- 90
and of the corruption of her Militia p2
Greece., why the Ronians ftrove to keep her from falling into Philips hands 45
Had a general Council called the Jmfbiilienes ^\ikc the Diets of Germany— 94 In many of her Cities had men of eminence for all manner of worth — 93 Not being at unity in herfelf , could not compafs any great atchievements abroad- — -9$^ By reafon of her diflcntions, could not make ufe of her vido-
ries againft the Perfians- 97. minded Arts more then Arms— — ibid.
Whence her vidories againft the Perfians proceeded 98. How (he came
to fall into thehands of the Macedonians — lOo. then, of another Philip lor
laftly of the Romans ii>i(i. Why after the death of Alexander, flie could
not recover her liberty ico.- For the fame reafons, having afterwards the
Empire of Conftantinople, (he could not preferve herfelf in that dignity — 10 ? How highly her Soldiers were efteemed by Philip of Macecfon, and Alexander theGwai — itiJ St 104
Guide Ui>ebh Duke of Urbio^ ttIj/ he would allow of no Fort^ in his Domini-
HARnii>dl, apon what ground he made war upon the Romans in Italy 3.4 What reafons fhould have removed him from that rcfolutioa — 3 j ,7 Honaritts the Emperor, his cowardifc and fimple faying — 77
Vttngarj., whence fo called 77. The occafion of the Wars for her, between
the Hoofe of Auftria and the Turks 1^5
174/7, how much fhe abounded in Soldiers 84, The Romans meerly out of their own Citizens, and of their other Territories in Italy, were furnilb'd with Commanders and Soldiers for all their Armies 6i. Was long obe- dient to the Wcftetn Emperors ; yet withdrew herfelf from under their com- mand, and fubraitted to Lords of her own 1 84
Italy , through her own Princes fault , at prefent , under the Command of Strangers — 140. Her late Quietnefe and Peace, and from what caufes — i ^4
When it began ——1^5. How it may be continued 167. Before the
times of Pope Leo the Tenth, io great mifery fof thirty years -^^182
(c) ItiUin
A Table of the princtpal Matters,
lulhn Princes, whether they were well advifcd in fetting upon Cbarls ihc Eight
King of France, at his depaiting out of Italy 140
^u^tirth with a bitter faying , taxed the extreme gripplcnefs and avarice of the
Romans- 13
^mHw Csfar, what fierce people he conquer 'd in France- pi. Why it wai
difficult and troubicfome for him to tame them- 159. He would always
charge his Enemy firft 187
jf^Ugdem large and ample, why apt and fubjeft to infurreftions-T^-'^a
LAtPs, what benefit they bring -^ I7. They ought to be confirmed by good Cuftoms 1 1 . Their aim ought to be, to take away the abufc of things,
not the things themfeWes to9
LeagHts ( or Confederacies ) why they are made, their f«rrp and power 14^
Made by the Chriftians againft the Infidels — -147-151-155-191. Which
arethefirmcft 147. Thedefefts whichthcymay, and ufc to have— 148
For what caufes they are made 1 54- How and when men may with reafon
exped benefit by them — 1 54. Why they arc no better efteemed — ibid. That famous one of Cambray againft the Venetians, why made, how foon diflblved, and how unjuft it was — 154-^55
Leontdoi, his famous viftory againft the Perfians 98
Lcrpts the Twelfth, King of France, his nature and qualities of mindc 135
Why he confpircd againft the Venetians j and how injurioufly- 13a
• 135
ledoffilsk sfor:^ Duke of Milaln , how fearful he (hewed himfelf upon the
League between the French and the Veoccians^ 1 3 j^. He calls Charls the
Eight King of France into Italy, and then to liis own great damage repents
himfelf of it 140
Lycurgut, why his Laws proved good — 11. Had many means to help him in
the fctiing of his Laws • 1 2 . Ordered his Republick fo, that it ihouki noc
much incteafe its Dominions — — 47
M
Agifiracia, the confirming of them proved very dangerous in Rome 1
. They ought to be of limited authority, and for a ftiort time- 5
^alu^ i?by it prefcrvcd it fclf againft ihe affauhs of Solyman — 175
Mtrim,
M
A Table of tbs principal Matters,
MAriits^ by what ways he began his grcatnefs - — 8. By his ambition he much endamaged the Commonwealth — 10-47. His difcreec carriage in the (nter- prifc againfl the Cimbri, which were Come down into Italy — 194 Medici^ how that Family got the fuperiority in Florence, and kept it — 105
The (jW/V/VMofthe Greeks or Maccdonians,what it was 21. Of the Cartla-
ginians, mercenary and incommodious — 39. Of the Romans, proved very profitable to the Commonwealth, by being in the hands of many — ibid.
Well undci flood and pradtifcd by the Romans 58-49-61-80. Afterward
grew corrupted and abjed: — df-73-74-75. Of the Turks, how numerous, well order'd, and in continual Pay — 186 195-1^5-196, Of the Chriilians, much inferior to that of the Turks — 186, Naval, cannot of it fdf much en- large the Dominion of a State • — 113. The Forces thereof are increafed and maintained by t hofe of the Land 114
H.'
NAtural inclination ought to be followed in the choife of our a(5Hons — 5 8 Hicelo Ory»»tf, Count of Pitioliano, like Fabius Maximus,3nd not like h.m-- 1 3 5 NobUs, why at firft of httle authority in Rome ^. Oppofing the Commu- nally, and hated by ir — 4. Authors of the deflruftion of Tyrannies 1 2
■ 0.
ctAvmm^ why eafily entertained by the Army after Caffars^death — 52
o
PEace, how it remains of it felf, being brought into States — 1 64. How , in thefe lafl times it is eftabliihed in the minds of the Italian Potentates — i^s
How Peace,. Concord , and Unity amongft Citizens ought to be preferved by
:, Laws lai
Flutarch, prefers Lycurgus before Numa 1 1
ppmpej , fet up by the Senate to take down Csefar 47. His triumpi- s — il>>J.
After the war with Mithridates, quitted the Army 'j i. Subdued for the
Romans above eight hundred Cities — 65. The laudable way and :irt by which he brought people to obey the Romans, and facilitated his enterprifes — 163 Tfie People of Rome, of what authority in the Commonwealth 5. How fronn the beginning it was of great power, and increafed it more and more — 1 5 Loving liberty, howitametolofeit- — 51. Sought by fedinons to obrain from the Senate all things, though never fo unjuft 52
The People i That to curb it. Seventy prevails more then Meeknefs — 16. Thit out of its natural ficklencfs, it ufeth to favour a Forein Frince, and by feditions and violent attempts to plot againfl the prcfent Power — J70
(C3) A
A Table of the princtp^il Matters,
A Prirjce fhall do well and wifely to have a care, that no Subje<5l: of his grow to be
Curpeifted for his grcatnefs^ io6. Muft not for his own relief make ufc of
Forein aids, that he may be too ftrong for his Native forces 103
Princes^ what fort of Militia it is bell tor them to make ufc of in their expediti- ons, and other matters of War 155. Sage advice to them in points of
War, and the choice of Commanders 145. Thofo of Italy have ufcd
to imploy foreign Commanders , and foreign mercenary Soldiers 122
See mdre in States.
REfublicks , how their divers Forms may be known 6. How their continuance may be known -- 18. How at laft they grow to be Ty- rannies 54. That a State deferves not the name of a Com n:ion wealth or
Republick, where the Decrees of the People, and not the Laws, carry all the command — 6. For the long prefervation and quietnefs of them, nothing more ncccflary then a Parity 104. A poor one cannot enlarge its Do- minion- 112
iJ<7w^, was a mixt, but imperfcft Commonwealth, and why 5-11. Was too
Popular 3. Why it could not free it (elf from many diforders 14
How long it held its greatnff<:^ 68. When, and how (he might have freed
hei felf from her many bad qualities and defers ihid. How (he abounded
in Soldiers and Commanders 39-6^ 7V-So. How (be made way for
Monarchy 39. She fcatter'd her corruptions amongft the Nobks and
the Communalty — 50. That, thofe Citizens proved worfl cppreflbrs to her, whom for the meet confervation of her Liberty (lie had too much txjlred -51 Her firfl, fecond, and third Age 59. Her fiifl feven Kings, of wiiat con- fid erable benefit they were to her 60. At what time (he dcferved the praife
of good Government 61
J^omans, why they rcfufed the Carthaginians aid againft Pyrrhus 26. Refnred
to have peace with Pyrrhus — ^ — ibid. For what caufcs chiefly they had the
better of the Carthaginians 39. They regarded not fo much prefenc
dancers as future^ 45. Out of one War they ftill framed another 46
Why they were invincible,according t> Polybius 78. The two pretences
under which they made their moft notorious acquifitions i^i. How by
Colonies they kept their new Subje<3s in loyalty and obedience -173
Mcmuluj, a man tierce, ambitious, and defirous to enlarge his Efface, traia'd up the People according to his genius -113
s.
SCipio Jlfricanui^ his worth and aflions -29-53. W^V ^* 5°°^ ^ com(z differing from that of Fabius 33. His palTage into Sicily, of what
benefit it was - — -35
Scifio Nafica^ when Carthage was taken, difTwaded the Senate from deftroying
that City 46. Whether that counfcl of his were founded upon good
reafon il>iJ. • n- 1
The Senate of Rome, what number itconfifted of,and when firft inftitutea -id.
Its authority 4. The generous anfwer the gave to the Ambafladors of
Pyrrhus 25-857. Little cfteemed of by Julius C^far 4^' Snbjea
to corruptions 50. . Severitj
A Table of the principal Matters >
Severity, in what fort of Commonwealth it doth good — 57. Was very oreac in Cato — fbid-
Sylia^ brought into Rome licentious living — 51. Increnfed the Order of the
Senators, to counterpoifethe Communalty, Gave honors and riches to [.is
Favorites ibid.
Solda/i of Cairc, how and why he loft all his Kingdom in a fhort time 160
Solymdn parallel'd with Charls the Fifth 22. His endowments of mmd and
fortu'.e 157. His great atchievements — 158. Why he made no great pro-
grefs in Hungary — 159. nor at Corfu againft the Venetians — ibid. Why
he made that expedition into Hungary 195. Had under his command four
Empires, and eighteen Kingdoms 1$6
Sparta^ a mixt Republick very excellent 5. Her Laws not written 11
That authority which the Kings had there, not prejudicial to it — 48. Miny
worthy men flouriflied in it, by reafon of the form of its government 58
For want of money, could not enlarge her Empire — 82
Spartans ^ when and why of great power in Greece 96. By what people fol- lowed and favour'd ibid. Stronger then the reft in Land forces — ibi-^.
Why they would not have their Cities begirt with walls — 171
Sutes^ whence iheir divers changes come — 53. How men grow defirous of their change — 72. Are augmented and preferved by the fame things which
gave them their beginning, and corrupted by the contrary 73- W^ere they
have been ruin'd by inteftine difcords, the over-great height of fome of their own hath been the caufe — 105. That tney have their beginning, increafe, ftay, declination, and ruine 8(<
Siilicfiy a Barbarian, and by nation a Hun, called to the command of the Romaa Army, betrays the Empire 89
T.
TBebans much efteemed of for the difciplinc of their Soldiers, called the Sacred Band 94. Pelopidas and Epaminondas, famous Commanders of
theirs ibid.
thtmiflecles^ what bts-advice was, and his Naval viftory againft the Perfians — 99 Tiberius Gracebuf flain by the Nobles of Rome, without any revenge from the
People^ 17
Jribunefhip in Rome, of ho\v great power, and its infolence 6. Called Sacre-
fan^tts ^52
Triumph in Rome, whf n firft inftituted, and to whom firft granted — 6i
Turks^ their afliftance refufed by the Venetians, and yet fucd for by other Chriftian
Princes 136. Why they cannot fo fuddenly nor cafily do any lignal enre>
priles by Land- ^161 . Are accuftomed, for their own fecurity, to deftroy
the inhabitants of fuch places as they take in, efpecially thofe of the better and
licher fort 172; Their chiefcft flrengthconfifts in their Cavairy 187
Their Law promifeth everlafting reward in heaven, to every one that lofcth his life in their Soveraigns quarrel 194
F.
Valerius Publicola^why in reforming the government of Rome, he yielded mmy things to the People -14-1). That he might haveorder'd the City
better — ibid. fcniit
A Table of the principal Matters,
Venice^ in time brought her Government to perfedion — 12. How flie hath
been able to prcftrve her Liberty thus long 54. What ber Government
is — ibid. When it began - 77-116. Her Foundcis lovers of Peace, anj of
an intent and end differing tiom that of the Founders ot Rome ibid.
Her greateft and moft difficult iitempts have betn eitha in their own Defence, or for Religion, or in Affiffance of others — iij. What wars and efforts of
fierce Nations flic at her firft beginning underwent 117. Why flie made
ufe of Foreign Soldiers and Commanders— — 121. That for having ac- cuftom'.d to imploy Foreign Commanders, fliehath not been able (by reafoi of thtir difloyalty ) to profccute fuch Enterpnfes of hers as had been well begun — ibid.
Venetians^ whatcourfc they took to free ihemfelves from the danger they were in of the Genoa-forces — 43. That thepradice of MerthandilinL^ is not to be blamed in them — \i6. Some of their illuitrious and famous Princes — tiid.
■ What title their Dukes afTumed for the taking in of Conftantinople 118
How prejudicial to them the Ottoman Empire hath been — ibid. That, had it not been for the treachery of their Commanders, the State of Milan had been
theirs 121. Their weighty and glorious enterprifes by Sea and Land
againft the Saracens , for the Emperors of Conftantinople , and againft the
Genocfcs 1 29. Why they called Lewis King of France into Italy — 1 50
. Why almoft all Chriftian Princes entred into a League againft them - 1 3 2- 1 80 How difcreetly they have continued Neutrals in the difcords of Princes, that thereupon Peace might follow in vbcfe latter tinKS — 167, Why they ftnt into Candy new Colonies of their own Gentry — 171
yertutj what two vertucs are necefl'ary for him that propofcth great matters to him- felf, and afpireth after glory — 88
Vcmtusy To make men vertuous, three things are needful 1 1
W,
WARi brought home to the Enemies own doors, how advantagious — aS When it ought to be carded on with protra(5ling of time — 31. War, and not Peace, was the caufe of Romes rume — 4/1. It is fubjed to divers fucceffes and chances, more then any other aftion of ours— 31-183-185 }V4rs^ made by the Romans after the fubduing of Carthage — 748. Made and
maintained by them in many places at once 65. Particulars moft necefTary
for them — -149. The manner of Wars now ufed , is the chiefeft caulc why the enterprifes of modem Princes prove not equal to thofe ot the Anti- cnts 148
7 he end ofthefecond Table*
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ERRATA.
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CO
THE
FIRST BOOK.
The Firft DISCOURSE.
JVhat tvM the true and proper Form of Gcvernment obfer'ved in the Commonwealth of Kome ; and whether (fje cohld be better ordered in Civil affairs, having ArmcU people on foot.
"^ Here are many, who rcfleding upon the Great- nefs of the Commornveakh oiReme^ wonder at her fo many profpcrities , by which (he flourifhed along time, and it laft obtained the maftery of all other Monarchies : And think- ing that it is enough to acknire her feats of ArrrWjand management in Per^ce, do not care for enquiring into trie reafon thereof 5 fo as ballancing thereby every of her fcveral ope- rations, they may know what they were that were truly worth praife and imitation, and what blame-worchy and to be avoided. But certainly thefe men feem not to know,to how many and how great and various accidents all humane works arc fubject, and what the true rule and meafurc is whe. eby the perfedlion of States is comprehended : For that is net iimply the greatncfs oi an Empire, to which fhe at the beginning rifeth by Fortune, and which is increafed by Injurtice-, but that may well be faid to be the true Form of Government, by which people living in peace and union, may woik lighteoufly, and obtain Civil felicity. He therefore w"ho Will judge aright of the actions of that Commonwealth, without i'uffering his eyes to be dazeied wi.h the fplenoorof the Roman gre:tners,let him confider them nakediy,as void of thac leputation which Antiquity and the power of Empire purchafed ihem, and he will find fome things peradvcnture ainongft the many for which Hie worthily defervcd to be cryed up by all men, which aie more to be obferved for the amendment of picfent Governments by their example^ then for imitation, out of hopes of aftain-
B ing
ing any true praifc or apparent good. But as there is nothing of greater importance in a City, then the Form of Govsrnmenr, by which, as by the loul thereof, every good aft is produced ; foof all other obfeivations which may be had of the City of Rome, there is not any more worthy, or of more ufe, then to examine what was the ttueft Form of her Government, that wc may afterwards fee whether (he might have been better ordered in Civil affairs then ^\q was, without difordering her Mi- litia ; and whether flie could keep together the People armed, and obedient to the Laws. To know then what the condrtion of her Government was, and thence to comprehend whether that fupreme excellencic were in it, as hath been thought by fome men -, following the Rule which Phiiofophy teacheth us, which fays, that every Form of Republick is not convenient for every City, but that they muft be varied according to the divers natures of the people, and according to other accidents •, we rault examine what that State was in it leU, and then what proportion it held with that City. But becaufe it would be too difficult a bufinefs to affign any certain condition unto her, which may equally corrcfpond to all times, (he not having fo pundually obferved one and the fame Form continually, but varied it fomewhat ac- cordingly as it inclined more or lefs to a Popular State ^ we muft have our eys moft fixt upon that Age, wherein the glory of that Commonwealth did moft flouriftij not forbearing notwithftanding to touch upon fuch things in other times, as may conduce to our purp ">fe.
He who would diligently confider all the parts of the Republick, will find not only fo much diver (ity, but even contrariety in them, as he will not be able cafily to rcfolwe which was her propercll Form of Government : For if refpeft be had to the great Authority of Confuls, cfpecialjy in Armies, we may, not without reafon, believe, that that City under the name of a Commonwealth, was governed with Laws befitang a Kingdom -, (ince that Form of Magiftracie did ufe fuch Authority in managing of Arms, in concluding Peace, and in agreeing differe;nces between potent Kings, as one onelv Prince could hardly have treated of thofe things with more abfolute power : differing from Monarchy only in this, that they kept this Authority but for a (hort time, and did acknowledg it to proceed from the will and favor of the People. But he who t\'ill confider what a (hare of the trjoft important refolutions of the Commonwealth the Senate bad, as that which governed tf,e publickTreafury, the chief foundation of a State, and to which the priviledg did belong firft to treat of, and then to refolve of fuch things as were to be propounded to the people, will be of opinion, that fuch a Commonwealth did lean more to- wards Ariftocracie, then any other Government. Yet paffing on to further Coiv- fiderations, 2nd finding the Authority of Confuls, Senate and Tribunes to be fo often baffled and nullified, and the Supreme Magiftracies oftentimes contaoiinated by the meannefs of popular men who have had the cxercife thereof, will vote other- wife, and think the Government to have been meerly Popular. Wherefore Poly- bitu being willing, in the fixth Book of his Hiftories, to affign fome certain Form of Government to the City of /f (7W(r,would not reftrain it under any one particular Foim, but called it amixt Republick, as was that of Sparta. Which opinion is fithence followed by fome modern Writers, who treating of the differing Forms of Commonwealths, and particularly of that of /?fl«»f, do pundually agree with foly- htHs. And certainly they were thus far all in the righr, to wit, That the divers manners of Rule by which that City was governed, could not be exprefTcd by any one name. For what gives the true Form to a City, but the communication of Gcvernment * which as it is participated by Citizens, makes fuch alteration or mutation in a State, as the Philofopher was of opinion, that though the City did totally remain the fame, the variation ofthis only was ablefo to metamorphofe it, as it cannot be faid to be what it was before : For it is not the Walls, nor the Inha- bitants,
(i)
bitants, but tl e Foimof Govtrnmtnt which makes it be fo. Thaeforehc vvhovvill dectrmine the Fotm of a City, tr.uft I averefpt ft rowhatfoeverc'oth therein help to the attai n ing of Magiftracic, that he may infold all paits that belong to the ma- naging of a Commonwealth. So as fit ce men of all ctnd.tions, according to the divers rcfpc ds either of Liberty, Kobil ty, Wealth or Worth, w ere admitted into Government, thefe divers conmunications will not admit ihc afcriptionof any peculiar or p art it ular form.
Agreeing tfcielore here n with /'f/)/'//^, wewillnowcnc?eav( ur tofindouc what is more hard lo knew, and is better worth inowledg, to wit whatfoitot m xture this was. For tlongha m xi Ctmmrnwealthmaybeperfcd, itfollows not, that all mixtures may niakehei fo •, nay rather v\herc feveral differing parts aie wound up together, fo as a thiid kind e [nature is produced by their connexi- on, iuch acompofition will rather incrtafethe imperfedion of the State, and be the reafon wfy itcrnnct long continue under fuch a difproportionatc mixture. And as it falls out in curbed es, v. hie h being compounded of four Elements, con- tinue fo long in lite, as that propcrticn is maintained, which w hen it is dcftroyed, they are likcwife wafted and corrupted^ ( For that part which becomes too pre- valent, changeih the reft into its felf, and dilTolves the form which they made when all together:) So that Commonwealth which is compofcd of divers parts, may continue in one and the fame State, as long as the Authority of Government is proportioned with equal temperament, as it ought to be, to each part. But as foon as any one part begins to domineer too much, it is apparent that (lie grows towards corruption : For the prevalent part by confuming the reft, doth by little and little reduce them all into its kH, and alters the afpta of the City. Therefore fuch a difpofition is rpquircJ lo this Form of Coveinmenr, as no diforder may be therein fourd whereby that mixture may be broken or confufed. V\ hercfore as divers Fa- culties concur together to the fonning of Man, but are notwithftanding fo well ordered in that anion, as all of them partaking of fome office or other, they have their feveral degrees of dignity •, fo divers Citizens reduced to live together in one City, though all of them may in fome fort participate of Government, yet the imployments muft be diverfly difpofed of, fo as fome of them may hold the firfl place, and as certain primary Caufes, mufl give motion to other things which are done in the Commonwealth.
Thefe confiderations being applied to the City of Ro»ie^ will make it appear clearly that there was no fuch equality nor order in her, as is to be defired in a mixc Commonwealth to render it excellent, and long liveJ. For the immoderate Au- thority, which was by the Laws granted to divers Magiflrates, hue much more the extraordinary power which was intrufied in many Citizens, Ihevvs how ill that fo necefl'ary proportion was obferved in her .- And on the other fide, the Peoples power, and the admittance thereof without any difference to all manner of Negotiations, gives manifeft tokens of acorfufcd difpofition, all Orders being mixt tother without diftindion either of Office or Degrce,and the bafer fore being oftentimes exalted above the more worthy. Hence it was, that amongll fuch con- fufion, many cuftoms might be introduced , which were "noc onely corrupt, but even contrary one to another •, as was that of prolonging the time of Magiftrates, which wa- repugnant to the great Authority which was referved to the people^ and that other of fuffering the wealth of private men to increafc to fuch a height in a City, where theie wasno prefixtboundeurof wealth appointed by the Laws for briig a Citizen • Which Laws or Cuftoms do fome of them tend to the pow cr of a few, and other fome of them are proper for a Popu'ar State. But it we proceed further, we Oiall find ther diforders fo far advanced, as not being able to confill together in one fubjed, they were the occafioa of that Common vealths
B 2 dillblution
(4)
dirtblution. The confirming of their Authority, whofe Mjgiftracy was by the ufual time appointed by the Laws exp red, wasintroduccdat tirft with fomc ap- pearance of advantage, but with very bad example, for that havin» begun im- portant affairs in Countiies tar off, they might finifh them, and weaRen the Ene- my before tlicir return home. Thus was the charge of the Province left toMar- cits FulvtM.vfho fought in ^^fi* ag:xin{i Antitchui ,dii\tv hewasoutoftheConful- Hiip-, the which was done likcwife loGneus Manlitts to bridle the daiingit/o//4»/, and CO appeafe the affairs in Greece^ and the like upon many occafions was done to diveis others, and very long in enfuing times, with very pernicious exam[le, but the diiorder ceafcd not iiere, for, without need, the City Magiftrates were fb far prolonged, as the fame were fcen to return ten times robe the peoples Tribunes. Which made the Citizens infinitely ambitious, and afforded thcra occafion by be- ing fo long in Po'.ver, of plotting inanythngs, and of molefting the Common- wealth divers waits by the peoples Infurredions « Nor was it lefs prejudicial to permit private men to grow to fuch immoderate riches, as equalling therein the moft Potent Kings •, there was a Citizen of iJ^nwr who arrived to fuch grcatnefs, as he faid, He ought not to be efleemed rich who could not ou' of his own Re- venue maintain an Army: Whence itarofe that the Nobilty, being muchen- vied and fufpe<5ted by the people, the way was opened to the Cracehi to ex- cite thofe heinous diforders which ended not but with the utterruinof the Com- monwealth.
Provifion was long before hand by the Lawagainft fuch diforders, Liciaeus the Tr.bune having inftituted, fo to curb the Avarice and Ambition of the Nobi- lity, that no Citizen fhould poflcfs above Five hundred Acres of Land ^ Butthefe Orders in ■ ivil Affairs were fo weak and imperfedt, as one Law might eafily be broken, by introducing a contrary cuftom : The Nobles therefore little efteeming the L'.cinean Law, did very much increafe their wealth, and fraudulently ufurping the puWick Territories, which were wont to be kept for the benefit of tfie people, bi ought in Forainers to manure them ; fo as the people being become very poor, and fee ng the Nobility injoy all the fruits of the common labor of the Militia, did very unwillingly fuffer fuch an injury, and did very willingly liflen and adhere unto any one who would teed them wicli hopes of bringing things to a jufl equality ; wherefore fuch as were feditious took occafion to try Novelties, foasatlaftin the times of the Giacchi, recourfe muff be had unto Arms, and civil DifFereaccs mult be thereby decided : which (as fhall by and by be more clearly fhewn) might have been 1 ng before torefeen-, for fuchCuffoms did much diforder the Com- monwealth, not onely in that they partook not of civil modefly, but by their be- ing clean contrary to the Laws of that City, which lent moft towards a Popular State, all Authority being given by them to the People in their fuffragcs^ and alfo in the moft important State- refolutions. So as it fcemcd refped: was only had to the Lberty of dividing the Government amorgft Citizens: All places of Magiftracie were equally common to all, and fmall means kept not any one far from the Com- mi nwcalth ^ they mi^ht marry togeth-.r, Foreiners were eafily made Free Deni- zens ^ the Tribunes had power to nominate all Magiftrates -, the manner of living was nut frecbut very licentious : And the fupreme Authority of the Tribunes doth of all other things moft cleerly fhewwhat that Government was, who being greatly refpeded and reverenced by all men, and called by the fupcrftitious title of Sacre- fan^t^ they were fo infolentin their office, as a Tyrant could hardly have ufcd more feverity in his commands. See how boldly a Tribune of the People rmde Marias VJoUntts.jk Nob!eman,be feifed on, commanding tfiat he fhould be fuddenly thrown head-long down the Tarpeian Rock, for no other reafon, but that in a Speech wh ch he had madc,he ufed fome harfh words againft the People. But the Tribune Sulpitttu
ufing
ufing moic violence, cure one morning into the Pi at :[4 with many armed men and clriv.ng away the Confuls v\ ho would have oppofed fuch an adion, made Mari>^ be decreed forthe undcrcakiBgagainlt AiihrUates^ not caiing though therein tie went againft the Laws, which roc being in any thing obferved, all good Infticuti- ons wtre made in v. i^,\\ hilft the Laws were violated and deflroyedby the Tribunes too £Meat power. He tlun whofhall confider thefe things, will not Iby that they tended not to the making of a Commonwealth totally Popular-, yet many things were contrary to ilule, iS hath been confidercd in perpetuating the Government of the Aimies, and in the exceffivc Riches of fome Citizens. Some Popular Commonwealths, as ihatoi 'Athens, ufcd by a quite contrary advice, tobanifli fuch Citizens t n yeais from the City , who did tor fome excellent quality far ex^ ceed the reft •, In fome others, becaufe diey did in fome fort partake of populari- ty, ti.eequallity of means, or levelling was introduced, fo tocontenc, and pleafc the people, as in Sfdrta 5 andcerrainly to grant but a limited powcr,and but for a fliurt time, to Magiftraies are excellent precepts of fuch Legiflators as will conftl. tu;c a free City •, For fo all the Citizens may have their (hare of Government, but noncfredy difpofe thereof, to his own proper ufe, and then indcavour to bring things to an equality, or at leaft provide fo, as they may not increafe fo immodc- rately, as any one Citizen may be envied or fufpe<fted by the reft, for his too great Power.
It is then no wonder, if Rome were much divided, fince thefe things were noc cbfcrved in her -, for by fuch a diverfity of Orders flie became a Body with two Heads, and of two feveral ftiapes, which occafioned continual domeftick difor- dcrs in her. For the Nobility glorying in the dignity of Confuliliip, wherein they ufcd great Authority, and which they forthe moft part kept amongft themfelves, nnd being alfo proud of their wealth, would ufurp all the Government to them- felves : And on the other fide, the people, bearing fo great a fway in all things, andi'elying muchupon the Magiftracy of the Tribunes were ib infolent, as they would acknowledge no obedience, nor bear any refped to the Laws or to the Magirtratcs thereof; but would refolve all things according to their own fancy and as made moft fir th.ir advantage-, which made that City, which wasfo •potent in Mihiary and Foraign Affa rs, very weak in fuch as were Civil and Do* medick -, for fuch a divifion of power in men of contrary minds, keeps the for- ces of the Ci^, with much prejudice divided-, whilft the one of them conteft- ing with the other, they hinder the refolutions and execudons of important Affairs, as it often fell out in Rome^ for necelTity urging to lift Forces to march againft the Enemy . the Tribunes were prefently ready to incenfe the people, foas there was none that would give a name to the Militia, which In- folencics were increafed by the peoples being able to do it fafely. For, the Tribunes minding nothing elfe but hovv to make their Fadion powerful, ac- cepted of tlie Appeals of every popular man, though in unjuftcaules, to the end that the people might be the more refpefted by the Nobility, and more ready and bold to raife feditions, whereby t! ey did always increafe their power, and had by thefe means obtained many things from the Senate, Tte Nobles likewife, no lefs follicitous 10 ir.creafe their authority, that they might keep back the Peoples info- lenae, fought always to keep them low, and did with like endeavours maintain thofe of their own Order in all Judgments. So as in punifliing or in abfolvmg of faults, it was often'imcs a thing of greater confideracion, whether rhe party concerned were a Nobleman or a Plcbiian, then whether he were guilty or inripcent: And hence great prejudice arofe unto the Commonwealth -, tor ail Juftice was foon cor- rupced, w.thout which no good Order can be kept 5 and each Party, valuing the puhlick welfare but a litde out ot a defire of their own greatnefs, the City was re- duced
diiced ohentimes into eminent dangeis. Thus ihe Roman Plebeians, thinking aV moft that they had not a common Country, hut that it did only belong unto the Nobility, forlbok it, and reared into the >^T^?«r/«f-, valuing more the ir.cieafe of their own powtr, by neceflitating the Senate to ycld to their defi:es, thenthctt putting tbe City into fuch adifoider. TleNobltslikewifemorefollicitous toabafe the People, and to increafe their own fortune?, then to preferve peace and union ia the City, did nfurilh Civil diCcord by ulurping the Common goods, and by re- ducing the People to ^reat Poveity through Ufury.
By this difcoLirte it may be comprehended, how badly proportioned the Orders were in that mixt Government : But it may he m.ore cUeily fem, bycorapar«g this Commonwealth vith that of Sparta, which proved more excellent ti en any other in that mixt Covernment, and preftived it a long timefieelrom all difcord, by vertue of her moft < xcellent Laws. In Sparta^ the Princes power ended not buc with his life, to the end that he being pitferred before all others for making the Laws be obfei ved, he might the better do it, beirg detained by no fclf-refpcft from depofing of Magi{lrates,"or from being judged by the People. But his Authority was notwithftanding fo limited, as he was rather a Cujles of the C(..mmc|i Liberty, then a true Pr;nce in the City. The People had as gi eat a (hare in Govermeat, i» their condition required : For it being they who were to make ufc of the Magi- ftrates, itfeaned they might better know their abilities-, as we fee it falls out ia other Trades, that the excellencie of the work is better known by him that is to ufc it, then by the maker thereof- The People had the power given them of choofing and of correfting Magiftrates^ but greater authority was granted totfeSenaie, which was placed as in the midft to defend the Commonwealth trom the Princes power, and from the peoples infolence, to the end that the-eby it mghi the better temper the one and the ether. Now let us (ce how in the joint union of thcfe three Governments, certain Condiiions were appropriated unto every of them-, buc neither fo many, nor yet f. ch as made them of dean contrary qualities, but fo as they might very well be united in one and the fame perfon. The Frince had per- petuity of power •, but this flood fo correftt d by the Laws, as it might eafily con- lift with the other States. The Senate, which was made up of Forty ei^ht of the prim.e Citizens,reprefented a trie Arftocratical Commonwealth i but becau'c they acknowledged their Dignity from the People, their power was not fuch as bereft others of their Liberty. But the Peoples authority in ordering rewards and punifli- ments,as it was not dangerous, fo it afforded place for a mcdcfl Popular State, and re ndred that Government more perfed, by mixture of all the three beft. But above all things elfe, there was a miraculous profoitionobferved in5/>/irr/», inftiaiingouc thcfe thirgs,vvhich ufe to caufe Civil diflentions amongfl Citizens : For the Noble- men had the greateft part in Honors, but the People v. ere equal to them in Wealth, all the Revenues bciug in common ^ fo as the ambition of the one, and the necef- fities of theoiher v\ere (atihfied, and all of them being content, they enjoyed much Peace and Tranquility, fo as that Commonwealth may endure longer then any of thcantientReipublicks.Andifat the firftflie had been a little more large in coiiimu- nicating her Government, byencieafing the number of her Senators, fo as there had been no occafion in Theepompm h'\^ time, for the better regulating their too great Authority, ol introducing ihe Magiftracy of thc£;'/'cr/, whereby the City began to be a little too popular, and leaving Licurgtii his antient Inftitutions, gave it lelf over to licentioulnefs, nothing could have been defired in that i ity to have reduced her to the higheft p tchof perie(ffion. Therefore as f;ir as the Roman Co- vernment differed from this, it muft be confcft it fell fo far fliort of trae excellen- cie The Conluls of Rome had gieat Authority, and it may be more free xhtn became any Maj^iftracy in a Commonwealth, but the little durance thereof made
it
(
7)
itlefsben.Ha.'lto tht tlie Republick : For clieir Power being foon to be given over, m:ide tlieni lefs diliocnc, and lefs bold in undei taking Pablick Affairs : For Confulihip being laid afide, the -.vay was opened of revenging private Iniuries by the Tribunes. So Cicero^ who freed his Country from Catdtns Confpiracy, when he was out of Place, was banifhed. But the Senate, btcaufe it had not any Ordinary Mag iflracy, from whence no Appeal might be made, by which it might curb the Peoples Infoltncy, had not that rcfped given to it, by which the igno- rant common people is Governed .- So as the people, not being held back by this Bridle, ran into fuch licentioufuefs, as they dared to commit divers Indignities even againft the chief Magiftracy of Counfulfliip 5 as they did when they plucked the Conful dmitius Hefiare from the Tribunal, that they might by force ob:a'n ad- mittance to that Supream Magiftracy. The weaknefsof the Senate was likewife the occafion of the increafe of the powcrof fome Ciiizens, for the peoples rtfolutions prevailing over the like of the Senate, theway of ariving at great power by the favour of the people, in defpitc of the Senate, was opened to fuch as were ambi- tious. Thus didMart/^s caufe himfelf to be declared Conful, cor,trary to the Laws, and CafAr to be confirmed in his Province : And to fupprcfs thcfe mens immoderate greatnefs, which tended towards Tyranny, it wasrequifite ( fince the Commonwealth had no ufual means to do it) to prefer other Citizens of the Nobilities fide, whofe greatnefs proved afterwards no lefs pernicious, then that of thofc whom they thought through their Authority tofupprefs, wherefore the Ci- ty became wholly divided-, fothat private injuries were with horrid cruelties re- venged by Syiia, though he profcfTed to vindicate the Common welfare .• And Pompey^ to mainriin his Greatnefs put rubs in the Treaty of Agreement with Cxf/ir: Wherefore betaking themfelves to Arms, the Commonwealth could notaclaft but fall.
Thefe diforders were occafioned through the weaknefs of the Senate .• But the people, polliffing themfelves of other mens Places, ufurp; thebeflimploy- mentsofthe Coinmonwealth, and being equall to the Nobility in point of liber- ty, would without any refpedl to other things partake equally of Government. So the right difpofure of the Honors and Orders of the City were confufed, which require Geometrical, and not Arithmetical proportion, in fuch fort, as the fame things be rot granted to all men , but to every one that which is moff con- venient for him. And certainly to conftitute a City of that form, as all her Citizens rtiould be equal, would be no better then to make a Confort of Mufick confifting all ot the fame voyces ; for as the latter produceth no true Harmony, fo doth no good concord refult from the former. Therefore care mud be had, that every Order may keep itsownftate, and be neither too much exalted, nor too muchabafcd, left the too flat, or too fliarp Tone occafion difllnance, as it was fcen to fall oitt in Rfime, where this juft proportion was but badly kept, people of unequal condition and \^ orih, being oft times made equal in Dignity, which caufcd a Governm.-n t full of confufion and diforder, not bouodcd in any one Form, but dif- pofed to recv.ive all Forms.
But if we will aflign any particular State to the mixt body of this City, as prcdoniiaate over the rcfl , there can be none more properly given her then popularity. Which though it may be already comprehended , yet it will be better known by pafTmg to forae other more paiticular confiderations. The ftate of the Commonwealth is known by obferving in whom the chief command is found, but the ma;efty thrreof appears clearly In th." creating of Magiftrates , in making new Laws , or repealing old ones, in making War, in difpoling of Rewards or Punilliment ; All which things being by ma- ny examples feen to lie in the power of the People , do evidently witncfs
that
(8)
that the State of this Commonwealth was PopuLr The People were they who gave authority to Magiftrates, nay even to the Senate it felf, by authenticating and invi^^oratino the Rcfolves thereof -, and as the foul ot that Governmenr, they did in dfvers manners move the other parts of the Commonwealth in their operations. So as her trucft and propereft Form can only be taken trom them -, nay,it was feen that the rt Tolutions of the Republick did bind the Senate, and were ot equal force with the Peoples commands, prolonging Magiftrates in their places, and by the authority thereof putting a period to begun Wars. Wherefore the corruption of a Popular State may be further feen, by the immoderate power of the meaneft Citizens.
Let us next view the ultimate end of that Commonwealth, which by a certain ordinary, and as it were natural change of condition, will (liew us what her firft Form was. For it being changed into Tyranny, which ufually arifeth from a Po- pular State, it appears that that City was formerly j^overned by the People, and had by corrupt manners opened the way to Tyranny; fo as this . ranfition was cafily made by the likenefs of State : For, that City where the People commands with licence, may be faid to be fubjeft to many Tyrants ^ nor admits ic of any change, faving that one man becomes the matter of thofe diforders, vhich a multi- tude were maftersof. There were likewifc always many popular Pick-thanks in l?pOTf,who,like the Flatterers of Tyrants,tracing the People in their humors, went a birding after favors, whereby they won credit and preferment. Which, as the Philofopher fays, is a manifeft fign, that in fuch a City the People command, not the Laws. VV hich is feen by many experiences, of which MArim was an evident example; who being born of very mean parents, and applying himfelf from the begining'to the Government of the Commonwealth,n0t guided by the glory of his PredecefTors, or any noble aftion of his own which might firft introduce him there- into, but confiding in a certain greatnefs of fpirit, began to think of acquiring great power fo as being become Tribune of the People,he betook himtclf u holly to abafe the authority of the Nohlcs,as he did in publiftiing the Law of Sulfrages,threatening Conful Cotta to imprifon him, if he forbare not to oppofe him. By which boldnefs he won fo much favor with the People, as he was able to difpofe of ihem afterwards as he lifted in any affair, how unjuft foever, or in working revenoe upon his Eoe- mies ( as he did in banifliing innocent Metellui) or to aggrandife himfelf •, infomuch as he contrary to the Laws, was created Conful, againft the CimbrtAns^ being ab- fent,'and in a contumacious time •, andlaftiy in making the Province be affigned unto him, which belonged to Sjlla. By fuch means the way was opened to the im- irioderate'power of Citizens, which in the height of their profpeiity brought that Commonwealth to its final ruinc. For thefe diforders being long before begun, were 3fterwardsby the fpacioufnefs of the City fo increafed, as the People being become powerful by reafon of the numeroufnefs of the Citizens, and growing more free and bold by iheir fo many profperities, not content to be equal to the Nobility, would become greater then the Laws. They banifh'd many Citizens without hear- in" the caufe-, they granted places of Magiftracie before the iifual time? they confirm'd the Authority of thofe that were already out of ir, and difpofed of all things not according to civil equity, but as they liked beft. Which things do fuf- ficiently manifeft the impertedions of that Government : For the^ Philofopher fays, that that State where the People command, and not the Laws, is fo corrupt, asitdtfeiv<;snotthenameof a Commonwealth, no fort of Government being to be thereunto aOigned. W hich cafily happens in Cities which are very great and powerful, as was that o(Rom. But it we fliall then confider the Conditions of thofe men into whofc hands that Government was put, we (hall thereby likewife find, that amongft the feveral Forms of Popular States, this may be thought the moft
corrupt,
('O
corrupt, as that wheieinto even Artificers were admitted : which being ufually but ill corduioned, and frequent ns; AfTemblies only that they may talktogeth.r, do conftituie an imperfcft State, and fubjecl to alterations. And h nee it ma v br de- duced, that this part being moft prevalent in that ib corrupt and imperfedl Corrs- munweal h, tf e other'; muft partake of the lame impe; fedtion : For n^ fuch union can be iramed out ot two good Governments, and one very bad one, as is requifite to give form ^o a good Govern nent-, neither could they continue together for n: V;r fo imail a time. Whence it may be likcwifc interred, that thofe orl er parts ot the Con«monvvealth, which may leem torefemble Monarchy .nd Ar ftocracy, as the Confuls and Senate, camelliortof fiich perfedion as isp 0|.er totho.c "^tatcs, de- clinit.g to th' contrary party For many t! ini:S may be obfcrvcd to have b^en done by Confuls with more utnoriry and boldnefs, then what became a Commonwtaiih. To pafs by many ot! er examples, C^far b:.ng confirmed in t^.at power v.hich he had received as Conful, ufurped the Liberty of the Commonwe.ilth. The e vcre lik'- wife many coiruptions in tne Senate, u h ch (hew how fuojed that part was iike- wife to various difordcrs : For when the C Ovtimonvs ealih was at the vtry 1. eight of htr perfedion. Senators were become fo mercenary, as ^ugurth having corrup ed many o^them, and purchafcd his own fatety by monies, it may well be faid, that the C tizens of R(me would have fold their City, if they could have mtt wjtha Chapman for it. Another Confideration may be added, to wit, That that Com- monwealth cannot be faid to be well ordered tv^n in the very Popular State which (he fo much affc ded : For it is eafie to frame any Government for a fhort time in any whatfoever Eltate -, but the fufficivncic of a Law- maker, and the cxccllencic of Laws, is f >uad ;>y the long continuance thereof. Therefore thofe O'dcrs by which the Peoples authority was too much incrc ifcd, cannot be faid to be truly Popular 5 bui fuch may be foeftecmed, whereby the State is long pre'er^'ed. Wherefore many thi gs be ng ordered in Rome v ithouc this temperance,in favor of the People, theyot tiiemfelvsb.retr the Stare of all folid.ty. T'us Liccntioufnefs of living, frequent Meeti, gs, App- aK to the Tribunes Freedom in accufing, and o her fuch things as fetmcd o cl one in favorofihc People-, ferved for the building up of Tyranny, and wr.ught Romes final ruine. Whicn was formcily feen in Athens-^ whuh bemg conftituted by J^/ow in a too Popuhr condition foonloft . er Liberty, and was poiteft by a Citiz-.n ot h rs named Ftjtfiratus^ who followed the fame way whch tiie Lcgiflator himfdf had opened unto him, by at ri-iucin^ too much to the I'eople. So what is intended for good, proves often fatal, if not well under- ftood.
But havng d;fcourfcd fufficiently of the Form of the Government, it w.ll rot be amifs to exam ne for.ie other moie general Con itions, by whxh the perfedion of every State may be the better kncwn. In ordering a City, refpcd is ;o be had to twothngs^ to what belongs to War, to \^ hat belongs to Peace-, to the end that (he may not be governed by Chance in either of them, but by certain Laws, and may be cqua ly prcfeived from forem plots, and from home difcords ; and to en- c'civour, that as ihe cannot always enjoy Peace, fo ihe fhould not be continuilly molefteJ with War. But he who will confider the A(f^ions of the Romaos^ and the Inflitutions of their Ci'y, will find them fo ferioi fly adrr ft to M litary affairs, as he may eafily judge that they propofed no other things to themfelves, then how to increafe Empire, by makng one War beget another: wherefo.e many Armies were inflituted, and many rewards for military valor, to make men bold and valiant agamft the Enemy ^ but not any thing whereby to accuflom them to Jul^ice, Tem- perance and to other civil vertucs, whereby the City might be maintained in peace and unity. " Tis therefore no wonder if that Commonwealth won fo much Empire, and fuch Glory in tmcs of War-, and in times of Peace, like rufty Iron, loft all
C, her
(lo)
her lufirc : So as troubles Aom Enemies abroad werenofooner ceafcd, but much greater v\erc excited at home by diflentions amongft the Citizens, whichdidnot terminate till things were iccallcd by cccaficn ot War to the fame Warlike order and difcipline in which the City was excellently well irftituted : Which might for a while prefcrve her -, but when tl rough the want ot occafion of War, (he could not by that means con eft her many diforders, nor reduce hcrfelf toany fctlcd condition for any fpace of time, being ftill agitated by ftcrms of Civil (edition, (lie muft at laft be miferably[loft,when it was time to begin toenjoy her greatnefs and profperity. For this caufe Scipio Nafca^ a very wife man, would not confcnt to the de- ftrudion of Carthage , knowing that that Commonwealth which was ordered onely for war, could not laft long in idlenefs. How can that Government then be termed 2ood , which is fo ill difpofed towards the attainment of a Cities chief end 1 And w ho can doubt but that the true end of a City is to have her Citizens live vertuoufly, not the inlarging of her Empire? Therefore tha Philofopher faid wellj 7 bat true civil Felicity rv^s not tobe exfe£ied from asiions which relate to things abroad, bat from thefe which are ufed a/Kongft Citizens. It argues not then an excellent Government in that Commonwealth, thatfhe overcame the whole world, fincethe perfedfion of Government lies in making a City vcrtuous, not in making her Miftrefs of many Countries. Nay the increafing of Territories, as it is commonly coupled with fome injuftice, fo is it remote from the true end of good Laws, which never part from what is honeft. Governments which aim at Empire are ufually fliort lived •, which denotes their imperfeflion : Which happens not onely becaufe they were not better accommodated in times of Peace, but that for the great inlarging of Confines, it is neccff ary to nourilli ambitious thoughts in Citizens, and fuch as are too dcfirous to domineer, which arc eaiily inrned to the prejudice of the Commonwealth itsfelf. For it is not to be affirmed that the fame thing can be good in refpeft of the puhlick, and bad in private Affairs. For the general felicity of the whole City, and the particular good of every Citizen, is one and the fame thing, they onely differ in fome certain refpetls. Then taking ones argument from thefe things, the end of this great Commonwealth might cafibly be conjeftured, which (as one faid well i wa^ over thrown by the wait of its own bulk. But grant, that the lives of fuch States may be prolonged, it cannot ceitainlybe done without falling upon many other troubles and dangers. Let CMariia his example ferve us to fee what advantage Citizens got by the immode- rate defire of Gloiy and Dominion^ who being alwaies bred op in .Arms, and havingwone Credit and Preferment thereby, finding that his antient Reputation besan to fail by enfuing Peace, raifed CMithridates King of Font us ^ againft the Commonwealth, to the end, that being to make ufe of his Vallor, he might re- cover his former Repute. Thus c>* thens who once in oyed a peaceful condition, under fmV/^j his good Government, when fhe turned her endeavours of Peace and Quiet, to Arms and Dominion, and would change her manner of life, fhe reaped the like Fruits of Ambition, which by fuch Orders flie had fowcd in the minds of hcv Citizens. For Alcibiades out ot too immehfe a defire of Glory, was he, who ot himfelf did incite the Lacedemonians againff his Country, by whom (he w as afterwards robbed of her Liberty and Empire. For all this, you hear me not fay, that the ftudyof Arms ought to be neglefted . which are very neccfTaryin what foe ver State, to defend ones felf sgainft the Injuries of Neighbors, and to prefcrve Freedom and Liberty: Nay, x^riflotle xt^xe{\tx\d^ Plato, for that he thought Cities had no need of Arms at thf firft; but onely when they began to have Dominion. But though they may be ufeful for fome other refpeds, Citizens ought not to fix their fludies fo much upon Military Exercifes, as not to know nor value any other praifebut that of the Militia, and to place their greatcft and chiefeft
Good,
(a)
Good, and the welfare of the.r City therein-. But they muft know, that a rhart muft travel fu:ther to find out felicity, wliichis derived onely from vercuous a(^i- ons, refervedin Peace, as the true fruits of the labours oi War. Let us thtn CO elude, that this part which was very excellent in Jlome^ loft much of that praifc, which otherwife it might have dcftrved for the cxquifitencfs of its Orders, becaufe true ufe was not made thereof, ; s a means to obtain the true intent of the City. For if Artjictle laught atthofe who praifed the Lacedemsnian Commonwealth, becaufe flic had made her Citizens To valiant in War, by her excellent Military Difc pline, becaufe fli. exceeded the other Cities of Greece in thelargcncfs of her Confines; W hat would he havt faid of the Commonwealth of £0me^ where cer- tainly Military Excrcifes were ftiidicd much more, to the end, that (he might Van- quifh thcturtheft diftant Nations : ¥or in Spartd^ too boot withluch Inffitutions as appertained to the Militia, there were excellent cuftoms for the breeding of C itizens in C ivil Vtrtues : And it is fcen that Licurgtts his intention aiircd not fo much at Empire asd.dthatof Eomulus-, the former much more rerpe(5iing the peace of the City, and the av;reem. nt arr.ong Citizens, minding Military Affairs onely fo fur forth as they are necefliiry for the prefervation of Liberty againft For- rtign Forces. Another confueraiion to be had in regard no Icfs then thefe , is, thatina well-ordered City, the Laws ought to be confirmed by the Manners and Educations of the Citizens, ihe w hich is of more force to make men ^ oncft, then is the fear of punifhment ^ nay, trom hence Adt ons arifc according to true Honefty and Venue •, for they proceed from a vertuous Habit,which is only acquired by Ex- ercife, Therefore where good Inftitutions of life are wanting, the fevcrity of Magillratesisnotfu cient to make Citizens obedient to the Laws* For when theappctite hath already gotten power, and is accuftomed to vice, 'tis too hard a inatccr to overcome her by force. Therefore -ir/7?o^/f faid, Thdt Laws^ though very ufeful^ dohittltttlegoed^ ifmerthe not endued tvith futhCttfloms and Difci' fline dsftstfiththejlateeftheCitj. Wherefore teaching in the eighth of his foliticks^ howCitizensarc tobemadcgoodandhoncfl, he propofed three things requireable, joyning Reafon and Cuftom to Nature. But Cuftom may be thought fo much more nccefTary then the other two, as that a mans natural inclination to Vertue, makes him not vertuous, iinlefs he confirm his natural difpofition by ha- bit, accuftoming himfelf to do well. Nor can Reafon force Appetite, butmuft firft find it well reduced by good Education, if (he will make ufe thereof in vertu- ous operations. As much more then, as this partisnectflary, fo much more fail- ing will be found in that Commonwealth, where f ch orders were not taken by a civil way, for the good Education of Citizens ; Whence it arofe that their Laws met not with fuch due obfervance, as did them of Sparta^ not written in paper, but (as it were) ingraven in the hearts of eveiy one by the force of cuftom •, where- fore (he proved truly miraculous, by reafon of the excellent cuftoms introduced by Ljcurgm. to breed up Citizens in a vertuous and civil life. Therefore Flutdrch comparing Ljcurgtu with Numa^ preferred L^cttrgw^ior that his having confirmed Citizens by good cuftoms in thofe orders which he had introduced into the City, was the reafon why t' ey were Ion? obferved -, Whereas Numa^ contenting him- felf with bare written Laws, though good, and tending to peace, not takiogany fur.hcr care for theeducation of Citizens, could not make them be dbfcrvedfor lb fluirt a time, but that they terminated together with his lite. And it is found by experience, that Ljcnr^us his Orders vvere of fuch force, as they prcfcrvcd the Liberty of Spart* longer then the like of any other of iheantient Commonwealths. W hcrefore fA//(»^o»»^fl(rj having overcome the Licedemaniaar ^ yet would he not totally tame them, and reduce them under the Achxan CommonweaIth,till he had cancelled all the antient Inftitutions of their City, wherein whilft young, they were
C a io
fo bred up to Liberty, as they could by no means be brought to undergo fervi- tude.
From this difcourfe it may then be concluded, That the Government of the RemAn Commonwealth was of a mixt Form, but ill proportioned within its fclf, too much inclnmg towards the corruption of a Popular State •, and that Ihe came fliort of the Spartans in three things : In the excellencie of Government , in the endeavours of Peace, and in good Cuftoms. The other part remains now to be difcufled • Whether the City of Keme might have received a better Form of State } For the good Orders of a City depend not always upon the Legiflators wifdom , but upon many other jfint Accidents. The firft thing to be had in refped , is the Nature of the People, with which the Form of Government ought to have a juft proportion. Wherefore Polititians fay, that the Legiflator ought not only to confider which is the beft Form of Government, but what beft befits cvtry City , and fuch other Accidents which make fo many alterations in States, as it cannot be tltaied but that Fortune hath a fhare therein. Lj- curgu4 was ju ly efteemed an excellent Legiflator;, but many things concutr'd in him which helped him very much to jut his thoughts in cfFedt : He was a King, and ufing force at firft, as it was fit to do, he might inttoduce fuch a Form of Go- vernment as would bridle the Peoples infolencic, and increafe the authority of the Senate y it made likewife much for his purpofe, that wealth of the City lay but in a few mens hands, fo as by bfeftowing Honors upon them, he could as it were by the way of bartering the cafilierdifpofe them to content themfelves with an equality of Goods, whereby he fatisfied the people of SfArtAs defire, who were but few in number, and confequently but weak, and the more cafie to be ordered in any fert of Government. Hence it was that the Legiflators of other Cities though they were wife men, could not notwithftanding form a Republick thr inghouc fo well ordered as did Ljc»rguf, becaufe they found not a Subjcft apt to receive fuch a Form, and becaufe they wanted that authority and power which was thereunto needful, or for other fuch like accidents, which did not correfpond well with what they did. Therefore Solon^ though he had had the fame intents, could not have in- troduced fuch a Government in /ff^fwj •, becaufe he was a private Citizen, chofcn by the Nobility, and confent of the People, to reform the City ; fo as it behoved him to comply in many things with the one and the other, and his fmall Authority took much of that refpeft and reverence from the Laws ordained by him, which oyght to have been given them. Wherefore many blsmed him and his Inftitutions; fo as at laft,to (bun fuch vexation,hc was forced to part from his ungrateful Country. He met alio with another difficulty •, He found the City divided, the People much accuftomed to enjoy Liberty, and at that time much inccnfcd againft the Nobility by the opprcffioni. of Ufury under which they fuffered -, fo as he was compell'd, to the end that they might reft content with their new Government, to eafe them in the r Debts, and give them a fhare in the Government 5 which he could not do without much injury to the Nobility.
The Commonwealth of renke hath gotten an excellent Government; but was not at firft governed by thofc Laws which fhe now is : But diverfity of Oc- cafions have opened the way to the wifdom of many of her Citizens, who adding new Ordeis to the old, have broughttier to fuch a height of perfedion. Which might the eafilier be done, becaufe that City was free-born, and was from the very beginning ordered according to the true Civil end, to wit, to Peace and Concord, and to the Union of her Citizens. But on the contrary, other modern Republicks, the Cities wherein fuch Governments were formed, having been formerly long accuftomed to obey Emperors, fince they got their Liberty by many Accidents, they knew not, as not being well acquainted therewith, how to ufe it, by reafon of
the
the Citizens various difpofuions of mind : So as wheeling often about with an lio- certain Form of Governmenr, they in procefs of time return'd under the command of one.
Thefe Confuiciations being applied to the City ofiJ^we.will prove that the pru- dence of her Ciuzen=;,though they were v,ry wife and valiant men,was not fufficicnc to reduce her to a perfedl Form of Commonwealth •, but ihcy might have amended many great diforders in her, which did much (hoi ten lier life. For he who will con- fider the conditions of the people of i?cw«, will find them to be fuch,asnoFormof Gorernment could better agi ec with them then a Popular State •, for they were all warlike men, bred up even from the very firfl foundation of the City in the exercife of Arms. And though a Commonwealth may be formed amongft thefe, which may have a certain fimilitude to an Ariflocratical State, when the Citizens being governed by certain Laws, partake every man moie or Icfs of that Government according to their worth ; ( For, Military difcipline hath a certain fpecies of Vertue, though It be none of thofe that do immediately fcrve to purchafe the ultimate end of a City ) yet this Government is very feldom met with •, and though it want the true and proper Form, is commonly called by the ufual name of a Commonwealth. So as I hough at firfl the City of Rome leaned much thereunto, in a fhort time the People had a great (hare therein; who not knowing how to moderate themfelves, made it grow licentious. But he who will look back even to her firfl beginning, will find that the Peoples authority did thereby ever increafe together with the City : For the Peoples power and liberty w^as great, not only after the driving out of the Tarquim^ but even when it was commanded by Kings ^ that City feeming even from that time to be naturally more difpofcd to the Form of a Commonwealth, then of a Kmgdom. For, after the death of Romttlus, the People being powerful, as having the weapons in their hand, and as being the firft Founders of that City, ofurpcd the aurhority of choofing Kings : who on the contrary fidcr, that they migfit the better confirm themfelves m their new Kingdom, endeavoured to accomoio- date themftlves to the nauirc of the People, and to purchafe their lovc by granting them many conirderable things. So as even under the Kingly government it had the power of Appeals, as app:ared in Horttim his cafe, who being condemned hy the Mag ftraies for his Sifters death, appealed to the People,and was by them freed. In favor of the m likewife the City was divided into Centuries, with a certain Order ofavery fmall Tax, according to which the Degrees ofthe Militia, and the Autho- rity of the Publick Courts ( things which did all of them appertain to a Popular State ) were to be diftributed. ' »
To boot with thefe Law«, the great number of Citizens, which did even then arifcto One hundred and thirty thoufand, made the Peoples party very powerful; as alfo their having been fo ready and fo fuccefsful in engaging themfelves in fo many enterprifes for the Conimonwealth,without receiving any pay for tfieir pains. Bat the Nobility was a long time very weak, and in but little efteem : For the firft Founders of the City being Shepherds, and all of the fame condition, there was nodifiinftion of degree amongfl them, favewhat was fbon after brought in by Rtmttlui • u ho chooling the Senate out of all that former number, that they might be alTiftant to the King in providing for things requifite for the State, by this order he divided fomeof the worthieftof the People in this new City from the rcfl, who gave the rife to the Roman Nobility. But even this Order was very weak ; for it was at firft inftituted by Konmlus but of a fmall number of men •, and though others were afterwards added thereunto, yet till fuch time as the City got her liberty, it never exceeded the number of Two hundred Senators •, nay, even thefe were much lefTened by the cruelty of Tarquiniuf SuperLw , and their Authority narrowly bounded by the Counterpoifeot Regal power. So as when the City put hcrfelt
into
(«4)
into Liberty, there were not Noblemen enough to form a ftate of opihfuti: in thii Ci(c 6\d Pul'liui y*Uriit4 find the City of Rome, a^ter the driving out of the TarcjBttts^ when he through Brutus his death, rema ning fole Conful, was to conftittite Laws, and new mould the Commonweahh. Whciclorc dtfiroas to introduce a State differing from the former, under the name of Liberty, it be- hoved him nottoUffen, but to encrcafe the Authority of ihe People: Kor elfe they would not have indured it j and by fiding v\ ith the Tarquivs^ they might ea- fily have confounded that Government, and reduced the City again under the power of Kings, For which reafon alfo, Brutus^ though he was firft created Conful, not willing to lofe the favor and afliftancc of the ptople,without which h^ ihoughc the new Orders of the City could not be well eftablifhed, perfwadcd his Colleague Tarc{mmuiCellt(ttnus, that to give fatisfaftion to the People, to whom the name of T4r(g«/ff was become odious, and fufpitious, tolay down hisConfullhip: By thefe Reafons it appears, that f''4/fr/»j was compelled to ordainmany things in fa- vour of the People, as were the Appeals from the Confuls •, 1 heorder, that upon pain of death no man ihould enter into any place of Magiftracy without the Peoples approbation-, the petty piinifhment appointed for them who (hould not obey the Confuls commands, which was no more but to pay fiveCxen and two Sheep, Moreover he cafed the poor of many grievances, and made many other very Po- pular Laws, whence he purchafed the name of ruhlicola.
By which 'tis underftood, that in ordering of the Commonwealth, refpedwas to be had in many things to neceflity and to the condition ot thofe times: yet ifwefhallconfider other Accidents, we fhall find them much contrary to fiich a necelTity-, for the new Legiflator was not Prince, as was Hcurgm ^ butpoG- fefl a place of Magiftracy for a fliort time, the Authority whereof was hardly yet well known, and not much valued: Soas he could not ufe force to withdraw the people from a Popular State , as it would have been reedfnl , finding the People fo difpofcd, as hath been faid. Therefore the City being af- ter a while to be reformed again , the Magiflracy of Ten was chofen, with greater Authority then was that of the Confuls , which took away all Ap- peals, to the end that being more feared and reverenced by all, it might without any refpe^l conftitute new Laws with great fiimnefs. And if Affins his ambiti- on had not ruined the bufincfs, that Commonwealth might perhaps have been re- duced to fome better condition : but yet not to any very perfed one, it being too hard a thing to order Cities well , which arc already much augmented ^ juft is we fee it falls out in every particular man, who in his tender years may be eafily made to undertake any manner of life, but when by praftife he is fettled in, as it were, a certain proper nature of his own, he cannot eafily be altered from it. And if there have been any one, who hath been able to order a City already well grown, yetweftiall find that that City was not fo great nor potent, as was the City of Rome^ at this time of the new Reformation •, and therefore the difficul- ties were much lefs, it being a very hard thing, and w hich, as faith the Philofopher, doth almoft exceed humane power, to difpofe of a great multitude in an excellent Form of Government, Then as thefe things were the reafon why this Common- wealth was not well ordered at firft, fodid they in time bring her to great dif- orders and fed itions, and finally to her deftruftion. For it is ufual, that the further hcadvanceththatisonceoutofthcway, fomuchdoth he return back wards, isfo much the more pufled, and the further from the place he intended to go to. So the Authority of the people being by thefe new Inftituiions alwaies to incrcafe together with the greatnefs of the City, fhe fwarved the further from the end, true Liberty, to which (he feeraed to addrefs her felf. And becaufe this Common- wealth was born with this infirmity, theworthofnoncof her Citizens, though it
were
wtre never Co groJt, was furlicient to cure her thereof, or to prolong her life ; As it happens in our humane bodies, which contracfting fome ill difpofition of hu- mours at their fii ft entring into the World, are foon thereby opprell and brought lodeaih, no natural verrue, though of force for other things, being able to afford any cure. 'Tis notwithftanding very true, that though fuch like accidents ren- dred the City uncapable of any excellent Government, by inclining her to a Popu- lar State, yet had they notfo dcttrminately difpofcd of her, but thatflie might have freed her felf of many of her bad qualities, had not the ambition of hcrCitizcns by increafing thefe her natural imperftd:ions,made her fall into greaterWiforders.
Let us begin to confider \^hat PubltcoWs adionj were from the very beginning of the Commonwealth, and we flialleafily difcovcrhis ambitious thoughts by ivbich he was moved tofludy fo over-much how to pleafethc peoples appetite in every thing. Ti efe his intentions were apparently feen, by taking his being re - fufe^linthe Eleftion of theConfuls fo heinoufly, as that he kept a good while from the Rcpublick, as if he had put his hand to the Government, for his own Grcatnefs, not for the common Good .- But much more for that having compaft that Degree, and finding the People jealous of him, for having built his houfeina higli and ftrong fcituation, fearing left together with the Peoples Love he might loofe his own A uthority and Power ,he chofe fo to humble himfdf ,as forgetting the dignity which belonged to the Supreme Magiftrate of fo great a City •, he made the Fafces , the enfigns of Confulfhip, be held in a pofture of Homage , whilft he made his Oration, to ftiew, (as he himfelf faid) That the Authority of the Con- fuls was fubje(fl to the Authority and Dignity of the People. This his defireof being efteemed Popular, was the rcafon why in this new Reformation, he went not abont to what was very nece(T;iry; to amend in part thofe defeifls which could noc totally be taken away 5 to wit, to givefjuft countcrpoife to the Authority of the people, tempering it with that ol the Senate, by very much incrcafing the number of the Senators, end by apropriating the weightieft affairs of State, to thatOr- der,which liow necefTiry it was, was afterwards feen, but too late put in execution; to wit, in S-jlit's time,by whom the fir ft number of Senators was doubled, yet but to little purpore,the Peoples Authority being already too mightily increafed,and many feeds O' corruption being by this means fown abroad in the minds of the people. But VAlenui added brit one hundred to the uumbea of ihe Senate, neither did make any Law in favour of thcin, both of which he might at that time eafily have done. For hcng r.t the time of the new Reformation to chufe new Senators of the Equeftral OrJer, or of fome other of the people, he would noc oncly have been content, I u: would have wone much honour, by exalting many of his Friends to that Dignity, as it was feen he did by thofe few that were chofen : And the Peo- ple would have had fufhcicnt power in the Commonwealth, if without commu- nicati-g the weighricft Affairs of the Kingdom unco them, the indcmptnity of chufirg.nd of corrcLl: ng Magiftrates hid been rcferved to them : And then that Appeals might have b en granted them, by which means they would notonely havclud a hand ill the City Affairs, but likewife they might have fee ured thcm- fdves horn being injured by the Nobility ( a thing much defired by the People ) and from djni;er of loofing their Liberties. And the Authority and Reputation of t' e Senate being by this means augmented, the Peoples Infolcncy might the mo e eafily have been moderated in thofe accidents which afterward happened. Which tough it leeraed ( as hath been faid) more harder to have been done m chat City, for another refpe^, yet the revolutions of Government in the firft birth of this Kepublick, didalictle kflen ordinary Difficulties. For paffingfrom Mo- narcfiy ( which in the T^v quins time was almoft become Tyranny) to a new condition the Lrgiflator might have made it ,an Ariftocracicj it being asic were
natiral
nitural in the chaiige of States, that the Government which had wont to be ih the power ot a Tyrant, paffcs into rhe hands of the Nobility, who are ufually the firft who lay hold in pulling down Tyranny, as in Rome^ where Tarquin and Erutus were the fiift Founders of L bcrty.
Therefore if the People deferred to be made partaker in the new Government, for having afTifted h;rein, much more ought the Nobility to have their dignities anJ pr vilc'gesincreafed, this common benefit of the City having had its chief rife from thm^ nor would the People have had any reafon to complain thereof. But PubltceU^ in fiead of increafi g the honor of the Senate, introiu ed by s very pernicious example, fmal! refpecft to the M igiftrjcie of C'^nluls •, wf ,ch occafioned many difoi dcrs, which might eafily hjve been corrcde.i by ju t fear, as is cleerly feen by many txamplcs, but chiefly by this •, that the Pcop e bang in nfurreftion, and contumacious againft the power of Confulfhip, the creating of a Delator, a Magiftracie of fupreme authority and reverence, j roved a fure icmedy to af!\vage the Tamult. And what more minifeft fign could there be given, that the people might have been tamed and made obedient by fear and by refpe(fl unro the Magi- If races, then that which was given upon the occafion of ^^ppius his Decemvirate i For being fo ill dealt wiih by him and by his Colleagues, as they wanted rot reafon to apprehend Tyranny^ yet the authority of this Magiftracie, from which there was no Appeal to he made, and the fevcrity wherewith it was adminiftred didfo bridle the peopl as they patiently endured all injuries •, nor riurft they go about to (hake off th t fl."ery. till the Sen teinterpofe^ t felf, and that Heratifu and f^a- ler us d claiCi thcmfelvcs Hea.^s of the Infurredlion againft the Decemviri. There ought thcr fore either greater ref^jeft to nave been given to the Confolary /authority-, oreUe^ if them -re fevcreanj tree power of an orcinary Magiftratc fecmed not t be convenient for the (fa e of that Commonwealth, the refpe<S and rev rence due to the pcrfon of the Magiftrate ou ht lo hav bren tran^fer'cd to the authority of certain Laws, of which the Magiftrate fhould have been chief Guardian, infliding fevere punifhment upon the not obfervers thereof : For by thi<; means the People would have had no occafion to be off n Jed with theNoblc<;, when their infjLncie fhould be punifhed by vertue of the Laus-, this atifiDg a";ongft many other benefits from the Laws, that he who is puniiLcd ior lis faults cannot compain of any one, being condemned by order of Law, not by the Judge his will.
But what hath been noted of PublkoU in this firft beginning, may alfo be known at all other tinges, and in many other of the chief Roman Citizens-, who through ambition fidi g wiih the People, were the cauie of their pri 'c and infolenc e. So the Confuls Vderitu and Horatius, not be ng able to obtain Triumph from the Senate, fought to have it from the People 5 and the who e Senate (not to multiply examples) by creating a Didat^x to fupprefs the authority of the Confuls Titus ^Himm Cincin>tatus, and Gneus Julius Mento, who oppofed tficm therein, had recourfe unto the Tribunes, who by threatening imprifonmcnt fotc'd them to give way to the refolution; And thofe Noblemen did ufually take another courf; then what is to be held with the People, with whom, grave and fevere proceeding doth avail more then humble and mild demeanor. But they Wf re (o blinded by Am- bition, as not knowing, or not caring for fuch errors, they ftrove who fhould mbft ingraaate themfelvs with the the People, by Prerents,Shews,and fubmifs comport- ment. And ihi;; infttudtion might be learn'd by the example of the People oi Rome themfelvs : For it w as oft times feen,that greater refpe(a was given to thofe few who had known how to ufe fcverity to the People, then to thofe who canied themfelvfs fubmifsly unto them. And certainly, amongft other things, the juc^gmenr which followed upon chccaufc between Menimius^nd Spiirius Servilim^ was very remark- able ;
able : who being both of them accafed of the fame fault by the Tribunes, to wit, that being Confuls they had oppofcd the Agrarian Law- Memmiu^^ who by in- ^reatit'sand fiilc.iufscarrijge endeavoured abfolution, was condemned-, h\\\.Sf>nritis Seri'tl.Ns ftoiuly w.itliftanding the Tribunes fury, and fpeaking fevercly to the People, \v?5 acquitted. And fiirius and ManiltMs, who had both of them been Conful*;, being not long after accured,the Nobles being willing totally to free them from fucH danger, killd the Tribune in his own houfc who had impeached them ; which did foaffnght his Colleagues, and the People, as none of the Tribunes would afterwards reallume the lame caufe : And all the Infurredions which were then in the City being fuddenly appcafed, all of them did willingly fubfcribe the Militia.
Affius cUudtHs was always very fevere againft the People -, and amongft otiier of his adions, the punifliment which he took upon the Armies infolencie was very obfervable, for he made them be decimated, every tenth man be put to death ; which was fubmitted unto without any thelcaft tumult, by rcafon of the antienc opinion of the Captains feverity, and for the fcarinfufed into the Soldiers by the fentcnce of death againfl fome Centurions who were accufed for having been Au- thors of that Infurredtion. Which was fufficient fo far to curb them all, as though they were all of them then in Aims, every of them flood pcaceiully fpedtitors of the death of fo many Kinfmen and Friends, and of their own aoubtlul chance 5 and ( which peradventure is a greater wonder, and doth the better confinn tiiis truth ) jlfpius being accufed for this fentence by the Tribunes, ahei- he had laid down the Confulfhip, iifing the fame feverity in defending himfelf, he was not held lefs guilty for having bccuformeily Coniul: Soasthe People neither willing to abfolve him, nor daring to condemn him, the r.iufe was put off, and he fuffercd to depart. And in the latter times, when the Peoples power was greateft, Tiberius Grjechns en- deavouring to propound the obfervance of the Licinian Law, the Nobles, chan^in* their h.ibiC5, and (lievvin^ great humility, labored to win favor from the People^ but fince they lav/ they could do no good by this means, they refolvcd for their laftrelpg.; to nfc force, and kill'd the Author of thofe fedicions. Which aflion of their: did f ) aftonifh the People, as they fuffered the Tribunes death, whom they had (b dearly loved, and who had loft his life in defence of their caufe, to go unre- venged. And foon alter, Caius Gracchus reafluming the caufe which his Brothet had in vain endeavoured, the Nobles, ufing the fame cunning, fought hrft by faic means to deprive him of Popular favor, making ufe of another iribune to this purpofe.by caudng other popular Laws to be propounded by confent of the Senate. i5ut humility avail'd no more at this time, then ic had done formeily ^ fo as it be- hoving them to betake themfelves again to Arms, they flew Cains Grucchus in the yive/iiine, and after the death ot two Brothers, annuU'd all the Laws nude by them -, nor did the People ever feem to refcnt ir. Which if it might have been doncbyanufual way ofaMagiftratc, as hath been touched upon, doubtlefs thefe ruder remedies, as better fu^t ng with the infirmities of that Commonwealth^ might have freed her from many mifchiefs.
This is Ukewifc confirmed by many other experiences : For as long as the Senate kept up the authority thereof, threatening to create a Diiflator, it kept the Teren- Tilu Law froin being made, of creating a Magiflracieof five men, «ha were to corre<f\ the Confuls power. But when ic chofc to appeale the People by giving way to their importunities, it did only invite them to endeavour more novelties-, foas Humility made them not morequict, but more infoltnt. W.^eiefoie having ob- tained Appeals, they would have aMagiftrateof their own, endowed vuthfuprcmc authority-, and having gotten the power of the Tribunes, they could not flop there, but would be admitted into the Confulihip, into the Dicf atorfliip, and to ail
D other
(.8)
Other fort of Dignities- and having obtained all fort of Honors, they begin to afpire to the Eftates of the Nobles •, who being too late aware ot their Error, to /iccp themfclvcs from being quite dif- robed of every thing,and not being able to re- medy themfdves by the Laws, or by Magiftracy, they were forced to have recourfa to Arms, to moderate the Peoples Infolencie.
Whence it may be concluded that the Romans not having ufed thofe means, neither at the firft making of their Laws, nor almoft at any other time, in any ot their Anions, which were proper to overcome certain bad qualities, which they had contradicd even from the birth of the Commonwealth, was the reafon why, remaining alwaies , as it weie a diftempered body, wherein ill humours did conti- nually encrcafe, (he was aUvaies fickly , perplextby fo many civil Difcords, and and came to a rtiorter period of life, then fhe ought to have done for many other of her raoft noble conditions. The example of this powcrlul and famous Repub- lick, if we will well obferferve her civil Orders, and wha: proceeded from thence, and if they (hall be meafured by truer and more general Rules, may inftruft us ex- cellently well, how todifcerntheperfciftions and imperfedions of Modem States. And fay it will not fcrve to correft Eirors, already too much confirmed by cor- rupt Cuftoms •, it will at leaft be of ufe to know what value ought to be put upon every Government, and what length ot dales may in reafon be allotted thereunto, holding notwithftanding that Diforder, for a truer Rule then all Orders, which is oft times introduced by various and unthought of Acciden:si upon which our civil Actions do depend, not onely regulated by humane wifdom , but fubjedl ( for ought that appears to us ) in many things tea certain cafualty^ though they beindeeddirededby alTured, though hidden caufes, relervcd in the bofom of Divine Providence, whereunto our Keafon cannot reach. Therefore if following the ufual manner of fpecch, we (hall in thefe our Difcourfes, make often ufe of the names of Chance and Fortune, let them be underftoodinthis true and pious manner.
The Second DISCOURSE,
What Succefs the Roman Jffairs would ha've had if Alexan- der the Great had turned with his ViSiorious Army into Italy.
i^H E Republick proved more fortinatc then any other State in ma- ny things, fo as he had reafon on his fide, who faid ; That Fortune, who was afually an Enemy to vertue, had made Truce with her, that (lie might exalt that City to the highefl: pitch of Greatnefs. But: this may chiefly be acknowledged from her, being freed from the ncceffity into which the courfe of time had brought her, of making trial of her Forces, againft thofe of ^/cxWfr the Great, who -after having conquered Da. rius, and fubjugated Perfa^ together with other Nations, did not bethink himfelt' of turning into EHrepe-, and chiefly mto Italy, rather then into the utmoft parts of theEaft: Or that from having accomplilhed fomany famous Interprizesin Arabia^ and in the Indiesj being as yet but in his youth, he lived no longer to
carry
(>9)
carry his Vi«5lories over the other parts of the world, notasyec concerned in his
Ferce.-, though invaded by his imraenfe defire of Dominion. It will certainly b e
worth the confideration , whether if y^/fx^Wcr hadatfirfthad anyfuch thou'»hc,
or that he had had time afterwards to put it in effed , to think what influence he
would have had upon the Affairs of Rome. This doubt was put by Z/i;y, who
in the Ninth Book of the firft Decade of his Hiftories, betook h'mfelf to dif-
courfe of what might have happened, if the RomAn Commanders had been to
'have made War againft Alexander, But without confidcring any thing which
might make againfthis opinion, he bends all his reafons to prove that the ifo/W4»
Forces would have proved Vidlorious if they had chanced to have fought againft
thofeof >4/f.v4»i:/^r theGreat; which he refolves for as great a certainty, as it the
effedhadenfucd. Yet many Arguments to the contrary may be taken outofdiveis
of thofe things, which I i-yjr relates of his Romans. We can take no furer way to
know what v.'ould have Ixen the fuccefs of things not done, thentoconfider what
hath been done 5 which may guide u s by conjedtiire to penetrate into what might
have happened inother things, if occafion ftiould have ferved. Let us then call
an eye upon what Alexanders adlions were in thofe times, and what thofe oi the
JR^wrfw Commonwealth ; and we Ihall fee what might have been expeftcd from the
" worth of Force, and either of them, if trial had been made thereof.
^/ir.v;j;7^fryEnterprizes were fufficiently famous, and known to all men,fince the recounting of them hath wearied fo many Writers And Plutarch who writ the Lives ofthcvalli.i4itcft, and mofl: magnanimous men of To many ages •, In his Preface to that of jlexjtjdfy, evrxtCfth himfelf ("with he doth not in relating the lives of any others j if he be not able fufhciently to write all his anions, by reafon of their number and worth. But the Rorrtans Entciprizes in thac age, were not in them- felvesvery great, nor very greatly cried up by others. Though thofe which they afterwards performed, did for glory out-do, what ever was done by any other Potentate-, So as Reputation and Fame (which bear fo great afway in all our operaiionSjbut chiefly in -a hat belongs tqWar) was without all doubt greater in Alexander^ then in thofe Kormn Captains who flourifhed in his time, when the grcatr.efsofthe Roman Commonwealth was but in its rile, and firft befiniiin^. But let u^ come to feme further particular.
The Commonwealth had not as then inlarged her Confines, further then into ■ Latins}, into fome parts of Z/7w/;r^<f, and into Picenum , amonglt people who were very near the Foljci, and the JEqtti. T heir Armies were not yet marched out of /^d/y-, which they did not till'ihey mar'e War with the Cartbagim.xns. Whence it is to be gathered, that the Commonwealth was as ycc but weak, and not accuftomed to thofe more weighty and important Adionsof War, wherein inafter Ages it muflbe conteftfhe did great and wonderful things. Butat this rime many vcrtues in the Citizens of if<?wc, and the cuftoms of the City, not as yet corrupted, were more to be exalted then thtir Military valour, which thou-^h their fouls might be full of, yet they wanted lUuftrious occafions to exercife it. "And thofe fo many famous Command'as, which as Livy fays, may be paralelled W\t\i Alexander-^ Fabius c^'taximus, Valerius Cor^inits , Lucius Fapyritts, Ji- lifs Manlius^ Torquaius, and others of that Age, what great Feats of Arms did they ^ The War was as yet made, as it were, underneath the City Gates-, Nor did thefc as Confuls, or Diftators lead Armies to fight againft any five the /E^«/, Sanniti, Tofcani, and other neighbouring Nations, which were but weak Com- monalties, whofe Dominions extended no further then their own Cities, and the Territories thereof: None of all thofe Countries being as then reduced under the powtrof any one Lord.Yet Z-rnVx words,and the deed itrclf,ofba7 ng had re- courfc fo oltcn to the Dictator, and having had War- fo many years with the fame
D 2 Nations
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Nations, (hews how much fo weak Potentates were feared by {he Remans,^ who cannor notR-ithftanding be faid to have been much fupcrior to them, eiiher tor ftreniith, and viorih of ihtir Militia ^ fmcc it behoved to fight fo often with them, and hardly could they after fo many dangers, and a long co-.rfc of time extinguifli them, or rather make them their Companions and f riendf.
\V ho can then juftly compare thcfc things to Alexanders great atchievements, to his fo many Vidorics wen over the greatefl and moft potent Kings of Afia f What though Darius his men may be faid to have been rude and bafe i it cannot be denied but that they were Three hundred thoufand armed men, end of that Nation wherein the Monarchy had long been : And Alexa.iders viftorious Forces overran more Countries in little more th(n ten years, then did rhc Romans in a much longer time, when they were ar their greateft. The bcfort-named Roman Comminders are defcrvedly praifed for divers vcitues: But what could there be defired more in Alexander^ to make him be an excellent Commander ^ Who had his (hare in more Battels then he •: W ho (hewed more boldnefs in undertaking en- terprifes, greater con(tancie in profccuting them, more hopes in effecting them^ What other Commander was ever more highly e(^eemed, and dearly beloved by his Soldiers^ Thofe ve'-tues which divided amongft many men, have made manv Capta ns worthy to be praifed, met all of them abundantly in him. Would a- lexander perad venture have been afraid to pafs into //4/y, who llicwed his undaunt- edncfs in entringinto the Defartsof Arabia^ without any other hope of bringing himfcU and his Army fafebacV. favewhat his courage and his happy Genius pro- mis'd him-^ But how c;;fi;y might he havepaffed into Itah h Greece, which was formerly conquered by his Fa.h.r King Philips being at his devotion 5 and to boot with tlie abounding commodides which that Country and his own Forces mighc have afforded him, might not he have hoped to be received and adifted by fo many people who were exprefs enemies 10 the Roman Commonwealth C who would noc have- retufed to have obeyed fo great a Prince as was Alexander, fo to avoid fub- mittini^ themfelvcs to the Dom nion of a City like to one of theirs, and with which they had long and grievous conteftations : Nay, the hatred and envy which they bore '.othe Romans greatnefs, would have made them all have fided with Alexander againft them. Was not Pyrrhta invited into Italy for this purpoie by the s.mniti and / arentini ? and did noc many of the Cities which were under the Romans obe- dience, put themfelves for the fame reafon under the power of Hamthal, being thereunto moved rather out of their hatred to be commanded by the Romans^ i.hen their fear ot being fupptefl by the Carthaginian Forces C
It now remains, that we confider fome things oi Alexanders Militia, and of that of the Remans. By which it will not be hard for him who will not willingly be deceived, to know on which fide the advantage, and the difadvant.-ge might have been : Since, if the number of Combatants be to be valued, who c:;n doubt but that the Armies of which he was Lord, who was Lord of fo many Provir.ces as was ^H lexander^ weic much to exceed thofe which one only City, though very popu- lous, and very warlike, as was that oiRome^ could put together : And if Alexander would do moft of his famous Adions with h s Macedonians only, it w:s out of his choice and judgment, not out of any weaknefs •, for he thought an Army of a few valiant and expert Soldiers fitter to undertake a great en^erprife, then a great mul- ttude, whicM oftentimes bring more confufion then aid. So ashaving , when he . had ovei come Darius^ made that fo memorable Order of his Soldiers of Thirty thoufind young men, chofcn out of the Flower of many fubjugated Provinces, and made them be inftiuded in the Macedonian IVilitia, he little regarded his own Macedonians •, whom (as it is written) he permitted out of favor, and in reward of their former fervice, and at their own requefts to follow his Enfigns, and to pafs
with
with Mm ipto /W/J to new undertakings. But tlie Co many Battels which he Co fuccefsfully made, may fufficiently witncfs the excellencic ot hisDircipline in the i^ilitia, as alfo his taking oC Co many Cities, his long Voyages, the4perpecu3l exer- cife in military works : By v^hich things it may be conceived, that no more Veteran Army could be found in thofc times, which was more expert in all that belonged to the Militia, more obedient to their Captains, and more obfervantof all Military order then then was thac of Mexanders. The ordering of Soldiers nkAhy Ale- xander^ which was called fhdanx^ is at this day celebrated •, in which the Ranks of Soldiers {landing clofe, being as it were woven together, and covered over with great fliields, they made a iblid and fafe body of an Armyjablc to fuftain whatfoever charge of the Enemy.
Liv-j does afterwards confider, that the Counfel of a wife Senate, as was that of Heme^ would have prevailed over any one mans Refolves, fuch as was K^lexander-^ but he confiders not on the contrary fide, how that in affairs of impoitancie, and chiefly in matters of War, the fupreme authority and command of one alone is re- quifite. The Romms themfclves were of this opinion, who in cafes of great diffi- culty had recourfc to a Diftator, whofe Commiflions Avere not limited, but he was only charged to take fuch care as that the Commonwealth might undergo no lofs nor prejudice. Nor for all this is the authority or reverence due to a Dicflator, who is Magiflratebutfora fhortiime, and fubjcit to give an account for what he does, in this to be compared with the majefty of a Kings command, and of fo great and fo cfteemed a King as was Alexander. How often fell it. out in Rtme^ that when fuppl'cs were to be fent to an Army, difcords were importunately foll:ci:ed by the Tribur.es, •''nd the Army hmdercd from being lifted < Was there any fuch thing in yile.^ar>der^ m whom lu,';cme Authority an^ Empire did confifl: "t Nor did he yet
want fome more confiding Friends, whofe counfels he was accuftomed to make ufe of, and thofe but a few, wife, and wholly intent upon the good of tfiafc Princc,upon whom all their greatncfsdid depend 5 as Counfels ought tobeinbufincfsot great weight, to the end that they may be maturely refolvcd upon, and readily executed. Which happens not where many command with equal authority,and oft-times with much differing thoughts and ends.
But It may yet be moiecleerlyfeen what fuccefs the RotMans would have had againft Akxandir^hy looking a little forward,and confidering the affairs of the en- fuing Agc.The firft CarthagifiUn war lafted for the fpace of four and twenty years, in which time the C4r//;rff/«/4w power was weakened by the Romans-^ but notfo quenched, but that it could foon get up again and trouble the very Romans that •were Conquerors. And when Hannibal pafled with his Army into //4/y lour and forty years aftenvards, Rome being much increafed in power and reputation, was not the Commonwealth oC Rome noi only robb'd of all the SDte which flie pofTeft, but the very City of i?tfwf reduced into great ftraits-r And yet Hannibd was not jtlexdt.der-^ he had net the Fonune, the Forces, nor Authority which /4/fA.'jWtfr had: He led his Aimy a long way by Land, andtheSea was blockt up by the poflelTion which tht Romans had in Sicilj^ and by their powerful Fleets at Sea, to keep him from receiving fucccr : Nor were his own Citizens a lef> impedi- ment to him, (who envied his glory) then weie his Enemies, in keeping ouc his Army. But theie was no fuch thing in Alexander^ who by a (hort cut ac Sea might have brought his Army to the Italian fliores , and hive cafily been accommodated with all things nccelTiiry. Nor can that be objedcd to ylUxaiider y which leflened Hannibals honor , to wit. That he knew ho.v to overcoir.e , but not how to make ufe of Viiffory : But amoni^fl many of his fingular endowments , he was very ardent and follicitous in profe- cucing Viiflories •, Co as no ditliculty nor danger whatfoever did ever retard him
the
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the lead of time, from making good ufe ot'his profperous Fortiine. U'iiicb affor- ded Plutarch occafion to introduce \^lexAnder^ fpeaking of hirafclf,in fuch man- ner as he challenged all the Praifes which was given unto him, as more due to his own "merit and worth, then to the favour of Fortune.
For thefc Reafons then, that which was firft faid, may be aflerted, that is, , that it may be numbered amongft Romes greateft good Fortunes, i\\d^t jHexandtr the Great bethought himfelf not fooner of coming into //4/y, or that he lived noc long enough to do it afterwards 5 For had he done fo, that Commonwealth muft either have been opprefled by fo much greater a Power, or if we will fpeak more mildly, and with more refped to tlvc RornAn Greatnefs, fhe muft have run gf&ac hazard in her Fortune. And certainly, that happy Genius which guided both thefe Empires to fuch a height of Greatnefs and Profperity, kept them at fuch a diftance, as that their Forces (hould not meet together, which had they done Tome one of their Armies muft either have been totally routed ,or at leaft their Fame and Glory muft have been much obfcured. The like may be faid to have happened in thefe latter Times, between Two Great and Fortunate Princes , The Emperor Charts the lift, and the Ottaman StUtan Solyma», who did both of them flouri{h in one and the fame time, and being both of them (if it be lawful to make this comparifonbyreafonof their diverfityof Faith) endued with great Emulation, grandeur of Spirit,and Warlike Worth, it feeiiis that either their own Elcdion kepc them from encountring one another, or t\Ce that they were alwaies kepc far aflifn- der by fome certain occult caufe , foas they might not hazard that Glory which with fo much labour and danger they had won in tne Wais , againft other Princes. But it was particularly obfervcd by all men, and not without great won- der, and it was attributed to the famerefped: 5 That the numerous and powerful Armiesof both thefe Princes being brought into i^njlrid, and come very near one another, with an intention, as it feemed, to try by Battle the force and worth of themfelves and Armies, fo great a preparation for War proved altogether vain: 5<)/)//wrf» not advancing with his Cartip to challenge ihe Germans to joyn Battle, as he had firft profeflTed he would 5 nor Cafar not budging with his men from the walls of Fienm , though before the apj)roach of the Enemy , he had proudly boafted that he would aflault him to revenge the former Injuries done to his Brother, and to all Germany. But bccaufe thefe confiderations fute not with our prefent purpofe, and for that we. may perad venture have occafion to treat thereof hereafter ; we wiU hear end this our prefent Difcourfc.
The
The Third DISCOURSE,
Whether was the betrer and more landable Ad'vice^ that of ths Carthaginians in offering t& ajpji the Romans, againft King Pyrrhus, or that of the Romans , in refufing their offer.
Moflgft many Wnrs made by the RemaMs^ that was of very great weight and danger, which fhe had to fuftain againft P^frr^a;^, King of £fire, when he paft with a powerful Army into Ital'^ in behalf of the Tarentines. Other Wars were made for the moft part by the Remans againft others, this was made againft them by a King of greater power then was theirs, and of greater worth in himfclf, and of better experience in AfFa rs of War. Infomuch as he defervcd after Hanmbd^ to be c' teemed the prime Commander of his, and of former Ages. This War was likewife commenced when the Commonwealth had not fo well confirmed her Power as flic did after- wards^ this being before the firft C4r/;&4^/W'»w War, which brought the Romsits firft .0 make war^out of Italf. But as the Romans upon this occafion gave many ex- amples of their undoubted worth, fo, opportumcy of handling fome State Affairs , from whence ufeful picvcpi* for Civil Government may be drawn, to him who (hall difcourfc upon their A(5Hons.
Whilft Pyrrhics was with an Armyin/f4/jf, the CArthagtnitnskvA their Ge- neral Mago with One hundred and twenty Frigatsto aflift the Romnns -^ But the Remans^ thanking the Carthaginians for this their readincfs to a/Tift them, fent their General back, with all the Carthaginian Forces.
Thisbein^^ the matter of Fad, it deferves confideration, whether the Crfr- thaginians , or Romans are more to be praifed for their Wifdom and Magna- nimity.
To proffer andlend afliftance to one who ftands in need thereof, efpecially to one who hath formerly been very fortunate, is a thing befitting Great and Gene- rous Princes^ andto refufe it, fo it be done raodeftly, and without Arrogancy, fliewsnolefs Generofity, fince men do thereby appear to confide in themfelves. So likewife to maintain War in anothers Territories, fo to keep it far from ones felf is a wife and ufeful counfel ^ an J not to value prefent dangers fo much, a^ alto- gether to ncgled things of a further diftance, isnofmall (ignof difcretion. But let us come to a more particular confideration of thefe things, that we may the better fee into them, and know what judgement to give of them, either in praifing crdifpraifing them.
The Romans were at this time in Amity with the Garth. tginians^ and had often formerly renewed their Confederacy with them .- The Confines of tleir Domi-^ nions being as yet far diftant one from another, whereby the cccafion of offence was taken away, did rjtific the Peace and Amity between thofc two States.- So asit was a thing well-befeemingfo great a Principality, as was that of i\\t Cartha- ginians., not to forgo their friends in time of danger, though thfy were not bounJ by any particular Obligation, to afTift them. And as the failing in fuchaduty might havecaft fome blur upon th:ir City, (o defervc they no fmall prjiiefor tleirreidinefs in performing It. But thefe things are peradvcnture of leis force, and cftimation amongft Princes •, Whence it may be worth confideration , Whe- ther
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thcr the Cdrthdginidrii were not perfwaded out of other reafons to afTift the Romans in this Wnr.Grcnt wasthc Fame ot King i*jfrr/^«x his Valor, and Forces at this time; and no lefs the report ot^his Amb;tion,anQ of hisvaft Defigns of afTaultin^ Sicily^md Affrica^\\\Kn he (hould have overcome the Romans . Wherefore the Carthaginians had reafon to ufe all thtir endeavours not to make triil of their Forces and Fortune with this Prince : And nothing was more opportune for them, tokcepfuch dan- gers far fiom them, then to keep Pyrrhus in Jtaly % who finding himfclf more withftood by the Roman Forces, thorough the alTiftance of the Carthagintans, would be neccfTicated to make the longer aljode in Italy ^ and (as it falls out in long Enterprifcs) to wafte many of his People there, and Ufl'cn that Reputation and Terror which ufually accompanies great Armies, in their firfl and unexpeded Af- faults. To make war in another mans Country is alwaies good Advice-, but bed for thofe that arc fartheft off, cfpecially when it may be lioped that fuch a fire may be long fed in another mans Country. The Forces of the Romans were fufficiently ftrong of themfelves, but much ftronger being joyned with thofe of the Cirr^^- ginians ^ and fitter to withfland Pyrrhus his Forces : Who on the other fide, having undertaken this Entcrprife, with vafte thoughts, and being refolvedto hazard his whole Fortune, out of a defire of new Glory , and greater Empire, and being himfelf a valiant Commander of a valiant Army, it was noteafilyto be beleeved that he would quit Italy , unlefs Vidorious, or elfe quite over- come and dcftroyd. If Tyrrhus fhould have overcome the Romans , when they were abandoned by the Carthaginians •, and being afterwards big with Reputati- on of his Vidory , (liould have paffed into 5;V;7y, to moleft the Affurs of the Carthaginians^ as his Defign was to do when he left his Country, what danger would they have been in, or what fuccour could they have expc(5lcd from the Ro- mans^ fince they had not been aided by the Carthaginians in their great neceffity, and muft have been much weakened by the Defeat given thenn by Pyrrhus ? But if the Romans had been affiftcd by the Carthaginians^ and Pjrrhtts^ weary of try- ing his Fortune in Italy , fhould have turned his Forces upon the Carthaginians^ how could the Romans have relufed to have afTifled the Carthaginians ^ in like manner as they had done theme" Whence it follows, that thofe men which the Carthaginians ihould have fent into Italy^ (hould have fpught not onely for the fafety of Italy ^ but for the like of Sicily and Jffrica, and with no lefs advantage to Carthage^ i\\tr\ to Rome. But though it had been apparenr, that the Romans might of themfelves have refifted Fyrrhas , and have got the Vidory, it had made no lefs for the Carthaginians , to make ufe of this occafion, thereby to oblige the Romans ^ whofe Power was then very great , and their Worth very- much cflcemed, and their intentions of inlarging their Empire , being already known: So as it became the C4f/^4_^/«/<(»f for their own fafeiy fake, to have an eye to the greatncfs of this new Potentate % and not being able to quell him, they had all the reafon in the world to keep him their Friend, to the end that he might: turn his Forces fome where clfe, and not upon them. But what Friend fliip is more firm then that which is bound with the Tye of great Benefits;: For the receiver, muft by an occult force of Nature incline to love his Bcncfador , and the doer, loves this the noble Produft of his good turn in another, and by fo doing makes himfelfbe the better beloved. Great was the Romans need at this time, who had not as yet met with a more formidable Enemy then P;yrr-t//J,and therefore the occa- (ion was iikewife great, which offered it felf to thcCarthaginians to contraft a near Fricndlhip and Confederacy with the Romans.
But to this it may be objefted. That by fuccoui ing the Rowans , the Cartha- ginians would draw anothers War upon themfelves 5 Nor was it io eafie a thing to overcome the Romans, as that Pyrrhtts could end that War fo fuddenly, or with
fo
fo entire Forces, as the Citrthaginians had caufc to fear them: Nay, rather the Imtmn^oi P-frrhM by Injuries, might p.ovokehitn to revenge, and make him forgo the iv<"»'««-^. and fall upon the Carthaginians. But fay that the Affairs of Rome^ though affifted by the C'*r/^J^/«/4»i,niould have fuccecded amifs (as things of this nature arc alwaies fubjcft to variety of Accidents ) what hopes had the Car- thaginians to defend either what they poftcflcd in Sicilj^or even the African coafts, when they (hould havefent the greatcftpart of their Shipping and Souldiersto afijftthe Romans ? And why (hould the Carthaginians rather fear Fyrrhus his Greatnefs, then that of the Ronuns ? fyrkta his Dominions lay further off, and more incommodious to mole rt the Carthaginians-^ then did the Romans-^ he was but one man, and though valiant , yet his life wasfubjc(5l to various mifchances ( as it proved afterwards, he being (lain by a ftone, thrown by a poor old wo- man ) But /ewe abounded in valiant Commanders, and was come to the pafs, a man may fay, of prefciving herfelf flill the fame : So as all other Princes ought rather to have had a care to keep the /tffOT4»i from growing ftronger, then anyo- ther Potentate : For Romcs power was more ftablc, aud therefore like to cau{e longer, and greater dangers to others. Wherefore to keep the ifew^jwlong bu- fied in the W ar againft Pyrrhtts^ by which their Forces muff have been weakened, was the means toprcferve other States from that Ambition of Dominion which was already djfcovered to be in the Romans.
On the other fide *, To alTiA the Romans in ridding themfelves of the Troubles of War, efpecially if this (hould have happened by their obtaining any fignal Vi(5tory, what was it but to increafe the Reputation and Courage of others, fo to haflen their own dangers ^ For being freed of fuchincumbiances, and afpiring after greater things ( a thing which is nlways occafioned by good fucccfs) it was not likely the Romans would ftjnd idle, but ready to imbrace any Enterpife, as it hap- pened afterwards. For the fiift Carthaginian War enfued foon after the War made with Pjrrhus : For the Romans meeting with no refiflance in Italy^ after the Honor which they had won in their Viftory over Fyrrhus, they began to march with their Forces into other Countries-, they paft into Sicily, being invited in by the Mamertini, :is Fyrrhus \\a% firft called ito //<j/y by the T^rf/^m;/'. And the weaknefs of A^yrrAwj his Forces did notfo muchoccafion theViAories won in the War, asdid his inconftancy in profecuting Enterprifes once begun t, whxh though ic was a natural defed in him, yet may it^be believed, that his fudden departure from Italy might be occafioned by the injury done him by the Carthaginians^ who un« provoked had taken up Arms againft him, and were ready to come and find him out in other mens Countries. But it maybe another greater refped might have jnoved him to affault the Carthaginian State, to wit, That he might onely have to do onely with the Carthaginians, as he had at firft fought oncly with the Romans^ beginnngto fufpeft, as having already difcovcied the Carthaginians good will, that if he Ihould tarry longer in Italy, and that the Romans danger (hould encreafe, that Confederacy might be made between them and the Czrthaginiins, which was firft refufed : Sothatwhatfoeverh: (hould afterwards undertake againft either of them, might afterwards prove more difficult. This was then the reafon why Fyrrhus, whilft the bufinefs in Italy was not yet finilhed, nor the danger of the Turentines not well fecured, marched to go for Sicily •, which caufed (b much trouble and danger to the Carthaginian Affairs, as if he had known how to make good ufc of his Vidory. the Carthaginians might peradventure have been brought then to thofe final Extremities which were deferred for another time , mori: for the "Romans Clo;y, then for their Welfare and good Fortune. Thus what hath been already laid, mayfulficefor what concerns the Carthaginians.
Let us now f.e what the V.ema»s did, and confidet whether they did well or no
h in
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inrefufing the help which was voluntatily offered themjnay brought home to them by thz Cart hap/ tan I. The War which was made by Pyrrhus :ig:im[[ the Kematts^ miift be thought to be both great and difficult, being made by a Warlike Prince, whobroughtmany many men with him,\vell trained up in Arms, To as by thcvc- ry Name and Fame of his Forces, he had almoft brouoht many Cities ot Italy to his devotion, withdrawing them from the obed.ence of the Remans ; and though hewercaftranger, yet having fiim footing in //4/)' , whither he was called by the 7are»tini^ he was not likely to undergo thofc dif-accommodations, which Armies ufc to fuffer in another Coimtry^ but his Forces appeared the more formidable by reafon of that terror , which things of great Fame, and not formerly known, ufe to bring with them. And the Elephants were a great caufe of fear, the RorMnns not being formerly acquainted with that manner of Milit'a. Info much danger therefore, when the whole Refl was at Stake, to prefume too much upon ones felf, and upon ones proper Forces, and to dream onely of Glcry , when • hey were to have been more follicitous of Safety, hath the appearance rather of Rafhnefs, then of mature and wife Counfel. And why fhould the R omar.s promife fo much unto thcmfclves againft Pyrrhus^ as to defpife the Carthaginians help, being as then accuftomed to fight with the Tarentini^ a weak Nation, given over to de- lights, of which they were reprehended by Pyrrhus himfelf. and being now to fight with true Souldiers, expert in all fortoffuffeiings, and all military DKci- pline, in the recent Wars mace by Pyrrhm in^JMacedonii. And when nothing elfe, but even Fortune C which ii\ matter of War is fo uncertain ) fhould have proved averfe unto them in any thing, to whom conM rhey afcervvards have had recourfefor fuccour, having defpife d fo great helps, readily fent by fo great a Power, of fo great eftcem and Authority, as was then the Commonwealth of CarthagC.
Yet on the other fide, it may feem no ways to agree with the V^omans Greatncfs and Generofity, to confcfs themfelves fo terr'ified by Py/rhus his Forces, as that they needed Foreign help to defend themfelves. The Romans might have had Peace from Pyrrhus^ who when he came into Italy ^ fent his Ambafladors to Ro/wr, informing the Senate by them, that he was come tocompofe the Difference be- tween them?nd the Tareatini^ with whom, if the Remans would have Peace, he proffered them the like.' To which, anfwer was made. That the Common- wealth of Rome had not chofcn him for their Arbitrator, neither did they fear his enmity-, thercforelet him firft return to his o\<^n Kingdom, and then, as a Friend to the Commonwealth he might treat of Peace, and fhould be willingly liflened unto.
But the City of Rome did already begin to envy and emulate the Common- ivealth of Carthage , which fhe did perad venture more efleem then open enmity with the Kingdom of -E//>e , wherewith fhe thought fhe fhould notfofoon have to do neither in matter of Peace ror War, though Pyrrhus his ambition had then brought him into Italy. Therefore if the Remans would not accept of Peace from Pyrrhus^ they ought lefs toacknowledg their Safety from the Carthagini' ans. They likcwife thought they might fo much rely upon their own Forces^ having valiant and well difciplined Souldiers of their own, as that there remained nodoubtofViftory inthat War, then what does never part from the uncertainty of Chance ^n War. They confidercd that the number of Armies or Fleets might be increafed by Foreigners, and yet the power to refift an Enemy not be made the greater-, whilfl either the differing ends of Princes, the little agreement between Commanders, or the contrary Cuftom and Difcipline of Souldiers, do often occ^fion many difcords inmatterof War^ which are not found where one onely Chieftain commands, and difpofcth of all things, and where better obcJience
fliewn
fhewnby Souldiersof oneanJihe fame Dominion. Therefore was it that th; "Remans didfundry other times refufe foreign aid-, a$ particularly, in the War a- gilntt. i_Jnt/0chi{Sj when refufing afliftance fent unto them by other Kings of A- fricA^ they with their own few, but valiant Soukiiers, routed Antiochus\\\% nume- rous Army, made up of many fevcral Nations. Such refpeds as thcfe might have been liable to confideration, even when their Faith and Fiiendlliip, who were to have lent afliftai^ce, had been for certain to be credited 5 but who could fecurc the RilWdfl/, who having already extended their Dominions far into Italj , could not grow much greater uithout injuring Nations further off: from being jealous of the Carthaginians^ who were antien: and powerful Lords in <^frica.^ and in S^ain^ and pofTeffed of the greatcft part ot Sicilj 5 and as there were none who could more hinder the increafe of their Greatnefs then the Carthaginians, fowasit necefTary that they being apprehended for fuch by the Romans , fhould likewife fear them forthcprefcivatiunof thtir own quiet and fecurity. Andwhic charity is this, m ght thofe wife and ancient Senators of ^ome fay, which hath moved thefe K^ffricjtts to be fo careful of us, as without any obligation of Confederacy, and not fought unto, they fhould fend fo prime a Captain as CM ago ^ with fuch a number of Frigats and Soldieis^ to affift us, and to bereave their own State of fuch defence, to preferve the States of other men ■: The greater the appearances feem- ed outwardly, the more might it be fufpeQed that thefe things proceeded not from fincerity of heart : If the Carthaginixns had done this, becaufe they held the "Komans to be fo unworthy, as that they were to yeeld to Pyrrhushis firft af- fault, and fo their Stales might be cxpofcd to the fame danger, it was not good to nourifh fuch an opinion in the Carthaginians , by which they fliould no fooner be quit of PyrrhuSj but ihe Carthaginians, who were as willing to keep the Ktmans ]o\\'y ^S Pyrrhus W3S^ might come .-ind (et upon them. So whilft they Oiould en- deavor to fecure the War which was on foot, and from which, if they were the fame men which they had always ufed to be againfi: their Enemies, they had great hopes they might defend themfelvcs, they might haveraifed another more dan^ gcrous and difficult-, if the Keman gencroCny had not fuffered that by anothers fraud, vvhereunto they fliou'.d onely have given confent and fome fmall reward, Fyrrhiis fliould have been flain ( as they were offered by an acquaintance of his, he fhouldbe) though thereby they were freed from all danger; but rather to ex- empt the Commonwealth from fuch a blemiOi, iheR^wu;? Commander chofe to acquaint the enemy with what was plotted againfi him -, how could they, or ought they to tolerate that the C4r/^'«^/"«i4w, who had fentaid, not out of any deiire of RcTO^j welfare, but as thofe that envied her glory, (liould boaft therafelves of being the preftrvers of the '^eman Liberty •: If it ihould have fo fain out by any acverfe accident that P-^rrhu; , who came to affault them, (liould have proved Conq'itror; noth'ng had been to be blamed but the Fortune of War, iince they themftlves iliould have carried themfelvcs gallantly and advifedly in the maintain- ing of it: But if they Ihould have accepted of the Carthaginian fuccour, men m;ght tliink, that the Remans gave themfdves for overcome , before a blow was giv. n and that they were nuch inferior to the Enemy, not in Forces, but in Valor : 1 hat Tyrrhus had not undertaken that enter prifc out of neceffuy, but one- ly outof acefirc of novelty, and hopes of glory : That therefore if his hrflaflaulis fhould be ftoii'.ly fuflained, he (liould have enough of it, and thit be ng invited by another occafion, which he uaderftood was already brewing againft him, by the Sicilian Difcords, being naturally of a fickle humour, he might readily turn to fomeothcr undertaking 5 and that as he had come into //j/y ilightly, and upon no occafion, to make War againft them, fohe might eafily be perfwadedby any ad' verfe Forturc to give over the Affairs of /rj/y, and fall upon (ometling elfe-,
E 2 had
(i8)
had he been fo ftrong in Men and Forces, as it feems men thought he was, he would not have fcnt his Orator Ci»eas to feck fiiencKhip with the Senate and people of Rome^ and to endeavour that by words which he might eafily have obtained by force, which was, to grant peace to the Tareptints his Confederates.
Something like this we may believe was faid by that ylppus^ a Senator of expe- rienced wifdom, whowasuTiployed inanfwering P)frrA«f his AmbalTador, end in readily accepting the inti.nated War. And whofoevcr (hall duly confider thefc fo many and fo fpiightly rcalons which they had to difmifs the Carthaginian adiftance, niuft needs be perfwaded that it did agree with the Roman wifdom and generofity. Yet he who will ground his judgment aright,and juftly weigh what the Carthagini- ans did, muft rcfletfl upon divers refpefts, by which fuch adions are ufually govern- ed. If then the advantage of the bnfinefs be only confidered, it will appear to con- fift wtU with what the Carthaginians did then advife upon : For, to hazard ihofc few Forces which they fent to afliift the Romans, tended towards the prcfervation of their own State from P)rr^/« his incurfion • and it appeared rational enough, thac the war made againfl him by the Roman forces, joned withthofe of the Cartha- ginians, might draw on to a length of time : For it was believed by the refolution which Pjrrhus took when he went from his Kingdom, that he fhould not have fo foon given over his attempt; and the Carthaginians being with a confiderable ftrength in the Roman Armies, might at their pleafures,and in divers manners have ib prolonged the War, and fpun it out into fuch a length, as they might have fo weakened both their Forces, as they needed not for a long time to fear either Pyr- rhm or the Romans. But in the Romans refolutions to refufe the Carthaginian fuccor, the magnanimity of their minds is chiefly t<% be prajfeJ : Uor the War was not flighted by thofe who refiifed to make Peace with their Enemies, and to accept of afliilance from their Friends 5 but full of dangers, which if they fliould be able to overcome, they thought it would be an aftion of great worth, but of greater difficulty. But this refolution, out of the atbrefaid reafons, made not fo much for their advantage (or the prefent, as for the future. And it was known, that rabritittt his generofity in preferving Pynhus his life (though his Enemy) from the Trea- chery of other mm, made no Icfs for the overcoming oiPyrrhtts, then did the mili- tary difcipline of Vderim Corvinus, and the Roman Armies which fought againft him. Wherefore he fent Cweaf to Rome to grant liberty to fuch prifonefs as he had taken, and to defire peace with the Romans, being moved thereunto rather by that noble adt, then by any lofs he had received in the conflid. And it may be be- lieved, that it was this which made him refolve to forego J^-i/jf the fooner, and leave the Roman affairs quiet.
Yet fuch a Conltderation may appear to be very v^-eak, being compared to the advantage which might thereby have been gotten : For it had regard to things of uncertainty, and to dangers far off 5 whereas the Carthaginians help might have made for the good of prefent affairs. Wherefore the Romans might be herein con- vinced •, if it were not to be faid, that the defire of Glory was fo great in them, as aimingonly and chiefly thereat, they put on their refolutions with fuch fervor^ as they did not only exceed all others, but even thcmfelves. They thought they fliould make their condition the worfe by accepting of Forein affiflancc, whacfoever fhould befall them : For if they fliould overcome Pyrrhits, affiffed with the Car- th.yginians, the military valor would be much lefftned, which othcrwife did belong to fo great an undertaking, and to the fo great hazard which thty ran •, but if they flnould be overcome, their fliame would be increafed 5 the Rortan Forces, though afiifledby fo great a ftrength of Foreiners,notbeingab!etorefifl Pyrdus his Army. They might likewife peraidventure doubt, left by rcpofing fomepart of their hopes upon Forein aidj they might mike their own Senators Icis fervent nnd foUicitous in
providing
providing things fitting for the War, and their Captains and Soldiers lefs diligent in their military imploymcnts ; as it ofcen falls out in what is recommended to the care of many, that whilft one to cafe himfelf a little, feeks to lay load upon an. other, the burthen is more weakly fuftained by many, then it would have been by a few; But the truth of thefe things can but only be difcufs'd by probable Arou- incnts, to delight our felves in the variety of affairs which prefent themfelves in "the ballancing of feveral reafons which may happen in thefe great anions : For to give a determinate fcntence therein, we want tlie groundwork of thofe particulais, which v/e cannot take notice of now in things done folong fincc, and by which all our works, cfpecially fuch as are fubjed to fo many alterations as arc all Civil and Mili- tary affairs, can be only beft regulated. It is mofl certain, that the Romatts^ who were formerly full of high and glorious thoughts, got fo much boldnefs and repu- tation after having driven f^rr^/^ out of Italy whh their own proper Forces, and overcome him in (o many Battels, as they did the eafilier undertake anv War, and no Nation in Italy durfl ever after oppofe their defigns, whereby they foon opened the way to a large Empire.
The Fourth DISCOURSE,
Which of the trvo fatuous Roman Commanders, Quintus Fabius Maximus, or P. Scipio Africanus, brought vwre of adz/antage to the Commonxvealth ofKotac in managing their War.
FAb'ttis Maxintfts^ and P. Scipio Africantis, defcended from noble Roman Families, and endued with excellent parts, did flourifh in the fame Age; which happening to be at the time when the Commonwealth oiRome was much molefted by the Carthaginian Forces, they had occafion to fliew theirvalorinthebehalf of their Country, and to purchafc much glory to themfelves. They had alike zeal to the common good 5 their love to their Country, their ftrength of mind, and knowlcdg of military affairs was alike ; buc^ they differed in opinion concerning the management of the War , and different was the occafion which they had in exercifing it. Great was the fervicc which the City of Home received from thefe two •, but they differed much in their ways and ends. Fabiits led the Armies through /^4/jf againft Hannibal^ for the fafety of the City oiRorne : Scipio fought in y^frica againfl the fame Hannibal^ for the glory and grandezza of J?cw(f,being already freed from fo many dangers of the Car- thaginian Forces. The former brought fuccor and help in a very feafonable tirne to the affairs of Feme when they were much d;flre(fed, and raifed up the tottering fortune of the Commonwealth : The latter, by difcomfiting many of the Cartha- ginian Commanders, ^nd even Hannibal himfz\l, did not only put his Romans in perpetual fafety from the Carthaginian forces and ftratagems \\hcrewith they had been fo long molefted, but brought whole K^frica under their obedience. Fabius prefcrved UaIj from the flavery of Forein Nations, into which llie had certainly fallen, had it net been for his anions and advices, Hannibal having already pofTcft himfelf of all the chief Cities : But Scipio did much enlarge the Roman Confines, and made the Africans confefs they were overcome by Icali.m valor, and fubmit their necks to the yoke of the Roman Empire. Thefe excellent Comm.anders fhewed great worth, and great experience in military affairs by thefe their adions, each of them ufing therein their proper qualities and endowments : Fabius loved
conitancic.
(50)
conftancy, gravity, followed late taken lefolutions, but fuch as were fccure. 5a^/o, meafuring all things according to the grcatnefsof his conception, did wil- ingly imbrace new Enterprifes, nothing that was glorious feemed hard to him. F^htHs feared tiAnmhal out of wifdom, not out of any cowardly mind •, Scifio dc- fpifed him, confiding in himfclf and in the valor of his Army. Wherefore Fabitu thought he had ended the bufinefs, \i Hannibal being rediced to much hardihip, fl-jould be forced to forgo Italy : But Scipio as if he had been fure of Victory, rc- fufing all offers of Agreement how advantageous focver,made by xhcCarthuginuns, would hazard the day in that famous place oi Zama^ where the height of Empire was to be decided between two powerful Nations. And truly itfeems, that it was Howes good Fortune, which made thefe two fo excellent men be at this time Co- etaneans, though with different thoughts applied to the Safety and Glory of that Commonwealth : For the one, with much patience overcoming the bitternefs of Fortune, and the Infokncy of the Enemy, freed her fromfo many dangers into which fhe was fain : the other , finding the Commonwealth already reftored, and knowing how to make better ufe of his good fortune then Hanmbd^ did by h;s noble daring add greater fplendor^and glory to her.
But here it may be worthy confideration, which of thefe two may be thought to have done things which were better, and of more ufe for the Commonwealth. Fahitt-s his adions tended to the fafety of his Country, when flie was reduced in- to great danger, and put a period to her troubles more by good Counfel, then by many Forces : But the /iffrican propofed unto himfelf the increafe of Glory, and of Empire ofthe City of Rome. Wherefore notfatisfied with what he hadfuc- cesfuUy done in ^fain , he refolved to pafs into AffricA^ where refufing all condi- tions of Peace, he would needs joyn battel with Hannibal^ wherein his profpe- rity continuing, he won a great and glorious Vi<5tory. On the one fide then, Fa- ^/'wideferts appear to be very great, hehavingpreferved the City when it was in a defperate condition, fo by faving it from theutmofl of dangers, he made himfelf a Qiarer of that praifc which is given to the firft Founders of Cities : And certainly fuch was Hamibals fortune at that time, the worth and reputation of his Army inch, as all Force indeavouredagainft him, would have proved not onely vain but prejudicial •, and his being judged by the Senate and People of Rome to be a Com- mander fit to cope mi\i Hannibal^ and onely fit to fupprefs his Forces, even then when Scifio that valiant and famous Captain, did live and flourifli, fliews that Fa- bins woixh was fo highly efleemed, as it was not to be exceeded. And this is af- terwards confirmed by the grave teftiraony of Patdns JEmilius, famous among the mofl celebrated Remans ^ who being, as Conful, to go into the Camp againft Ha»' nibal^ iughly extolling things formerly done by Fabius^ whilft he was Diftator, faid that he would rather be praifed in matters of War by him alone, then do things which might differ from his adion?, though they pleafed all the people of Rome therein. f4^;>« was indeed excellently well advifed in all he did-, for he was no lefs valiant in uithftanding the Enemy in Battle, and in correding the error and niflinefsof (JTZ/Vw/w, Mafler of the Cavalry , who had importunely, and con- trary to his opinion begun the Skirmifii, then he was formerly wife in forefeeing thc<!anger, and in endeavouring to keep it off". Hisconftancy of mind in adver- fuy uitneflcd his no want of Courage, but out of abundance of Wifdom he fhun- red the hazard of giving Battel. Wherefore after the difcomfeiturc at Cann*^ no man was more conftanr, and ready then he to take a refolution. It is therefore faid, thatin the dejeftionof foulr, and confufion of all things, the Citizens had recourfe to his Counfd, as to an Oracle : And the comparing the a(5lions of others, in what concerned the adminiftration of War againft //4Wffz^4/, made F alius h)s worth appear the more-, for before he took upon him the Didatorfliip, the Con- ful
(50
ful FUmhiius was routed nt the Lake ThrAfjTTtems^ and when he l.ud down the Ditftatorfhip 5 Tereniius u\\\noox}[\Q^ courfcs then did Fabius^ gave occafion for that famous and grievous overthrow which the Romins received at the Battel of Cami£ i whereby it m:iy be known, that wife Commanders f juft hkeunder- ftanding Phyiitians when they meet with weak bodies, do oftentimes m ike ule ra- ther to prefcribe quiet and good government, free from all diforder, then Phy, fick) when they know the Forces of the Commonwealth to be but weak, as were thole of the Remans at that time, ought alfo to free the State from great and emi- nent danoets, by temporizing,and by proceeding ieafurely with all advantage, tl.en by ufing Force of Arms and hazarding a Battel. Which made Hanmhl fay, Thai he feared Fdiiis his fearfulnefs more, then the daring of the other Somart Captains : Andfindin'gallhisDefigns at other times fruftrated by Fabks^ he affirmed that the Jf<J/w4w had alfo their Hannibal. Nor could his cunning be in- deed overcome otherwife then by cunning, and by knowing how to make life of fit- ting occafions, and how to bereave the Enemy of the hke, which indeed was pe- culiar to Fdbius,
It may moreover be faid for Fabiiis^ and in praife of his advice, that as no humane Ad on is more fubjedl to divers unexpected Accidents, then in Battle, wherein great EfFeif^s are often produced from very fmall Accidents, fo cannot a Commander attribute at any time fo muchprafe unto hirafel fin Viftorics, but that good Fortune will challenge a great fliare therein : Wherefore it is numbered araoagft the chief qualities which are to be defired in him who would prove a good Commander, that he be fortunate. Befides, no Vi<5tory is ever won by meer fightine, without much blood, and much lofsof ones own men; fo as toover- Come an enemy by fuch means as Fabius knew how to do, and without expofing himfelf to the danger of a fet Battle, to overthrow an Enemies Army by redcce- ingit to great hardships, is a thing of more rare vcrtue, and which m.kes rhe Commandtr more praiie- worthy. By thefe cunnings were H4mibj/s cnnma^s deluded , by ihel'e was his fierccnefs tamed, and the reputation won from him, and from his Army, which he had won in Battel , by having fo often worfted and oveiihrownihe Romans. So as it may be faid, that Fablus conquered Hanmbal a Conqueror^ but that Scipi$ overcame him when he was already conquered. For Fibttis had to do with him, when he was in Italy with a puiiTanc Army, and in the height of his greateft profperitty j But Scifio made not trial of his ForctS againfl thofc of Hannibal^ till he was returned to ^/Wf 4, with his Army beaten and wafted by fufferings, and whea by the ufurl change of humane Affairs the ftate of things between the C4rr^i<^;«;4»j and Romans was fufficiently altered. W hercforc Hanmbd^vi\\o had formerly endeavoured nothing more then to fight his Enemies in a pitch'd field, when he was returned to AfricA^ perf.vaded the Car- thaginims to Peace, and propofed all conditions of Agreement to Scifie^ fo to fliun joyr.ing Battel with him; in which, as if he had foretc-ld his own misfortunes, helofl tliC rjmnant of his Army which he had brou^htfrom ltd).
V\ hercfore llioul J it not then be thought^ that it was harder for Fahhts to ftop the courfe of Hannibals Vidories, then .t was for Scifio to overcome him in Battel, when the C4rr^4^/>;;4»j were at their greatefflofs, and calamity c" Nay, it wasob- jeded to 5a/'/ 0, when he endeavoured to lead his Army into Africa, that he did it to (luin cncountringwith Haambalin July. It is a very common, but a very tru:faymg,
Non miner tst virtus qu'im qnerere^ parta tucri.
Fabius prefervcd thcGlory, Reputation and flate of the Commonwealth, which
his Anctftors had vvon;5<:/^/o increjLd them. So as had it not been for FjHis, the
Name, at ieaft theFame of RfMC had been alnioft lofl ; But lb: had or.ely been lefs
glorious without Scipie. On
(?0
On the contrary, who will confider Scifios great adtions, how can he judge hiin to come Hiortof any other Roman Commander whatfocvcr, either for glory orde- defert -, fince he may be faid to have been the firft who opened the way unto the Romans of conquering the whole World, as they did in a (hort time •: For by his means AfricA was conquered, and a curb put to thegreateft and moft powerful Enemies that ever the Romans had •, fo as none ever after durft withftand the Ro- man greatnefs by force, or did difdain to humble and fubmit ihemfelves to their Morth and fortune, whom the mofl powerful and fortunate of all other Nations did already obey •: 5«p»fl brought all S^Mn under the Roman obedience, driving away the Carthaginians from thence, whom he overcame in four fcveral battels : Nor did he make the way eafie to greater acquifitions, lefs by his excellent gifts of mind, then by force of Arms •, making thofc people affcdlionate, and faithful to the Romans. And yet as not much valuing thefc his great deeds, being returned to F.6me full of glory, he endeavoured to return again with his Array into Afrua^ knowing that the Carthaginians could not keep quiet at home , but mufl be troubling and endangering the the Romans : Nor had he lefs difficulty to overcome rabim his obftinate opinion in the Senate, who blamed this advice, then in rout- ing the Enemies in the Field.
But if Fabiui be to be cfteemed, becaufe he in a fhort time freed the Romans from the danger of the Carthaginians ^ what muft wc fay of Stipio, who did for ever fecure them from thefe their Enemies, bereaving them of their Land- Forces by taking the Flower of their men away from them inBattelj and the like of their Maritime ftrength, having by agreement forced them to burn all their Ships i Which won him fo great refpeft from all perfons,as at his return from Africa people ran from all parts, only that they might fee him. To fay truth, what can be (aid of rabiuiy favethathcdidnotlofeif But in 5«"f /*vVi<flories, what can be defired to make them greater or more glorious •". In the fpace of forty five days he raifed a powerful Army ; and followed by more Voluntiers for the fame of his worth, then he carried Soldiers with him by Decree of Senate, he marched into y^fricA .• He conquered People 2nd Cities, that were enemies to the name of Rotrnn 5 he overcame AfdrtiM and Hanne^ two famous Carthaginian Commanders -, he dif- comfited Hdnnibals Army, and ending the War with the overthrow of the Enemy, he returned time enough to Rtme to lay down his Magiftracie. Hannibal being withdrawn from the walls of Reme^ and kept at gaze by Fabit*^- his cunning, flayed in itdly^ expecting fuccor from \^fric4^ to renew the War with greater Force. Scipies advice and aftions were only able to draw him out of luly -, fo as carrying the Warclfwhere, at the fame time he freed his own home from the troubles and danger therevof . He who fhould have asked Fabitu^ what the figns were, what the fruits of h s Victories ^ what could he have fliewn ^ No Enemies taken, no Cities won, no Gold nor Silver brought into the Comon -Exchequer. But many things' prove the glory and defcrts of Scipto : So many Prifoncrs taken, amongft which HyphaXj the great and famous King of Numldinr, fo many Cities fubjugated in Aifrica, and in Spain - the annual tribute impofed upon the Carthaginians •, the rich Pilbge brought home from the Enemy.
What is there then of like, nor to name equal, between thefe two, which may make them contend for military glory i But certainly it may be affirmed for truth, that the one and the other of them are come to the height of glory, though they took fcveralways to arrive at it: For each of them fliewed wifdom and valor in their anions, becoming advifed Statefmen, and great Commanders, Divers acci- dents concurred in their feveral ad ons, which perfwaded them to proceed after a differing manner: For J"//^;/^ being to withff and Hannibals violence, who being already advanced into the very bowels of Italy ^ and being drawn veryneer to Reme
hcrfelf
(3?)
herfelf, hsd filled all things with fear, did not think it fitting in this confufion of affairs to hazard all the fortune of the Commonwealth in a day of battel .- For the neerncfs and power of the Enemy did not allow time to recruit and flop the courfe of Hantubtls Vnflories, in cxk that Army wherein the chief hopes of Remes wel- fare did confift, fliould have been beaten.
But Scifio having to do with the fame Hannihal, when he and his Army were in Africa^ and neer th: City of Carthage, knew that if any thing of ill fliouId befall him, he lliould only lofe thofe men that were with him •, which lofs might eafily be recovered, the condition being confidered wherein the Common- wealth thea was : And it being his fortune t» overcome Hanaibd, he reduced the affairs of th? C/trthaginians ( whom he had worfted in divers other battels ) to the ntmoflof dangers : Wherefore by the viftory he got great rewards for himfelf, great glory, and increafed the Empire of his Commonwealth. Scipio had alfo other reafons which perfwadcd him to fight 5 his being in a forein Country, his keeping of the Enemy from recruiting after their late lofTes, and he being fhortly to lay down his command 5 fo as to fpin out the War in length, was to deprive him of his conceived hopes of viftory, and to leffcn what he had already done. Scifio there- fore had as much reafon to engage in battel, as FAhfus formerly had to refufc fighting. ■
Thisisconfirmedby the fcveral ways of proceeding of the Canne Ffdnmhl^ an excellent Commander 5 who at firfl, when he was in /f^/y, dcfired nothing more then to come to a pitch'd battel, out of the aforcfaid reafons ; fo afterwards being withdrawn with his Army into Africa^ fhunn'd encountring Scipie as much as he might, the diffcicnc condition of affairs advifing him differently. And it is a general rule , That thofe things ought to be avoided which pleafe the Enemy-, for the re- fpcas being different, that which makes for the one, muft needs be bad for the other. It mufl afterwards be confidered, that if f 4^/«* had pleafed, when he was made Diftator, after the unfortunate Fight at the Tr^j}emi»e Lake, to lead that Army into Afrkt which was deftined for the fafcty of the very City of Rome^ it tnud have been expofed to apparent dangers of the Enemies vidorious Forces, with uncertain hope of fuccefs in Africa ; nor would this diverfion have been then peradventure a fufficient means to have freed it from danger, as it did afterwards when Scipio s counfel was followed in an opportune time, when after divers bad fucceffcs both in Spdin and Africa^ Hnnnibal was fent for back to afflifl the much weakned affairs of his Commonwealth.
He therefore who will go about to imitate the a(5lions of thefe two Captains, if he will reap good thereby, muft firft very well confidcr every particular of thofe things which he goes about, and therein accommodate himfelf, either by hazarding battel, and hafting on to the end of the enterprife with fudden and refolucc Parties, orelfemuft harafsand overcome the Enemy by drawing things out to a length, and by reducing him to many inconveniencics. He alfo who will advife wifely touching the affaulcing of another mans Country, to keep his own h:om danger, or who will the make good his own affairs only by way of defence, muft have divers refpcfts in confideracion, which lead to the kno wledg what in his cafe is fitteft to be done-, and by fo doing he may hope for the good fuccefs which thefe two famous Roman Commanders had. But howfoever, though their affairs fall out lefs pro- fperoufly, he will win the praife of being cither a wife and circumfpcift, or elfe a valiant and bold Commander -, as befell Scipio znd Fabius, becaufe each of them knew how to manage the War fo, as the condition of Times, the quality of their own and of their Enemies Forces, the divcrficy of the Place, and other refpeds and accidents, which in fuch cafes ought to regulate our adtions, did advile them to do.
F The
(3+) The Fifth discourse;
Whether War being to be made againjl the Kofnans^ Hannibals Counfd jvas good to carry it into Italy.
HArtnihal^ a cried up CarthaginUn Captain, intending to wage War with the Romdm^ refolved to lead the Army which he had already raifed in Sfaio into Italj by land , pafling firft over the Pfrenenit Mountains, ami then over the Alps, that he might approach as near as he could to the City of R^wr , the Seat of the Empire. This is thought by all men to be a bold and generous advice, but it is much doubrcd whether it were advantagious for the CirthtgintAns^ and for Humihals own de- figns. He thought, that being to quell the Konntn Power, he muft (hake it in thofe pares where it had taken dcepeft root : That the Remans would be furnifhed with Soldiers,Viduals, Moneys, and all things elfe from /^4/y,wherewirh they were wont to maintain War againft fcveral Nations, and to encreafs their own Glory and Empire : that whilfl they were Mafters of this, they could not be much prejudiced by any thing that could be attempted againft them in other parts : That ufually his advantage was vety great who aflaulted another at his own door, bccaufe he keeps the perils,and greateft lofTcs of War far from him.- He increafeth courage in his own men, and takes in from the Enemy, and makes the way more eafis to Viftory, not onely by F orces but by Reputation, and alfo by the fear which he infiifeth in- to the Enemy; but the farther off the War iscairicd, and the nearer the Enemy is affaulted in the Centre and very heart of his State, the more are fuch advantages got. If the R5W4;>/, who were alwaies wont tomolefl other mens Affairs, fhouli be forced to fight within their own Confines, and were to wage War, not to in- large their Dominions, but to defend themfelves and what they held deereff, they would prove lefs then themfelves, becaufe their courage would fail them, and the Iplendor of the R<?w4» name would be obfcured, which did fo much help to the atchicving of their Enterprifes.Thcrefore the RtfW4«j knowing by experience the difad vantage of making War at home, and open enmity being profefled between them and i'/&/7///> King of cJW^^^ow, fearing leafl the CArthnginUn War being ended, he would aflault //4/y, as //4«»i^4/ had done but a little before, would be the firrt who fhould pafs with their Army into Greece, and carry the greatefl trouble and danger of War into the States of others. But the longer and more dif- ficult the way was for H4»»/^4/ to conduct his CarthagifftAns Inio Italy, fo much greater Honor would he win when he (hould have overcome thefe difficulties : That without great conflancy and worth in the Commander and Soldiers, fo hard an Entcrprife could not have been undertaken , fuch craggy mountainous feats pafled^over\ and their way be made by the Sword amidfl an Enemies Country.
To this was added , that there were t«iny in Italy, who were not pleafcd with the R0W.1WJ Empire, bywhofe Coloniesfcntby them into other peoples Coun- tries, they were robbed not onely of their Goods but of their Liberty : That the fame given out that Hannihal would free thcfe from the V^eman flavery, and the whole world from the fear of their ambition and power, might alienate the minds of fuch as were Neighbors to the Row4»^, and reconcile them fo much the more to him. Hanmbul did likewife coniider, as he whofc intention it was not to make Inrodes into the Root4« Territories, to make a fore and long War with them, * that
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that there were m.iny in the C,trtfj4gini4n Senaewho were not well pleafcd with tliiscnrtiprife, fome being moved by refpeCl: of the contrary Fadlion, others by envy to his gUry, and others by zeal they bore to their Countries quiet. That it' hefliouldbe withhisArmy infome neighboring Country, and that the Romans fliould be but weakly invaded, and not foundly fee upon, it might in likelihood t.iil out he fliould be Cent for home, and Peace be concluded. He feared likevvife left his Army, which was compofed of divers Nations, when his Soldiers fliould find themfelves nejr tii:;r oun houfis, they might the more eafily disband. Be- ing therefore onely intent to come with his Forces into !t*ly, he would fliun all occafionsoftiyinghis men againft the Ri'wrfw/ in a pitch'd Field, when P»^/;/*f Scipio went to encounter him at the Banks of RhodanHs. Moreover it would not fitisfie the hi« hand m.ignaniaious end which he had prefixc unto himfeif, of freeing Carthage^bis Country, from the Tribute to the which flie was made lia- ble by the Remans, to moleft them in any part further from the State, but he muft marchagainft the very City oiRome, theSe.it of the Empire, to allay, or at leaft to weaken much their power. Other fmaller things might have given fome trouble to the Romsns^ and have retarded their greatnefs-, but in the fame dan- ger and uncertainty of War, whereby flie had provoked fo powerful an enemy a- gainfther, the reward, and the benefit were not equal in both the cafes. Very great and difficult undoubtedly was fuch an enterprife, but befitting Ha}iniha\ who, as it was faid, had through the magnanimity of his (pirit, propofed unto him- felfto imitate the deeds of Hercules, and had taken up arms againft the Romans^ not out of any hatred he bore them, but for the dignity of Empire. So as what: would have infufed fear into another , did (tt his mind the more on fire. He thought likcwife by force of necclTity to infufc into his Soldiers that ftrength and conftancy of mind,which was as an excellent vcrtue in himfelf,whilft fighting fliould be enforced, all occafion of flight being taken away, to put all their hopes of fafe- ty in their Swords. This mofl: expert Commander knew likewife wherein his I orcts did exceed, and therewithal he would make trial of their worth. Where* fcrepafTing with his Army fafe over the Mountains, he forcfaw he fliould find large Plains in Italy ^ wherein he might fight the Rom.tns upon great advan- tage, his Army abounding in Horfe, and thclnfantrybdng the /ftfwj;:xchiefefl: ftrength.
Then as thiscounfel K'as taken by Hannibal with rcafon, foif this adlion be particularly confidered , it may be faid, that he was very fuccefsful therein : foe the firfl time that he had to do with the Roman Armies in It^ly, though the Ar- mies of two Confuls were joyned together againflliim, that which wasfirftfenc againfl: him into Frince^ and that which v^as deflined to encounter him when he fliould have defcended the Mountain?, he cameofl With fuch vidrory as he put Rome into great terror, both for that the City was not wont before to hear fuch bad news from their Captains, as alfo for having fo powerful, and fo vidorious an enemy fo nigh r.t hand. But v;hat can be added to the vidories gotten at the Lake oiTbra- fymtridj and at Cannot , (places made famous for the calamities which the ilomsns fuffcred there ) to make his glory greater < and the good thereof was anfwcrable to the greatnefs , >or thofc of the Hmpire rebelling every where, and flying from the Romans diflrrefled fortune, x.o Hattntbals favor and obedience, he loon made himfelf Mailer of almoftall /r4/v, and put the very City oi'Rme to grcatdan- ge; and confufions. So as it was eitler his noble daring which begot liich profperous cfle(fi), or tlfe It was thereby accompanied.
Yet ti-.cre wanted not other rejfons, and refpeAs, which may make Hannihals adnce of 'ea.ing his Army into /f-«/y appear Icfs ufclul, andlefs prai'e-worthy 5 sod it mjy be faidjthat if he had p.iflej in;o Italj with almoft all the whole Cartha-
F 2 giniaa
(?6)
ginian Fo:ce<;, bringing along with liim Veteran Soldiers, and the greitcft ftnngth of the Caithapinian Empire, he ought to have confidered, that unc!e:t3king to rr.akcWaragainft the Ror»d»s, a warlike, powerful, and fortunate Nation, the C^^rthaginian State wns not likely to keep unrr.olefied by their Forces ; Reafon not permitting it to be believed, that they who formerly, not provoked by any injuries, but rather excited by a defire of Government, had happily waged war with the Commonwealth of Carthage, w ould now ftand only fpedtators ot their own mifery, and rcpulfers of oftence, but that they would rather endeavour to carry that fire which was kmdlcd in their own houfcs, either into ^/r/Vj or Spain^ to keep the Carthaginian Forces from fuccouring that part where their own danger was in- acafed. And fo did the effe(ft enfue^ for the Romans having firft alTaulted ^/'^w, and after y?/Wf4, and finding them both but badly provided of Garrifonsfitt-ng to withftand fo porcnt an Enemy, they reduced the firft under the obedience of their Commonwea'th, driving all the C4rr/7<j^/»;d«i from thence, and did put the other into fo great conlufion, as little more then the bare name of a Republick remained to the very City of Carthage. But how could Hanmbal hope to tarry long in Italy ^ and to be able to receive fuch fuccors and fupplies as he muft of neceifity fland in need oi< The way was (liut up by Land by the craggy mountains, and by the Enemy ^ and the Sea was lefs open to them, the Romans not being only maftcrs of the Sea, but of Navigation •, for their Fleet was greater then that of the Cartba- ginUns : whence it was, that the fuccor came neither time enough to Hanntbal for him to profecute his Viftorics ; neither when it was fent, could it come fafc to him, his brother o<^/^r«^4/, who conduded it, being cut in pieces, together with all his men by the Conful cUudiiu.
Out of thefe refpeftsitmay be thought, that it had been b:ttcr andfafer for Hannibal tohvit commenced the War againft the Romans \r\ ^ icily ox Sirdima, The pretence of taking up Arms againft the Romans, for the recovery of fuch things as were granted out of great ncceflity to them by his Commonwcalthj was more juft. Wherefore he might have bethought himfelf of not provoking the disfavor both of God and man againft him -, as it appeared on the contrary, that his breach of Articles, and his too bold defig n of driving the Romans out of Ital^ , their own proper feat and dominion, made all things prove crofs unto him. The bufinefs would likewife have proved more opportune and eafic, by reafcn of the ill fatif- feftion which the people of thofe Iflands received from the Romans power, which occafioned in them a great mind to rebel, as wasaherwards found. The Carthagi- nian Commonwealth was ftrong enough by Sea •, and though Fortune had not been propitious to them in tl cir Naval conflid with the Romans^ yet was their experience in Maritime affairs greater ^ and the City was then fo well provided of Shipping, as we read that they were above five hundred Ships which they were forced to burn by command from 5<://)/>, after H4»w^/i/; Rout m Africa, \i Ha»^ nibal would then have put his Army into thefe Bottoms, and have turned with powerful Forces upon Sicily and Sardinia., and being alfo afTifted w ith the Peoples inclination, he could not almoft have doubted to have reduced them in a fmall time under the Carthaginian power. And having won thefe Iflands, what way would he have made for the enterprife of Ital^ ? He might have made ufe of this fiiuation, and of his Fleet, to have kept the Sea open to himfelf, and block'dupto the Romans : whereas doing the contrary, it happened othcrwife •, for the Cartha- gin'an Fleet being very weak, the greater part whereof were imployed in other places, it was overcome by the Romans^ their Navigation and Succor was hindred, and finally all Hannibals dcfigns were fruftrated. But the advantage which Hanni- bal might have reaped by fuch an enterprife, and by the getting of Sictly., may eafily be known by what Scipo got, who being to pafs with his Army into /4/r;V4.putting
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in at Srcily^ he thereby got great afTiftance and accommodation. And the Cmhs- _^/«/j//^ themfcLvcs were aware, that the War ought to have been handled thus : For after the death of Htero^LoxA oiSjracufa, they fent their Fleet to regain Sicily, but the counlel was too late and unopportunely taken-, for Fortune beginning now again lofmilc upon the Romans, and the tntciprifc being undertaken with but weak Forcfs, they did Ltileelfc but raife Tumults, with more oflofs to thofe th.it had rebelled againft the itowj/;/, then any advantage to theCarthagimans. It feems Jikewife that Hinnibal, when he firft endeavoured to joyn in league with Philif King of Macedon^ whofe ftrength by Sea was very great, and his jealoufies of the i{«7W4»jlikewife verygrcar, asalfohisdefirc tofecure himfelf therefrom, had laid abetter foundation lor his defigns, and might have had better fuccefs irt hs en- deavours agaioft the Romans ^ which becaufeout of vainglorious ambition he would ccceleratc, he ovei threv" ihcm.
Let us then bound //rfw^/Wipraifes within ftraiter prtcincfts, though his fame found very glorioufly in the memory of ail Age?, for the greatnefs of his atcempis, and his fuccefs therein at firft-, fince that advantage ceafcth which might firft have counfclled him to the affairs of Italy .- And let us only fee whether he may have purchafed any true glory by his fo great daring, and by the rcadinefs wherewith he buckled to battel. He who will vvegh things with teafon and experience, will find that Wifdom ought to be of greater confideration in a worthy Commander, then force of Arms. Which maybe fecn in Hannibal-^ for the wifdom of j^itintttt ftbius did that againft him with fafcty, w-hich the War waged with much lofs, and more danger, by Flaminiuf and by Semfroniw^ and afterwards by Gaitis Terentiuf^ all of them Confuls, and Commanders of the Romnns Armies, could not do -, who raflily hazarding the doubtiul events of Battel, were overcome by Hannibal^ and brcught the affairs of if^w<r to almoft utter defpair. The praife then which is given to H^nmbd^ is great cagernefs of mind againft dangers : which though of it felf ic may make him worthy fomc admiration, yet fuch a vertue falseafily into vice, and inftcad of Boldnefs, may be termed Rafhnefs, Eut if we will confider HannibaU A<flions yet a little more narrowly, we fliall the better d.fcover, that Hannibal havng undertaken ths War unjuftly, and violated the Articles ma Je between the Carthaginians and the Romans^ he cannot defcrvc to be truly named valiant, the vcvtue of Valor not confifting in the maintaining of an unjuft Caufe. And if Han- niUl ought to glory of his liaving routed the Romans, his glory will prove the lefs, fincc the Captains whom he overcame were not fo much cryed up,and were of leffec experience and worth then many other Romans, who never had to do in any great: enterprifc -, and that it was not his own worth, and the worth of his Soldiers vvh.'ch msdewaytohisVi(5lories, more then did the ignorance, rafhnefs, and chiefly the difcord of the Roman Commanders -, to whom, through fome unlucky Star, it was the tr.isfor.unc of the Commonwealth at that time to commie the guidarce 2nd command of her Forces. But when he met with Fabius^ Marcelius, or Scipio, the face cfaffai:s altered. And yet Hanribal ought to have believed he fViould have met wiih thefe, or at leaft fuch as thefe, then with the others, cr iuch as them: For the Canhaginijjis had experienced much to their lo's, in the preceding War, what the wo. th of the Roman Commanders was. Hannibal might likewife have cor.{icic;cd, how hard it would be for him to vanquifh fo many Cities, fo many Roman Colonic-, defended by Citiiens who did partake of the Roman name and Vilor. But this was fecn a' tei wards by experience, when he firft began to under- take the taking in of Cities, and when cntring into r/w^r/4. and being incampti about SpoUtiim^ he fpent much time tixre to little purpofe-, end findiig how ftrong defence was made by a little Roman Colony, he fawhow vain his defigns wju'.d b: of dorm'ng the City of Reme.
Adi
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And though many of the chief Cities of Italy fell into his hands, this happen- ed through the icnovvn of Vidories which he had won •, which working upon many people who did accommodate themfdves to the Vigors fortune, they gave themfelvcs willingly over to the CarthagMans^znd rebelled againft the vanquifh- ed Romafis. But to beficge Cities required time, and tiirie afforded means to the Rovjans^ who were at their own homes, to recruit their Forces, and reduced Hannibal^ who was a ftranger, into many inconvcniencies and neccfTities. Info- much asitisail rmcdby Wi iters, that when K/i;j»//'4/ had the means of fighting afforded him (which he fo much dc fired, but had little leafon to hope for) by Terefjtim the Confuls rafimefs, who was afterwards routed and overcome •, his affairs were reduced to fo great and defperate ftraits, as manifefl figns of revolting over to the enemies Camp were difcovered, and in himfelf a mind to fave himfclf by flying away into s^frica by Sea.
But let us take the end of War into confideration^which we will be better able to judge by, then by its beginning: And though itis ufiially faid, that Event is the fools Schoolmafler, yet it often falls out, that things are known by the event, wh ch would never have been formerly thought upon; and the beft inffruftion is that which is learnt by experience. Hanmbal^ after having with various and uncertain fuccefs, but^ith very great and certain dangers, oftentimes tried the event of fun- dry Battels with the Romans, was conftramed, not fo much out of obedience to the Carthaginian Senate, as out of neceflity to forgo Italy^ and to lead the re- mzindcr of his Army , which was already very much leircncd, back into Africa^ to relieve the City of GArthage^ which was by Sciph reduced into great danger •, and with his like former boldnefs, though not with the like profperous fuccefs, come to a day of Battel with his enemy : Wherein his Army being overthrown, and with that Army, which was the flrength of the Empire, all hopes loft of ever being able to make head againft rhe Romans^ the War was finally ended upon new conditi- ons, snd by the agreement, but incffedl by the ultimate ruine of the Carthaginian Commonwealth: And together with the lofs of her Liberty, (he was bereft of all her maritime Forces ^ for amongft other grievous conditions, fhe was in joyned to burnallher Ships, whereof fhe had great ftore-, fodefirous were i\[t Romans to keep her from attempting any novelty.
But how can we pafs over thefc great a(flions,without refle<5ling upon the wonder- ful variation of humahc affairs, and without marvelling at the feveral fortunes of thefe two powerful Nations ? For the Carthagininrts having as Conquerors over- run all itaij^ and bereft the i?tfW4m of almoft all their Forces, when it feemedas if their Commonwealth, following this her miraculous profperity, was in a fliorc time to mount to a fuprcme greatnefs of Monarchy, they fell from thefe high hopes into the extreme of mifery, being bereft not only of the gallantry of Com- mand, but of Liberty. And on the other fide, the Rontatts, who having not ma- ny years before her Armies fo notably defeated by H^nmhal^ as they were glad to imploy all their care about the fafety of the very City of Rome^ did on fuch a fudden rife to fuch a height of reputation, and power , as driving the Carthaginians out of Sfaiti and having put the affairs of Africa into great confufton, they forced them to recieve their Laws from the Romans. This vi(5lory of the Rowans was that which opened them the way to that Monarchy, at which they afterwards did in a few years arrive-, for having quell'dthe Carthaginians^ and increafed their own Power by ihe ruine oF the Forces and Dominion of others, there was not any other Potentate who could Ion;; refift them. Other people fecmed not to be afhamcd to yeeld to tfem whoh'd conquered the Carthaginians ^ and made themfelves Matters of the. r Commonwealth. No truer, nor better reafon can be given for this indeed fo miraculous dive; fity of condition and fortune which befel thefe two great and
powerful
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powerfal Commonwealths, then the excellency of Military Diicipline, which was better ordered . and underftood by the Remans^ then by the C/trthaginians. For hence it rofe, that every Citizen being amongft the Kowant imployed in the Militia, they had greater ftore of Commanders and Soldiers. So as though they were oftentimes worfted by Hannibd^ they could notwithftanding foon muftcr o;her Armie<;, and get new Forces : Which the Carthaginians could not do; who having had a notable rout at Z^wi*, u ere totally opprcft, not being ever able to rally again, becaufe they had no other Soldiers nor Commanders under vvhofc condud they might hope for better cvcnts.But when the Kemans were over- come, they wanted not fahitts Maximus^ Marcellm, Claudius^ Scipie, and many o- ther?, who behaved tiemftlves more fort unately in that War,and did better fervice the Commonwealth-, and they could cafily fend Recruits unto their Armies, and fupply the places of fuch as were (lain in Battel, out of their own Citizens of Feme. Which wascaufcd by the committing of the Government of the War to their Confuls. which place of Magiftracy enduring but a year, occafion was offered to many other Citizens, to get experience in military affairs, and all others were fo obliged to the Militia, as after the Carthaginian War was ended, they who had not Terved in the Wars for the fpace of four years at the leaff, were by the Cenfors noted of Infamy, and blotted out of thepublick Mufter- books. But the C4r- thagima»s haviaQ through the power of the BarchinianFadion, transferred the Supreme Authorityof adminiflration of Arms, upon fome few Citizens, as it was formerly upon Hannibal^ the Father to this man, and after him upon this Han- Ttthal^ and his brother Aldruhai - when Afdrt^al was (lain in Italy , in the con- flid which he had with Claudim^ and when Hamibal the Son was abandoned by his former good Fortune, and by the reputation he had foimerly gotten ; and the Commonv>ealth being alfo wonted to make ufe of mercinary Souldiers^ the Army of antient Soldiers being loft in the Battel of Zar/ta^ they could nor reci uit it vrith their own Citizens, nor withftand the blow of fo dire a mifchancc. Thefe, and fuch like things may be argued, concerning this great adion of Ilamihls^ ,ind tbcfc important fuccefles of War-, but rather out of probabilities, thenan.y certain demonftration. Yet thefe very confiderations, mayferve for ufefuliuftrudions in hard and difficalt refolucions, to forcfee what end is likely to befall the under- taking of great Priijces.
The Sixth DISCOURSE,
Whether it was well done by tht Romans, ta carry the If ar a-
gdinft the Carthaginians, ttito Sicily and Spain, and into Macedonia and Greece, againft King Philip j whil^ Han- nibal waged War with them in Italy.
AS amongflall the Wars made by the R(JW4wx, none was more long or troublefom, then that which they made with the Carthagiwians, cfpecially when their Commander Hannibil did fioiirifli , lo from hence chiefly may noble matter of difcourfe, and ufeful Inftiudions for matters of State be gathered. Whilft Hannibal was in Italy, which was for the fpace of about Fourteen years, the Remans made War notwithftand.ng in other Countries -, as in Sicily^Spain and Africa againft the fame Carthaginians ; and againft Philip King of Macedon in Greece . But as War was made againft them
in"
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in Italy ^ fo were they the fii ft Authors of thcfe other Wars ; which affords occ.ifioil of no fmall wonder to him who confidcrs, and doth well weigh this their proceed- in*^. One would think, that the Romtns being fet upon at home by fo powerful Enemies,as it was apparent that their whole Forces were not able to refift.fliould not have refolved by dividing the iarac Forces to make their defence weaker-, fince the main of all their affairs depended upon the fuccefs of ther Arniies againft Hannihl, how can it be thought a good advice, to hazard with part of their Forces the whole Fortune of their Commonwealths A thing which when forced by neceflity, is thought a great misfortune to the State wherein it happens. And when Italy fliould be lofl, as it was in great danger to be whilft Hamihal vias there with a pu- ilTant Army, to what purpofe could any acquifition feivc which fhould be made in Spdin or elfwhere, which muft of necclTity fiiU of it felf ^ And with what courage could the RontATis fight in Forein parts, when their own Country was wafted with War, their houfes, wealth, and all that they had expofed to utmoft dangers So as whilft fighting againft Hannib*l , and all their minds being inflamed, not only out of a military obligation, and out of charity to their Country, but out of the natural and povrerful love which every man bears to his own affair.?, one man flood for many : So when abroad,tbe unquietnefsand doubt of mind keeping them afflifted and in jealoufie, by reafon of the dubious cafe wherein they left whatfoevcr was mofl dear unto ihem, would not permit many to ftand in fight for one. Who can praife the fuffcriog of danger to increafe at home, out of hopes of purchafing abroad •". Had the Romans Armies been in another Country, and imployed about other affairs, reafon would have advifed them to have fent for them back into Italy, when they faw fo powerful an Enemy upon their backs. For, Vis uniu fort tor. Force when united is ftronger, and better able to keep what is harmful afar ofT. Thus we fee it falls out by vertue of mother Nature^ in our bodies ; when the Heart is ill at eafe, all the fpirits of the body flock thither to defend it, as the moft noble part, and whereupon life it fclf depends .
Hannihd was a powerful Enemy, formidable for his excellent worth and mili- tary difcipline, and for the many Forces which he brought with him 5 and more- over Italy w as as it were unarmed at this time, and wanted her valianteft Command- ers, and beft Soldiers. What could the Carthaginians have more defircd for Han- nibals profpcrity, then to fee the two Scifiis^ Gntm and Vublitu^ on whom only the welfare of the Commonwealth, now fo much in danger, did reii, fent into parts afar off, fo as they could not, in her very greateft extremity, return to fuccor her ^ li Hannibal had had a mind to have left Italy, was not this parting of the Roman Porccs, and the want of their beft Commanders, a powerful reafon to make him flay s And what advice was it to provoke other Princes and People to enmity, as muft needs be done by fending Forces to moleft Spain, whilft the Commonwealth was in fuch trouble and danger, as fhe ought to have made friends on all fides S By which they incenfcdthat Nation, and drew other African Princes upon their backs, who were Friends and Confederates with the Carthaginians. And the in- creafing power of the Romans being formerly apprehended by other People and Piinccs, the condition of thofe times ftiould have rather advifed them to have cloaked fuch thoughts, and not to draw hatred and envy upon them : For every one muft needs hold, that if the Romans, being in fuch calamity and danger, would vex other Countries with war, no Province would have been free from their Forces when they fliould have been rid of Hannibal. Which made the Romans caufe vvorfc, i.ndHafjnihalsbener, with thofe in //rf/y, who did not much affedl the fo rcuch greatnefs of the Commonwealth j and much more with forein Nations. Wherefore the French, who firft oppofed Hamibal when he went into Italy, did for thefe rcfpefts favor his brother Afdrubal afterwards, when he paft with fuccor
through
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tlivuugh tbeirCounti'y; niy, many of them joined with his Camp, and followed the CaicluginianColois in Italy^ ro maintain the War with them. If the Romans did not know themfelvLS to be lufficiently able to withftand HannibA in Italy, where they had all conveniences, and he being a ftranger wanted all, and could only come by them by iorce •, what reafon couid perfwade them to maintain War in Sfain at the fame time 1 which War muft be as incommodious to them, as ic was advantageous and c nvenitnt for their Enemies •, both for that that Province was at their devotion, for thencernefs of the City of Ctirthage^ and for tr.e accom- nioJauon the Sci afToided them, in furnifhing them with all things necelTary to make War-, which certa nly may be done better and more commodioufly at home. Thus theCimbiians, after having given many defeats to the Romans in GallU, were by them overcome in Italy. War is likewife made at home with lefs danger, out of the cafinefi of^ recruiting an Army, when Battels prove unfortunate. Tiius the Ronans being oft-times worded by Hdnuibil^ did ma'ntain and raife up their ab- jedfoitunc; And the Venetians be ng afTaulted at their own homes by ihofe of Genoa., by reafon of the commodity they had of aflembling all their Forces togctI;er, did not only wi;hftanJ, bucdid overthrow the Aflailants, who were gotten even in- to their Waflies, and were fetled in the City of Chieggia.
But if wc will then confider the particular condition wherein the Romans were at that time, welliall find all their affairs in great difoirder, and fuch as did advife them rather to Itflen then to increafe new Expences, by undeitaKing new Wars. The publick Treafury was fufficicntly decreafcd by lofs of the ufual Rents of fo many places which //<««w;^4/ was pofleft of in Italy^ for that what they were ma- ' ftcrs of in SArdinia, was to ceafe paying ufual and great contributions ; for that the people uho were fubjedt to the Romans, were fo much wearied with continual V\ ais, as they u ere hardly able to maintain thofe few Soldiers which they had need of for their own defence, not in a cafe tofiirnifh other Armies with monies, as Writers affirm. Others add, that the affairs of the Romans were grown to fo great a (Irait, by maintaining fo many Armies fo long a time in feveral Countries, as that the Sapio's writing to the St nate, that they could no longer maintain their Soldiers who were grown needful of all things, the Commonwealth was fain to beg aid from ihofe who had gained much in former times by publick Impofitions, fo to provide outoF private purfes for the paying and vidualling of the Army : An example of much charity to their Country ,which was brought to Co great a necelfity -, but with - all of ill advice, and but little wifcbm in thofe who had brought it to that pafs. The Romans affairs were fo weakned inSpain^ as Gfieit^s Scipio^ contrary to the cuftom of the Romans, was forced to make ufe of many Soldie;sof that Nation to recruit his Army : which thiough the deceit of thofe Barbarians, was the caufc why he leceivcd a notable Defeat , wherein he himfelf likewife lofl his life.
It mi^ht at f^rft peradveniure be thought an ufeful advice to affault the Cartha- ginian States, fo to remove H^mmbal by diverfionfrom Italj. But fince cxpciience proved the contrary, how can the increafing of danger at home, to carry it abroad, bepraifed:' 'fwas already eight years that Gneu-s Scipie hid made War in ^/'4/;», and Marcellus had labored long with various fucceffcs in i'/V/'/y, when Hinnibd wasnotwithftanding (till fo powerful in Italj^ as marching withhis wl-.ole Army Irom ( apud^ he went to afliiuk the very City of Rome, w here all things were fuii of tumult and confulion : And had not the Romans had good fortune by the great ftoreof rain and water, which falling from thcskies, retarded the firft affault of Hannibdl., all the hopes of fo flouriifiing a Commonwealth had been difpi'Ch'd. Who then in fuch extremity of danger, in which with great uncertainty of fuccds the Walls and Gates of Rome herfelf were guarded, did not willi that M-trcellns^'
m Q ihe-
the two Scifio's, and the reft that were at war in Sicilj^ and in Sfain, had been there prefent, who if the City of Rome lliould be loft, muft be made a prey unto the enemy ? The very fame and honor of fuch a Vi(5lory being fuflicicnt to make all that the Romans in lb long procefs of time had taken from the Carthaginians, return to their former obedience.
On the other fide, if fo many Commanders and Roman Soldiers, wafted in wars fo far off,had been all joyned together in Italy^how con\dH4»ml>al havefo long withftood fo great a power ^ The firft onfet of the Carthaginian Army vv;!s great, when it advanced fo far, as the fortune of the Bermm began to give back, and the Romans to confefs themfeh es overcome,having had many great routs. But when Fortune began to face about, and the worth of the Carthaginian Soldiers began to flag, who were deboiihed with the delights of CafuA^ (which was the canfc why Hannihl tarried long in Italy without doing any thing of note^reafon telU us that if he had been aflailcd by fo many Roman Commanders and So\diers, he tnuft have been forced to have left Italy. And he being gone,and the danger removed to a fur- ther diftance from home, the -Rtfw^w^ having a valiant, and an expert Militia, and having won great reputation by this Vidory, the other enterprifes which they fhouldhave afterwards have undertaken either againft others, oragainft the Car- thagimans themfelves at their own homes, would have proved more eafie, and more certain : And experience proves dearly , that the Affairs of Italy would have given the Law to all other proceedings 5 and that upon thefuccefs thereof the whole War did depend -, for the Romans could never drive the Carthaginians totally out of Sfiin, till the rout given to K^fdrubal^ Brother to Hannibal^ by the Conful Claudiui^ by which the power and fortune of the Carthaginians growing left in Italy, they fared alike in ^^4/;).
But the War undertaken by the Romansy againft fhilip King of Macedon^ at the fame time when //4/^ was all on fire with the Carthaginian War, mayper- adventurebe thought a bufincfs of greater importance.ForP^////> was a great Prince- and might eafily have troubled the Romans affairs, by reafon of the neighborhood of Greece^ whofe people were his friends and confederates. And though fhilip had ftiewed himfelf not to be very well affedled to the Commonwealth of R(jwe,fince he had firft fent his AmbafTadors to Hannibal^ to treat of joyning with him in confede- racy againft the Romans,and had afterwards fct upon,and taken the C itiesof Afoh- «;tf ,and Or/Vo,that he might have, (as it was fufpcded) the better opportunity to of- fend the Romans i yet the prefent condition of Affairs feemed rather to advifc them, to diffemble their injuries and fufpitions, then by unimportunely reveng- ing the one and affertaining the other, put their affairs in greater danger, and make him a certain and open Enemy, who was as yet concealed and doubtful. And time might have opened the way u .to them to have made him their friend, and to have brought him into their parts •, which it was formerly known he had mind enough unto of himfelf 5 but being put in fear and jealoufie of his own affairs by Hanmbds fo great profperity, he was diverted from it. Andcounfels which bring certain mifchicfs with them, ought not to be undertaken out of hope of evading another evil which is further off, and uncertain, when he who ufeth it is in fo weak and dangerous a condition, as the addition of any new inconvenience how little fo- evcr, is fufficient to ruine him ; and this was the condition of the affairs of Kome at that time. Yet it maybe faid that the very Authority of the Romans name was a thing of great moment, and fo much the greater as the event approved of their counfel. For Hannibal could not have been drawn out of Jtali , bur by troubling the affairs of t^/w4, and by putting the Carthaginians into the fame hazard and dangcrs,as they had endeavored to put the Romans into.They confidcr- ed then, that Hamibal having fhewed fuch conftancy, and worch in leading fo nu*
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merousan Army, confifting of divers Nations into Italy^ and having found that Fortune ( according as is ufually faid j favoured his boldnefs, their chief hopes of cvtrcoming him lay in making him be his own ruine, and fuffcring bis Army to moulder away through hardftiips. And this manner of warfanng, ufed by Fa^^itts MJMimttshad fived and reftored the Commonwealth, which the different opini- on of other Commanders, byhnzardingthemfelves upon the forrune of a Battel, had almoft quite undone. Now to compafs this, it was nccelfary to keep the Car- thaginian Forces fo imployed abroad bydiverfion, as they could not relieve f/d« - rthlin Italy : For it fo, many of the Carthaginian /^rmies might have pafled fafcly imo Italy, as the Scipie's did defeat in Spain^ they would have fo overfto.vri /u/jf, as th;re could have been noefcape tor the atfa.rs of Kome. This very ad- vice was followed by the Venetians, when they had their Enemiesat their own own homes , and were in the fame danger and diforder by reafon of the roue given them by the Gentefes , as the City of Kerne was in , after the defeat ac Cdnnt. For they joyned in confederacy with Barnahy Vis Come , Duke of ijlli/la/j, and making a great Effort, fcnt many Soldiers againft the City of Ge. rca, and did fo molcft their affairs by Land, as they kept off thofe fuccours, which otherwife would have been fent to their men who had taken the City of Chi- f^^/4,who mifTing of fupplie5,and being fought withal, and befieged by the Venetian Forces, of Conquerors became conquered,and fell into the hands of the Venetians. Moreover the Romans confidercd, that in the Wars which they made in Sicilf and in Spain, they had this great advantage, that they fought not with Hamibd^ a Captain of fingular and unparalleld valor. It was likewile held, that the Roman Commanders and Armies, might more fecurely make trial of their worch and fortune, in Wars made out of /fa/v, as they had oftentimes done 5 for when they had any lofs abroad, they lofl nothing but thofe men which the fortune of War be: eft ihcmof-, but if they fhould overcome, they got the tnmies Country; juftas icbefcl them in Spain, therefore it being difadvantagious for them to fight mltalj^ it proved the better advice to temporize with Hannibal vnltaly^ and I't the (ame time to fight with cJW4«^o, Afdruhal, and other Carthaginian Commanders in Sictly, and in Spain. So as the loffes in Italy were recompeafei by acqu ficions made in Spain^ the which of all other Countries, was the frrft that was reduced into a Province, and did much inlarge the Confines of the Roman Empire. But if the Sea had been open for the Carthaginians, as it would have been it the Romans ncgledim? iheir Fleet had nor provided for the affairs of Sicily^ Han- n:bj might eafily have been furniflied with things neceflary from the Carthagini- ani, wherewi-.h to reinforce his Army , So as no part of Italy lliould have been free frotn his forces, who una.Tifted or fuccored , could notwithflanding keep his Army To long together , and attempt fo many enteiprifes -, they therefore thought t^ey had done enough, in entertaining A[drnbil, a Captain of great autho- lity ; nd valor, io as he could not ( as they knew his delign was ) pafs with a ne^ Army into /fjr/y, to joyn with Hannibal^ as he d;d after the Scipios6cii\ and after the rebellion of many of the Spinilh Cities, the Carthaginians bcng moved todothcir utm^ft, lince they had loff Syracufa and Capua which were both of t'-ein fain iato the [\omans power. So as no afliffance being <;i^en unto Hanni- bal, all t; e labor was loft which he had fo many years underi^one ii Italj. On the contrary, the Romans peifevcrin ^ n tfj ir fi ft opinion, when the two^c pie's xoere <^€CKi. fent Pntlim Scipie into Spun to keep Afdmbal from making his p^itage, "diverting the Forces whic'i were to pa's over with him into h^ly^ by keepin_» the Carthaginians molefteJ at home : It follows not therJore by a general rule, tiut what was good for one of the enemies, muft hi hurtful for^beotrer-, .foasit were good for the Carthaginians to wage W^r m /rj/^jtariroi-n then ov\n homes,this very
G 2 fame
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fame thing muftbe harmfal for ihe Romans. But fince they could not be the firft AfTaibnt, Haffm^al having fain upon them with fuch violence, it was rcafon, thac the Romans taking the fame courfe, fhould alTault the Caithaginians Territories. We read alfo, that ihe fame Hannibal, being ftill of the fame opinion which once he was, hcingwhh i^utifchm in the time of his Exile, whilft he was treating of making \v ar agiinft the Romans, he perfwaded him to pafs over as foon as he could, and withasgreatafirength as he could put together, into Italy -^ affirming that all othtr enterprifes would be to no purpofe, whilft Italy was at peace and quiet, and that the Romans had means to maintain War abroad.
This very fame thing, for the fame refpedsdiverflyconfidered, ought to have inftrudled the Roman Commanders and Senators in the Carthagini:n war ; to wit, that they were not to fuffer their Enemies to rcfl quiet at home, fo as (ree from all thoughts of defending themfelves, they might the better turn all their Forces upoa Italy, and the very City of Rome. And if ihey had taken that refolution at firft, which they did afterwards by the advice of Puhlius Scipis, (who from the conquer- ing oi Africa, took thcnimeof African) towage War with the Canhaginians neereriheir own home, they might peradventure have freed //^/y fooner from the fo many troubles and dangers which (lie underwent by Hannihals long abode. Euc it may be moreover faid, that many other things did force, or at leaft pcrfwade the Romans to undertake thefe Wars. Sardinia was firft affaultcd by the Cartha- ginians with thofe very Forces which were deftined for Half to relieve Hannibal^ fo as it behoved the Romans to march with their Armies thither, not only to main- tain and defend thatlfland, which was of fuch importance to the Commonwealth, but for that they therein defended the welfare of Italy^ by keeping fo many Warri- trs afar off. who if they were free, were ready to affault her. And this advice proved very fortunate •, for ^intus Fabins gave fo notable a Rout to the Carthaginians in Sardinia^ as they loft about Forty thoufand of their Soldiers. The death of Hiero the Tyrant of S^raeufa^ cccafioned the War made in J/V//jf, and the great com- motions of that Ifland, by which it was comprehended, that if thefe their defigns had not been hindred by the Romans, that great and famous City would have fain into the power of the Carthaginians, to the great prejudice of the Romans, who for the fame reafon (being alTifted by the Mamertines) undertook the firft Carthaginian War-, ju.^gingthat if the Canhaginians (houldbeabfoluteMafteisof5/V;77,icwouId, be a ftep to pafs into Italy. But this would have been the more incommodious ac this time, for that by reafon of the fo many places which Hannibal had taken in Italy^ they might have had a more eafie and fecure receptacle there. Moreover, the Romans were invited to make War with the Carthaginians in Spaiji^ and to divert; their Forces, by reafon that they underftood how that Province was but ill fatisfied with the Carthaginian government, and that it was well inclined to the Romans; which did much facilitate thofe enterprifes which were boldly undertaken, and tor- turately atchieved. The City oiSaguntHm was alfo the firft rife of thefe Wars in Spain • which they thought it did not become the generofity of Rome to leave in the power of the Canhaginians-, fo as upon any other good fuccefs, they might fcem to have loft the chief caufe in this conteft : Neither did they notwithftanding take 54^//«/«OT till after eight years War in y/>4/», when the other affairs of Reme began to profper very much ; as if the City which was the beginning of fo many Wars, had been referved to be the end thereof.
Thefe and other fuch like rcafonsmay be alleadgedfor the War undettaken a- gainft the Carthaginians ; but that w hich ihey made againft Philtp may be faid to be ci\iki\ rather by necelTuy then choice : For Philips for his part, being already refolved to follow Haanibals fortune, and expeding large recompence, had fent his AmbalTadors feveral times formerly to him, to concl^ude a confcderacic with him :
where-
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wherefore the Romans thinking it better to prevent the Eriemy, then to be by ihem prtvtnted, fell fuddenly upon him with their who'e Fleet and Army, hopins^ to fupprcfs h:ni, though they did not wholly cfFed their defign. But they continued their War againft him afterwards in Greece, incited by the commotions aheady raifed in that Province by the Italians ; knowing that unlefs they fliould interpofc themfelvts, Greece vmii either fall into Fhilifs hands, whereby the power of a People that were Enemies to the Romans, and already very formidable of them- felves, would be greatly increafed •, or elfe they muft have recourfe to the alTiftance of King y^/M/«<, as the Grecians had already protefted to the Romans, and fo they muft fuffcr the neighborhood of another King , who was already powerful in Jfta^ and might at another time trouble the affairs of Rome. And the wifdom of the Romans was aUvaj s fuch, as not being caft dov\n by any adverfity, they never feeined fo much to apprehend prefent dangers, but that they had an eye to thofe which might enfue, and in time grow greater. And this pei^dventure was that which did prove the Romans power and worth more then any thing elfe ; fince, when as they were as yet but mafters of a fmall State, and that their affairs were re- duced into great difficuliies, both by their fo many bad fuccefTes in battel againft Hanntbil^ and by the tilings of their Fr.ends and Confederates, yet they refolved to maintain War at one and the fame time in four feveral Countries, to wit, in Jtdly, Sicily ^Spaift^md Greece-^ and they were able to manage them all. And certainly fuch advice was no lefs ufdul then generous : For he who fhould overcome the Romans in any one place, could not hope quire to fubdue them, fince they hid other Armies and valiant Commanders who might make good their fortune, and raife it up again.
So as things formerly allcadged for arguments to afperfe this their refolution, may peradventure be allowed of in fuch States, and amongft fuch Princes, wher^ there is not that worth, difcipline, or power as was amongft the Romans-, buc in them, or fuch as they, they are of no force-, and very Experience, bytheiffueof thefc Wars, fecms to confirm and approve of the Counfels by which they were undcr.aken.
The Seventh DISCOURSE,
Whether the dej\ruSiton o^ Carthage was the rife ef the rmne ef the lloinan Kepnbltcl^
C> Arth'tge^ a glorious and famous City, both for the command fhe had in Ajrica and S^ain. and for being long Rival in glory with the Common- wealth o^Eome, being at laft to yield either to the great worth or happy Vgcniusof tl e Romans, was not notwithftanding made tributary to Rome, but was burnt and deftroyed even to the ground. The Carthaginians were oft times overcome in battel by the Romans, and had fevcrc Laws impofcd upon them-, yet nere thofe undaunted fierce minds never well quell'd, but be- ginning to heighten their hopes and augment their Forces, after the fccond Cartha- ginian war, they moleftcd thofe that were friends to the Romans, and contrary to their Articles, began to fail upon tfeSei with Menof v\ ar. Thefe things being therefore treated of in the Senate of Reme^ caufed variety of opinions : Some were for the total ruinin^^ of the City of Carthage^ linccotherwife the Commonweakli of Rome could not be free from thex in;uries and molcifations :, and Cdto was very ftiffot this opinionjwho bringing fome frefh Figs which were gathered in Carthage^
Q^.ewed
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(hewed what dangers they were always fubjcd ur.to byreafon of thtir Enemies neigborhood.
Bu: others endeavoring ihe contrary, fought to prove, that totally to cxtinguifh the Catthaginians was no good advice ^ and Scipio NaJ ica^ a man of great au- thority, was greatly avcrfc to this rcfolution, being thereunto moved (ashcfaid) not through any pitty to the conquered enemy, but for the advantage of h s own Citizens, who when t!,ey fliould be free from the fear of the Carthaginian Forces, would fuffer many evils through Idlenefs. So as itvvas the common r:iyin», and opinion, that the deftruiftion of the Carthaginians would haften on the ruineof Jtcme. And Salufi in the beginning of his Hiftory of Catilines Confpiracy, de- fcribingthe abufive cuftomsot the City of Rome at that t me, feems to be of opinion, that the overthrow of Carthage did more harm to the Commonwealth, by introducing idlenefs and pleafure, then the keeping of her flourifliing and in arms, would have done. Yet there were other confiderations which did thwart this opinion, {hewing that it was not peace and idlenefs, but the continually being verft in Arms and War, which was the true caufe of the Civil difccrds, and change of Government in iJowf. This it was which fomented ambition iniheCiiizens, this it was that did too immenfely increafc iheir power. Finally, it was this that di- vided the City, and through difcord brought it to utter ruine. And Ik)W can it be faid that the City of Rsme was rained by Peace, fince (he never tafted thereof :f Infomuch as for the fpaCcof Six hundred eighty five years, that famous Temple dedicated to ^anm by NamA Pemfilliut^ that it might ftand open in tim.e of W?.r, and (hut in time of Peace, was onely twice feen to be (liut ^ once in the Confulfhip of Titus CHanltHs^ after the end of the firft Carchaginian War, and once more in jittguflns \\\s, time, after the Naval \i\t\ox^ ovtx Mark Anthovy. Thus were the Rom3ns,and chiefly the moft valiant amongfl them, great enemies to Peace •, not fo much endeavoring to procure greater ftrength to the Publick Empire,as to encreafc their own glory and power. Therefore one War was made to beget aoother,no time being ever to be found wherein the City was to enjoy honeft and civil leafure. And Provinces, and the authority of adminiftring War, was oft times confirmed to thofc who commanded their Armies, who cither dcfiied to continue in their com- mand, or occafion requiring it to be lb, that they might put an end to the Wars De- gun : As it fell out in the fecond Carchaginian War • where the tims of tarrying in that Province, and the continuing of his command was prolonged totheConful Scifie^ who waged War in 5/>4//?, to the end that he might fiuilh what he had begun.
The like was done to Fabius in the Wars which he made againft Hannibal in Itdy^ and upon other occa(ions •, a thing which being done contrary to the rule of Law, though it made fomewhat for the Publick advantage at the prefmt, yet was ic caufe of great difordcrs afterwards. Thus Marius whilft he was abroad in the Juourthan War, was created Conful , and made chief Commander againft the Cimbriam^ though he ought not in his abfcnce, and in time of contumacy, to have been chofen to that Magiftracy. C.<(ar^ after having commanded the Roman Armies five years, when he was fent to wage War in France^ had his place of command continued unt^3 him for five years longer ^ and not herewithal content, but being accuftomedtorulc, he asked leave of the Senate to keep abroad, and to continue in the Army-, which when the Senate would not give way unto, they too late op- pofed his defire, he being grown fo powerful , by reafon of his continuation in mili-ary command, as he valued not the Senates Authority, nor tl^e being decla- red an enemy to the Commonwealth. But if we will confider the beginning of Civil Difcords, how, and where the (iding beoan, which iiifeded the minds of the Citizens with peftiferous corruption, we (hall find that this happened not in time
of
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of Peace in Cities, or by reafoii of Civil Affairs-, but in the Camp amongft Weapons, and when the Commonwealth was buficd in weighty War>. For ^4- jwbeing I runk\vith the dcfire of mil tary glory, and not being able to endure that it fliould be taken from him, or dimini(hedby ^■y//-', as he imagined ic might haopenby rcafonof ^jZ/jj happy fuccefsin the Jngurihan War, w herein hav n^ taken ^«^«r/^.i alive, he had the glory to have put an end to that War-, He be- gan to think of eflabl.fliins^ yet more grcatnefs inhimfelf, by making many of the Ordcrof Cavaliers, an j of the people partial to him, and impudenrly corrupting the Citizens, firft with moneys, and afterwards with open force of Arms -, making the Magiftracy and command of the war be conferred and refolved upon in him, as he did in the Confullhip, and Proconfulfhipagainft Mithridates. The Nobili'.y be- nig afrighted at this mans greatntfii, by reafon cf his authority and reputation with the Soldiers, they mightily cncreafed ^^i^^V power, who was an enemy to />idr/«y, tsilat laft they came to taking up Arms and llirddingof civil blood. But who knows not that Cxjar , moved thereunto more out of a dcfire of his owngreatnefs, then ou: of his alliance with A/ iirw, raifed and maintained his Tadion in Rome- ?ud that his power encreafcd not in Peace, and in the Market-place, but in War, and i-i the Camp •: So for the fame reafon for which SjlU was advanced 3 little before, i: behoved the Senate to confer more grca-nefs upon Pompey then became the condi- tion of civil Government ^ fo as the whole City was divided •, and with thofe armt, by which, though taken up, and made ufe of againft enemies, the firft occafion of contention among private Citizens was given, the very Commonwealth muft be wounded, which flood in the midft between them-, foas her vitil fpirit of liberty being taken away, her throat was cut by thofe whom flie had mofl favoured. But whence did the fo many ocher corruptions of thofe times arife,fave from the fo many profperous fuccefTes of war, by which the Citizens being much enriched and made p'.oud, could not betake themfelves to live parcimonioufly,and with civil equality? And ic is faid of Cdftr^ that he corrupted the people of Reme by moneys which he had got in the War, Co to make them confer places of Magiftracy as he lifted, upon fuchaswcreh^s friends, and partial to him. Out of thefe rerpe(fts the wife Legif- htor, iiifwr^rt/, intending to lay the foundation of a long lalting Government in t>ptrtd^ though he introduced Military cxercifcs , to the end that the Citizens m ght be able to defend their Country 5 yet he ordered the City fo, as it could not much increafe its power by any Forgein War. But the Commonwealth of Rome not being ordered for peace^ could never find out, nor enjoy a peaceful condi- tion.
Mow isit then given out, that peace and idleaefswasthcruinecf that City ? Ho>vfliouidihebelecve that her Arms Hiould remain idle, if (he would have the whole v.orld for her enemy, as Maritts faid to Mithridates -, that who would not re*^ cieveLaw from the Romans, muft make thettifelves more powerful then they f So as the counfel which Scifio gave to his Romans of not utterly deftroying Cartka^e, might be good in another relpcd, for the prcGrvation thereof might tncreafctht glory to their Common'.vca'th, which many of her valiant CiciztRS ictmed greatly defirous of, to w:t, tohave eafily pardoned theirenemies, when teylWuld have humbled themfelves ; as the C4r//>4^/«/j«j had th.ndonc, have- in_; not onely with great humility begged peace of the Senate by their Ambaffa- uois, bur given many of th^ir chief Citizens for hoftages to Scifio, and great ftore (t Arms, to fccure the Romans that they would keep their Articles. And truly the deft ruiflion of th.it noble City, did differ from the ufual generofityof the Romans, who had wont, after Vitffory, to grant the Cities and Kingdoms to tho'.c very enemies with whom they had fought, making both King and People in all p.-irts or Tribu.ory, or Confederate to the Senate and People or Romi. i3ut I
fee
(48)
fee noreafon at all why tbcy fliould forbear the rooting out of chcfe the Romans anticnt enemies, for fear left they fliould be undone with idlencfs, and that civil dif- cords fliould thereupon enfue. How many years were there between the fecond and third Carthaginian ware and yet when was the Commonwealth of -K*w»f free from Forei"n w.ir, though thefe her Enemies did not appear lo be fo -f The lafl: Canha- glnian war being hardly ended.did not they wage war in Spmn wiih the Num^ntincs for the fpace of fourteen years -f And yet in thcfc times the bounds of the Roman Empire may be faid to h.we been very narrow, in lefpecl of what they \\ ere after- wards. France^ which then was Miftrefs of more Provinces then nowflieis, was not as yet fubdurd •, nay, die difficulty and length of that War btingin^ along with it the prorogation of Command, fince CxfAr commanded the Armies for ten years together, did much increafe thofe diforders which did at lafl prove the ruine of the Commonwealth. But how much did Pompey enlarge the bounds of the Ro.nan Empire in Jfia ? over how many conquered Kings and Provinces did he triumph f Armenia, Cufpddocut^ Med a^ Iberia^ Syria, Arabi*^ Ph^nicia, and other Nations were reduced under the Romans power by this fole Commander. It wiIl feem ftrange, and yet it is related by authcntical Writers, that nine hundred Cities were made fubje<a and tributary to the Roman Empire by Pompey, and almofl: as many more by C^efar .- And he who will confider it well, (hall find that the Roman Commanders did flourifli mofl, and were mofl crycd up, after the dcff rudion of Carthage. Rome wanted then neither means nor will to cxcrcifc her Arms : not to mention fo many Wars, which were all of them famous, if not for the grcatncfs of acqufition, at leaft for other weighty accidents -, and if not for their ftrengih, ycc for the wifdom of the Enemy : That of Tigranes^ Mtthridates^ ^'^g'trth^ and fo many others,where the then almofl lofl name of the Carthaginians did not concur. But if it had proved true, that the Commonwealth of Home, when Carthage fliould be deftroyed, fliould have remained in idlenefs, fo harmful to her liberty, if ^ r;/)/Vj counfel had proved fuccefsful, and thofe evils had been taken away which he feared would befall the Commonwealth, Carthage was not only not to have been undone, but her power fliould have been fuffered to increafe ; for it is ken by what hith been faid, that War of it felf was not able to keep the Citizens united, but was rather that which did divide them. But this peradventure might have been done by War wherein their own defence had been onlyconceined, and the keep- ing of themfelvcs from danger : And yet it is an abfurd thing to fay, that an Enemy muft be prcferved, and men mufl be continually in trouble and danger of War, for the confetvation of a City. But fay, I befeech you, was th.re not forty three years between the fitft and fecond Carthaginian war ^ And yet though Rome \vis{:ee from dangers, and from being troubled by the Carthaginians, nay, forfome years every where more quiet then flie ever was at any other time, yet fell flie not upon thofe great mifchiefs of Civil contentions, which flic afterwards incurr'd in the great- eft heat of her forefl: Wars. This was occafioned, becaufe the City was not as yet corrupted, as it was afterwards, becaufe it grew old, and becaufe there was not any that knew by correfting her diforders to return her to her firfl: principles. What danger can enfue unto, or can harm the common liberty or authority of Citizens either in War or in Peace, whilfl the Laws areobfervede And when the Laws are trampled under foot, what State can be free from the fnares of the Enemy ^ The Spaitan Kings had not fupreme authority in War -, hue War be.ng governed by good Laws. could never injure them. Power intrutled in Citizens wi;h due meafurc and temper, was never prejudicial: And behold an example thereof. On the one Me^AgeJiUiis King of Sparta^ being Commander in chief of the Army againft Far- Kxhafus^ and being entred Afia with great hopes of fignal vi^ffories ^ when he was called home by the Magiflracie of the Fphori, readily obeyed. On the o her fide,
C'ifar^
(49)
Cdfar, being already returned into Italy from the French cnterprife, will, contrary to the will of the Senate, keep the Army together, and dcfpifcth the authority thereof. C^r^Vcounfelofdeftroying Crfr/>&i^tf might then have proved good, not of it felf, but when the Romans, being fafe for thefe Enemies, and fetled in a con- dition of not being to fear any Forein forces, Could have ordered unto themfelves j firm and quiet Civil State.
It was known by experience, that the other agreement made with theCaitha- ginians had done but little good : For they keeping ftiU the fame mind, though not the fame fortune, did not let flip any occafion of throwing off the yoke of (lavery which the Romans had put upon them. So as the only means to reft fccure from their Forces, fince their words were not to be truftcd, was to put them out of their antient neft, and to make thtm live far from the Sea, as they were commanded to do after that their Country was deftroyed, fo to bereave them of the opportunity of the Sea, by means whereof that Commonwealth was grown great and powerful. But wherein was the quiet of Rome bettered by the xnlne oi Carthage , if they would hive to do with more barbarous Nations,and Nations fiirther off, not moved thereunto through fear,nor provoked by any injury, thinking thti' Empic was only to be bounded by the Confines of the Earth 1 What had the Parthuns of common with the Commonwealth o^ Rome ? what injury had they then done her, to make the Romans take up arms againft them •: yet Crajfus had a mind to find them out in thofe far diftant parts, whereby to draw upon himfelf and the Roman Armies fo many great lofTes and ruines as they were to undergo in that War. The overthrow of Crfr//&<»^ffliouldperadvcnture have taken from the Citizens of /J^wf their defire of continual warfaring, as it took from them the occafion of being in Arms •, but ic didnotfoj for the caufe which produced andnourifh'd thefe ihoughts,was internal, not external. So as they were not provoked to Arms, but did rather provoke others •, and when they fought not for the welfare, they fought for the glory of the Empire : For all the Orders of that City confifted only in the excrcife of the Mi- litia. But how could a City be long prcfer??ed, which was wholly bent upon thofe things which were the means to brmg her to her end i how could Ihe enjoy true civil felicity, ifftie knew not what it was, and did not value it, but did abhor that peace and qu;et wh ch begets civil felicity ^
Therefore if that Commonwealth had been well inftitutedin civil Orders, and that w hen Carthage was deftroyed, flie had known ( which (lie did not ) how to lay down Arms, this had been the way to bring her to much good, nay, to tf.e true and chief good ofcivil felicity,not to the ruine and perdition thereof. So as if Scipio doubted that the introducing of Idlenefs into Rome might bring with it fuch notab!e difadvantage, it was perhaps, becaule knowing the imperfed ons of that Govern- ment, he feared not that Idlenefs which the laying down of Arms is wont to pro- duce, but th It which is born, and doth increafe with the corrupt cuftoms of Cities, by v-hich contrary, but wholly peftiferous tffefts are begot en ; as the making of fome Citizens love pleafures, and hate labor and toil •, and others ftrangely proud, loTcrs of brawls and novelty. The (_^^6f«/<t;oj endeavoring to banilhthis fort of Idlenefs from out their City, committed the care thereof to the chief and moft fe- vtre Magiflrate, called ^reopagtis. But that true and vertuous Quiet wh'ch is op- pofed unto Toil, and which as a thing to be defired ought to be fought for in a City, doth not banilh, but doth nourilh truegencrofitv of mind, which makes men willing- ly enter,whfn need requires, into the dangers of War, for honcfty fake, and for the dtftnce of their Country, not out o* ambition and dcfire of fclf-greatncfs : And to free the City from the fear of her powerful and bitter enemies, the Caithaginians, was not contrary to this. So as I mayconcluJe, That it was not the dcftruiftion of Carihage, but the ill Government of Rome^ which wrought her mine.
H Th?
The Eighth DISCOiyiRSE,
Why Rome could ttot regain her Liberty after the death of Juli- us Cxfar, as fht hadfermerly done^ by driving the Tarquins prfi cHt, and then Appius Claudius and the other Deccin- viri.
'«^ jmr Any do not without reafon wonder, why the City oiRome^ which n^ /■ after having droven the Tarquins out, who had reigned for above I ^ / ■ Two hundred and forty years : And which having afterwards made I Y ■ jt^flusCiAuditts, and the other Decemviri h.y down their Magi- ^ -^ftracy, who ufurped Tyranny, could put her felf into a free con- dition •, why I fay fhe could not do the like when Brutus^ and Cafsius had (lain ^**- lius Cdfar : when it appears they ought rather to have done fo now 5 the people being more numerous and powerful, andtheCityinfuchgreatnefs, as the libef ty, nay rather power which the people had in ordering that Commonwealth, ought to have been more eftcemed and held dear. To this may be added, that in the time of King? the very name of .Liberty was not well known, much Icfs was the good thereof injoyed 5 Wherefore a good which they had not known ought to have been of lefs power with them : And in the Government of Kings the City had been fofuccefsful, as it feemed (he might run a hazard by chufing a new form of Government, which (he had not formerly experienced. And in the time of the Htctmviri the affairs oi Etmt were alfo in a very weak condition -, nor ought the Liberty, or command of that City be reputed a thing of fuch moment as it became afterwards by the wonderful felicity by which (he marched to the height of all Glory and Greatnefs. Befides, the Government of Ten, retained a certain (hew of a Commonwealth •, and many being therein intereffed , (he feemed to have thereby alfo abetter ground for her fubfiftance? Whereas in C;«/i«r/ time, he having reduced the main of all affairs into himfelf, and begun to accept of the Title and Honors of a King, all Form of a Commonwealth and of Liberty was loft •, and he having maintained himfelf in that degree onely by his own Greatnefs, and [n a City fo full of Nobility at that time, andof fo many generoufly minded men his Principality muft of neccffity be the weaker, and eafilier to be eradicated; v^'hic'h when it (houldfall, it feemed that the former Government of Common- wealth muft of it fclf rife up again. Thefe and other fuch like rcafons, afford oc- cafion of feeking into the caufe why contrary effefts were feen to enfuc.
We will herein confider fii ft, what the cuftoms of the City of Rome were in tach of thefe times-, and what effects were prevalent in the peoples minds, men not being accuftomed toimbrace fuch things as are truly ufeful, but often fuch as by the predominate affcdion are held to be fo. Whilft the City was in an humble cond.t.on, and that her Citizens were not begun to be corrupted by an immode- rate ambition of Governing, there wasnofiding nor partaking ftudied amongft ihcm, which crept on bv little and little, and did fo contaminate all orders, as it reduced the Commonwealth to fuch wcaknefs, as wanting ftrength to rule her felf, (he muft fall, and being once down could not rife up again. This corruption began amongft the Soldiers, in whom the Commanders did permit fuch unbridled li. centioufnefs, to the end that they might difpofeof them as they lifted to opprefs iheir particular enemies, and fometimes againft the very Commonwealth : As Sylld, did to leffen u^Arim his power, and iMmus no Icfs to counterpoize SjUa by
the
th: fame means, things growing Into fuch diforder, as he n\ade the fervanis of ihe Commonwealth to take up arms againft his enemies the SylUmtxs • and this au- thority did fo continue in great Citizens, and in the Commanders of Armies, as it Teemed a wonder, that Pempey the Great, who had exceeded all others m Glo- ry and Power, after his return into /,m/)|, having profperoufly ended his enter- prife againft Mithridates^ fliould be content to quit the Army, when every one feared char he would enter Rotae therewithal, and do even then with Rgmeas C^far did not long after, alTume unto himfelf the chief Government of all publick affair*: So great was the diforder, and fo little was the Authority either of Laws or Se- nate efteemed. But his Defign, who plotted tyranny in the facceeding time, pro- fpercdthc better, for that this corruption which wasfirft entrcdinto the Soldiers, was paft into the Nobility, and fprcad every day abroad amongft the people: For thofe who had been Generals of the great Enterprifes of War, being grown ex- ceeding rich, did feveral waies purchafe the popular votes, turning and winding ihem as they liked beft, to the end that the places of Magiflracy might be conferred on them, or upon their Friends and Adherents. Neither was the very Senate free from this contagion, but being long before accuftomed not to be at their own command, but to depend upon the power of thofc who were of fupreme Authority in the Armies, they fell headlong into the fame errors (joto which the people were fain, manifeftly adhering by way of Fa(5tion, not by any civil favor , to parti- cular Citizens who headed parties, and the autho.s of novelties -, which was at firft done with fome appearance of honefty, to maintain the Commonwealth, and to defend Liberty againft thofe who had been too immoderately exalted by the peoples favour, to the injury of oiher more deferving Citizen*;, and to the preji:- d ice of Liberty. But in the procefs of tim: and afftirs, thofe who had taken up Arms in behalf of the Commonwealth, proved no lefs burthenfom, much power thereby encreafing in one particular perfon , then thofe themfelves againft whom At ms were taksn up. For an immoderate defire of encreafing in pov^ er and wealth, began to poHefs the fouls of many who were already accuftomed to rulelonoer, and with greater authority,then was fitting to be done in a Civil Government. So as all things were put into great confufion-,and now,not thofe who were worthy and va, liant,but thrsfc who were moft bold,& infolent found places of greateft ^honor in the Commonweal, h Hence it was, that it being obferved that thofe who had adhered to i'jf^j' J party ( when his Adverfary being overcome, he was become almoft the folc Arbitrator of all things)had often gotten great riches, and preferments in reward of their wicked ad bns,the wealth of thofe who were profcribed by ^^^j being given to thcfe,and fuch being eafily profcribed at his Favorites pleafure,vvhom they would rcb of cl eir Palaces or of what they valued moft : Many allured by hope of getting better things, and more eafily then they could have done in a well-governed Com- mons ealth, loved confufion, and favoured the Government of one alone, thinking that they might obtain Honors, and many other favors,which are ufuallybeftowed freely upon fuch as are partial to them, by thofe' who will preferve themfelves in height c f Power.
Hence then it arofe thOit Brutus andCsfsius^ the murderer s of C<f/4r, '.^-ere not fo backe.l, nor met not with that general approbation from the City, to uphold t'^eirfjft, and the common Liberty, as ^»nius Brutus and r/>^i«'*i did, when they raiiedjthe people to free themfelves from the Tyranny of the Tarquim^ and of thi; Decemviri: Thelaiter had recoiirfe unto the Camp, and kindled a fervent dcflre in ihc Soldiers to vindicate the injuries , and infolencies ufed by the Tarqitins sndby Affim: But whit favour could Brutus and Cafsius exped from the Sol- dier?, themfelves being contaminated, and more defirous to preferve the chief command in one onely perfon, that they might keep the power in themfelves, then
Hz to
to remit the Commonwealth into Libercy, whereby their uncuib'd licentioufnefs was to be corrcfled <! Therefore as foon as O^avi/n^ the adapted fon of Julius ^ r.nd who afterwards took upon him ihe name oi O^iavitts CdfAr, and oi Augujttu, returned after C^/<irV death into Italf^ hewasfieely accepted by the Aimy, he being well beloved by the Soldiery, ouc ot memory to ^ulitts dcfar^ and out of hopes that if he fliould fucceed him in power, they might ftiare in the fame favors and privilcdges. But Brutus and Cafsitts were compell'd to gather together fufh- cicnt Forces to defend themfclves, to have recouife for help to Fore n Princes, and with their Soldiers to fill thofe Armies, which were to defend the Liberty of Rome. So much were the Cuftoms of the City altered in thofe times, and thofe generous Roman fpirits cxtinguiQied, who for a long time had loved the name of Liberty more then any other thing, and then any other Nation. And though the fad committed by C*[ars MurthererS was approved of by the Senate, yet there were many chief men, and of great authority, who being Ctf/4rj friends, and de- pending upon him, did muchdeieftit; amongft whom were CMArftts Aatemu^^ and Lepidus, Cxfars intimate friends, whodidopenly and powerfully maintain, that Br.itm and C*fsius were to be purfued by the publck Arms, as Enemies to the Commonwealth, and that Cafttrs death (hould be revenged.
This diverfity of inclidhion in the People, and in the Senate towards the former and tbcfe latter Vindicates of the Liberty oi Borne, to boot with the diverfity of Cuftoiis by which the City was fvvaycd at thefe feveral times, were much fur- thered by the differing conditions of the pcrfons intercfTed : For the name of the Tar(]nhts was become hateful to all the common people of Rome, not only becaufc they kept them always buficd in laboring their own grounds, but becaufe they were become hateful to all people by reafon of their haughty carriage 5 fo as they had no Fautorswho did defire or endeavour their return to Rome, but fome few young Noblemen who were well plcafcd with that former Government, by reafon of their intimacie with the Kings fons, which fccured their infokncies. But thefe were not of th'.mfclves of Tany authority to diflurU the peace and common liberty •, and thofe in whom the publick authority did refide, were fo well difpofcd towards the good of their Country, and fo uncontaminable by any other afFe(5tion, as Brutus condem- ned two of his fons to fufFtr death, becaufethcy were of the number of thofe who had confpired in favor of the Kings fons. And in the time of the Decemviri, Ap, fiui was not held to be proud, but cruel 5 and yet not fo really, but in appearance, which by the common people is held to be as bad: For he had ordered many Li- fters to walk always before him and his Colleagues, with many Fafces in their hands ^ and having afterwards taken away Appeals, he Teemed in all his a(fiions to aim at Tyranny, which is always injurious to the People. So as it is no wonder if they did not afterwards refent that fuch men fhould be removed from Government wherein they had behaved themfelves fo ill, and did defire to return under the Government of Confuls and other Magiflracies,
To this may be added, that the People had then almoff the fame authority which fome particular Citizens did afterwards ufurp, and did go about to obtain all unJLiff th'ngs from the Senate by fedition, as thefe did in the enfuing times by force of arms. So as no fuch way being opened in the firfl State of the City, the People knew that when the Decemviri fliould be driven away, they might obtain many things of favor to themfclves, as indeed they did. For, Appeals were not only again allowed of, but much amplified, and the Tribunes of the People were declared to be Sacrofanifi. But Cxfar^ ufing therein either his natural endowments and worth, or fome wonderful cunning, had wrought himfelf into much favor with the People, by his humanity, rpagnificencc, liberality, by his familiarity with all men, by eafily pardoning offences, making of noble and frequent Shews, by his
fumptuous
(55).
futnp'.uous and coftly Feafts, and by his rich Gifis^ and by ih'efc means fecnred his Tyranny upon the found foundation of univerfal favor, and upon the favor of many partial Friends, whom he had made great, and by many fingular favois bound them taft unto him, and interefTed them in his own greatnefs and power. So as he who will confider thele things duly, muft confefs, that in BrHtM and Cafsins the intention was more to be commended then the a(5l; for their danger could bring no tiuefafety to the Commonwealth, as they themfclvcs were foonawjreof, by- flying from that City, which they ought to have fummoned to Liberty, and making iherafelves the Heads of thofe who ihould rife up in their bchaU. But the bufmefs being inopportunely undertaken, raifs'd of that fuccefs which opportunity might have brought ic: For C<e/<»r might eafily have loft the Peoples favor, cither for that ih nking himfeU fuflhciently fetled in his Dominion, he might value it fo much in the future 5 or for that they being nviturally given to love change, might grow weary of his too great power, which was already begun to be much fufpefted by his iiaving accepted of the title of King, and of many other Honors which he had formerly refufed : Things which made the People aware of their error, in being too conformable to the will of one fole Citizen. If fuch an occafion had been waited for, he who fliould have had a mind to have reftored the Commonwealth to her Liberty, might have had fome better foundations for the effediing of his dcfire. Andifitfhallbeobjefted, that the City could not throw off the yoke of fcrvitude after the death of Caligula and Nero, though they were very vicious, and much detefted by the People •, it may be anfwercd, That then the power of the Emperors, and authority of th.: Soldiers were too ftrongly confirmed, who put Caligula 2nd Nero, and other of their fucceffbrs to death, not out of anydefireof rcftoring the City to liberty,ai Brutus and Cafsius had done, but for that they were weary of their Empire, and hoped to be better rewarded by thofe who were by them cryed up for Emperors in place of .^hofe that were fla'n. * The caufe of fuch diverfiry of fuccefeiiiiiy likewife be known, if we will confider fome things more in general. Whilflb the City of Some was in fuch a condition by reafon of her Laws and Cufloms , as (he was of herfclf well given to Politick Government, it was impolTible to introduce Tyranny, fo as it could be continued there : For the Body of tl- e City not being organifcd fo as became fuch a Govern- ment, which is the Soul of the City, fuch a Union could not be feded there, as might afTume vital Form : And as it falls out in natural affairs, every thing is not made of every thing, but from this or that other affigned matter, fuch, or fuch a thing is particularly generated, anfwerabletothequality of the faid matter, and to the vertue of the generating caufe •, fo in our civil adlions, every State cannot be fafhioned out of every State, but thefe things are likewife determined by a certain order -, fo as from Ariftocracie we pifs into the power of a few, from thence to a Popular condition, andatlaft to Tyranny.
Yet are thefe Tranfitions very hard to be obfervcdin the Cityof Ko/w^5 for that her Government was always mixt with divers fpecics of Regiment: yetic may be feen how divers Parties prevailed in divers Times, fo as they came to con- ftitu;e a different Form of Government. At the beginning Vcrcuc was highly cflecmcd, the greateft Honors and chiefeft Places v/ere conferr'd upon fome few thatwere the mort famous, and mofl vertuous Citizens, though the People had always a (hare therein. But Ambition, and the defirc of Rule and Riches, did afterwards mightily increafe in the Nobility-, who deceiving the Multitude by feveral artifices, they reduced fo much of the publick Authority into them- felves, to maintain their private greatnefs, as the Laws having loft their effica-^ ce, and th: choice of the Magiftrates, and the rcfolution in all weighty and imprrtnnc affairs, depending upon the will Gf fom^' iew powerful Citizens,
t!-c
the City wholly loft the rcfemblance that fhe had of an Ariftocratical StJtc 5 and took the form of being governed by a few: And tbofe very Citizens, that they might prefcrve the power amongft themfelvcs, were forced to favor the mul. titude, by promifing and permitting unto them things that weic both unworthy, and unlawful. So thefe men,that they might domineer over more noble pcrfonagcs, were forced to obey the bafc will of the Soldiers, and of abjcft and infolent Popu- lar men, which reduced the Commonwealth ac laft to a bafc and corrupt Popular State ( though in former times the peoples Authority was always great ^but better moderated notwithftanding by the Laws and certain confiderations) from whence it was more eafie afterwards to paf$ to Tyranny, the Plotters uiing ihofe very means, which it hath been obferved Cdfar made ufcof, toufurpuntohimfelfihe folc Government of the Commonwealth.
Such changes have ufually been feen in other Cities,and at other times, where the condition of Government hath given the fame occafion. So s^thens was al- waies fubjedk to frequent alterations of Government, and particularly to Tyranny; Inforauch as the wife LegiQator Stlon^ who had the charge of reforming it, before his death faw it fain from the ftate whereinto he had reduced ir,and tyranny brought in by FiJiJIratus : for the corruption which was amongft the Inhabitants, afforded matter and means to any one who had a mind to poflefs himfclf of the Liberty thereof, /^ad it is likewife feen of Modern Commonwealths, that thofe wherein the people have had much authority, or rather liccntioufnefs, they have not beea able to keep in a conftant Government, firee from Civil Seditions, and have been butftioft-lived. As happened in the City of //tfrwcf, wherein lor the confidcra- tion abovefaid, it was eafier for them who had a mind to fupprefs the liberty there- of, and hard for him who defircd to preferve it. So as though the Houfe of iMediei hath by various accidents been fundry times driven from thence, and though u^/*xrf»</tfr the firft Duke there'>f loft his life ; the City, though other- wife noble and magnificent, being mudftnfedcd with parties, and corrupted by popularity 5 all endeavors of preferving it ih' the form of a Commonwealth, and in true liberty, proved vain : Andon thecontrary,the Commonwealth of FV«/«, by reafon «f her excellent Form of Government, which though it be mixt, hath little in it of Popular Government, and much of the optimati, not having given way to fuch corruptions as ufe to trouble the quiet of civil life, nor afforded means to any who ftiould goc about to plot agalnft the publick Liberty, hath been able for a very long fpacc of time to maintain her felf in one and the fame condition, and free from thofe dangers,into which other Commoawcaltbs have faln,for not having a GoTCrnracnt of equal temper with that of hers.
Tk
the Ninth DISCOURSE,
Pyhich is the fafer way to be ta\en^ to arrive at Honor and G/o* ryin a Commoumealtb ', that xphich wat held by Cato, dr that which was parfned by Caefar.
Julius C£[Ar^ and CMmus Cato, who was aftenvards called Uticencie^ both of them very famous, and greatly cried up perfons, both for their excellent indowmcnts of mind , and for the great Authority which they held both with the Senate, aad with the people, did both of them flourifli at the fame time in the Commonwealth oi Reme: But they did fo differ in Manners and Cuftoras, as it may afford occaflon ofwonder,if we w,ll confidcr how,ftearing fevcral courfcs,they happened both of them to arrive almoft at one and the fame end: And of doubt in him who fhall propound unto himfelf the example of thefe two great Pcrfon3ges,to purchafe Fame and Power in a Commonwealtb,whether of the two he ought moft to imitate. Cafxr won much love by his great humanity, libe- rality and magnificeace; but Citowis reverenced for the aufterityof his Com- portment, by the integrity of his life,and for the zeal he fhewed in the managing of all publick affairs. Thofc who were oppreft either by poverty, or by enemies had recourfe to C<c/4rfor protedion^ and thofc who hated wicked men, and the inventers of novelties, truftcd that CAto would chaftifeand fupprefs them. C<ifAr never fpared for any labour by which he might hope to purchafe renown and glo- ry; and Crf/^ by defpifing glory became glorious: C<efAr defiredtofhew genero- fity, and greaincfs of fpirit in all his a(fl;ons -, and Cato delighted in nothing more then in modefty, and innocency of life : Cdfar was much given to all afls of Gracej and C4?oconftant in all ads of Juftice .• CxfAr Teemed to take delight in Sports, Feafts, and Banquets •, and Cate profeft openly to fcorn all favor , fave what the merit of his own worth brought with it. So as the greatnefs wherein the Com- monwealth then was, was (iiid lo be mofl refpiendent in Caf^r^ fo the prefcrvation of the antient Form of the Commonwealth, and of the cuftoms of her firft age was held to be prefcrved in one onely Cato.lhtk two fo excellent Perfoniges took thefe two differing ways, yet each of them acquired great Renown, Fame, and Authority. Great was C^/irj glory by the many things hsdidin War, hmCata was no lefs celebrated for Civil Affairs. Cxfur by h;s ^reat Authority could make FrdTtce be firft afTigned unto him, and then confirmed upon him, where he kept in chief command with his Army for the fpace of Ten years •, Healfo made ufcof the peoples favour, nottoaggrandife himfelf, but to make the greatcft honors be conferred on his Friends, and upon fuch as depended on him, which was that which made his fadion fo potent. And truly, he who will confider it well, will findc that as long as Rome retained any Form of a Commonwealth , elite's power was no lefs then was C^/jr; , for he oftentimes bore it even againft Cxfar : As when the bufmcfs of thof: that were Complices with Catiline in his con- fpiracy, was in hand inthe Senate, they being accufed by Cato^ and defended by C^/iir, were condemned to be put to death. Andalfo another time, when he op- poftd the publilliing of the Law propofed, and favoured t>y C-^/jr, touching the civifionof Lands in X<t/;«w,wherein O/oV authority appeared to be the greater, by making Cefars ambitious defigns fail of fuccefs in io popular things as were the Agrarian Laws. The fame fuccefs had the things maintained by C<efar againft Pontpejy though be was more pavverful th:n any o:bec Citizen ; for having ftoutly
oppofcd
oppofed CMetellus, wha moved at the time of C4/4/i«<'j confpiracy, thztFtmpey (hould together with his Army be recalled back to Rcme^ he carried the bufincfs ; which was the caufc why thefe two prime Citizens endeavored the friendftiip and good Will of CatOy for they doubted of compafling what they defired without his good will,fo great was his Authority. C*/4r,when Catt appeared to be hisbittercft enemy, procured Cato's releafemcnt, when he was impnloncd by order from the Senate ; And Pompey, that he might be faftened to him by the bond of Alliance, endeavored to have his Ncece for Wife. Whence it is conceived, that Cato's au- fttre behaviour had purchafed him more Authoiity , though unarmed, in the management of the Commonwealth, then the reputation of having command- ed Armies, and their fo much obfequioufnefs to the people, had done to i'<»;w/'f7 and Cxfar.
A juft occafion then offers it felf here of confiderationjWhether was; the better, and fafercourre taken to arrive at Glory, and Civil Greatnefs, or that which C<e- far^ or that which Cdto took:^ Cxfars comportments fcem to have been more no- ble, and better befitting a Civil life, asalfomore eafie to be imitated-, andwhat indeed is of more importance for the happinefs of a City, then quietnefs and con- cord amongft Citizens ^ What more proper to produce and pre ferve this, then Magniticence, Grace and Affability? all which vertues were proper to Cx[ar^ and which by a ftraight and (peedy way guided him to the height of greatnefs and glory. He who defires to obtain this Lvour from Citizens,muft abftain from doing any injury, muft feekout all occafions of doing good, muft attribute much to others, muft (peak moderately othimfelf, muft do good things, and make them appear to be fo, foas he may help not onelyby his a(5lions, but by his example. Rigor, Severity, the negledl of all other refpefts, where there is onely an up- right mind to do wdl (things which are fufficiently commendable in Caio) may of themfelves per-idventure border nearer upon true vcrtue, but bear a lefs pro- portion with civil vertue, if refpeft be had to that which is found, not to that which is defired. Who does not value the love of his Citizens, or will not en- deavor the acquifition thereof faveby very upright ways, which are not always poffible, meets with continual occafion of contention, from whence great and open enmities do often arife, which do at laft put the City into confufion. So as (uch men do firil luine ihemfelves,and then the Commonwealth. When laws are obferved with, fuch extremity of rigor, itfeemsto be done to opprefs Citizens, not to preferve Juftice ; Wherefore fuch a Government is but little acceptable, and therefore eafier to receive alteration upon any accident that fhall happen : This was fcen in Cato's adions -, for his way of proceeding got him many enemies, who that they might make themfelves able cobulk with his Authority, made them- felves ftrong by Alliances and Friendihips, and became not onely formidable to him, but even to the Commonwealth, If Gate had not defpifed the Parentage offered him by Pompej^ Ctjar had not joyned alliance with him by giving him his Daughter ^alia for Wife, which was the occafion of both their too excefflve greatnefs, by which they ruined the Commonwealth. The people were not pleafed with Cato's fevere way of proceeding, which made them the more eafily adhere to C^fdr^ and his AfTociats, and fo not perceiving it, became enemies to the Com- monwealth. Therefore Cafar might ftill continue in the peoples good opinion, and long preferve his Authority and Power : But Cato, though his counfels did fometmes prevail, yet was not his Dignity and Power grounded upon fo found foundations, as that he could alwaics keep himfelf in the fame condition : Nay, fometimes things were born againft him in the choyce of Confuls, when people much more unworthy then he were Corrivals with him. The little pleafingnefs of his proceedings was alfocaufe, though under pretence of horior, and publick
imploy-
(17)
imployment, why he wjs fent from the City, and in a manner banlfhed, being /enc by Sea to Cyprus for (bme concernments of that Kingdom •, fo as the Common- wealth fufTered by his abfence •, and particularly Cicero, who was formerly upheld by Cato's authority, and held for a Defender of the j-ublick Liber; y, was banifhed. By the.'c things the qucftion fcemscleerly enough decided, that Cdfars way of pro- ceeding is much moie cafte and certain to brmg a man to dignity and greatnefs, then the way which Cato took.
Yet he who on the other fide (hall examine Catt's manners and a<flions, as he will find them more praifc;- worthy, fo will he think that they may lead by a tighter and more diredl way to true Honor, and to that greatnefs which is to be dcfircd by him that lives in a Commonwealth. For he takes a fafcr and a more noble way to arrive at Dignity, w ho walks by the way of true Vertue, of Juftice, Modefty and Temperance, then he who endeavors the like by Popular Favor : For that Favor which is won by a good repute, and by vertuous ad^ions, is eafily preferred by ber- felf, and of herfelfj nay, the cry'd-up Honor which arifeth from pubiick Imploy- raents and Places, if it be not grounded upon true worth, foon vaniflieth, and leaves that in obfcurity which did before fhine forth fo bright. But he who deals uprightly, doth always advance as it were by a certain natural motion, and confirms himfelf more and more in the habit of well-doing. So that Favor which hath fo good a leaning- flock, is more firm and flable ^ whereas that which is purchafcd by extrin- fecal appearances, as it iseafilier gotten, fois it upon any flight occafion more eafily lofl. For thofe who arc moved to tavor for fuch reafons, are incited fo to do rather out of their own humor, or for their own advantage, then out of any true aflfe(5tion that they bear to fuch perfons : And therefore growing either glutted of the fame things they did folike atfirft, or thinking that they may receive thtm in a larger proportion from others, they change their minds, and turn their liking elfwhere. Moreover, he who does that which of it felf is good, can never want a reward : For though he do notpurchafe thofe exterior demonflrations which are ufually gotten by worth, and which do more illuflrate it, he notvvithflanding feels that true content within himfelf wh ch fprings from well-doing, and which is held by wife men to be the bcfl reward of good adions. For he who loves and favors Equity and Juff ice, makes the Lawsbeobferved, prefers the publike good before private interefl, thinks nothing an injury wherein the Commonwealth is not offended 5 this man may be truly faid to be a great Citizen •, for that pubiick dignity and great- nefs maintains his private credit and effimation : Nay, fuch men as thefe, if by any 111 fortune or bad accident they fall from favor, they find alwa) s, as it were by fome occult power of Vertue, fome others to proteft them. As was fcen in Cate, who having drawn upon him the enmity of the grcarefl part of the Nobility, and being but little befriended by the People for impeding the y^grarUrt La.v, though he were for a while held low, he was notwithftanding created Conful in rivalfhip with Metelltts^ -A ho was favored by Pempey. And by a more notable example, CMitren* himfelf, who was accufed in Judgment by Cato, was nor only not his Enemy after- wards, but defended him againft Metellta • and dte's reverend authority prevailed ovtr Metettfis his fury, who being accompanied by a number of armed men, was come into the i*w^^'« to promote the Laiv of making Fompey return with his Army to the City in the tmieof Catalines Confpiracie : /^nd we read, that when he re- turned from Cyprus, the Magiilrates, Priefls, the whole Senate, and very many of the People went in fuch numbers to meet him, as the banks oiTyhr were full of them on boch fides, as if he had entred into the City in triumph. And another time being in the pubiick AlTemblies put by the Prctorihip,by the violence of the Con- fuls CraQus and Pompiy, yet he, being but a private man, was accompanied home to his own houfe that very day with more men, then followed the Magftrarcs,
I li
(■)8)
If then we will know in this diverfity of affairs, which of thefe two courfes it is beft to follow, fince by what you have heard, equal credit may almoft be given untcboth, VTC muft weigh what his natural inclination is who will fee thefe ex- anofiljes before him to follow them; what the true end is which he propOfcth un- to himfclf, and after what Form of Comment that Commonwealth is ordered ict which he is born, and which hcfervcs: for without fuch confiderations ic is hard to know what courfe of life a man muft take. He who feeks to win favor, muft a- boveall things ftiun aftedlation, as that which makes a man always fufpedled to be ambitious, and his a(ftions not acceptable. For he whofe genius is naturally given to humanity, andtoafvveetand pleafant mannerof converfation, If leaving that, he will put on a Socratical fevcrity and gravity, he cannot hope toufeitfo, but thatfome other end being difcovered to be in him, he will not onely not win cre- dit, but will fometimes become ridiculous. So on the contrary , when a man is known qot to be wittily or facctioufly given, but that his nature is rather given to be grave," if he will appear to be evil and very familiar, fauning and flattering with humble words, and in a bafc manner, he incurs the fame mifchicf-, for fuch forced behavior denotes afFedlation, and grows tedious. Catowzs born with this fevc- rity, as he had witnefled all his life time, by all his aftions. He was a Sloven in his feeding and in his. apparel; he weiK on foot to his Conntry-ho ife , and fometimes whenhe wasinplaceof Magiftracy he would give Audience unfliod, and inGatjr ments unfit for the Bench. In fine, all his actions were unpolliflied, fcvere, de- fpifing fuch things as others did moft value. The clean contrary was feen in C<ffar^ who was given to quaint behaviour, humanity and gracc.They therefore by their fe- veral ways proved both of them great men, and fanious, becaiife they followed theii natural genius and inclinations. " '
In the next place, the end which a man propounds unto himfclf, vvhocnder- vors to get Honors and Imploy ments in a Commonwealth, is to be confidered: for if he aim oncly at thepublick Service, and at h:s Countries good, it isfitteft for fuch a one to lay afide all particular intereft, andnoc viiluing any private fa- vor, to attend onely a punclualobfervance of the Laws, and the depreflion of fuch Citizens, whoto the prejudice of thepublick Liberty, will become too powerful nsdidCato- But ifone who is meedy byafled by ambition, propounds untohim- felfthe becoming great and powerful, by any whatfoever means-, thofe arcs and applications which are pleafing to moft men, and which purchafe applaufe, and uni- Vf rfal liking, will certainly lead him more fafely to that end,and conduce moft to his purpofe, as they did to C^far • who abafing himfelf that he might mount the higher-, giving,that he might get the more; being fubfetvient unto others, to the end that he might command over them,knew fo well how to cover his moft affedled and ambitious thoughts, as at laft he did not onely attain to the greateft Authority that is ufually granted to any one in any Commonwealth, but drew all Dignity and publick Authority upon himfelf.
Next it muft be had in confidcration,vvhat the Form of that Commonwealth muft be, in the which a man who lives therein, propounds unto himfelf the acquifition of place and honor. For ifthcFormbe Optimatical, wherein venue isefteemed above all things, certainly Cdfo'j Manners and Cuftoms will better fute with fuch a Government; for in fuch a Commonwealth, tfie Magiftratcs in their difpen ra- tion aim chiefly at thofe things which were very eminent, and much coairaenced in Cato: But if the peoples authority be great in the City, C^/^rj- Manners and Ar- tifices will be better beloved, and likclif.r to win approbation, and confequcntly the peoples favor in their fuflfrageSswhich may Carry them to the height of Civil pre- ferment. 1 herefore in Sfarta^ which was an Optimatical Commonwealth, Ai- vers .men did floarifh, who in their lives and manners did refemble Ctf^ ; as on
(59)
the contrary, thofe Citizens were moft efleemcd of in Athens which was a Popu- lar Commonwealth, who knew how to win the Peoples good will, zkct Caf^rf way : whence it was that flie fell cafily afterwards into the powtr of many Tyrants-, infomuch as the liberty of the Commonwealth was pofTcft at one and the fame time by Thirty fuch men. ?>\i(.\nRtme where the Government was partly Popular, partly Optimatical, both Crf/ir and Cato might win renown, for divers Citizens were diverfly minded, according to the diverfity of Government in the adrainiftra- tion of publick affairs ; but in that mixture, C^/kr might get firmer, and more fetled authority then c*tfi in civil dilTtnticns , becaufe the Popular Fadion was much the greater. So that Cato fiding with the Senate to the very laft, and being, accord- ing to his wont, and worth, unwilling, to be cxpofcd to the licentious will and plea- fure of the Conquerors, he wasborndown, together with the Senate, and reduced to tie neceflity of making himfelf away. And Cdfar being by the Soldiers fufi frages , and by force, confirmed and fetled in Power and Authority, which were already too immoderately granted him in the Commonwealth by the peoples favor; he polTefl himfelf of the common publick Liberty, and dcflroycd all Form of Ci- vil Government.
The Tenth DISCOURSE.
To vfbat Age of the City o/" Rome, ths gnateji praife aad m:rit fs to be gii/eriy for the profperity 4nd greatnefs , whereto Jbe arrived,
^~>i Uch and fo many are the Grandeurs and profperities of the City of Rome^ ^^ as the conflderation thereof affords always new matter of difcovcring divers ^^myfteries therein very well worthy to be examined and obfcrvjd: hut if I Iwe (hall confider amongft many other things, how her profpeiicy didftill ^"^^ from time to time increafc both in ftatc and reputation, a particular defire will arife in us, of knowing to what Age the chief pra fe and merit of that Cities arriv.l re :u.ha height of Greatnefsand Glory, istobcattribuied. Three Ages may chiefly bcnumbred \^ herein that great City did flill more and more increafe, ind grow greater in Reputaion. To wir, the firft, which may be termed her In- fancy -, from the foundation of the City till the driving out of the TAtquins, and to the firft Confulfhipof Junius Brutus^ and of Tirquinitts CoUttintds uhchwas the fpacecf TwO hundred twenty four years: The fecond, which fliall be her Adolt Tccnce , from that time till the beginning of the fecond Carthaginian War ; betwixt two which times, there pafled the fpace of "two hundred forty fix years : ThetKird, her Youth, which was the flowre of her ye3r<;, and ofhergrcatcftpro- fpei ity, mjy be termed the left of that time which paft from the beginning of the laid War, which was In the Confullhip of Afpitu CUuditts , firnamed the BclJ^ till C£(drs Di<flatcrn-iip, the fpace of Two hundred and twenty years, which makes upihefuUnumbtrof Seven hundred and ten years, which the Common- wealth of Remeh([e<i, which mighcbe fo termed for the temperate Government of the hi ft Kings, and for the authority which the Senate held therein alfo, as long as the r Dominion lafted. For what concerns the times of Emperors, no mention tceds to be made thereof, for what concerns our purpofe : For to boot with the co;rupcion which infded of the t^rft I orm of Civil Governmeat, they enjoyed,
la and
(Jo)
and f or the moft part but unworthily, the labors of other men-, and though the City maintained hcrfelfin great height for the fpace of four hundred years, nay, though many gallant and magnifick things were by the Majefty of the Empire, and by the t'mperors power, yet thele did not concur to the firft foundation of the Empire, which is that wh.ch is now particularly enquired into •, but the Emp re did for the moft part decline in divers parts, and in fundry times, till at laft it began to haften more headlong to ruinc.
The chief and grcatcft praife then of this moft noble and moft artificial Fabrick may be attributed to the fitft that laid the firft foundation : For thofe that fucceed- ed them, finding that they might thereupon fafely creft the great ftrufturc of the Roman Empire, their Counfels were excited, and their work chiefly helped by thofe who did firft think thereupon, and did fo work, as the City being well ordered and difpofed of with good principles, might rife to a greater degree of dignitv and Empire. But thofe of the third Aec, having noble examples of worth before ihem. and feeing fo good and gallant a work already fo profperoufly increafed and raifed up, went more couragioufly on to greater and more noble works, having framed a conceit unto themfelves out of the former profperous fucccfTes, that they might be able to make ( as they did ) their City the Miftrcfs and Monarch of all Nations, The firft Age was governed by feven Kings, of differing natures and cuftoms for the moft part, bnt well fitted to what concerned the fervice of the new City, and Homes rifing greatnefs. For Remtflus the Father and Founder thereof, was ex- cellent at Arms •, fo as accompjnied by other military men, he began the firft habi- tation, and did fo order thirgs, as the new City might fubfift of herfelf, without putting herfelf under the proteiftion of any neighboring people. But Nttma, who fucceeded him, that he might give the form of a true City to the nsw Inhabitants^ ordering them by certain Laws, and chiefly by Religious worfhip, didfo hihive himfelf, as in all fucceeding times that City was always much given to Religious affairs •, which though they were falfe of themfelves, yet did he thereout era v good advantage conctrning Civil affairs. The third King, Tu/Ius Hefiiliits, reaimming Arm-;, bridled theboldnefsofthe neighboring people, who confpired the ruine of the City •, an J getting many vldories over them, began not only to think of iuch things as concerned the fafety of the City, but to enlarge her Confines by way of Arms in her neighbors Territories. Jnus Martius did ffudy Civil affaiis more, and minded the multiplying of people in the City, and the making of dive s Orders which might reduce it to the form of a great and well-governed City. Tan]nimus Prifcas accuftomed the People to know the majefty and dignity of Empire-, by which reverence he, to the great ftrvice of publick affairs, increafed obedience in thofe who both then and afterwards were to command in the City, and in the Armies. But 7arquisifu Sujerbta^ the City being already got to her full growth, procuring his own ruine by his rafhncfs and unbridled liccntioufnefs, opened the way to the liberty of Rome^ and to her greater greatnefs.
By which things it may be conceived, that the fecond Age found the City ai- re idy well inftituted in Arms and Religion,much increafed in People and Buildings, accuftomed to know the d gnity and majefty of Empire, ftie being efteemed and feared by the neighboring people, an Enemy to Tyranny, and finally fit to receive a good Form of Civil Government, andabletogovcrnherfelf by her own Orders and Forces. So as thole who followed in the enfuing Age, finding the way chalk'd out unto them to l:fad the City onto a greater degree not only of fafety, but of glory, they found lefs of difficulty in all their undertakings : As it is ufual in all things, whcreuato it is harder to give a beginning, then to augment them. Where- fore the praife is due to thofe firft Romans, which is given to the firft Invertor of tbinss, of knowing how to put on generous thpughts, and ufe good counfels, when
the
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the City was Co weak as (he knew not how to nourifli thcm.^ nor iiad any example of her own men. Therefore in the following Age, the height of praifc which was given to any one that had deferved well of the Commonwealth, was to honor him with the name of Pater Pitrjx^ and to compare his aClions to thofe of Remalus^ and of thofe that followed next after him 5 from whom, as from the firft Founders of the City of Remt^ it was generally granted that the reft had leceived power and vtrtue to imitate them. The cuftom was therefore always obferved in Rome, of honoring her Birth- day with folemn facrifices, as that which by iis happy Aufpices had not only given exccll^t Auguries, bat as it were a certain vigor to the To many other Felicities \vhich did at all times accompany her. And it was particularly interpreted for an excellent Augury of the City of Rome's greatnefs, and of her increafe in power and authority over all the Latines, that (he was born and increafed from theruines oiAlba^ moft of the Latines having been Colonies of the ruined City of Alb 4.
Now if we fhall confider what may be alleadged on the behalf of the fecond Romans, weftiallfindfuchand fomany things to be faid for them, as the firft Gar- land of the glory of Rome's greatnefs may feem to be due ro them, without offence to any others. For he «ho fhall weigh things well, {hall find that this Age brought forth more noble and truer Examples of real worth, then any other 5 fo as they did not only excell themfclves, but even all Foreiners : For the military valor which flourifhed in the Citizens of Rome of this Age, was accompanied with other excel- lent vertues, and efpecially with vaft charity towards their Country, not for their own glory, but out of love to her greatnefs and profperity. Danger was fo defpifed by feme of them, as forae famous men araongft them did even facrificethcmfelves and their lives for their Countries welfare 5 as the examples of Curtius, and of the two Decii do even at this day, much to their^glory, fhtw. The generous Com- manders in that Age did contemn riches as well as danger 5 fo as they overcame not only their Enemies, but even themfelves •, things which were praifcd and admired in ^utntus Cincinnttus in Fabritius^ and in Paulus t^milius. But haw famous did they prove in matter of War, and worthy of that praife which is given to excellent Commanders l He who fhall confider how Enterprifes were managed by the two Pdpjrii, the Father and the Son, againft the Samnites •, what the Forces of the con- quered Enemies were ; of what advantage their vidory was to the Remans • will confcfs that their merits came not fhort of any, neither in thofe, nor in the following times. This Age was often to withftand the Calls^ who were pow'erful and bitter Enemies to the Romitis^ by whom the very City oi Rome was afTaulced and in- dangcred •, for the delivery whereof /"wr/wj Camil/us grew fo famous. But this was not the only orcafion of trying the Roman Forces againft the French in thofe times ; jeuintus Servilius aU, and ^JF*biits withftood them -, when the French retuining more powerful then before neer to the City of Rtme^ by means of thefe illuftrious Commanders, th.ir whole endeavors proved vain. In this Age, divers People of Italy did fundry times jointly confpirc againft the City of Rome • which^ th; more formidable (he grew to her neighbors, the more did a common apprehenfion make them arm againft her : And notwithftanding, flie tiid not only feem not daunted amidft thofe dangers, but having fiill the better of thofe by w liora ike was infcftcd, fhc increafed by the ruine of others. For thefe rcafons Forein fr-rccs were ailed in by the very /r4i/4»/, and f^rr/.'«j was received into7r.j/y, that h: m ght wage war with the Romans • whofe renown was fo great, as the chief honor in matters of war Wisgivcnby HanniOdlio Pjrrhus. And he who in a few words will conceive the worth of the Commanders in this A^ejct him fay that Livj^who was much ver.'ed in the Roman affairs, did attribute fo much to the Co;nmandcrs of this Age, as he aftcemed them not only equal, but fuperior to i^/f.vjw^fri he Great: holding for
certain^
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certain, that if i^ltxandet ^hti he had conquered Trfnoi, hadmrncd into///!/;, he would have left the glory that he won in Pcrfia^ w hen he (hculd liave met wiih thr Roman Forces, commanded by Fdhius Mdxin^us, V*ltnMs Ccyvwtis^ Papjrjur
But above all things it is worth confiderat ion, that in this Age, the City of Jifme was confirmed and eftabliihedwich more certain and uleful orders, as well in Civil as in Military Affairs, whereby (he long after was govermd, andbyver- tue whereof, (he chiefly arrived at (uch a height of grcatnefs. Great were the re- wards which were given in if <wf to militaiy worth, and thofe Citizens we: e much egg'donby glory to great undertakinjgs, and (harp fuffcrings. Triumph was a great ornament and glory to viftoiious Ccmmandtrs-, which was firft ufcd to honor the Conful feflhumiui , for the Victory he wan over the Sdins. The firft equcftral Statues, were likewife an invention of this Age, which were grant- ed to Confulswhoovcrcamc the i4//«j in Battel. In this Age the Mural and Ci- vick Garlands were firft ufed , to the erd, thanherc might be rewards (or tvtry mans worth. The wintringof Solders in the Fields and under Tents, was be- gun to be ufcd by the Romans in this Age: a thing which proved fo ufeful and necelTary afterwards in greater and farther diftant cnterprifc*. What did more ad- vantage the City of Romexn her grcaicft dangers and weigh[ie(^ occafions, then the authority of Diciator ; a Magiftracy of reverend majefty, and which proved fo often the true and onely remedy to maintain the affairs of Btrnein their lefs profpe- rous times. This was firft created in Rome, to refiftthe forcesof Forty F$ftUi L*- tim, who were joyncd in league together againft the Romans, and againftvvhom Fofthumittt was created the fiift Diftator. But how levcrend and unviolable the obfervancc of military orders were with the Commanders of this Age, may be de- monftrated by the famous example* of the fevcrity of fefihumitis^ and oi juafilsus TorquAtm againft their own Sons, who lor not obeying the command of their Su- periors, though it were accompanied with noble daring, and happy fuccefs, was punifhed by death.
And as this age wasbuficdin perpetual Wars, new Wars being perpetually raifed up by the fame people of I at turn vind Tojany, VNhom they had often over- come, fo to it that Fortitude, Vertueof mind, and Military Difciplineis chiefly to be attributed, by which the people of Reme proved more excellent then all other Nations. For this fo continual cxercife of Arms for fo many years toge- ther, didfoaccuftomtheCityto Viilitary Affairs, as it was not onely eafic for thofe that followed after, to tread in the footfteps of thefe their Predeceffors, but almoft neceffary for the prcfervation of the City •, which being long accuftomed to labor and warlike occupations, could not, nor would not without inteflinc dif- order, live in idlenefs. And as for the orders in Civil Affairs, certa niy no fmall praifc is likewife due to this Age •, for not to touch i.pcn many particular Laws and luftuutions; the moft famous Laws amongft the Romans of the Twelve Tables, madeinthc Deccmviraieof c/^/'/'/wC/<*«ii6».y and his Colleague?, by which the City of Uowe was chiefly governed, verc Inftitutions of this Age-, induftrioufty taking divers things from the Grecians, amongft whom more then in any other Nation,all learning, and all the moft noble Aits did then chiefly fiourifh. Amongft other things, great was the wifdom of allowing i he Latins to be free Denifons of Rome, for hereby the City was notably augmented, and her Empire eftabli(hed. For (he did not onely for ever free her felt from the vexation which (he had had for the fpaccof Four hundred years by the Forces of thefe people, whom they had often fubducd, and who had ofien rebelled againft the Romans, and could not by Force be kept within the bonds of obedience, but being hereby obliged fo f.ift, and fo intcrcffed in the fame Affairs wirh the Romans, (be. was much
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aflified 'oy tliem ia ihe Co many Wais which the Romans made aftcrwatds."' The ufe of Colonies was of great advantage likewife to the Roman Empire ; for it fer vcd to esfc tlie City when Ihe was oppreft with too many Citizens, and toLcep others in obedience who were daily reduced under the Roman Empire. And this u'e of Colonies , though it had a certain weak beginning, when Rgmului fenc fome to inhabit in the City of Fidena,, yet was it oftencr and more orderly intro- duced, and confirmed in this fecond Age ; So as experience (hewing the good of this inftitution to thofetlist came after, this cultomwasevcr after followed by the Romans. This Age is like. vife a great argument of the civil wifdom of the CicL- zcns: for though there w; re therein important Infurredlions often made, and (b great broils between the People and the Nobility; and though it were harder to keep thofe in obedience, who had continued to fcive in the Commonwealth in her Wars for the fpace of a hundred years after the driving out of their Kings, without pay,yct were they able to appeafe all difcords without the effufion of any civil blood, as it happend afterwards in the third Age, wherein great tumults arofe from little ones s fo as Civil Wars , oratleaftdiflcntions and partakings continued amongfl: the Citizens for about Fifty years, from SfBds Didatorfhip to that of Citf4rs , thereupon the final ruine of the Commonwealth enfued. Italfogivcsa great proof of the peffc(9:ion of the orders obferved in the City of Rome in th^fe times, that fhe was twice able to (hake ofFflavcry i Firft, that of the Kings, and then that of the Hecenftiiri ^ which the Third Age could not do, which being once fain under the'tommand of 5jf//rf, though he himfelf forewent the vaft authority which was granted him, and left the City in Liberty, continued notwithftandingftillinfafti- Ons, which foonaftcr brought her part all remedy under Cxfars moft exprcfs Ty- ranny. And certainly great was the endearor after Liberty in this fecond Age, in rcfpedl whereof all things elfe were fct at nought •, infoiiiuch as BrHtm did noc par- don his own Sons life, it being fufpefted that he had had to do with Tarquin to the prejudice of Liberty •, and the whole people of Rome condemned ManliU'S Cafito- linus to death, he who had faved the Capitol and the City of Reme^ for being ftif- pedted his adtions tended towards Tyranny. Thofe who lived in the hardeft times of this fccond Age (liewed their conftantgenerofity, when the City oC Rsmc be- ing burnt and dcftroyed by the French, they would not abandon her, and go to live at ri*;/, as their (orlorn fortiine,and the condition of thefc times (eemed toad- vife them tbd6-, but kept their hopes alive for better thing?, which if they had then abandoned, that rtarae and fame oi Rome had pcradventure been for ever loft, which her happy genius promifed her. So as he who (hall confider the works and anions of thofe Citi/ens of Rome of this fecond Age, may with reafon think them worthy of great priife-, fo as it may fee m they had nothing todefirc, whereby to have been made as illuftrious in the (igbtof the world, and their a(flions equal to thof^ of the Third ^-ge, then to have had occafion of greater cnterpnfcs, as they had. But on the contrary, thefe mens anions arc more to be commendecl for the integrity of their manners, for their love towards their Country, and for the r other noble vertues • whereas in thofe of the la(^ Age the fplcndor of their glorious aiflions in War, was oft-times obfcured, and ftained by other viccs, by A:nbitioH, Avarice, and immoderate Liberty , to which things the Third Age was fo a jdifted, as they brought her in tht height of her grcateft piofperity, to ut- ter mine.
But before we pafs this fcntence, it will become us in juffice to hear what thofe gallant Romans" can fay in their o^nbehalfs, who by the cried up Fame of their ftupendious a*flions, have filled the v;orld with the glory, and wonder of the Ro- man gicatnefs. And how much flioiter the time was wherein the fjpreme Mo- narchy was fouuded and cftabliflied, io much greater deitionftration is thereof
the
tie generofity and worth of ihcfe men, who had the boldnefs to undertake Co many Entcrpiifes, and could bring them to a good end. For, the firft time that the ' RomAm carried their Forces out of lulj, was by rcafon of the Carthaginian War 5 wherein amongft other things, it was not only a thing commendable, but much to be wondred at, that the ifo»»4;7/, being till then unexperienced in Maritime affairs, did fo foon learn that manner of Difcipline, as they overcame the CArthagimtns in many Sea-fights, who for fo long a time before had profefs'd thcmfelvtsto be Sea- men, and had the fiift place given them by all other Nations for their Naval preparations.
Bur whereby can the excellent Military Difcipline of the Romaxs be better known, and their unvanquifti'd worth, then by their deeds done in the fecond Car- thaginian War •, wherein at one and the fame time they were able to maintain fo many Armies in Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Greece ? And yet one only City of Rome could furniQi them all with Commanders and Soldiers out of her own Citizens, and Italian Colonies-, and that in fo great a number, as that there was above Eighty thoufand fighting men of the Roman Army in the Fight at Cdnns. On the con- trary, Carth-ige, though htr Dominions weie large and powerful, after fhc had beea feveral times routed by the Romans in Spain, being Willing to defend i^frica^ nay the very City of Carthage, the head of the Empire, was forc'd to recall that her Commander in chief, andthofe her Soldiers which (he had in Italy. The Romans thrice overcome in battel by Hannibal, took flill frelh courage, and afTuming new Forces, did evtn face Fortune, whom they won at laft to be their friend, and in a manner obedient to their dcfcrts. But the Carthaginians, when once overcome by Scipic'in Fight nter^4»ii<t, yielded, and humbled themfelvcs to the Romans. But the lafl Funick War, as it ended in a ihorter time, and with lefs trouble then the former two, fo brought it more glory and fecurity to the Romans -, for the very name of the formidable Roman Forces, wasfufhcient to put an end to that Wars and the final ruinc of Carthage which enfued, did for ever fecure the Common- wealth oiRome from the falfc faith of the Carthaginians.
But other great and noble feats of Arms, undertaken at the fame time with great courage and happy augury, as the War againft Philip in CMacedonia^ and in Afi* againft ^niiochtu, did fufficiently illuftrate the Roman Force;;, and did enlarge the Confines of their Empire in farthefl diftant Nations. In the three Punick Wars, which lafted forty three years, with variety of fortune, they fought fometimes more for fafety then for glory : But herein the People of Rente (hewed not only the power of tiicir Fjrces,bu': the generofity of their minds -, having undertaken the one War to reven-'c the injuries received from Philip, in his having fupplicd Hannibal with fuccors ; and the other to preftrve fome Cities in Afta, antient Colonics o{ Greece^ in their Liberty, and from being injuriou/ly opprefs'd by Antiechm. And if it be faid, that thcfe fo many Entirprifes were made by the Italian Forces s the firft and chiefeft difficulty confifting in the fubjugating oiUaly^ the firft and chicfcft praifc feems to be due to th's Age : But take this for granted, it muft be added, that a great fliarc of this very praife is due to the laft Age -, for the Infubri and Liguri were not afliibjeded by the Romans, till after the end of the fecond Carthaginian war 5 the firft bein" conquered by Marcelltu, the fecond by j^itttm Fuhius •, who wari fomuch ihe more glory thereby, for that thefe are very noble parts of Italy, and that the Country of the Inftibri was pofTefs'd by the Calls, who were at that time very potent in thofe parts, and Liguria was inhabited by a very fierce and warlike people. Thefe are not then things altogether fo great and glorious, as that thty lurpais all other tilings done by other men at other times : But if we (hall look luiiher into this very Age of Rome, we (hall meet with other a<ftions fo great, and as miraculous, as their fplendor will obfcurc the glory of thofe very Romans,
who
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who were focryed up in compn ifon of other Nations. For when the City of Cttrthctge was utterly ruin d, with which the City of Rome had fought lb long, and ok-times with vaiiety of fortune, and thofe dangers bting fecurcd forever, there not remaining any other Potentate who could of himfelf give a juft counter- poile to the Roman power, they march'd fo faft on to Monarchy, as in t' e fpace of one hundred years, between that time, and the time of Cafars Didatorliiip, they extended the Confines of the Roman Empire almoft over the face oF the whole Earth, Amongft the reft, great was that War which was taken againft Mithndaics, under pretence of defending Nicomedesmd AriobarTanes^ who were Friends to the People of Rome, but in effed to oppofe his vaft defigns, wherein afpiring at the doininionof all Afta^ and of £«r<i^ealfo, he became formidable even to the ve:y KomATis ; who though tliey had to do with this potent Enemy, who could put to- *;ether in this War an Army of Two hundred ihoufand Foot, and Fifty thoufand Horfe, and a Fleet of Three hundred Ships, yet did they not only difcomfit Mi- thridites^ but took occafion to make other Vidlories in Nations far off-, for they marched witij their Armies into ArmtnU againft Tigranes^ bccaufe he had favored Mithrtdates^ and xeccived him into his Kingdom, when he was driven away by the RomiKs, And he who will obfeive the Roman Hiftory, will have occafion of won- der, that though the Roman Commanders and Armies were often overcome in battel, yet in all the Wars that ever they made th.y have at laft proved Viif^ors, But the things that wee done in the !aft years of this Age, do exceed whatfoever could at firft have fain into the thou-ht of man, thereby to fettle the Common- wealth in a flourithing and fortunate condition. To pafs by fo many other glorious V dories and Triumphs, who can choofc but admire the great deeds of < omfCf and of Cdt^ixr ? the fpecd which the fird made in finifhing fo many War?, his great good fortune chiefly in fubjugating fo many Eaftern Provinces in a very ftiort time •, and the lecond's conftanci© and fortitude, demonftrated in fo many battels, and in cutbing fo many Weftern Nations. Infomuch as it is faid of both thcfc, that each of them won above eight hundred Cities to the K oman Empire-, which certainly hath dimmed and obfcured the glory and memory of ail Antiquity.
What refolution Ihall then be given in this fo doubtful queftion,in which fo many reafons may be alleaged on all fides ^ It is a great matter certainly to give a begin- jng to things, which bemg afterwards increafed, are wont ufually to proceed on .more cafily: And yet on the other fide, according to the known faying, they are ,no lei's £0 be commended who add to things begun, and do piefcrve what is already -gotten, tr>en are the original Authors. But neither thefe, nor thofe may be faid to liave won the Cole ; which they can only properly be faid to do, who bring things alreaJy begun, and fincc much augmented, to thehighcft pitch of pcrfedion which fuch a thin;j is capable of, orwheieunto, being meafurcd with due refpeft, it can arrive. And thefe degrees are found in almoft all things that arceffefted by humane induftry ^ that is, the beginning, the incrcafe, and the perfedion : After which two other ihngs follow,- declination, and final ruine, whereof we do now treat. But thefe fevetal degrees may clearly enough be obferved in Empires. In thefe then did the Citizens of Rome adoperatc themfclves in all the aforefaid Ages fo worthily, -and fo much to the good of the City, as each of them may feera to lay claim to the c^ ief Crown of the Reman glory. It may then be faid, that though many things concur to the produdion of any thing, yet do they not all do it after the fame mao- iKr, nor arc they all of equal dignity in themfelves, or of equal force for the confti- lutmgof that work. Thus in the foundation of Remes Monarchy, certainly the Founders of the City did concur from whom flie received her firft nutriment, which help'd fo much to ftrengthen that body, and made it fit to fuRain the weight of (b great an Emp re. Thofe alfo who did ncxtfucceed them, who did add to her Milifil
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her Government, to her good orders both for War and Peace, and made her fitter for greater thinps, have tlieir part therein-, and finally, thofe who by fo many, and fo fig nalVii^ories, placed her, as it were, viith her own hands on the top of her grcatcft power and dignity. But in this connumcration of things, what can be affirmed, but that ihelaftAge, which by her particular A(Ss, and labors fawthc Commonwealth featcd, as it were, in the Throrc of Majefty, may with reafon challenge the greateft part of this merit and glory, becaufe Ihe concurred as the neareft caufe to the founding, and eftablirtiing of the City in that ftatc and condition, wherein (he was in her greateft excellency and glory amongft all Na- tions. It is true, that he, who in another refpcift, will more confider the necefllty then the dignity of the thing, may peradventurc be of another mind-, for it is moft certain , that had not the City of Rtme been firft founded by Romulus^ and maintained by other Kings in her beginning againft herinfulting enemies, it the Capitol had not been favcd afterwards from the GmIs^ if ihefomnny confp.racies made by the people oi Italy againft her rifing greatnefs had n t beenrepuift, there could have been no fuch thing as the Vi-'tories and Triumphs of the Scipios^ CMarcgllM, Falprititts^ CMetellus^ Porfptj^ and C/ifar, and of fo m;ny others 5 whoatchievcd thofe things by the ftrcngth of the City, already happily begun, and cncreafed with much induftry and valor.
But as it ufually falls out in natural things that their augmentation , changing as it were that firft Form, proves the corruption thereof, fo as tfar fubjcft bemg re- duced to another condition, little count is held of precedent affairs-, foinrhefc thinos which are formed by mans induftry, as a more unpolifhcd Form is fuc- cecded by another , which renders that fiibjcft more excellent and perfcd, no man values the former, or ccnfidersit with a thought of praifc or imitation: So we fee it falls out in the more noble Arts, as in Pflinting, Sculpture, Archi- tcfture, and the like, which daily grow to more pcrfe^ion, thofe are moft com- mended in them who therein prove the greateft Matters -, fo as their particular praife walks hand in hand with the perfedion which by their induftry they have brought to that Art, wherein they have with much induftry and fludy fpenc their
time.
Cinchndtw his poverty was praifed, and the like of fome others of thofe Com- mandersjwho were called up firom the Plough to be Confuls and Didators.becaufe iheyborea certain proportion to the condition of thofe things, and of the City. But the magnificence of Cra^us, and of LucuUtu^ had more coherence with the greatnefs to which the City of RmediiA afterwards arrive. It feems then that neither can there be any comparifon made between thefe ages, for as they were fufficicntly different between themfelves, fo different thoughts, ftudies, and ex- crcifes did become them .• which things, iftheyhadany thing of conformity be- tween them, it was rather by likcnefs, or figure, or rather fome difpofitions of ihofe firft weaker operations , to the other greater and more noble. And as it is fcen in every individuahnin, the fame things are not proportionate nor proper to all Ages, but divers things do accommodate themfelves to divers Ages,though the one be fubordinate to the other, fo as the txcrcifes may both be the fame, and differ- entjbecaufe they arc accommodated to the fame aim,and end,but are notwithftand- ing otherwifc put in afe, in Childhood, Youth, and Manhood -, juft fo in the point we arc now upon, things fait not with a City in the fccond Age, which were pro- per to her in the firft, neither could the fecond do thofe things which wcfrere- fcrved to the third, and which would not be praifed in the third, had it not done more then eiiher the firft or fecond. So to end this Difeourfe, it may be faid,Thit theCityof Jtowfj happy genius produced men well adapted to her three con- ditions, andveryexccllcntforwhaf each Age and condition brought forth. Y6%
if
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if the fuil: vvould hav^ made t.o,-) much haft in agrandifing, ani making the Ci- ty famous, they might nthtr have diibrdered thcmfelves, and by making ma- ny enemies, have encrcafed the difficulty of efPedting thofe things, which when rip;r, proved afterwards more fjfe and enfie: And Hkewifeif the fccond Should have unbraced things difproportionable for her ftrength,and have carried her Forces out of It'll) ■) before (Jie had therein ft tied the Roman power, it might have proved rather the corruption then the perfed^ion of the Commonwealth. The firft therefore, and the tccond, are very much* to be praifed, for fuch things as be came that Age and flate of the City wherein they Were done. But by how much more the adopcrating caufe doth work upon a more noble a perfcift ubjedt, by fo much doth the work prove more ptrfcdland excellent. Therefore thofe of the third Age having occaflon to aft in greater matters,as finding the City already very fpacious and powerful, the offfpring of their induftry and labour hath proved more noble, and they have won fuch praifc to the Commonwealth^ as greater is not to be pretended unto.
The Eleventh DrSCOURSE,
Heup the Roman Evipire, though it fell oftentines int« the band'' of bafe and wtck^d men y was notwithjianding able to m^in- tatn it f elf in the reign of many Emperors^ and how it came to be finally dejiroyed.
S amongft all humane unions ^ thofe Commands and Powers are nobleft, and of greateft worth, by which a man gets to be above other men, and doth govern them in a manner as God doth rule and govern the world, fo of all Dominions and Commands that ever were, the Roman Empire was greatly remarkable, and held in great efleem and revcrenceby all Nations^ and did fo far extend her felf, as it may almoft be faid with tlic Poet, That her Confines were thofe of the whole world which was known to antiquity. Which may be comprehended by this, that Ceuflantine the Great i'^avng divided the Empire between his three Sons, the c\dev C0»fia»ts»ey to whole th;rd part fell the Provinces of Spain^ France, and the greateft part of Cermany, together with the Ifland ot Great 5m4/«. made War with his Brother Co»/}a»ti»e^ to whofe fliare many other Countries fell, to come to a better aggiuft- mentofdiv Ti,.n, wherein bethought his Father had dealt unequally with him. Bu now this fo ftupendious Fabrick credcd in the concoutfe of many years, by the worth and labor of fo many gallant men, muft finally run the fate of all humane things, muft be d.fTolved and fall to the ground, and by herrulnc occafionvaft revolution of things. Henccit wasthat fomany noble Cities were ruined, and the ground-work of fome others laid, which proved afterwards very nobic Struftures. Hence it was that many intire Regions, had their antient Inhabitaors driven away, and were pofTeft by new Citizens, had new Cuftoms, new Laws, new Tongues and new fadiions brought in •, and hence it was that /m/;, which had been the Seat of fo great an Empire, was fubjed to greater alterations, and more heavy calamities thn other Provinces. It will not then be an unacceptable labor ( man being fo naturally given to the dcfire of knowledge) to feck out how, and for what eaufes c iefly thefe things happened. For that general mle, That wharfoever
K 2 hath
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hath had a beginning, muft have on end; will noi faiisfie our inquifuivc unJ<r- ftandings. Empires, as all other earthly ih ngs. have their beginning, increafe, per- fcdlion, declination, and laft ruine and defttudiion, all oi thtm crdaincd and dif- poled of by certain caufcs : And though they may be fcen to vary according to the variety of Accidents, that is not rotwithftanding Chance which appears to us to be fo, when we cannot penetrate into the true caules bt things.
In the beginning, the Roman Empire was governed in the form of a Common- wealth, ^er firft Founders having begun to enlarge her Dominion amongft her neighbi ring pecple. She cpnunued in this her inlancic, as I may call ir, many years, till the times of thofe famous ^fi/ro'j, who brought i/'<j/» and y^/r/V-Junj'er ter domin on. But afterwards in the enfuing Age, wherein defar^ Pgmpej^ and fo many other famous Commanders did flounfh, fhe mounted to the height of 1 er greatnefs and glory : Neither did Augujiw C^jat degenerate from the worth of them, though the Form of Government was chanred •, but he likewife did much increafe the Empires Confines in the Eaftern parts cmon^ ft the JnciiAns, and other exterior Narions, and eftablifli'd excellent Or^ crs both C;vil ;ind Military in tl e Empire But this Monarchy maybe faid to fta; d at a ftay at this t me, be ng con- ftituted in a Throne of Majefty, reverenced and obeyed by all Nations^ and in this condition fhe prefeivedherfelf forwellnigh three hundred ye rs, v\ herein though many and great Wars were mace by the fo man Enr.p. rors w ho governed in thofc days, yet were they rather male for thepiefervat.cn, then for the enlarging of the Empires confines : For there was notalmoft any of the barbarous nnd far diftanc Nations, as well of the Ea(t, as of the Weft* which thofe Emperors were not forc'd to vanquilhand overcome feveral limes, and reduce them to the obedience of the Empirt, from which they had rebelled. And if any one did enlarge the Empire in furthcft remote parts^as did i he Emperor Tr 4; 4» in Armenia^ India^ and fome others in other Regions and Provinces, it was notwithftanding at the fame timeleflened in other parts by new Rebellions. But in calienm his time, who was the thirty fourth Emperor, the Empires fupreme greatnefs began to decline : For though fhe received her mortal wound afterwards in the time of Arctdius and Uonorius^ which was above a hundred years after, yet in this intervening time, the Empire being in her df caying age, grew weak, yet fuftein'd herfelf, and like a Tree whofe root hath been for a long time very deeply fix'd, could not be eafily eradicated 5 fo as though fhe were of t&n times fhrewdly fliakcn by Armies of fundry Nations, yet was fhe able to refume her ftrength, and keep herfelf on foot.
Thus ftood the Roman Empire then, wherein many miraculous things offer themfelves to our confidtration, and invite us to feek out the true occafion there- of. For on one fide it appears a ftrange thing, that an Empire arrived at fuch a height of greatnefs, when fhe once began to decline, hafted fo fafl to her ruine, there not being any other Potentate left in the World, which was able to counter- poife her power, yea, which did not obey her, as fubjugated by her Armies-, having alio fo many Soldiers to defend hcr,defirous for their own advantage to preferve the Empire, But on the other fide, he who lliall confider, into the hands of how many bafe and wicked men this fo great Empire fell, he may ve y well wonder how fo violent a thing could endure for fomany Ages, and how a Dominion e;overned by fp many Tyrants could pafs from hand to hand through the feries of fo many Em- perors, whereof there were above five hundred between dsjars time, and that of '^yirc'idtm md lisNoriuSy in whofe days the Roman Empire began vifibly to fall, by the taking of R«me^ by the ruine of Ifalj^ and of other Provinces belonging to the Empire: And yet 'tis known, that the Perfian Monarchy, which was of fo great eftcem amongft the antientKngdoms, was quickly ruined by its falling into the hands of Princes given to idlencfs and pleafute, and wa? by Akxindcr carried
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to anothtr Nation ; whereof there are many examples feen almoft in every Age.
* Let us then fay. that another violence helped very mach to fufta "n this violence • of fuch a force is the union oF alike things. Thus did the corrupt Ciiftoms of the Peop'e and Militia of Heme help to maintain the Stace and Power oi thefe Tyran- nous Princes : Forfincc People lived in Rome with much licentioufnefs, and were enteitained with many Paftimes and publick Shews made by the Emperors, where- in thofc appeared to be moft fplcndid who were molt overgrown with vice, as were C'lliguU and Nero^ who did not only make the wonted fports of Hunting and of Comedies be often repreknted with more then ufual magnificence, butintiodcced new Shews, as Naval battels, Chariots drawn by Camels and Elephants, and per- mitted all licentioufnefs to the Soldiery, nomjndcfired to change conc'ition-, and the Pretorian Soldiers enjoying all things of ufe and priviledg neer unto the City, did not greatly care to be commanded by generous men: And when fuch Princes grew tedious to them, they put them to death, proclaiming a new Emperor, and rece ving from the new Prince many gifts in reward of their wickednefs : And the diforder grew fo great as fometimes the Empire of the World wasipy the Soldiers foldbyOutcry to who would give moft for it, and at low rates, a? it fell out in the lime of Didius J-ulitnus. Nor was the authority of the Senate able to correft this fo great inconvenience-, as well for that being trodden under foot by force, it was grown very weak, as alfo for that the anticnt Roman generofity was wanting in them. So as the Senate having rcfolved, after the death of Caligula^ to free the City and Empire from the like Tyranny, and to reftore her to her liberty, they could not becorftantiutheir rcfbluticn-, but being abafed by fear, fubmitted foon to the obedience of Claudius^ of ' <efars linage, and accepted of him for their Em- peror, as foon as he was cry 'd up by the Precorian Soldiers. The like to which happened afterwards in many Emperors-, thofe being confirmed by the Senate, which were chofen by the Army.
This licence was diverfly ufed by the Soldiers themfelves : For the Pretoriaa Bands, and that Army wherein the Emperor was at the time of his death, pretend- ed a particular priviledg in the cho.ce of the new Emperor. Yet Emperors were fo oficn cry'd up by other Armies alfo, which were in feveral Provinces of the Empire, uS all of them defirous in Galienus his time to ufurp this authority, there were thirty two, who ar one and the fame time made ufe of the name and title of Roman Emperor. So as it ftems it may be truly faid, that the Roman Empire was pre- (erved, not in refped to unity, or to the fame form of Government, but only in relpedt of that Authority which Roman Armies held of making Emperors, whom by I cafun of the faid Armies all Provinces were to obey, there being ro Miliiia l.kc to that of the Rimnns , or which could refifl them , or withdraw themftl'.es from their yoke. But great was the diverfity in all things , al- moft in all Ages-, for the height of Empire was arrived at by feveral ways; Some gotit by Inheiitance, asT/^m/*^, Crf/,-^»/4, Ntre; and in the following, Ctpfian- »/«Mf, Co/;/ j»//«tf, and many others ; tome, though very few, were chofeoby the Senate, many by the Emperors themfelves, who in their hfe-timc chole fome one for their Companions and Succeflbr in the Empire, calling him Ctfar^ to whom uf.erthe former Emperors death, the T. tie of E;nperor, and of i^ugtijfus was given: But their number we:e moft, who got the Empire through favor of the Soldiery -, wherein one and the fame refpcd did not always prevail, but many much different confideradons-, regard fometimes being had to the birch and affinity that anyone had to the former Emperors, fometimes to worth, and to fome fingular aAionof War, fometimes to favor, which Commanders knewlbme way or other how to come by from their Armies, and I'ometimes to lome other fuch like things ••
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Whence it vas that perfcns note nely of much differing conciiticn, Lutcvtsof divers Nations, were mace Empercis of Roott -^ 7ra)an ard Thtedotius were Spainards-, trohw^ Giovintar/ut, -^nd rtf/f»//r/«i, Hurgariars •, DiccUftan^x Dai- macian Co^o a Slavonian •, and feme otteis. But ihat which made the difference greater, was that this Empire as it was diverfly goittn, fo was ic diverfly admini- ilred : By fomc fo tyrannically, as\here is ro fo irfcmous and wicked vice, whereof you find not Oumeful examples in the lives of Tiheius ^ CaitguU^ Ners , Commedus ^ Catjc/iIU^ HdttgJiolus , and other of thofe Emperors- V hercas the Empire W3S governed by fome othcis with fuch Wildom and Ju- ftice as no more perfcft Regal Government canalmoft be imagined. Andwh:.c excellent veriue (not to i'peak of i^ugufiw') was there to be defircd in yelpAtt^n, Tittu, Trdja/t /idritir>^ AntoninM, Marcus AureliuJ ^ Alexander Se- 'i;fr«/,and fuvih like ? Whence it was, that there having been good and bad Em- perors in divers Ages, asmuchof Dignity, Authority and Po'.\ eras this Empire loft through the bad Government of thofe wicked Princes, it recovered as much by the valor and good Government of thefegood and venuots Princes.
And this nvgy be allcdged for the firft reafon, why the Emp re was able to pre- ferve it fclf for fo long a fpace of years.For being for a while run into many diforders, fnch as were introduced by the bafenefs and negligence of other iheir PredecefTors, wext by the worth of generous Princes amended, and returned to their firft channel. TheRomans antient and confirmed ufe of good military orders, didlikewife help well towards this : Wherefore though the Empire were in the hands of unworthy pcrfons, yet finding the ufual Armies already raifed, and ready for any cnterprifc, they were able by itieans of their Commanders, to wage war fucccfsfully, and to quiet fuch rifmg, and rebellions, as continually arofe in fo great an Empire. Thus •jtberiusdid not onely return trance^' wh-ch had rebelled to obedience, but fubjugated Cemagent^'&ndCaf^adociadXiddiWmg out their Kings, reduced them to Provinces. Nert driVe the Farthians out of ^irmeni't , and placed King Tigranci there, making that Kingdom Tributory to the Empire. CUudius did not onely reduce c^attritania , which by means of her Commanders made inrunedionagainft the Empire-, but did himfclf in pcrfonpafs with his Army into £f!gUnd^ toappiafetheRifingsof thatlfland-, and yet thefe Princes were not thought to have of tbemfelves any great worth in them. Thefe and fomc other fuch like caufes may perhaps be alleadged why this Empire could maintain it feif in that greatnefs to which it was arrived.
But to come to that which men arc more curious in inquiring after, as a thing very (Grange of it felf, as alfofor many other notable confequences-, to wit, to the caufes of its declir ing and luine. Three may, in my opinion, be chiefly alleadg- ed-. The immeafurablcgrcatn.fs of the Empire, the fimplicity and wickednefsof thofe who governed It, and the corruption ofcuftoms, which were far different from tl ofe with which it was firftjoui^ded, and wherein it grew great. Humane imperfcdion is the caufe why mans vertue , as it is not onely finite, and bounded, but weak and brittle •, fo hath it to do with things not onely finite and bounded, but circutufcribed within no very large limits -, which were it otherwifc, it would loofe it felf in an Ocean from whence it would not know how to cfcapc fafe. And of this, to omit the examples of many other of our a<ftions, we will onely consider, for as much. as appertains to what we have now in hand, That his worth muft be exceeding gi eat, who is to rule, and command over othas. Phylofophers have affirmed," That fuch a one ought to exceed others as far in Wit and Worth, as he doth in Dignity and P o■^ er •, nay that his worth and vertue oujht to we gh againft that of all thofe that he will rule over. But let us pafs by thefe fupreme Eminen- ces, which are rather to be dciircd, then ever hoped to be found. 'Tis very cer-
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ta!n, that it is very hard to govern an Err^pfre vVell, ani the greiter it is, t'\e greater h the difficulty of governing it. Whereioie LycHrgus , a very wife Lei^'fluor, knov\ing that the quiet of a City, and the long prcfervation thereof in one and the fame condition, and with a certain Fornnof Govcrnnnent, ought to b-thetru2 caufc of ordaining good Laws, would of his o'.vn eleftion fo difpafg of his Sp^rtans^ and of the orders of that Commonwe;ilth, as (h: lliould not be able much to enlarge her Confines. But on the contrary, Rams, uSall the conftiturions of thrCicy. aad the Cities Armies aimed chiefly at the enla-gingthe power of the Common- wealth, fodid {he never Icnow what belonged to the enjoyment of Peace, not onely by reafon of foreign Forces, but nor by occafion of difcord between the Ci- tizens. The bounds ot her Empire grew to be almoft immcnfe, and flie marcht with her Forces to the utmoft p.ir:sof the Earthjfubjugacing the farcheft dift inc snd moft Darb^rous Nations. But at laft,not having almoft any foreign Enemits to fight witb,herCitizensb.'gun to make ufe of their Armies which had conquered ocherNa- tions, in long and deadly contentions amongft themfclves •, till at lafl the worch and fortune of C<e/ir prevailed, foas AiiguBtts remained fole Lord of the World, and Tr^fr/w/. who fucceeded him, entered pcaceibly into fo great an Empire, wherein were an infinite number of Soldiers,train d up in a perpetual Militia,and by reafon of Civil \ ars, accuftomed to live very licentioufty. Thegreateft acquifitionsofthe laigeftand fartheftdiftant Provinces were very lately made, there having been a- bove 1700 Cities taken by two oncly Commanders, Cttf^r and Pcmpej^ and powerful Nations vanquiihed. So as it behoved to keep a great number of Sol- diers in thofe Garifons, to keep the people in obedience, which were in pares fir- theft diftant from the Senate ot the Empire.But the very feme th;n» which was in- troduced to provide againft thofe dangers, was aufe of cithers, By reafonof the Authority which the Armies had already ufurped, and out oi hopes afforded co the Commanders of attaining this fupreme dignity, by be n^ by the Soldiers cried up Emperors. Wherefore one c-.ely man, though of never fo much worth, not beingable to fupply all places, and provide for fo many things as fo great an Em- pire ftood in need of, and lefs able to corrcd ch? diforders,which in fo many States, as c^vil humors in members fartheft diftant from the heart, did daily more and more encreafe, the Empire muft reeds be continually vext both by foreign Nations, and by its own Soldiers ; (o as it was hardly ever free from fuch troubles ; nor vvas War looner ended in one place, bUt it broke forth in another'-, nay for the moft part, divers Roman Armies fought iri fcveral places, at one and the fame time, each of them endeavoring to fuftam him whom they had chofen to be their Empe- ror. Therefore Adrian to remedy fo many diforders in the Empire, which he thought did onely arifc by reafon of the Emperors being ^o far off, and the large- nefs of the Confines, refolved not to keep his certain abode in Rome^ but fpend- rng his whole time in travelling to vifit all the parts of his Dominions, tokctp his Subje(fls in their duties; and knowing hcrw hard a thing this would be to do, airi almoft impoITible in (o large Confines, he refolved tofhorten them in the Eaftern parts, making the River Euphrates ii\c utmoft bound eur of the Empire, andre- ftorirg all the people of the higher Provinces to their Liberty, even to //>V/4 ; who being by his fucccflbrs reduced under the obedience of the Empire, and many rebellions cnfuing thereupon, and much difficulty, not onely in the further diftanc parts, but even in thofe that were neareft at hand •, ConfisnttHt the Great, knowing that thefe evils coold norocherwife bchclpt, but by carrying the feat of the Em- pire nearer thofe parts, chofetheCityof ^;f ^(^wr/Hiw to be the place, v\hichbeing febuilt by him , took from him the name of Con/Iantinaplc. And hence it is that the Indian Gymnofophift, being defirons to ihew Alcxindir the Great, that whilft being born away with a drfire of Rule in far diftant Regions, he was gone
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fo far from his own Kingdom, as he gave it occafion of rebelling againft him, made ahardand fliff Oxc-hidc belaid upon the ground, and walking upon the ucmoft skirts thereof, (hewed him, that when the pare that was trod upon gave way to the foot, another part rofc up : And that fo it befell many great Princes, who whilft they feek to keep one part of their States low and quiet, the reft, which they keep far from, rife up in rebellion.
Hence ic was, that many Emperors, not only fuch as were unfit for Government, but even the uifcft and moft valiant, knowing and confefling themfelves to be op- pieftby the weight of fo great a mafs, chofc others who in their life-times were to be their Coadjutors in Government, and who fhould fucceed them after their deaths in the Empire, which vvas feldom quietly poffeft by one alone, the Armies of far diftant Provinces reiufing oft-times to obey ihofc who were chofen to fucceed in the Empire by other Armies, though they were with all folemnity allowed and accepted of by the Senate-, as befell GalU^ who being created Em- peror by the Spanifh Army, was not accepted of,nor obeyed by the German Army. The like befell many others ^ fo as fometimes it was not well known who was the true Emperor. And certainly, at all times of thcgreatcft height of this Empire it rmy be known, that no one man,though of never fo great worth,was able to govern it in peace and quiet. And even Augujlui himfelf made trial of many Infurredions in 5/>4^«,(7fr/w/i«)f, and iniheEaftern parts, amongft the Scythhns and PArthianst, though at Inftjthrough his finoular worth and great good fortune,thc whole World being reduced to an univerfal Peace, he was able to Ihut up that famous Temple of ^4»w,which was kept always open afterward,his Succeffors having always occaflon to molcft themfelvs with War. So as the faying is made true,that Suis (jr iff* Rsma viribtts ruit. But this her, ruinc was certainly accelerated by the lewd conditions of thofe into whofc hands the Empire often fell : For through their fault, the internal caufes of the States corruption were either occalioned, or much increafed ^ fince by their ignorance, bafeneft, avarice, cruelty, lufl-, and other enormous vices, they drew on contempt and injury, the firft and chief roots of all change of Govern- ment : For by contempt the Subjeds take occafion to rebel, and chiefly the richcft and nobleft s and from injury comes hatred, and defirc of change of Government. And it was the greater misfortune for this Empire, in all other refpefts more fortu- nate then all other Empires, that in thofe very times wherein there was grcateft need of a continued fijcceffion of wife and generous Princes to confirm the State, which by vertue of the great Augufttu was reduced from War and paftdiforders into Peace and good Government, fliould after him fall into the hands of three very lewd and bafe Emperors, Tiberius ^CaliguU^^nd Nero 5 from whofe enormous vices thofe chief evils arofeto the Provinces of that Empire, which wc but now mentioned, the contempt of that fupreme dignity, both amongftForcin and her own Soldiers. The former, by rebelling, ftrove to free themfelves from their obe- dience •, the other, through infolencc, bereft them of Empire and life. Hatred, and defirc of change arofe likewife in the Senate, which was deprived of its authority 5 and particularly in thofe who were ofFcnded,or had any thing of gencrofity in them. Hence ic was, that foon after, to wit in f^ero's time, defars linage ended ; and thai the Soldiers accuftomed to much licentioufnefs under fuch Princes, uiurp'd the au- thoriry of making Emperors, as they did in GaUa after Nero's death, in otho after CAlbd^ and fo in many others. His \yprth who commanded in chief, and his good fortune who was to fucceed in the Empire, was fometimes able to make a Succeflbr, but not to take this authority totally from the Soldiery, through confidence of whofe favor many afpired, though by bad means, to ufurp the Empire ; and amidft "thefe contentions the Empire muft needs be divided, ihatter'd, and weakened. From this root another diforder arofe, yvhich was caure of many heinous mifchicfs,
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to w!t, I he general corruption of Cuftoms in all the Orders of the City of Rome : For Sub,e(fts following, as ufually they do, their Princes inclinations and cxercifes, men began to give themfelves over to an idle life , and Vcrtue being neither nouriflied, ror at firftmaint lined, ftill languifhtd more and more-, fo as the Artot Commanding failing, good Obedience was alfo wanting •, every body made his wiil his law •, nor was ttiere any fort of wickedncfs, how infamous foever from which the Commanders or Soldiers were reftrained by any rcfped borne to the Majcfty of ihe Prince. All reafon was reduced to the fword,and every one dared to attempt as much as his power encouraged him to compafs. Such and fo grent were the vices which crept daily into men of all degrees and qualities, as it would be too laborious a thing to number them up all. This one example may fuffice to (hew, to what dif- folu encfsandlicent'oufncfs the affairs of jJow<r were reduced, when ^4/^4 having chofen Fifo Lafimanus^ a man very famous for his civil behaviour and military worth, his cle(fiion was neither accepted of by the Army, nor by the Senate, bc- caiile it was thought that if he fliould come to the Empire, he would corredt the many mifdemcanors both of Citizens and Soldiers : But both of them being kili'd, and in (Kad of him Othe was made Emperor in Rome^^nA FitelUus at the fiTie time cry'd up hmpcror by the Army in Germany, The affairs of the Empire wee then governed uith fuch confufion, and grew fo much worfc in the fucceeding Age, the diforders growing to be confirm'd by a bad habit, as when any Emperors Chould go about to correct the immoderate liccntioufnefs of the Soldiers, by reducing ihem to their antient difciplne, were they never fo good and wife Pr nces, they were (lain by the Armies-, 2S\\'3s AUxanderSeverus, Prthus^ and fome others. So as no certain Form could be given to fuch a Government, wherein the Soldier had fo great a ftroke in Authority, making and unmaking Emperois at their pleafure ; fo as it might feem to refemble a Popular State •, and yet the Emperors commanding with fupreme authority in fo ample a Dominion, Monarchy might appear to be there formed.
It is not much to be wondred at then, if this monftrous body of the Roman Empire being compofed of almoft incompatible, ill-govtrn'd, and m fproportioned p.irts^ lliould be fick of divers infirmities, and mufl at laft fufFer diffolution, fooner thenother^ile hergreatnefs and power promifcd. The negligence and pufillanimity of fome Emperors uerclikewife caufe why the City-Soldiers, who kept ftill about the City, as it were the Life-guard of the Princes perr">n, and who were tht flower of all the ;eft both for valor and difcipline, being long kept idle, grc v fo effemi- nate, and fo unnccuftomed to labor and military exercife, as when fome more valiant Prince would mike riJ of them, they lo nd tr-.emfelves deceived in the hopes they had of their prift ne worth. Wherefore the Empire hav'ng already receive .1 great loffcs and damages in divers battels, things grew to that heig' t, a (n .t to mention many almoft innumerable particulars which in this aCe might be pr.diice O^hen the States of t'.ic allaultedEmp.re would defend themfclvs againft the Northern nations ( as you (lull (hortly hear ) they were forced to take othc:s of the fame Nations to oppofe their violence : To fo great a want both of Power, Soldiers, and Military diicipline was the Empire reduced before it was fo rent and fo beicit of many Pro- v.nces, as it was afterwards. Then, as the Roman Empire was got to that height of power andgreatnefs by theworth ofthofcfirft antient Romans, and by the exccl- lencie of their military difciplne, fo her good Orders being aferwaids corrupted, llic took fo clean contrary a way to her firft beginning, as it behoved her foon to fall to rune; it being a certain and true rule, That States do increafc and are pre- feived by the fame means by which they had their firft beg nnings,and are corrupted by tl e contrary.
And he who dial! confider the antient ways and works of thofe who laid the firft
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foundations of tliis Empire, an:^ (liall compare them with thofc \vh:ch infued in the tmc of Emperors, will find fuchdift'ertncc therein, as the neceffity of coming to fuch an end may loon be fcen. The Ro.Tian Armies and their Leac'er-, were once excel. ent examples or vvorih and difcipline. Who does not praife and wonder at whai Tttus Maalitu did, v\ho punilht his viftorious Son with death, becaufc he fought the enemy befo;e the fign ot Battel was given ^ Very remarkable were the fcve.e punifhmcnts which were oft-times impofed upon the Soldiers difobedience, cv.n for flight caufes, whofe tumultuous proceedmj^s were oft-time punidied w.th decimating the whole Army. But how different from thefe examples we ethofe which were afterwards in the follovving Age Oiewn by many of thofe, who waged War and commanded the Roman Armies < The Commanders indulgence to* wards the Armies, the Soldiers uncurb'd licentioufn: fs, the authority and boldncfs which they afTumed unto themfelves, both over the people, and over the very Em- perors, whom they were to obey, are not they monftrous things in a well ordered itate^
Thofe antient Romans did fofludy Military Affairs, and fo frequent were the exercifesof the Viilitia with all Citizens, as when the City of Eomelnd rot ex- tended her bounds beyond Italy, {he hadfo numerous Armies, as (he was able to maintain atone and the fame time, but in feveral parts above One hundred thoufand men in Arms •, and yet when fo many calamities and ruines befel her by the Barbar-ans, when (he commanded over fo many Provinces and Kingdoms, her antient Difciplne wasfoloft, as for want of Soldieisfhe was forc'd to roakeufe of m-.rcinary Barbarians, wfo getting at laft to be very powerful, did joyntly turn their Arms againfl that Empire, for whofe defence they were called in, and whofe pay they took. Nor is the vanquidiing and beating of the Roman Armi:s, which was for fo many year-, unc*iquerablc? by other Nations, to be attributed to the Goths or thole other Northern people ^ but raiher to the corruption of their Ci;ftoms, toth.Uofsof their good Diicipline, end to the difcord and hafenefscf the Commanders, and Soldiers of thofc times. For were not the French a valiant and ftout Nation -f to overcome whom, it behoved CxJArio fight lb many Bat- tels and to make fo often trial of the Romans worth and fortune, and that not without much danger. Did riot the Romans wage V/^v in Spaw for the ipace of almoft Two hundred years together, before they could well conquer that Nation, and get quiti pofleffion thereof -f How often did the Saxojts, Bavarians and other people of Germany rake up Anns tomoleft the States of the Empire^ Yet all their commotions were ftill fuppreft. And had not the Roman Empire almoft continual War by reafon of their fo many Infurredfions, wi;h many other Eailern Nations, and chiefly with the Perfians^ And though fometimes theytaftedof adverfe fortune, yet their lofs was always recovered, asalfo theprejudiceof the reputation of the Romans Forces by their own Commanders and Soldiers, fo as they were always forc'd to keep within their own Confines, and under the obedi- ence of the Empire. But when they ftood in greateft need , when the Empire re- cieved fo fore and fo irreparable blows from the Barbarians, it was brought to fuch weaknefs in the Eaffern parts by reafon of the many great diforders which were in the Head, and in all the Members, which were now become incureable, as it was not able to fuftain the force of the fierce and warlike Northern Nations. And beginning once to fall, when its worth was but little,it could not get up again, as it had done at other times.
Now if we will apply thefe more general confiderations, to fome particular chan- ces of this Empire, the true ciufe of its declination will the more eafily be known.' The Affairs of the Empire were almoft at all times greatly molefted by divers cf the Northern People, many of which were never rcdncedto the obedience of the
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Empire, fome of which had not been known till they took up Arms , but of all the reft the Gotbr proved the moft famous for the ruine of the Empire, and for the fo many calamities of Italy ^ and of many other Nations 5 and he who (ball confi- dcr their beginnings and their progrefSjmuft needs wonder very much, and through confiifion lofe the difcourfe of humane wifdom*, To think how this barbarous p:ople, anJfofar remote from our Regions, and unknown by them, infjmuchj as at this day their original is not by Authors agreed upon, without or Kmgdom, or Military Difcipline, falling down tumultuoufly atnrft, topoflefs themfelves of other mens Countries, fhould foon become fo powerful, and formidable, as that they Hiould overcome the Romans, who had overcome the world. Who could have imagined that anew, and unknown people, were tocome from forth the uc- moft Northern parts, to deftroyfo vaftan Empire, by which fo many powerful Kings, and famous warlike Nations were fubjedted^ The moft general opinion is, Thatthefe men who deftroyed the Empire, came from Scyth Uinzo E»rcpe^ where they were pofleft of many large Regions, differing amongft themfelves in name and habitation •, thofe who lived more towards the Eaft being called Eaftern" Gothi, and others, more Wejlcrn-Ctths. But they were thought to be but nci'^ Inhabitants of that Country, into which they were firft come from certain Iflands in the SarmstUn Ocean ^ and that being worfled by fome of thex neighboring people, after many conteftations had with them, their Country being; moreover of two fmal a circuit for their abounding numbers, they betook thegifclves to feek out new feats, and other habitations. And thus they palled over very many times in very great numbers into the Provinces belonging to the Empire , polTc/ring and indamaging many Countries : The things a Httlc before mentioned, being the caufc why thefc evils , and the greater tuines which cnfued were not remedied. For the Empire being of a very vaft extent, was continually troubled with fundry commotions in fundry parts. The Princes who commanded were of little worth, and the former anticnt valor and difcipline was no longer found in chcir Armies, which were gwen over to licentioufnefe.
Hence it was, that when in the time of Philip the firft of that name, but in order the Nine and twentieth Roman Emperor, the Got&s fixt themfelves in Mj(i* and r/^riff, fuch forces were not fent againft thefe novelties, as might appeafe them, and quell the then but fmall ftrength of thefe tumultuous people. For there being BO loyalty in the Commanders, nor valor in the Soldiers, thofc who were fent by the Empeor agaioft fuch enemies, intended their own particular intercft more then the fervice of the Empire. Infomuch as Mtcrinus and Decitu being fent the one after the other to be chief of the tnterprife, made themfelves be cri- ed up Emperors by the Army, having firft permitted much licentio»ifn:fs in the Soldiers, that they might win their gooil will. And when the fame D(ci»$ was truly polfcft of the Empire, after the death of JiMcrinits, and of Philip alfo, joyn- ing battel with the Geths^ht found the cf!efts of nourilhing (edition in Armies, and inwinking at their difobedicnce, and at the non-performance of their military du- ties^ for his Army was routed and put to flight by the Goths ^z^ he fecking to lave himfelf by running away, was drowned in a marilh ground. And when after thefe lodes, the Empire ought to have been reftored,and the honor thereof vindicated by the Succclfor with new Forces V C*llttt who hud obtained this fupreim dignity by the Souldicrs rafhnefs, and who was a poorly fpiritcd man, and f:ad come by the Empire by indire(itj means •, That he might cn>oy his leafure time in Rome , which he leudly fpent, he was eafily perUvaded to make afhimefulpeace with the Goths , not onely permitting them to tarry in the Provinces which they were pollcflcd of , but obliging himfelf to pay them a certain fam of money yearly.
I, 2 Tbas
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Thus the City of Reme^ which was Miftrefsofthe whole World, became tribu- taiytoa Barbarous people, who knew not till then what belong'd to Imperial dignity, to Wealth, nor to Military glory; This bafe Agrecmenc gave a great blow to the rcpucation of the Roman Empire-, fo as in Culicntu his time, who foon after fucceeded in the Empire, fo many mutinies and infurreftions arofe, as Italy it felf was hardly kept in obedience •, and the Goths grew fo infolcnt, as break- ing the Peace which they had made with the G<j«/j, they took many Cities in Sjthinia^ in Thrdce, and in MacedonU : By which profperous fuccefles others of the Goths being encouraged, who had tarried all this while at home, where they lived in narrow precin<fts, they fent to the Emperor Valens to demand abode in the Provinces of the Empire ■■> with whom fear prevailing more then the ancient honor of the Empire, and the Roman generofity, gave way to their rcqueft, allotting Bulgaria and Servia for thefe new Inhabitants to live in •, fuflferlng the Northern Nations thus to get footing, and to increafe in flrength, which had always been the grcateft Enemies to the Empire, and from whom the Emperors had received fuch injuria and fliame. Thefe eafie acquifitions, and the hopes of greater matters, made t^Urieus Kingof the <?o//{'j march not long after with a numerous Army from his own Kingdom towards Italj^ demanding that a place of refidence might be allow- ed him by the Emperor Henoritu in France ^ and receiving a denial, did in his fury do greater mifchief. •' *
But the fame Emperor r4/^w foon felt the barm of this hisill-taken advice: For the fame Goths incrcafing through the bafeneft and negligence of others, and the Huns^ AUni^ and other Northern people confpiring together with them, they be- fiegedthe City of Confiaviittople^ and other noble Cities were endangered : which made GratiafiM choofe Theedofitts for his Companion in the Empire, for the great repute which was had of his valor, though he were a Sjuniard by Nation. But though he behaved himfelf gallantly againft thefe Enemies, and wanforne brave viftoties-, yet (Ince they had already got great flrength, and were governed in obedience under their valiant Maflers and Commanders, and for that the Empire was ftiU buficd in other Wars, it was thought expedient to come to peace with JlaricM King of the Gtths^ leading him and a great nunaber of his men under the Empires pay, to make ufe of them in other undertakings. For the Gethsht'mg kept in continual pay by fome former Emperors, amongft other Soldiers which ferved the Empire, and being of themfelves converfant in many Wars, they were become a valiant People, and had learn'd the Roman difcipline, though not the corruption which overthrew it, in the Roman Camp. Which, though it might be good for the prefent occafions, it did certainly prove very pernicious afterwards: For though by this Peace Tbtedofiuf^wis fafe from any fear of this Nation, whilft he governed together with GrdfsJnus^ and alfo afterwards when he held the Empire alone by himfelf, he being a perfbn of fingalar worth, and one who by his induffry had fomewhat renewed the antient difcipline amongfl the Soldiers, yet after his death the Forces of the Empire beginning again to flag, and the Empire falling into the hands of his two fons, x^rcadim and Henerius, who fucceedtd their Father whilfl they were but young, and proved not to be of fuch gallant parts as the condition of thofe times required, many of thofe who commanded under Theo' </i9/?»j in feveral parts rebelled, who were all of them cryed up Emperors by thofe Armies wherein they commanded-, by which occafions being invited, the cothj did not only return to rife ap in Arms againfl the Empire, but alfo other Northern Nations who did then inhabit Germany^ as the JUni, franks and Vandals, took up Arms, and did at on? and the fame time affault the Stares of the Empire in fevcral parts 5 many of them marching more particularly towards Italy, and sgainflthe very City of it^/wf, which after divers paflTagcs remained in prey to thefe Barbarians ?
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the antienc Roman worth being fo decayed, as there was not any one who did Co much as provide for the welfare of fo (lately a City, which was the Queen of the World. And the Emperor Hofttrm ( a thing which is not to be mentioned wich- out much marvel) whilft /w/7 and other Countries were wafted with War, and the very City of jRwwf was reduced to the utmoft extremity, remained in RAvenna an idle Speftator of his Subjedls fo great alamity, a/id of the ruine of his State, in fo bafe and ftupid a manner, as being told he might do well to provide for the prefer- vation and lafety of fo many of the Empires Provinces, which being mifcrabiy torn in piece$,werc falling into the power of the Barbarians, anfwered. That he could live without them.
After the ruine of Rome^ thefe vidofious Barbarians paft into FrAUct^ and into Sptin^ where being recruited with other people of their own Nations, and the Roman Armies being bufied in Civil fcditions, and in maintaining thofe Emperors wh ch each of them had chofcn, they had Icilure to fix themfelves there, and to take pofTcflion of thofe noble Provinces, the greateft part of whofc ancient Inhabi- tants being cxtinguiflied, they fctltd themfelves there, and did long govern thofe Dominions ; and others of them palTii^ into Africa^ and having won large Terri- tories, did with the fame Fortune and lame thoughts inftitute their proper King- doms. But on the other parr, other People called the Huns fell into Fa»xi9»i4^ called now by their names, Hungaria^ and poffeffing themfelves likewife thereof, fixe their abode and dominion there. So as there was hardly any Weftern Province of the Empire which was not at this time troubled by this fury of War, the Roman Princes and Soldiers not having fufficient worth to withftand them : Infomuch that when AttiU marched with a furious Army to dcftroy Jtdlj^ the Empire not having any Soldiers that they durft confide in to impede his pafTage, the Romans were forced to take King Theodericus with a good number of hi» Goths into their pay5 by whofe afliftancc that cruel Enemy was at that time kept off. Bat the Empires weak Forces being at laft tyred, and fome Commanders being loft in whom there remained yet fome worth and difcipline, the greater, and almoft fatal ruines oi Italy began ; whereinto when thefe aucl Barbarians entrcd, they put all to fire and fword, bringing total deftruftion to many noble and populous Cities. Which (according to the natural order of all things mortal, wherein Corruptio unius efigenentio dterius) gave occafionto the birth of the City of Vtnice^ whcrcunto the rwnainder of the Italian Nobility had recQurfCj and faved themfelves.
The
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ff^hy tbt Comntenweahh of Rome , though (be fuffinred many Pefeats in d'tverj Battels , yet did ^iU prove ^i^orioHs at IS.
HE who fhall narrowly confidcr the great adions of the Romans, wiU dill difcover new thing; therein not onely w(M:thy of praife but of ad- miration. Their profperity was certainly very great, but proceeding, as it is CO be bclccved, from their worth, and from certain and ordi- nary caufcs. The People ot Rome made raor« Wars, then evci: any Potentate hath been known to do; but that which occafioneth the greateft wonder is, that their fuccefs in all of them was profpcrous : And that though the Romaa Armies were in many Battels overcome, yet ftill in the conclulion of every War the V iAories fided with them.
It will then be worth the while to feek ouit the trueftjor at leaft, the moft truth- like caufes thereof, by reafoning thereupon. The City of Rome waged continue Wars from the firft foundation thereof till s^ugufim his^ time,which was for above Seven hundred years. The gates of that fampus Temple of ^*nnfy which were never to be (hut but in time of Peace, flood always open, urjiefs it were once in the ConfuKhip of Tittts Mav^Ihs ; nor was there almoft any Nation known in thofc daies, with whom the City of Rome hath nq^ at fometime made trial of her forces and worth. That Commonwealth in faraapyi and fo long contentions of War, was likewife foroetimcs favqred, fom?tipe$ frowned upon by fortune -, fo as fometimcs flie was brought in^ovecy grcat,danger 5 yet fliUihe prevailed at laft, and triumphed over her formerly vi(StoriQfls cnejmies, , Long and heavy was the difpute, which in her very beginning: ib^lwd; with fo many people of lulyy and chiefly with thofe tiiat were neacefl,, vphp iingly by themfelves , and joyat- ly with others, did confpire againft the Romans, and did by all their hcfl endea- vors feck how to keep the power of the Empire low, which was ordained, as was afterwards feen, to the height of all gteatnefs. Nor was the Commonwealth of Rome fecure from the efforts of foreign Nations 5 nay many times (he was to with- ftand the fury of the French, who aflailed her with great Forces, that they might totally fubdue her, and pofTefs themfelves of her Territories, as they had done of fo many other parts of Jt4ly. The Commonwealth made ifrial of her Forces,even in the beginning of her greatnefs with other Kings 5 till beginning with the fiift Car- thaginian Wars, to wage War further from her Confines, (he prcvrd ac bft a terror even to the moft remote foreign Countries , which (he at laft fubjugated affiiming always greater and better courage, as her Empire did cncreafe, and her' Military Difcipline bettering by exercife , as did alfo her worth by profperous fuccefs.
Who will not then admire thefe fo great and unparellel'd things /* Who can confider them without endeavoring to know the reafons thereof 1 Foljbius^ whilll he recounts fome of thefe wonderful things, terming the people of iJ^we invin- cible, adds ( that he may in a manner give thereafon thereof) that thefe people brought whatfoevcr enterprife, how hard and difficult foever, after many andva-* rious fucceflcs, to a good and defired end, becaufe they were modeft ia profpcrous, and conftant in adverfe fortune. Thefe two excellent vertues are certainly rcqui- (itc to whofocver propounds true and perpetual Glory for his end, and doesafpire
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tlieieunto : for the variety of humane affairs does not tolerate that man iliould ar- rive at the height of power, and at fupreine ho; ors by a ftrcight and Ihort path of continued profperity -, therefore conlfancy, oi let us rather term it Magnanimity or Fortitude is requifite for hi:n, to the end that he may perfevere in the fame s^al- lantry and grandeur of fpirit , w herewuh he did propound any great adtion to hm- felf. Without being weary or quiet till he hath efFcfted it. And modeffy is Uke- wifc neceffary for him, that is to fay a temperate aftedlion, fo as he may not lofe himfcl' in profpcrous fuccedes, and being puft up with pride and vain giory, may not th!nk he is come to his journeys end , when he is not gotten half way thither -, which is the caufc why many have loft their good ionune, and not reaped ihe tru: fruits of many worthy and well begun labors. So as it may be numbrcd amongft thofe tilings which made great Kings amongft them, and which brought th^rmio fo great an Eminency ot power, and command, that ; hey u ere endowed with thefe two excellent Venues , whereby they knew how to make ufe of both fortunes.
But thefe may peradventure be but general rules, and not fuch as may give faiif- fadlion-, tor if we will look into the Commonwealth or Greff^, we (lull find ma- ny eminent ex imples of both the'e ver;ucs, yet were they not able to carry them halfthe way fo far towards the Goal, whereat the Romans arrived •, theref re are not their aiiions worthv that hiphcitcem which is dcfervcdiy put upon the Roman Affairs. There have likewife been many famous Pnnces in leveral ages, who nei- ther wjnted generofity o^ mi-^.d, conftamly to prnfecute noble adions by them begun-, normodefty and temperance in al; othei affeftioiis, meerlyoutof adefire ol glory •, anJ yet their entcrprifes h; vc not aiwjies fucceeded well, nor have they inlarged the.r Power md Dpmi.iions, as did the Romans. Let us pafs on then to other confidiratioisuhc'i Hull her atter be looked upon, how the Rom ins govcrn-d themfclves and thr.t cou.-.fds .n their Militia, wh it th.ir milicary orders and infttutions were, what ftatethrv were at fin; pjfleftof, which ferved as it were for a ladder for them whereby to climb up to the height of fuch greatnefs and command, and wc fh ill find thar thefe w le fuch amon^it the Romans as were not all ot them together, or in fuch cxcJlenc^' ;n other Principalities and Natioi s, fo as they were wiih reafon to produce ucn eff. dt. ai they did. All the Offi :es of War wereadmnftred amon. ft the Ronans by their Citizens; varying fome- times the condition of the pcrfons, together with the namcsand authority of thof.- vho commanded the Armies ^ for they made fometim s ufe of Nobleman, foine- limcsof Phbeians. Bi t they ftill kept amongft the;r own Romans, all the degiets ohhc Militia, and cffordidocc-fion to many to excrcife themfcvs therein, To as there was not any witty Cit zen, oi hopeful! Yo.in^^-manoF noble extra (ft, wj o was fjr trom them. Nay, itis ftcn, that thofc who were m->re given to the ftudv of fpeculadve Learning, when the places, andGov.rnments corn- mi. ted to their charge , did fo require, betook tlicmfelvcs, as others did, to the managing of Arms, and to warlike Affairs-, in fuch fore as even Cicero^ wholly oiven to Philofophie, and the ftudy of Eloquence, when he went Pro- conful into C///t-M, waged War v\iththe Parthhns. Hence it was that they ne- ver wanted Commanders, and if at any time the Roman Armies fuffered any thing by the imprudency or infelicity of one Commander, tlicy knew qu ckly how to m.ikc amends by the worth and fortune of another, as it fell out ac all times; Tor inth.it Commonwealth, by reafon of her orders, and by her being (till im- ployed in \\ ar, the way was alwaicsopen to many Citizens toimploy themfclves in Arms, and in commands of the Armies. N^^rwas the obedience whch is due by Soldiers to their Commanders the lefs for this. For a Conful, or Di^t uor had the like authority in the Camp, as the perfonof an abfolute Prince could hav; had, ^^ho commanded his Army pcrfonally. There-
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Therefore by dcfcending to more pjrticulars,the bcnefic may be the more eafily decerned which redounded to that Commonwealth, by means of thefe her good orders .• For if any diforderdid at any time happen (as ufually there doth ia any, how well foever ordered Government ) through the fault of any particular Citi- zen, whereby the Commonwealth (uffered prejudice in the adminiff ration of War, this might foon be amended, and the prejudice received from the enemy, might quickly be reftored by the prcfence and worth of fome other Citizen. Thus it Jell out, that when the Roman Armies, whilft the bounds of the Commonwealth were but fmal , were overcome by the Sabins , by the Equi^ by the Capen. ttati^ by the Falifci^ and by others of their neighbors, with whom they waged War, ihcy could eafily flop the courfe ot that their bad fortune, and fhunrun- ing into greatt r dangers. The rout which was given by the Equi^ and Sarins ^ and which was the greatcft giveh in thofe times, was known to be occafioned through the diflafle which the Army took at Affitu the Decewuiri and at the injuflice, and cruelty which he ufed towards the Soldiery. Wherefore returning to the former Government of Confuls, ^intiw the new Conful had the means given him of recovering the Militias formerly loft honor and credit ^ by giving a great over- throw to thofe very enemies, who were grown fo proud and infolent for their vidlories had over the Roman Army.
Thusliktwife, when the Roman Armies were (himefully put to flight another timeby the f<j7i, HdeM*teszndFaliJci, firft through the defeat of PapjHw Mf*» gelanus-^ and then by the like of Gtmtius^ and Titinius the military Tribunes, who were mean and unexpert P/f^"4»f, and who without much authority hadthecarc of the Army-, V/hen ^i»tt*s ServiltHs was created Conful, and after him /*«. rius CAmillns^ they won the moft famous vidories that the Romans had ever got- ten till that time (which was Three hundred and fifty years after the building of the City )againft the tx£^«i,and other of their Enemies.Butthis may be better con. ceived in greater afFairs,when the Commonwealth was much increafed. The Roman Arm es received fo notable defeats in the War -.vhich Pjfrr*«f made againft them, as the whole affairs of the Commonwealth feemed to be in no little danger, having fo potent and viftorious an Enemy within their boforas : yet at laft not being M- mayed for any ad verfe fortune, but treating freely with their Enemy, rather as van- quifliers then vanquifhed, they reduced their affairs to fuch a condition, as Pyrrht*s thought it his beft courfe to quit itAlj, and leave the Romans qu et. It is herein to be confidcrcd, that the Romans being fo long accuftomed to continual Wars with their neighbors the Italians, and particularly mththtSamnites a little before this time, againft whom the Romans marched with numerous Armies, and had good fuccefs winning many famous vift^ries; infomuch as Fd. Corvinus kill'd above thirty thoufand Samnites in one day, made much for their withflanding fo great an Enemy as Pyrrhta, and for their maintaining ihemfelves againft Forein Forces, agninff the ufe of Elephants, and other new ways of warfaring, which Italy had not known before-, whence it was that the City of itow^ did at this time abound in valiant men, and who were expert in the Militia. So as Cyrtneas who was fenc by Fyrrhui to Reme^ told him, that hehadfecn a City fo very full of Inhabitants, as he feared if his Highncfs fbould continue his war with the Romans, he rtiould go about to overcome an Hjdr* : And Pyrrhus himfelf hath more then once admired the worth of the Roman Commanders.
W ho doth not even with wonder confider, how many Commanders, and how many ArmiestheCommonwealthofittfWf could fetout in the War with the Car- thaginim^, and efpecially in that with //4w»/^<»/, which did moreem'anger the af- fairs of Rome then all the rcft^ fince it maintained War in fo many fevcral parts a: one anJ the fame time, in Italy^ Spatn^ K^frica^ ani Creice. Which they were
able
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able to do by reafon of the infinite number of men wlierewiii! Itatj was thfn in- habited, who were all well difciplined, by reafon of their long exercife in War. We read, that when the Roman; made War with Hannibal^ they had fometimc;, vthat of their own proper Soldiers, and what of their AfTociates , who did all n:ighborneer upon them, twenty three Legions, which made abouc an hundied thoufand Soldiers, for defence of their Empire. Moreover, whilft the Common, wealih kept her Forces divided in feveral p3rts,as fhe did with wonderful judgment in ilie Carthaginian war, which was the (breft of all the reft, though (he tafteJ of adverfc fortune fometimcs in fome parts, yet were not all her Fo-ces utterly de- ftroyed-, for that part of their Forces which was yec fafe and entire, was a )le to make good the fortune of the whole Commonwealth. Thus after thofe notable Routs which the Roman Armies had, the one by the Tygufia» Cauls, when the Forces were commanded by Luciits Cafsius ^ the other by the CjmhrUns^ when they were led on by dius Servilius Cepio^ in which two Battels the Romans loft above Eighty thoufand Soldiers, they were able notw thftanding to recruit them- fdve?, and defend their affairs 5 becaufe they had another vidorious Army at the fame time, commanded by t^farhs, who had juft at that time glorioufly ended the War againft ^ugmth. Thus when the Commonwealth of Rome fcemed to be utterly ruined by reafon of the two difcomfitures given them, the one at Ty^r^/y- menes^ the other at Cann£^ {he was reftored again by her profperousfuccefs in War with Spain. Thus when two of her Armies were woifted in spain^ the Common- wealth was prefervcd infaiety by foriunate fucccfs ot their VVars in Sicily and in Jtalj. When the Romans were in greater danger then ever, there being at the fame time two greatCarthaginian Armies in Italy^MA two moft valiant General, fJanni- bd and Afdrubal; yet would not the Romans keep all their Warriors in Utly^hnt did at the fame lime maintain and reinforce their Armies in Sardinia, Sicily^ Francf^ and Spain. And though by reafon of fo many Wars which begot one another, the Commonwealth muft needs oftentimes run great hazards, efpecially fince (he oft- times cxpofedhtr Armies to the doubtful event of Battel i yet did they thereby receive this of good and fafety, that by reafon of their continual cxercife of Arms, they were the more eafily provided of valiant and experienced men, and were the better able to govern themfelves in adverfe fortune. The Carthaginians, on the contrary, not being able to make ufe of many good Commanders or Soldiers, (for they did not make ufe of their own peculiar Militia, as did the Romans, but did imploy fomefewof the chief of their City-Fadions in commanding their Armies) could not fo eafily recruit and reinforce their Armies, when they were weakened by any adverfe fortune -, nor had they whereout to pick better or more forcunate Commandcrs,when any of theirs were faulty. Infomuch as when the Carthaginians were overcome by Scipit in Africa, they were forc'd to rccal Hannibal fro n Italy^ fuffering the Romans to take breath in thofe parts where they were moft molefted ; and Hannibal liimfclf not having means to recruit his Army, which he had brought with him from ^frisa, and whiCh was wafted and weakened by long march, and adverfe fortune , was necclTitated to give way to the valor and fortune of the Romans.
It made not a little likewife for the Government of the Roman Commonwealth, and for the maintaining of her in her weak beginnings, that the Miiitia was ex^r- cifcd for many yeais without any pay to the Soldiers. So as wh 1ft their means w.is yetbutfmall, andyet they muft ftillbc in Arms, by reafon of their being (till in- fefteJ by many of the neighboring Nations, the want of monies was no caufc of not maintaining their Armies, as it hath been the rune of many Stat s • but if they happened to receive a Rout, the Army might be recruited by other chofcn an J com- manded men. But afterwards when the City W3s,mu:h better peopled , and much
M ftronoer
(80
ftronger, fo as (Iw w«s able to make greater undertaking?, th? publick Exchcqurf was lb enriched, anfvrerable to what became a well-ordered Government, and which afpired to the heighthof Empire, as (he was not for this caufc fo incommo- dated, as that (he mud yield under the weight of War, nor yet for any her greateft misfortune. Whereas in fomc other Commonwealths, as in that of Sparta, the poornefi of the Exchequer introduced by Ljcurgus his Laws, hindred her from enlarging her Empire •, and when (he afpired thereunto, fhe was forc'd for want of things requifite to flie for help to the Kmgs of Perfia 5 fo as in litu of domineering over the reft of the Grecians, fhe became a fervant to Barbarians, b'ecaufe (he ex- ceeded thofe Terms and Rules wherewith her Government was founded and cfta- blilhed.
After thefe confidcrations, fomc things may be added which proved likewifc very advantagious for the fecuring of the Roman greatnefs : As the continuation of the Militia, ouc of a duty impofed upon every Citizen, of fpcnding almoft all the beft years of his life in the Camp, everyone being bound to militate till he had advanced fifteen Pays at leaft : So he who had fought in one or two Battels, was not permitted to fit down and reft, but continuing in the Militia, by reafou of the exper.cnce he had gotten, became more ufeful and advantagious in the Wars. Amongft others, we have a notable example of one L. E. sicdus^ who was Qain in the Camp in the time of Affius his Decemvirate, after he had followed the Wars for Forty years together: and afier having been in above a hundred Battels. Itisalfoathing of great confideration, thatthe nerve of the Roman Armies con- fifted in their Infantry, though they had fome Horfe to ftrengthen ihem 5 whence ic waSj that iheywerefooner recruited, and reinforced after a rout, for that men are fooner recruited then horfes: there being greater ftore of them •• And which the Romans could the better do, becaufe they made ufe of men of one onely Country for their Soldiers, that is to fay, of their own men, and thofe ot their Aflbciatcs who were at hand and ready to be joyned together, and be imployed in any adlion; which doth not fall out fo when Armies are to be raifed and recruited out of many- Nations, and from far diftant places. But it was a great help to the Romans a- bovc all other things, for the maintaining of themfclves in all events of fo many Wars, vvh'ch they made with fo many powerful Kings and Nations, that they were poflfcft of ItMj 5 a Province, which in thofe times did more abound in men and at ms, then any other Country 5 as may be known by many things, but chiefly by this, Thatthe Commonwealth of RtmehzA labored very long ere (he could fubjugate Italf , which was not wholly fubdued, in all the parts thereof, till after the Commonwealth had extended her Precinfts very far .- when afterwards by the Forces of the fame //rf/y, (he in a few years overcame all other Provinces,and Nations. Therefore the War which was made againft the Romans by the neigh- boring People, the ficeni^ Peligni^ U^arufini^Luani^ (Jifarci, and others, which was called B e Hum Sect aU^ becaufe they termed themfelves fellow companions to the People of Seme 5 though there were but a fmal part of the Italian Forces in it-, yet that Country being excellently well inhabited with warlike men, it was thought to be one of the hardeft, and moft dangerous Wars , that ever the Common- wealth of Remt made •, nor could it be ended out by allowing thofe People, the Franchife and Liberty of Roman Citizens, which was as much as to grant them C^e thing they fought for; for the obtaining of that, was that for which they foughr. And we read, that a mufter being made throughout all /r^/jr of all the Soldiers which might be afTembled to withftand the danger which was thr earned by the Barbarians, when the Trdr/f alpine Gauls which dwelt about the if^tfit'/w/, were funmoned by the other Gauls, who were already pofTeft of fome parts of Lom' bjirdj^ that they might prepare to affault //</; •, the Mufter role of fuch as were
able
(S5^
rblc ro bear Arms, amounted to Sevea hundred thoufand Foot, and Threefcore thouCanJ Horfe, who weie fit to ferve upon fuch an occafion. And yet the great- i ft part of Lemb.irii-i^ wliich was pofleft by the faid Gattls^ nor (ome other o[ thofc IM-ovnctSwh. chare row comprehended within the Confines o( Iialj^ were not nu iibercd in this Mufter-roH. Which is fo much the more to bewondrcdat tor that this happened after the Carthaginian War ^ to wit, when the Common- wealth o' Rome was not yet gotten to thic height of Powor whereunto (lie ariivcd after .vards -, people mjltiplyitig through the greatnefi and felicity of the Empire, and many men having been confum.d in thac long and fore War.
To thefc things may be added the excellency of Military Difcipline, which as it Nvas in great perfe(f>ionw,th the Romans, fo was it of great advantage to thcob- tainingot fomany Vi(ftorics,andto thecompleatingof fo many enterpnf s. For \.\\ow^\M\\QLreciin,CM*cedoman^ zn^ Roman Militia weie ofgreateftecm at one and the fame time, yet thac of the JZ(»/»4«j did fo f ir exceed th: others, as that ic was notoncly ftronger,and more recure,but better fitted th.n the reft for all places, and times. Amongft other Ord«rs of the Grecian and of the Macedonian Militia, wherewith the Armies of Alexander the Great did in particular fo miraculous things t\\c fhaUnxwzs muchcelebrated •, but this, though it were in it felf of very g cat ftrengtb, it oft-times proved not fo ferviceable, if upon any occafion itbecame to^ be d.vidcd, or difordercd : But the Roman Orde:s were not onely firm and ftable, as was the Phalanx^ but were more adapted to every place, and every fejfon, and proved very congruous for all warlike adl.ons 5 fo as to their own great advan- tage, and to the prejudice of their enemies, making ufe of their own Soldiers, the Romans performed the Office of whatfocver military Difciplinc by their own men, fighting in allpofturcS,either in whole bodies altogether ,or Squadron to Squadron, or man to man, fops r ot any man was idle or ufelefs in their Camps,or Battels. For whilO ihcy minded fighting and not flying, or free booting, therouts which their Armi.s did oft-times receive, were not fuch, but that they did in fome places make their party good againft their Ciiemy, and keep fome part of their Army lale -, whch proceeded principally from the exqu'fite ordeis of that Militia. In- fomuch as W4»«/^4/ when he came firftinto/M/y, having after his firft confl (5ts learn d the excellency of this Militia, made his ^oldiers ufe the Romans Arms ; and Pjrrhus did rot onely betake himfdf to ufe thcfe Arm<;, but did mingle m iny ftdian Soldiers, the better to accommodate his Militia to the Roman Ordinances ; (ayini?, that that Difcipline of the Barbarians (a name given by the Grecians to all other Nations) was not at all barbarous. So when it happened that the Romans received any rour, as they did in the Battels made againft the two aforefaid Com- manders Wj»»/^4/ and Pjrrbiis^ very experience in other fucct (Is made them know that it was not chegoodnefsof any forcin military Difcipline whch bereft the Ro- mans of the Vidones which they were wont to bear awav,bu for that the Romans wanted fuch (xcellent Commanders as tliofetwo were. Therefore when the worth of he Commanders came to be equil, the goodnefs and cxcclUncie of the Roman Military Ordinances prevailed befo-e thofe of thofe very Armies, which for fome other refpeds had tlie better of the Romans.
But to proceed upon our late corfideration, we muft (wy that t'le Arm; iifed by tie Romans were thought very convenient, pndb-tter then thofe of other Na- tons, a> Launces whch wcieufuilly given to Soldiers of the firft Files-, whereby they received much benefit, as well to vuthftand the firft fi.rccft efforts of the Enemy, as to weary them in cutting thofe arms in pecees, being to come to cloler fight-, and then whole bodies of trelb and well armed Soldiers fucceeded in the Ruman Arnr.ies. For their bodies-.', ere covered Witb t'leir Biicklcrsj which were
M -i, very
(?4)
very la, ge ones, andthcfliort, but very fliarp fwords and finely tempered, \i[ed by the t^omans, were of great advantage to the Soldiers, who mighc wield them inalongfi^hf, as well to defend the infdves fro n their Enemies blows, as to lee flie upon Them', which was not pradtifcd in other Militia's of thofe times:, parti- cularly not amongft the French, with whom the Romans had often and dangerous fichts , for they ufed very little Bucklers, and long heavy fwords, very {harp at the point, foas they were cafily wrcfted, and made unufeful. Therefore the routs which the Roman Armies received, were very few in eoraparifon of thofe they gave their Enemies-, and being butfeldom worflcd, and often vidorious, thcflate, flrength, and reputation of the Empire did (till incrcafe-, fo as when fome advcrfe forunc happened, it was notfufficient to extinguidi, no nor fo much as long to weaken the greatnefs of that Commonwealth. Divers particular good rules obferved in the adminiftration of War, were likewife of great moment for the carrying on of the Roman affairs. Amongft which the diligence which was ufed bypublick conflitations in dividing of the prey, may be numbred for one ; for they ufed to place the prey or booty firfl in publick, and did then fo divide it amongfl the Soldiers, as thofe who were upon the guard fliaredas well thereof, as thofe that were forwardefl in thcaftion, and who had fackt the Enemy. Where- by occafion was not given for thofe notable diforders which have been obfetved to happen in thefe latter times , wherein upon fuch an occafion the lofs of the whole Army hath cnfued.
The faith alfo which was fo cxa(flly obfcrved,and the fair proceedings with fuch Cities as were fubjed to that Dominion, won the Romans the good affedlion of the people-, bywhofe favor Empires arc ufually more upheld upon anyadverfe accident, then by any other thing. Of thefe we read of many notable examples; it being as far from that good Military Difcipline.to bear with the mfolency of Sol- diers, lis it is introduced in thefe our laflAges to the great prejudice of people, though friends and fubjeds. For fuch faults as thefe were ftverely puniiL'd j the which is obfervable amongfl fo many other adions, for what the Romans did to thofe people, to whom they did not only rcflore the goods and liberty which had been by the Soldiers wickedly taken away, and fo their grievances were redrcfV, but thofe were fevercly puniih'd who had committed fuch things. To this may be added, that the Romans, to the end that the power of the Commonwealth mighc ftill prevail, and might upon any occafion be made ufe of, endeavored as foon as they bent their minds to greater matters, to accompany their Land-forces with Maritime- aids, fo as the one might help the other, and the one not only be made more powerful by the other, but more fecure, as it fell out, and as it may be ob- fcrved in many of their adtions ^ but chiefly when feeing their affairs fuccecded but il'l wi;h the Carthaginians, who prevailed by reafon of their antient Maritime pro- fefTion, and had likewife great advantage in their Land-Miliiia by their ufeof Ele- phan s, which the Romans had not as yet well learned how torefifli they bene themfelves wholly to Naval preparations , wherein they did afterwards behave thcmfelves with fuch valor and profpcrity, as they overcame thefe their fo fi-.rce and cruel Enemies in a Naval fight, and raifed their fortune.
Let us in the next place obferve, that the greatnefs and generofity of the Romans was fuch, as not content to fecure their neer neighboring dangers,and out of a defire of quiet to leave the fparkles of thofe Wars unquench'd, from whence another fire might foon be kindled, theyalways endeavored to fee the lafl fparkle quite put out. The Roman Army was overcome, and much endamaged by the Ga/li Gejfati after the death of Conful Atilius ,vfhett their liberty being expofed to much danger upon this fo fad accident, the Romans would once more try the fortune of battel, wherein they had good fuccefs, and cutting in pieces above Forty thoufand of that:
Nation,
(8>-)
Nation, they did vindicate their former injuries. Nor yet did they then lay down their Arms, though they were freed from that their greateft danger •, but knowing that there remained yet other pow erful Armies of the fame Gauls in other parts of Itd-j, they would continue war againft thcm,and of aflailed become alTailors ; which atforded themoccafionof thofe CMArcetlw his notable vidorics, and of making thcmfelvcs mafters of the cjiiefefl Cities of Lombardj^ which were poffefl by the GauIs. The Commonwealth of Rome was never in greater danger, ihen when Af- druhal pafiing Over the Alps with a numerous Army, entred Italy, \v\\\\9i his i^ro:hcr Hdnnihl was there likewife with another powerful Army. They fought Afdmbat^ and to their great joy their Confuls were vidorious: which notwithftanding , they forhare not to continue war in Sftin^ though they were free from their greater and reerer dangers 5 but with the Forces they had there, went to find our, and to fighc other Enemy- Armies of the Carthaginians which were in that Province-, for they knew if thofe Armies fliould remain entire, the War might eafily be renewed, and other impediments being removed, Hamibal would be the more eafily fuccorcd with neceffaries which he wanted, and fo might flill inolcfl the Romans in half. Thus not allowing of any Peace, then what might be pure hafed by cither having totally queird,or atleafl very much weakened the Enemy, the Romans never laid down Arms but when they were entire Vidors : which other Princes not being able to do, have deferred their ruine for a fhort time, but have not totally kept it off.
Many other things might like wife bethought of, by which it mi^ht be evidently proved, that the Romans did always prove viftorious at lafl, and did perpetually increafe their State and flrength. But what we have already faid, may fuffice to teach fuch Princes and Nations as ffiall afpire to the higheft degree of glory, whither it is that they ought to bend their thoughts, and which arc the befl means to arrive thereat : And when all other ncceffary accidents fhall correfpond, thofe who fliail imitate the excellent worth and difcipline of the Romans, will not find themfelves any whit deceived.
The Thirteenth DISCOURSE,
Whether the City of Rome could have maintain d her felf longer in the glory and wajefiy of her Command^ ^f P^^ f^^d preferi/ed her Liberty and Form of Commonwealth^ then fl^e did under thi Covtrnment of Emperors^
AFter that Cafar had robb'd his Country of her liberty, andrhanging the antient form of Government, reduced the Commonwealth of Some into a Monarchical form, (he continued therein in a continued fenes of many Emperors, fafe and entire, or at leafl wiihout any re- markable alteration or declining, for the fpace of about four hundred year?, till the time of \^rcidiui and Honorius^ wherein Italf underwent many miferable ruines, as did alfo the very City of Romt^ which was the Metropolis of the Empire •, fo as (he could not rtfume her antient greatncfs, as formerly fl>e had done after fomeadvcrfe events.
It appears to be, and truly is a thing worthy of deep difcourfc 2nd confideration, how this fo great and well-founded Empire, after it began to tocccr^did fo foon pre-
cpita:«
(g<J)
cipitatcinto final luinc. If the timeoF this its duration be rasarurcd in rjfpcftco the ordinary mut ition of humane things, and mo.e pinicularly of State- v. overnments, the time of us conunuance may appear to have been long enough: but if the greatnclsand pow.roftheEnpire b. taken into coi.fidtration, which was fuchas tiiat ihere wisno other Potentate that could weigh againfl it, or raihcr no Coun- try which w.s not in fomc fort fubjeift thereunto , it may very well invite us, fo far as may be probably conjeftur'd by fo great fuccefs, and where fo many various accidents concur, and have a Hiarc, to conjcdure whether the Roman Empire would have been longer or (hortcr lived, ifit had been ftill governed in the form of aCommonv\eilih, then ;t did when it fell into the power of one onely man, under the government of Emperors. Many things may pcrfwa 'c ustobeleeve that inwhacfoever condition or form of Governmcnr,ihis Empire muft have run th; fam; fortunc,and walked on with fome lutle varia.ion of time to the fame end it cid. 1 irft the vic;flitude c f humarc i flairs, which by rcafon of thdr natural imper- fedions, wili not fuffer fublunary things to be ftill in the fame ftate of being, but will have itfo, as being carried about in continual motion, they muft fom^times be ra.fed higKcr, fall fometimes lower. OthtrPcople, and other Nations, befidts theRoiT.ans, have flourifli'd in other timei, though not fo much, nor fo highly cried up. Other Ages have feen other great Empins, fo as the rile of the one hath been the fall of ihc other •, and it is a great tru.h, that Lordfhips and Empires, 3s do mens lives, nay as befals cv;ry thing that is born, in time wax old, andpro- lecdingon by ordinary and natural gradations, have their beginning, incrcafe, timeof pafcdtion,declinaLion, and »;nnl luine. Ti\l Houoriuj his xn\e^ at which tmc the Empire began palpably to wander from its grandeur and dignity, it had continued for fo many years, as the longer duration thereof would have almoft ex- ceeded the common condition of otler things ^ this may well be a general rcafon , k t one th..t is (o approved of by other rtafons, and continual experience, an ic may be reputed ccnain in particulars, though fometimes wc ignore the proximate reafon. tut to proceed to more particular confi derations, why (hould we beleeve that thcRoman Empire (liould h^ve bcin of longer duration if it had been governed by a Commonwealth, then under Emperors J' Not onely reafjn, but expciience flicws, that the Governmeist of one alone is fitted to keep up fuprcam power in large Dominions; fmce all other great Powers and Lordfliipshave been fo..ndcd and go- verned by one oi.ely King or Emperor.
1 he City oi R«me is the onely example of a Commonwealth which ha^h pur- chafcd large Dominion •, nay, wc may therein alfo obferve, that as foon as (he ^nwtobeMiflrefsof many Provinces, that Foim of Government behoved to be altered, as not fit to fuftain fo great a weight. In the vciy times of the Com- mon ^ ealth , wl ea any thing was to b: agiaitcd or treated of>fpecially in \S ars of gr-at in portance and difficulty,thcy ran to create a Didtator ; becaufe the fupreme aucliori > whch by vertueof that Magiflracie was granted to one man alone, was held requlfite for the good adminif^ration of the mofl ditficu'.t bufir.efTcs. The Magiftracy of the Didator did punftally rcprcfcnt the Majcftie, and Dignitie which the Roman Emperors did after retiii-. Wherefore Cdfar , when he matie himfdf the Maftcr of the Commonwealth , mad: himfe!f be declared perpetuall Didator ; And the name of Emperor was taken from the very niTC ufed by the Roman Commanders, and fliewcd the Authority which they had of Eir.pcror, which is to command over Armies. And certainly t ■ e uniting the power of many in one alone, doth not onely not weaken, but coth much to the ftren^th and power of a Government or Siare: For it encr.-af.th obedience, facihatesrefolutions, and haftciis the execution of wcighti.ft affairs. So as hid not the Rom n Fores, when milicaiy Difciplin: floucillied moft aT.ongft
them.
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them, been with -held oftentimes, as if opprcft by internal fcditions, Tprung from thatfort of Government wficrcof they did fo much partake, and which did oft- times retard great enterprifes, it may be argued that the City would have fooncr gotten to that height of greatnefs and Empire, which fhe arrived at, born even even by main force againft all thefe difficulties, by the great worth of her Citi- zens.
Let as obferve in the next plate, that though the Empire of Rome had changed the Form of Government, and reduced the fupreme power into one alone, yet we finde not, that fh: was bereft of thofe arms, and helps wherewith ftie had been pre- fcrved whilft Ihe ^si a Commonwealth -, but did rather encreafe them, and did ycrymuLh eftablilh Forces-, for the Emperors kept alwaies about their perfons a great number of Soldiers, for the defenceof Imperial Majefty, which were there- fore called PrttoriA»-h2.nds^vxiA Armies in the Garrifons of Provinces, which might defend, and keep them from any commotion which m ght be raifed, either by their own Subjects, or by foreign Nations. Nor were the Emperors themfelves wanting in t iking order for Arms and all things belonging to War-, nay,notontly thofe that were held valiant, but even who for all things elfe were tfleemed cowards, and given over to all manner of vice, did either by themfelves, or by their Com- manders undertake and finifh many Wars. So it feemi liklicfl that the Romm Empire might govern her felF, and fo long prefervc htr greatnefs as fhc did, chief- ly for being fuftained by the chief Authority, and reverent Majefty of one oney Lord, which was of fuch force , as it for a long time did overcome that weaknefs, which oiherwife might havebcfaln the Empire, byth^abedl bafenefsof many Emperois •, where on the contrary, whilft it was a Commonwealth, it was divided, rent, weak, andeafieto have beenoppreft, if it had then met w'th the power of anygrcjt, and valiant Nation, which would havefappreftit, as did fo many Nor- thern People do to the Empire. And if the corruption of antient cuftoms may :be judged to have been the rcadieft and trueft occafion of the ruineof this Empire, the Commonwealth was never free from the like, but even as for this very caufe, of having fain from her good Principles, that firft Government was altered, and the City loft her Liberty, fo might (he have done, though fhe ftill kept the Form of a Commonwealth. Avarice, ambition, immoderate fenfuality, were the maladies wherewith the City of Rome began to be infeded, not when fhe was governed by Emperors, but whilft fhe was ruled by her Citizens in Civil Government •, And if it be objefted that this did not hinder her from giving the greatcft teftimony of her valor in War,fince in the laft Age of the Commonwealth, when thefe vices and corruptions were rifcft among the Citizens, Military Difcipline did flour fli moft, and greatcft aiflions were done : It cannot then be faid, that neither the con uption of manners in the times of Emperors, did deftroy the Empir-, nor that the inte- crity thereof could have longer preferved the power of the Commonwealth. But io much the lefs for that the Empire did not falltoruine (though it was fufficient- ly agitated by homc-difordcrs) in fuch fort, as that either the Subjcds did vindi- cate their Liberty, or the Commanders of Armies divide the Empire amongft them, as did LyUexAndert Commanders after his death ^ but the Roman Com- monwealth, though it was oft-times thruft at by fuch commotions , was ftill not- withftanding able to fubfift, and to raife it felf up again when it beL;an to fall . Euc birbitous and foreign Forces overthrew it at laft-, with whom the famous Com- manders in the time of the Commonwealth, not having had any occtfion to tiy their worth, it cannot be faid \\hat would have fucceeded upon fuch an occafion, if the Government of the Commonwealth had continaed till that time. It is likely, that the difordcrs and fadions increafing much mor-*, whereof fo many p.ftiferous feeds had been fowej in all the Orders of the City, the City, and
Ter-
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Territo ics belonging thereunto being to remain the weaker, and the more expofed to the injuries of foreiners, would have been the cafilier opprcft, ifflic had been to have wuhftooJ the terrible iliock of thefc fierce and wild Northem Nations, which th; Emperors Forces did notwithftanding long refift -, infomuch as the Roman Empire maintained it feU" for the fpace of two hundred years after it was molcftcd by thefe forts of puople •, nay, it maintained itfelf in dignity and majcfty for about f\ ty years after it was (hrewdly (haken, till in the time of the Emperor Zee the Firft, Rome and Italy being totally abandoned, the name and power of the Wcflern Empire did totally terminate.
It may therefore be thought a gallant and wcll-advifed aiflion, that the Emperors did fo long temporife, and keep the Armsof thcfe fo powerful Nations from the more iiward parts of th:ir State, of //4/jf,and chiefly of Stme herfelf, like fo much venom from their hearts •, with which if they (hould have iryed the fortune of War^ haz.irdmg one Battel, or more, as upon other occafions thofe antient Roman Com- manders had done, they might peradventure have brought the Empire fooner to its ruinc, fince they had to do with a very warlike people, and whofe condition was fuch, as they muft either die, or overcome. And certainly they had done worfe, if they had therein trufled and relied upon Fortune, fince they could have gotten no- thing by the viftory when they fhould have won it, were it not the faving of themfelves for the prefent againfl thofe Armies, who might have been facceeded by others of the fame Nations, and fo the War to have been rencived more hotly and direfully then before, out of a dtfire to revenge the death of their hicnds; whereas the lofs of a Battel or two on the Romans fide, might have drawn along with it the ruinc of a mofl noble Empire. It was then fortunate for ihe Common- wealth of Rtme^that (he met not with thefc people in fuch necelTity and dangetjfor if that had befaln her, which hapned in the time of Emperors, that Fame might pcrad- tenturc have been obfcured which^fhc wash^ppy in,of being glorious and vidorioiis in all Wars •, and the courfc of her fo many profperous fucccfTes might have been interrupted or broken off by this unfortunate end.
Yet it we will look on the other fide, we may peradventure meet with other no lefs prevalent rcafons which peradventure perfwade us to the contrary. Experience ftiews us how good the Orders were wherewith the Commonwealth was founded, to make great acquifitions : But it is a general rule, That States are preferved by walking in the fame ways wherein they were founded 5 for every thing is preferved and maintained by alike things, and are corrupted by the contraries. If the Roman Arms, governed by he;: own Citizens with Civil authority, were fufficient to re- duce fo many States and Kingdoms under the power of the Commonwealth, what reafon have we to believe that they (hould not ftill be as able to preferve what they had OQtten •, which is more cafily done ^ The bafenefs and cardefnefs of many of ihof? Emperors did doubtlefly open the way to the Empires ruinc ; for they often-, times fuffcred thofe Northern people to fettle themfelves in divers Provinces of the Empire. x^Uricw was permitted by HtnortM to inhabit with his Coths in France -, and foon af;er becoming his Colleagues , they likewife obtained fome Cities in Sfain from him. yaUntfrnanus granted likewife Servia and Bulgaria to other Got hi •, and before thefe, Gall/ts had bought peace of the Goth j fo as be- coming more bold and infolcnt, they made themfelves mafters of Thrace, Thtffalj^ and of CMdcedonia. Thus the very Emperors themfelves having through their pufillanimity fuffercd mifchief to increafc at home, and thefe their fieice Enemies to grow powerfu', they could not afterwards drive them out of thofe places which they had pofTeft themfelves of, nor keep them long out of Italy. This woulql not have b:en fuffered by the generofity of the Roman Commanders and Citizcns,who when they were in a much worfe coiiditign, would by no means agree with King
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ryrrhftf^ who had affailed Italy^ unlefs he would leave them, and return to his ow fi Kingdom. And that they might draw Hannibal out of Itat-j, they betook them- felves to moleft the Carthaginians in Spain and in /<frica^ after they had for fo many years gcneroufy withftood their Forces. And whilft that State continued in the form of a Commonwealth, as if Liberty had infufcd noble and generous thoughts into them, the City of Rome was an example to all the world of all forts ofvcrtue,chitfly of Magnanimty in undertaking great enterprifes, and of Fortitude and Conftancic in managing them, and in bringing them to a happy end. But when the Commonwealth was luin'd, and a new foit of Government brought in, that antient Roman worth went aftray by little and little, till at laft it was quice loft. So as the enduing Ages gave as many examples ot ignorance and bafenefs in the very Emperors theinlclvcs, and in others who were of gicateft degree and authority in that Empire. Hence then it was, that the good and antient Cuftoms being cor- rupted, both in Civil government, and chiefly in the Militia, the State being re- duced to great faintncfs, and growing old, had not ftrength enough to govern it felf when it met with ftout oppofition. The Roman Empire was brought to fo mife- rable a condition when it was fet upon by the Northern Nations, which wanred all manner of order and military difciplinc, as well in their Commanders, as in the Soldiers of their own Nations, whereof the Roman Armies had been for a long; time full; infomuch as for above twenty years together, before ihz Goths ^iWd into Italj^ they put themfelves into the ufual pay ot fome of the Roman Emperors : And when TheodoftHs the Second, who was to make head in France againft a v.ilisnt and numerous Army led on by Attila^ it was found that the Arnoy which he had then got together retained only the bare name of a Reman Army, being totally compofed of Btrhrians, Vi^gots^ Franks, Burgoniaas, Alani, and others, who notwithftanding bore away the vidory for the Roman Emperor. The like hapned in Gratianus his time, who being fet upon by AtaUricm King of the Goths^ was fain for the defence of Italj to make ufe of Goihs^ Huns, and ot'-.er Soldiers of thofe Nations.
But the antient valor of the Romans was no Icfs loft in their Soldiers then in their Commanders : For fo great an Empire was grown to fo great a fcarcity of valiant men, and fuch as were fit to command the Armies, whit h were to withftandthe raging violence of thefe fierce and barbarous Nations ^ as Honor ius found none to whom he could commit fuch a charge, but one Stilico, \\ho was himfelf a Barbari- an, a Hun by Nation, and very perfidious •, who moved by his own intereft and dcfigns, fought to maintain his authority, and to the end that he might place his Son in the Empire, whilft he commanded over thofe Forces wh ch were raifed to cxtinguifh the Gothiih Armies, he did not only not beat chem when he might have done it, but fol'icited other Northern people to aflault divers Provinces of the Empire,and fo procured them more Enemies. And Theodojius the Second, having placed all authority and hope of defending the Provinces of the Empire from the fury of Attila, in one Etitu^ when he had loft that Commander, he had not any one fitting to undergo that charge, but was forced to leave the paflagc into U^ly free unto him. That which is reported of AttiU, doth greatly witnefs the wcaknefs of the Empire, and in what need it ftood of valiant and faithful men ; that being fore- told by his Southfayers, that if he fhould come to a day of battel with the Roman Army in France^ he Ihould lofe the day, but that his lofs would coft the Empire dear, for they ihould lofe one of their beft Commanders -, he d d put fo high an efteem thcieupon, as notwithftanding fuch an Augury, he refufed not to joyn batte^
The Wars made by the Empire ranny years befoie the times of this its grcateft calaiamity and ruinejWcre made againft their own Ro.nan Commandcrs,who com-
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manJfd over their Armies in feveral places, and who being in far off Provincis, lebclledagainftthe Empeiors, hoping ihacihcy might ufurp the Empire, to the which every one of them did afpire, iince they favv that all ways, even the tnott indiredl, lay open to a fuccelTion therein, foasthe Difcipline and woriihwasa- hke in both the Armies, and ftill the Romans got the vidory, that is to fay, thofe who had the greatcft Power and Authority in the Roman Empire. But as foon asoccafion was offered of trying the worth of thofe Soldiers who fcrved the Em- pire againft foreign Forces, and that whatfoevcr the Roman Empire loft, proved an addition to their cruel and mortal enemies, the weaknefs thereof: was foon fccn, and what a lots it had fuffered by the total corruption of Difcipline, and good an- tient orde.s. Which could not have happened, if the Commonwealth had ftill con- tinued ; for it is not likely that valiant Commanders would be found wanting in thit City, where by the vcrtaeof good military Inftitutions, SoldiciS did fo n^uch flounfh? fince thofe who had betaken themfelves toother iraploymencs, ■when once they took upon them the Government of Provinces, behaved them- felves fo in the Militia, as they dcferved commendations, for there was a certain fpirit of glory in them all, and a defire of propagating the common good, as alfo an aptnefs for all things which did befit Roman fpirits. But as foon as the Form of Government being changed, the fame Romans began to degenerate from their antient worth, and that the chief imployments, nay the Empire it ftlf fell into the hands of foreigners, all things elfc muft likewife fuffer alteration •, and in parti- cular, diforders in the Militia, and the licemioufnefs of the Soldiers grew to be fuch, as fo great an Empire fecmtd fometimcs to be governed by chance, there not being any one therein who took care for the common good, nor for the ob- feivanceof good Orders, neither at home nor abroad. And the making of the Militia mcrcinary, wascaufe of the going Icfs in worth and difcipline, asalfo of treachery^ Infomuch as thofe very Soldiers, who fcrved the Emperors, favored the Enemy ^ as it happened in Jhcodefius his time, when thofe who were to guard the TireneUn Mointains, were bribed to let the V*ndds and Swedes pafs into Italj^ without making any oppofition-, which was the occafion of other raifchiefs. And the treachery of his Commander C^Btu hindred the Emperor Decitu from pur- fuinga famous vidory gotten of the (7*/Af , when not being fo well flefht as they were afterwards, nor yet fo powerful , they might have been the eafiiisr kept back.
But in time of the Commonwealth, the Roman Commanders, and Soldiers, fought for their own Grandezza •, the Nobility grew famous and powerful, and the people in whofe name, and in that of the Senate all Wars were made, got ho- nor and advantage by thofe things which by their Arras they added to that Domi- nion : So as amongft other aftions of the Commonwealth, it is not without won- der tobeconfidered, how flie could maintain fo many and fo numerous Armies as ftie did, mecrly out of Roman Soldiers. But when thefe refpefts began to fail,and that the Militia grew mcrcinary, and that the Soldier grew paft all meafure info- lent, by reafon of their Commanders leudnefs, who permitted them to do all manner of foul things, to the end that they might have their afliftancc in their ufurping the Empire : The Roman Empire which had formerly wont to be fo for- midable to their Enemies, fo obedient to their Commanders ? began to behave themfelves poorly againfl thicr Enemies, and infolently againft their Lord and Matter , troublefomc to their friends whom they were fent to a/Tift, and too unable to defend them againft foreign Forces: which things, as they were begotten by the change of Government, fo is it moft apparent that they were the occaG(|nof bringing the Empire to a fooner and more miferable end. So many, and fo heinous diforders could not have rifcn, if the City had continued in a Form of Common-
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wealth, or of Civil Government', for though all the Citizens might not havtf peiadventure proved good and valiant, yet amongft fo many there would ftill have Ibme one been found, of fuch excellent worth and charity towards his Country^ as would bavc been able, if HOt totally to cure fuch diforders, atlcaftfofar to have bounded them, as they fliould not have run into fo great a precipice. And though amongft the Emperors, there were fome who were endowed v/ith excellent ver- mes, yec could not the affairs of the Empire revert to its beginning, becaufe there paft fomctimes a whole Age betwixt one and another of thefc good ones: And the Empire, for a continued feries of many Emperors was adminiftred by baft men, plunged in a multitude of vices ■■, Infomuch as it became almoft impoffible for thofe whofuccecded to reduce the affairs to any good condition, which had fo long run to the worfc.
Moreover no one mans abilities, though never fo excellent, were able to go- vern fo great a body, as was the IVo man Empire, much lefs thofe of fuch as were fo unfit, even for Governments of lefs importance, as were many of the Roman Emperors. Whence it was that ^^ri4», a wife Emperor , thought it fie for the welfare of the Empire, to go in his own perfon, and confolidatc it with hispre- fence, and vifit in perpetual progrefTes, fomctimes one, fometimes another Province 5 for the good Government whereof, they being fo many, and fo re- mote, the example of fo many rebellous Commanders and Armies, ifiewed how falfeandiimvonhy the Miniftcrs had been who had been by the Emperors fent thither. But in the Commonwealth there were a great many Citizens who were interefled in the Government and Greatnefs thereof, fo as though fome valianc man went to the Wars, the City remained not without Government or Obedi- ence 5 nor did the appointing a Commander in chief over one Army, bereave J hem of others who might command more Armies, if they had need to wa^^e War at one and the fame time in leveral places, whereof the Commonwealth of Rome did in all Ages give notable examples.
Nor can it be affirmed, but that the Commanders, and Armies of the Common ■ wealth have made War wiih people as powerful in Arms, as were thofe Northern Nations, whofe fury the Roman Empire could not refift. For, not to mention To many bitter Wars made by thofe antient Romans, the cnterprifes done by ^#- liuf CdJAT in france^ were they not undertaken againft people, in whom all the refpeds met which were confiderable in thofe Northern Nations I very numerous Armies j for we read, that one onely Array, amongft many fundry people wherc- into France was then divided, which was vanquifh'd and wholly overcome by C<<- /4r, confiftcd of above Three hundred thoufand fighting men. But the HelvetHf Foringi^ Boij, and others who were routed and overcome by Cafar^ had taken up Arms cf meerchocc, and that they might get new places to dwelin-, juft as did the Cotijs^ Hunnes^ Vandds^ Lomhtrds^ and others •, and this with fuch refolution as to put a neceffity upon themfclvcs of doingtheir utmoft to get a dwelling place, they burnt all their houfes in their own Country. But the Almans led on by their King Ariovifius ^ were they not a fierce Nation, and long trained up in Arms^ and yet thefet^erc alfo overcome by the fime Ctfar^ and by the Roman Arms. The fame may perad venture be more properly aflerted, of the C/Wr^, Ambreni^ and Tfutoaes, who were not long before this overcon>e by Marius : For thefe were alfo a very barbarous people, and come from the Northern Countries, from whence Romes fo many mifchiefs did aftervvards proceed. Thrrcwere of thefe above Three hundred thoufand fighting men, they had left their own homes for thejfame rcalbn, that they might find out new habitations •, and being already well advanced into France, they boafted thn they would be Maftcrs^f Italy, and ruinc i?o;wf : But againft thefe did the Roman Armies boldly march, and
went over the Mountains to encounter them •, fo as thofe Baibaiians began to be rouced, and met with a rub to their grcateft Forces : And afcerwards thofe who bad advanced by another way, being gotten fafe into luly^ they fcnt to defue Marifis the General of the Roman Armies, that he would ailign them fome Terri- tories where they might live quietly, and they would therewithal! r^ft contented, without endeavoring to advance their Fortune any further by their Arms. But they did not then obtain it of the Roman General , as did the Goths and other Foieiners afterwards from fome of the Emperors, who not trufting in themfelves, nor in the.r Armies, permitted thofe Barbarous hoftile Nations to live peacefully in thofe Provinces of the Empire,whereof they had injurioufly poffefled themfelves. Nay, though there were not above Fifty thouland Foot in the Roman Army, and that they were to fight with fix times as many of the Enemy, the Roman Com- manders did not rcfufc to join battel with them, and did totally overthrow the Enemies Ai my, thereby fecuring /m/jt for thjt time, and foe many years after, from Tranialpine incurfion?. But 'tis feen,that neither the number of the Enemy ,nor the defperate-mindednefsof them with whom they fought, nor the difcipline nor induration in Armies and military duties , (all which things were in thefe barbarous Armies overcome by the Romans ) were fufficient to difcourage the Roman Commanders and Soldiers, whilft the Commonwealth did nourifh generous thoughts in them, and in their Forces. And in K^ugujius his time alfo, becaufe Difcipline in War was obfcived, Drufus and Tiberius Nero were able to drive away the Fandds^ who were then called Borgondi^ and to frighten other People of the furthermoftNorthein parts from coming to infeft italj^ as they were pre- paring to doi
No good argument can then be inforced from what hath been faid, nor can there be any rational judgment given of what would have befaln the Roman Empire, if It had flill been kept urtder the antient government of a Commonwealth, till the great combuftions made by thefe Northern people, by whom it was deftroycd.- Certainly the acqu fition,or prefcrvation of States, docs not depend upon the Form of Government, whether it be of one alone, or of a few, or of many-, for we have examples cleer enough ofgreat Empires which have beenwonj and preferved by a King, by the optimati, by a People, and by a Commonwealth mixt of divers forts of Governments. But the ftrength or wcaknefs of every State depends upon par- ticular Orders, chiefly in point of the Militia, wherewith it is inftitcited, and the force and vertue whereof ufeth to be fuch, as tven Tyrannical Governments, which carry with them fo much of violence, have rifen to a great height of power, and have preferved it long, as by woful example to others we may this day difccrn in the ottoman Government. As then the City of Rome grew great and powaful, not for being cither formed of an Optimatical, or Popular, or mixt Government, but for her good Orders and Inftitudons in military affairs J whence it was, that when at any time the Romans had bad fucccfs in their battels, yet all their entcrprifes did flill end in vidory : So cannot it be allcaged for a true and immediate reafon of the ru nc of that Empire, that it fell under the government and obedience of one alone. For this Supreme Authority, were it either by fucceffion, or by eledion, if (as it hath been for a long courfe of time in fo many other Countries ) it had paffed in a fetled and ufual manner from one Prince to another, whereby the Soldier (hould have had no occafion to have ufurped a very uadue and harmful licenrioufnefs in all things, and that the antient difcipline, obedience, and military worth had been ob- ferved in the Roman Armies, as it might have been, under one only Lord and Mafler, it may be fafely faid and believed, that that the Roman Empire would have fuffcred no more by the fury of thefe Northern inundations, then it would have done if the State had' coDiiniicd in a CemmonweaUh -, but as the Cmhi,
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Teutones, K^mhreni, all of them people of the fame Nations, were formerly with- flood by the Roman Arms, fo the violence of Goths, Httns, Vandals, and all fuch like might have been flopped. Ic is only fo far true, that the change of Govern- ment afforded occafion to the ruine of the Empire, forafmuch as the goo J orders and Roman difcipline were peradventure eafilier corrupted, when recommended to the care and diligence of one only Prince, who was oft-times unfit for Government, then it would have done, had it been guarded by many Citizens at once, as it was in the Cor.u-nonwealths time. But it is very hard to penetrate into the true caufes of fo great events, and fo remote from our memory, which are rcfeived to the deeper judgment of him who is the true and Supreme Lord, and who governs and doth difpcnfe States and Empires byways and ends, which are unknown to humane reafon.
The Fourteenth DISCOURSE,
Why the Grecians did not much extend the Confines of thdr Do- winion^ as did the ^om^Tis^y and hovpQtCQcc came ts loft her Liberty.
OF all other amient People, there are two that have been greatly fa- mous -, fo as their names, and the glory of things by them done, hath been conveyed over to the memory of Poflcrity with large acclamati- ons-, tovi'it^ the Ronuntzn^^CrecisosT, alike for notableexamples of all worth and vertue, but fufficiently unlike for the greatnefs and du- ration of Empire. For whereas the Greda/is did not extend their Confines be- yond the bounds of Greece herlelf, nor did flie long flouriih in the fame fplendor of dignity, nor greatnefs of fame and dominion^ the Romans did command over almoft the whole World, and their Empire, although the Form of Government was changed, endured for many A^es •, for there part above eleven hundred years between the building of Rome, and the time wherein flie was taken and fackt by the Goths. They then who (hall confider thefe things, may with reafon defire to "know why thefe two Nations did differ fo much in fortune, fince they were equ illy vorihy. It was not in any one City alone, thatchoife men for both all civil and military worth did flourifli in Greece^ as in Italy they did in Rome -^ but many Cities did at the fame time produce C itizens excellent in all manner of thinos. It would be a tedious thing to number vp the gallant Adions of Mtltiades, Themifto- cUs, AriflideSy fhociin^ AlcibUdtSy L/igeftUus, Cimo)$y Leonid.ts^ Epimiaor)d.is, andoffo many others whofe Fame rings loud amongftus: And P/«Mrf /^, wh:n he writes the lives of the mofl excellent Romans, finds as many Grecians almoft to parallel to them, who are as highly cry'd up for the fame vertues. Yet c'i.i never anyof their Cities, nor Grfcf^herfclf the Country common to them all, evei rife by any of their acYions to that high pitch of Fortune and Command, as did the City of Rome, and whole Jtaly^ by the illuffrious deeds of the Romans. This di- vcrfity of fuccefs ought not to be attributed to Fortune, but their c.rtnin and natu- ral caufcs. If Greece (hould have enlarged the bounds of her Empire into the far- theft diftant Regions, asdid Italy through the power and gallantry of the Roma>s, (lie muft either have been reduced under the power of one only Potent:. te, or they inuft all of thcn^. have been joined in an uniform confcnt in the profecution of great ddignsi But fo many cifticuUies diicover therafelvcs in both thefe thing*;, as when
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they 3; econfidercd the wonder ceafeth, why (he could not encreafe her Domini- ons, anfvverablc to the Fame, Vcrtue, and Glory of things done by that Nation. Greece was divided into many feveral people , who were all of them totally, or for the moft part governed by proper Laws, and Civill Inftitucions in the Form of a Commonwealth, though they were of divers States. And though ihcy had a ge- neral Councel, which was called the jimphiiijones^wherein men met,who were fent from all the chief Cities, to treat of the moft important affairs, and fuch as did concern the common intercftsof all Greece ^ yet did not this Councel give one onely and certain Government toaW Greece-, but it was fuch an AfTembly as arc the D;ets which are in thefe times fometimcscall'd in Germany upon fome particular Occurrences -, wherein many Princes, and free Cities of that Province meet, which do much differ in State , Dignity, and Form of Government, and who have free votes in counfeliing and in refolving upon fuch matters as are therein treated. But amongft other people of Greece^thc Spartans and the Athenians^ antient people of Greece, and who for a long time, bad by their worth purchaft much authority, were very numerous and eminent when Greece did flourish moft, both for publick power,and for t he admirable worth of particular Citizens. For though the Cerin* rA/4w/, the Argives^ the ^ichxans, and fome other people, were of greater coo- fideration , in rcfped of other Icffcr Cities, yet they for the moft part did ra- ther follow the fortune of the Lacedemonians , and the Athenians, then their own . And the Thebuns^vAxo for a while were in better efteem then the rcft,by rea- fon of their Soldiers Difcipline, whom they called by a particular name, of the Sacred Cohort, yet becaufeof all h r Citizens, onely two arrived at any cele- brated honor, to wit Felopides and Bpaminondas^ and for that her Militia con- fifted but of Five hundred men, their City never arrived at that degree of Domi- nion and Glory, as did SpArta and Athens. But as much as thefe were greater then the others, fo much did they the more emulate one another, both for private worth and glory,as for public kDignity and Reputaion.To thefe did the other peo- ple of Greece adhere, fome being by them commanded, others by vertue of particu- lar confiderations. Thefe two Cities were highly efteemcd for the orders of the firft Founders of fuch Commonwealths, to wit Ljcurgus in Sparta, Sind in Athens^ Ihefeus; fo as thefe people who did long before inhabit the fame Country, began to take name, and authority over the reft : Thofe who did inhabit the Terra firma^ held for the moft part with the Spartans •, and thofe of the Iflands with the Athe~ •tans. But yet every City was free, and hugely intent not to let the power either of the Spartans or Athenians encreafe too much, but to keep the ftrength of thefe two chief Cities fo equally ballanced, as when the one of them (hould go about to opprcfs the other people of (7rtff«, theopprcffed might have recourfeto the other.
It is therefore to be obferved in all the anions of the Grecians, that the reft of the people were never firm in their friendships, either to the Spartans alone, or alone to the Athenians s but when the one of them began to exceed the other, they fided with the weakeft •, not valuing any tie of ftiendihip or contederacy,when ihey met with any fuchrefpeil .• So as for a long time the affairs of Sparta,zni of Athens marcht hand in hand, though each of them both gave and received ma- ny routs, and partook both of good and bad fortune in Wai'. Spurt* was ftrongeft by land, and Athens by Sea ; fo as they did counterpoife one another •, and there- fore, and for that (as it hath been faid) they had each of them many dependants, and confederates, they kept the forces of whole Greece divided, nor was there m.ans afforded to either of them, much to ^xc^td the other. Wherefore neither of them could bufie thcmfelvs in far off affairs, nor againft ftrangers, becaufe they wereftill at conteftaiion between themfelvcs. A«d if at any time they^vent a-
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bout to do It, they were eirhcr hindred or diverted, as were the x^thentAns, when they paft with their Fleet above Sicily under pretence to afllft the Leominians^ but in effcd, to get the Ifland to themfelves •, afpiring , by advice of ^lci(>ud':s ( who had higher conceptions, then any former Grecian had had ) to pafs over into >^/r/V4 againft the CArthaginians-^ thcSf>arta»t having difcovered thedefion, ani not being ab!e to endure, that the Athenians (hould to their prejudice, grow more powerful, rcfiftcd their Forces,and fuccor'd Arf/jr/>;4, when the City was ready to be loft , andalfo aflailcd the Athenians in th:ir own Territories, to divert them fromihuenttrprifc. The fame thing, for the fame occafion fell our, when the Athenians paiTing with their Fleet into f^)'/^ had induced the Egyptians to rebel againft the Perfians •, and very powerful Forces were already brought by Sea from Oreecc to Cj/)r«*, to affault the King of i'^r/?4'/ Territories-, Bat the Lacedemo- nians growing jealous of their greatnefs, fruflrated that defign, oppofing them fo many waies,and by fo many Forces, as if the bufinefs had been not to have abafed, but to have exalted the power of the Perfians, the common, and continual enemies of Greece. But thefe things were done by the Spartans, as they gave ou:, onely tD curb the immoderate ambition of the Athenians, and to maintain, and deFend the liberty of whole Greece 5 upon which pretence they undertook, and for many years maintained that famous War, of the people o^MorcA, which did much moleft whole C7rf fee, and kept their Forces very low. Therefore in the time when thefe two greater and more famous Commonwealths did flourifli, they made ufeo'c' t^eir Forces more againft themfelves then againft foreiners •, and in domeftick War , which was the caufe why Greece grew weaker , not more powerful : For whatfoeverof prejudice bcfel either of the parties, was prejudicial to Greece \:iZt fclf, and the fame and glory of their victories was blemilh'd and leftened by the lofs of thofe Grecians that were overcome.
Therefore fhe never became formidable to other Nations, as did Itdly^ where when the fame and worth of the Romans began to prevail, and the other neigh- boring Potentates were extingu llied, her force and power being all of a peece, the Roman Arms were dreadful to all people, nay they were all finally overcome by them. But Greece n.vj&^ having been able to reduce her felf to a condition, that all her forces fhould be under the power of one onely Potentate, and that War was adminiftred under the Aufpice of one onely Commonwealth, (be was of necefTuy tobealwaies too weak and impotent toinlargeher Confines much. So as that which made the Grecians be much efteemed, to wit, her having fo many Commonwealths, did much diminifhthe glory and dignity of Empire, to w.'iich HDtherwifc her many fignal vertues might have carried her, if her Force* had been in ihe power of one onely or Prince, or Commonwealth -, or at leaft if there had been a greater union, and better intelligence amongft the fo many Commonwealths tliat were in her. But too great a defireof Liberty, which made it harder fojjpne People to be obedient to another People, was diredly that which made them injoy it the leffcr while. For being weak, and divided amongft themfelves, the way lay open to any who who would aJTaulc, and opprcfs them. But the better the Gre- cians were accommodated with all vertue and difcipline, which made them eftcem all others befidcs themfelves barbarous, fomuch the more were they born away with too much vivacity of fpirir, to fuch an elation of mind, as none* of them could induretofee themfelves cquall'd either in publick, or in privJte by ano- ther, nor any City to his, nor any of his Citizens to himfelf. So as every mo;e valiant man, and every more generous aftion grew fufpitious to others, and were more cnvied,and difturb'd then the reft, all their ambition and emulation be'.ng tur- ned upon themfelves.
Itis reported that P4«/4;7/^/, who was Commander in chief in a \ i5lory had
againft
againft the Pfr/j4m, did in token thereof prcfcnt the Temple of ^^/tf/^o in Delphi with that famous {;olden Trevet •, wheieat the reft of the Grecuns being greatly fcandalized, made Paufanias his name be raced out, and placed in ftead thereof the names ct all the Confederate Cities, whofc People were prefent at that Vidory. And 'tis faid of AlcibUdes^ that full of vexation , he had wont to fay, that he could not flcep for thinking of the Triumphs of Miltiades. But there arc a thoufand examples of fuch like things, which (hews how fervently they did contend one with another in poinc of glory. ThemifiocUs and K^rijlides were profefs'd Enemies; fowere Alcibiades and a icias^ and many others of the moft famous and valiantcft Citizens of >*//'f«j •• Where there was fuch contention amongft ihemfdves, and fo great care was had that no one man (hould exceed another very much, notwith- ftanding any adion which might make him more glorious and potent, as Oftracifm was ordained, which was, the baniihment of fuch Citizens for ten years, who were very remarkable cither for excellency of parts, or profperous fortune, more then were the reft •, by which means they loft their beft Citizens, nay (bmetime made them bocomc their Enemies, as was feen in Alcibiades, Themifiecles^ Pericles, and fome others, who were born for the aggrandifing of that Commonwealth, and yec through the conuption of the Orders thereof provtd prejudicial to it. Whereupon Xerxes, who favored, and gave entertainment to fuch men, bad wont to fay, that he prayed God that his Enemies might ftill banifh fuch Citizens.
The divers Forms of Government made likewifc much againft the union of the people of Grace. Some of their C'ties were much for Democracie, as -Athens ; and fome others lean'd more to Ariftocracie, as Sfarta. Such diverfity of Govern- ments produced diVerflty of Cuftoms and cogitations 5 fo as they could hardly be all of them plcafed with one and the fame thing , every one meafuring their aftions with peculiar refpefts divided from the reft. So as when in the time of Lyfauder King cf the "^fArtans^ the City oi Athens was taken, to the end that they might matter it the better, they changed the Form of Government, reducing it firom a Popular condition, the form of its former Government, under the authority of a few, as that which did more refcmble the Spurt Aft Government. And in the follow- ing times, when ihe Spartans ran the fame fortune with all the other Grecians^ and was compell'd to obey the King of mfacedert^ it was requifite to alter the Laws and Inftitu ions of that City, which were at firft ordained by L^curgas. Thefe things did beget and maintain fo great a difunion in Greece^ as (he could not only not unite her Forces together to carry them againft other Nations, but hardly could (he defend herfelf with them : As was feen, when being mightily endangered by an Army of the Ferfuns, which came with a great power to aftault her, the War was diverfly adminiftred, they not agreeing what City fhould nominate the Commander in chief , the Spartans would have reduced the defence to narrow pafTages by Land, and the Athenians would have put the whole fortune of Greece in their Fleecy the ficuations of their Cities, and the condition of iheir Forces, would not permit that one and the fame thing (hould be equally ufcful and commodious for them all. Nor was the eminent danger of the Perfians fo potent Army able to u lite the Forces of all Greece, but thai fome of the chief People, as the TheJJ'alianSy Argil es, and Thebans would be exempted from out the League-, and the Argives being requcfted to adhere to the Contederacie of fo many other Cities, anfwered, that they would rather obey the Perfians, then give way unto their antient Rivals and Enemies, the Spartans. Finally, the Grecians hav ng obtained a great and un- cxpcdrd Viftory in the Sea-fight at Salamine, when they were to have purfued their Fortune, after having beaten the F leet, and made the Enemy retire, the;/ of themfe'ves gave over all farther hopes, and came home 10 their own Havens •, for thai the Spartans envied the glory of the t^ thenians^ and fearing by rcafon of their
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being ftronger at Sea, that if they fliouldhjve proceeded on in their fucccfs, they would not have fpared their own Grecians.^ but have domineered over them-, and foon after being more moved by envy, and their antient home-contentions, then by any hatred to the Enemy, when they (hould have driven the remainder of the Perfian Army out o( Greece, the afi'ochte Cities fcl upon the T/&e^4»j,becaufe fevering them*, ftlves in thefc common dangers from the Grecians, they had lecourfe for frien^(l•^ip to the Per (tins. So as Greece reaped no good by this profpcrous fuccefs, becaufe the Grecians knew not how to value it.nor kne\v they how to ufe the Victory when they had got it. (JMArdonius was overthrown at the Battel of ?UteA^ together with his whole Army, which after ATfrxw his flight he commanded in chief : But whit ad- vantage got the Grecians by fo great a vi(5lory,fave their dividing of the prey < which made them return all of them the fooner to their own houfes. Nay, there arofe greater and more cruel civil wars between them afterwards, then had ever been be- fore ^ and the bufinefs grew to that height,as the Spartans who had always piofefs d themfelves more bitter Enemies to the Barbarians then all the reft, joiiied in league with them, and confpired with Tiffafhernes^ who was Governor of Z./^/4 for King Dtritu, 10 ruine Greece. Truces made between them were alfo often broken •, and out of too great proner.efs toadhibit faith to the fufpitions \vhich they had one of anothcr,the publick faith was broken 5 no tye being ftrong enough to keep thofe minds faft together, which were fo divided by perpetual emulation. But of all the reft, two things are very conliderable as touching this prefent Difcourfe, and the Judgment which is to be given thereupon ; to wit, of what ftrength the Grecians were in military affairs, and with what Princes they had to do, in the time when Cre(ce did floutilh moft, and had moft rcafon to afpire to enlarge her Empire. Certainly he who (hall well confider it, will find that warlike Difcipline was neither Co highly efteemed of, nor of that excellcncie and perfe(5fion amongfl the Crecianr, as it was amongfl the Romans • for the Romans valued nothing more then m.ilitary valor and difcipline 5 nay, for a long time they fludied no Sciences nor Liberal Arts, ( wherein thofc xvho took any delight, made ufe of Grecians) but did wholly give their minds to military cxercifes , and fought for praife from noching but from War. W hence it was, that more Soldiers excellently well train d up in military af- faiis,wcre to be drawn out of the City of Rome, then our of other whole Provinces : whereas the Grecians did not give their minds to the ftudy of War, but to Learn- infT, and to the Liberal Sciences, which fiouridi'd a long time amongft them, a^ either born with them, or very well cultivated by them. There were as many of them that frequented Univcrfities to become Philofophers, as of thofe who ftudied the Soldiers craft. How many ProfefTois were there amongfl them of Oratory and Poetry, wherein they proved fo excellent,as all that ever defired to prove good therein fince, have obfcrvcd their rules, and trodden in their ftep;. How many rare Artificers have there likewife been of Grecians in all the moft noble Arts, paiticu- larly in Sculptuie and Pidurc-drawing ^ The original, or atleaft the peifeclion whcreof,knows no other beginning then from Greece : In the memory of all A?es, the names of Phidias, PelycUtus, i^lcamenes y^gLtpj-hon, Pol^gnotus, Parrhajius^ Zeuxis,Ape/Ies, and of fo many others arc celebrated. Wherefore Greece was more famous for the cxcellcncieof Learning, and of the Liberal Arts, thtn for skill in the Militia. Yet was the City of Sparta better then the reft at military affairs; and Athens was fufhciently famous for her Fleets by Sea, and her skill in maritime af- fairs : yet the Spartan Militia v as bounded within narrow precindls, and it was lace ere the -<^f/;fWMm did much mind their maritime exci;cifcs, to wit, not bcforj T6e- miftecles his time. And certainly, neither of thefe Cities was compbatly well ordered for the acquirement of E npiie : For Sparta, thotigh her Inftim ions tended to Arms, yet did they aim more at their own detenco, and at the prefervj-
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tion of Libertie, then at the acquifition of Empire-, not onely private Citi- zens, bat even the publick weal being conftitutcd in great poverty, and rcftraincd to a fmall number of Citizens •, they were forbidden all commerce with forcincrs, leaft they might corrupt the Laws and Cuftoms of their Country, their lives were auftcer, and they were contented with a little-. Whence it was thatthofc Citi- zens were a long time from defiring any further greatnefs, it being therefore propounded to CUoments Kingofip4r^*j by oae Anaxageroj o{ <jWitetum,who had cauftd many of the Cities of Ionia to rebel againft the King of Perfia -, to make ufeof thatoccafion, and take up arms 5 fhcwinghim that he might penetrate even to the Cities of 5«/4, and poflcls himfelf of the wealth of all thofe Kings ; 7hc Spartait laught at the propofition, and confideiing onely the length of the voyage, riid, He would none of thofe riches, which were not worth fo much la^ bour. ' Yet becaufc the Government of Sparta prefcrved it felf for a long time without any great alteration or change, and grew therefore the flronger, it was able to get the Dominion of whole ^Morea ^ and had after wards the prime place for dignitie, and Empire amongft the Grecians. On the contrary , Athens^ which by the opportunitie of the Sea, and by divers of her isftitutions aiming at thein- creafing of the City,feemed as if (he ought to have inlarged her Dominion beyond the Colifines of Greece^ could not make good ufe of her Forces, nor reap the fruis which became the worth of fome of her moft excellent Citizens, who were high- ly fpirited, and were minded toraife their Country to further greatnefs, becaufc (he could never order her fclf fo as to prefcrve herfelf long in one and the fame Form of Government, but was bulled in perpetual Civil diforders, precipitating herfelf fometimcs into a corrupt Popular State, fometimes into the tyrannic of a few.
Bur. the Grecians feemed as if all their thoughts were ufually bounded within themfelves •, infomuch as it is faid of fome of their moft famous Commanders, That they did more willingly exercifc themfelves in Wars made amongft the Gre- cians themfelves, then in Wars againft the Barbarians ^ (ince come what would, the sdvantage and honor of the Viftory did remain in Greece. But as for what be- longs to the Militia, fome may peradventure think, that it may be proved by fome fam*ous Vidories that the Grecians won from the (J\fedes and Perfiant^ that they did much ftudy Military Affairs, and were very good at Military Difcipline, in- fomuch asfor that parr, there was no more to be wi(hed for in them. To thii it may be anfweted, That it is not to be dcnied,butthat the Grecian Militia might be thought to be good and laudable when compared to that of the Barbarians, with- whom they had moft to do 5 But that it is no waies to be held comparable to that ot the Romans, v\ ho did excellently well underftand whatfoever belonged to the true Militia,better then did any other Nation in any whatfoever time. Infomuch as by rcafon of their good orders, and of the fo many Viftories which they wan, they propounded unto themfelves the conqueft of the whole world •, w hich out of the fame reafons they effefted. But it is obfervable in the Vidorics which the Greci- ans got againft the King of Perfia's Forces, that they were occafioned, not fo much throu'^hthegooJ ordering of their Militia, as by reafon of a certain obftinate re- solution which they had put on , to defend Greece hem the eminent (laveryof the Barbarians , the fear whereof made them bold to encounter whatfoever danger.
Many of their anions prove this, as amongft others, that of Leenidas was fuffi- ciently famous, who being left with onely Five hundred of his LAcedemovians to guard the Strieghtof ihermopyU, fell boldly with them one night into the Per- iianCamp, where were fundry Hundred thoufands of men, not being pcrfwaded thereunto out of any hopes of vi(itory or fafety, but onely out of a defirc to re- venge
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Vengethe injuries done by Xerxes to Greece, by the flaying of fomany etiemieSi and by his own voiunrary death. Who knows not that in the Naval fight zt SdUmind^ it was necefficy that made the Grecians fo coaragious < Since the i^the»ians, who were of greatcft power in that Fleet, were already without any Country, their City being burnt by the Enemy-, fo that their ultimate hope oi any good confifted in that daies good fuccefs. And to make the ncceflity the greater, JhemiftecUs, who was their Commander m chief, chofc wifely to joyn Battel in a place which was far from any friends Territories, thereby to bereave every one of any other hopes of fafeiy but by being vidtorious. And the great multituJeof the Perfians Fleet, ferved rather for confufion to them then for any ftrength, for of above a thoufand VefTels which were therein, it is faid that hardly Two hundred encredthe Battel. And the Viftory which was obtained not long after by land againft the Army led on by MArdenius^ was rendred the lefs difficulc by the reputation which the Grecians had won by their Naval Vidory, and by King A'erxw his running away, whole Soldiers proved no more couragious then did their Mafler , for whofe .;lory it was that they were to fight ; whereas the Grecians fought for themfelves, for the fafety of their Country, their Honfes, and ofall that they bad.
But to boot with all this, it may peradventUrc not without truth be affirmed. That the adions of the Grecians have been transferred over to the memory of po- fterity , for jjreater then what indeed they were. For Greet e had great ftore of ex- cellent Writers, who according to the cuftom of the Nation, amplifying fuch deeds as might purchafe glory to them, have ftudtcd very much to fet them forth to the beft, and to make them appear praife-worthy. Wherefore Sdufl in the be- ginning of his Hiftory, rcndring as it were a reafon why he took the pains to write, faies. That the A (5lions of the Romans may appear to be the lefs, out of the little care they had of putting them into writing , every one being more intent to do praife-worthy aftions, then to celebrate the adlionsof other men; whereas the Grecians anions were made to appear, not whattheyreally were, but fuch as the moft excellent wits of good Writers could by their adornments fet them (lately forth.
Moreover there met many things in the Romans , much differing from what hath beenfaidoftheffrw^f-jj for their whole ftudy was to make their City powerful by any whatfoevcr way, that they might, as they did, draw upon any occafion great floreof Soldiers ftrom thence. This was the original of the fantflu- arie, wherein wicked men driven out of other Countries were received, and after- wards People of many of the neighboring Cities, were allowed the priviledges of iheCityof JfflOTf, the more to incerefs them in what belonged to the honor and greatnefs of 2J»»»f, as to that of their Common- countrie, yet was not the War adm niftred under divers names or aufpices, as it was in Greece^ by reafon of the fe- veral Leagues had between fcveral People, but by the fole authoritie of the Roman Commanders, and flill in fole refped to what made onely good for the Common- wealth of Rtme. Now if we will confider with what forein Porcntates the Gre- cians had to make War, we (hail find that this alfo made it the har.ler for them to acquire other mens Countries, for jult when the Grecians , by reafon of their hav.ng many gallant men amongft them, might have afpired at the aggrandizing of their Empire, the Perfian Monarchie was grown fo powerful as it ruled over all the Eaft", And was not onely got near to (7rf re ? , by the pofTelTion of Ljdu, but did alfopofi'efs /mj, an anticnt Colony of the Grecians. >oas ic was a very great and difficult undertaking , to go about to poflefs the Territories of ^o greJt a Prince, who though he Ihould receive a rout might cahly recover his lofs, and puthimlelf in a fafe pof^orc of defence, by jceafonof tb: largenefsof bis Domi-
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nion, and the multitude of Soldiers that were at bis command. So as join this out- ward impediment to the inward, which lay in their homcdifcords, and we (hall fee that the Routs which the Grecians gave to the Perfians, did no further incommo- date the Ferftans, then the lofs of thofe Armi«5 ^ nor did the Grecians receive any further benefit thereby, then the defending of thcmfelvcs, and their fafctyfor no longtime from further dangers. But the Kingdom of L^acedsn, though of much Icfs ftrength for extent of Empire, became very formidable by reafon of its good Difciplmc in War, and for the great worth of fomc of her Kings, amongft which Thiiip the Father of Alexander^ who as he proved a great Prince, and of deep defigns, fo was he very pernicious to Greece : For divers People of Greece having recourfe to him for help aga'nft fomc other Grecians that were ther Enemies, they were willingly received, and their requeft gracioufly liftned onto, that fo he might nourifli their difcords, and weaken all their Forces by continual Wars ; by which means he made himfelf Arbitrator of all Greece-, infomuch as there were not any of them who did not fometimcs apply ihemfelves unto him, either for Peace to themfelves, or for help by War agamfl others.
Wherefore Philip difcovering his intentions at laft, that he was refolvc J to rule over all Greece^ he entred thereinto with powerful Forces, and was no lefs grievous CO thofe who firft called him in, then to the refl againft whom he declared his coming to be. So Thehes^ which was the firfl City which m.de ufe of his Forces, and did itoftner then all the reft, was one of the firft ( though with prejudice to all the reft) thattafted the bitter fiuits of her unadvifcd Councels, being ruin'dand dcftroyed by the fame Thilif ^ who being much allured by the taking of that City, and by hopes of greater matters, rcfolvedto make himfelf Maftcr of other Cities of Greece : To which defign whereas all Greece ong>£)X. to have oppofed themfelvcS for the common intereft, they went about, though by fcveral and divided councels, to join themfelves with him, and to place their own fafety in his friendfliip and fidelity. Thus did all BeottA^ ihejfalj, and othei Regions adhere unto him- and the Athenians^ who, tncouraged by Demojihenes^ took up Arms themfelves, and endeavored to raife whole Greece zgxnii Philips being but in weak condition after the fo many defeats received from the Lacedemonians^ they alfo had recourfe to him for fafety by the way of favor and peace, not only for themfelves, but for all Greece. So as the Spartans being left almoft alone to oppofe thilips Forces, they proved much too weak to withftand fuch a power •, fo as Greece being oppreft by Fotein forces, fellatlaft into the hands of the M<«fe</fl»w»j. And when there was a likelihood, by the death of Philip, who had not as yet well confirm'd his govern- ment over them, that the Grecians might haveftiaken off their yoke offervitude, Alexander fucceeded in the Kingdom, fo valiant a Prince, as he was a terror not only to his neighbors, but to all the Eaft; who by his fuprcme greatnefs, and cx- c'ellent worth, made all his Soldiers fo inamor'd of him, as fomc of the Grecian Commanders, who had followed him in the Wars in Perfta^ ftuck not to affirm, that there was not any oneinGr^^^rf, whooughtnotto defireas thegreatcfthappinefs that could befall them , that Alexander might fit in the T hrone, as King of Per(ia.
But after Alexanders unexpefted death, Greece feemed to have a better opportu- nity offered her to remit hcrfelf into her former liberty, being juft at that time in Arms • for the Athenians with many other people wcrerebcU'd againft /ilexander, and had an Army on foot of Thirty thoufand men, befides a numerous Fleet, dif- contented becaufe he would have received into their Country a great many of Citi- zens, who had been banifh'd for diverfity of Fadions. And moreover^ the div.fions of Empire made by Alexander among fo many of his Comm mders^ and the con- tentions which fuddenly arofc amongft them, were things which gav&Cr^a^ great
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opportunities of not being any more fubjecfl to be commandeil by a Fo"einer. Yet could (he not lay hold thereon, cither becaufe their former valor and gencro- fity began to fail in them, and their antienit Cuftoms to be corrupted, (for many who had received favors from /'/j'////> and from /ilexander^ loved better to be go- verned by one man alone,thcn to reftore their Country to her liberty 5 and chiefly for that the People having for the moft part had great authority in thofe days, the beft and moft valiant Citizens were rewarded with baniihment and other injuries for their fervice : ) Or clfe it may rather be faid j that the fame reafon of Civil dif- cord which had at firft made Greece weak, and not able to maintain herfelf in a free condition, did concur at this time likewife to make her relapfe intoflavery. Thu> ihe Ach^ans, and the Argives^ who together with the Atheniam had taken up Arms againft the Macedomaos^ either out of fear of Antifaters Forces ( to whofc fhare in the divifion of the Empire after Alexanders death, tMacedonia and Greece fell, of which Provinces he was formerly Governor ) or elfe egg'd on by envy, they foon forewent the League which they had contraded, left the City of Athens might have returned to her former greatnefs, and fo fuffered the AthentAns to be made a prey of by the MacedonUns. And the Spartans^ out of their fame antient refpeds, ftanding idle Spedators of other mens miferies, and not thinking that the fame afflidions might befall them, minded more to fccure their own City with new Fortifications, then to oppofe themfelves, as they ought to have done, to thefe Forces of the Enemy,and not have fuffered them to incrcafc by the Forces of Greece herfelf^and by thofe whom they had fubjugated.
After this, Grf^tc enjoyed peace and quiet 5 fome of them enduring patiently the Macedonian government, and others not fearing (as they ought to have don. ) the like mifchicf, becaufe it was not as yet come home unto them. So vrhen by the various accidents which befell the Macedomtns in thtir own Kingdom, Greece might have kept them low, or at Icaft have kept them from further domineering, permitting Cajjander, K^ntigonui ^ and Demetrita to live peaceably and qui- etly for all them, and fometimcstoo much believing the r flatteries, and allured by a certain appearing Liberty wherewith thofe Princes thought good to keep the Grecidns in obedience to thern, they knew not how to make ufe of any of fo many occafions, tillar laft in Philips time ( that Philif with whom the Romans had Wars fo long, who proved fo gallant a PriQce,and pofleft himfelf of MdcedoniA together with other Provinces ) ftie returned to her antient revolts. And as Fhilip .the Father of i^lexander made himfelf Lord thereof, by the fame means whereby he had got entrance thereinto; for King Philip cntted Greece, being call'd in by the Argives and Achaans^ who were made War upon by the ty£tali4m^ with whom many of the Cities of Greece were fo ill fatisfied, as to fliun being governed by them , they voluntarily put themfelves into the power of King Philip ; who had the way at laft opened unto him ( to the end that no part of Greece might befafc from the Macedonian Forces ) to fall upon 5p4r/rf, with which City P/';7/'p was before upon good terms and in peace : For the Lacedemonians not being able to endure that ihc Athxans^ by Philips favor, fliould grow too great in Morei^ the Principality whereof they had for a long time held,breaking their former agreenienc and confederacie made with P^/7//', were joined with the Atolians^ alTiftin^ them againft thcAch^anSy who were Friends and Confederates of tlie hive Philip. And after many revolutions, the bufinefs came at laft to that pafs, as the Grecians being too late aware that they had fuffered the authority of the CMacedoniAns to giow too great over them , by which fome of them had been formerly tyrann cally dtalt withall, and others apprehending the like imminent danger, nor able to endure thefe yet greater mifchiefs, they fled to the Rtmans ^ craving help and (uccor from them againft Philip-^ as did the Cicy of Athens chisf^y, as having fuffered
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greatcft iniuries, and being wont to be the head of the grcateft, and mod impor- tant innovations in Greect. Nor was it hard for them to obtain it •, for the Ro- mans, making profelTion, that they had made it their bufinefs that there ftiould be no unjuft power upon the earth, but that Reafon, Jufticc, and Law (hould rule every where, did willingly imbracc the protedion, and defence of the weakeft, whom they found to be opprcft by the more powerful : which thing under pretence of defending others, and of a noble peece of generolity, made the way to divers acquifitionsthecaficrtotbcm5 covering by thefc means their ambition of Go- vernment.
But the Romans were very cunning herein, who in all their aflions (hewed as if they dcfired nothing but glory, by which they did miraculoufly win the hearts of all Greece: For in the Expedition which they made againft Fhtlip^ their Armies having, at the inflance of the Grecians themfelves paft over the Sea, run many hazaards, and endured much hardfhips ; when they had conquered f^/7//>, and drove him out of Greece^ they reftorcdall thofe Cities which had been formerly under h»s Dominion, to their Liberty •, fuffering them to live under their own Laws 5 but yet fo, as made advantagioufly for them, placing fome of their own Roman Soldiers in fome of the bordering Towns; alleadging that they did this for the good of Greece, that being freed from theflavery of Philip, they might not fall into the like of Amigontti, a powerful King at that time in Afia^ who might be the better kept out of Europe, for fear ofnot offending the Roman greatnefs, then for fear of the weak forces of Greece, which were already very low. But the truth was, that thefe places opportunely held by the Romans, ferved to fecurc them of the Grecians fidelitie, if at any time forgetting their obligation, and de-; firous of novelty, as they had alwaies appeared to be, they fhould have a mind, with prejudice to the Roman affairs, to joyn with any other ftranger Prince -, for they defired that they might depend on the Authority of the Commonwealth of Rome.
So as that Greece which had fo many valiant Soldiers and Commanders, and was fo famous amongft other Nations, not having known how to make ufeof time, whilft the name of the Romans was but obfcurc, and that their Forces wcrebuficd clfe-where, to make way for their further greatnefs -, was forc'd afterwards to fol- low the fortune of the Romans, and toconfefs themfelves to be overcome by their more excellent worth -, and to acknowledge all that remained of good or fatcty to them, from their favor.
But to rerurn from whence we have digreft \ and to proceed with the fuccclTes of Greece in divers Ages, let us fay ; that it being the fate of Greece to fall upon two fo potent neighboring Princes, as were the Kings of Ferfia, and Macedonia, ic did not onely foment their Civil difcords, but did haften their final ruine, tor if the Grecians had had lefs powerful neighbors, they would either not have had rc- courfeunto them,or elfetheufcot their Forces and alTiftance in their own Greece would not have proved fo prejudicial to thcm:It being a true & general rule in State Affairs, that no foeign Forces arc to be made ufe of, for a mans own fafety, which arc much greater then his own •, for by fo doing, a man muft depend upon another mans will-, which where rule isinqueftion, is ufaally more ready to endeavor its own conveniency and greatnefs, then to keep word , and to confider another mans good, though he be a friend and confederate: Yetitmaybe affirmed, that (7rf^<re having for neighbors not onely one but two great Potentates, it was a thing which asic hindred her from making acquifitions abroad, foit might have been of great help unto her for the prefervation of her felf, and Liberty, if (ht could have made good ufe thereof; For if at any time (lie (hould be oppreft by one of them, (he had means to have recourfeto the other, from whom flis mi^ht fafely build for
help.
help, fmce fclf-intereftconcurr'd therein, for it would be dangerous for either of them to fuffcr the others power cncreafc too much, by the ruine of Greece. So as if the Grecians, when they were threatncd ruine by Philif^ had known how to make ufe of the help which was offered them by the King of f^r/itf, they might peradventure have efcaped that bad fortune; but being exceedingly jealous one of another, they had all of them recourfe to the fame Prince, becaufe none of the reft might make ufe of hisfriendfliip and favor. Thus Fhili^ the firft had greateft opportunity offered him, of making himfelf by degrees, Firft, chief Captain, next. Arbitrator, and laftly. Lord of all Greece, by keeping fomeof her people quiet, and in peace, Avhich he eafily granted them for his own ends ; and by making War at the fame time upon fome otheis of them, and he who (hall compare thefe antienc fucceftes of the Grecians affairs, with others of the enfuing age , and nearer un- to us, fliall and will find very like efFedls which have fprung from the fame occafi- ons. ¥oT Greece being once humbled, and afsubjefted by the Roman greatnefs, was afterwards returned to great honor and dignity in the time of Conftantirie who placed the ftat of the Empire in the antient City of Bi^aritium ; but (he knew not how to keep therein by reafon of her difcords. For after that the French and the Veoetian^ had taken Confiantiapple^ though the Empire returned to the a- forefaid Grecians, yet through many and various chances which happened after- wards, whole Greece was divided 5 fome of them following the Princes of the Crecian cxtra6l,and fome of them the Latins, the people for the moft part hold- ing with the former, and the Nobility with the latter. So as recourfe being had to Arms , for the deciding of fo many controverfics, they applied themfelves for help unto the Turks, and caufing a great number of them to pafs over in to Natoliti in Greece , Creeces ultimate ruine did enfiie thereupon. For thefe Barbarians, who were accuftomed to live among craggy Mountains, inamored of the beauty and pieafantnefsofthis Country, and moved, as fome fay, by a certain good augurie, whereby they were advifed to tarry there, promifing them much happincfs in that Region, whereinto they were come, and called, they pofleft themfclves of divers parts and Cities of the Empire, fparing nor friends, nor enemies -, and placing their Regal Scat amongft them,they grew foon much more powerful, being favored therein by the great diftentions which ftill continued amongft the Grecian Nobility, and other neighboring Lords, as i\\ok oi Servi*^ Bulgaria, and /ilbania, interef- (ing themfelves therein, they, together with their own interefts, drew along with themthedeftrudionof many other States, andgavejuftoccafioncopofterity, for ever to blame their ill taken counfels. For it the Grecians had been at unity within themfclves, and as folicitous to keep the Turks from advancing their power, as they were to abafethatofthe Latin Princes, they might certainly have hoped to have kept that fire a far orF, which hath burnt and confumed fo many noble parts of Chnftendom. Since it is feen that the Grecian Forces, whilft their Lords, after being driven from the City oi Cettjiantinople hy the Lacins, kept in the parts about NatelU (which was for above fifty years) although they had already be. un to be governed by one alone Prince,undera juftform ofEmpire,wereyetable to keep them bounded within the mountains of Natalia , in barren places, not fiifPering them to make any acquifitions of moment, nor to enter into Emspe^ as they did af- terwards. But It was the part cular imperfedion of this Province, and of that in all other rcfpeds, moft noble Nation, that Hie undeiftood not, or knew not how to make ufe of her many anJ valiant Forces -, Since if we will look back upon antient ftories, when F^////' had reduced Greece mo\\\% power, he put fo high an efteem upon the value of thofc Soldiers, as he undertook by them chiefly toeffe:t his antient dclire of making the enterprize of Ferfia^ which not being able (as hin- dred by death) to etiedl, was after fo glorioufly ended by h!s Son Alix^nder^
and
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And it is related, that being thus minded, fhilip had already muttered Two hundred thoufand Foot,and Fifteen thoufand Horfe in Greece •, and that AlexAnder dcfirous to profecutc his Fathers intentions, but by different advice, building his chiefcft hopes in the body of an Army of but Thirty thoufand valiant Soldiers, many of which he raifed in Creete^ did by their valor chi;fly end fo many glorious Entcrprifes.
The Fifteenth DISCOURSE.
Whether 0{ix2iC\{my uftd by the Athcmsins^ bt a jhU things ormoi and whithtr it he ufefnl jor the prefer vat ion of a Common' wealth.
IT was inftituted by the Laws In fome antienc Commonwealths, that fuch as were very eminent above the reft cither for Riches, Glory, Friends, or for any other Civil power, or who did exceed the other Citizens for any parti- cular worth, (hould bebanilhed the City 5 not out of punifhment or pe- nalty, but for the common good, to the end that Equality being the better maintained, and as it were a certain Confonancie amongft the feveral ranks of Citi- zens obferved, the Government might be the fafer, and more durable. Which cuftom was for a long time obferved by the Athenians^ and chiefly then when thcic Commonwealth did flourifli moft 5 and ten years was the limited time for this exile- ment. This Law was commonly called Oftracifm, whereof JriFhtk toucheth a little in his Third Book of the Peliticks. But whether fuch a Law be juit, or no, and whether it may make for the prefervation of a Commonwealth or State, for which end it was inftitutcd, is a Confideration of no fmall moment in point of Folic e ; there being much tobefaidon both fides, both in praife and difpraife of fo flrangc a Law and Cuftom.
In the behalf thereof, thcfe things may be had into confideration : That nothing is more requifite for the long prefervation of a City, efpecially of fuch a one as is governed in form of a Commonwealth, where the Government is in the hands of many, then Equality amongft Citizens j whereof the more excellent the temper is, and the more it is tied faft by flrift Laws, fo as it cannot be exceeded on any fide, the life of that City or Commonwealth will be fo much the longer, more quiet, and more fecurc. A City may be refcmbled to a humane Body, compounded of divers Elements, and confifting of many Members : and that as that hum me Body is more healthful and more handfom, wherein every elementary quality is better diftributed, and every member better proportioned i fo that City or Commonwealth wherein every degree of Citizens hath a moderate authority, ftateand fortune, and well pro- portioned to the whole, doth preferve it felf the longer, and keep freer from the contagion of civil fcditions. Though the Head be the nobleft part of the Body,and the Eyes the like of the Head, yet would they not be of ornament, when either that or ihefe were bigger then their ordinary and natural form ; they would rathtr take away all Decorum and beauty, which is nothing but a due proportion in all things. Then,though it may feem a gallant thing to fhew the grcatnefs and nobknefs of a City or Commonwealth, that there be many very wealthy men therein, and of excellent civil gifts, and that the fupreme Degrees and Negotiitions of the Com- monwealth be beftowed upon thefc-, yet another reafon may perfwadc the contrary; for this emincncie fpoils the proportion of the whole, and doth not reprefeot a City
of
.of Free-men, and partakers of the fame Government, but the form of a Tyrannical .Government, confiftingof Lords and Servants, hateful names in good Govern- ments. Therefore all the beft Lcgiflators have chiefly aimed at the reducing of all things, as much as may be, to an Equality, in thit City where they would intro- duce a Politick Government, and a peaceful and durable condition. Infomuch as FUto, to take away all occafion of civil difcord, would have all goods to be com- mon, in that his Commonwealth which he propounded to himfdf for the moft cxadt form of Government : So as there fliould be no fuch name as Rich, or Poor, ;but only that of Citizens of the (ame Country, and who live under the fame Law. So as no man could out-doe another, by altering this (o neceflary and ufcful C.vil Equality : which not being to be had where there is a Propriety of Goods, the x^thenidtJs would provide againft thofe inconveniences which the unequal con- dition of Citizens produced, by driving at a certain time out of the City fuch as had caufed thedifordcr, and who were fufpe(5led to be the Authors of Novelties, and of trouble to peaceful living.
And truly, he who (hallconfider what the beginnings of thofe evils have been^ which have inwardly vex'd and troubled both Coramonivealths and other States as well in antient, as in thefe more modern times, (hall find, that all the confufions and civil diforders wlich have after a long time brought many States to their ulti- mate ruine, have fprung from this root. How was partiality^ and the corruption of good and antient Orders introduced in the Commonwealth oi Rome, whence all great things may take example, if not from having fuffered avarice, and the power of fome Citizens to increafe too much-f Who having made themfelvcs fo great by the continuation of military Commands, and for having many ways whereby to purchafc popular favor, as the Commonwealth could not keep them within any bounds, nor could the Laws curb them, did totally fubvert that Government : in* fomuch as it was faid of C<t/4r, that he would not have any Superior to him in the City ^ and of Ptmpej, that he would have no Equal- And Cato had wont to fay, that C^fars immoderate greatnefs had cnforc'd Fompey likewife to exalt himfelf above whatotherwifc became the publick fervice, to the end that the one might counterpoife the other. So grant one inconvenience, others will eafily follow i And as too great eminencie in any Citizen, although he be not ill-minded towards the Publick, ought to be fufpe<3ed 5 fo it is hard to rid ones felf thereof when it is once brought in and tolerated, where thofe ufual means and inftitutions arc want- ing which the Carthaginiamhad, without falling upon violent courfes, which in ftead of Phyfick proves poifon to that State. The Houfe of cm edict began to lay found foundations for its greatnefs in Florence^ by means of old Cofmo's great wealth ^ it afterwards increafed very much by the vertue and wifdom of Lorea^o •, and fo by little and little getting to a great height of power, which exceeded the ordinary condition of a Civil State, it was no longer able to live under the Laws of the Country, but would affume unto it felf the fuperiority of that Government i So as when the rlirentines were too late aware thereof, they could not moderate that too immenfe greatnefs ; for the continued power of that Family, wherein there had been excellent men for worth, and eminent degrees and dignities, purchafed by them boih in their own Country, and elfwhcre, had get them fo many to fide partially with the m,as their own Faction was able upon any occafion to fnlfjin them. The like happens alfo in fome States wherein there is not fo exprefs a form of a Commonwealth, but a fupreme Prince, yet alfo many particular Lords of great authori:y. In fuch States, the too much greatnefs of Barons hath oft-tines proved too pernicious: For there being in all men naturally a defire of growing greater, andihey having means to do fo, where their power isnoclimitedby the Lnvs and C L floms of the Statejthey are cafiJy induced to mount higher then ftan Js wuh their
P degree,
degree, to equsl their authority to that of the King himfelf, and to put for inoo-' vjtions prejudicial to the State. Amongft many others we have a notable example hereof, in the prefent troubles of Franee^which were occafioned by having fuffer- ed fome prime Lords to grow too great in power, whence civil difcords haverifcn in the Kingdom, and the better to fomentand fuftain their parties, and to perfcft their dtfigns, they had recourfe to fortin forces, and kindled that fire which is not well quenched yet. It hath therefore been thought a very -.vary and well advifed courfe wh ch hath been ufed by fome Princes, to have an eye upon fuch, whofe greatnefs and cminencie above others may render them fufpeded, and to allay ths their grcatnefs, by not admitting them into chief imploymencs, by taking away or leflen ng their Priviledges, and Immunities,and by leflcnng their authority ,and uni- vcrfal favor by other means, according as occafions have counfellcd. Confdvo a great and famous Commander in the former age, had done excellent fervice to King FerMnanJfi; and when in all other refpcftshe was to have looked for great rewards, as having by his own worth gotten, and preferved the Kingdom of iV^^/w, he was taken oft'from all imploymcnt, and brought bick into Sfain to fpend the remainder of his years in a private condition ; That prudent Prince was moved thereunto, as knowing that fuch a man who was fo generally cried up, and who was fo followed and applauded both by the common people and the Nobility, could not but be to be ♦fufpefted : So as he knew ic wasrequifiteforhisown f*?- curity, and the like of his Dominions, not to fuffer him to grow greater to his Mafters prejudice, and therefore to take from him all Command and Imploy- mcm.
The Inftrudions given to this porpofeina figurative way, firfl hy Per under to Thrafjbaluiy and after by TarqutH the proud to his Son Sextut are very obfervable, towic, to cut off the topsof thehigheft Poppies, orearsof corn-, whereby they would inter , that he who will rule m fafety, muft not iuffer men to grow more eminent then others, for what concerns any Civil Power; which though it ap- pear to be a thing proper to oncly tyrannical', tates, yet when it is ufed with diC cretionandwifdom,hath another afpc A, for all particulir interefts ought to give way , where the pubiick good, and the preftrvacionofuniverfal Peace and Quiet of the State (which is ot a much greater concernment) isinqueftion. But when this may be done by any ordinary way, as by Law and Cuftom ( as it was among the AthenUns and other antient people) then this remcdic proved the more juft and fecure. There is not any mifchief in the City which ftands in more need to be cured by the phyfick of the Law, then Ambition? for Ambition is fuch a ficknefs in the mind of man, as where once it takes root it never leaves the mind free and healthful till it be torn cut by raa'n force? but rather the maladie increafing by length of time, it makes men as it were frantxk, fo as the ambitious man covets all things, and is not fatisfied with any thing, having neither mean nor bridle. Ho- nors, Dignities, Preferments how great foever they be, feive rather for tinder to make this inward fire flame the higher, then for water to quench it, infomuch as fomeof thefc vain-glorious men thought it a fmall matter to command the whole world , when they he?rd it difputed that there were more worlds then one. Now to this almoil natural, and ordinary defed of humanity, and altogether as harmful to the quiet of all States, as it is of it fclf incorrigible, Oftrmfme will prove a whole- fbmecure- and which the Athenkns in particular knew their Commomvealth flood in need of. For as Greece did in that Age abound in men, who were really valiant, fo ambition feemed to have fet up its reft amongft them.
Wherefore miraculous things are written of that Nation inthofe times. But fuch as wherein ic may be found that true worth was greatly contaminated by an immoderate defire of glory, and; haughtin€fe. The Laws of canvaffing, and all other
provilious
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provifions thereunto tending have ahvaics proved frulders, for every little fpark'e thatremiins of this fire, though it be covered over withafhcs, may caufe gre3C Combuflions. It feems therefore that no other remedy is fufficient for thofe evils which proceed from pride and ambirion,then totally to rid ihe City or State of fuch men as aic defirous to exceed all others.
Plata faid, that men who were truly wife would be as contented with not ruling over others, as mod men do what in them licstoott precedcncie, and command ever others. Therefore where fuch a defirc is dilcerned, and where there is muter to occafion it, as are great riches, high pl3ces,and vain clory,a man may with reafon fuppofe that there is there an unfound foul, which ought to be taken away left it infe(ft the whole Commonwealth. To take all Nobility, all riches, all civil pre- cm nencic, totally away from a City or Commonwealth,as is no.v done in Tlirky, and as formerly ic hath been done by divers Princes, that they might rule the more fecurely, reliflieth too much of Barbarifm, and Tyranny, though it hath not proved an ill taken advice to them that have known how to u e ic,reputing it juft though not in felf, yet as it hath fuitcd well with fuch a Form of Government • but to rid a City of fuch things, and of fuch men for a certain prefixt time, is f ch a provLfion as tends to the prefervation offplendor and reputation without either prejuiicc or danger. This is a means whereby vertue and other civil prehemnence- may be re- warded ^ but not fo, as the greater pare be fcorneff, andoppref^ for t^ehaughti- ncf$ of fomefew. And he who ifiall well confider it, iTiall findc at banillimenc from amans Country is not a thing (imply, and of it flf evil orat L-aftnotfo
f;reatanevil, butthatitmay becifilyand willin Jy b rnuit ali, by himwhova* ucs the common good fo well as he ought. Bu that wh ch makes banifhmtnc be thought a mifchief, isthebad cuality wnich is there un o annexed, uhen itisin- fiidted for puni(hment -, there being thereby imprinted as it were in indeleblc cha- radcrs, that fuch a one is leudly given, and hath commi ted fomc fju't, which is a thing naturally abhorred even by the wickedeft fort of men. But fet this rcrpc(5l afide, toliveoutof amansCountrie, hath no refemblance of evil, but is willingly imbraced by many as an advantage, and fome endeavor it as a badg of honor, tbac they may have occafion to ferve their Prince, and to defervewell abroad. He then, who to obey the Laws and Ordinations of the Commonwealth or Stare ihall live for a certain time from his own home, is fo far from fufFering th-reby in hij ho- nor, as he merits thereby i for he may fay that by this his obedience he is Ser- viceable to his Prince and Couniry^ though he do not ad any thing. So then h©/ receives no injury, and may, and ought to pafs by any particular inconveniency, lor the publick good. Nay it may fo happen, that that very power and grearnefs, by which a man becomes liable to >he Laws, is the longer and with lefs d mger pre- fcrved unto him , though he cannot enjoy it without Ibme parenthc fis of time. For we fee by expcri:r,ce,that thefe greatneffes and continued profperities do cafily precipitate a min, cither through the envy of others, or by being too immoderate- ly ufcd, and fomctimcs draw along with them the total ruine of the whole Fa- mily.
It may in the laQ place be alleadged, that th s exemption from ruMick imploy- mcnts, aud Court fcrvice, may make him retire to his private ftudies, and enjoy himfdf, which ought to be cfteemed oneof thechiefeft blclTings which man caa attain unto in this life. Infomuch as the Philofopher fiid, that to be kept from preferments is aplcafant breath of wind which fweetly convtys thcvxi'e man to the Haven of peace of mind, and of his lawful ftudies ; which naany forbear to do of ihemfelves, leaftthey may be thought by the world to be vile, andabjed m.n, and of no abilities^ By thefe things it is concluded that Oftracifm is a good thing, and to be pra.fed- and thu this cuftom of the Athenians is fit to be followed and im: - tatcd by others. ' P 2 Buc
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But now let us face about. What is more ncceffiiry for the prefervation of a City or State then Juftice, wiihout which no fort of Govcrdment can laft long, nor merit the name of a Commonwealth or State : For, take away Jufticc, and you take away the very being thereof, and leave nothing but a mif-fliapcn matter, made up of corruption and diforders. But in diftnbutive Jaftic^, Whic h imporrs fo much towards j;ood and quiet living, Reafon doth advife it, and all good Cuftoms do ap- prove of it, that a Geometrical proportion, not an Arithmetical ought to be ob- fcrved •, infomuch as it is not all men who ought equally and indifferently to fhare of Honors and Prehcminencies in a City, but thofe who for fome good qualities and endowments do deftrvethem. Therefore that Government where the Law of Oftracifm is obferved, muft needs be fobjedt to all change and revolts : For it cannot but be difpleafing to the chiefeft and bcft of the City, who feeing themfelves whilft they arc prefent, threatned with exile, and the overthiow of their grandezza, and having recourfe when they are abfent to the favors of other Princes to revenge themfclviS for the injury they have received, may eafily difturb the P> ace of the City, and put the whole Government into a hazardous condition. Thofe who have been driven out of their Country by reafon of any Civil fadion, as it fell out long ago in divers Cities of Itdlj, have always been inftrumcntal to the keeping of thofe Cities in perpetual troubles, and of reducing fome of them toflavery, which had wont to enjoy liberty. And yet what was this banilhment but a kind of Oftracifm •: For in thcfe civil fcditions, none but fuch as were of greatcft power and authority, and of whom the reft were moft jealous, were driven out : Nor was this done by the will of one only, but by their Decree in whofe hands the reformed Government was. So as it may be faid, that thefe Cities iifed the Law of Oftracifm •■, which hath notwithftanding always proved prejudicial, and at long running mortal. And to fay truth, to what purpofe could fuch a Law or Cuftom fcrve, unlefs it were the more to exafperate Civil diftention 1 Which the fame Athenians having learn'd by experience, they did annull this their Law t,'' for the bufinefs was come to fuch a height, as they drove out Citizens out of particular fpleen, not out of any publick refpeft •, as was done by HjfdrUlus^ a man of a mean condition, and no ways liable to Oftracifm, who for being an Enemy to \^lcibiades and Nicias^ was by their means baniftied by vertue of that Law.
But fay the Law were kept within its due bounds, and ufed only againft fuch as bore grcateft fway and were moft eminent ; to reduce all things to an Equality, is not only an unjuft, but a violent a(flion, and which doth even contradict Nature herfelf, which did not only make fo many different fpecies of things created in the world, but gave various inftinfts and hidden qualities to thofe of the fame fpecie?,' foas fome might prove more generous and of greater worth, as is feen not only araongft Men, but amongft bruit Beafts, yea even amongft Vegetables. Then fince this Equality is not to be found amongft Men,it is great injuftice to diftribute things equally in a Government to thofe whofe parts and defcrts arc unequal : For in conferring of honors or preferments in a City or State, a Geometrical, not an Arithmetical proportion muft be obferved : It is the vertue and merit of every one that muft be weighed. He who is richer then another, may be ferviceable to his Country by great and frequent contributions to the Publick. He who hath many Clients and Friends, may by his power and authority difpofethe Peoples minds to believe well, and ad well in the Cities occafions and affairs. He who is advanced above others in glory, muft have defetvcd it well of the Commonwealth by fome noble adion, and may confirm himfclf therein by fome other like adion. And he who i> more generally given to any Vertue, be it or Warlike or Civi), is always fit-er then others to ferve his Country and Prince upon all occafions. So as to drive fuch men as thefe out oi the City, i$ no better then to cut that member from the
body
body which is lovelieft, and fitter th€h the reft to be fcrvlceable thereunto. Such an Infticucion then can h^ve no admittance but in Tyrannical governments : And tl-.c examples alleadged of ThrMfjbAltts and Tarquin^ are examples of Tyrants, who being refolved to preferve thtttifclves by violence in thfeir ufurped dom nions, were TO be jealous of all the beft and ftioft powet*ful men, and endeavor to be quit of t! em for their greater fecurity. But a juft Prince muft not imitate fuch examples -, nay, even in a Politick Goverflhient, thefc Proceedings would be pernicious. For he who will thereby prefcrvi! hiittfelf, muft change the Form of the whole Govern- ment, and reduce it to a D^fpotical and fertile condition : with \^hich fuch Orders holding fome proportion and conformity, they may fw a certain time prove uleful for the maintaining of that Tyrannic • as it hath done to the Turks in thefe later times, and formerly in fome other Natiott$, wherein the whole Government hath related to the foleand peculiar accommodation of the Lord Paramount, without any refped to the good of the Subjeft, and moie according to will then to Law. Nor IS it true, that the power of Citizen^, orgreatnefs of Barons in a Kingdom, proves alwas harmful ^ it may rather upon many occafions prove the fafety of that City or State. But this may be ill ufed, as many other things are-, the which not- withftanding vvhofoever fhould go about to take totally away from a City, would rune it, not bring it to pcrfedion. Therefore the Law ought to provide for taking away the abufe of things, not the things thethfelves, when they are not fimply and in themfelves evil. And if the Authority which the Roman Commanders held in their Armies had been well regulated, ahd their continuing in theii' military Com- mands moderated by a fbortcr time, dtfar could not have made ufe thereof as he- did to the prejudice of the Commonwealth, he having continued fo many years Commander in chief of the fome Army, and in the fame Province. Nor had they needed to have raifed Pom^ej to fuch a height,to oppofe C^fars greatnefs : But when- when they had let it run on too long, to declare him an Enemy to his Country, and diive him out of Italy^ proved a violent remedy, and mortal to the Common- weal th-
Neither can that benefit be expcfted as is pretended, (by the baniiliment of fo many Citizens, who being become too great, are for fufpition driven out of their Country ) of fee uring themfelves from their power: rather Injury add(.d to Am- bition, ferves for another incitement to make them endeavor fome innovation in the City, and make"; ' 'em the more follicit9US in plotting by the means of fuch as are vheir fr ends .h-. adherents in their own City or State, to raife fome revolt in it, for which they have cafie recourl'e to the favor of other Princes : So as the trouble of bein ' oftcnfive to thofe States from whence fuch men arecxpell'd, is rather in- creafedthendiminiilicd. We have infinite examples in all Ages of thofe, who being driven by banifliment out of a City or State, have been the occafion of nottble mifchief and ruine therc!jnto : 'A r though ic cannot be denied, but that the coo great power of Citizens in a Cicy, or of Lords and Barons in a Kingdom, begets fufpition, and is dangerous, and doth ufually caufc no fmall difhcukics to the good and peaceful Government of that State-, yet lome other remedy then Oftracifin may be ufed to obviate thofe diforders which fuch cxcelTes do commonly beget j For that is only to fuft^er a fore to grow old and to gangrene, that they may be after- wards forced to ufe fire or fword to heal it. In a well- govern "d State, an eye muft be had, and care taken both by the Law it fdf, and by the Prince who rules in chief there n , not to fuffer any one to grow to too excelTive a greatnefs : And if any one do arrive at fuch a condition, as he begins too far to overtop the reft, the foundati- on and groundwork of his power muft dextetoully be taken away, and of his pi ic- ing thoughts, fo as he may not thereby be able to work any novelties, or diftuib the publick peace : Which may cafily be done by his wildom who commands m chief.
Tlie
(no)
the f.imc men ought not to he fuffcred to continue long in the fame imploymcnts,and efpcciajly not to exercife them too long in the fame place ; fuch things ought not to be left in the r power, which m-iy ferve for fuel the more to kindle thdr ambitious thoughts to the prejudice of the publick good^which may be done under a pretence ot honor, foasthe Princes may not be noted forinjuftice, nor can the particular peifonages account it as an injury done them.
If any one do abound in riches, let him have cxpenfivc impbymcnts, that he maylelTcn thac wcalih. which made him appear more eminent then others. If he be of too great authority in the Court, or amongft the People, as having had the management of important affairs along time, fend him to fomc place of Magi- ftracie, or other imploymcnt a far off", and change him often from place to place. If he be great and remarkable for glorious adionsdoneby him, givehira hard and difficult imployments, whetein if he fuccced not well, his reputation will fo.n grow Icfs with the people, who judge by the events. But if fuch a one appear too much ambitious, anJ be fo, as many men arc fecn to be, ouc of a certain vain-glory, but without any malice of heai t, he may be contented and kept quiet, by confer- ing honors upon him of glorious appearance, but little profit. But the remedy will prove peradventure harder in thofe who bo.fl themfelvcs to be more nobly defen- ded, and of becter blood then others, for many fcveral refpedli meet often times in them, to make them great and powerful ; yet even againfl chefc remedies may be found, without paflxng by a violent and illegal way to the driv.ng them out of the Gtyor State-, their friends cm: kindred, may be kept low and humble, whereby their power is lefTcned •, iftheycommitanyexccfsincafeofJufl.ee, as fuch mcii out ot arrogancie often do, be fevere unto them, take their priviledges from them, declare them to be for a certain time uncapable of any Publick imploy ment, and do fom: other fuch like things •, which being done , upon fome juft occafion, although the panics concerned be therewithal! difpleafed, yet not b:ing difliked by the ge- nerality, their hatching of mifcbicvous plois againft the prcftnt oovernmencand Weal publick, will have lefs fewel to feed upon.
Butwhatfhallbefaidof him, whofe worth and vertue do-h exceed that of all oihers 1 by what pretence can a juft Prince, or a well-governed Commonwealth humble fuch a man, or keep him low, or aloof from partaking of their Councds ^ To this it may be anfwered , that if this fuppofed perfonage be endowed with true vertue, he will not be fubjed to any fufpition, nor will it be imagined that he will do any foul or wicked thing which maybe prejudicial to his Prince or Coun- triej but that all his endeavors (hall aim at the common good, and it is jufl and convenient that fuch a man (hould alwaies bear fway in every well-ordered Com- monwealth. But if the vertues which render him fo great and eminent, tend to policie, that is, whena man docs that which is good and honefl, having his mind bent upon fome other objcd then meer worth and honefty, as mofl men ufe to do, out of hopes of glory, or of bettering themfelvcs-, which things notwichflanding are fo far vertues as they arc helpful to the State , and have a certain refemblancc of true worth J it will not be amifsthat fuch a one who may be fufpeded tomif- imploy his good endowments, be proceeded againft in manner aforefaid. We may then conclude that the cuftom of the Athenians concerning Oftracifm ought neither to be praifcd nor pradifcd in relation to the aft it fclf-,bui may admit of commenda- tion and imitation as far as the intention thereof reacheth, vt^. to provide that the ambition or miicc of a few, rob not many of their quiet,nor do perturb or confound the whole State.
thendof thcFirfl BOOK.
(in)
THE
SECOND book:
The Firft DISCOURSE.
ff^hy tht Commonwealth of Wcmcc bath not fo far inlargtdhtrFrc cinSii as did the Roman Commonwealth.
E N may be allowed to wonder not a iittlcj if they take it into their confidcration, why thcCommonwealth of rf«/Vc,having fo excel- lent Laws and Inftitutions, and having fo long preferred her fdf in power and authority, hath not notwi'hftanding much inlarged theprc- cinfts ot her Empire, as did the Common- wealth of lome^ in a leflcrfpace of time and in a form of Government which was not void of many imp:rfedions : The thought thereof hath made me oftentimes defire to fejrch into the true caufes of it.
I find this hath been taken into confidera- tion by fomc other modern Writers -, but to boot that h is difcourfes are already buried in oblivion, it may be the things by him alleadgcd have not been fuch, as may give lull fatisfiiflion to one who (ball look narrowly into the carriage of our ci- vil anions, He was of opinion that the greatncfs of the Roman Empire wasfoiy to be attributed to the vcrtueof her Ordinations, and Form of Government^ from which fince the Venetian Commonwealth doth differ, he thinks that the caufc why (he hach not been able to make (o grear acquifitions. And he is fo refojate in tliisopinion,as without diftinguilliing between things & things, between times and time?, he dcth fo equally extol all the orders and aftions of the Roman Connnon- wealth, as he doth propound fome things for example to all other Princes an J Com- monweahhs,asarcrathertobe blamed then to be imitated, and which were therea- fonsof the luine of that Commonwealth, as the diflen ions which was bttwtcn ih: Nobility and the Common People, and other f«ch things which are rather
^iforJcr}
diforders then ordcrs,3nd more apt to confound, then to eftablifli States. Infomuch as his opinion is, That if thtre were a City at this day in Italy which had the fame \: orm of Government as Rome had of old, that City might, as the other did, make herfelf Miftrcfsof the World. Asif the condition of times,3nd the fo many various accidents upon which humane anions, and cfpA:ially the augmenting and change of States do depend, were to be held for nothing -, and that it be in the power of a wife Legiflator to give the Empire of the World to that City, which he knows how to govern by good Laws. But experience teacheth os much otherwife 5 fines we have known many antient Commonwealths founded by very wife men, and con- firmed with excellent Orders, equally for what concerns Peace as War, yet not any rne amongft fo many hath been able, I will not fay to acquire fo much Dominion as did the Commonwealth of Rente, but nor hardly able any ways to extend their Prccnfts amongft their Neighbors. Theintrinfecal Orders of the State are not (imply of themfelves fufficient to make fo great Atchicvemcnts, (though they may peradventure concur very much thereunto : ) Nor ought the State of Venice bee not being Miftrefs of larger Territories, be attributed to^any deteft in this behalf-, bat many other things are to be taken into c6nfidcration, whereby the trueft caufes of fucheffcds, which amidft the uncertainty of fuch like affairs can be found out, may be difcovered by looking into.
To know then whence fuch a diverfity proceeds, we muft take the bufincfs a little higher, and examine, Firft, what was the original beginning of thefc two Cities, Rome ji^'^ Venice -, what their Founders were •, and then what their fit uati- on, what the inclinations, ftudics, and vertues of their Citizens -, and laftly the con- dition of times, and qualities of their neighboring Princes muft be examined; All whith things appertain to this Confidcration, as well as the Orders of the Com- mon \vealth,3nd their Form of Government. He then who fliall look upon the firft Founders of thefe two Cities, will find them, even in thefe the r fiift beginnings, roc a ]itt!e differing : which occafioned differing intentions, and differing ends -, and therefore peradventure a differing ftate, and differing condition. The fit ft Ereftors of Venice^ where men who were peacefully given,as thefe who having been wearied by the fo many calamities of /M/y , occafioned by the inundation of the Barbarians^ had withdrawn themfelves, that they might fliun the danger of War, inco that piece of marifh ground in the K^driatick Sea, which was then greater then now it is, and the chiefeft of many fmall Iflands, which by a common name were called Vemtia. So as they lived for a while without any Orders cither Military or Civil •, thofe firft Inhabitants contenting themfelves to live in peace and quiet, without dreaming of any grater matter : For it neither ftood with the end which they propounded unto themfelves in this their n«w abode fo to do, nor did the condition of thofe times permit it : And they were fo fenced from the Arm sof Enemies as then, both by the natural condition of their fituation, as alfo by the fait waters, as they needed not to arm themfelves for their own defence. Therefore their Citizens being by long cuftom inured to thefe thoughts, they had no thought of taking up Arms, though the City were already much increafed both in Forces and Authoiity, unlefs when they were provoked, and more to keep themfelves from bein^ injured by others, ortoaffvft their Friends and Confederates, then out of ambition of Rule, and of enlarging their bounds. And he who (ball confider what their greaceft and and moft difficult enterprifes were in thofe firft times, will fee they aimed all at this end. The Venetians fought firft with the French, and afterwards agninft the Httns^ in defence of their Country ,and of their Liberties •, and long after with the Genoefes, enforced thereunto by neceffity, and provoked by many grievous injuries : For this very valiant and generous Nation would not reft quiet, out of an emulation of glory in Sea-affairs j wherein though they were oftentimes worfted by the Vcneti-
ans^
("3)
.T>?j, yet tliey ftill found occafion of new Contefts. The CommorAvealth o^ Venice hath of i-time4 taken up Arms likewife, in times neerer this our Age, with greater prcpaiationfor War, and with more courage to defend their State in Tend frma^ which they had already gotten with much ado, and whereof they were juftly pof- f. iTed ; infomuch as they have fomctimes valian ly repulfed the fury of moft power- ful Leagues of Princes who were refolved upon their ruine.
But it becomes not the momh of a Venetian to fay how oft they have taken up Arms in defence of their Fiicnds and Confederates, lefl he miy feem to upbraid others with the fcrvices his Countrymen have done t^em. But divers People and Cities alTiftcd and preferved by their Forces, do witnefs this. And to fpeak only of things of more recent memory, how great a defire hath th';S Commonwealth fliewn to the common good •". and to this purpofe how careful hath (he been of the liberty and glory of ^ft^j, in fuftaining long and heavy War, to prcferve the noble Ne.ipvlftdn Territories in the Italian Princes, and the like of rJMtUn ? But he who V ill look further back, and fee what they have done, will find that the Venetians have undertaken and finiflied famous enterprifes out of zeal to Religion-, as they did in the Wars of the Holy Land againft the Saracens^ and divers other times againft other Princes, to preferve and increafc the glory of the holy Church.and the Papal dignity : which amongft many other aftions, is clcerly and nobly witn.fTed by the famous Naval vidory won from the Emperor Frederick Barborp^'a ^ for the which fenice doth at this day enjoy many great priviledges, in witncf) of her great worth and fingular merit. But it is needlefs now to particularize in thofc things whereof all Hiftories are full : It will fuffice to touch uponfome things, w'le eby it may be conceived what the firft beginnings of the City were, and what were the intentions and end of her Citizens^
Remes ends were far different from thefe, who from her very beginning aimed only arEmpirc and greatnefs % being built by Romulth-^ a fierce and ambitious man, who not content to have recovered his Kingdom to his Grandfather Numitor^ and opened the way to the Lordlfiip of y^lba longA^ refolved by the aftiftancc of a great many young men who followed him, to purchafe a better fortune and con- dition for hmfelt, and to build a new City, which muft have a warlike inftitution ro keep the minds of thofe ftirr ng youth bufied in military cxcrcifes,3nd to defend himftlf from h.s neighbors, who finding that the new City aimed at greater de- figns, thought to keep it low. Semulus might with reafon promife himfelf to pur- chafe more Domin on, and to enlarge his Confines-, for he built his Ci;y in a Count y which was pofleft by many people, who were weak, and at odds within themfclves, fo as he needed not fear any potent Prince who migl t oppofe his de- figns, or fupprefs his Forces before they were fomewhat better cflablifhed. This was the firft foundation of Remes greatnefs 5 for the City beginning foon to habi- tuate herielf to military difcipline, and to turn her thoughts upon War, and ag- grandifing her State, fhe grew fo confirm d therein with time, and withcontinud militavy orders, as the Militia and all things thereunto rending did continually flour 111 m her. For thofe that came after, following (as it falls out for the moft part) the example of their Pre deceffors, her Citizens were always defirous of warlike glory, and of Empre-, proving to be like Homultts^ and thofe other valiant men f.om whom they had their beginning andincreafe. Thus they always made on^ War beset another, not being able to endure the fufpe<5ied power of their Neigh- bors,nor yet the injuries done unto them by their Friends and Confecera:es -, under wl ich two p:etences they made firft many notable acquificions in Italy ^ aad afterwards ( paffing over the Sea ) in Africa, in Sfain^ and in many other Pro- vinces.
But to pafs on now to another Confideration, Icr us affirm that the fituation is
Q_ of
of great moment for the Rule an J Dominion which one City Is to have ovsr an- other, as that which affords f.cunty for felf defence, and opportunity ro fubjugate o-.hers-, this helps likewifcto make a City plentiful aad vvcalthv, without which States'aie hardly acquired. For where there is fcarcity of livelihood, povertie is more to be fought withall then Enemies, and want of wealth renders a City alwaies weak,ande3rietobew.iftcd and oppieft. Hence it was i\ui Sparta, thou^^h (lie had excellent Laws and Inftitutions, yet whilft ftie obfcrved them, flie could not mucfiinlarge her Dominions •, for by them the City was bound for what concerned both the private and publick condition,to be kept poor, and far from any commerce with others-, and in our time the Cantons of the Stvit:{erf^ though ihsybeavery valiant Generation, yet being poor, and feated amongft Mountains, and for the inoft part in barren places, their Soldiers being fighting under the pay of other Princes, they have not been able to do any thing for themfclves, or to make any acquifuions, but haveonely preferved their Liberties.
If we fliall then confider the fituation of renice^ we (lull certainly find it very opponune for moft things, and miraculoufly well for fomc things. For if we have refpcd to fafety , what Ciry cm be compared to this, which without any Bulwarks of Walls, orGairifonsot Soldiers, defended by her natural fcituation, is of her felf fafe from all injuries, and inexpugnable < So as (he is the onely example alter fo many Ages of being untoucht by the Barbarians violence. ]f we refpcd abun- dance of plenty and wealth, the accommodation that the Sea affords her, and the fo many Rivers which difgorgc ihemfclves, either into the neighboring Sea, or into her own G ulf, are fuch and fo many, both for the conveyance of viduals, and of merchandize, as it is no wonder thatfo great a multitude of people can live in her with fuch abundance of all things, and not onely her own Citizens, but even foreiners who inhabit there , grow rich therein. But as for Empire and command, as (he is miraculoufly accommodated for the imployment of Forces jn Sea enter- prizes, fofor what belongs to the like on land, (lie hath not thofe conveniencics which pcradventure are requifite. Theretore it was long ere (he bsthoDght her felf of purchafing any Territories in Terra firma^ minding onely Dominion at Sea, whereunto (he was invited by her fcituatcon, and by the inftitution of her An- ceftors :, touching which it is worthy confideration, that the Sea Militia and Di- fcipline, upon wh ch the Commonwealth was for a long time bent, are not fuch as can naturally give occafion of great command ,becaufe their Fleets cannot of thcra- felvcs penetrate further then the Rivets which fall into the Sea ; wherefore all her acquifitions were onely Iflands, or places on the Sea fliore, bccaufe ilie had not then numerous and well difciplincd Armies to dive into the hearts of Dominions, and to purfue vidorics.
All Cities which have placed the pitch of their power in their Fleet;, haveh:d theUkefuccefs. For though they may have purchafed fome reputation, andfome precedencie by Sea, yet have they not b:en able much to inlaige the Confines of their command. Thus the x^thenians and other people of Greece^ though they wcrevcry ftrong in thefe kind of Forces, proper toihat Nation fiom whence the art of building of Ships, and of Navigation is thought to have its original, yec have they alwaies been eftcemcd weak, and but little valued by fuch N..tionf;,which th y could not by their Forces make fubje^f to their Dominions. But the City of Mome , which ftodied more the Miltia by Land, then by >*-ea, an i built hei: greatnefs more by Armies then by Fleets, having more field-room wherein to exercife her Citizens valor, made much greater enterprizes, and made many Prov nces fubjedt to her Dominion. Nor did the Romans make ufe of Fleets by Sea before they were neceffitated, that they might fail into Sicily and /fo frica, to oppofe the power of the Carthagininns , which tjbey had rfafon
to
to be jealous of, by reafon of their too great power, and vicinity.
But when they had occafion to make ufc ot their Soldiers by Sea, they iTiewed no lefsforwardncfs and daring therein, then they had done by lartd.- Infomuch as thesitilhmd experience of th^CarthsginUns^ who had long beei^ Mafters at Sea, was oft- times overcome and deluded b/ the valor and military Difciplineof the RomanW till at laft ihat Nation which' was held to be fo powerful at Sea, was de- ftroyedOTd beaten by the Romans, who had a longtime been lincxpericnced in Martime Affairs, but very expert in Land-Armies, and Military Difciplne. So as the Empire of the World being conteftedfor by thefe two Comonwea'ths, ic was fecn that it more availed xht Romans to be a little fuperior to the Carthaginians by Land , then it did the Carthaginidns to exceed the Romans mrxh by Sea. For the good Orders of their Armies, the valor and difcipline of their Soldicrs,got chem the vi^'orie over the Carthaginians, and opened the way to the Monarchieof the Worlds which had fundry times before been done by th: fame means, by the /jfy- rians^ Perfians and Macedonians ^ Land-Forces hiving alwaies in great acquire* rncnts prevailed over thofe of the Sea, and the D.fcphne of Annies over the ex- perience of Maritime Affairs. This IS likewife more clearly fecn by reafon of the new Monarchic founded in a (hort time by the Turks in '/)/<», and in Greece, which was not done by Sea- Forces, wherein they were not any waiesconfiierable, till of later times, but by the multitude of their Cavalrie, and more by the firm ranks of their ^ani^ries. And to fay truth, the very Forces by Sea are increafed vind lYiaintained by thofe of Land, for larger Territories do eafily furnlHi men, moneys, viduals, and other necefTaries for the well ordering of Fleets at Sea. The which is likewife known by experience of the very Commonwealth of Venice^ which before flie had got any State in Tfrrrf firma, could never make fo numerous Fleets, though (he did very much ftudy Maritime Affairs •, nor could fli'.- pre^rail in the important Warsagainft i\\zGenoefes, as flic did afterwards, when her power was much increafed and confirmed by fier Land Territories. Thus in this lafl Age, flie hath been able to fct forth 3i firfl above a Hundred nim'jle Galleys, and after- ward more Calley?, and grearer vefTels of all forts as hat'' been feen by experi- ence in the two laft Wars againfl the Turks, wherein nothing more gallant and gloriouscould be defired on the Commonwealths behalf", whereupon alfo, as the worthy and becoming fruit of fuch induflry did the Y'l^oxii oi Lepanto enfue, which will be memorable in all Ages, /^ndit mayfufficeto know what the Ma- ritime Forces of the Commonwcilth are, and how they are abundantly fiioplicd from Land with all things to make thetn powerful at Sea , yea, even then when the Sea wjs blocked up tor what concerned them ^ that they were able to maintain fo great a Fleet in allfcafons, for three years together, therefore Franciffo F^f- cart, Duke of Venice, a Prince of fingular wifdom, by whofc advice, and under whole happy aufpiccs, great acquifitions were made on fi;m hind, was wont to fay, that the Commonwealth could not have increafed inuch in power , if flie had not imployedher Forces on land en^erprizes -, which bccaufe flic had no: formerly done, was the caufe why that greatnefs was much retardeJ and hin- dred, w hereunto fli; might eafily have arrived if fuch counfel had been foon- cr taken-, and by fetting before her the example of the worth and glory of the Romans, (he might have afpircd to greater Empire. But thole wl o governed the Comrnon wealth were a long jime fir from any fuch thoughts •, bein^ more in- tent upon peace and qui;t , or upon fuch Wars as might inlaree and ftcure her Do- min on by Sea •, which may be cleirl y witneffcd by what p.ift \v>th E7^Uno dt Ro. »»4n<»,withthe Sca/ligers,the Carrare ft. :xnd withotheis who ruled in tl enext ne'gh- boring Cites-, whereby it is Cecn tYauhe Venetians biwg contented with def; nd- ing their friends, and viridicating their own injuri-.s^ dreamed n^it on their Domi^
C4 2 nions,
(1.6)
nions, of which they might eafily have bereft them 5 till when overcome by nc^ cclTicy, and by the infolcncic ot ihc Carrareft^ and by other accidenis of thofc times, they were compell'd to apply their minds and Forces thereunto, and to fix their Dominion there.
Let us confider on the contrary, how opportunely 5»»»f was f«tcd to foment her Citizens difpofuions much to augment her Dominions*, almoft in themidft of 7/4/;, juft fitting for a principal City, being placed (as may be faid) in the Center, to the end that (he may equally extend her Power and Forces on all fides. The City of Rtme ftands on firm land, or Terra firms • but fo neer the Sea, as (he may reap the commodity thereof, without being thereby endangered : (he is spt to breed up Armies,and to nourilh men in the excrcife of the Militia •, nor is (he inconveniently fcatcd for the tranfportation of her Forces by Sea into other far off Proviaces. This diveriity of fituation hath begot diverfity of inclinations in the Inhabitants. Thus doth Nature always adapt mens minds to thofc Arts which they arc to cxer- cifc themfelves in, or elfe Cuftom doth inform the Habit, and turns it into Nature. For as ihe Rmjus following exercifes conformable to the fituation of their City, were more inclined to Land-war, and in Peace to husbandry : So the VenetiAns in- vited to other thmgs according to the diverfity of place, applied their ftudies other- wife to defend t?'cir Liberty, and 10 increafc their wealth, ufing the Sea- Militia foir the one,and Traffick and Merchandifing for the other. W hich whofoever (hall up- braid our Citizens withall, fecms not to know, that without thcfe a City could neither have long prcfervcd it felf, nor inacafe in (late and wealth, as it hath done : For not having any particular Territories whercout to cxtrad their livelihood, fhe would have been always poor and weak, and wanting other imployments, (he would have been deftroycd, if not by forein Forces, by her own Idlenefs, as many Other Cities have been, the Citizens wanting wherein to imploy their thoughts, and to exercife themfelves in quiet times. But if the Citizens oiRome were much commended for their husbandry, infomuch as at this day many famous men of that Commonwealih are as much celebrated for having been good Husbandmcn,as good Commanders-, as were Curtius DenUtust £luintim CinsirmtM^ K^tultM CoUa^ thus, CMarcm Re^nlus^ Scifio Africantu^ and others 5 wherefore (hoold the Fe- netUm be upbraided with their Merchandifing , this being an exercife as fitting and requifite for the fituation of Fenice, as was that of Tillage and Husbandry to the like of Rov>< ? U the care of cultivating the Earth did not abafe the minds of thofc antient and reverend Remans, who have left fo evident examples of worth to all other Cities and Nations, why (houldthe induflry of Merchandifing redound to theopprobry of the Vettttitns^ feeing to the contrary with how much glory and how much publick benefit they have for fo long a ferits of years govern'd the Commonwealth?
The ftudies and anions of the Romans and yenetians have then been differenr, but notwithftanding alike ia this, that they aimed at the fame end, though they took fcveral ways thereunto •, to wit, at Glory, at the Grandeur and Liberty of their Commonwealth. Many famous examples of Fortitude , of love to theic Country, and of all other forts of worthinefs have been fecn in each of them ^ fo as in our men nothing was more to be dcfired, unlefs greater and more frequent occafions wherein to have imployed themfelves, that the greatnefs of their adions might have correfponded to the magnanimity of their minds. Yet do not we Fene- tiam want examples of many men who have been very famous for fortitude of mind and military worth •, and he who (hall examine the life and adiions of many Princes of the Commonwealth, will find them to be fach as deferve praifc and celebration. Sachhive OrdeUf 9 Faliero^ riJalCy Dfminlco Micheli, znd Hearico DandaU^ Se^ baliiano Ziant, AtiJrea C«ntaren«, Tietro M0emct^ Andru Griiti, SehA(iun»
Veniero^
(»7)
r^wVtf, and dlvfts Others been ^ whofe worths might be parallels to that tJfthe Fdl/ritiiyMdrceSiyFalfiiyScipics^tnd others of their fo much cry'd ap mcft,if they had had a larger field to exercifc themfelves in, or had the grcatnefs of their Common-' wealth afforded ihem fame equal to the merit and valor of thofc renowned Rormnu But let us now come toconfidet thofe moft important rcafons of the condition of Times, and their Neighbors qualities. The City of FtnUe had her beginning ^ when lulj was pofTcft by the wild Northern Nations, and when being perplcx'd with all other fort of miferies, Ak fell finally into the flavery of S/trharisas^ wherein (he lived for the fpacc of many years : How then could a new Cif y afpire to Em- pire, while the Forces of the SdrUrians were fo powerful in that Province, as thtf moft powerful Roman Empire was not able to withftand them, which was (hook and deftroycd by their fury i It rather feems a wonder, that a City in her firft and weak beginnings was able to manage fo great a War, and withftand ( as fhe did afterwards ) the violence of two fierce and potent Nations, to wic, the French^ and Huns : The French, when their King Pifin being cntred Italy with puifTant Forces to drive out the L»mh*rds^ and being (candalized that the City oi Venice had lean:d to the friendfhip oiNieephofus Emperor of Conftantinofle^ tu n'd his Forces upon her to fubjugate and deftroy her: And the //•»/, when parting from PAnnonU^ C which took from them the name of ffungarj) having overcome a very powerful Army of the Germans, and k.li'd their King Lcdovtcus^ they fell to overrun 'lalj again, their fury was withftood by the Fenetians, which Berewgarins, a powerful Prince, was forced to give way unto. But afterwards, the Forces of thefe Weflerii BarbarUns being in time weakned by Charts the Great, the State of Italy fell agairi in to the Weftcrn Emperors 5 who being then very powerful, and m ifters both of Cermanj and France^ the Forces of a weak Commonwealth were no: likely to con- teft withfo great Princes,with any hope of acquiring Territories. Th'fe difficulties being added unto by the Cities fituation, withheld the Venetians a long while froiA thinking how to enlarge their Dominions in Terra firma •, in which opinion being for a long time confirmed, and having very fuccefsfully imploycd their ftudies and Forces in Sca-entcrprifes, ( though the alteration of times did counfel them to the contrary , giving them hopes of noble acquifitions on Land ) they cither defpifed, ot knew not how to make ufc of the occafions which afterwards were ofFerea. Thus w hen the German Emperors, troubled with the domeftick troubles of that Pro- vince, did forgo ihcir poflefTions .n Italy, the Venetians not minding then that op- ponunicy,left the advantage toothcrs,which they might eafily have reaped : where- upon other Cities of Italy purchafing iheir Liberties from the Emperors at low rates, framed a peculiar Government unto thcmlelves, as did Florence -, and otheiS •were polTeft by other powerful men, as Milan, Mantna, Fertara^ and other Ci:ies of Lombardy : when if the Commonwealth of Venice^ whole power wjs already much increafed, had been minded to have pofleft themfelves of any of the Imperial Territories, it is not to be doubted but they might in a fhort time have male no- table acquifitions. But when they began very late, and more provoked by injurit J then by ambition of dominion, to think upon Territories by Land, they found divers other Princes become very powerful both in Forces and Authority, and confirm'd in the States which thev poflefl under fomewhat a more lawful title. Wherefore they met with many difficulties •, and amongft the reft, the Wars proved very heavy unto them, which they were forc'd to make with Philip Maria Vt[conte Duke of Milan, who being Mafter of a great and rich State, became quickly very formidable. Nay, not lone after,thefe new Potentates bemg already much increafed and confirmed, and all of them growing jealous of the Venetian greatncfs, they joined all together with powerful Forces to oppofe their dcfigns. Thus in the Wk* \\hich they made againft Hercules dcifie, there was not any Italian Piince which
did
(ii8)
did not joynagalnft them, bec.iufc they favv that if that'Dakes State fell into the power of the Venetian Commonwealth, the way would be hid open to her for much greateilinatters in Italy., whereupon a noble Viftoric which was already almoft gotten, was impeded.
Hereby it maybe then conceived how much the condition of the times was averfc to the Commonwealths inlarging her Prccin(5ls by Land, parJy by rcafon of her fclf,and partly through other variousaccidents •, which though they were fome- whatmore favorable unto her in what concerned the Sea, yet met (he not with fmiU interruptions therein to her enterprifes. For the Eaftern Emperors being Maflers of Gr^fc f,and of other States and Countries, wherein the Commonwealth was to have inlarged the Confines of her command by !^ca, (he could not make any great acquidtions whilfl they preferved themfclves in fuch reputation aniftrcngcb, as became their State. But afterwards, when that Empire began to decline, (he began to increafe and flouriOiglorioufly, and her worth was waited ujonbymuch profpericic; aswasfeen when the FenetUm went in companie of the French lo the bufinefsof thei,ei/4»/, and after many noble warlike aftions they tookche City and Empire of Cenfiaotittople-, of which acquifition the Commonwealth had fo great a ihare, as that their Dukes did then afTume the title of Sign$ridelU quar- taparte^ e (JMeiz,a^ di tutto L' Imperio della RemantA. And foon after with the like profperous fuccefs, they did by fundry means reduce many Iflmds, and chief Maritime Towns under the'r obedience-, and the Commonwealth marched on apace to greater power and command. But this courfe of gloria and vidorie by War was much flackened by the original Cuftoms and Orders of the City (as has been faid) which related more to Peace, and Merchant affairs, then to War.
Infomuch as ;the VenetUtts feemeJ for a while to mike ufe of ch :fe new acqu'd- tlon> , rather for the better accomodat'on of their Navigation, and Traffiick, then for any occalion of other enterprifes. Their bufinefs did there'ore infinite- ly' increafe at this time •, infomuch as there was not any City famous for merchandizing \nt\\t Levant, whither the rv«tf//4» Ships and Merchants did not flock. Nay , a great number of men of that Nation did ufually remain in ihofe Ci- ties, through whofe hands the moflpieciousMerchandifeof thofe Couitriespaft, to the great advantage of the City, and of her private Citizens, So as the Genoefes plying the fame places, at firft a certain rivalfliip and emulation arofeamongft them, as well for the profit of merchandizing,' as for theexpercnefs, and glory of Sea af- fairs, till atlafl they came to open and cruel War : which kept the Commonwealth fo bulled , and perplexed by difturbing Navigation , and even private affairs , as for along while they had no leafurc to undertake other enterprifes, though they bad met with cppcrtuiy for it, and that they had been thereunto difpofcd. For the Venetians \av\n^ fundry times hazarded their Fleets upon the doubtful event of Battel, they tafted both profperous and adverfe fortune •, infomuch as they were to fight in their own Gulfj not more for Empire, then for the fafety of the City.
Thus whilft the Commonwealth fpent her befl years, partly in tbefe private af- fai s, and merchandizing bufinefs, partly in the fo long and troubiefome Wars againfl.the Genoefes ^ another Power arofe in the Levant, much greater, and more formidable then was the Greciin Emp're. For the Ottaman Lords, begn- ning by divers accidents, but chiefly by reifonof the difcords among Chriftians, to make notable and fuccefsful progrefs in their rifing Empire, grew quickly very great and powerful not onely by Land, butalfoby Sea, hav.ng reduced the City of Co»/?4»//wop/« into their hands, a very fit place for Sea enterprifes, whereby the Common wealth of Venice was not onely bereft of all hopes of further in-
creafifi'
(ii9)
•^leafing their Dominion by Sea , having lb great and powerful an Enemy fo near •khmd, bat even whac they liad already got, was expofcd to hazard; fo as being to maintain a bitter and difficult War, and to manage it with unequal Forces againft th;s the.r fore and perpetual a.lverfarie , (lie had more reafon to think upon her own defence, then by force of Arms to win what belonged to others.
Let us in th; next place confider the conditions of the ncartfl neighboring people amongfl: which llie was to inlarge her Confines , whereby wc may alfo know what difficulties the Commonwealth met with •, for at the very firft ffie was to oveicom : the Dalmatians, a Nation not onely very valiant, but of a quick wit, given to fedition, and defirous of novelties. Whence how great her difficulties were in quelling thefe, may be conceived by this, that the Commonwealth of 5o»!^ having To many, andfofardiftant Nations, yet could ffie never bandfomely put the yoke upon DAirnatid^ which never was uader the Roman Empire until the time of otlivius Augujliis, but had ftill before notably indamaged the Roman Ar- mies. It is then no wonder that the ftateof a Commonwealth (hould be lefs,which had CO contend with fuch Enemies •, and who may not know by the adfions of this Commomvejlth, that Ihe rather wanted occafionthcn worth for the further eo- crealiiigher State and fortune::'
Let us now likewife confider the condition of the times wherein the Common- wealth of Rome had her happy beginnings, and made the fit ft progrefs to her Em' pire. Which we rtiall find to differ much, and to be free of the fo many difficul- ties, which th; Venetians met with. Rume had not at her firft rife any povvcr- iul neighboring Prince •, for the Affyri^ns had then the Monarchic, whofe confines did not extend beyond /ifia ^ and after the concourfe of many years it was carried by Cyrui amongfl the Perftans^ with whom it remained for about Two hundred years, till it was deftroyed by Alexander oi CMaetdon, who though henoado oreaterconquefts, and made his Forces be felt and dreaded much further off, yet dying young in the height of his Vi(5lories, he could not get into Etrope, nor afford the Romans occafionof making trial of their Forces with a powerful and valiant P, ince. And by his death (, he having left no ifTue, either legitimate or illegitimate bthind him ) that Monarchic was foon deftroyed , an.1 his Empire was divided be- tween his chief CommandeiS; fo as fevcral Kingdoms were thereout framed, with which feverally the Romans di\ afterwards much to their advantage make War. So as w/rf having then been the chiefeft Seat of the Empire, the Provinces f (Europe were not at thai time any waies annoied by the power thereof 5 and thofe that were further from thence, as was Italy ^ lefs then the reft. B:<t Greece which was then in highefleem for the excellencie of her Inhabitants genius, for what concerned both Civil and Military vertues, wasdiviJed into many feveral Peoplc- doms, who contending wiihin themfelves forthedignitiebothof the foveraigniie of that very Province, itfo fell out that afpiring either wholly or chiefly iherear, they mnded not the annoying of other Nations by their Fore s. In Afnca the Carthaginians were very lirong, the power of C^r/^/j^^ being almoft at the fame times as much incieafcd, as was the like oi Rome in Italy : Soaslliehad the Do- minion of many provinces of Europe^ and did pofTefs the grcaceft part of Spain.- t ut this power did not any waies moleft the Romans firft defijns, nor did it hinder them from making acquifitions :n Italy , nor from confirming there- in thofc Forces with which ffie afterwards did fubdue the World. F.;r the Can/'aginians came not near the Romans for little lefs then Five hundred years, till fuch time as both the Commonwealths inlarging their Confines, they g-^ew tobc neighbors ; Whereuponat laft they commenced War,out of thcer.v/ and jealoufie that each had of other. This was the condition and ftae of tim.s wh rein the Comrronwcalth of Rome had her rife and encrcafc.
Whence it may be obfeived, that though there might be Corns great Potentates
then,
(no)
then, yet was thrre none which might compire with the Ro'tian Emperors, who had a greater Monarchy then all the reft •, befiJes they were Co tjr ofF,as their grear- nefs could not impede Jfowiw ircreafing, though (he were as yet bu a new- begun City. But flie met with the like profperous condition both ot affairs and times, in relation to he rncercft neighbors: For Rome had notonly not any great conteftati- on with any powerlike Piince in her firft and weakcft beginning • but iw the fpace of three hundred and fixty years, till the firft French war, (he had no occafion of making trial of her Forces againft any powerful people ? for then Italy was nor on'y notfubjeft to any one Prince alone,who might be greater by other Forces and other States, as ic happened afterwards in the Venetians times, but being divided into many parts, as well in refpeft of dominion, as of other feparations, e;!ch Country contained many people of differing government and power : So ns Latium alone of herfelf, which is now called Campagnadi Roma, contained four Nations, ortather Communaltics, the Herniei, Latini, Folfci^ and f ^«/ ; with whom the People of JJtfWf did for a long time make war. I mention not i[\cCecinenfi, x} tCniflnmeni^ Amintti, Sabini, K^lbani, and other Nations of lefs tfteem, againft wh'ch in her beginning (he cxercifed her Forces, w hilft (lie learned ( as a man may lay ) the firfl rudiments of her Militia. Tufcanj, though being taken all together (he were very powerful, and whofe Confines were then much larger, yet was (lie divi led into fo many Signories or Lordfhips, as the Forces of every People apart by t!iemfelves muft needs be weak and of fmall moment : which may eafily be knou n by this, that bare Three hundred men of the I- amily of the Fabii were abU to wage ^^ ar with the Feienti, who were the chief of that Region, with whom they o:t times fought with difplay'd Banners, and with dubious event, and were atlaft fupprcft more by the fraud, then force of their Enemies. So likewife the other par;s oi Italy vhich were necrer Rome were fo weakly inhabited, as it isnot m,ch,thatanew City, but yet well inftiufted in weapons, might get untohcrftlf State and Domi- nion: Nay, he who (hall confider what the incrcafcof that CommonweaUh was from time to time, will wonder how that People, who got afrerwardb tl,e dominion of the whole World, was fo late in enlarging thcConfiaes of her Territories upon her Neighbors, when they were to contend in War With thofcth it we-^e weaker then they, and that the bounds of their Emp re did extend to beyond /M/y. Fof, for above the fpace of four hundred years, when the City was Co much increafed in C itizens, as (he raifcd Armies of Forty thoufand Foot, bcfi Jcs ^'orfe, the affairs of Mome were notwithftanding ;n fuch condition as they made War even under the Walls of Rome with the £^«/, Ftlfciy and Veientts^ her firft Ene nies. And this wonder is not a little increafed, when you (hall confider that Military dilliphne did flourifheven from the very firft in Rome, and was ever afterwards hid in geac cftcem by her Citizens, who were bent with all their might to augment t^ e p jwer of their City, not being content, as were the ?'enet:ans, to enjoy \ e ice and fecurity. Wherefore the Roma?js give eafily way for friendlhip to all Forciners, that tSey might by the multitude of their Citizens render their City more povverful, aid fittf r to worft Adverfaries : And their firft King Romulus fet up a Sanciuny, where all forts of men, whether free or (laves, good or gu Ity, might have receptacle. But that Commonwealth had alfo her imperf Aions, whereby .bein\>troubl d with perpetual civil difcords, (he found many impediments, and much drtficulcy ineflFe<ft- ing her Citizens generous defigns. But b.Mng gotten to a great heig t oi- power, the Counterpoife of forein Forces ccnfing by her own gratnefs, (Ik was ab:e for a time to bear with her fo many difqrdcrs, t.ll at laft (he was brought to her final ruinc.
We muft now be permitted to take fomc other things into confideration which appertain to particular order of this Commonrteskh. A City which afpircs unco Empire, muli above all things elfc be wdl provided of Arm?, fo as ilie want not
any
(itl;
any thing that is requifite for War : but fhe ftands no left in heed of good Laws, which arc for many refpe(5l« of great importance in all Governments*, as alfo fof that when the licentiourners<)f Arms, intrufted in the hands of Citizens, is not corrc<flcd by the authority hi I^aw, that which was deftin'd for the good and pre-. fcrvation thereof, it turns it hft to her ruinc. Therefore it is requifite that a City be conftituted with fuch La\r^ as may refult both to fafety from foreign Enemies, ^d to union between her o^'n Citizens*, by which civil agrennent the ftrength and reputation of a Commonwealth is much ircreafcd. Of thcfe tuo conditions which ought to make a City powcrful,and fo as that power may continue long, the ConMnonwealth ofKeme had the firfl in perfedion,but was very faultyin the fecond: On the contrary, excellent provifion was made by the Founders ot Fevice for the fecond, butmuchremainstobewilb'd for in the former. Thus then had keme a naturally warlike people, which fhe kept continually exercifed in Arms, obferving cxa<aiy Military difcipline and orders: But fhe was much diforderly and coofufed in Civil affairs, nor knew (he how to keep any fctled form of Government, leaving too much authority in the People, and wanting ufual means to fupprefs the iin- moderate power of Citizens. Whereas in Kenice^ the form and order of Civil Government is in every pai ticular well difpofed of,and excellently well underftood •, fo as fhe is the only example which in fo many Ages, and fo many accidents both of good and bad fortune, hath never been troubled with any important domcftick difcords. But then, as for Military orders, they are not altogether fuch as are re- quifite for the acquiring of a large Conwiandj for at her begnning, fhe applied herfclf ( as hath been faid ) to maritime affairs, not with any intent of fubjugacing other Cities and Nations, but rather (as the condition of thofc times and bufi- nefles did require) for whitt cbneernird Traffick and Machandifing , to which the preferration of Peace did iWiich conduct, and the keeping of open.and free Com- merce with all men 5 butKaVing flncehkfifomc fuch thoughts too late, they were not very fervently purfiitd neither, but only as rfeceffity or Tome occafion did dilate : For the City was not difpofed iind eftablifhed with certain and pcrpe ual Orders, norwith any very ambitious ends for what concerned War •, and tor Land- Militia, it haih already been'Gfid, that for ^ long time rhe Commonwcahh \<>as to- tally a ftranger unto it. And therefore when at laft fhe made it her bufinefs, for want of any fitting preparation for it in her own people and Citizens, (he had re- courfc for help toForeiners •, and this cuftom growiag Wronger by time, (he haih always made ufc for the moft part of Forcin Commanders and Soldiers, brought under her Pay from elfwhcre : which, as experience fhews, hath turn'd much to her damage and diforder-, for her Forces being under the command and power of oihermen, (he hath not betn able upon many fitting occafions to make gojd Qlc of the Victories, which (he with great danger and cxpencc hath won. And not to mention many other things, ir is a thin^ very well known, that had not the no great fidelity of the Commanders coufcned the Commonwealth of her juft hopes, in the Wars which (he made with Fhilippo CMaru ri[co»te^ there had noc b^en any inch of that State which fhe had not been Mif^refs ot. But fometimes the Marquils of A/<i«/«a, fometimes 7/ Carmignuola^ and fometimes Sfor'^d, invited thrreunto either by greater rewards offered them by the Enemy, or by fome other peculiar, though very irrational refpe fts of i heir own, forfook the Conimoawealchs caufe, and bereft her of the frut of certain Vidory, Which diforflers, together with fo many others fprung from the hke occafion, and which did fufficienrly inter- rupt her further proceedings, would not peradventure have enfued, if the Cnm- niomvcalth had been accuffomed to give the command of her Armies by Land to her own Citizens, as fhe was alwaj/s accuftonncd to do in her E'ec.s, in affairs of no
Icfs difficulty and importance.
K Tbe
(Ill)
. ^ Tbq Rmms did Qot thus, who being to rig oat Fleqf agiinft iVtCAfthaginUns, 4|d not feck out SictlUns, oxGrecUm^ or people of oj^r Nations, to command over them, but made ufc of their own Citizens as wcj^^y Sea as by Land. Cincin' «4/</5 was taken from the Plough, and made Diftat9(5 againft the J^^/w- Ckert being taken tirom pleading at the Bar, wa^ Cent to th* government of CilicU,znd to make War agamft the Pdrthianj •, Scipio^ who parieda frefti Soldier from Rente is faid to have gotten the knowledge of the militarie Art, by the way, before hear- riveci at the Enemy i Sylla, bein^ fcnt Queiftor it\io y1/ric4^ with the Conful A/4- ritts, being.tiUthtnaPuneyin the Militia, becamcina few daies^fo well inftru died therein, andraifed fo great an opinion of valor and military Pifciplineof himfelf, 3S the Commonwealth did very foon put their chiefeft hopes in him, in all their weightiefl affairs. In brief, people that arc of a ready wit„ ^^nd noble fpiriC, do cafi- ly accuftom themfelves by exercife to all things, and prove excellent therein ; the- cxpjcriencc whereof hath been feen amongft our felvcs, for thofe few who have betaken themfelves to Land-fervice, have given fuch proof of their valor (which is witneffcd by particular Hiftories) as it may very well be known, that the Com- monwealth might have promifed unto herfelf al^ gallantries from her Citizens, if flie had known how to make ufc of them. But fhc \yaS:run into this error, bccaufe fhe would (as the conjindlure of times did slmoft require ) follow the example of the other Princes of Italy^ who long before, and clMcfly at that time when the Coramonwealth did mofl apply her felf to Land-affairs,; madeufe of mercinary Militia's, which was then heightned to a great efteem by two famous Commanders of that Age, Braccio and SforzA^ who werq afterwards imitated by others in this fort of Militia ^ Wherefore the Ca,pt,atnsvyhofc Troops did ordinarily confift of horfe, led them along to the fervicc fometir^iespf €W> fometimes of another- Prince, So the Venetians who were but learners io tJfe^^ fertpf Militia, faw thas th: Popes, the Kings of Maples^ the DuJies,of t^ilAn^. iht Floremirus^ who bore great fway and authority.iQ//4/y,m^de.wrc of d»is,f$>:t of Forces, they began to follow the footfleps which were traced out linto tfe^ra by others. Another re- fped may be added hereunto, which h^th^eadyl^fen, touched upon, that the Commonwealth having then put her felf in a certaJQjqourfeii which fhe had for i long time cbfcrved, of making ufe of her people and feet Citizens in Sea-afiairs, it fcemed dangerous to fpmeto make fuch an jnnovatiQQ ip.a City ordained for civil Government, ai:d which was greatly fixt therein by-long cuftom. But it is not to be denied, butthatwhentheaggrandizingof aStafeqr Empircis in queflion, this- which hath been fpokef> Qt.is agrcat f;»ul£ ip a: City whiqh doth afpirc therc-
untpi . - . : ■ ;•'. '
'And it is to be obf^rved in the Roman Monarchy tl^at the happy fuccefs of their famous viftories is chiefly attributed, to the difcipline of their Militia, becaufe ic w,as excellent, and becaufe it was excrcifedby their own Soldiers-, and particularly in the Carthgimin Wars, wh;c^ were forer then all therefl which the Romans did ever make 5 it is obfetvable, that the Ctrthaginians being equal to the Remans both for the reputation and worth of their Commanders, and fuperior to them in the numbers of their Soldiers, to boot with the ftrpqgthof their Eleph3nts,which they made ufe of in their Battelj,yet their Armies were overcome,which confided of ' mercinarie people, and alTcmbled out of many Nations, andyec not by the greater worth, but by the greater fidelity, conflancy, a.».d Ij^yc of the Roman Soldiers tio-'- wards their Countrie. '■'•'
;But for fuch abufes as thefe )t may be alledged in , behalf of the Commonwealth oiVemcc, that (lie did it to fhun thofe mifchiefs into which the Commonwealth of Rente ran by giving thefe military corpjm^nds to, hec Citizens j yet he who will truly examine the flate of affairs, will find that the authority. which is granted,
'i limited
limited and corrected by the Laws, cannot be prejudicial to the publick g :>od •, na:l the experience of the v:ry Cityof r^w/c/r confirms this, where fo great .at sorine being fo olten granted in commands at Sea to her own Citizens, ye; i: u as n.ver known that ths Commonwealth fufRred any mifcheif thereby, arJ cert:nly a great miftery lies in the wJldifpofed orders of a City, by winch Citizens are eafily kept w ithin their duties, whcicin if any one chance to fail, he is foo.i cliafti-' fed without any difturbance to the peace of the Cicy. \A hich if by nothinnelfe^ is fufficiertly proved in the City of yenice^ by the long duration of thai Com- monwealth. So as thefe things were very well underftood and ordainea by her 5 and llie might the more eafily do it, by realonof the conditions ot thofe her hrit in- habitants, as hath been faid. But fuch freedom and licentioufnels was given in Rtme to that warlike people, together with the government of their Forces, aS the Laws were not fo reverenced as they ought to have been ^ and the orders of the Militia being inftitutedbv Remulus^ before thofe of Religion and civility by NumaFo^pilius, military difcipline was alwaics in greater cffeem then the Itudy of civil affairs.
By all which confidcrations it is manlfeft , That the d ivcrfity of fuccefi in th^fe two Commonwealths, hath I'prung from this diverfity of in(litution«, and from fo many accidents, and not from any one reafon, as was faid at the beginning ^ buc inihisdivLrfity both of them have their praifes, and all thofe perfcd.ons and feli- city, which is grantnble to humane af&irs. if<»7»f was Miflrefs of the World, buc could not long enjoy this greatnefsand profperity, nor yet with the quiet of her Citizens. But Venice^ though of much meaner Precinfts, and condition, hath pre- ferved her felf ( as an onely example j in her liberty for fo many Ages, free from all domeftick troubles, and with the miraculous union and concord of Iter Citi- Kcns.
The Second DISCOURSE.
Whether or no the Commenvpealth of Venice be to be blamed for bai/it7g fallen upon her the defence of the City of ?\'iA^rvbeH it rvajf oppugned by thi Florentines.
I Have often, not without fome, to me appearing reafon, wondrcd, that fome Hiftorians fhoiild fo much blame the Commonwealth of Venice iov having u. ken upon her the defence of the City of Ptf/i againftthe //or^wr/^*?/, wters- by they may feem to reproach the counfels of thofe wife and flout Senators^ who had then the managing of pubiick affairs in their hands, for thofe very things, for which other Princes and States, have been by other Writers much ce- lebrated. He who w 11 know ihr truth of fuch judgements, mufl take unto himfelf more particular, and inward conliueiutions, for it often-times fails out, thatlook- ing into the very pith and marrow of bufinefs, the clean contrjty is found to what didfirft appear, and the face of things do fcem to alter. Such actions may then bemeafurcd, either by the ordinary reafons of jufiice and equity, or elleby the reafons of State,which are the more proper.lf youconfiJcr th s n<5fion of the Com- monwealth according to the firfl meafure, what is ic that doth otf^nd the nice con- (dences of thefe fo fcruplous men < to take upon ones fclf the defence of the wcak- cft, andthofe who fuffer under the malignity of fortune, hath alwaies been thought apioosadion^ and befitting great and generous Piinces j and how mikraWe was
R 2 tte«?
the condition of the poor Pi fans ^ how much it did deferve to be imbraccd and fa- vored both out of compaflion and )uftice, is demonftrated ( to omit f or the prefcnc other particulars ) b^ what was done at the fame time by Charls the Eight, King of France, whilft he was in Ital-j, and by the fo many favors aiforded to the caufc of Pifa by all the chief of his Court. Char Is had promif;.d the Florentines to liecp the City of Ptfa under their Dominion, being obliged unto them for their readinefs in receiving them into his State, and tor hav.ng afforded them all affiftancc and accommodation z, yet did the affli(^ions of the Pi[ans appear to be fo grievous, as he was moved more by compaflion then by his own intei eft, or by his promife made to the FUrentines.
A forein Prince ufcd this charity to the fifans, with whom he nor his Kingdom bad never held any friendfhip or confederacie, his interefts being not only feparace fi-om, but contrary to their welfare : And fliall it be thought a ftranoe and irrati- onal thing, that the Commonwealth of rf»/Vf, which had had the Ptfans for their friends and afTociates in divers enierprifes, and who kept i\'\\\ friendihip and commerce with that City, fiom whence alfo fome of the noblcft Families of the Commonwealth draw their original, and whofe caufe for the fame refpcdi was ftraitly annexed unto their own, ihould intercft herfelf in behalf of the Fifans, to comfort them in their great afflidion c" Nor ought the Commonwealth of Venice toufe greater rcfped to the Florentines, then they had ufed towards her, ngjinft whofe defigns they had fo oppofed themfelvcs in the Wars formerly made againft the Dukcs of U\diUn and Ferrara^ a(i fting their Enemits both with mtn and monies, as they were thought to be the chief hindcrancc, why the bufinefs under^ taken by the Commonwealth with great hopes of good fucccfs, had no better an end. 1 he VenetUns were thereunto likcwife moved by the example of othere : For if the Duke of HiUn^ the Cencefes, the Luchefes^ ard thofe of Siemm. had afTifted the Pifans as much as they were able,how could the Venetians, \v\iQk Forces in HaIj were much (upcrior to theirs, ftand idly looking upon the Pij^ns miferies, and upon the profperity and greatnefs of the Florentines, whereby the common troubles of itdj were augmented , fincc they alone aJheied to the French faftion.
But let us confidcr a little more particularly the caufe which was undertaken to be defended by protcding the Pifaas, and what it was that they did endeavour. Certainly nothing but the recovery of their anticnt liberty, whereof they were bereaved either by their feveral misfortunes, and by the violence of others, or at leaft (as they faid) to reduce themfelvcs to a lefs fevere government then that of the Florentines -, under whofe dominion being fain but a little before, and the City of Fifa being fold at a low rate by the Vtfcpnti, the Pifans pretended firft by the favor of Charls the Eighr,King of France^ and afterwards by the like of Msximilian the Emperor, to be returned to their former liberty : The former having ufed his power, and the other his anti ni pretences of the Empire, to put them mto that condition. And grant that icfpedl were to be had to the pofleflion which the Flo- rentines had of that City, which noiwkhftanding was but of later times, the Fh- rentines were likewife to have rcleafed the Haven of Ligom to the G noefes, from ivhom they had taken it by violence. The Venetians did not perfvvade the Fifdns to forgo their obedience to the Florentines, as Lodevick SfarT^ had formerly done -, for thty minded more the appeafingof the commotions of UaI), then the raifing of more s ihey did not free them from the bond of obedience to the FUremines, as did the Emperor and the King of France, bccaufe they knew fuch an artion did not belong unto them % they were not the firft that did foment the alienation of that City, as the Geneefes and thofe of Sienm liad done, bi caufe they had no in- tention to advantage themfelves by the difcord and ruinc of others : Buc the Cify
having;
having already totally rejedled the obedience of the Florenthts^ being thereof freed by the authority of other puiflant Princes, and afTiftcd by other more petty Princes to maintain their liberties 5 the Venetians being requefted and conjur'd by the fija/ts^ when they faw them ready to fall into the depth of mifery, if not affifted by them, and that their ruinc would draw along with it greatprejudi.e to the peace and Ibcrty of all Italy, they at laft took upon them their protedion and defence. And I herein fay nothing but what is moft true, and confirm'd by the teftimony of thofe who have written upon thepalTagesof thofe times.
But let us conlider other more particular accidents, and more weighty refpefls.' churls the Eight, King of France, was at that time pafs'd into Italy ^ to get the Kingdom of iV<</»/« j an undertaking wherein he had profpcrous fucccfs, which was an ill omen to Italy : All the other Princes of Italy oppofed him afterwards in h's tiefigns, ( inftru(flcd by the fall of the King oiArragon^ to have an eye to their own danger ) ev cept only the Florentines ^viho ftiil continued in adhering to the French^ the counfel ot the mofl po:ent Citizens prevailing over the opin.on of the more wife. So as the Vrench preparing to return with mighty Forces into Italy ^ they had fricndiliip with none, nor had they any other receptacle, fave with the Florentines^ with whom they had already made a new agreement to be by them aflirtcd with men and monie<;. Pi fa was at the fame time ftraitly beleaguer'd by the Florentines - and had (he not been faccor'd by the Venetians, all her other aids were fo weak, as flie muft fpeedily have fain into the Flarentines hands •, who being freed of the ex- pence and trouble of that Siege, would be more powerful, and more ready to affifi: the French, and to facilitate the enterprifes which they were to attempt in Italy. Then if it were judged by the common opinion of all men to be juft, honeft and laudable to take upon them the defence of the fafety and liberty of Italy againft the Vrench ^ how can thofe a<Jtions be blamed, which did tend (as it is feen) necef- farily thereunto, by keeping foreign Forces afar off, and by bereaving them of their i riends affiftance ^ The aftairs of the King oiVrance did at this time ebb and flow, but for the moft part ebb in the Kingdom of Naples : Great were the King of Ar- ragfius hopes of recovering the State, being therein aflifted powerfully by the fame Venetians : The King of Vrame, tbouoh his Forces were in arcadinefi, was doubtful whether he fhould come into Italy, or no. So as at fuch a conjunfture of time, every leafl thing which tended cither to the augmenting or UlTening of his hopes, was of great moment. Pope <^ lex ander moved by thefe refpefts, did much prels the \''enetian Senate to be refolace in alfifting the Pifans, vvhilft he h m- felf was foraewhat doubtful and irrefolntc. The Venetian Senate f«d the FlO" rentines in good effeem, and laying afide the memory of what was part, would have had them for their friends, if they would have feparatcd thcmfelves from the Vresch (who were then the common Enemy) and have entred into that Confede- tacie whereinto all the refl of the Princes of Italy were entred, and by whom they had many fair offers made them, particularly to procure the redintegration of their State, if they would put on a generousrefolntion to regan thofe Forts, which as cautionary Towns for their fidelity were held by French garrifons, and do this by Force of Arms, not by Treaty or Agreement. But if thefe things cculd not be liflncdunto out of a pertinacious will, infcded by thepradifeof fome of their Citizens, what was to be donee' Should the general fafety hare be^n negleffed, to fcrve the will of fome few, who peradvcnture did not well underftand their own proper and true interefls:" To whom then was the injury done herein c" Not to the fifans, who with humble and earneft intreaties had very often prefl the Venetian Senate to lie received into the protedion of their Commonwealth, nay, into their Dominions : Not to the Florentines, becaufe they to keep themfelvcs from part- ing wirb th« Vrenck, did enforce a neccdiiy Upon thic Vcnttiam to take sfnd maintain
Cu6)
fuch a refolu'.ion, thit they might keep the Flsrentlnts bufied about Pifd^ and the French from thofe fuccors, whereby the troubles and dangers oi Italy were i,.cicafed.
But I find that thefc tranOiftlons have been diverfly interpreted, and the Senate blamed, whodidnotai.nat fuccourinw the opprcflcd Pifans^ not at the common Cii cty ot Italy ^ but at th:ir own thirft of bringing the City of fz/i under their Dominion. To this it is anfwered, that where the adlions are evident, no judge- ment is to be given contrary thereunto-, nor ought the fcctets of hearts to be fearched, u hich is referved to a more excellent power then what humane difcourfe can arrive unco •, it is certain that the defence of Ft fa, which was oft-times denied them, vyasat laft undercakenby the Vcmtiam^ when they being forfakenby all others, they were neceflfitated for theaforefaidreafonsfotodo. The Pijsasoi- fcrcdtopiit themfelves wholly into the power of the Commonwealth, andtofet up her colours in iheir City , the Venetians would not yeeld hereunto, nor accept of this large offer ; but the Pifan Ambafladori were fent back with many thanks for their afftdion and were heard in what they defired, though in a diffenng manner; for the Commonwealth took uponher to defend the lib; rty of the City with the forces and authority of the Commonwealth, which (lie did for many years, with fuch fervencie and general con fent, fparing neither rxpencc, labor, nor danger, as fie could hardly have done more in htr own defence-, they ftnt both foot and forfefeveral times to the Pifans under their beft Commandeis, asalfo moneys and vi<;;u3ls, and (hipping to accommodate the City with all things neceflary, and to free ihein from the fiegc ot the Florentines by Sea. Yet to give a greater tc- ft mony cf what their minds and intentions were in this, when it was propounded to put the City of Pi fa into C^eftrs hands , and to remit the right of their caufe to him, the Venetians did not onely not oppo(e it, but counfelcd them fo to do, defirous that this controverfic might be ended, vvhilft their faith, and the common intercfts were prefervf d fafe -, and when there was yet fome opinion, that the Florentines allured by this advantage, and hope, might have adhered unto the league ; but on the one fide, in progress of time, the Florentines obdurate refolution was difcovcrcd cf governing themfelves by Counfcls, apart from the reft of the Italians ; and on the other, the deep deceits of Z-sitfjv/ci: 5/i»r:(<», who under the (hadow of procure- ing peace and quiet, growing jealous of the grcatnefs which the Venetians mx^t. a, rive at by the acquifition of Pija^ and calculating other mens by his own, did in reality endeavor to fecurc himfeltfrom this his imaginary fear, byhindring theA'^- netians from purfuing that enterprife, to the which not long before he had exhort- ed them
The Venetian Senate was inforccd to maintain the caufe which they had under- taken, to keep from breaking their faith unto the Pifans^ and to free themfelves from the infamy and repute of weak advice, to which they flioiild be fubjcd, as if they had condefcended for fear of Lodomcks Forces, or elfc as not knowing his cunning ^ when it was already known to all men, that the endeavor of agreement with the Pi fans, which was agitated under the name of the CoUcgues, wasraa- nag^^nely by him, and according to his will and interefts. But fay I pray, is this the jonely enterprife wherein the fincerity, and candidnefs of the Commonwealth is to be known in juft things, and fuch as do concern the common good of /^/jr f How often hath fhe maintained Wars, to the end that there might be a right, and an Italian Governor in the Dukedom of ^Jiiilan} which cannot be denied fincc "the cffcfts thereof be foappaient, as fhe would notlaydown Arms before (he had compaft this her inreat, as ihc did by that famous agreement which was made in the City of gtfi«?^»/4 the year 1529. in which year, by means of the Venetian Senile CHaximilian Sftr:^ was reftorcd unto his State, to whom the Dnke-
dem
domof A///4» didofrightbelon»: and their ends In the bufinefs concerning Pifd may likewifc be difcovered, fiace when the agtcement was come unto^ thzreneti- aor had no reiiped to their own advantage, but onely to the benefit of the Ptftns^ to the prefervation of their Ubcrcy as much as might be, and to the right of what belonged to their Territories, which ihty were poffeft of when they put themfclves into the Commonwealths protccftion ; wherein the yenetUns were alwaies very conftant^ though the imminent War with the Turks might have made them forget the dangers and interefts of other mens, for thtir own concernments. And at laft, as they would y celd to no: hing which might be prejudicial to the Pi fans, fo to wit- nefs to the World that in realty they had no thought in maintaining this contro* vcrfic, to any peculiar defign of their own, in making themfelves Matters of that City, they put the determination of thefe differences, into the arbitrament of Herenles Duke of F err an ^ which though it had not any tffedl afterwards, the /*/- /4«j not confcnting thereunto, yet it might be difccmed , that the Pifa»s avcr^t- nefs thereunto, or the conftancy wherein they perfevered, was not fomented by the renctia/tSj but rofe either out of the mcer election or ncCcflicy of the Pifn/ft themfclves.-
But ler us come to another confideration, more proper for this bufincfs, that is,^ to the reafons of State, wherein tho many of the fame things do concur ,yet they are clo.hed with other rcfpeds, wherewith Princes building either onely or chiefly up- on what may moft redound to their own advantage, donotadvife withcounfel of equity, or do not attribute thereunto what is rtquifite. Ic is moft certain, being already reduced to the greateft extremity , if they fhould have been abandoned by the VcneuAns^ they muft have put themfclves either into the power of the Duke of Miild»y or of the Floreittines ; but rcafon of State would not permit, that in this conjuncture both of times and affairs this City fhould be joyned to the Dominion of cither of thefc. As for Sfor^A his vaft and difordinacc drifts wet e already knosvn, and how he would bethefolc Arbitrator of /f^/y-, foas if be fhould become more haughty, and puftup by this important acquifition, no pan of Itdj could remain quiet or fecure either from his force or craft. And as for the Flertntiites you have heard how refolute rhey were not to part from the friendihipof the King of Frame^ by how much greater the danger of whofe Ar- tnywas in recent memory, fo much the more were his friends and aflociatstobe kept weak and under, to the end that they might not increafe to the prejudice and apprehenfion of the reft. It was feen in what danger UaIj was put by tore n Forces, howfoon the Kings of \^rsgon were driven out of their Dominion, how little refolute the other Princes of /r^/jrwere to withftand forein Forces, which having once found an open and eafie way into Ittly ^ icwas to be imagined that they would be caufe of greater dangers and moleflations to her. So is the Com- monwealth being to be put into a condition of being able to relift the Forces of greater Princes, and of not being eirpofed to their wills^ (lie was neceCTitated to thmk upon mcreafing her power and reputation, that (he mi^ht d pend upon her own Boils, and be well eflcemed of by others. She knew particularly tliat Tofanj was a State which might accommodate or dif- accommodate the French defigns, accordingly as it was well or ill affeded towards them. Andihe keeping of the City of fi/i dependant upon the rf«frw«j, might fevtral waies b:; helpful unto them in their intentions, in keeping the French from fucconng the liingdom of Naples^ and in fecufing themfclves afterwards from the Fbrentittes^ as alfo in win- ning fuch flrenoth and reputation to the Comnaomvealch w.th friends and adhe- rents, as llie might provide for her own prefervation, and forthel.keof thofe other Itilians, who liad the like intentions with her to maintain p;ace in /^-j//, and to keep her fafefrom foreign Forces- It was not thcii onely uftful , butn'ecefl'iry • for
(n8)
'or tbc VenetUn^ in this conjin^are of affairs, to hare footijig "n U»lj, and to hare the City of f///, if not fubjc A to their dominion, at Icaft dependent upon the au- thority of the Commonwealth. Now take it for granted, that that fufpition might be true which they have fo much divulgBd,who have endeavored to calt a blur upon the honor and dignity of the Commonwealth, to wit, that the ff»fi/4»y intended to make thi mfclvcs abfoluce mafters of that City, only out of a defign of iocreafiog ihc:r dominion. Certainly the ai^ionsof a Philofopher, and thofe ofa Princc,ougfit not to be meafured by one and the fame Rule ^ nor muft wc fancy the condition of men, and of affairs, to be what peradtcnture they ought co be, but what they arc for the moO part. Magnanimity is the proper veitoe of Princes,which makes them always bufie themfclves about great matters, and whereby they make tfiemfclvcs be dreaded and reverenced by ot!;ers. Therefore the defire of Glory and Empire is highly praiied in fuch Princes as have been greateft and moft celebrated, as Lxf /** xAnier^ Cyus G&^Ar, C bar Is, and all the reft of the moft famous men, in whom a fpiiit of Grandui? and Generofity, which did ftill egg them on to new and glorious cnterprifcs, is not only commended, but even admired. If the Romans, whofe ali- ens are praifcd and celebrated by the general confent.of all men, had been content to conta n themfelvcs withm the precin(5te ofLdtium, their worth tvould have been "hidden and obfcured, nor would their names have been (b highly crv'd up to the memoryofpofteiity; And had not the yenetia/fs hzdhr^cr thoughts rhentokeep within their private mcrciiandifing affairs (as it became them to do in . htir weak bc- gining ) difpifing or ncgle^iing fuch occafions as they fundry times met with of en- krging the bounds of their Dominions, the Comjnoawcaltb would not only not have gotten fuch efticm and reputation as it hath got, but could not have kept her- fclf fo long in liberty, amidft fo many revolutions of affairs, and fuch movinos of Forein Armies. • ;;;; . :.!
It remains now only to fee whether the opportunity of the Times, and condkioa of Affairs did counfel them to purchafe new glory and greater Empire to their Commonwealth. \\ hich though it may be known by what hath been formerly faid, yet it will more clearly appear by adding fome other part calar Confideration^i The Commonwealth was then in a more powerful condition then any Prince in Jt4lj, being much ftrongcr then them all both in Land ana Sea- Forces 5 the Ptfj»s caufc was generally well wifh'd unto ; the Florenttnes were but little acceptable to the reft of the Princes of Itdj, byreafonofthcir firicndfliip with the French, and for this and other refpedts were {urticularly much hated by their neighbors, the Cenocjes, Senefes, and Luchefes •, and all the adions of the Commonwealth fcemcd to be favored by a certain Genius. She had lately gotten the Kingdom of Cjprwi flie had enlarged her Confines in Frinli, by theacqu.fition of many Towns in the Countiyof GoritU; and (he profpered greatly in all that fhe took in hand, and won iTiUch honor. So as in this happy conjundion, the ;'f»«/4»j ought not to abandon their good Fortune, left they might too late repent for not hav.ng known how to make good ufe of their profpcrity. They were to be ruled by the example oF thngs paft: For having oftentimes let flip many opportune occafions of in- aeafing their Dominion by Land, whilft their Enemies were but weak and not well fctled in their States, the like enterprifes being by them undertaken afterwards in a lefs convenient t;me, proved more difficult unto them. Others thought, that for th-' like reaforiS the Venetians fhould have forborne to meddle with the affairs of f'f'i \ for (laid they) the City was fo (ituatcd, as it could not be defended by them wuhou: much expcnce and inconvenience, they leing to take a long compafs about the Sta before they could furnifhit with things neceffary •, and then the City it telf was not fo great a purchafe, as deferved fo much labor to purchafe it. They added moreover, that at the fame titue, the friinds •f tbc other Princes did much envy
the
(lip)
the Commomveahb for her great profpcrity 5 (b as it Hid bettfer 'become the wit- dom of tbatSenate to endeavour by concealing their thoughts of 'afj>k'iDg to greater things, to allay this envy, then further to indreareic, ai they did by'attemptingfo grear a novelty. ,, , /
. No doubt but thofc wife iSenacors whdfati then ac thehfltnpriGlo\^erhtfi6hf,' did refled upon chsfe doubts and fufpitickis 5 but it is io be believed that they were cafily free of them, confidcring that the Gommonw^alth, <vheh fhe was not yet fo powerhil nor ftrorig, had undertaken many difficult, biit glbrbUs cntapriles in parts far off, and had gotten notable viftories againft the i'4r4iri?«j, who were then very ftrong both by Sea and Land, and had placed Trophies ot (ingular Worth, and oreat zeal to Religion, in the tfoly Land 5 that fhe had nrrany times takcti up Arms in the behalf of the Emperors of Cfififtdyitinople, againft "divers other Potentates, and upon occafionS, had reduced many Cities into^er power, which had formerly belonged to that Empire-, and that likewlfe (he had for many years raaintained fharp Wars againfl thzGeatefes^ and had put a period to matiy other gallant affairs by appirent vn^ories : So as they thought that the Commonwealth had reafoncb promife herfelf gt)od foccefs ih this her nf>bltf defign of taking Upon her the defence of Pff't^ and of the affairs of Tufiany. Whefefore then otight they to diftrufl thai the Commonwealth might keep the City of Pifa at )ier devotion, in times when her power and atithoriry was much inctedfed , arid beitJ^ accommodated with fo many Ships and GiHics which were ufually upon thfe Sb\ and having the Ifland of C^fu in the Gulfs mouth, to receive the Ships in the mid-way which failed frooi the one Sea to the other •: But on the contrary, who does not know how very op- portune this fituadbn was for many other things, diid of what uic for the Com- monwcaUhf Their having got footing {ntnfcanj^ Ai'ght, accor'ingasoccafions ihould be offered, open them the way to greater acquiutions • ' and the Haven of Lfgorn was ejitreamly commodious for the Nav;ga:i6n. an'd Traflick which the City of yenice holds with the VVcftcrn Provinces: \\ hichmay the better be knowa now, for that fince the affairs which had wont to be trSnfiifted iij'theEafl, being now turn'd to the Wefl, Ships which come from thcnc6 feden with fqn^ry forts of Merchandife,. putting into the Haven o^ Lig$rn^ to fhiliii further Navigation, do there unload th^felves, from whence their Loafding is. afterwards brought by Land to Veiiiet. ; So as it feenis, thofe wife Stnators did even then forefce what highi eftcem was to be put upon that fituation. But thtirdefires have at leaft prevailed thus far, as that this Country is pofl'ctV by very wife Princes, who ar« great friends to the Commonwealth •, with whom an excellent intelligence being held, as hath been of late, and as it is to be hoped it will be for time to come, Commerce will always be open, fafe, and free in thofe Countries. So as no reafon can perfwade, that the fear of being envied by other Princes, fhould keep the Vettetsins from at- teniptingfobcneficiala thing: For if thefe thoughts (which ought not to be ad- mitted of by any generous Prince ) (hould have been fuffic;ent to have ftopprd the courfe of the Commonwealths good fortune, fhe muft not only have abftaincd from this, but from other enterprifcs •, and fo her Dominion and Fame would hava been (hut up within her own Wafhes, if that peradvencure might have been permitted them.
It was therefore neceffary for the prefervation of themfelves, and of th-.ir liberty, to provide thcmfclvcs of fufficient Forces ( which cannot be had without Terri- tories) to rcfifl fuch as would offend them ; for the keeping of others well-affeded, is not fufficient to keep off injuries. But War is not alwaies made out of fear of another Princes power, and with a mind to fecure ones felf therefrom, but moft commonly out of contempt , and out of a beleef of being able eafily to cffecfl what you undertake againfl them , and envy is oftentimes more fupprcd in the
very height of good fortune, when a mans condition is raifcd much above that of "oth.rs Ihcnwhcnitis kept within common and ufual precinfts. But what Prin- ces envy ought the Commonwealth to have feared < If you will (ay any Tranf- alpin Princes, they had not as then any fuch firm footing in Julj^ nor fo ready Forces, nor pcradvcmure had they their thoughts fo interelTcd, as that they were „ to make War upon that account with the VenttUMs ^ it you mean ItAliAn Princes, every one of them wer# weaker then the Commonwealth, and the diverfity of their ends and intcrefts would be furc to keep them from joyning together. Not was it likely that they would confpiie with greater Princes againft the r*««/4W, fincc it became all of ihcm to apprehend forein Forces, left they might allfufferin a common ruine. And if it be faid, that notwith Handing ic fell out fo afterwards, as was feen by the league of Csmhraj which proved fo pernicious to the Common- wealth, it may be anfwered, That things arc not done ( cfpecially among Princes) as rcafon would perfwadc ; and no ceruin judgment can be given of A<ftion$ wherein Fancy reigns. But let it be faid, that the condition of things, times and tc- fpewtSjWcrcaheredby reafon of many much differing accidents and anions, when thefc more heavy Wars began -, but chiefly, bccaufe the French being become jnore powerful in Ita^t by their acquifition of the State of LMiUn, and more dc- firous of fubduine her, they refolved to leave nothing unattempted, which might bring this their defign to effcft •, foas it was from hende that all the troubles and dangers came upon the Commonwealth, whereas fhe ought rather to have expell- ed thanks, and good offices firom the Crown of Fr*nees foas peradycntu re there may be more reafon to blame the Commonwealth for having ailed theKiiigof fr*nee intoA^/jf, had fhe been thereunto moved out of adefirc of inlarging her Pominions, and had not been thereunto compelled by the fraud and infuffcrable infolcnciesof LpJivko Sftrz4, tofupprefs the which (he was inforced to havere- courfcto forein Forces, which afterwards turned themfelves upon herfelf. But in the defence of rij* things were otherwifc-, the end was very honefV, for the bufincfswastocomflorc the opprefTed, nottoopprefs others*, an enter prife which was to be approved of for the common welfare of all the UslUnSy whereby th;y onely were weakened, who favored the affairs of forein Princes. The reward, if the Warfucceedcd well, was very great, for it made much for the advantage and reputation, efpecally at that time, of having the City of ft[* either her Subjcft, Friend, Dependant, or Coafedcratc.
The
The Third DISCOURSE.
#
That the Commonwealth is not to be blamed for the unfortunate fHccejjes of War^ after the routing of the Venetian Army in tbea&ion of Giaradada.
HB who hath fought out anoccafionto blame t^e Commonwealth of Venice^ out of envy to her glory, and particularly to the excellency of her Government, falling upon the times of he. grcatncft mif- fortunes, fay<, That when by her unfortuna e fuccefs at the rout of CiarttdAda^t loft her State by Land, fhe witnefled that there was reither worth, norftrength, nor power in her orders to govern an Empire ; and that (he had had her incieafe, and had to this day maintained her greatnefs more out of a certain appearance, and opinion, then by any excellency of power or counfd. I find thefe things written in fome Authors, but ch efly amplified and zi- firmedhy NieheUf Mdchiavel, a name which hath formerly been very famous ^or the curiofity of the matter which he took upon him to write on in his difcourfcs^ buc it is now fo condemned to perpetual oblivion by the holy Apoftolick Sea, as it is not lawful to name him.
The misfortunes which the Commonwealth underwent inthofedays were cer- tainly very great, but fuch notwithftanding as ought rather to move cojfnpaffioa in all mcrs minds, andihewtheinftability of humane affairs, then to afford matter of blame, and further oppreffion. Itisfaid that the imperfection of the Common- wealth was difcoverd by thcfe publick adverfitics; and (that I may give the very words of fome men ) that there was no true worth or excellency in her orders • y c prove they not this by any other reafon then what is taken tro-.n the aft.on it klf, to wit , becaufe (he loft the day to the French, and that by the lofs ther of tbe publck affairs were brought into exceeding great danger. But he who (hall penetrate more inwardly into the truth of thefe things, will not r;ft {;iti.f- ficd with this judgement, framed rather from the event then out of inv re (fon, and vill fp^ak much otherwife, and will take many other things into confiderjt on, be- fore he give his judgement. And if we will by this our Difcourfe peutratL into the mo; e inward confiderations, we fhall find that the Form ot G( vernmtnt is as it were the foul which gives a true being to a City. For a mu'tituJe of men af- fembled together could not have whereof to live, nor would their place of habita- tion deferve thenameof a City, were it not for certain Orders and L .ws. But as the fenficive foul, which informs the animated bodv, cannot alwajs make eqiul ufeofallher lundry powers and faculties-, for though Ihe preferve her felf inhef own purity, and perfedion, yet needing the parts of the body, ond ex rinfecal ob- jects for her operations, ihemuflofc times ceafe operating and fometime pro- ciuc th impel feft operations ^ To will it happen in a C ty, that though the form of government, which i^ as it wcreihe foul tlnreof, be of it felf very vigorous and peiftdf, yet can it not always, nor :n all things ihew i'.s force and excellency, by reafon of the n.cd it flandsinof inftrumcnts, and by its encountnng with many extr.nfccal accidents, foasit muft fometimes reft wholly iale, and other fomc- times do but little t:ood by its opcra:ing •, Whence I infer, tliat though a City bs exceedingly well ordered for Civil and Military Affairs, yet cannot ihe promifs htr felf to enjoy peace lone, noi long to keep ierfclf m one and i' e fame condition,
S i favi
0}0
fjve ondy as long as (he dial be permitted fo to do by the condition of other things, which are out of the Legtflators power. So likewife the advc rfe fortune of a Com- monwealth or Kingdom, which roay depend upon fo many other occafions is not fufficientto infer, that fuch States arc ill ordered: But rather as he maydcferve the name of a good Orator, who handles his caufe fo as he does perfwade handfom- ly, though he he do not always attain his ends ^o ought not the Legiflator co b? accounted lefs wife, nor thole Laws Icfsgood, by which the Government is well regulated as touching Peace, and the prefervation of the City or State, though various accidents may produce the contrary efFefts.
Thefe reafons and examples do cleerly (hew, how ill-grounded thofe oppofitions are, by which, without any confideration of io many other circumftanccs, men will conclude that the Orders of the CommoaweikhcA Ft fttcc were weak, and of no worth, becaufehtr Army was worfted in the Battel of Ceridad* •, andbecaufc after that Rout, the lofs of the State, and fo many other great lodes did enfue. It is not the Event, but the Counfel by which thingsarc done, which ought to give the true praife or blame to our adions. Let us then fee in this Cafe which wc are now upon, what the counfcls were, what the hopes, what the condition of times were, and of Princes, and let us look into other fuch circumftances, and then wc (hall be able to give a better judgment- The times are three 5 and the affairs which upon this occafion may fall under our confideration, are of three forts-, to wir, fuch as did prcccdfc the aftion, thofe wherewith it wasaccompanied,and thofe which follow- ed after. The Commonwealth, before this unfortunate accident fell out, was not only in a very profperous condition, by reafon of her happy fuccefs in the laft War againft the Emperor (.Maxtmiliart^ but alfo ( as it was thought ) in a condition of much fafety, being joined ifLleague and amity with the powerful King oi Frunct, when unexpeiftedly fheunderftood that almofl hll the Princes of Chnftcndom had confpired againft her 5 and almoftat the fame time fhe heard that the King of TrAtict had denounced War againft her. Where will you find a m nd fo conftanc^ as will not be much difturbed at fuch an advcrtifement as this ^ The affc(5iion muft needs be n.oved at the novelty of the adion, and Reafon troubled by t egrcatnefs thereof. What had the Venetian Senate reafon to fear at this time Icls then this ^ The King of I'r&nce^ in league, friendftiip and confedtracie with the Commonwealth fer many years, out of oblervanciewhcreuntothe Venetians had not only refufed fricndlhip with C^efdr^ which was offer'd them with fo much advantage to toemlcivs, but had taken up Arms to defend and prcfci ve for that King, their Friend and Con- federate, the State oiMiUn-^ little mindful of fuch a fervicc, (astheufualafferfli- ons of other men are feldom found amongft Princes ) confpites her ruine,and tu ns thofe Arms againft her, which through their friendfhip were grown fo powerful m UaI^. What lliould move him thereunto^ Not defire of revenge ^ tor there ap- porcd no injury : Nat any fear of his own affaiis 5 for he had found tFem alreao y very conftant unto them : No felf-intereft •, for he ought to have been jealous of C^fars greatnefs, who had been his perpetual Enemy, and to have wiihed well unto the Venetians, who had been his antient Friends. But what (hall I fay of the relt i l-iad not C^far the like obligations to the Venetians^ as the King of France had, which (honld have kept him from fuch a confederacies Nay, had he not peculiar lefpeds which counfell'd him to the contrary f The injuries which the Frei.ch hid done to the Empire-, the King of France his particular hntred to him; the high afpiring thoughts of that King, pernicious to the dignity of the Empire, and to the German liberty. Wherefore as he could never promife himfdf fate and firm f iend- ftiiptrom the French^ fo he ought rather to have obviated th.ir power, then have hclp'd to advance it. But who could have cxpe(ftcd tt at fuch an action (hould have proceeded from the admired wifdoro of Ferii»And King of SfAin^ fo unufual, and
('33) .
fo harmfal to himfelf, by reafon of rhe prejudice and danger which he was to re- ceive, in not preferving the State which he had won in the Kingdom of Naples in pe^ce and qi'iet •: For which caufe, the grcatnefs of the French^ their fidelity, and natural dcfire of novelty ought to have been (ufpcdled by him •, yet he alTented to 'thcincreafe of their power, and of his own danger. But how did thofc generous thoughts which Pope ^ult$u the Second feemed to bear to ihc greatnefs and liberty odtalj^ correfpond viith his joinng in confedcracie with the Tranlalpine Princes who went about to opprefsher by the ruine of that Commonwealth, which was confeft by all men to be at that time the Maintainor of the Glory of Italy, and the hope that fhe might again rife to h:r anticnt greatnefs and reputation 1 What fafety could the Apoitolick Sea expedt, by increafing the power of thofc Princes in Italy, who were great of themfelves, whom he feared, and upon whofe author. ty before* favv the Popes of Rome muft depend <
T hcfc certainly were fuch th-ngs as did tranfcend whaifoever could have fain into the imagination of the Venetian Senators, or of any other men how wife foever: Nor was the immenfity of the danger lefs, nor lefs able to moleft and confound the m.ncis of thofe who were to prepare for refiftance againft fo great a War. The King of /"M^t^hisForces were of themfelves very powerful, that Kingdom being then more flourifliing then it had been for many years before and become more formi- d ible by the poflefTion which the Frtncb had got of the Dukedom of >W//4», which afforded them mighty convcniencies to afTault the Confines of the Common- wealth. And though Cdfars Forces were not of themfelves greatly confiderable, yet were they increafcd by the fame he gave out, that he led his Army \nto Italy to make a certain and noWe prey thereof, and with a mind to reftoieche Empire to its almoft lofl greatnefs, whereby he reconciled the mindes of the German Princes and people, and got them to joyn their Forces with his. Moreover, the King of .J/>4m Naval preparation was in particular to be feared-, to prevent the which, thofe Sea-Forcesof the Commonwealth were to beimployed, which fhould all of them have been imploycd m defending the State by Land from fo fierce an afTault. The Pope added no fmall reputation to the League by his authority ^ and his Spiritual arms being accompanied with Temporal forces, became the more dreadful. And though the other petty Princes forces were but fmall, yet was their will to offend the Commonwealth great ; and the Kings of England^ Po/4«rf',and Hungdry were fought unto and foil cited by all thcfe together to join with them, and to declare enmity to the lenetians.
\{ \.\\ttix\\z Venetians had yielded to this fo new and great preparation for War, v\htch like Thunder made both its no.fe and harm be heard and felt at once, what could have bten faid unto them :" Ought not they to have been judged woithy of excLife, and their Commonwealth free from the imputation that their Orders were no way s good < For as an obje(5l of immenfu;able force does not move, but cor- rupt the lenfe ;, fo the encountring with fo weighty a confpiracic, was a thing noc likely to incite the Commonwealth to (hew her vcrtue, but rather to diforder and to confound her. Yet it is fcen how (lie behaved herfelf upon fuch an occafion •, and whether it may be inferred from thcfc her firfl counfels, as from a thing that was in her own povv.r, that flic was not worth much, or that flic did any thing unworthy ot herfelf, of her Fame, or of the reputation which flic held amongft other potent Princes of that Age. What appearance was there in her of any fear, or rather what greater iign could be dv fired in her of generous confidence and moft noble darinj; < Wh.,t di.1 Ibe refolve to yield up of free-will :* What noife, what complaints were heard, which fliewed that flie would terminate that cq^fllttion with vain words, which could no: be ended but with Aims -f The Anfi^^vhich was given to the French Herald who came to denounce unto them, that the King was apon hi5
march
march in Arms againft the Commonwealth,\vas onely,th3t that War was intimated them from the King, when they had more reafon to exped Amity and Peace from him-, but thitthcy would not be wanting to their own defence, being confident that th y Ihould be able to defend themlclvcs by theic own Forces, and through the rii;htof their caufe. The eflfefts were anlwcrable to their words ^ for they be- took themfclves forthwith to provide for fo great a W ar. The moft expert Com- manders were fent for from all parts, veteran Soldiers mufteredin all places, in fo great numbers, and foqual fied, as it was agreed upon by the common confent of all, that neither that Age, nor any other, for many years before hadfecnluch an Army of meer Italians \n Italy, Great and very miraculous was the union and concord bithinthc Senate and City, wherewith men of all conditions and ages to lend their helping hand toaffift their Country at fo great a need. There ap- peared fo great a zeal m every one to the common good, fach refolu:ion to main- tain the ftate and liberty of the Commonwealth even to the Ijftgafp, as thofc vvho have appeared to be no very good friends to the Venetians in oih^r thing?, do praife thefe procccdings,being forced fo to do by the powtr of truth.
But 1: t us come to thofc other things which accompany the a<5lion it felfj The Senate upon mature advice, refolrcd wifely how that War was to be managed; they knew the enemy was veryftrong, the danger great, and thit the welfare of the Commonwealth depended upon the prefervation of that Army which they had now got together. But as it would be a great rafhncfs to hazard it upon a Battel, fo to keep it onely to be a fafeguardto the City, (hewed timoroufnefs in them, •would diCcourage their men, and increafe the courage and reputation of the ene- my. Whiift they bethought thcmfelves what to do in this great exigencie to evade both thefe inconvenicncies, the Senate ordered their Commanders to march with" their Army to thofe Confines of the State of Milan where the Enemy fhould ap- pear to be lik.ly to make their firft afTaults ^ to the end that follow ng their Army in near, but fafe quarters, and that keeping them flill incommodated, andinjca- ioufie and fear of being aflaulted, they might keep them from advancing further, and from falling upon any entcrprife. The Commonwealths Army was very ftrong in Horfe, amount ng to the number of Ten thoufand ; and in Foot, to boot with a great number ofSoldiers of their own Country, commanded by thtir own Oa'ers, they had Twelve thoufand veteran Soldiers, unda experienced famous Commanders, together with a great train of Artillery, and all other inftruments for War-, fo as the Senate had reafon to beleeve, that they might effed theic ends of m.intaining the War, and of keeping the ficUi and fo fpinning out time ( as it becomes thofe who are upon the defenfive part, and find themfelvcs to be the weaker) fecure their own Affiirs, and keep further dangers from them.
For it oftentimes falls oat through various accidents, that the grcsccf Armies be, they do fo much the more eafily moulder away of ihemfelves -, and the Forces o^ manyfevcral Princes, though they be atfirflgieat and formidable, prove lefs fit for great tnterprifes, by reafon of the Colleagues different ends and interefts. And as learned Phyfitiansufe no flrong and violent remedies when the fick party hathbutfomegrudgingsofan Ague, and when the difcafeisnot yet well known; So thefe wife Senators were of opinion, that theCommon wealth being fet upon and almoft opprcfl by the fudden violence of fo many Enemies,it made not for their wel- fare and fafety,to come to the violent remedy of a pitcht field, with enemies whofc flrengthwas not yet very well known. Together with thefe reafons, ihtVet^etian Senate hid for their exi|g»lc thcfuccefsof the Commonwealth of Rome^ which finding her felf affailed^i^owerful Carthaginian Forces, and her Affars being reduced to a ereatftrcight, prefer ved themfclves from greater danger^ by drawing
out
out the War at length, and by keeping the Enemy incommodated •, bbtchei^V- rtethm had not a Fa^iui cJWjX/>»/» for their Commander in chief, as the French had an HannibAl^ for there were many of thofe vertues in Ledmick King of hramr^ which were praifed in HannilrAl % chiefly a mighty thirft afccr glory, to purchafe which he valaed neither labor nor danger, i ut ^^Iviano a famous and cried up Commjnder, not more for his own worth, then for this misfortune of the ye^ie- tUtis^ was of a nature much contrary to that of Fabitu^ in knowing how to make advantage of time J and though be had many other noble qualities, as greatnefsof fpirit in undcrtaking$,undainted courage in executing what he undertook, and great experience in matter of War; yet were thefe venues little advantagious for the prefent occafion -, better befitting a Commander who was to aflift a puiflant Pr:ncc, delirousot glory, and in his moft profperous times, thcnaCommonwcalch,which not making ufc (o much offeree, as of occafion,was flowly,but fafely arrived at that grcatneftjand which was now, more then formerly to procecdby the like counfels.
But it may peradvcnture be faid, that the Venetian Army wanted not a Fabius^ having NieoU Orfint, Count of FitiglUno^ who in his other adions mav be truly (aid to refcmbic f4A/'«* very much, for he alwaies proceeded wiih the flo'.vcft and fafcft advices-, but in this he appeared much different, and inferior to him fincc he would not fuccoufv^/i /<«»*, who contrary to his order had given Battel, as did fAbitu MAximus^ who readily fuccoured ^/«r«* ^/»«f/«», chief Commander of the Cavalry,though contrary to his opinion he had rafhiy cxpofed himfclf, and pare of the Army to the danger of Battel. But on the contrary, Lodftvick^ King of France^ was not onely like Hanmbal, but did much exceed him - for Hannibal knew onely how to overcome, but knew not how to make ufe of Vi(Slory, having fpent much time to little purpofc, after the rout given to the Ramans at Can»a ; but Led<mick purfuing the Vidory, ftopt not till he had regained all that he pre- tended unto from the State of r^»/V^ But the Forces of the Commonwealth did cither prove Icfs valiant, andlefs fortunate then formerly they had done, or clfe they were hurried by fome occnlt caufc upon this calamity. Yet can it not be faid that the Senates advice was lefs good , who in their Orders to their Commanders , did alwaies lay before them the importance of the bufinefs with exprefs and particular command to fhun the neceffity of joyn'ng Battel with the Enemy. Thofe prudent Senators knew very well that that Army wns not to be hazarded upon the dubious event of Battel, wherein confifted all the hopes of preferving her State by Land, and that the condition of affairs were fuch on their fide, that it they came to the trial of a Battel, it muft be upon too much difadvantage. The War was maJe at their own doors, fo as if the Enemy ftiould prove viftorious, theconquer'd party could not have time to rally or recruit them- felves, for prefcrration of their own affairs j but if the French Army had been o- vercome, the War would not notwithflanding be at an end, the Forces of the other Colleagues remaining flill intirc : which were likelier to be ru'ned by their own difordcrs, and by the difcords which ufc to happen in Leagues, then by force of ArmSj which could not be made ufe of without danger. The bad advice of fome Commanders, orelfcfome fatal adverfity of the Commonwealth would not per- mit that this advantage of tiraefhould be waited for-, whereupon they came to theconflift, not onely contrary to the fo many aforementioned refpec^s, but up- pon fuch difadvantage, as with but half their Forces they hazarded the whole For- tune of the Commonwealth. How valiantly they fought is witnefTed by the ge- neral confcnt of all men , nor do the victorious Enemies deny but that the vido • ry was a good while doubtful -, but a few not being able longer to refifl a much greater number, that notable rout enfued which drew after it fo many lofTcs and Raines j For the French Forces did not more fccurc the way to their Army in all
placet,
pl(ices,and facilitate their under takjngs,tben did the reputation of their viaofcyK;:?
Amidft fo great amazement and aflonidwnent, nothing was ktc unatteaipted by LuigiGritti, oadchnfto'ert C\foro, who wcte ihe PreviJatori del Cdmpo, to \ip- -bold the Common wealths fading fortune.- They betook thcinielvcs to rally the remainder oif the Army, they comforted the Captains and Spldief;s with hope of .better fucccrs i they intreated the Nobility and people of BrcfcU , and of o- ther Cities, that being mindful of their^-Loyalties , and of pther things done in fcrvice to the Commonwealth , in former V\ ars had with Philip oHfris Vifcpate, they vvould be like thcmfelves, and with like conftancy keep them- felves under the moderate command of the Veuttians^ and abhorring tbc fcvcrc 7r<infAlfine Dominiop, they would with one onely inconvenience frtethenfifelvcs from many grievous mifchiefs. But they were all fo polTeft with a Panick fear, )as no entreaties nor reafon could be liftneduntp-, thofe who had tfcaped the Baftd, were unfit either for ftrength or valor, to auempt any thing againirt the Enemy, oo difpofition to defence was found in the City, no not fo much as to keep ^herofclves from plunder ^ there were but few Forts at that time in the Stite, and thofe few of no condition of holding out long. What was then to be done < to whom wjs any recourfe to be had > If all Princes and Countries werebecomc Enemies, who were to be truflcd ^ If all memory of former benefits were Jaid afide, ib as leaft grati- tude was found in thofe who had been moft obliged, how conld new men be railed, and provifions made for a new War ? Jhe armed Enemy was already at the gates, nay even within their houfes, threatning alTpred ruinc. What was to be dortein fuch a general difpair, but to give way and fuffer the cloud to pafs, wh>ch they fasf there was neither witnorcounfclfufficient to withftand? And as fometimes it tills out in grcateft Tempefts, that the skill and labor of the Marrintrs being over- come by the malignity of the weather, they take down their fails jnd fufF-r the fhip to drive up and down whitherfoever the Seacarries it 5 So in cafes of grcateft dan- ger, into which States do fometimes fall, he that fits at the helm muft comply with his fortune be it never fo bad, till the fury of thofe tempefts being paft over, the L-oramonwealth, though born dovwn, yet not quite funk, may rife again, and make way for her prifline greotnefs.
The Army being then to retreat, and the lofs of the City drawing other lofTes ^ter it, as one flone that gives againft another, it was thought the b:ft courfe to free the people from their former oaihes, foto prcfcrve them from facking and plunder, which they mufl have undergone, if they fhould maintain their loyalties^ and to free themfelvcs from the tax of rebellion, if they (hould fubmit to the Ene- my. Such a rcfolution might appear willing, and therefore lefs generous, butic was really neceffary •, prejudicial to him who doth confider meerly the prefenc con- dition of things, but which might prove ufeful in the future : At firft fighc, it ap- peared to proceed from rafhnefs and fear, and yet it proceeded from wifdom, from charity, andinrefptftto the good of the State, and of theSubjetfls. The piety r«r prudence of the Senate coald not admit of the onely hope which was ofF.-rcd in this fad condition of times, to beufcd for withflanding fo many enemies , uhereibre the Venetians ^idi magnanimoufly refufe thofe helps, and afliflanccs, which were offered them by the Turks ^ though but little before ( as fome writeri affirm) they had been very much fought unto by other ChriOian Princes, as by Frederick oi AtAgtn^ and Lodovicm sftrT^j^ for the defence of their Dominions •, and rot long after by the Emperor MaximiUan^to be tnade ufe of againft the Venetians , but nei- ther did the juftly conceived anger againfi fo many confpiring Princes, nor the de. fite of recovering what was loft, prevail with thofe moft wife and religious m;n, but that it was over-born with the zeal of Religion, and with a firm refoJution of prffi-; fervingthe glory of their ochet acchicvcweais againft th« Infiddsi, immaculate f*.
neither
(in)
neither would the reafon of State, if well underftood, confidered in the exa.tiple of others, fuffsr them fo to do •, and efpecially in the unfortunate fuccefs of the Em- pero sof ConHAntinofle^ who having iinidvifedly call'd in to their alTiftance the or/<OTJ« Princes, who were much more powerful then they, had drawn a greater ruine upon themfe'ves, which proved the occafion of the tall of thar Empire. But b:ing unwilling notwithftanding to give over all hopes of accom nodating the af- fli(5t;dcond.tion of affairs withlbme eafe, the Senate refolved to have recourfe to the Pope, and to C.tfar, ( though they had then appeared their bitter Enemies ) to treat of fjme Agreement. They were moved much hereunto by the refpeft and reverence due to that holy See, and the pious and religious apprehenfion they had of Ecdefuiftical ccnfurts, to which they wcrerubje<ft ^ and they trufted moie in prev.iiling with Csfar^ then with the King of France : For what hopes were :hcrc to do any g-^od by intreaties with him, who being firft bound to the Common- wealth by obligation and confcdcracie, had fpurn'd at all thofc refpedts out of mctrdefirc of novelties:" Tothefe then they granted all that they pre:ended unto 5 for being to make them quickly jealous of the King of France his greatneTs, they knew fome way would be found out for the Commonwealths better fortune.
But how is it poflible to pafs over here in filence another thing, not at all diff.r- in^ from this, by which fuch bafe afperfions have been endeavored to becaft upon the Fenettirts-^ fmce by this curprefent difcourfc we go about to vindicate th:m, by fearching into the truth ■::' We read in Guicchiardine^ a Modern, and to give h m his due, in many things an excellent Hiftorian, an Oration publifhed by him in the name of s^ntonio ^ujliniana^ fcnt by the Commonwealth to Csfsr ■■ wherein it is faid, that the Fenttians begging pardon at Cafars hands, with much fubjcdlion and fervihtyofm^nd, did offer to fubmit the Commonv>?ealth to bepctpetually tribu- tary to the Empire, and to acknowledg to hold their liberty, l.vesarwJ livelihood fiom him : with fome other bafe unworthy cxpreflions, not only not true, but not likely to b: fo. For fiift, it is very certain, that ^ufiinian being ftnt Ambalfador to CMaximilian^ and finding him at Trent^ was never admitted to have audience, peradventure for fear of offending the Confederates, and making of them jealous. Then, it is moft certain that the Senate gave no fuch Commiffion : And Lt ;iim who will not believe it, liftcn but toreafon, and then he will be perfwaded to the contrary. The Commonwealth had then lofl all her Territories by Land 5 but at the fame time fhe enjoyed all her State by Sea, wherein were not only one or two Citics,but d.vers Provinces and noble Kingdoms •, their Naval accoutrements were very great, and equal, if not fuperior to thofe of whaifoever Potentate at that tijne ; all entire and whole, not having fuffered any thing by this thunder of War, which had only overrun ihcir Terra firma : their Treafure but little diminillied from what ic was at the bcgining of this War, which continued afterwards, and was maintained forthefpjceof many years: The City o( Fenice, placed by her miraculous fitu- ation in compleat fafety, all attempts which could be made againft it bein? to prove rafh and vain, as the eff.ds proved afterwards: A great Train of Artillery, r.ndof nil things icquifitc for War ^ a quiet People, and obedient at the beck of their Nobiluy^ andaconf^ant and refolute mind in all the Nobles to dem?n(lrate all the proofs of worth and love towards their Country. But that which tbliowed after- wards ;n their defence of the City of Padua againft the Forces of all the Princes of • the League, willfufHceto prove, that the Commonwealth was not foweak e.thcf in Ccunl'el or in Power, as to have recourfe to thit lafl extremity of making that Ciiy tributary, which had maintained her firft freedom lor above the fp-ce of a thoufmd years. Say, I befecch you, was not the Commonwealth powerful by Sea, and fi.fficiently valued by all other Potentates, before Hie h;d rny State in Terra
T f'ma r"
^/m.i ^ Nay, Hie v%as oft-times fecn to ncgleil occafions which were offered of making acquiriuons in Terra JirmA^ thinking her Hit fate and powerful enough
vviiho.u ihcm i . n ,-
What was it then which could move them to make thcmlcives Servants and Subieds, who had no reafonto doubt not onely their liberty, bat nor theircuictcft, mod antient, and moft proper Dominion, which was that of the !>e3, tor the prc- fcrvation nh'ereot, as aftairs Hood then, they had no re.ifon to make fuch hafte to Ct/Jr for friendlbip < Who can with reafon blame the advice, as the condition of iliin'-'S went then, of giving and yeelding that up loMaxtmlian which could not asth;nbekept iromhim-, to wit, fome of thofe Cities in Terra firma which he pretended right unto-, fmce fome agreement cnfuing with him by fuch concefli- ons, and injuries ceafing on that part, the way might be opened to ftraircr, and m )re pirt.cular and advantagious conventions with the fame Ctcfar, who was natu- rally defirousot novelties, whereby the Fortune of the Commonwealth was again to beiaifed up. And this counfcl tried afterwards with othas bad good fuccefs, when th.y joyned in a new confederacy with the fame French againft Maximtliaj;^ who fcorning" their fi-.endOiip, would not liftcnto their piopofitions. Thefewere thecounfels, thefethe a«ftions of the rr»f /wwr , from whence, fome wo^ldtake occafion to detract from the praife and dignity of theii" Comraoriwealth, and par- ticularly from the excellency of their Government.
But we may better know how injuiioufly this blemifh is laid upon them, if we will examine howoiher Princes and States did behave themfelves, whenthty were inlikeadverfity •, which I do not alleage as taxing any one, but to flievv the ufual courfe of affairs,' by the example of others. Obfervc what art the King of Aragori ufcd to preferve his State, when C^^r/^ the Eighth, King of France came agamfl them in hoflile manner, yilphonfo who polTeft the Kingdom, having tried the ex- tremity of fear before the danger grew near, out of the meer report of the French Forces, departed from iV4/'/<'J, leaving all things at fix and fevens, whiUt their Ar- my wasyet mRome; and A Ipbonfo the Sou, who had boafted that he would de- fend himfelf , and to that purpofe had muflcred a great many Soldiers, retired with them into the narrow pafles of the Kingdom, withouc makingany triall cither of his fortune or of his valor, and yeelding rather to the Fame, tnen to the Forces of the Enemy, fuffercd th.m to take free and quiet pofTe/Tion of that moft noble Kingdom. 'v>\it Frederick ok Aragon^ who was reinvcfted in his State, by the fa. vor of the people, and by the afliftance of other Princes,, with which the Venetians did readily joy n, what ufe did he make of other mens labors, and of his own for- tune ■: Soon after the Kingdom of Naples was aflaulted , by Lodowick King of Frarice^ and by Fcrdinando King of Spam.u which affault being much difcouraged, he would notlflento the advice of his Commanders, whoadvifed him to keep the field, but made fome flender provifions tor the Towns,and foon after, thinking more I:ow to efcape . then how to defend himfelf, he fled into Jfchia^ and went from thence into frai^ce, and put himfelf into the power of the fame King his E- nemy, contenting himfelf rather to live a private man in peace andfafety, then to reign in troub'e and danger.
But what fliall wc fay of the French, who boaft fo much of the t valor, and glo- ry in War ^ How eafily when they met with the firft misfortune, did theyfuffcr themltlves to be bereft of all they had before fo happily acquired in the A'ingdom of Naples < And that fo haftily, as i: feemedthat they had fredy yccled up the pof- fefTion of fo many, and fo noble Cities to the vigors, the Spainards, by agreement, and r.s it were in reward for the day which they had won. Nor is this thconcly example 4 fincewehave fecn the fame French, wtiowere fain win fuch fervency with ih ir Forces into Italy, and had with miraculous profperuy recovered the
State
State of MiUn bat a little before, refoivc fuddenly td forgo all thdt they had wofi, and to retreat to beyond the Mountains, after the rout vvhich ihey had rece.ved from the 5iv/;(j{(r>-/ at Nevara-^ thefuct'our wf,ich they met withal by the way 45 they fled,not being able to make them halt. Who was more famous then for dextejrity of wit for the managing of weighty atf airs, then LoddviftSforh a Duke of (JIf //4«^ yet when a great deluge of War came upori him, whatufe tould he make 6i all his Artifices f Could he (hew that conftancy and generofity which he had ma- ny times before publickly boaftedof:" The onely news of the league made againft him^hy Lodowick Kin»of Frsmt^ and by t!e Vtvtmns^ did fo afioniflihim, as lofing all underftanding, and leading his Affairs un provide l for, he refolved ac very firft, upon what ought to have been his laft a d moll defperate adv.ce , to f^y into Ccmany^ foregoing the defence of that State, which being once loff, he did afterwards in vain feck to recover.
(B'Jtin this point I may help my felf in looking a little more backward, and trying whether the gallantry of the antents, fo much commended, didpr-ducc other cffedh then thofe that I have fpoken of. Tie Roma/is^ who conquered the whole world, metfometimes withadverfc fortune, wheron let us Ice how they behaved thcm'^elves •, forheisvery timerous who is not bold and generous in pro- fperous affaiis. In what peril and hazard di^i Brennus Prince, and Commander of thec;-*/// Senones^Mtzh^QkyoiRome after :he defeat given to th« if ff»»4« Army, under the unfortunate condu(ff of the Fabti? no man t ought of making any defence , but fouj^ht how to fave himfelf and the beft things he had , m the Capitol •, their houfes, and walls were abandoned, and t e very gates left open to the Enemy by the Roman Soldiers, v^Hofled into the City to fave Lhemfclvesj and had not the good genius of that Commonwealth, \Vhich was prrferved for greater things fent CAritts Camill us to fuccourir, the rifing glory of the Romans bad even then been exftnd.
But what (hall we fay of things that happe-ed afterwards , when their Fame grew greater <: Did not the Rtmans lofe pofleffion of all Italj^ after the rout given them by Hannihtht Cann* i Did not the Cities belonging to their ftiends and confederates rebel every where ? And did not they ihemfclvcs give overall topesof defending them •:" the refolutions taken by the SouiJiers,(>ievved what the flight, what the fear of the conquered was. For feme, wh.lftthey were yet in their own houfes, rendred themfelvcs prifonersto the Conqu-rors-, others with- drew to the Sea fide, intending if they could ha-T the benefit of ihippino' , to go to fome other Prince, and feck out a new Country •• Bui with whit defpair the Citizens of iJ^wtf were poftefl, when they heard the news of t'ns misfortune, in how great confufion all their Orders were, maybe conceived by what Z./x'; re- lates, who undertook not onely to writethe Hirtory of the Commonwealth, bar to celebrate with perpetual praife the fame and merit of her Citizens. And it wa$ credibly behevcd (for as much as we hear ) that thofe valiant men, unaccuftomed to know what fear was, were flrucken with fuch amazement, as if Ha^itihl had known as well how to make ufe of viftory, ashedidto overcome, rhe To great and fo long continued fortune of Rome^ had not onety been hereby interrupted, but totally fuppreft. And thefe very felf fame Carthaginians^ who had fo lone, and fo floutly con tc (ted for glory, with their rival, the Common vcalth oi Rome, when they tafted of acverfe forrune,went affray from their former generofity, and fuffercd chcmfelves robe born down by extremity cf defpair, for after the defeat which they bad received by Sea by the Rom.ws^they ind ned to yceld up unto theitt rhelflandsof 5/f//)f,and 54ry/»/4 and tomakethimfelves tributary for ever to the Senneand people of ifow-and afterward being overcome in Battel by Scipio Af' fricjnw ^thcy fell to final rttin. Lut why do I infhnce in fomany examples: Are not
T % thefc
thefe fufficient to prove, that the valianceft and wlfcft men are ftrangely tcrr.fied at great and Qntxpc(flcd misfortunes -, and that when Armies arc loft, which are the inftrumcnts whereby States prefervc tficmfdves from the evils of War, good Counfels muft ccafe, as not able to keep off other greater cvJs which do ufually follow after that a Battel is loft.
Therefore out oi the above-mentioned reafons, and by what hath been done by others upon like accidents, every one may be dcerly fatisfied, that the m sfortune which the State of yenice underwent byreafonof the ill- fought Battel oiGtara- ddd* , ought not to detract any thing from her other praifes : For her fubfe- qucnt adions, by which with fingular conftancic and gencrofuy (he recovered what ftic had loftjtendet her by the joint confent of all men truly glorious.
The Fourth DISCOURSE.
Whither the frincts of Italy did n>eUy or m^ toajfault the Army of Charls the Eighty ^*"g of France, when after having gott<!n the Kitfgdcm t»/Nap'es, he btfed to fafsCver the kioutttains.
Mongft thofe things of fad rencKmbrancc to Jtalj , the paffage of ChAfU the Eight, K.ng of France, to the Conqueft of the Kingdom oi Naples, may be numbrcd amongft the faddcft, and moft recent: For ever fince thit time, the Tranfalpine Nations have had a power in Italy -J and the grcatncfs oi the Italian name, which began a: thac time to be raifed up again with hopes of greater glory, all the parts ot. Italy being under the command of our Italian Princes, return'd to fuch a declination by this blow, as it could never fince recover its priftine majefty; But that which moft af- flids the minds of thofe who are any ways gcneroas, is to think, that this moft noble Country fell into fuch misfortunes through the fault of her own men ^ and that the Italian Princes, to fatisfie their own difordinatedefires and immoderate ambition, did call in Forein Nations to the prejudice of Italy ; and little valuing the truer and greater dangers, they ftood bafely looking on, and fuffcr'd this their common Ccantry to be rent in pccces by Foreiners. The French Forces did at this time pafs into Italy ^ by which ftie had not for a long time been molefted, being called \tihy Ledovick Sfor^a^ and maintained by other Italians: But ere long they were all aware of their ill- taken counftl, being touched by the danger more ac hand, by reaon of the French-mens great felicity-, which as it might have been forefcen iuriher off, fj was it not now fo eafily to be remedied. They therefore joined all of them togecher afterwards in confederacie for the fafety of italy^ and to oppofc King charts his dcfigns : So as af.er the acquifit on of NapUs^ as he would reiurn into France by the fame way which he had come in, with his Army, which was notwitbftanding much lefs numerous in men, he was oppofcd by the Army of the cojifed.rate Princes, as he came to the banks of Taru^^ who meant to hinder his paftagc, and to fight his Army. For a little before, the Pope, t' e King of the Romans^ rhc King of S-fain^ the Commonwealth of Venice^ and the Duke of MiUi^ had joined in confederacie to this purpofe^ thcyenetiimXwvng been the firft mo toners thtreof, and exprefs Ambafladors from all the afo-efaid Princes had XixtunFtnice^ where the League was coaduJed an J publifhcd. This refolution , ■ Wis
was at ihofe times generally commended, as bring ge erous, and fuiting with the honov o[' Italy : But notwithftanding, there wanted not thofe then who defited t'liey had been more moderate •, nor will it be now from the purpofc to examine this bi-finefs, fo to draw fome fccure document for times to come by a diligent txmiination of the things done, and to know whether they were leaily fuch as f^elerve pr.iifcand imitation, or whether there was any thing more to be defited th:.rein : For they appear to be attended with that wifdoin, without which no adion, though perchance it may have good fuccefs, deferves either to be praiftd or imitated by wife men. The taking up of Arms to drive the French out of Italy ^ was doub^lcfs a rcfolution as much to be commcnped in the Italian Princes, as fome of them were blamed for calling of them in, and others for aflifting tfiem to the common Ihameand prejudice. But how thcfe Arms were to be made ufe of a- gainftthem, and whether it vvjs well done to hinder them when they were march- ing away, and to flop their pafTage, and force both the French and themfdv s to come to a Battel, is fomwhai a difficult cafe, and which may admit of divers con- fidcratior.s.
It is an anticnt and approved proverb, Thata Bridg of Gold ought to be made for an Enemy that flies. And this is grounded upon folid reafons •, for no Battel can. be fought without much hazard and unceitainty of fuccefs, fince there may hap'p.n many unthought of accidcnts,whcrein the ufe of wifdom is excIuded.Tp'erc- /orc wheie to joinbat.el is to be thought a good advice, the condition of affjirj muft be fuch, as that a man be not neceflitated thereunto, but makes it his cho ce, and comes to it with gteater hopes of overcoming, then tear of bsing wcrftcdj and likewife the advantage muft be more that is to be cxpeded from the Viflory, then the prejudice which depends upon the lofs thereof. By thus meafuring the car- riage of thefe affairs by thefe rules, we may the better know 'what judgment to give thereof. If we confidcr the flate of affairs before the Armits drew near, there appears no necefficy of fighting at that time : For the King of France led his men back over the Mountains to their own homes, without prejudice or inju^ to any one 5 fo as the meeting him to ftop his paflage, and give him battel, procecJed from elcdion, snd from the determinate counfcl of the Princes that were Confede- rates againfl him : But what the end of the combat was like to be, and how the bufinefs was ballanccd, might be guefs'd at by many particulars, before a (\rokc waS ftruck. The King of Fr*nce led along with him an Army conftfling of French and Svi>U\irs'^ the former excellent for the Horfc- Militia, and the latter excellently well difciplin'd in Foot-fervice : So as the Italian Militia vV.as confefs'd by all men to be far inferior to both thefe-, for they had wholly lofl all their antientexcellenc inftirations, and had wanted true difcipline for many ve.trs, being by Foreners be- reft of their ant!ent military glory. But the much difFdenc imprefTions wh ch \\ere in the Soldieis themfelvcs, wasof great importance upon tbisoccafion. The French were haughty, and puffed up by their fuccefs at Naples •, they flighted the Enemy, their very namefeeming to have infufed fo much tei ror into all ^^t Italians^ as that neither Princes nor People had dared to oppofe them, butafforJed them free and fa!e pafTage every where. On the contrary, the Italuns accuftomcd only to fuch \\ ars as were made in Italy, wheiein little valor was fhewn, and Icfs difcipline, with- out almoft any lofs o^ blood, as if it were for meer (hew and fport, were to fear the unufiial encounter with the French^ and to boot with their Valor to apprehend their profperity, which had made the way fo eafic to t^em to fo great and fo nob'e an acqu:fi;ion. The Kit\gs party was likewife favored by the Kings own prejer.ce, and the danger which his own perfon was in -, which occafioned no fmall daring in the French Soldiery,fome being thereunto flirr'd up by their natiital love to their King., others by hopes of reward, and others for fear of punilhmcnc. But of all things die.
the diverfity of the caufc ought to be of greateft moment. For the French had no hopes of fifcty, fave what lay in their Arms, being in an En«mies Countiy, the way in their return home very difficult, by reaCon of the craggy Mounta ns though they (liould meet with no iinpediiiient by the Enemy ^ the Army of the Colleagues fuffcrcd not under the like nccefliiy, for being at its own home, it migf.tbefurc upon any aJverfc fortune to have fafe receptacle in every City. Moreover, the ItdlU/fs were incited to fight, onelyout ofadcfireof honor, or of revenge, and this was much more in the Princes and Commanders, then ia ihe corr.raon Sol- dier-, which things being well confidcred, might by reafon of what is the u'uJ ilTue of fuch aftions, caufe rather doubt, then hope ot vi(Sory , if they (hould come to a day of Battel ^ or at Icaft might make it appear, that bufiiiefl*es were fo equally balanced , and fo doubtful, as where there was no inforcing neceffity, to purfuc a bufinefs fo full of danger ,wjs not worth the while. We muft now confider the ad- vantagc,as alfo the difadvantage wh ch mighthappen upon the good or b id fuccefs of the battel •, which though it be in all affairs doubtful and uncert3in,yet out of the a- forefaid refpedts it was now both thofc in extremity. We will fay that the then chief moving caufe was, lo drive the French A rmy out oiltaly^ and to reftore thofc of Aragon to the r Kingdom, out of which they were driven by K.Charh. The con- federate Princes might in all liklihood have compaft tnis their intention by other more fafe, and more fecurc means. For what d fturbance mi;>ht they meet with- al, in the enterprife which ihty were to cndcavoc againft the French in the very Kingdom o( Nafles^ from that Army which haftedto pafsovfrthe Mouncains, and was to diflblve of it fclf i And fay that thofe people fhould be routed and de- feated, Ihould therefore the Kingdom of Naples be difpofed of accnrdino to the pleafure of the Italian Viftors .■' No certainly , for the King had already lefr ftrong Garifons there of his beft Soldiers to fccure it. The viftory could no: be fo great,and favorable for the Italians, but that they m.uft have loft fome of their men j foas if they had a mind to atteippt any thing upon the affairs of Naples^ it had been bet- ter for them to have gone with all their Forces upon that enterprife, then to give battel to thofe, who did hot any waiesoppofc their defi^n, fince when they (liould have overcome them, they were to go with that Army, leflfencdby the Battel, and wearied with marching, to the main bufinefs of t-aking the Kingdom of Naples^ where the things offered at by Ferdinand would have had cafiir fuccefs if fiC had entred the Kingdom with greater Forces, and as he was willin|ly receiv^ed by the City of isafles, whither he might coracat firft with thofc few men he had, fo would the rcfl of the Cities willingly have revolted from the French, and have puc themfclvcs under the obedience of Ferdinaffd^iithey had fecn he had Forces fuffici- ent ro defend himfelf,and to make good their rebellion. Bur fay that the Colleagues would have fecurcd ihemfclves yec better from the French, totheenJ, thattheit intentions upon the Kingdom of NapUs might not be hindred or diverted •, had it not been better for them to go with the Army of the league to find out Monfieur d'Or leans, whoit the fame time had poflsft h mfelf of the City of Nevdra^ to drive him out oiltaly^ together with thofc of his party who had fetled therafelves there, then to follow thofe, who did of themfelves that which wii\ moft defircd by the league-,to vvic,haften back over the mountains^ Nay,it may be ftrthcr faici,chac unlefs the French (hould be neceffitated, as feeing thek King in danger, as alfo that Army which waspurfued by the Italians, they would not peradvcnture have fent at that time more men intoltaly, and Monfieur d'Orleans would not have had any occa- fion to have poflefl himfelf of Nevara, whicbdid afcrrwaids redound tothegreac prejudice of tfie Colleagues, and pactieulady to the bufinefs of Naples .- For part of thofe Forces which were promifed and intended to affift Ferdinand in the reco- very of the Kingdom, marched to the recovery of Novara^ out of defire whereof,
Ledewick
Leduwick sfor7[d did at lafl: draw himfelf out of the league. Whence it appears, that it was rather revenge, or vain-glory, then any juftieafon which the Princes propofcd unto themfelves in this their confederacy, that moved them to refolve up- on hghtin;-; the French Army.
But let U5 now confider more particularly, what of advantage,what of good the Colleagues might have got, \i they had had the better of that Battel. Thebeft which they coi-ild hope tor, for all thefe their pains and dangers, could be nothing clfe but the routing of thofe Forces, which w.re not likely to make War any more in Itd^ •, and the Italics had /as then no reafon to think of nny Tranfalpine Affairs. It may be the perfonof the King, who was then in the Army, might perad venture be confiderable, if he had fain inio the power of the Colleacues-, 'But both his life in that hurly burly was expofed to great danger, and fay he had been taken prifoncr, he might have found many waies how to efea^e. And (ay al- things had fain out according tothe wifli of the Colle.igues,what would the Italians Iiave gotten by having fo great a Prironer,butthe drawing upon thcmfJves an in- undaiionof Forciners, which would ftill have put thein mto great rtroub:es aad dangers/* That warlike Nation, which was at this time more thenar any other, devoted to their King, would not have fat down by fuchan indignity, fuch an in- juiy without revenging it with the'rown Forces, ind by drawhig o;her Tranfalpine Waiions who wifhed not well to the glory of Italy ^ efpecially in Military Affairs to joyn with them.
Let us fee an example of this in what followed the next Age after 5 where we (hall find that the imprifonment of King Francis^ though taken by fo great a Prince as was Cbarls the Fifth , to whom none of the Princes of the League, no not the whole League it felf was to be compared, produced nothing, but longer, and more heavy Wars, which ended not till the conquerors had yeelded many things to the conquered. But on the contrary, let us imagine into what ruine /^^/^ would have fain, il the Army of the League had been routed and defeated, the Enemy being in the State of MiUn wherein are fo many and fo noble Cities, for defence whereof there were no other Forces on foot, then thofe which were to hazard themfelves in that Battel ^ and to raife another Army which might be able to make head againft fo powerful enemies, and fo victorious, would be a bufinefs of forae timeT and very hard to do if not impofTib.'e. And if the veiy name of the Freficb^and the fame of their Forces had made the way to fo great a vidory eafie to them, a'nd fo cafi;; the conqueftof fonoblea Kingdom, whatmifchief hadth;y not reafon to exped, if by the dilcomfeiture of that Army, the Forces, not onely as formerly, of the Km^s oi j^ragon, (hould have been beaten of whole Italy, and alfo fuca forein Forces as could be ready to afford any fuccor, for in that Atmy were all the Soldiers, tha-t the King of Spain had in Italy •: So as there was not any State which upon fuch an accident could promife it felf fecurity. Affairs then flanding upon this foor, who canpraifc the advice taken by the confederates, of fighting the French-: But on the other fide there wantnotothcrreafons to plead tor the honor, wifJom , and maturity of the Italians in this aflion , to boot with that noble daring wh ch can byro means be denied them, it is very likely that the flourifliing conditi- on, and profperity of Charls King of France began at that time to make him be ha- ted and fufpeded not onely by all the Italian Princes, but alfj not very accep- table to the King of Spain • infomuch as he who had called him into Italy did al- ready repent his raili advice, and he who did not withffand him, blamed himlUf for his flacknefs,and irrefolution : fo as they agreed all together to abate the fj great p6wer of that King, and to curb his profperiry, and his thoughts of further achieve- ments. If then the King had been futfered to return without any ler, fafe and ni- umphant into bis Kingdom, was it not to be feared, thi: the Fr eric h not content
with
with tluir hnvng got ihe Kingdom of Naples^ would pafs over t)ie Mountains the next year rgai^i with greater Forces^ to what danger would the Dukedom of jvf //j» and Tiift,a»y have been expoled 1 upon which States it was known that the French had fee thrir minds, neither would they have fpared the reft, if they had had any opportunity offered them of advancing further.
And it the It alum lliould have fctmcd but co doubt their beating thofe Soldiers, who were but the remainder of an Army which had firft paft the Mountai.-.s, and fad left a good part of ihcir Forces in feveral Garrifons in the Kingdom of Naples^ many whereof were likevvifediffipated through feveral accidents-, what hopes had they to witliftand their entire, and much greater Forces, with which they were to rttum the next year on this fide the Mountains to new entcrprifesC Nor had they any reafon todefpJr of vidlory, fir.ce ihe Colleagues had an Army for number of men much grea er tlun the Enemy, commanded by experitnced and valiant Offi- cers, well provided both of Curalurs and Light horl'e, well diipofcd to all anions, and which were to fight with people opprefl with fear, and who may be faidto have almc ft fun away already of thcmfelvcs 5 cfpccially the advantage ccnfidered which the sflai'ants fci the moft part have. It was further confidered, that the French Army had done nothing whereby to be dreaded, or to cool tie courage of other rren •, fir.ce the frexchhadnoi onely not met with any occafion of fighting, but hrd not (o much as fcen the face of an Enemy-,fince the Enemy was the rather to apprehend this enccunter,for that it wjs unexpedled,ihey bein j accaftomcd to find all pafiages open, no: needing to make their way by the fword. Nor was-the ad- vantage fmall'tvhich they might promife unto thcmftlves, by beating a vidorious Army, and a warlike Nation, theperfonof fo great a King being alfo in that Army -, wherefore in fuch a cafe, the French-mens courage was raiher to fail, then to avial them. A n J it was to be belceved that the Enemies to that Crown wou'd the fooncr appear againft them, as the Emperor iMaximilian^ Benrf King of £»^. Und^ and that Ferdinand King oi Spain would continue the more firm to the /m- //4» 'confederate. Then vihat courage, or what hope of fuccour would thofe French- men have, who were left behind for the defence of thcKingdomof Naples': and the City of Novara, which though it were back'd with the Kings men, who to thi> pijrpofe kept his Army a long time together after the Battel, was reduced to fo great ftieights by the Colleagues, as the King was compelled to yeed it up upon Articles to 5/(jr:(4- would it not foon have been taken by the folc reputation of the vido y •: Neither would this have been an occafion of difTention (as afterwards it was) amcn^ft the Colleagues, and which bereft them of the chitfeft advantage which t!iat confederate could hope for.
Thefe arc the Confiderations which we may conceive did move thofe Princes to rcfolve upon following the French Army, and to join battel with it. But that which amongft fuch diverfity of reafons fecms more anfwerable to reafon, is, that the Battel was not occafionedout ofanabfoluterefolutionand refolute advice, buc happened pai t y out of neceffity , both Armies being already drawn very near, and partly upon a refolution taken by the Commanders upon the very place. Buc the Princes of the Leagues trucft intention was to nccefiitate the King of /■r4;»ff, when he fiiould fee fo great a preparation for War to be made againft him, to haften his dtpaiture the more,and to enforce him to draw fb many more of his men from the Kingdom of Naples^ thatfo he might make his pafiage thefurer. And that the Kirgdomnot having fulficicnc Garifons to defend it , might the more cafilyfa'.l into the power of iche i^ragtnejes^ for whom the fame Colleagues were preparing a Fleet by Sea to afTaultit.jNorwasit judged by the example of things formerly part, that the States of Italy were free from the infolencies of the French^ unleft the Princes of Italy (hould either pu; ihemfclvesintoapofture of War, or if they ^ ^ flroulci
(•40
lliojU keep their Forces far diftant from the way whereby the King was ro return for France-Jmceinhii former pxiiigt to the emerptKe oi Naples, though he was more necelfitaced to makehnft,and h.x 1 greater need of making hinifelf Friends more by favor th:n by force, he had notwichftaiding ufed ftrarge novelties in Tufcany, which the /'/c)/-i'«^//»« did • much rcfent. And who could have afcercained that he would not do the 1 ke in his return, in all other parts, where meeting w th no ob- ftacle.hc might meet with opportunity of pleafmg himfelfjor procuring any thing of advantage ^ . .
The Colleigues fcekingro provide fpt* thefe mifchiefs,& rather to flum new incon* vcniencies, th: n endeavor to repair thrir part lofTes, they thought it the beft Courfe that the:rArmy fliotild folbw that of the Kings,fo to keep him m ptrpetual j^aloufie -and iLrpitionyand hinder him if he (hould make any attempt ; hoping U'Kewire,us ihcy had like to havedone, thac-this was the way to make the King come to fomc good agreement with them, which had been often endeavored, and not without hopes of •good fuccefsVcven when the Cam-'ps were very near together. But the Collej^ucs, incited either by the Armies being To near together, by the defire of glory, or hope ot victory-, or perchance being inforc'd fo to do, as it ufually falls out when the Enemies Army is reduced to ftraight paflijges, they fought the Frerch ■ the: Com- . manders of the Leagues Army, we're then to have confidered, that th' y had more reafon tohopc^for vidorie, then to fear lofs in that daies fight, as tieeffcift did : in part prove, it being thecommon opinion, that had not their own men been put intogreat d;fordtr, by their own light-horfe, whofell too foon to pillage the Ene- mies Camp, they would have had a full and glorious viftory. But though the bJ finefs (liould have fucceedcd othcrwife, they knew the ftatc of affairs to be fuch,;^s thevii5loryoi the Kings behalf could not occafiori them thofe great mifchiefs which upon fuch an occafion have been confidered, the Kings Forces not being fo great when moft entire, much lefs being much weaken-J by the conflift, as could prove very formidable. Such like events may teach us no' to attempt fuch th^n^^s jn which it is hard to refolve,and wherein the profit v/hich may accrue is very doubt- ful •, nor to bring our fdves ro fuch a condition,as the necefCty of putting on another rcfolvc, bereaves us of choice. Nor will it be a lefs ufeful precept for Princer to have a great care, and to be very well advifed in chuling their Commanders, w hich are to have the chief imploymcnt in great enterpr.ff s -, for 'f their nature and cuflomsbc not conformable tothe thoughts and intenrionsof the Prince, it is in vantog.vethemany Infirudionsor CommilTions-, for oft-times a rcfoiution is to be put on open the main concern, wherein a mans natural ir,clina;ions may prevail over whatfoeverftridl command which the Commonwealth csi vemce had experi- ence of particularly in this daies fight, in the Marquis of Muntua^ and fome years after with much more danger and damage in Barthohmto d' Alviatie, at the Bar- rel of Ciaradad^-, in both which perfonagcs, natural ardor and too vehement a de- lire of glory, prevailed over the Senates wife and moderate counfeis.
\
Tlie
;The Fifth DISCOURSE,
Whether or no the Farces 6f Lea^nei "he ft for great Eater- prifes.
AMongft thofe things which fall into difcourfe when people talk of weighty State Affairs^ and of War enterprifes, one, and a chief one, is that of Leagues, and Confederacies, in which divers Potentates do joyn, either out of fome particular defign of their own, or for their better fecuritie, or to abate the power of others. And the wcaknefsof Potentates who are wanting in the antient military worth and difcipline, hath been the occafion why wc read of more examples of fuch anions,in ihcfe latter times,thea we have heard of formerly. So as now adaies, as alfo in fome later times pafl, when any great enterprife is debated upon, recoutfe is forthwith had to Leagues, by means and vertue whereof , it is ufually thought, that greater ends may be compaffed, then can be hoped for from the peculiar power and vertue of any one onely State; and chiefly to curb and keep under thofe Forces which do threa- ten whole Chriftcndom with nr.oft danger and damage. Thofe who fpeak in the behalf of thefe Leagues, and who heighten the hopes thereof, ufc thcfeor the like reafons.
Firfl,becaufe reafon,&natures felf doth teach us,that the multiplication of the force and vertue of the movers,makes the motion the greater,and more powerful-,and thac power and perfedlicn which in humane affairs is denied to one alone,is eafily found among fl many. There is hardly any one fo weak, or fo little befriended by the gifts of nature or fortiine, VTho may not be fome help to another, by adding that little wlich he hath to the much more of the others. This is thecaufe why in humane a(flions, and efpeciaily in fuch as arc of the nobler fort, the perfc(flcft are thofe which ate moft compounded: The beft harmonie is corapofed of differ- ing rones of Voyces. The perfedlefl State Governments (alwaies provided thac they be effentialand not meet Idea's) arc thofe which being compofcd of the Three beft, do comprehend the perfeftions of all the Three-, and it iseafie to obfervc the like in many other things. And Jrifiotle, when he would Ihew the pcrfetSH- on which proceeds in everything from this concourfe and union of many, dothin- flance in the example well known in thofe times of publick banquets and entertain, ments, where thofe wherein many wereimployed, fome in one thing, fome in an- other, proved more noble and fumptuous, then thofe which were made by any one ondy, though never fo wealthy Citizen. Let us then gather by this, thac fuch Forces likewife, wherein fcveral Potentates do concur, for fome noble arid important adion, where every one lends his alfiftance and advice, will be fitter to atchieveany great enterprife, then thofe of one onely, though never fo great a Prince.
In War there are feveral Offices, and fevcral imployments, whereunto we fee that one Nition is not fo proper ( be it either by rcafon of the feveral influences of the Heavens,'pr through cuftom which is a fecond nature) as is another : So in this miffery of War, fevcral people prove proper for feveral imployments. Inpitchc Battels, the Dutch and Smt:[ers have exceeded others , and have purchaft moft Ume; The Italians have been alwaies efleemed for making affaults, and ftorming of Cities s and the Spainards are held better then others at defending a ftrong hold, by reafon of their undergoing labor and difquiec, and for their dexteritie in military
atflicns*
(hi)
actions. Others are better ac Horfe-fervice then on foot, asihe French-, othns arc good at Seafai!ng,ar.d ac Maritime Difcipline, as the Genoefes^ Portugefes^ and Vcnetiir/s •, and others have been particularly addicled to other txercifes. So as thofe who are able toimploy fevcral people, and feveral Forces, as Leagues may do, ( efpecially if they be made between pniflant Prmces ) may have great dcfi^'^s; for they fliall have wherewith tooffend, and defend, both by Lund and Sea, and numbers enough of Soldiers, fit to undertake and accomplini uhatfoever Enter- prife. But befides this, many things arc requifite for the maintainir g a long War ; Arms, Ammunition, Viduils, Money, and other things, the which no oneSuie can {ufficiently furnifl-i, at leaft not without much incommodicy, for any long time : but where many joyn together, and every one furnifiheth fomewhac which they moft abonnd in, the enterprife is fure not to be impeded, nor retarded, for wane of any thing^nor for the difficulties which arc occafioned thereby. Moreover, for great enterprifes, as they cannot be fo foon effeded, fo are they fubjedtto the hazard of ill fiiccefs, when they depend upon one cnely Commander, who when he is loft, there is never another of equalaurhority, valor and experience left to ftcceed him ; for there are but few of thofe that are fit for much pains-taking, and for ma- nagement of great affairs. Infomuch as that State is very happy, which in more then one Age meets with a generous and warlike Prince-, and that Prince is very fortunate who when he wiU not follow the Wars in his own perfon, hath a Subjcifl of his fo qualified, as becomes him to be who is to command an Army, when the War is difficult, and of importance-, which is thecaufe why we of:cnti'nes fee gieat enterprifes which are well begun, precipitate into great diforders and ruines.
The death of Alexander the Great, without any legitimate Heirs fit to under- take the Government of fuch an Empire, and of fo weighty affui's, kept the CMacedonians and Grechns ( of which two Nations his v.ilijnr and unccnquercd Army did confift ) from following his profperous courfe, and from conquering the Weft, as hehad done the Eift, and which whilft he was alive, he had propofed to himfelftu do. The Carthaginians chiefeft ruin': arofefrom the wane of Com- manders-, for having placed theit hopes in one ondy Hannthal^ r hey were forced to fend for him back out of Udj ^ to defend themfelves in Africa againft Scif>i$^ ard his fortune forgoing' him, whfin he was beaten they knew not whom to betake themfelves unto, to uphold their tottering Commonwealth. Buc in Leagues there is no fuch hazard runj fincethe beft Commanders that are ii any of theConfL-- dcrate Princes States may be imploied, and the Pr;nces themfelves may ferve upon an urgent occafion; fo as one Commander being loft, another may be fonnd to fuc- ccedhim, of as great excellency and worth. For every State hath iifualiy in all Ages had fome one man more eminent then the reft, unto whom in grea eft ex- tremities they have recourfe. So as a League, if we fuppofe it tobe likca will Fabrickt humane body, may, fince it hath the ftrength of many Dor.inons uni- ted in it, berefcmbled to5ri4r^»*for ftrength-, for ashe had ahurdredhands, to make ufe of as he pleafed in fevcral anions, fo mac.y do lend help to fuch a Le iguc, and make it ftronger and fitter for any undertaking. Mo-eover when we have to do wiihavery powerful Prince, as it falls out in great EnterprTcs, if we will weaken his ftrength, we may endeavor chiefly to keep his forces divided, and im- ploied in fever d parts, for io they are lefTened. and becone lefs apt to make refin- ance-, but as this will be hard for a finale Prncetodo, ihouL;ha great one, for he who will drive another man from his own home muTt be mixh ftronger then he-, fo is it move eafily done when many arc confedrates togetl-er, and thi^ not oneiy becaufe feveral forces joyned together, prove the greater f, aUuthbeen faid) and ftveral Armies abounding with all things neceffjiy may be thereov t fram-'d, but for
V 2 ih;
(1+8)
the commo'ioiifncfb which fcvcral confederate States have, of aflaulting the Ene* miesCounry, ar one and the fame time, in fevcral parts. Wherefore when any grejt and d.iliculttnterprife was to be undertaken (not tofpcakot antient times) i)i!t ot more modren ones, againft the Saracens^ani the Tujks^two Nations,which have goveinedand dominetredin thcfe latrer times with great fame and force , recoujfe was had t) Leagues, to Crujadoj^ and to the unions of ChrifUan Piinccs, by m.ani whereof njtible thiigs liave been done againft thjfc cruel Baiba- lians.
How many Prince?, how msny ftveral Nations jo'n'd together in the time of Pop.- Urb^in the Second, for th; lecoveiy of the Holy Land < About f ifcy thou- fand fighting men w.reraifed, commanded in chief by Godfrcf oi Sullen^ who ganedlomany a -.d fo famous Vi(f^orics, and fo worthy of ctcinai glory j this holy Le.igu'? having regained more then a hundred Ctics in ^//4, which were poffeft by the Saracens. And in the t me of taldrvin the Third, King o^ ^-erHfdUm, wh.n thtEmperoi: C enradfis 2nd Lodorvick King of France, joining together with other Itder Princes, wcntihemftlves in perfon againft the faid Saraceas, did not they do excellent explo ts, ihoigh couzened and be rayed by fome Lords of c^)*-', they could not con.inue on their entcrprife with likefucctfsasat thefirft. And hath not this laft A^e fecn one of the moft fignal and illuftrious Naval v.dories that wa> tvet heard of:" which was the fight at Lepantg, which was won from the Turks by the League of the Chriftian Princes. But let us add fomewhat more in parfuic of our former coniideruions. Great; ft entcrprife s, though happily begun, are oft- t mcs left imperfc<5l,when they depend upon theForces of one only Prince 5 for the reft of his neighboring Princes, either out of envy, oi fear of his greater profpcrity, take up Ai ms againft him to make him give over the hopes of further acquifitions, and beth nk himfelf of defending his home-affairs • and to keep the fcales more tqual between hi.n and his neighbors, and to take away the jealoufies of State, which are of all other things moft dangerous , and whereof we have infinite examples. But when a weighty War is to be undertaken by the Forces of many Joint- Potentates, this fufpiiion ceafcs i for Leagues are ufually made with othec Princes md neigl.boiing States, or with fuch as are concern'd in common intcreft. And this Arni'.y or Con ederacic doth rot only fecurc thofe States with u hom the Confideracieiscontra(ffed, fo as the one fears not the other; but it prefcrves each of them from the injiries that any may go about to do to any of the Confederates. For one State fuppoiting another by leafon of their convention, things are fo well and ftoutly governed, as People not bc.ng able to worft them, keep from molefting th. m, knowing that by offending any one Confederate, they ftiall draw upon them the Forces of ^ll tlie reft, and haften their own ruine. Every one of thefe Princes inay then by reafon of their ftrait conjunftion and confederacic with others, more boldly and more refolutely undertake and accomplifti any whatfoever entcrpnfe, without danger of being c'ivuted by sny particular inteicft of his own. And all thefe Confidcrat.ons are better confirm'd by many notable examples. Greece was af- fjultcd by Xerxes^ that powerful Prince of Perfia^ with an infinite number of men both by Sea and Land ^ almoft all the feveral People of that Province, u;u;ed and tonfeder.t d together againft this fo great a warlike power: And fuch was the tihc icic of this un on, as that though one only Greece was to vviihftand the Forces of ahr.off all the Eaftern Nations who were flockd together to that enterprife, but ftilliinder the Imperial command andcondud of one and the fame King Xerxes, they d.d r.ot only make their part good, but repulfed fo piiifiant an Enemy, much to his own prejudice
The allod.te War which happ.ncd in the time of Marius and Sy/Ia^ wherein rcany AfTociatcs and Confcdetates ot the Rmans did con'pirc together againft the
Common-
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Commonweilch of Rome, though the Confederates were all of them but weak people, :is the Maruce»i^ Veflini^ Samnites^ LticAns^ and other of their neighbors, yet was this War held one ot tht moft dangerous that the people of Rome did ever fuftain: For thele people luJ jolo'dthemftlves together with much fervor, to re- venge thcmfelvesof the Roman Nobility, who had fiift promifed them, and then denied them the lib, rty of being Cit zens of Rome. And in thel'e brer Ages, whole Gennsttf liaving confederated together againft the Emperor Cbxrls the Fifth, was able to raife fo numerous an Army, though all the German Prir ces did not concur therein, as did much perplex and endanger Charts. Which examples prove what many Forces, though weaker being taken apart, can do v^hen join'd together, againft one potent Prince. Thefe then may feem fufficient reafons and examples to ground a favorable condufion in the behalf of Leagues, and to make them be held a ftrong and powerful means to order great entcrprifcs by, and to bring them to a good end.
Yet there be many rood Confiderations which may be alleadged on the conrrary part-, foashe who fixiU mind realities, andnot what the maeniticencie of name or preparations do promife, will doubt much whether thefe Leagues and Confede- racies do really prove what they appear to be. It is moft certain, that as the trucft perfcdion confifts in union, and that \^hat^oever will partake of that, muft be reduced to this -, fo may all our humane anions prove the more fuccefsful and per- feft, the more reducible they are to this unity •, and if it happen to fome fomctimes otherivifc, it isbecsufe thofc foineare not capable thereof either of thcmfelves, or becaufe their cor. upted cuftoms nil! not fufFer them fotobe: But it is not to be denied, but that in all humane adlions, chiefly fuch wherein great affairs are con- cern'd, and more chiefly in mutcrs of War, after mature advice t^.ken. fudden exe- cution is rcqu fite •, and th:it itisncceflary toreduce all things as uiuch as maybe to this unity : So as the foveraign authority confift in one only, and not in many 5 for the multiplicity of thole that concur (efpecially by way of p riiy ) in the fame a^ion, doth not help, but rather diforder and confound. Then look how much harder it is to reduce things to an unity in a League, the lefs -zallant do they prove, andlefsfitforprofecujon of great affairs: For they contain, and almoft naturally, fuch contrarieties, as muft occafion the fudden corruption thereof. Several are the thoughts of fevcral men, the cuftoms of Nations d.fferent, and ( which in this cafe is of moft importance) thecounfels and refolutions by which confederate Princes govern themfclves, do not only differ, but are for the moft part contrary, according as State-jealoufies are apt to breed occafion of falling out. The powerful dciire after Rule never fuffers right to be known, nor people to be therewith contented ; It is therefore to be obferved, that in all Ages the greateft and moft fignal aftions in War have been done and accomplidi'd by the worth and profperity of one only Prince, or at leaft of one fole Potentate, w ith a feries of divas Piinces and Captains who have commanded therein. K^lexander the Great, the • "ommonwealth of Eeme^ C^.^r/j the Great, and in thefe latter timci the Ottoman Empire-, not to mention manyothtrs who have been great andpotenr, though not altogether fo highly cry'd up, did all of them arife to that height of glory and power bv the power and worth of one only Command, with the true and proper m.litary difcipline ofeachof them, nnd under the condud of one and tl-e fame Principality. On the contrary. Leagues (hew their weakncfs at the very firft fight: For company and multipl city denotes always imrerfciff ion, and in this particular makes it be known, that thofe things wh ch a Prince or a Commonwealth cannot by rcafon of their weakncfs do of themfclves, and by their own Forces, they feek to effect ic by the company ;;nd help cf others. Wherefore (as it hath been laid) in this rcfpe(ft Leagues have been more frequently ufcd in thefe latter Ages, then of o'.d : r or
many
manv Princes and States are failing in military worth and courage, and nctablc of tbcmfelvesto do a; y notable aftiorf-, foas one Nation, or ore Prince not being able to overcome another and all of them wanting the ekcdlencic of good Or- dir<, he who luuh at any time endeavored to advance himfelf by fo nedeligrt, hath been forced to h.verccoiufc to the advantage of Leagues -,' of which ItMy^ fince by rcafon of the declination of tliC Weftern Empire, fkt hath been divided into fo many membeis, and Sciqnorits, hath in particular afforded many examples, which may ferve to teach whatfocver belongs to thcfe Leagues ; whereof wc do not read •of aiy great s^ood tffeft which hath enfued at laft, or at lead which have continued long in thJr firft profperity •, for their Forces, though powerful enougVi of them- felves, when met withal by contrary refpeds, and weaned in their fiifl attempts, have foon gone but lamely off. A nd he who (hall well confidtr fuch particulars as- are mod necefTary in great undertakings, willeafily fee how badly they do corre-| fpond in Leagues. I Jeliberations would be wife and mature, but not flo^^.and un--' feafon.ible -, execution would be fpeedy and bold-, counfJs are o t-ti Ties to be liken upon unexpe^ed accidents^ the end of all ought to be one and the fame, though the Offices, Degrees, and Authorities be diffeienc •, the refpeft .-?ndaim one and defame, wheieunto all refolutions do tend-, towit, thefatety,t,loryand the greatnefs of that Prince or Staie, for whom the W:ir is made-, the reward and hoJ nor one and the fame, and alike th; lofsand (hame, fo as the pbflibility^p^ have- ing means to lay the fault on another , do not retard the doing oF wh« is"
fitting. ^ J
Thefe are things which have alwaies been hard, artd rare to be fouM-J/.ye't they may the more eafily be met withal in an enterprife which is undtrr :!!:eii by one one- ly wife f->rince, or by one well governed Commonwealth 5 Bni m Lejj^aes all ihi.-gs run counter byafs to thefe important affairs. It is not alwaies renei ofitic, but f(ar which makes a Prince take up Arms, which likewife makes o.iicrs j jyn uith fnm, \^ ho other Aife do much differ from him in dcfires,and interefl : but thacbranc be.n? over, and every one bein^ in their former particular, and more natural con- dido'ni he who dreads War bends to idlenefs, and willingly takes all occafions to change V,':ir for Peace t, and he who was become a friend by reafon of fome con- tin'encie. n 31: out of any good will, difcovering his real affedion Upon fomeocher occafi-m^ or by reafon of fome change, returns to be not onely as formerly^ an Eivcn-ty, but more nveterate then before-, fo as thefe Ties of Common interefls hein", ibon loofcncd cither by particular intereft, or by fome other affeftion, hatred, confufion, and diforder doth thereupon enfue.
The Moralifts fay, That friendfliip cannot long continue between thofe vi-here one and tie fame thing isnotinteichangcably given and received; and that there- fore true fr.endfliip is onely found, where the end is not ihat which is advantag ous or delightlul (becaufe equal correfpondencie is notufually there) but what is honeft, which alwaies is, and docs ftill continue the fame on all behalfs. In the Fricndrhipor Leagues of Princes, every one hath his own conven encie, and par- ficul .r ben', fit fur his aimed at end, and then the like of others onely fo f;u-, as by accideiiL it m*^ fquare with his. But it commonly falls our, that what makes for onr,nHkesaganft another-, foasthe fame things cannot pleafeall: wherefore a thoufand accidents doeaifiy caufe diverfity of opinions, contentions and breaches, l"o as hntdly any League hath been able to preferve it felf any long time. It is slfo ufually feen that no man minds what is recommended to the care of many-, and therefore in Leagues, which are faftned together but with weak Tics, whilft one doth either tpjft upon anothers provifions, or is ill latisfied with others omiffions, men neg'ed their own duties, and fludy m.ore to pick a hole in anothers coat, thetj to mind his own bufiacfs. The ignominy which may infue upon fuch defaults, and
the
ihelofs of reputation, which ufe to be great iqjitements to a noble mind, aretioc fo much valued in things which are undertaken and negotiated by many together, becaufc the way lies fair to cxcufe ones felf, by laying the fault uponanother, or ac Icaft the fault is Icflened by others being fharcrs therein.
Thus that common benefit, which is fo magnified and cried up, aqd which ought to be their oncly objed, is found ondy in a certain fancied Idea, and in a foteatU remtta^ or io a vain and ufelefs appearance, whilfl none endeavor to re- duce it to its true, effential, and perfeft being , by laying afide their own proper and peculiar advantage, and by direfting his a(flions to the common good of his Colleagues. So as he who (hall duly confidcr what the firft intention is of making a League, and with what degrees it is proceeded in afterwards, and to what ends ic is direded, will by many evident examples find it quickly fo transformed,3S though it meet not with any external forces, it cafily diflblves and moulders away of ic felf. Leagues made by Cbriflians againfl theTurks have oft-times in particular met with thefe impediments and difficulties •, the League between Pope Alexa»dsr the Sixt, and the three mofl powerful Kingdoms of Europe^ the Kingdoms of Spain, Fance^ and Portugal, and the Commonwealth of Venice^ was ftipulated with great hopes and noble intentions 5 the Venetian and French Fleet came into the Archipelago^ where they had fome profperous fuccefs 5 but the forces of the other Colleagues were in vain expefted the firft year, and it ended the fccond year before it had fully effefted any thing, by rcafon of the difcords which arofe between the Crowns of France and Spain, which were occafioned by the divifion of liAples^ foas thefe Princes turned their Arms each upon other, which were intended againft the Infidels. The league made between Pope F4«/che Thrid, the Emptror Charls the Fift, and the Commonwealth of Ftnice, againft Sultan Selimjn^ likewife ended almoft as foon as it was begun ^ and it is too well known, as being of rpfcent me- mory, what occafions of vidlorics were thereby loft, and out of what relpecfls. But what greater thing could be expedled from any League, then from that which God bleft with the famous vidtory at the Cur:{olari Iflands^Yet how flight a matter was able to retard the glorious atchievemcuts which were with reafon to be ex- peded from thence, when a flight fufpition of the Spainards, that the States of Flanders might be molefted by the Frendh^ by reafon of the going of the t uke of JiUn[en, the Kings Brother towards thofe parts, was fufiicienc to k>cep back the Fleet which was deftined for fo great affair in the Levant, and to make the bcft fea^ fonof ihe{yearpafs over without any advantage ; whereupon all other things .'ell into great diforders,and the League was quickly terminated, Neither can this natural motion of Leagues be fo ftopt by any means or endeavors, as that all the Col- leagues may have the fame intentions in prcfcrving it.
What greater rcafon can one Prince have to promife unto himfelf the continu- ance of f riendfhipj and fidelity from another , then had the Commonwealth of f r*/V* to expcdt, firft, firora X-w/i chc Twelfth, and then from /■r4«c*< the Firft, both of them Kirgs of France < Since to keep from any waits violating the fri^nd- fliip and conjundion, which (he held with the former •, (he drew upon her the Yon- ces of (j^faximi It an the Emperor, and expofed her State to fo much labor, atwl danger 5 and did fo long maintain a gtcatparc of the expencc of a weighty War, firft, to free the Seconds own perfon from Prifon, and then his Sons •, yet (asu- fually affeflion prevails more in the minds of Princes, then common reaf.m, or juftice by which private perfons govern themfelvcs) Z,fww, breaking off his anti- ent Capitulation, which he held with the Commonwealth, was a great means to make all the Princes o{ Europe confpire againft her-, and Francis, as foon as he had made what advantage he could by the agreement, laying aiide all othftrre- Ipefls, made peace for nimfelf alone with the Emperor, leaving the Common-
weaUk
('50
wtalth expofedto great toil anJ ganger oi VV'ar. So as when any ftedfaftncfs is found in any Colleague, all that is to bcfaid,i5, That as he that doth obterveic defervestobepraifcd for his (idelitie, fohe thac doth rely too mu:h thereupon, is nottobc muchcommcnJed for evil wifdom. But it may be moieo/er confi- dercd, that many times the Colleagues begin to fqu ire but badly in the very be- ginnini^ of their agreement, which tends much to the prejudice of the comnon mteitft. Whilft the laft League againft Selintts the Turkilh Emperor was in irejty, and when it was fo high time to relieve Cjfrm^ it was long and importunare'y argu- ed in Rome, where they were firft to imploy the Forces of the Leagu? •, and for.ie of the Spanilh Mnifters were fo blinded with their particular incereft, as they pro- pounded and ftifly maintain'd it to the very great prejudice andlofsof time, that as foDP as the Lea^'ue (liould be fully agreed upon, the Forces thereof fliould mirch to ihe Sea-coafts of Africa^ to rake in fuch places as they thought might make mo!l for the advantage of Sfain •, not weighing that whi'ft they (liould leave their Ene- mies powtrtul, with the Fleet fafe and entire in the Levant^ it was very vainly done to ihink of getting fuch things, which though they ihould fucceed well, muft he to nopurpofe, and muft qu'ckly prove unfortunate, as experience (hewed afterwards, and which reafon could not perfwade before.
But if thefe peculiar refpeds be at firft concealed, they break forth in the procc(s of tim.% and work fomctime worfer effefts in fuch of the Colleagues as are either Wf akeft, or do confide moft in the Confederacie. Ferdinand King of Spain^ though falling off from the other Colleagues, he joined with great offers and protefhtions ■with the Commonwealth of Venice -, yet when the Ciiy oi Brefcia was recovered , he would keepitforhimfdf, and appropriate the firft fiuit of vi(flory toh.mfclf, which by the former, and by renewed capitulations was deftin'd to others. I^ope Clement the Seventh, the Commonwealth of Fenice, and the Duke or Milan joiri'd together in League againft C^/^r- but their ends were, ifnot apparently contrary, at leaft intrinfecally differcn'. The King of France defired by all me:uis to free the Crown of France from fome prejudice which he had done it by the former agree- ment with C<efar^ and to fct his Sons at liberty, who were left with him in nature of Hoftages : But on the contrary, the other Confederates chief enaeavour was, to take the Dukedom of Nibn from C^far^ and to iecurc July from his power. The enterprife was begun with profperous fucccfs, tie Italian Princes doing readily what became them ^ but the King of France, when he knew how to ohrain his ends by another way, and began to fufpeft the Colleagues conftancie, did ncicfier make War on the other fi Je the Mountains, nor did he fend his Forces into Italy, as he was bound to do : W hereupon the League wh ch was made with great preparation, >vith good beginning, and better hope;, ended in an agreement, wh ch wa< volun- tary and advantagioijs on the Kings behalf by the recovery of his Children, but inforced,and not over-fecure on the behalf of the other Colleagucs,who fell Ihort of th' ir conceived hopcf,being abandoned by their Friend and Confederate,the King.
To know then the truth amidft.thisd.verfityof reafons and examples, we muft diftinguifli and confider apart for what occafions, and with what refpeds every League is made, what the end therein propofed is, and upon what termsand con- ditirns it is concluded ^ for by thefe particulars we may the better know what good or^ad may be expe(5led by joyning together in League, and whether the- League be likely to be of fhort, or of long duration. Sometimes Leaguts arc made ty Princes or Popularities out of ncceflary defence, and to provide opportunely for their on nfafeties-, the Confederates obliging themfclves by particular and ftated obligations to defend each others State, when ibcy (liall be aftJiulted by any others from without: And fuch Leagues as thefe have proved profitib'e, as harin^^ rc- fped to the prefervation of Peace^ and to a cercan and honeft ead •, and wl.iU't no- thins
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thing but thecotniron intcreft is treated of, fo as they have a'l the fame o!>jcd:, as well in maintaining , as in makingthc Confedef^cie, The Confcdtr cie made be» twcen the Pope, the K ng of NtfUs^ the Commonwealth ot Flor<n(e. the Duke ofAtiUtt, and other lelTer Italian Princes, did long prefcrve the Peace of 7/4/7, and wasforawhileveryadvantagious for the Colleagues-, for the only drift thereof was to conftitute fome afTured bounds to every of their powers, and to fettle them in a juft temperature, making the Confederates thereby tlie ftronger and more able to withftand any one that (hould attempt any thing againft them. Sometimes a- gain Leagues arc made for more necefTary felf-defcnce, and which muft fudJenly be aftuated ; to wit, when a State is aflaulted by one more powerful, and that the neighboring Princes, left themfelves might fuffer if they (hould permit a neighbor- ing power to grow too great by the ruine of that State, do take up Arms jointly for the defence thereof, in whofe defence they know their o«n fafeties are concerned, fincc they might foon incur the like danger, if they (hould not keep him at a further diftance from the others home. , And fuch a Leaoue may :i\Co at firft do gallant and memorable things, if it fo fall out that the condition of affairs being a'tered in the fame League, and the Colleagues intercfts becoming different, they will ad vince further with thofe Forccs,and with more full intentions to ruinc that Foe- Potentate, and take occafion by joining in League to increafein State and power. When thefe refpedfs. and their contraries already han-" led are confidered, th-fe Leagues do ufually lofe all their cfficacie, fince they fail in their chiefeft and furcft ground- work, when the trueftconjun(5tioD fails, which is that of Princes minds, thoughts and defigns, whence conformable anions, and fqchas are of great efficacic and worth do arife.
Almoft all the People of nreeee join'd together to defend themfelves againft Xerxes his Forces, a mighty King of Perjf*^ who came to alTault them with an innumerable Army ; and they got that famous Vi<^ory by Sea at SaUmis^ which furn'fh d them at the fame time with profperous fuccefles at Land, where they put the fame King to flight : And Greece wis prefcrved at that time by vertue of thic League fi:om fo great a danger, againft which it appeared almoft impofTible that fhc could defend herfelf. So likewile in thefe latter ti.nes, the Pope, and Philip King of Spain join'd with the Commonweal: h of f^eftice in defence of the Kingdom of Cyprus- J ( to whom that Kingdom, as part of her Territories, did chiefly belong ) when it was afTauIted by powerful Turkifh Forces-, and having put together a powerful and numerous Navy, they bore away that famous and fingular Vi(ftory, which will be celebrated in all Ages -, the Turkilh Forces were routed and fluttered at Sea, and their honor and courage lefTened ; But when all this was done, 'v hat other thing did the vidorious Gr*(r/4;i/,anfwcrable to the hop s which were expeded from that thtir fo grear Viftory, the whole fruit whereof at their leuin ho:ne ended in the dividing of the booty •! So alfo the Chriftian League by isca, did n^t only fpend the reft of that Autumn, a fit time for any enterprife which they could have undertaken, after the honor they had won in the aforcfiid Vidory, in dividing the prey, and in other matters of fmall moment, but alfo fpent all the next en:un » Spring and Summer idly, without being able fo much as to keep together, fo to keep the Enemy from recruiting, to the great, notable, and woful example of what we are now in treaty of, and to fhew that the Forces of Leagues are v\ cak, though made between potent Princes. The purchafe which is got, or which is hoped for, cannot be fo equally divided and agreed upon, but that'fome of if e Confederate Princes will happen to have a greater iharc then the reft •, and every incrcafe, b.-lc ne'rfo little, doih eafily caufe jealoufie, or at leaft envy in the reft. Almoft all the Potentates of Europe convcnedtogethcr in the famous League of Camhrsy agamft the Commonwealth oi Venice^ allured by the hopes of being able to divide hi
X loble,
noble, rich, and flourirtiing State, which was fo much a more prevailing objeft irt the minds of the confederate Princes to makeihem endeavor by their joynt Forces to fuppreis the Commonwealth, and bereave her of all her riches. But as foon as the Colleaoms fii ft defign began todifcover thcmfelves, and begot jealoufies^d fuf- piiion amongft them, infoiruch, as the very fame Princes who had confpired to- gether to ruine the Commonwealth, did foon affift and fuccor her, being become bitterer Enemies one to another, and amongft thcmfelves ( each others greatnefs becoming formidable and hateful to their companions) then they had been before out of the famereafontother<r«(?/M»;, againft whom they had joyntly taken up
Arms. • r J
It was not hard, though not very reafonable, fov Lodervick K\ngot France, and rerdittand Kin^ of spai/j. being blinded with the fame defire of tnlarging iheu: Territories , to joyn together in driving the ArageniAns from out the Kingdom oi Naples, but afterwards they did aseafily difagree, touching the/^ividing of what they had got 5 So as the League might help to bereave others ot that Kingdom, but other Forces were requifite for the appropriation of it to ones felf,an'.Uhereunto the proper and peculiar vertueof the Militia, and of good counfel was likewife required. Leagues ufelikewife to prove advantageous when many Potentates take up Arms againft one new Prince , who is yet but weak , and not well fctled in his State-, as was feen by the example of the League made by the Princes of Italy , againft the ScaSigers , and certain other petty Lords or Tyrants •, for Leagues being of fome validity in their beginning, and not meeting with any ftout: refiftance, may at the very fitft effort have ruined the Enenj^ againft whomfuch Leagues were made, but when they have to do with a Potentate of efleem, though he be inferior of himfelf, to the power of the Colleagues, they have not produced any great efieds ^ as may be known by divers confeder icies made by the Princes of italj, againft the Commonwealth of Venice-^ againft which, as being become formidable toxhemall, though all Italy hzxh more then once taken up Arms, yet (he hath been able to defend herfelf agair ft fuch forces ; forthefirft Efforts being withftood, the reft proved lefs difficult, by rcafon of the ufual weaknefs which Leagues are foon reduced unto. And it might have fucceed- ed fo with her likewife, in the times of greater danger in the Leagues of CamBraj^ had not AlvUno with his unfeafonable refolution , of immaturely hriftning on the the Battel, drawn that ruin upon the Commonwealth, which (lie might eafily haveefcapedby temporifing, andthe League have been difTolved thereupon, asic was not long after.
Now byreafluming all thefe confiderations, thefe general and true Conclufioni may be thereout afferted 5 that Leagues may prove beneficial, either when they aim (imply at defence, and at the maintaining of Peace, by thereputidonof fuch an union •, or when one that is not able to defend himfelf by his own particular Forces, is aftually aflaulted by one that is more powerful then he, and whom he is not able to refift of himfelf. For if no other good be got by fUch union?, yet the bufinefsis fpunoutthe longer, and there may be away found out to deviate imminent ruine, by diverfion. But he who will confide too much upon fuch U- nions, or be lefs diligent in negotiating thofe Affairs which of himfelf he is not able to do, will foon finde he is deceived •, nay if he be not the more cautious, and circumfped, he may become a prey as well to him who appears to be his friend, as to his formally declared enemies. Whence it is inferr'd that to make Leagues out of a mterand voluntary eledion of increafing Territories, is very uncertain, and falacious, yet may prove good if many who be ftrong and powerful joyn againft one that is weak-, but at laft the fire is greaer which breaks out amongft the Col- leagues thcmfelves, then that which they carried home to another mans houfe. Bur
that
tlwt ii Statt which is already grown great and powerful, mjy be oppreftfay the "ftrcBgth of Leagues, unlefs it begin firft to totter by rcafon of its internal difordcrs, from whit tht experience of fo many paft paflages teachcth , and from reafon which is corroborated by cuftom , is a thing which no man ought to proraife to himfelf , unlefs he dchght in flattering himfelf with vain and prejudical hopes.
There remains yet forae things to be ftated which have formerly been alleadged in the behalf of Leagues, left they may get more credit amcngft men then they deferve. To that then which was faid. That the multiplicity of the movers, make the greater motion, and things are better done by many, efpecially things of the higheff nature, then by reafon of the imperfcdion and weakntfs of our humani- ty, can be effefted by a few , it may be anfwered •, That it is true, that the aflift- anceof many is requifite to the affeding of great things; but it is jJfo as true, that for the right carrying on of affairs, itisrequifite thatthefecondcaufes (to fpcak in terms of natural Philofophie) fhould be fubordinate to the fiifl, as is feenin the Order and Government of the world ; So doubtlcfly no great enterprifes can be efFedcd without Armies, Commanders,and a thoufand other necsffaries ; but by how much the more all thefe are conffituted under the power of one alone, by which their order and union is the greater, the work they take in hand will prt)ve i'o much the more excellent and perfeft. A Prince, though finele in what he goes about, is not forbidden the making ufe of Soldiers of fcveral Nations in '.is Militia, to the end that he may have an Aimy ( as hath been faid ) fitter for any miutary adion, in bufineffes which are at once undertaken againft fcvaral States, fo as all of them be to be underflood as Enemies, though they be not confederates •, but the truefV and fecureft rule in this cafe would be, to be fo careful and diligent in training up, and in difciplining a Prince his own Militia, as that he may be able to provide for alladionsof War, out of men of his own Dominions, as we fee thofe have done who have done the moft glorious. a<^ion$. The fame may be faid of other things belonging to War, for w hich a wife Prince ought fo to provide, as that he may rely upon himfelf, and not upon the friendfbip of others. As for the alTertion, that Leagues do abound in Chieftains fit to command Armies 5 this proves not aUvaics true by reafon of the fcarcity of excellent men which hath been found in all Ages ; or fay that fuchbe to be found amongfl confederate Princes, they ufe to caufe more of difcord and contention, by reafon that every one pretends to have the fapreme command, and chicfefl honor in the Militia 5 and more of preiuiice to the Leagues, then of profit or advantage. And if it be found that fone Leagues have cffeded great matters, it hath happened ( though but fcldom) whe'c the par- ticular refpefts which we have mentioned, have concurr'd. But in the fore- named unions made by Chriflians againfl Infidels, no good reafons can be given which c'o futewell with the bufinefs now in hand, if we fpeak of Leagues according to the ordinary acception of reafon of State-, for fuch Princes or People as wcrefigncd with the Crtciata hadall ofthem but oneonely refped and affe(5lion, whxh was more prevalent with them then any other, ro wit, their zeal to religion •, therefore their Forces not being onely kept together by that fo powerful bond, but even their fouls, more heavenly then humane rewards being propofed to them, they might work miraculous efieds: though they could nor,cven in this cafe, alto^^ethtr fhun thofe difordcrs which arecaufcd by the aflbciation of fo many^ and liy the mul- tiplicity of fovereign Lords, and of Nations, The fame may be faid of ether Unions, ss of thofe that did alfociate the Remans^ and of the Hans Tow ns of Gcr- m*nj-^ for amongfl thefe certain particular re fpc(fls did concur, which were cooi- mon totiicmall, no refpedls of States concerning differing interefls, and other things, which have been confidered in Unions \^hich do truly and ufually bear
X X th«
this name of Leagues: For when, thoui»h againft Infidels, any enecrprifcs ha^rc been attempted by Leagues, out of other rcafons, and other humane refpcds concurring more principally therein , what fuccefs they have had, and how dif- ferent, though ufual to Leagues, may plainly be known by other examples already fpoken of.
The Sixth discourse;
Why modern frinces have not don* aBiont eqnal to thofe which tpere done by the Antients.
^ Here arc fome, who praifing only theaiftions of antient times, do equally blame all modern deportments, and hold them in little or no account ; as if the way were block'd up to thofe who are born in our days, to keep them from arriving at any height ot glory. Others on the contrary labor to heap our prefent Age with all manner of praife, and to compare it to the moft celebrated and moft cry'd up former times ; affirming that the snticnt worth is fprung up again in thefc our days, and in our now modern mtn, which come no: (hortof, nor differ from the former times or men, fave in the veneration which is given to Antiquity. They celebrate the ingenuity of modern men , for the cxcellencie and perfeftion unto which they have brought many noble Arts and Sciences, which were obfcured and of no cfteem informer times 5 parti- cularly th.it of the Militia. In which refpeft, by the fo many new-found ways of Fortification, and expugning ftrong Holds by their Engines, and by other very miraculoDS Inventions, it appears that the induftryof Modern men hath not only equall'd, but in many things much exceeded that of the Antients •, and that the glory (?f many excellent ProfefTors of the mofl efteemed Arcs fhines cleerer in the prefent Age, for that they have not only fufHciently improved that of the Militia, but alfo Architedlurc, Painting, Sculpture, and other noble Arts and Difciplines, which are adornments to Civil life, and have drawn them out of obfcurity wherein they were hidden for a while.
I do not differ fo much from the opinion of thefe men -, nor do I think that other mens adtions ought to be fo much heightned, as that through a foolifh modefty or ignorance we fhould undervalue our own, when they deferve praife. But as for Mili- tary adions, v^hich as they are the moft perfpicuous to the eyes of all men, fo are they mcft commended, or blamed by the univerfality of men-, when I call to mind the warlike aftions done by the Antients, and thofe done by our Modern men, me- thinVs that thofe do fo far exceed thefe, as ihcy can hardly admit of any comparifon \ though thefe latter Ages, as they have produced more excellent Wits in other DifcipUr.es, fo alfo may they glory in the valor and generoficy of fome Princes, no Icfs great in worth then in Forces. But that which peradventnre affords no lefs caufe of wonder, and which affords particular matter for this difcourfe, is to confider whence it is that modern Princes, though fome of them have been generoufl/ m nded, and of much experience and worth in military affairs, of great polfcfTions, and flrong in power, yet have they not been able to bring to pafs fuch cnterprifcs, as for thc:r\\ eighty confideration, for the flionnefs of time, or for thecafinefs therewith they were done, can walk hand in hand with thofe of the Antients; amcngfl whom we fee one only Alexander, one Pom^tj^ one C^far to have fhbju-
gacc4
gated many entire Provinces,and conquered many Nations. And not to go furthet in fearch of the like examples, fince one Age alone, very neer this of (Jurs, can eafil/ furnidius with them: Were not the Emperor charls the Fifth, Francis the Firft King of /"Mw^ and (ifwillpafs by the errors of Religion) Sultan Soljmi» Em- peror of the Turks, Princes great, and valiant in all acceptations ^ io who n fo many endowments both of Nature and Fortune did concur, as hardly any thing rematnd to be defired in any of them,to make and conftitute a potent Prince, and an excellent Commander, fit to undertake any aiSion, bow great or difficult foever, What was it that Charls with his undaunted and dreadlefs fpirit did not undcrtaki ^ Who was ever known to be more ambitious of praife and, military honor then Francis , iicvcr weary, nor fatisfied with toiling in Arms, and in leading Armies < Solyman was fo feivently bent upon purchafing glory in the Wajs, as his age, though very great, was not able to affwagc it •, forhedycd in the Field amongft Soldiers, when he was eighty four years old. Thefe great Princes were fo puiflanc, and (o i eirta k- able for the number ot Soldiers which they led to Battel, for military Dilcipline, and for all that belonged to War, asiheir Age had no caufc to wonder at, nor to (c-.avf any preceding times, which Fcre famoufeft for fuch affairs. Yet he who ih.ill par- ticularly examine their a<5tions, will find they come far fhort of the famous ads of the AntientSj and that they correfpond not with the fame and opinion of lach Princcs,and of fuch Forces, f or if we we fliall confidcr the deeds of thofc few afore- faid, not to mention fo many others, what, and how many were the tiJu^iS done by jiUxander the Great, who having in fo fhort time vanquifh'd the powerful Perfian Empire, vidorioufly overran the whole Eaft, and made the terror of his weapons known to People almoft unknown till then, and yet d.ed whilft he was very young <*. How many Cities and Provinces did Pomfey and Cafar bring under the Roman Empire^ The firft conquered and fubjugated Pentui^ Armenia^ Cippadocta, Media^ Hiberia^ Syria^ CylictA^ CMefofotamU^ Arabia, &x\&^nd£A-^ things v. hch:!;ough done, feem incredible : And the other, though he did not overrun io great a ipacd of Land, did no lefs admired things, if we will regarJ the condition' of the con- quered •, He quill'd the warlike Swit^ers^ French^ and Dutch ^ and mid. fo man/ and io fortunate expeditions, as by his means only above eight hundred Cities were brought under the Goverment of Rome.
W hat can be alleadged on the behalf of thefe modern Princes, which may com- pare with thefe for military glory i chads the Emperor led fundry times puifTanc Armies upon feveral undertakings-, but what was the fruit that i.e reaped nyhis mod famous Expeditions "t The greateft and mod vitftorious Army which he ever put together, was that wherewith he withflood Solymaa^ when became to aflaulc y.aflria ; yet he never departed with it from before the walls ot vicnfta ^ io as all the Trophy of Viftory which he got there for fomuch expence and labor, was only not being overcorrie •, for his Army never faw the Enemies face. The Wars oiGetmanjwQXc very difficult in this behalf ^ yet thcicin he contended notwi.h any Prmce, whofe Forces were of themfelves equal to his-, nor were they made out of elcdion, or hope of glory by new acquirements, but cut of necefTuy, and foe the defence as well of his own pcrfon, as of the Ennpire •, and all the good h: goc thereby, was only thercftoring the affairs of the Ciownto the former condition, fo as the Empires authoti y might not be lelTened.
Tlie Wars made fo 'ong between Charls the Emperor, and Francis King of France, with no lefs hatred then force, did oftentimes weary both th-ir Armies ^ but though Crf/"-.r had feveral times the better, yetatlaftthe ^^owtioi France \\2% notdimin (lie ;, .'.orthegreainefsof Charls his command made any whit the lar^er. foas he was maftcrof fo many, and lb ample States rather by his right of inhere tance,then by means of War-, th: enterprilcs of Tunis and Algier in ^fnca^
miah*
(1+8)
• greater appearance of generofity, the bufinefs being very difficulCj
ith great courage, and much danger, and wherein the glory ap-
c then the advantage-, yet the unhappy fuccefs of the one, did
,.' honor and praife won by the other ^ andthcfe undertakings did
^-uce no greater effcfts then the acquifition of one or two Cities, and
.' . one of the chiefeft of Africa: whereas one one\y Scipio Cuhdixtd Cartba^e^
v.e Head ot fo great an Empire, and brought all thofc Regions under the Reman
Eagles. *"
The Ads done by Soljman were fomewhat greater then thefe, but not to be compared to thofe of old •, nor perad venture will they appear to be very famous, if wc (hall confider his power, and the long time that he lived Emperor. He con- fumed much time, and many men in HangarU^ making many expeditions againft it,and yet got but one part thereof, which was none of the greateft Provinces neither. He wan the Ifland of Rhodes-^ but what glory could redound to fo mighty a Prince by overcoming a few Knights, who were weak of themf^lves, and who were not fuc- coured by others^ And yet he was therein aflifted more by fraud then by force. He pafl with his Army into ferfia-^ but though he might fay with Csfar, veni^vidi^ yet could he not add 'vici; for as he with great celerity over.ran a great part of the Perjim Empire, and came to the City of Tattris, fo not being able to fix ia anyplace^ or eftablifh any conqueft, he retreated to within his own Confines, having left the greateft part and the beft of his men in the Enemies Country, rout- ed and defeated by divers acciden'S. Thefe things then, and many other the like, give jufl occafion of wonder, and incite curious wits to fearch out the crueft caufes of fuch divcrfity of fucccffes.
Amongft which, nay, in the primary place, the different means of warfaring ia thofe times, and in thefe may come into confideration, wherein if we come to more particulars , we (hall mtct with the ufe of Forts and Strong Holds, which are be- come more frcqaent in thefeour Ages, then they were in former times, the arc of building being doubtlefly in greater perfcftion with us then it was with them. There is hardly any State or Country now adaies, wherein there are not many Towns and Cities, either affifted by natural ficuation, or elfe by art reduced to much fafeiy by many inventions found out by modem ProfelTorsdf Fortificati- on , fo as almoft every place is fo fortified as it is able to hold out with a few men, againft many •, aud he who will in thefe times enter into another mans Country with an Army intending to poflirfs himfclf thereof, muft firft win all the Caftles and ftrong Holds upon the Frontiers -, fbi; it were ill advifed to advai>ce forwards and leave fuch places behind them, fince his vidaals m^iy be thereby hindred, and he may feveral waies fuffer much damage and be greatly diflurbed. Moreover to be p after of the fi€ld,& leave the Cities and flrong Holds omeduced, would be but to labor hard to get polTeflion for a few daies, which being founded only upon the For- ces of a field- Army, when that fhould be worfted,all thhlgs formerly won, muft of neceffity fall of ihemfelves. Hence it is, that fincemach time muft be fpcntia lying before a Fort or Citadel, and that many men arc requifite to take it, and all this often- times in vain, the attempts of modern Princes meeting with this difficul- ty, aie notfo foon nor fo fadlycompaft, as they were by the Antients who mec not with fuch obftacles. And how can it be expedled therefore that many great vidories ftiould be won , fincc they meet with fo many rubs by means of thefe ftrong Holds ^ whereof we fee many clear examples in the adions, of the afore- mentioned Princes.
The Emperor Char Is made War feveral times with tiumerous Armies againft the King of France^ propounding great matters uuto himfelf, which proved all hue, vain at laft, by his having met with ftrong Cities well raunited, fuch as required
much
(1^9 ~)
much time and labor to take them •, wherefore though his fuccefs in War ums fome- times profperous, yet it came folate, as he hardly got any advantage or ben: fie thereby^ as was feen when after much time fpenr, and many men loft before the Fort ofSt. Defir which wasfcaied intheniidfl of France^ whither he wasfonu- nately advanced, though he reduced it to his own power, yet was he at Jail f rccd to come to agreement with the Enemy ( as finding his Forces much weakened by that acquifltion ) that he might fall upon another Enter prife. The lame, and for the fame caufe, befell Fr4W/if King of /rrfwtf, who having fent his Son the Dolphin with powerful Forces to the Pyrenean Mountains, to tl)e end chat he mi'^hc break into Spain, promifing himfelf eafier fuccefs therein, by an unexpe died ;iiTau!r, and becaulehe hadaffaultcd at the fame timeoiher parts ot Cafars Dcminions with other Armies: TheI>o//>^;»bcingat thcveryfirft to tike. Per pi^ nana , a Fort pla- ced upon thofe Frontiers, he there met with fuch, and wichio many diificukies, as this fole encounter was fufficient to keep thofe Forces from penetrating any further.
5o/y«?4» being entred with a powerful Army into Hungarie, intending to paft into ^uftria^ wafted fo much time in cxpiigning theftrong Hold of Btida^ asic proved the fifety of that Country, and chiefly of yienm • before the wh ch he was in that refpcd the longer a coming, and by this delay afforded the defendants the more time to provide for their own fecurity, fo as the City being of it fel f very te^ nablc, it may be faid that flie did not onely fave her felf, but by the prcfervation thereof, all t^w/r/4, and other Provinces of (;frw4«;f, were preferved then, and feveral times fince. So hkewife in the War which was made by the fame Seljma»^ againft the Venetians^ though he was come thither himfelf in perfon, with power- ful Forces both by Sea and Land, yet his Forces being repulft by the Fort of Ger- /?r, which was forcibly, but in vain attempted by the Ti'rks, he was forced td withdraw from before it 5 whereas without the help and advantage of fuchaftiong Hold, both the Ifland oiCsrfee, and other places belonging to that State muft have fubmitted to fo great and warlike a preparation. By reafon then of cbefe d l!i - cultics, and fuchoccafionsj the undertaking of later times have proved lefs gloiiJ ous for nJattcr of adion, then thofe of former daies. When Alexaiidcr had over- come in Battel I>4r/«f the powerful King oi Perfu^ hefoonmade himfelf Mafter of his whole Kingdom, and paffmg further into the Country, even to the ocean Sea, he found the wayfoopca, as the onely difficulty he mec withal, was the o- vercoming of thofe FortrefTes of Rivers and Seas which nature hid fiirmlbed the Country with: Infomuch as thofe who writ his a:: inns, fpcak but of two ftrong Holds of any importance, about which he was nccelTitated to fpend fometimea- mongft the Indians in his vidorious over-running fo m my Countries. But Pompej made fuch way in following CHithridates, and in plandng Trophies of viifories, in all places whereby he part info many Eaftcrn Provinces, amo,it;ft people that he had rather march'd over, then over come, as ir m ly be eafiiy conceived that he mc t nowhere with any impediments by ftrong Holds, which were able to ftop the courfe of his vidorious Forces. C.tfar found it fomewhac a harder bufinefs to fub- ju^ate thofe people of Ertrope, wiih whom he was to fight ; but this was more out of the natuie of the fituations and the fivagenefs of the people, then by reafon of any flout refiftance made by any wel! fortified Cities •, yet in the fpace of Ten years he compleated fo naany vidorics, as he fubjugated Three hundred fveral forts of People,
It thefc, though great Princes, and moft valiant Commanders, had been put to theexpenceof moneths and years in the taking of one only Fort, certainly theY atchievc-ments would have been fewer, and their giory not fo much ci y'd up. This was manifeilly known by the example of other Ages : For it may beobfervcdj that
ths
^he fo crejt progrefTcs of War have been made chiefly in the Eaftcrn part?, where at all ciircs ( peradventurc by rcafon of the largenefs of r^c Country ) the ufc of (Irong Holds hath been Icaft had-, fo as not only ^le^ander the Great, and Pern, cj^ both ot ti.em more famous then all oiher Commahdcrs, but fome of the Roman Emperors have by their Chieftains fubjugated (pacious Countries in a fliort time: And in later times, Jf/jfw«y the Great Turk by the fame reafon was able totally to fubjugatc the Soldan of Ctirc's Empire ^ For having had the better ill many Battels, and nor meeting with any ftrong Hold \.o withftand him, the whole Country which was under that Empire fell as a prey into the power of the'/arh, who were Viiitors and Maftersofihc Field.- Bur(uch acquifitions, as ihcy arc very Cvifie to be made, fo arc they but feldom peacefully pofleft 5 which was the caufe why the Roman Emperors could never fo govern thofe furtheft Eaftern parts^but that cither by the Inhabitants themfelvcs, or by their neiohboring Kings, tunuUs wereccminually raifcd: So as it behoved them to fuojugatcthc fame Provinces fcveral times. Bat if thefe difficulties of winning Fores and ftrong Holds did retard the courfe of Vid^ories, certainly they ought not t^leflen the praTe of moc^ern Princes and Commanders s but when they deferve it by their own military worth and induftry, as great difcipline, cunning, conftancie, and fufF.rance is dif'covered in this for: of Militia, and as (ue-h acquifitions are more ftablc, and lefs fubjed to the various fortune of War -, fo the fewer atftions of thefe men may for glory and praife be juftly compared to the many of the others, wherein perhaps they would have equali'd them, had it not bceafor the concurrence of fuch differing accidents and refpeds.
But if we (hall continue to examine other parts appertaining to the Militia, we (hall find thar the diverfity of tffedts hath proceeded from the diverfity of other things. The invention of Guns is fo new and fo miraculous a thing, fo out of the vay of a'.l War-Engines which were known and ufed by the Anticnts, as it may vellbebcleved that ibis muft needs have made a grert alteration in the managing of thT Militia -, and the ufe and invention of Gunpowder is fo increafed in thele tinrics, and fo varioufly multiplied and perfc(5ledj as it may be faid that men make not War now sdays with fteel and iron, as they were wont,bnt with fire, t hen this formidable Inftrumcnt of Attillery, which makes fo great and irreparable havoclc, is the reafon why Commanders proceed with more caution in giving Battel, and feck to fpinoutthe War in length, to reduce ihe Enemy to fome ncc, ffity 5 and t':at I fing more Art, and trufting lefs to Fortune, they fpend more time in bringing their cnterprifes to a.i end, but doit with more ftcurity. W herefore we feldom hear of pi ch d Fields in thefe days, wherein whole Armies fight with all their Forces: And hence it is, that the Forces of fuch as defend an affaulted Country notbeingtobevarquifli'd, nor much weakened but with time, unlefsthcy want fitting defence, no great p.ogrefs is made therein, which is not done more by time and induflry then by open force. Where likewife it is to be weighed, that the nc- cefTity which is now adays put upon Armies of bringing along with them a great Tiain of Artillery, all their proceedings muft be much more flow, and without tl em they can neit'^er keep themfclves from being offended by the Enemy, nor yet can they undertake any cnteiptife, wanting fuch Inflruments without which no Town nor place of importance can be taken.
Let us wind about a little, and fee what hath been done by the Antients. What a voyage did Fompey the Great make in the purfuit of iJiiithridates ? He with his Army overran abundance of new Countries, continually conquering andfubje(Sing them, with as much eafe, as if he had gone to vifit them upon pleafure, and not to wage War with them. When Alexdnder the Great would go into Ir.dia^ he made his Soldiers leave all the Booty which they had got in Perfia^ and all t!:cir Baggage
•jifrfi. behind
(1(5.)
behihJ them, and choofing out fome of his nimbleft men, he with them madg ihic ions; and difiicult journy, and fent many back, thinking that a (tw ( but thofe valiant) Soldiers, would luriice him for that purpofe-, for in that Age, 'twas only worcii and power which b^reaway the wcighcieft affairs. So as llich Princes and Con lUiftorsof Armies as hadaftrong and able Militia, as was that of Alexander the Great, and that of the Romans^ not meeting with any ftrong Holds to with- fland ti.em, nor with any Soldiers of like worth and experience asti.ey were, nor wiich could withftjnd their aflauks, they fuddenly bereft the Countries wh'ch they ailailtd ol:" all defence, by worfling their Armies wherein their fole fecurity lay, and fo made themfclves eafily makers of them ; and by the reputation which their men won, and the terror which thr y caufed m their Enemies, who had no where where- unto to flie or to have refuge, they madeon-j Vidory make way for another, fo as they might in a fliort time lay the ground- works of thofe great Monarchies which the World doth now fo much woncer at.
To thcfe things it may be added, That thechiefeftflrength of the Anticnts, and that wherewith they atch eved their chieteft adion?, lay in their Infantry, which could cafiUcft and with greateft expedition winde about evay where, and be made. ufe of at all fe.ifons. But changing their cuftom afterwards, fo as thofe that com- manded great Armies would have their Foot aided conrinually, and back'd by good flore of Horfe, they could neither begin, nor finifli great enterpnfes, as made bcft tor them, being to confider the Seafon, the Country, and other conveniencies, and their Horfcs being to have mrat, which they could not always, nor in all places come by. Wherefore now that by reafon ot the greatnefs of their Empire, the Turks Ccnfines are fo feparated,and fo far diftant one from another, it may be hoped that other Princes may refl the quieter, and the more fecure from ihcir incurfions, for that their Land-forces confifting much in Cavalry, they c.innot move fo fudden- ly, nor lead on their numerous Armies fo eafily nor fo commodioufly, nor do fuch notable things by Land-, and which the fclf- fame refped may make it be doubted that they may bend iheir ftudies more to Sea-affairs.
Together with all thefc refpeds, the condition of Times and of Potentates is not flightly to be confldcred, if therein we meet with a generous Prince, and one that is deliroiis of military glory. For if bechance to make trial of his arms and worth with a Prince of equal, or not much infcr.or ftate, valor, and military difci- pline. he cannot hope by any power he hah to make any great acquifitions, be- caufe he will meet with a juft counterpoife to his woithand power : For though he may peradventure be puffed up with fome good fuccels, yet is he not fure but that he may have Ibm.e advcrfe fortune, whilfl his Enemy is ftill flrong, thou h as yet wo. lied. WhatdiJ fnncii King of France le.tve unattempted to get footing in Itil-j ? how many Armies d;d he lead thither ■:' how much trcafLte did he fpcnd in thofe attempts^ when was he ever weary or (Ittisfied with warfar ng':' Yet being withftood by the Emperor Charts the Fifth, who was of equal force and worth, and wis refolute to keep the French out of //j/y, all his endeavors proved vain, finding it very hard to get any thing, and impoffible to keep what he had gotten,' that State being befriended and back'd by too gieat Princes. Whence it w.is, tha: by reafon of the refiltance which each of ih.fe great Potentates nude againft i he . o.her, kno;\ingth3t they could not much exceed one another, and each of t^ein h.avn^;;ne>e upon the affairs of Italj^ they both of them did {till much endeavor hiendlhipand confederncie with the Princes of //j/y.and chiefly with the Com non- wcaltl) of Venice. (■ cr, wl at neither of ihem could cffed of t';.emfe!vcs, u hich w.s to keep the others Forces fupprtffcd in Ital^ , they thougr t they mi^ht the eafilier i\o it, by joining with fome other Italian Potencate s f^^ the many Wars wluch happened between them, and chiefly in 54t/o;(j and mthe State ci Mrhn^
Y mull
(i<jO
muft atlaft be ended by agreement without any advantage to cither party , both their 1 orccsjbcin^ weakned, but neither of thrir hatreds or emulations flack ncd; though Churls the"'Fift, by theanexpefted death of frdmifco Sftr7^a, did at laft re- c'ucc that State to his Dominion.
Hence it vvai alfo that Charts and S tinman, greatly fearing to encounter each o- ther, did very much ftiun the having to do together, and to haz;ird that glory to the uncertain events of W-r, which they had with fo much labor arrived at. And this was the caufe why Charts though he was a bold and valiant Prince,when his Bro- ther ffr^/;?/iW was in great danger by reafonof^o/yw^w ForceSjtelblve.' impo tu- nately to p.ifs into . Africa ; for being refolute that he would not march againft Selj- w4i'jForceSjnor contend with them,hc would witneis to the world that ic was neithec labor nor danger, that kept him from turning to the dcfenre of Hungary . and yitijlrU^ wh ch were then alTaulted by the Turks •, but bccaufe he efteemed the bufi- nefs of <_^fr;V4Vcryreceflary. And when a greater neceflity wrought it fothac they were to take up Arms one againft the other, and that numerous Armies had taken the field, yet they kept itill aloof off, the fear, and apprehenfion which each had of the others power and fortune being alike-, foasat laftfo great an accumu- lation of Soldiers disbanded , neither p.rty having feen the face of an Enemy ; whilff Charli would not give way that his Army fhould go from before the walls of Vienna, to go find out the Enemy, nor would Solyman advance further to meet him, though he had at firflpublickly given out that he went from Cenftantinofile to fii>ht with charts t\\t Emperor before his own doors. So as you may clearly fee 'that it was the counterpoife of thefe two gteat Princes of one and the fame /\ o'e whicii kept their Forces confined within certain bounds, which for their va- lorand other refpecfts might have carried the Trophies of vi<5locy into the furtheft remote Countries.
Now on the other fide let us examine the condition of Tiines and Porentates v> ith whom thofe famous Commanders of old had to wage War. Alc-xande^ the Great, found the Kngdom of Perfta^ wherein he fuccefsfully made his firlt expe- dition?, for extent of Empire very rich and powerful, but wherein was an illdif- ciplined Militi.i, and commanded by unexperienced Leaders, and men of no va- lor •, wherefore exceeding the Perftms in worth and difcipline, though he came fliort of them in numbers, he may be faid to have been better then they for matter of War and therefore willingly imbraced all occafions of joyning Fattcl •■•.•ith them. And for what concerns the Eaftcrn Kings and Nations , which he afterwards brought ur-vier his power, who knows not how unfit they were for War. ofthem- felv'Twcak not joyned in confcdeiacic for common defence, nor fuftained by (Iron? holds, nor by the flrength of a well ordered Militia •: Infomnch is the: orcateft ^lory that can be attributed to Alexander^ is for the gcnerofity of h s mind whidi moved him to venter upon fo many entcrprifes, in defert and almoft unknown Countries, rather then for that he overcame great difficulties in fight,an«i brought chem to an end.
The fame almoft may be cbferved by the things done in the Eaflern parts by Pom. fey the Great. It is true that dfar met with greater difficulties in the things he did in trance and in Sfain^ for he waged War with people who knew how to manage their Aims, and who were till then thought unvanquifluble -, wherefore he fpent m:)re time there. Yet thefe Provinces were divided into many Kings and Popu- lariiies, none of which were very ftrongof themfelves, nor were they very fecure bytheafTiftance of others to make them abletorcfift an Army of veuran, and excellently well diiciplmed Soldiers, as was that which was commanded by Cafar : So as it feems we may with reafon conclude that if thefe cried up Commanders had'met with powerful and valiant Armies, able to be compared with theirs, and
chac
that thefe hid been guided and upheld by the experience and worth of great Conri- mand rs, their fames would certainly have been lefs, nor would they havcfoeafil/ have afrabjc(5ted fo many Councries, and erefted their Trophies of victories in fo many Regions as they did.
But bcfidcs all thefe confi derations, we may perhaps wiih rcafon weigh, the arts and wai^s which chcfe an ient Warr ersmadc ufcot (lo boot with what belonged to th^ Militia) to make their acqu (icons an \ glory t!ic greater : for h,e who (hall con- fider their adlions, may therein dfccrn o.infl.med a de iieof ^~ra Te and ^lory as it feems th.s was the onely thing which th>y propounded to thcmfelves for reward of all their labor and dan^-er, an \ for M^ end ot .11 their undertakings •, for they have left many noble examples behind tfe-n, not one y or military valor, but of equity ,clemcncie,tempsrancc, and of other i:lori usv>:rtues which llifted them very much in winning favor,and aff (^lon wt;h the pwoplc, and likewife the love of many of thofe very Princes who vvere overcoaieby th in.
Thus we read of <^lexai»der , that t^e ronfirmcd the'r Kin :dom'. to ma- ny Jndinn Kings whom he tvercame, and did inceafe them to fome others; and being contented vvithobe'icnce trom hen, nd lectivin.; fuch things as wrc ntceflfary for his voyage, he f-remcd r ither ro afpire after the glory of new acq lifi- tions, then CO reap any J<ivant3geby whathehaci aire dy>\on: But Pomft^^ not like a vidorioui Chieftain in War, butracer like a Friend md Arbitrator^ c >m- pofcd the differences between ihofe Prince, of the Hall:, reftored t! e antienc Lords to their Kingdoms, and j:aveneiv States to tiich '^th rs as did dt^tivc them. Infonnuch as it was fiom his lib ral ty ihac Pbir-KAces was to acknowledge the Kingdom of Bofphe/t^^ Aotiochtts, t'^atof ^ileui-t^ Tygranes^ the Kingdom of ArmenU^ Ariobar':{a»es,th3X.oi Cap^adodA^ Viota'us^ ihtlikco^ Caliria^ and did onely reduce fuch Countries into ^r^v•,nce^, and na 'e them im nedia ely fubjeft to the S.nate and People ot Rome, wherein he foU' d no legitimate Lords and M afters, -s it fell out in Syria, ^i*dea and fome other Regions. It was by reaf n of thcfc proceeding's, ihatmany People and Pr'nccs, did voluntarily luinic to the Empire of y4/(fx4»</(rr and of the RBrmns. Wherefore Dattu when he was over- come by ^lexATider^ admiring his great Continenci-. and Humanite, pnyed the gddsthatif the fail of that Empire was deftined, the glory and fucceflionof the Kingdom of /'cr/Jj might Lll up m i^/fx-iWirr. All iftones arc K;ll ot fuch ex- amples of worth anii vercae in things done by the Romins ^ Butnowadaics P in* ces and Commandersdo but little min J cheimiti ion ofrhcfe men.an.i wage War, notoutof adefireof glvirv, a^^ did thofc magnmimous Attients-, but onely outof revenge and cruelty, orclfeto turn alt t'^c frui andbneficof v^idi.ry upon them- felves leaving nothing fafe nor inrire to th conq .ered. W ence itenucs that they who tears ihefc extreams, defperately rcfolve to do th' ir ucmoft, and hazard all, ra- iherthLnto (ubmitthemfelvesto th.- power and difcre: ion of thofeon wh'tm they f.eth ir ul.imare ruine depends, f y t is mea;is,proce dings mircha flower pacp,ani all acquifitions become more difficult. To th'S imnoderatc d. fire of having all th ngs forth.rown fervice, working a contrary eff.d to their int-ntions, kecosih* Con- fines of their Dominions more narrow! V bounded, andthe cby Ld'c-ns th:t glory which they fecm to afpire fo much at. If then our Princes and Chieftains will walk in the waiesof the Antients, they wil' findethatjuft.ee, Ciemercie, and moderate Empire, are ft on;er and more fecure Eneins to take ftrong Holds, then thofe whchthey in theic times make ufe of. And if they benotfjulty inthc tru ft wor h, they will find futficient valor and difciplne in th:ir Soldiers, tobringtopafs vvh.t- foever gr at Enterp i.es, and to exalt iheir name to fuch a height of glory, and fo illuftrate themfelves and their Age as the/ may in all things be defeivedly compared to the famoufeft and raoft cried up ot the Antients.
Y i T.h«r
The Seventh DISCOURSE.
If'h^t the caufe is rvhyXizXy hath enjoyed fo long Peace andQu^iet in thefe latter Xtntes.
H
E who (hall call to mind what troubles Italy for a long t!me hath fuf- fcred undifjwhich after the pafl'agc oi Charts the eighr King oi France^ till the Peace made at BolegnU^ was for the fpace of thirty five years continually infeftcd with bitter Wars, and fubjeft to all thofe greater evils which the wickednefs of man hath found out to his own undoing, ntay juftly think her very happy in this prcfent, and the laft preceding Age, wherein after fo long a combuftion (be hath enjoyed fo happy andjquict a Peace : For though in this time feme little fparklcs may have broken forth, yet have they not fpread mucEi, nor lafted long-, but being confined within fomc fmall circuits, the greater and more noble parts of Italy have remained fafc and untouched by this flame. Wherefore thofe P inces who this menn while have had the government of the feveral States oi Italy, are certainly much to be praifed, and the people of Italy are chiefly to acknowledg fo great a benefit from their wifdom and vigilancie. Yet becaufe there have divers accidents happened , which have opened the way to Piinces s^htreln to walk dircdly on to this right end of Peace an J Concord, it may be worth the while, particularly to examine from whjt caufes this good hath proceeded; for thereby it may hkewifc be known how the like may be pre- ferved.
It is a Propofition fufliciently known, and indubitably true, that SuhUta cattfa tollitur fjfeiifti ^ Take away the caufe, and the effed which proceeds from thence Will ceafe. Wherefore by truly examining the caufts from whence the Wars and moleflations oi Italy did proceed, we may perceive how thefe ce.ifing , (he hath re- main'd in that peace and quiet, which may be faid to be the true, proper, and moft natural condition of a State •, all other workings in a good Government, and even War it feU being ordained for Peace : whereby as Ci ies and Kingdoms enjoy Civil felicity, fo muft that State be moft ptrlcdl, wherein the perfedeft workings are cxerc.fed to the moft ptrfcft end. Peace is of it felf introduced into a State, by taking away the impediments which do difturb it, juft as health is introduced into our bodies by taking away thofe ill \ uraors which keep them from their perfcd and natural condition. Now if we will take into our confideration, whence, as from the principal occafion";, that H rmony ( if I miy fo call it ) which the Concord of the Italian Princcs had fo long produced, and prefeived with fixh liking and confolation of all men, was fpoil'd and corrupted, wc Hull find that two affec'tons which do ufually accompjny Empirr, and which at this time grew very powerful in fome Princes, were thofe roots from which fo many mifchiefs did afterwards pu: forth, to wit, Fear and Ambition •, Fear of lofing ones own State, Ambition of pofrefTmg what belongs to another. The fear of the King of ^Jragcm juft indignation made Lpdovic Sfor\a think upon Noveltie>, made him hav; recourlc for help to France^ and made him believe that was beft for him, which proved his ruine: Butitw s ambition of add ng new Territories to that Crown, and gloy to himfe'f, which n ads CZ/^r/; the Eight, King of France^ but young both in yeara and experience, think upon nothing but how to effetft his defins, by accept ng of Sfoi\as piotfcr ofp-ifTing into/f4/)i, which proved the Sepulchieof lb many Soldiers, and of fo mii.y gillant Commanders of that warlike Nation, by the fomany Wars whicia
arofe
Sfofe from that Spring-head, and which brought no other advantage to thd Authors.
Euc let us make a little fui ther enquiry. The fo famous, and as ic may juftly be termed, fo pernicious War to all Italj^ made by the League of fo many Chnltian Princes, who had all confpircd the luinc ot ihe Commonwealth oi Venice^ whence did it a:ife buc from thefc two wicked feeds, Fear and Ambition •'. Many Princes apprehended thegreacnefs of the Republick, which was already much increafed by the proipcrous fuccefs ;n War w herein (he was affociated by t! e French^ whereby fhe was become very formidable, cfpec'ally to the Princes ot lidlf •, whtrefcre they all deiiied her abafemcnt for their own fecmity. Nor was the Emperor M-iximtlidn totally free from this fear, who had learnt by late expcr en.e how powerful the Forces of the Commonwealth were grown, which had btieit him of f niic Towns belonging to him. But Ledovick King of France ( tlie tbirrt after Empire being always uquenchable) growing ftill core defiroiis to poflcfs the whole State of <JMiU»^ whereof he had already gotten the greateft parr, and repenting hmfelf that the Cities of CrcmoriA and Gtaradada. were fallen lo the Fenttians^ was egg'd on by this fpur of Ambition to join in confpiracie with the other Princes a- gainft the Commonwealth, which had fo lately and fo many (evtr.ilwjys deferved io very well at his hands. After thcfe cnfued many long Wais, though not equally grievous, which had many varic us and uncertain events, and ivliich were fomented and maintain'd by thtfc feeds of all difcord, fear and ambidr n. W hen the greatnefs and power of the Emperor CW/^ the Filth was increafed and confirm'd in Italy, the Commonwealth apprehended that her State in Ttrra pm* would not by reafon thereof be very fafe : (he therefore willingly took up Arms, accompanied by the Frer>cbj to fecure herfelf from tlic danger (he conceived ihe lay under by reafon of the continual neighborhood of a greater and more powe;ful neighbor, by having a particular Prince of that State, who might be Duke of Milan. Francii King of f r<j«^e defired likewifeto fee the Emperor berefcol that State, hut out of other refpeds- ; to wit, becaufe his ambition was fuch as would nev^r fuffer him to give way to the fortune of C/'iir/j the Emperor, and ro fee Char Is fo much fuperior to him, elpecially in Ual^^ where his Predecc (Tors the Kings oi France^ ?.nd h.: himfelf withnoleisfervcncie, though with worfe fucccfs, hadiaborel folong ,uth fuch expencc, and with tl.e lofs of fo many men, only to retain and keep fome Teiri- tories.
This was the tree, from wh'ch the boughs or fprouts could not be fo faft cut ofl', but that one War foon fuccceded another ; wheiewith It^li was long perplex'd, till in the year i jzp. the Princes being tyred, and the People ruin'c^, a^'rccment was made in that famous Meeting at Bolognia^ in wh.ch fo found foundations of the peace and quiet of ital'j were laid, as they may almoft be faid to have continued till now, with fair hopes of longer continuance. For though ft. r thus many years there have been fome commotions in Italy, made both by her own Inhabitants, and by Foreiners, ^ ct in refpedl of the calamities (he underwent in thof; former Ages, they may rather be termed uprores then wars. This condition of affairs and of affedions being changed, and the materials being removed by which the fire of war wa^ fed, i/vj/)f remained in great tranquillity. Soon after thisintrodiiiftion of Peace, the State of i»///jw,by ihcimmaiure dt2.t\\o{ Franc i ft o Sfor^a^ who left no ifTue beh'ind f.im, fell into thepow.r of Ch.iTls the Enr.peror, and af^evwards into his ("on vhilifs ^ in which Princes no fuch rcfpcftconcurr'd as lately have been mer.tioned, whereby th: peace of Italy iri^ht be troubled, as it had been before : Fe r thefc Princes, by reafon of their other giea; pofleifions, being pe.iccluhy Maftersnf fo fair and noble a part oi Italy, as is the Kingdom of Naples, and Dukedom of umlan, they had no reafon to trouble the peaceful condition of affairs, either out of any apprehcnfion of
their
ihcir own burinelTcs, or out of a drfire to enjoy vvhac appertain- d to others. They were ♦reed hom fear not on^lyby the frirndfliip folemnly eftabliflied, aadranfi.d by the other Pocentites oi Italy, but much morcbytlieir own power aiJ. g-eat- ne.s and ch . kiowledgc: thit to intrench upon one, might cafily m ve .ill ; he reft, an! afFirdoccifi m of bringing torein Forces into /M/y, vvi^er by todifturb iheic own i'ecleJ poffdirnn of fo Urge and nobc a (hare ihsreof, ktpt ths ;n tro n dream- ing upon the polTcfling of other mens cftates. So likewifc the Common vealth of f^enice w. s at this time in fuch a condition, as being only to cov-.t peace, Ihe night hope to in joy it fafely, becaufc (hs was ntith.r fo great nor powr rful, as to hope af- ter new acqutfitions, being connterpo.fcd by preater ¥oxce%n ftaly. ^rho upon the leaft difcovery in her ot taking up Arms, would oppofe h r, and not fufF.r h r to incre ifcjto thi-r prejudice-,neither was (lie. yet fo wcak,as lb • might cfread being e fiiy oppreft by others, fo as to fecure herfclf from fuch a dan^e^ , Ihe might be conftrain- edto think up-^n novelties, or to procure new fiends Th; C 'U c\ Territoiies, bring fecured no lefs by the reverence du: to religion, then by'orceof A. m;, re- mained fafe and quiet i nor had the Popes any rcafcn ei.hci to te.ir their own af- fairs, nor yet to defirc a greater temporal cftate-, for having recovered many Ci- ties w. ich the Chu ch had formerly loft , difcords being ceafed, and the fafti- on \vhercwth(he had b:en troubled be ng almoft e lingdilhed , :,nJ the au- thority of the Barons of Rome being moderated, that holy Serwisina condi- tion of as great dignitie and fafety, as (he had been at any time bebr ■ • a id Duke Cojoto de CMedici, Dnke of Flarertce being allied to th; favor and fricn.'.lhip of a potent Prince, wherein he was very fortunate, was fife eno gh •. and bein-? like- wife 3 new Prince in Tufc^ny.he was to think, as he wi'ely did, ruber how tof.tle himfJfwjll in his no ^le Dominon, then to dream of becoming the Au:hor of new War?, an i of increafing his State.
Hence it &.\2S thatthe Forces of thefe greater Petcnr.ites being balbnced and th'-ic thoughts temptrtd, all occifions of making any gre.it change or altera irn of Statel in her was taken away, fuchashadhipned in the former Ages, t^rou^ i the comm.Hionsot the very Prncesof Italy. As for fuch dangers as might h.'ppen from abroad, Italy was at this time fecured by various accid.-nts If vfc (h.ill firft conftdtr theEmprc, from whence her greateft troubles h;d ohc'n t mies come, t' ofc Emperors knew very well, by whar had fucceeded tj Charls m the Imperial dit-nity, that they had not Forces fufficient wherewith to bet ike the n- felves to forein entcrprifes oat of any particular intereft or ambition, wit .out the hell of Germaay, which was but 1 tile inclined to increafe their power and autho'i- ty. Bui ( though the modrate mnds of thofe Princes, whic'iwis aUvats in- clined to Jufticc and Equity muft be g eatly praifed ) the emin nt cjanger their St teslayinbyieafonof tlie Turks Forces, was above all other thL-gs able to keep them tromti ink ng of molefting other mens States-, which Turks, being one^r and fo powerful neighbors, have kept them bufied and molefted, and in a con !i- tion of thinking ra( her how to fecure their own affairs, then to i creafe their for- tune by new acquifi.iors, not onely when they were forced to take up Arms for the defence of Hung'try and AujlrU^ but even in time of peace, and grea rft fecuri- ty. The freneh I muft confefs have been more intent to trouble the peace oiltdlj^ on which they had a long time fct their minds, out of a defire to get fome footing there. Bur though the Forces of that flourifhing and powerful Kin'.'dom were very formidable before thefe Civil Difcords, yet experience hath (hew.d that their attempts, when they have had none to receive and to up'iold chem n //j/y, have cauf d more dread then damage-, for their Armies being to be furnilhed with all ncceflanes from a far off, they have been overcome by weaker Forces, and oft- times by ifidr own \^'3nts. Therefore becaufe in thefe later limes, when they paft
over
("57)
over the Mountains, they were not confederate, as formerly they had been, with any great Potentate in Italy, therefore have tliey been able to tarry there but a while, nor have they made the noifc of their Trumpets be heard a far off, though they have never let flip any occafion out of a delireof Novelty and glory ^ fo as all thofe who have at any time been ill fatisfiedby the Imperiilifts, and then by the Spaiftards, have been eafily received into frieodfliip with them. Thus was thcdefenceof Siennnrnhnced, a Cityoppreflby the fevere Government ofC*- ftrs Oihcers.
Thus were the /"frw^/M taken into prote<aion, to keep them in their pofleflion of Parm^ and Pi^cen'^ , out of wh ch the Emperor would have driven them : Thus was the Prince of Wrrw liflncd unto, who by hs favor, and ihc infurredli- cn of the people furthered the hopes of great acquificions m the Kingdom of NafUs. Thus /'4w/ the Fourth met with good correfpondencie in HennYimg of France ^z% foon as he difcovcrcd himfelf to be ill afFecled towards C^/^r, and that he would take up Arms again ft him ; for he hoped to attain thofe things by the friend- fhip and conjundion of a powerful Prince, and one, who according to h;s defire, was ap: to commotion";,whercin he had had but ill fuccefs at the fame time in Italf.by icaf-nof the weak alTiftanceof i\itSenefi% but all this while, and upon all th;fe ocafions, it may be truly affirmed that thcfe were ra-.her Tumults then Warsj which (:s hath been (aid) was occafioned chiefly, for that fuch a difpofiticn of n-iind and of aflfairs, was found in the Princes of Italf, as they did not much, nor all at a time intaefsthemfelvesinthefe Wars. And though fome of the Popes did bufie themfclves therein, yet fince thefe Wars were not treated of as any thing belonging to tfie Chuich , or immediately appertaining to the Apoftolick See, they were neither favored by the other Princes of //^/y, nor yet imbraced by the fuccecding Popes, with th: fame thoughis, becaufc their ends, nor intcrefts were not the fame 5 n^y they did ra her endeavor toappeafe, then to foment thtm. And thofe who were the raifers and furthecersof thefe novelties, and of the coming of forein Forces, being weak of themfelves,and not being feconded by any,they could not long make good the W>.r, not havng fufhcient Forces of themfelves, ;ior beinj» able to make fuch nfeof thcTranfalpine Forces, but that they were exceeded by thofe who oppofcd them, and who were of grea'er force and friendfliip in Italy ; as waspariiculatly fcenin .he Warsot Sienna^ which lafted longeft, and were the foreft that happened in thefe latter times. For the t rench having no other recep- tacle in Italy then what was given them by the Senefi^ who had called them m, nnJ being ttoutly oppofed by cW/j the Emperor, who wis flrongcrby reafonof the many cpportuneaids which he received from the Duke of Florence^ they could rot long continue, nor fix their abode in //■4/y. In which occurrences t'le State of Venice may juflily challenge no fmal ftiare of commendation. For that r.otwithftand- ing the fo many offers, and preflures made unto her, to take up Arms, and to make ufeof fuch occafion? as prefented themfclves, to augment her fortune, Ihenoc- withftanding, wiih lefsafjiiing thoughts, but certainly with very wi.eand fafe advice, continuing inhcrnewtrahty did rather endeavor by her many good offices to withdraw fewel from the fire which had already burft forth in ItaU, then to make it flimethc hi{;herby intcreflingherfelf therein, and by joyning with either party. Whereby flie did r.ot undoubtedly advantage herfdt onely, but whole Italy^ where flie being one of the chiet Potentates-, by keeping quiet an.-l nnvur, not inclining to either party was the reafon why the Imperijl and trench Forces, coua- terpoihng each other, could not effed any of their defigiis, which might have prove '• prejudicial to the I berty and p:ace of Italy.
Hence then it eafues, that the beft advice for the prefervation of ih'sp-aceand quiet of /;4/)i, is to keep affairs fo equally ballanced, as tlvu the Princes vv'^o have
Dommioa »
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Dominions thfre, may neither have reafon of fear, nor of ambition, which (as hath been faid) have informer times been caufeof her perturbances. In which happy condition llic will ftill continue, if the Princes of Italy Qiali know fo to moderate their defires, and kc.-p themfelves fo clofely annexed together by an uni- onofmlnd, andbygoodin elligence, that the one may not fear the o; her for any delireof novelty which may be found in them, nor difcovcr themfelves to befo weak by their divifions as out of the eafincfs ot th: prey, ambition may move otheis toafpire alter their Staces.
The Eghth DISCOURSE.
Whether Citsddf and Strong Holds, much ufed by cur wodera Prince Sjbe covimodiousysnd of true fsjcty to a State^ or no?
"^ Orts and ftrong Holds are of late grown into io great eftcem, as Princes feem now adaies to mind nothing more thenthcfc for the fecutity of their States. Yet this bufinefs may admit of fuch various confidcrations, as it is not peradvcnture cafie to be difcerncd, whether a Prince that is thus advifed be in the right way to cffed that which he propounds untohimfelf, which is, the fecurirg of hij affairs. To know then what ouj^hc truly to be ihjught in this cafe, wemiift firft confider what this arc of Fortifica'ion is of it felf, on which fo much ftudy , andcxpenceis beftowed, and whether it be grounded up- on fuch undeniable piinciples and reafons, as by means thereof the benefit at which it aims, of prefervin^ Cities and States in fafety, may be cxpeded from it. Cer- tainly this fi:ft confidiration admiis of no fmal duubc or difBcultie-, for we arc taugf.tby modem txperence, that alhhe waies whereby a ftrong Hold may be aflauitcdand takeii, are not yet fo well kno wn,as being reduced under i; neral terms, ast'at itmay be afTertcd, that thereby an art is found out which con.ains all forts of poflible offence, and wh.ch is governed by a cert: in and true rule to effcdthe intent thereof, and to come to the perfection thereof. Nay, rather we fiud to the contrary, that the profcflbrs of this Artdo not agree well in their principles-, and tl:ac time makes it fu'ojedl to fuch alterations, by reafon of the new waies which the wic of man finds out ns well for offence as defcnce,as it feems it muft be confeft, that this is not in reality a true art,or at leafl, that it is fo imperfcftly known and ufeJ, as ihat (Irongholdsarebuta weak foundation for the fafety of a State, though they be never fo many, and be in eftecm by military men. For, fay noching elfe dots it, the experience of more then one Age doth evidently prove, that in a Ihort time they become vain and ufelefs •, fincc a Fort which was formerly greatly efiecmed, and held to be alniofl impregnable, hath now by the invention of^ new engins. and wa'es of opugn n,^ it, loft that reputation, and is thought little lefs then ridiculous : aadit may be beleeved , that the flime maybefal any ftrong holds which are in thcfe daies built, by reafon of the new waies of off"ending which many do daily with much ftudy and induftry labour to findc out.
Whence it is' that Princes find they have often fpent much time, workm.mQiip and moneys, inabufinels, whichin time of need can but little avail them; audi they wi 1 reap any benefi: thereby, they muft continually be at new expcnce both of monies and men, keeping them continually bufied in new works-and Fabricks, 9Jdingahva:e^,oralcer;n_7 many things about the.r Forts, to fie them to theufeot
the
the pi'efent times and Militia. Buc give it for granted, that fuch dtoag Holds may be brought to rather an imagiaible , tiien a poflTible perfecflion and fccurity, cer- tainly they are no \"ay fervfctable of themfdvcs, but arc like dead and ufelefs things, which have need to be as it were inanimated and be m^i^ uftful by good GanfooSj. who may Jteep and defend them. ,, .i' ji
AndiF othervvife, they fervefor the convenicncie and fcrvke of the Enemy: which makes it yet more queftionable, wheth r ftrop.g Holds be a .greater fafety or weakening to a State 5 . and where there are many and very great ones, the dovibt. is made the greater; fince fo many Soldiers mail be iraployed in heir defence, as if the Priacebenot very powerful, he rtiall hardly find Fo ces fufficient t«» keep feveral Airaies (as they may be termed) on foot, ton-x within the Forts and f ime in the Campagnia. Nor can it be made good, that ftropg H( ilds are of themfe'.ves fufficient to fccure the whok State; for though tiiey may entert:iin thehnemyfor awhile, and flop the firft brunt of an impetuous affault, ytt a: Lift^ uniel' tney be back'd \^ith Forces from without, and timely fuccorc4 and reieved, being over-, come either bj( power, length of time, ornecefliiy, they muft yield and tall into the power of the Enemy t which cannot be denied, no not by the veiy ProfelTors and Favoteriiof Foraficatiori. Ai^j^tit cannot bedenied, but if a Prince have fufficient Forces to keep cSf Field i.ii!!i8fe*own Country, he may thereby keep him- felffrom b.inj: injured; for aien do not eafily put things to hazard, where ihey. think to meet witi. ftouc.oppofidon^ ^nd the only opinion and reputation of fuch Forces, is able to keep off che grcateft dangers; For the Enemy who did defign toalTault luch a State, btvOmes jeiJo.s and doubtful, nor is he bold enough to enter fur into fuch a St.i'-e as is guarded i>y a good Army, and chiefly in lituations ( fuch as are almoft in all Countries ), as are naturally fortified by H Us, Vailies, oc- Rivers , where it is hard toep er,3nd harder to i':'reat. And if any wt-llexpene ced' Captain command over fuch Forces, he willbe hkciy enough to defeat '.he Enemy, without endangering himfelf, by ktep.ng him from vi<^uais, and \'o imp oyed and bufied in liindry ways, as he fh:il) neither be able to ke^ep long in the C ountry, nor much lefs impioy himfelf m the taking orfacking of any C.tics fince he kno-vs be is hourly fubjed to furprifals, and to be ry n'd ; and flrong Holds fecuri ig no- thing but thofe quarters where ihfy are fituated, they do not fecurethc -.t.'ce, if they be but a few ; and if many, they require all the Forces for tneir own defence, and leave the Enemy mafler of the Field, to the Pxinc? his pre i mice, jud the Peoples defpair. So alfo, if they be but little ones, and incapable of fuch Works, and fo many men as are requifite to make them hold out long, they and the Soldiers which defend them are loft ; and if they be g eat,and contain large plots of ground, as is mofl in fafliion in ihefe days, they may be more perfect in thcmfrlves, but tney need fo many men to defend them, as thofe Forces which ought to be imployed for thefifeguatd of the w! o'.e Country, or a great part thereof, are bounded w;;h- malittleci mpifs.uid feiiceoffomc City or Citadel. And yet thefeveiy Soldiers, whendrawaoa. -uco the Field, may do much better fei vice -, for being falhioned into the body ot .n .rmy, they become -is it were a moveable Fort, which fecurcs at once many Cities and a great iradt of C' untry : nay, by thci'e the Enemy is .much !n.^amjged, und the troubles and tianger ot War are kop. tar from a mans own home. For ( as bath been faid ) ^'ivei fions, and preventions may be made by thefe Forces, theymay becarri.d.nto .inothtr ma,is Sttte, and fet another mans honfc on fire, ixfo.e it take h. ad in ones own houfe^ but he who pi iceth his lafety :n ftrong o!d.s, puts hiiallif i.'to a conditiun of being at histnemies difpofal, in whofe will it lies ro ch^ofe what fhall make moft for his a ivantaoe, with i;reat pre- judice to tlieo;pulu.g party : For he may either p.Us by the For>s, ovcr-ru^chc Country, enrich his Sultlieis by booty, impoveriih th;Subje(flsof chit Coun.ry'
Z which
which Is afla.iltcd, and cannot be releivcd, by rcafon that the Forces thereof a re" difpcrft and imploid in the defence of the flrong Holds •, or if he will make any cer- um atchicveinent, he may fit down before any Forr, and without indangering his own men, vvhli't he (lull live upon the Enemies Territories, he may in time, take itbyfiege, and effed his own defucs (for as hath beenfaid) no ftrong Hold carf promifc it felf long fatety where no fuccour is ready at hand.
But let us come a little clofer to the bufincfs, and let us fuppofc that tbefc flrong Holds may be brought to fucha condition as they maybe alTuredly able to rcfift any open force which (hall come agafnft them, and not be deceived in that their belecf , as often times they are •, How can they fccure themfelves from treachcrie, and from fuch dangers as they may be fubjeft unto by the negligence of Soldiers, or falfehood of the Commanders that have the cuftodie thereof^ io which cafe the Princes danger is fo much the greater, and more irreparable,for that his Enemy is ia the Dominion';, in a well munitcd feat, from whence he cannot hope to drive him, without much labor and difficultie. Butio greater Cities wherein area multitude of p;ople, and whefc thefe cautions and fufpitions are not ro be found, others no whit inferior to thefe do arife •, for fuch quantities of viduals is requifite to feed the mjny men that are therein inclofed, aS no Prince is able to provide tor fo, as ma/ ferve them for a long time-, and if this fail, to what end ferves Walls, Weapons, or Soldiers •! To this maybe added that the fafety of fuch flrong Holds, does in a great pare depend upon the pleafure of the people, who being of themfelves naturally fickle, do often favor forein Princes out of very flight reafons, and fome- timesout of ameer defire of noveltie-, and plot by fedition, and by open force againfl the prefent State, and deliver themfelves, and the City inro another mans power : And though they may afterwards repent themfelves of their folly, they know not how to mend it, when a powerful Army is within the City Walls •, nor c]n this be done by him who defends the Stite, becaufe he cannot keep fo many Forces together as are able to defend feveral places at once, and becaufe loving his Subjeds , as a legitimate Prince ought to do, he is loath to dtflroy a City of his own though whole Armies be therein.
But if the State be open and not peflred with FortlScat'ons, though it may the more eafily be loft by fudden afTaults, or by ill aff cded Subjefts, it will be the more eafily regained, and as foon as the Piince who is deprived thereof, fliall have mean^ torailiehis Forces which by misfortune may have been beaten, he foon makes head again, and recovers what he had lofl, the Enemy nat having any fafe hold wherein to abide. And of this there are many apparent examples. If the Com- monwealth of Venice ^\n the times of her greateft calamitic,had had her State in Tern frmaCo well provided of ftrong Holds, as now it is, fhe might not peradventure hive run fo great a misfortune, fbehad notfo foon loflfo many and fo noble Ci- ties a^ (he did i but it miy be alleadged on the contrary, that if in that evil Crifis of aPairs wherein (he was brought to fuch adverfity, fhe had had fo rnany impor- tant Forts 2s now (lie hath, and that they had fain into the power of the Enemy, (he would not certainly have fo foon recovered her loffes, and reftored herfelf into her prifline power and grcatnefs as (he did. We likcwifc fee the State of Mi- hn^ which fell fo often into the power of the French^ it flaid not long under their Daminio^ fornor finding any ftrong and Royal Forts, wherein they could make any fafe abode, nor having time toered any byreafon of their continual Wars,or for want of monies, the defenders of ihit State did often times prevail •, and every accident, ei;her of the change of the peoples minds, or of their Enemies increafe of Forcrs, were fufficicnt to drive them out : Which would not have happened if they had but once been Ma(fcrs of any ftrong Holds, from whence they could not havf been expel'djWichoura long and hard fiege. GmdoUidde D.ofW?-^//?,a Prince
but
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l)Ut of finall TerncorieSj but very wife, and well experienced in War, moved
..by thefe refpeds, after he had recovered bis State which was formerly taken from
^ him by Duke Valentine^ he refolved to flight all the ftrong Holds thnwere
*" thtre, knowing that they could not at firft preferve his State unto him, and
when hee fhould lofc it , they would make the difficultie of regaining it the
greater,
When Churls the Eighth, King of France, going to win the Kingdom of Nafles
]^p3ft through T«/i:4;>jf J the Forts which the Fleremttes\\d.(i\i\i\\t for their own fe-
^.curitie, were the very things whereby they wereraoft indamaged, and thefe falling
>into the power of the frfw^, whofe Forces they thoughc they were not able to
>'ithftand, they put the Florentines to vaft expence, and made them undergo great
I'^flavery, out of a defire of recovering them. Whereas if that State had Ia;n op?n,
^ the King, who was bound upon other entcrprifes, paffing forward, would no waies
' have troubled the affairs of that Commonweahh. The like, and almcfl: out of
^'thelike refped, did afterward befall Duke Coftmo^ when the Emperor Charts the
.'Fifth would keep fome Cafties belonging to that State in his own power, which
'fliould otherwife have been left free to Coftmor, and which was the occafion of
""that (aylng^^Cbele ferteT^ fenoi cep^idelU Tsfcana^ That ftrong Holds are the
fetters of Jufcanj.
Thefe are the greateft mifchiefs which flrong Holds ufe to bring with them 5 ' but there are others not altogether fo grievous, but more certain and irreparable. "For who can deny but that the exceflive charge which Princes are at, notonelyin .building FortrefTes, bat more in muniting, and guarding them doth fufficiently ' exhauft the publick Exchequer, and necefTitate the disburfing of fuch moneys in times of peace^as ought to be kept for the more urgent occafions of War, And cer- tainly he who could fee what vafi fums the Commonwealth oi Venice hath 'pent for fome late years part in making and muniting fo many Forts both by Sea and Land, would be very much afloniflied, and would confefs that fo great a mafs of trc afurc would >bei fufficient to provide for any War how great foevcr, and to withftand for a good while any potent Enemy. It may peradventure likewifc be f id, and not untruly, that whilft a Prince repofes much confidence in being able to maintain liis State by means of thefe ftrong Holds, and by the affiftance of a few Soldiers, he is not fo careful as he ought to be of other things which belong to the M luia, which are notwithftanding real and fecure foundations of a State. The Lucedemo- mAns would not therefore fuffer their Cities to be begirt with a wall, becaufe they beleeved that by the thoughts of fuch fecuritic, their Citizens would become mora carelefs and negligent in managing their Arms,by folc means whereof tht-y though: that the Forces of an Enemie might and ought to be kept afar off. Which that wife man would likewife infer who faid, That the walls, which ought to fecure a City (hould be made of iron not of ftone. And a spartan being demandeJ by aa %^thenia»^ what he thought of the walls of Athens': anfwtred. That he thought they were very handfome for a City which was to be inhabited by women 9 inferring, that it is not neccffarie, nor honorable, for able, valian- men, to feciirei themfelves from their Enemies by fuch means. It is likewife ulually feen, that a Prince, who thinks heftiallbe able to curb his Subjects, to gov.rn them and rule them as he pleafeth by means of Bulwarks and Caftlcs, and tkw therefore he needs not the love of his Subjeds, is much lefs riiin Jful of thofc things which become a good Prince, and which purchafe affedon, Ytt we are taught by many evident: examples that the peoples love or hatred is that which doth moft preferve unto him,' or bereave him of his State, and makes them more ready or backward to render him obedient; asisof late feen in fUnders-^ wh.chfomanyFortrefTe;, and Ar- mies hath not in fo long a time been able to reduce to the devotion of its ligifmaca
Z a Prince*
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Piinc. And it may gentrallybeobfcrvcd, tiat fuch Govcrnmcms as havelafted longeft, have been prefcrved, not by the advantage of ftiong Holds, whereof foine have noi had any, but by vertuc of a good Militia, and of the Subjcifts love.
The Romans were accuftomcd, when they bad won any new Country, to fend new Inhabitants thitbtr, who being placed either in the antienc Cities^ or in oihcts built by ihemfclves, they called Ron:ian Colonies s and by thcfe mens valor, as People devoted and obliged to the Senate and People ofRome^oxxt of remembrance of their def.rt, and in gratitude for the good which they had received, ihcy eafily lept the new Subjcds in loyalty to the Commowealth, and the Countries which tiKyhaJwonby their Arms, in obedience. The which, being mo^ed thereunto by the fame refpeds, the r^wfr/4«j did like wife in Candu^ fending many of their own Gentlemen th.thir to make Colonies, and to defend and maintain that Ifland. BuC the 7urks^ in a very violent manner, but anfwcrable to the cuftom of their Govern- ment , do ahiioll totally deftroy the antient Inhabitants of their new-gotten Ccuntiies, chiefly the rxheft and ths moft noble, from whom they take theit: Lnds and poflefllons , and give the revenues iher«f to be made ufc of by the Sold ery, making r/>w4ri thereof (as they term it) which are Pays or Revenues afligntdover to the Soldiers, upon condition that they are to maintain a certain number of Horre,by which means they keep a great number of Warriors continually on foot, who fciving for Garrifons for the fafety of the new acquired Country, arc notvvithftanding always ready to ferve in any other place, and upon all occafions as th.y (hill be commanded, to the greater benefit and fafety of the State, th. n Forts and flrong Holds can do to thofe other Nations which make moft ufe of them. But o.her Princes, who have had greater abundance of Territories, if you will refpedl their Inhabitants, did ufe to leave great (lore of Land upon their Confints dtferc and unmanured, as at thefe times the Per funs did upon their Confines towards the 7«;ij, X.Q render it more difficult for a numerous Army to pafs through them to their pi eju dice, oi in cxic they do, to make any long sbode there : which hath often been of gieat ufc to them, as hath been feen, when very mighty Armies have been led on by the Ottoman Emperors againft the Perfians, they have moft commonly been wafted and dcftroyed by their own fufferings and wants.
From tbefc things it appears it may be inferred, that there are other Arts and ways which may much better do that for which Fortifications were fiift found ouc, and for whch ihcy are now a-daies fo much ufcd , efpecially amongft Cl.r ft:an Princes. And yet if we will f£ce about, fome other, and thofe no con- temptible arguments will be found, which will plead for the very great advantage which Princes and States receive from Fortifications. It is moft afTurcdly certain, a at to ft cure a mans felf by all means poftible from offence, is a precept not only taught by Rcafon, butdidatedby Nature, which, as it were by fome occu'.t and miraculous coun el, hath pleafedto divide thofe Nations by a long feries of high tow'ring Mouiitains, and to fccureihem from the injuries which the diverfuyof Cliinate hath produced in their fcveral affeflions and cuftom?, and confequently a certa n natural enmity •, and hath likcwifc provided in all parts more eminent feats amongft Mountains, and more indofed onesamidft Vallies, wherein the Inhabi- tants may preferve themfclves fate from the force and violence, which the ftronget ufe to exercife upon the weaker. So as Fortification may be faid to be an Art which doth imitate and fielp Nature, becaufe her operations are like thofe oft' e others, and do fomctimes reduce the workmanrtiip of Nature to more pcrfedion and ufe, And though this be not grounded upon fo certain piinciples as ihofe of the Sciences, yet doth (lie govern herfelf by a kind of Reafon in fuch things wherein fli: is verfcd.
And
And thus much may ferre to prove that (lie deferves the nariic of Art ; neither OU^ht (h: to be e\'era w'lic undervalued, bccaufe nevv things an J new rules are daily found out by tlie iivJudrie of thofe that ftudy her, fince it is proper to natural and eternal thngs to keep themfelves always in fuch a condition, as that they futTernoc any alttrutioa. But lay what thing it is, which of all humane operations, wherein fuch ceitancy and conftincie is to be founds No man will notwithftanding fay, that men aie to live idly, or totally to b.take themfelves to Contemplation, and dcfpife Co many Arts, which are the ornaments of Civil life, becaufe we cannot ' procee 1 therein by way of demonftiation to one only and certain ti uth. Nor can it be fiid that this Aitof Foitification is of late invention, for it is very antient, nnd hath been known alinoft in all AgeSj and by all Nations-, but fomctimcs in leflir, fomer.imes in greater pcrfedion, according to a certain variety and viciffitude wh ch Time caufcth ;s ue.l in Arts, as in all other things. The Ancients had their *' orts, and Engines of War to take them, which by a general name they called Jormenta : Amon^ft other Engines which ferved to batter down Forts, the Rams were much known and ufed • and wc find mention made of many other forts of Inftrumtnts belonging to the offence and defence of Cities ; and of thefc fome fo miraculous, asthtir forcemay be faid to caufe no lefs wonder, then do our Guns nowa-daies. Tothispurpofe we read, that when Jf//»/* would vanqufh a certain City in ^/'4;», theDifendeis thereof threw certain Irons over the walls, fo artificially ordered, as they therewith drew up fuch of the Enemies Soldiers as came neer the walls, to the top thereof. And ic is related of that famous Archimedes^ that he invented an Engine which was ufed in defence of his Country Sjraciifa, by which an armed Gaily might be raifcd by force out of the water, and drawn up on the Town- walls. How can it be then faid, that fuch Art of Fabricking was unknown to the Antients, if they ufed fuch ftudy and induftry in defending and in oppugning Forts ^ Nay, m:ny of their moft cry'd up Commanders have been praifed particularly for this; and the Romans, who were very excellent at all things belonging to the Militia, were very good at this a!fo, and did thereby preferve their State, which they had almofl loft by fighting : For Hamibul in his profperous courfe of vi(5lory, was forced to keep io long , and fpend fo much time before fome fmall, but ftrong and well- walled Cafllts, and Colonies ot the Romans^ asthcfafcty of the City oi Rome was in a great part attributed thereunto.
But to fpcik no more of t!efe antient proceedings, do we not fee that many Forts and CaftKs have been built in not many Ages ag© in many phces, and chiefly in Itdlj ? Which though the ufe of Cannon renders now of no ufc, yet compare fuch Fortrelfcs with the mannvr oi warfaring in tho(e days, and they may be held almoft cqud to ours, or at leaft they fhew that men did ftudy as much th.n to fecuie themfe'ves Irom being injured by the Enemy, and the better to maintain their Srarcs and Territories by that art, as they do now. The fo many Sieges and beleaguering of Cities, whereof mention is made in all Ages, do deerly prove that the ufc of Fortification is of veiy antient ufe, and hath been continued in all Ages, though it be nowieduced to much greater perfetflion. Now if wc (hall coi fidtr whit advantage is made by Fortifica.ions, we ftiall find them to be many, andof gre-.t importance: For it is fufficiently manifeft, that a Country wherein areno ftrong Holds, isaUvaies in apparent danger, and left almoft at thedifcretion of the Enemy ^ who whiift they may fafely at unawares enter thereinto, not meet- ing with any obftacle, have it alwaies in their power, if not to prejudice tfie main nflairs of tha: State, at leaft to vex the people by fire and rapine, of whofe fafety and prefervaticn the Prince ought alwais to be careful.
Wc may find fad example of this by the late and well known paft'ages of the Country of Ftiuli in the late Wars which the State of V<»ice had in Terr* firrm j
being
being totally deftitutc of ftrong Holds, it became a prey to whoroever would af-
■''*' fauitic •, infomuch as it was not onely ruined and deftroyd by regular Armies, but by
^'' fuch as pafTed tumultuoufly over the mountans vthc Inhabitants thereof being only
^^folong fecure, as the Venetian Army was permitted to remain amongft thofc Con-
^•-'fitics-, but as foonas being fummoned from thence, upon other occafions, itbe-
"hoved to be gone from thence, the Enemies returned again tofre(h and fecure de-
*\ prcdacions-, which will likewife Wcfal any Region which is not defended, and main-
^"tained by Fortrefles. And where the members of a State are farafunder, if ic
^■'itiufl be defended onely by the Soldiers fword, many Armies will fcarcely be able
" to fecure it 5 whereas by means of ftrong Holds, the fame people who are able to
*•' defend them, willlikewife fervein a great part toprefervc the Country- as well
*"' becaufc many of the Inhabitants may there findc fafe refuge, as likcwife for that is
*''nogood advice nor ufually imbraced by good Commanders to advance forward,
•'■and to leave the Foftsof the Enemy placed in fitting parts upon the Frontiers be -
"• hinde them, the State is preferved from greater dangers. As on the contrary, the
'State wherein there are no ftrong Holds, though it be provided of a good
^ and valiant Militia, yec muft it depend upon the various chance of War, and
'hazard all upon the uncertain event of Battel^ and if anything of misfortune be-
fal the whole Country is left to thedifcretionof the Enemy, and the Armies
not having any Cife place whereiinto to retreat are totally defeated by one rout ;
as it happened in the laft Age in the Soldan of Cairo's moft famoft Empire, which
Soldan being overcome in feveral Battels by Seljmus Ottoman^ and wanting time to
rally his Army, and ftrong Holds whereunto tohavc refuge, did in a fhort time
lofe his whole Kingdom and the Empire oi the CM am mahcc hi wis overthrown;
which was before very famous for military difcipline, and efteemedvery fecure,
by repofing its fafety in the Valor of ftrong and able men.
To this may be added, That ftrong Holds do not onely fecure States from thefe u:moft hazards of adverfe Fortune, but make very much for the keeping it away, and often-times they reap the intention of tiue fecuritie, without any hazard -, foe when he who intends to aflaulta State, fliallconfider that his attempts are likely to prove tedious and difficult , and that it is doubtful whether he fliall be therein vidorinusor no, he does not foeafily fall upon thebufinefs^ but when the War is once begun Fortreflcs do affuredly fufficicntly keep from comming to join Battel; for theaflailant will not eafily hazard himfelf upon the danger of a pitch 'd Field; becaule he fees he fliall be debarr'd the chief fruits of Vi(5torie ( which is the get- ting of Come City or place of importance ) by ftrong Holds : And fo alfo he who isalTaulted, the more he fees his affairs in a good pofture by the means of ftrong Holds, the'more he endeavors to prolong the time, to the end that he may defeat him by his own incommodities, without much ufe of weapons : Whence it is that in thefe times, wherein the perfedtion of fortifying is much incrcafed, field Bat- tels are feldom fought ; for to fight makes not for the advantage of cither of the parties out of the above faid confideraiions -, Since thevTit and induftry of the Commanders ftemsto prevail over Fortifications and do in a great part take that uncertainty from Wat which ufeth to be found therein. In the condition of the prefcntaff.:irs and times, it is alfo feen that as much time is fpenc in the taking of one onely Fort, as in former Ages, and when another manner of Militia was in ufe, was fpent in taking in whole Provinces. Which per adventure is likewifethe caofc why the Princes of thefe later Ages, though fomeof them have been very powerful and valiant, have not made any great progrefs in all the Wars which they have made: Wherefore it fcems it may be affirmed that Fortification is a very noble and excellent Art, becaufe it helps to compafs the ultimate and true end which ought to be ihe aim of War in a well regulated Swte, to wit; peace and fecuritie. . W^at
(i75)
What is then to be lefolved upon in this divetfitie of allegations ? Ic is a true and general rule,that all things cannot fuit with all things,nor ought wc in the actions belonging to civil life to (eek for that wh ch is rimply,and of it felf good,for it would be in vain to do fo -, divers things prove ufeful to divers ends, and to divers perfons, and they ought to be accommodated to the condition of times,quality ofcuftoms, and to other particular accidents. Therefore the fame manner of proceeding in the Government, and prefervation of their States becomes notfeveral Pr.aces, buc -fevcral waies. Such Princes as have large Dominions, and powerful Forces, mav Acutely repofc their fafciy in their Militia, and Soldiery, they have no great need of Caftles or ftrong Holds •, and if they will have any, it may fuffice them to havs them placed upon their utmoft Confines, to fecure their Country from fudden in- curftons, and for the opportunitie and fecuritic of fuch Garifons as fuch Princes ufe ro keep in their provinces, which are furtheft remote, and at a great diftjncc from their Imperial Seate 5 as the Roman Emperors did in former times, and as the ot. toman Lords do now, who irufting in their own power, do endeavor much more the taking of Forts which do appertain to other men, then the making of n:vv ones thcmfelves, which they ftand notfo much in need of, for that their great- nefs keeps them free from being injured by others. But kfler Princes ought to govern themfclvcs by another rule, and ftand more in need of flrong Holds •, for not having any large Territories, nor much money to keep a great many Soldieis continually in pay, what they cannot do by force or reputation, th:y do by the advantage of Foit.fications 5 for they keep what belongs unto them fo well guar- ded by a few Soldiers , as fometimcs the Forces of any whatfoever powerful Prince are not able to pluck them out of iheir neft, nor yet to bereave them of any part of their State : Whtrvof wc have had many examples in thefe later times, and amongft the reft, the defence of CMaluis very remarkable, which being af- faulted by the Forces of fo great a Prince as was Soljman^ the few Knights of Malta were fo able to defend ir,2S theTurks wcie forced not without fome lha.nc,aad much to their prejudice, to quit it, after having fpcnt much time, and loft many men before that Forr.
And the Turks having learned by the experience of others, the good of ftrong Holds begin now to have abetter eftecmof them, then formerly they have had, efpcciallyin places furtheft off from the Seat of the Empire, wheie all things neceflaie cannot be provided for, but in a long time, and with much inconvenicncie. They have to this purpofe built many Forts in the parts which they have lately got- ten in Perfia ; and have therein done very wifely 5 for whereas the former Ottatmn Emperors, reaped no good by their enterprifcs upon ter(u^ but as foon as their Armies were w ithdrawn,the Country which they had ovcr-run,but not gotten, re- turned to the obedience of its former Lords, now, by degrees from time to time, they have by their Forts fo confirmed themfclves in the polftffion of fuch places as they have once taken, as the /'fr/;4»;,being a people little verft in the expugning of ftrong Holds, have but fmall hopes of ever driving them out from fuch fpacious Territories, firft gotten by force of Arms, and afteiwards by fuch means main- tained by thcm,& by a fife pofleiTion fecured unto them. So as the ufe of Fertredes are fomc time according as place andoccafionilullferveof nofmal fcrvice, nor on- ly lope tie Princes, but even to the greatcft. But as for the numl cr of thcf:: firong Holds, for the time, form, and other accident, which ought to be oblerved in the building of them, no fuch certain rule cm be given as can fcrve all men ac all times. Cnly this may be fud, that a wife Prince ought 10 confiJcr herein, not on- ly wiia the dcfigns to do, but what his Eftate, and what his Forces are ^ orher- wifethat which was intended for a cure and fufter.ance, may prove poifon and ruin to the State. As when a Prince will make fuch, and fu many Fortre^es, as that by
rcafjn
reafon of too great and incoufiderate expence in time of Peace,in tnaiataiiung them, he tnuft of himfelf confume ■- ihen that will prove true which hath formerly been confidtred that a Prince ot no great fovtuoe, not being able to garrifonife or furnifti fo mnny lortreffes with things ncCvrlTary, nor to draw forth the body ot a well- adjufted Army into the fielci,in gicatci\ uanger of War, will find he haih not fecured, but increafed his own dangers, and hath put the total of his affairs in great diforder and confufion.
Fortreffes then, as all other things in a w^U ordered Government, ought to be difpofedof with good judgment, and a well regulated temper ^ fo as their number and oreatnefs may be proportionable to the condition of the State, and of the Prince his Forces : They muft not be placed idly in all places, but ouly upon the Frontiers, an ^ in places fit for thatpurpofe -, and fo as the natural fituation of the pbce may aflfifl Art as much as may be, and be alfo thereby aflifted •, for fuch Fortrefles say be maintained in gi eater fccurity, and with fewer Soldiers. Bur above ail things, ail poffiblc care muft be had, that in time of greaceft need they m:<y be mccord • fox no Fort can hold out long againf^ a great force, unlefs it be fupplicd by new Garri- fons, Munitions, and with all othtr ncceffaries. It is alfo very advantagious f:)r Fortredes, that there be good ftorcof good Farth or Mould within them, thereby they miy feveral ways accommodate thcmfelves for defence, according, as the ap- proaches to take them are made •, and alfo to have ready opportunity to ufc the be- nefit of many itttrcats, and to eain time, which is the proper and grcateft convcni- enci'.for Fortreflfes. So as if fit.mg provifions and refpeds be had, FortrefTes fo built .ill prove .idvantat- ious for a Pnncc or ^tate, not only jn the opinion or Soldi- er*, but even of Stnteunen. But when they arc made without judgment or art, it is not '.he iault of the Work, butot him who knows not how toufe it, if fuch good effeds do not enfur thereupon as are defircd : Which happens not only in ftrong Holds, liuc iw ;iil othtT thi; gs, which being ill ufed, lofe their efficacie. Thus chen the e arguments are ealilyanfvvcred by thefe diftin(ftions, and by what hath been alleaceed in the beh -.Ir' of ftrong Holds, which might at firft occafion any doubt : Forth'eArtof Fortification ought not to be deipifed, becaufeithathnotalwaies been the I'arnc •, rather it ought to be fo much the more efteemed, bccaufe we fee it grows every day to gieater perfedion by new inventions, and by experiences. Thus it farts alfo with ttie Art of building of Ships and Houles, with that of Sculp- ture, Phyfick, Painting, and of all otiier excellent Difciplinej, which ( Experience bein^', the bcfl Introduftrcfs ) did not arrive at fuch cxcellencic and eftimation fud^ denly, but in procefs of time.
And notwiihff anding, this Art of Fortification hath in this our Age gotten fomc more fetled Rules, and ( as a man may fay ) more certain Principles, fince the ufe of Fatctries and of other manner of Attaques introduced by modern men, whereby l])edoih govern herfelf in the whole, and in every one of her particular members, in form, diftance, proportion of parts, and in other things, whicli are alwaies the fame, where the {i?at will permit it. Variety of noble Wits have added fj much of oinamenr and of perfcdion of late to this noble Profeffion, as all doubts which may b. put whether there be a true Art thereof, or no, are evidently cleered : And though fometimes (he may vary by reafon of the d.verlity of fituations, or by any other accidents which cannot be comprifed within one and the fame Rule, this ought not todetraft from the dignity of the Artificers thereof, then it doth from the Polititian ( who ct rcainly is the chiefeft Architeftor in all our Civil operations ) to ptoceed by probable arguments, and oftentimes alter his advice, that he may fit his -iftions to the circumftances which do accompany them. Nor doth it follow, that fuch an Art lliould be the worfe thought of, becaufe it doth not alwaies com- pafsitsend, wWchis the prefcrvation ot fUch a City, or fuch a Country where
fuch
fudi Foraflcatlons are erected •, fince that likemfe depends upon various accidertt?, whichnohununcartor wifdom is able to forcfce nor when forefeen, to provide alvvaies by any induftry a due remedy againft them. It may as well be faid, men ought to torbear building of Ships, and deprive ihcmfelves thereby of the Traffick and Commerce which is held with far diftant Coumries, btcaufe many Ships penfli in the Seas. The Phyfitians care doth notalwaies cure the fick party ; the Orator doth not ahvaies compafs his ends by his perfwafive oratory : Ought men therefore to forbear Navigation, Phyfick, or Perfwafion ^ Ifa wicked and pcrfidiou'; mjn betray a Fort unto the Enemy which was recommended to his truft, ought th s to be attributed to the evil and imperfedion of Forts ^ What thing is there fo goodj asmay notbeabufedby wicked men:^ tisonlyVcrtue which hath this priviledg- all other adornments of Humanitie would be exiind, and expeli'd the World. If a Fort be loft for being badly garrifoned, ill defended, or by fome other finifter accident-, ought the fault which is committed by the Prince his negligence, the Commanders ignorance, or by the Soldiers cowardife, belaid upon thedcfeflof the Fort, which is of it fclf well made ^ But fay, 1 befeech you, are fuch diforders and dangers as may arife in a State, by want of care in a Prince, by the perfidioufnefs of Commanders, or cowardife of Soldiers,become fo peculiar to Forts and Citadels, as the lame by the fame occafion may not happen in Armies, and in all other de- fences howfccver attempted^ Wherefore then by feeking for fuch perfedionin Fortf, as is not found in o;her things, (hall we by the lofs^f that advantage which "tiiay be thereby received, and is often received, leave the State in the hands of Chance, and to the difcretion of him who doth delign to afllmlt it. Nor ou;hc ic to be faid , ih:i fti ong Holds {hculd be defpifed, and the wholfe fifety of the State be placed in the Milicin, as in a thing of firmer foundation, becaufe it is not every Prince that can alwaies keep an Army in pay, nor would this be fufficient to keep a State from uiicxpcdled aflaults, which hath many feveral Confines. More: ver, he who piaceth all his hopes of fecuring his State in Armies, and in openly fighting his Enemies, nruft oftentimes ( as it hath been faid ) hazard all to Fortune, and put him- felf upon the danger of a thoufand accidents -, and unlefs Field forces be back'd by ftrong i 'olds, and equal to thofe of the Enemy who doth afTaulc ttem. they muft remain idle and of no ufe : For not being able to v^iihftand the fliock, what can they do elfe bui retreat, and fuffer him who (liall be ftrongcr 'o make . imfelf Mafter of the whole Country i whereas by the help of Fortre0es,a few are able to reli(^ many, and to gain time, the only true remedy of him who is the weaker,and w ho is to relift and withfland the Forces of one that is more powerful.
Nor ought the example of the Spartans be of any validity to perfv^-ade the con- trary, who would notfecure their Cities with Walls, or any other Fortifications 5 becaufe having only to do with other people of Greece who weie weaker then theyj they thought themfelres fate without fuch helps •, and that by e oing fo, they pur- chafed more praife and reputation : But when they were to wage war with the Terft^ns and CMacedonUns^ who were powerful Enemies, ev:n they fought to puG themfflvesinapoftureofdefence, by having recourfe to narrow paflag-.s-, and to keep off" the Enemy, afTifting the natural iituations of the places by Fortifications. Moreover, the5pr^.<;75ha(i but fmall Territories, and but a few places to guard,' and were much given -o the Mihtia •, fo as th.y who w.ll reap advantage by follow- ing their counfels, muft be Lords of Cities, all the inhabitants \vh;reot muft be Soldiers, and all of them defirous to preferve the State, *as were the Spartans. Buc thereafcn why tbsDukcof t/'^/»did flight fome oi his Foits,was peradventure be- caufe he knew himfclr too weak to ciefend them ; and be fides, becaufe he thought it better not to invite oihers to wage war w it'i him, ei.her out of a jealoufie ot them, or out of a delire to make ihemftlves mafters ot them, he being to conlulcr all
A a Foice%
(.78)
Forces as Oicy related to his, or if he would make ufc of other mens affiftance he mud dep.nd upon them. And tor what concerns the ftrong Holds of Tujanj^ it may be faid in the rirft place, that it was the imprudencie of PUtro de C^edict^ not the Caftles wi .ich did trouble and difordcr the Florentines : And (econdly, that ic may be Duke Cofir»o would not fo cafily have gotten Cxf^r to have coafirmed him in the podelTion oi that State,had ic not been that he might thereby fccure himfelf of his f^ith in that new [dominion ; But the accidents which may occur are fo many, as it is impoflible to comprehend every particular under one and the (amc rule. And is it not a vain thi g to affirm, that ftrong Holds ought not to be made ufe of, becaufe if it fo fall out asW State which wants them be loft, it may be the more eafily re- covered ^ For that is no more then to expofe a mans fdf to mortal wounds, out of hopes that when he is hurt he may find a cure. And what Prince can afture himfelf that though he hath been negligent in muniting his State with Forts, his Enemy when he (hall have made himfelf Mafter of his State, will not fortifie fuch feats as he ftiali find commodious for his fafety.
But if it be faid, that a Prince grows wicked, covetous, and cruel towards his Subje^s through his too much confiding in ftrong Holds, it is no. cafily to dif- ccrn that thefc fo far remote affairs have any thiig to do with the vices of the mind, and if they ought to be taken into fuch confidcration, the reafon would reach no further then to Caftles and Citadels^ but in greater and more important Fortifications, the Priitfte is fo much the more bound to prefcrve the love and loy- altieof hisSubj:ds,in thacheftands in the more need of them for the fafety of the City thus foitified.forif itlhould fill into th; Enemies hands by the peoples re- belhon, the lofs would be the greater. But it may be the confideration of expence which that Prince puts himfelf unto, who builds many ftrong Holds, mayfecmto bear more weight with it then any of the reft, whereas his chief care ought to be, to accumulate treafureintime of peace, againft Wars (hall happen •, to which ic cnay be anfwered. That States cannot be prefeived without charges and exoence 5 and that if a Prince lliould go about to procure the like fecuritie to himfelf by his Mili- tia, as he doth by his (^rong Holds : he muft be at infinite more expence, and fuch as none but great Kingdoms and Empires are able to undergo. But if a I^mce proceed therein with fuch temper and judgement as hath been fpoken of, and which is alfo requilite in all things elfe, he can incur no danger by Fortifiations, of running into thofediforders and neceflities, which many carelefsmen, and fuch as know not how to govern do fall.
We will then conclude, that Fortifications arc very ufeful in all States, but chiefly in fmall ones, and in thofe more then any others, which have many Confines, and powerful neighbors , for fuch States have need of good guards, and have not wherewith to keep Armies perpetually on foot^ as the Turks do in thefe times, nor to make Defarts as do the Ferftam, nor to inftitute Colonies in feveral parts, as was the cuftomoftheanticnti?(jOT4«j-, and if the Commonwealth of Fenice did imiuK them therein, it was but once 5 and with more defire to the felf-inhabitants of the Ifland of Candi4 at her devotion,then to defend it from forein Forces; But now that the Turks power is grown fo formidable, it would be altogether unufeful, and not of any moment, without ftrong Holds, and a well paid Militia ^ therefore the care and ftudy which Princes take more in thefe latter times then they did formerly in Fortification muft needs be praifed by whofocver confiders things with a right judgment.
The
('79) The Ninth DISCOURSE,
Whether the opinion of F$pe Leo the Tenth were good er ndj and hit coHnfelfafcy of driving forein Nations out of Italy,' by the heip of other TrAnfilpwc Forces,
ITaly had been molefted with Wars by forein Nations, almoft continually for the fpace of Thirty years, when in the time of the Popedom of Leo the Tenth, (lie feemed to have fome hopes of quiet, and of enjoying feme better condition, after her fo many and fo grievous vexations and raincs, which had called to mind the unhappy racmoric of the former calamities which fhe had undergoneby the invafion of the Northern Armies, but the wounds ot the late evils remained yet uncured j for two noble members of this Province were fain into the hands of forein Princes, the State of MiUo being at the -icvotion of Francii King of Frdoce, and the Emperor Charts the Fifth being pofTeft of the Kingdom ot Nafles-^ which Princes being now weakned and weary with fo many Wars, fo as the one could not exceed the other, and having at that time their thoughts elfe where bent, being governed more by neceffitie peradventure then by their own wills, they feemed to reft fatisfied with what they did already pofTefsin Italy ^ and that they would fuffcr her to enjoy atleaft foihe reft after her paft jno- leftations.
In thispoftureof Affairs, Pope Zw, who had often negotiated with feveral Princes about the bufinefs of Arms, and had endeavored (ashefaid) the liberty of Italy ^ and chiefly the prefervation of the Dukedom of MiUn in the Govern- ment of the .y/(»r:{4V, was much difpleafed to have the power of ftrangers any longer continued, and particularly that the Church (hould be bereft of two nobl» Cities, P4/'»»4 and P/Wf »;(tf , which were become members of the State of ^jMi- hn. Therefore with a haughty and generous mind, he refolved not to prefer an unfecure quiet, before fome prefent troubles, fo to (hun other moleftations and dangers, which he thought might grow the greater by fucha peace, ia future, if not to himfelf, at leaft to the Church. And knowing that he (hould not be able either of himfelf, nor by joining with other Italians^ to drive forein Potentates out of //d/;, he refolved to join with fome forcincrsagainft fome other foreiners, with defign (as he faid) that when fome of them (hould be forced to forgo Italy ^ ic might be the eafier to expel the reft.
Leo having thus put on this noble and generous refolution, it miy feem to merit praife by all men, as to the intention j but as for the means he tooktocompafs ir, it is not fo cafily to be agreed upon-, for many and weighty refpeds do concur there- unto; for fome of which,this a(^ion may feem to be as wife,as glorious jand if we will refleca upon other fome, there will appear much more of difficulty and danger therein, then of fecurity and hopcj. That all TranCilpin.rs might be driven out of Itily^ wosathingdefired, and not without caufc by all ;/.j//jw/, and which ought to be his chifeft care and endeavor who had fuch Territories, degree and authority in that Province, as Leo had. The antient dignity of the Italian honor feemc J to appear in the Pop<s majefty, and in the fplendorofthe Court of Rome : f nt as for the efft (fling of this bufincfs, it did pla'nly appear th-it all thepower of the Italtjn Pottntoteswas too weak-, fince two.giejt Pri ces and wjrlike Nations, had fir many part ye:irs, though with various fortune, got footing there, and (fill kcpr their Folfcfrion, fo as their power could fuffer ro difturbance, bucmi.fl: be confirmed
Aa 2 and
(.8o)
and confolidated, and muft become more formidable to the Church, and to all the Italian Princes, unleG it were byfomeof the fame forein Nations. If the fole Foices of the Italian Princes, when Italy by reafon ofa long Peace did flourilh moft, were not futficient to ftop the French Forces, which were then but new in thofe parts, and but meanly aflifted •, what reafon was there to believe, that this Province ftiould ever be raifcd up again of herfclf, and fhould by means of her own Forces re- turn to her ptiftine fortune and dignity, after having been fo long vexed by cruel Wars, and having loft two of her noblcft Members.
Wherefore though toadminiftcr frefh fuel, as it were, to this fire of War, as would be done by the authority and Forces of the Apoftolick Sea, iftheyfhould jon with C^far^ or with the King of Franggy might be troublcfom and dangerous, yet might it be bentficial, or at Icaft hopeful, fince it might fo fall out, that the fortineof War being various, and fubje<a to unexpefted chances, fome good efFe<a might enfue thereupon for the liberty of Italy ; the Forces of thofe Princes who did oppofc her, growing much the weaker, or elfe by their growing weary of the work, and by their tu.ning themfelvcs to fome other undertaking. Whereas on the con- trary^ to fuffer them to fettle there, and to get in time greater authority over the people, and more love to the States which they had gotten, was a certain and irre- parable ruine, and an utter abolilhing of all hopes of ever rcftoring the States which wereponeft by fti angers jnto the hands of the Italian Princes. But the fear left both thefe Princes, who were ^rown fo powerful in Italj^ might join together againft the Tenitories of the Church,or thofe of other Italian Princes, to divide them amongft thcmfclves, as had happened not many years before,when the Emperor Maxmiliatt and Lervii the Twelfth, King of Fra»ce, who had been formerly at fuch great en- mity one with another, grew good friends by dividing the Lands between them which belonged to the Venetium 5 might chiefly perfwade the Pope to quit neu- trality, and to fide wuh the one or the other of thefe Princes. Leo knew, that upon many paft occafions he had done tilings not only of but little fatisfadion, but of much difguft to both thefe Pririces and Nations, more particularly to the French^ who VI ere alwaies jealous of his canning •, fo as great etitulation growing in them both, and a defire of commanding over all Italy ^ and finding that affairs were io equally poifed between them in this Province, as the one could not much exceed the other, nor make any new acquifition, it was with reafon to be feared, that being void of all hopes of having the Pope to fide with either of them, from whofe friead- fhip they might for many reafons exped very confiderable afliftance, they might ac laft convene together to the total opprelfion of the Liberty of Italy. Nor was Leos Neutrality in this conjunifture of time and affairs able to fecure him from fuch a danger, fince he had formerly openly declared himfelf and taken up Arms in company with oihers^ and chiefly fince the Frtnch knew, that he was no waies pleafed with their Dominion in Italy ^ as well for the common affairs, as for his own particular diflike that they had poffefl'ed themfelves of the Cities oi Parma andP^'rf- (cnfa, which were returned to the obedience of the Apoftolick Sea by his Prede- cefTor Julius. So as the Churches State, and that of the f /flrw?/»«, which was under the fame Popes proteftion and government, grew to be thofe alone which were expofed to the injuries of all men 5 for the Venetians were ftill firm to the French^ and the other leifer Princes adhered fome to the fortune of the French^ fome to that of the Impcrialifts. It was then the moft ufcful, fafe, and requifite counfd, to join in friendfhip by particular and reciprocal obligations, either with Cdfar, or wifh the King of France : By doing which, to boot with fecurity, many good effeiSs might follow, to wit, that the adverfe party being fupprcft and driven out of Italy^ that party which fhould yet remain there as firicnd, and free from the jealoufie or rivallhip of any forein Prince, was likely to afford a long Peace ( a thing
very
(«80
^yneceffary in rcfpediof the many late affliftions ) and fuch accidents might the inore probably happen in procefs of time, whereby lulj might more eafily free herfclf from ihe feivitude of one only Lord and Matter, then (he (hould have done from the like ot two-, it being unlikely that two Principalities fliould meet with one and the fame fortune, at one and the fame time. But if nothing elfeofgood had happened during this difcord and contention between thefe two Princes, their States muft be fubjcft to the cxpences and troubles which do neceffarily accompany War 5 fo as feme revenge would be had upon thefe forein Nations, for the fo many calamities which they had brought upon Italy 5 and that faying of the Scripture would be verified , To revenge a ma» upon hit Sttemies , bf other JEnemies.
The Emperors of Rome^ when the Empire began to decline, and the antient Ita- lian worth and difcipline wasalmoft loft, they not having Forces Infficient of their own to wiihftand the Northern nations, made ufe of the Soldiers of the fame Northern nations to drive their FcUowforciners out of UaIj 5 as particularly of the Goths ^ of whom they had fcveral times great numbers in their Armies. But fay that one of thefe forein Princes could not have worfted the other,though aflifted by the Apoftolick Sea, even in this condition of affairs hopes would not be wanting> whilfl War fhould continue between them : For after having long vvreftled to- gether, cfpecialiy fince the quarrel arofe out of hatred and warlike emulation, ic was not unlikely that they would rather quit the Territories which they held in Itilj to fome third perfons, then to yield one to another, foas it might remain in their own power : Concerning which furrender, particularly of the State of mUm^ many Treaties had been formcrly.ie* had likcwife a very ftefh example of councels taken by the Venetian Senate, which in the fame cafe was confirm'd by experience to be very wifely done : For that Senate finding that their State was fallen into great misfortunes, and reduced to fo low an ebb, as fhe was not able to recover of herfelf, they joined with fome of their very Enemies, againft other fome of their Enemies ; "whereby they did not only feparate them, but did revenge themfelves much to the prejudice of thofe that they had excluded from their fiiendihip, and did thus recover the State which had been ufurped from them. But Leo's advice was afterwards the better appioved of by the particular iffue of this very bufinefs : For having after many feveral cogitations of mind join'd in confederacie with C<«/ir, the City of icJW//4« was taken from the Frwf)?' by their joint-forces, and the Cities of PArmx and Piacerffa were recovered co the Church ; not without great hopes, had it not been for the imexpeded and unfortunate death of Pope LeOy that the Freruh (hould have then been totally expulfed out of Itaij, and MAxinttlian SforT^ reinveftcd into the State oiMiUn^ according to agreements made by the Pope, which would have greatly fccured the liberty of the Church,3nd of whole Itdly. Which when it (hould have fo fuccecded, there was reafon enough to hope, that the French would join in driving the Imferinlijis oot of the Kingdom of Naples , being fatisfied ( without any other reward ) with having revenged themfelves for their received injuries, and W'ith feeing the Imperialifls reduced to their condition, for what concerned «he affairs of Italj. And it might be hoped that this might the eafilier be done, by reafon of the far diftancc of C^/-irj Territories, and by reafon of many ill humors which began already to grow in feveral places -, whereby he might be ncceifitated to bend his Forces and thoughts elfwhcre, and leave his affairs in Jtaly but weakly de- fended. Leo then may feem to have grounded his councels well, like a wife Prince (as he was) upon good foundations, for as nnich as miy be eftcded by humane wif» dom, where (o many other accidents do concur. Yet were there not wanting fome ^ho did greatly blame this refolution of Pope Leo's^ taxing him with inconfiderate- nefs, becaufe being led on by vain hopes, he had unncceifarily imbroil'd himftlf
again
(•80
again in War: And if we fhall look more narrowly into this bufineft, we fliall find that many ConfiJerations were wanting •, which may raife at leaft feme rational doubts, whether the Pope were more to be praifed, or to be blamed for this aftion.
It is moft certain, that Warinitfelf istroublefom to Princes, grievous to the People, and fubjcd to many various and uncertain chances. So that as every wife Prince ought alwaies to avoid it, where there is no exprefs necefliiy, it appears that this Prince ought to have had it in more horror then any other, in refpcd of the times, and of his degree and place, which ought rather to have made him endea- vor peace and qui;t between Chriftian Princes. The Dominion of the Church was by his Predeceflbrs means arrived already to fuch alargcnefs, as it might feem better to become the Succeeder to augment the fafety thereof by procuring friend- ship with other Princes, and by a conftant neutrality, then to expofe himfelf to new troubles and dangers, by adding more States thereunto. Italy having been much afflidted, and brought in almoft every of her parts to great mifefy and cala- mity, for having been the feat of Warfor the fpace of thirty years, didnotonely much defirc peace and quiet, but did chiefly expcdi it from the Popes councels and adions, by reafon of his fupremc authoritie, and of the zeal he ought to have bora to the publick good.
How could it then defcrve praife, that when forein Princes fcemed to be incli- ned to fuffer Italy to remain quiet, he (hould afford them occafion and mems of imbroiling her in new troubles and calamitiesi vyhichwere certainly to infuebyre- a^iiming Arms, where the advantage which might thereby be gotten was very doubtful and queftionable i But, that which in this cafe is chiefly to be confidcred, is, that Leg's intention being to drive the forciners out of Italy^ and to vindicate her liberty, he fliould have chofen fome good means to have done it. Many antienc and modern experiences might have taught him, how hard a matter it might be to keep the French on the other fide of the Mountains. The Romans were not more troubled with any other Nation then with the French^ in treeing Italy fi:om forein invafions -, for Ihe was oft-times afTaulted by them , and many of her parts pofTefl by them, and the Empire it felf was endangered by their Forces. And of late years fince the paflage of charls the Eighth, though they had proved variety of fortune, yet kept they ftill the fame refolution of waging war in Italy, and of keeping footing in this Province, not being frighted from this refolution by any misfortune bow great fotver •, but being once beaten back,they returned with great fury to feek out novelties ^ and at this very time that we now fpeak of, they were poflefl of the Dutchy of Milan. Therefore to fecurc himfelf from the Freneh^itvizs not fufficienc to drive them once owtoi Italy '^ for the Forces of that large Kingdom being ftill very powerful , and they being alwaies prepared for novelty , their dcfire bore them chiefly thereunto, where it had done formerly, foas/u/y remained ftill cx- pofed to new incurfions, and fubjeft to the miferies of War. Therefore this inten- tion of Pope Lee's^ of keeping the French long out of Italy ^ could not pcradven- tur« have been compafled but in a long procefs of time, and with much variety of fuccefs, no, not though Italy had been all of a peece, and in greater power and pro- fperitic then ftie then was.
Whereas at this time the Commonwealth of Venice being now returned to great power, was joined in confederacie with the King of Francehy vertue of antient Capitulations; nor was it to be hoped for , that out of any uncertain hopes, and of long cxpedlation, ftie (hould eafily forgo fuch a friendfhip : And as for other PrinceSjthey were but \veak,and their ends not conftant nor conformable. And on the other fide, c*/4rwa$ very bare of monies, and had many other irons in the fire, fo as the greateft weight and care of managing this War was likely to fall un- to
(i80
to the Popes ill jre, v.Iicreai if he Hiould flacken never fo little, all that had been done would have been to no cftldT: ; and thofe places, which by rcafon of thiscon- federacie wich the Church, were taken from the French^ would quickly and eafily havefaln in:o th-irhanis again. Bucfiy t\\iiCbarls had becnable tohaveim- ploiedallhis Forces about this bufinefs, the greater they had been, the greater (hare would he have precenied in the bufinefs: and the Icfs able had the Pope or any others been to oppofehis Forces.
ChArls the Great, a Prince of excellent worth, freed italf from the flavifh yoke of the Northern Barbarians, driving the Lombards from thence, who had had the chief command there for Three hundred years; but he would therefore make the grcateft a ivantagc thereof unto himfelf, cteating his Son Fipin^ Kingoi Italy-, nor ougl t a.iy ot Charls his promifts to be thougt t fufficient to (hun fuch a danger, to which ic was known he was much more moved out of a fervent defire to draw the Pope into this coniederacic of excluding the Kingoi Frafice, then that hehad any waies quitted his d-Jire to the Dukedom of fJ\iiUn, What reafon was there then to bekeve, that when C.«/4r fhould be become more powerful in /M/jr, and (hould h:ive dr.ven out the French^ he (hould likewife beexpell'd from thence, when his Territories and Authority (hould be there the greater ? It is rather to be belecved, that by his increaf; of power, Italy fliould be in a worfe condition, and the danger thereof the more, for whilft thefc two Princes ftood upon equal terms, and with an inveterate mind did counterpoife one another, the other States were the more fecure, it being unlikely that any one of the parties would permit that the others fhould increafe, or be heightncd by the ruine of any of the Princes of Italy 5 buc he that (h )uld be aflaulted by one was fare to be aflifted by the o- ther; {oz'iLeo ought chiefly to have endeavored in this conjundlure of affairs to have kept thefefcaUs even by his neutrality-, for whilft the bufinefs ftood thus, it behoved th: very Enemies of the Italians x.ow3\wt their Fricndfhip, for their own good, and for the preftrvation of their States.
It is not eafie to decide whether it did really conduce more to the good of Italy, thatthe Pope Oiould continue in his reutrality, or by his joining with fomeoneof thefe forein Piinces who at that time bad fo great an influence upon Italy ^i\\t fucccft being to depend upon many very much differing 3Ccidents-,for fince humane wifdom is not able to provide againft them all, fhc cannot find any fecure way which leads to that deftin'd end. Let us fay then ( ftill keeping our felves within fome general rules) inthefirft place, that to join in friendfliip and confederacie with a more powerful Pdnce, and one who ij a near neighbor, when the increafe of power IS intended by this conjundion, is never to be done without danger, nor ought fuch aiefolu ion ever be taken but out of great neceffity •, efpecially not by fuch Princes, whoarc not fo weak, as they need a leaning ftock, nor to depend in all things upon the event of anothers fortune. Now Leo had no fuch reafon to forgo the little quiet which hehad then purchaftby plunging into a Sea of Leagues and Confederacies, which are vtry hard to belaid fafthold of with Princes of great power , defirous of glory , who pretend the fame things , and between whom War is not fo eafi'.y ended, as it isreaffumed. The Churches Patrimonie was fufficiently fecured by the majefty cf Religion, by Pontifical power, by therao- ne; s which by many waies llicmay be fupplied with, and by her Domn ions, being at this time muchinlarged by ^uliiu the fccond. So as Leo's intention is to be praifed for havin;2 his thoughts fo carefully bent upon the Libertieof Italj.lt is like- wife to l-.c c'cfired that he had had either more judgement or temper, to know andchufean cpportunetinne, and a fitting occafion-, and yet it is like wife a gene- ral rulc.ih ., to wait for the advantage of Time,when Affairs are upon great ftricghts, doufualiyb ai.; notable advantages, andfometimcsby ne,v andanexpccSed waies,
Italy
JtAlf was long under the obedience of the Weftern Emperors : If at that time w hen their povvtr and autfiority w:u fo great, the Popes would have call'd in torein Forces, and made ufe ot them to reduce tlic Government of //4/7 under the Churches power, or clfe into the hands of fome other Italiin Princes, Italy would in the firft place have certainly been given in prey to the infolcncie of foreign Soldiers, and at laft (lie would peradventure have been bi ought to a worfc condition. But by temporifing, fuch occafions arofe, as the Church increaftd her Dominions by ceitain lawful Donations without the fheddmg of blood, and all Italy remained fubjeft to her own proper and particular Lords •, and the Wtftcrn F mpcrors being long vex'd and troubled by the Wars ot Germany, were forced to forgo the affairs of Italy.
Moreover, though C^far's fortune and power was then very great, yet was it fubjeifl to great alterations, by rcafon that he was a new Prince in his Dominions, becaufe that they were far divided one from another , and for that many were apprehenfive of fo faft increafing greatnefs. So as many more opportune and better grounded occafions might peradventure arife of compafTmg fuch an intent, and the War made againft him by t\\t Germans^ which tended fo much to his danger, might prove fuch a one. By making fit ufe of which accidents,C<e/4rV power might receve a rebuke as concerning ihc affairs of Itdy^ if the French forces had been any ways received, or tr.at the Italians bad been of the fame mind as formerly they had been more nnfeafonably- Therefore to feparate the friendfhip of the French totally from the Itdi^ns^ cr Leo did for as much as in him lay, difcovering a double injury to them, fmcc the Kuig of France might think that fraud was join'd co ill will, couia not be but in ill-t^ken advice. He had done better to have fomewhat allaied their power ss to u\< affairs of /r4/)f, then to have quite cxtinguiQid it, tili the Jtalinns might get loaie better light how to recover their liberty. The Fexetian Senate took another courfe,ihough they had therein the fame intent : For wh.llt the affairs of the fe t.vo Princes, C/^^r/j the Emperor, and fra^^c if K'xrgoi France, were in thegre:.teii; iieat oi War in Italy, they would apply themfclvcs to each of their fortunes, and accorcing ro the conJitionof time and affairs, they often changed friendihip -, being ftiU conftant in their a ui, which was to keep their Forces as equally ballanccii as they could, and that they fhould both be weakened by their contention one w''h snoihcr: But when occaficnwas offered of failing upon one without too much advantace to the other, ( as it did in the lafl Wais made by the Fenetians in Ita'y, after Kir.g Francis was let out of Pcifon ) they (food firm and refolute, ro[ being eafiiy perfwaded upon any conditions to lay down Arms. For on the one fide, Cifars power did decline by reafon of many adverfe chances, and the af- fairs of Naples were in great confufion and danger : And on the other fide, the af- fairs of fr4;ra were not much bettered as to the prejudice of the liberty of Italy ^ for a chief Article in this Confederacie was. That the State of A//74;» ihould be re- flored to Francifco Sfor\a, as at laft it was. But ice in this conjundlure of affairs did precipitate himfelf into fricndfhp with the //w/i^r/rf/z/^i, and drew the enmity of the French upon him, fo as his danger became almoft equally the fame, what- ever event the War (hould have-, and the fequel did more demonflrate this by the imptifonment of Clement^ and by the flavery which C^efars greatnefs threatened to all Italy.
So as ic appears to reafon, and by the fequel,that a noble and magi=i'ficent fabrick, as Leo's propufition touching the freeing of Italy from the fubjed:ion of Foreiners, was really to be eltee.i.ed, was not built upon fo true and folid a foundation as was able to iupport fo great a weight. Fut for the prefenr, after many various accidents, the condition of affairs may be efleemed either good, or at leaft lefs bad •, forafmuch as Italj, through FhAip the King of Spains great wifdom and moderation of mind,
hath
(ISO
hath enjoyed a long and peaceful condition, and flouri/heth novvas much as (lie h3th done in many preceding Ages, to the Peoples great coHifort, and to the fingulac praife of the late Princes.
The Tenth DISCOURSE,
IVhether the Connfel tdhfn by the Emperor Charls the F'tfth^ and by hk Commanders, of not parting from the jpaUs of ViennA, when Solyman was come with very great fkrettgth from Conftantinople to ajfault it^ deferi/e praife, or blame.
AS two great and finmous Princes, not only for the largenefs of theic Dominions, but for their particular warlike valor, the Emperor Charls the Fifth, and SeljrHan Ottcman the Grand Signior of the Tnrks^ did both of them flourifli in one and the fame Age -, fo amon^ft the moft memorable things of thofe times, the ftupendious preparations for War made by the alcove-named Princes in the year 1552. was moft remarkable, and varioufly thought of. All pofTible means was ufed by both of them, and the whole World put into Arms ^ lo as the fortune of thefe two Empires was judged to depend upon the worth and prowefs of thefe two Armies. But the fuccefs did no ways anfwer the fame of fo great Princes, and the noifc of the preparation-, for neither did the Imperial Army ftir at any time from the walls of Viennx^ nor did the Turkifh Army come within many miles of them.
Now (ince more recent bufineffes have recalled this to memory, it may prove ro unufetul Confideration to reprefent what of praife, or of blame may be given x.o this resolution put on by the Emperor Charts^ and his Commanders. Many were of opinion then, and the fame may now be thought, that in this cafe, or in the like, the managing of War in this manner, ftanding only upon defence, and exptding to be adaulced by the Enemy, did much withdraw from the reputation of the Chriftian Militia, which was already much in the wane, and was fufhcient to awaken frertifpiritsand boldnefs in the Turks to undertake any thing the more eafily a^ainft theminthefu:ure 5 fince the flower of all the Soldiery of all the ftronszeft and moft cfteemed Nations of Chriftendom, being alTcrabled under the conduit and aufpice of a mighty Pi ince, the Head of all Chriftendom, and in a bufinefs of Inch weight, which had drawn the eyes of the whole World upon ii, not any the leaft thing was put forth againft thefe Enemies, no Army brought to face them, nor put in a po- fture of feeming really to defire battel ; none of their Foits were afTaiilted, no Country of theirs prejudiced ; Why were fo many valiant men brought from thex own homes into far diftant Regions c" why fuch expence C why fuch preparation for War C Was it that fo flrong and flourilhing an Army fliould rot and moulder away about the walls of Vienna-: What could have better decided the qucftion which till then was difputable, in behalf of the Ottoman Princes, and of the Ti rk- ifli Militia, and againft the true honorof War, which our Princes and iolcicrf ha7e Icng laid claim unto, andfomctimes atchitvcd, then after fo great a pep irution of Arms, after fo cried up an enterprife with intention to quell the Turkilh forces, to halt fo long, and to fo little purpole, not knowing what rerolu;ion totake, but that thatCamp,thcn which no former Age had for a long time fcen a greater, nor a more noble one, fhould ft.iqj ftill, like an unmoveable Foit 1 Being overcome by truth,
Bb we
Ci86)
we muft confefs that the hopes of Vidlory for Chriftian Princes was loft, or at Icaft brought to this pafs, as Dot to iofe, muft be t.rmed Conqueft -, but neither could this be c^or.c by taking this couife.
No Chrilliaii Prince had ufiially fo great and fofciled a Militia, as could conti- nually maintain fuch an Array in the field, as was at this time put together with much pains and- induftrie-, foasby drawing out the V\ arin length, they might think to weary and diforder the Enemy, and finally to) overcome at laft. But on the contrary, the Turks, who have continually a numeroas well ordered Army, may eafily upon whatfocver occafion fend forth very powerful Armies to vex the Chriflian Princes, taking fometiraes one place, fometimes another, without ever quitting them, or being driven out from them: whereofthere hath been fo many proofs already made, whilft we do nothing but make a defenfive War againft the Turks, as till this time hath moft commonly been done in this very bufinefs, and by thole very Princes who man: ged this Warj the experience whereof hath been too evident, and too much prejudicial, by the affairs which unhappily befel King redinand^ whofc whole Army being cut in ^ttc'sin Hungary^ and the noblcfl Cities of that Province totally loft, might teach foi certain, that wh Ift the Turkifti Forces ihould remain fafeand imirc, the danger of Vienna^ and of the other Ci- ties of K^tt fir/a and HiMgarj was not quite over, butonely deferred for a fcafon, which delay might perad venture prove unfortunate, by reafon of the weaknels wl ich is brought upon the Forces of Princes by long lying idl^, and efpecially thofe of fiich Princes as keep not a continual Militia on foot. NA hereas the Turks, who have an Army alwaies ready and well paid, and who by making one War continu- ally fpiing from another , keep them alwaies well difciplined, might at another time with greater Forces afTault the fame Territories of the Houfeof AujlrU^ as- it happened not many years after. So as had they not been freed from greater, and more eminent dangers by Selymittsdesxh^ the authors of this advice might have rep; n edit, and all the reft might have had caufeof greater forrow, for having loll fo fa r an occafion of making trial of the valor of Chriftian Commanders and Soldiers inapitch'd Battel-, whereas we want not clear and memorable ex- ampl.s, how far the true zeal of Religion, and a noble forwardnefs hath been o'ten tavoi ed from Heaven with profperous fuccefs^ as when divers Princes of £»r<>/(r croft t(^e Seas to wage War with the SAracem, and to recover, as they did, the holy Land from the Infidels, driving them out ofdiversCitiesof^/?-*, whereof they were pofTeft,
But thefcare not the fole examples-, for he whofliall call tomemorie greater a<flions done by famcus Commanders, will know that they were well advifcd when they aflaulted the Enemy, not waiting for him at their own doors -, fincc the ad- vantages, and damages arc great and evident which do sccompanic thofe who ma- rage the War divcrfly in ths principal point. He who aflaults the Enemy within their own Confines, enheartneth his Soldiers, infufethfear into the Enemy, carries all Icfs and dang r from h s own home to that of his Enemy : But he that ftaies expeding that the Enemies Forces (hould come home to him, minding onely to withftand hui), cncourageth the very Enemy, and makes him the more bold and infolentjputshisownSubjedsindefpair, by making them maintain their own Ar- mies, and expofing them to the rapine of the Enemy. Moreover if any advcrfe chance befal whilft the Enemy is in the bowels of their State, all that they have is made a prey of, and irrecoverably loft.
We read of C;fr«y J in whom wehavethecharaderof a moft excellent Com* mander, thit King Cjaxares being encamped in his friends Country, and ftaying there to exped the Enemy, he advifed him to change his refolutlon, and to enter the Confines of the y^jf^frwwj, andfet upon them at their own doors, andlhewing
him
him the advantage he might make thereofjperfwaclcd him to do (or, by which mean s he got a notable Vi(flory, wording a great many oF the Enemy with a much leiler Humber. It was ahvaies C^/4rj courle, who was the true Matter of good Militia, both to pre-occQpate the Enemy, and to be the firft thatlhould aflaulr, when Battel was to be given; thinking that the courage which the lb doing infufed into the Soldiers, did to boot with other benefits, help much to the getting of the vidory-, wherefore he taxed Pcmpey of an error, becaufc he did not fo in that fa- mous Battel of Pharfalia. The Romans underftanding that Hdnmbal was coming with a powerful Army to prejudice them in ///t/yjthough the fiift defence was made by mountains and craggy fituations which he was to overcome,yet they thought flc to fight him before he could get into 7/4/^, and fo keep the War the furtheft off them that they could. But Scipio not being able to bring him to Battel, though he met with him at the banks of Rhodanm, as foon as they heard that the Enemy was got on this fide the mountains, the ^c>»4»j would not notwithflanding wichdra-.v their Armies, as if they had been afraid to come before the walls of Bcme^ whxh //4W»/^j/gave out he would afTault, but fent their men with the fameConful Sci- />/ij to beyond the River fo to fight him, wifely knowing that the danger doth in- creafe (o much the more, by how much nearer the Hnemy approaches to the heart of the Country. And the fame Romans underftanding afterwards that ^fdrubd was coming with a great Army in Ualj to afTift his Broth:r//4ww/Y'j/, they refolved to meet him beyond the River CMetaurus^ to prevent the Enemy, knowing that toefchew this danger, was to occafion other great dansers. Thus the v.if^ory gotten o^ttAfdrubd bereaved Hannibal of the viiflories which he was hkely to have gotten, if iheRomans had been flower, or lefs refolute in encountring the Enemy, The Imperial Commanders ought to have taken the fame advice, and might have done it-, for the Turks mufl make a muchlojjger march into Hungary and Juflria^ then we to affault their Confines, which are now grown too near us. Moreover the Turks chiefefl ftrength lying in their Horfc , which cannot march till the earth afford fodder for their Cavalry, and being to come out of hotter Coun- tries into a colder Region, they cannot without much difficulty and incommodity march into the field in the firft fcafon of the year, as others may do, whofe con- dition doth differ from theirs,both m the condition of Militi3,and in the temperature of the Air, wherein the firfl skirmifhes are to be made.
So as it appears to be very flrange, nay, indeed a very great wonder , that having made fo great a preparation for War , they would not io much as in thought pre-occupate the Enemy, and enter into the upper Hungnria^ from which Country they might have been furnifhed with many commodities, and upon occafion, fecure ihemfelves by a fortunate day, a long time from Turkilli Incur- fion?-, for it was not likely that by ifl/;wjw departing that year wihout bavins; done anything, hefhould forfake the Guardianfhipand protedion which he had taken upon him of the King of Hungary, butratlier afpire to mike himfclf Maftcrof that Kingdom, as he did, being more encouraged thereunto by iheweaknefs and backwardnefs of the ImperialiOs, who if uhen they had done their utmofl:, had done nothing at all, and the Turks knowing thatC/;4''// the Einperor being im- ploied in other very confidcrable Wars, would not be aUvaies able: to afford his Brother fo great alTiflance, was not this a great incitement to them qoickly tore- new the War, to the greater prejudice 2nd danger not onely of Hur.gar-i, which ffr<//'»-»«i^ laid claim unto, but even to the like of Ferdina/ids own Icnito ies ■: and not long after the fad it felf flicwed what might have been forefeenby reafon? for Jfl/;w4w could not onely not be peruvaded to quit the protet5lion which he had taketiof bis Pupil King Steven, but before he ihouldcome t") any accord with Ferdinandj demanded tribute from AnftrtA-, and the cond tioas bath of War aad
Bb a I'ejc^
Ci8S)
--.Peace growing daily woifcWworfe, thegreateft pirc of ff»»^4r'y being !oft after
■* the nocable ditoomri'.ures of the Germin Armies at EjJ'echio and Bua.t, and the other
P'.it concinuiiii^ ftiU in great danger, tic certain lofswas kno^vn which did redound
unto ihem bv not hazavding a Battel at this time, when the'teirs and hopes were ac
Isait alike on both fides.
But fay that tins had been too rafli, or too difficult a thing to have been eft'tded, Avh.u hindred tliem or diffwadcd them trom pafling througii their own Countries, and marching with their Army to between D4U4 and Sava^ a Country which had not at all been prejudiced by the late Wars, and therefore fit to furnifti their Army with vidu-ils, and where tVerc are many mountainous feats, which were advantagi- ous tor the Jmperialijts^and incommodious for the Turksin refpeft of their Cavalry; whatby they migfit have preferved two Provinces, which were Patrimonal States Oi the I- oufe ot K^upia^ and therefore ought to have been the more carefully kept, CaritithtA and Stirtj, \ which being abandoned, were left a fecurc prey unto tr e . urks, who urtaly deftroyed them by fire and fword, endangering likewife th= lofi of feme ol: their chief Cities •, for the way would have been block'd up,and kept Soiymin from coming thither, ii it had been firfl pofTefled by the Jmper'tAliJis t, and Scl'^m^tfjs reputation would have been much le(rened,it he bad tarried behind,leaving t'at Country untouched, which he was come to afl'auh with fo great an Army» But to do as ths Imperialiflsdid, to keep fo many men with fo great a Train of /.rtillcry and all neceitaries for War, barely to defend one City^ which lay noc open, but was begiit with walls, which was held ro be a ftrong Fonrefs, and which being but meanly provided of men, had formerly repulfed great Turkifh forces; whai was it^ but by this new and prejudical example to confirm the Turks,and even our own men, in the opinion, that the Chnflian Militia was inferior to thatofrhe Turks, and that our Princes,being intent upon their own defence, and not without fome fear to imploy their utmolfendeavois therein, were for their parts tofutiec the Tui ks to enioy their large timpire in peace and fiifcty 1 Which the Ottoman Pi i)Cc shave brought to i'o vnft a gieatnefs, not by lettng tiieit Forces lie idle, and by being content to defend that Title which they had gotten at firll, but by g<^irig everywhere to find out the Enemy , fighting hm upon all occafion?, and by making their way by their fwords into other mens Countries. How ori have' the Turks entrtd into the Confines of P^r/4, nay, wrought themfelvesin even to h,.r inmofl parts, chiefly intending to come to a day ot fight with the Perfians Armies, which they have often effcded < though the Perfians were rather to be feared, then to he defpifed, for their antient honor in War, and for the manner of their Militia •, and yet ac laff they have in thefc lafl Wars got fafe poiTeffion of the chiefefl: pait of tliis mofl noble Kingdom.
What then is more to be fiid, but that if this way of proceeding have proved profperous lothofe that have walked therein, he who takes anoiher way walks on towards deftruift on, and either through ignorance, or too great a thirfl after quiet and fecu ity, involves himfelf into greater troubles and diifliciilties c" And though the lofsbe made bypeece-meal,which may peradventure make it appear the lefs, yec at lafl the whole falls into more certain, though a later ruine. And to fpeak of more' modem affairs -, how had not only the Commonwealth of Venice^ but feveral other States of Chriftian Piinces been preferved from the Turkifh power and iniblencie, it the Leagujs Fleet, fliunning all occafion of fight, had retreated without that fa- mous Vidory ot Lepa»(o ? But it was afterwards more clecrly feen, that Cbarh his intent on in th.is War was fiir from joining battel with the rnfks^ either that he would not hazard his glory and honor, or manifeftly confcfs himfelf inferior to- 5o/Yw.?»mFo;ccs, when Htwgarj zadK^usfrta being aflaulted at another time' by the fame Sohma», in ftead ot fuccoring or affiffing his Brother who was in emi-
enc
nent dangefj he went to try new adventures in Afric/i^ of a much more inconfide- rable nature. If a day of Battel be ever to be had, what elfe was there to be done • to keep off tbe ruine which doth threaten Chriftendom every day more and more •'. He who hazards, may lofe-, but hemay alfo win: And he whoftands idly,anddors nothing, whilft he endeavors fecurity by ufelefs means, docs by degrees daily fall into new dangers, and doth as it were voluntarily ( but for ceitain, bafely ) fubmit himfelf to tfe yoke of a grievous and unworthy fl ivery. liCermatty and Italy had been fo forward to furnifh men and monies for this cnterprife, ( the authority of fo great a Prince who was the chief Author and Head thereof, being confidered ) as upon other occafions which did happen not long after, thefe affiftances might have bien fooner hoped for. When were the whole Forces of Germany feen fo united, as they were ac this time^ Nay, it was rather to be doubted that many feeds of difcord were to grow, which were already fprcad abroad throughout this Province, by reafon of ReligiAi and State- policie, whereby Germany might be weakned and divided. From whence then was there any good to be hoped for againft this Co for- midable Enemy, if fo great a preparation for war proved altogether vain antl ufelefs "f The condition of prefent Times, and of long Cuftom, will n- -t fuffer us now to hope that we may fee what formerly fell our in .hat famous Couual of tlcremont^ that at the words of an Hcrmite, at the bare exhortations of a Pope, Chriftian Princes and people (hould readily take up Arms againft the Infidels, being content for bond of fiftii union to be all of them fignea with the fign oi the Croft. But now when nny fuch thing is treated pf, fuch difputes arc ma.*e upon every point, every one looks fo much to their own patticular ends ( not meafuring things aright, nor mind- ing the common intcrcft \n comparifon of their own ) as Leagues and Unions being contcntioufly handled, flowly concluded, and untimely diflblved, there comes no good of them. • " ■ I
Wherefore it canntit be Taid, that thry thought by delay to referve occafions pre- pared for Vidory, ro which the Caufe which was then in hand ought not a little to have excited them -, to wit, the maintaining of King Ferdtnand in his juft pretences to the K'ngdom of Hungary •, from whom, without any right, and unprovoked by any injury, it was attempted to be taken. Very (hame fliould likewife have been able to have made them not fuffer fo miferable a fpedacle of fuch devaftitions and ru.nesaswere made by the Barbarians in CArhthU and Stiri.t^ whilft they ftood looking on with fo great an Army-, at \vhich the Imperial Commanders being at laft moved, they went about (though late) to revenge t^efe injuries-, and their boldnefs being afTifted by fortune, the Freebooters were routed, and almoft quite difcomfited in all places rhcre they were afTauIted. So as it a penrs ii may be plead- ed by this late example, that they might have done greater things, if they had at- tempted ,t. Moreover, fo many military men might v.ry well have knovvn what advantage mig!.t have been gotten by giving Battel, fince in this pofture of affairs great rewards wtre to be expefted from the Viftory, and but fmall lofs, had they been beaten: For the Chriftian Army^ if viftorious, might have penetrated into the Turks Dominions, where there are no ftrong Holds, i.\Kt fome few upon the Frontiers i andnotm.eeting with any obftacles, might have marched ev-n to before Conftantine^le, planting their Trophies in fundry places, by one fole Vitffory. Whereas on the contrary, the Imperjalifis. uponanya'verfe fortune, had many Rrong Holds whercunto to have retreated, and by maintaining them, might have retarded the courfe of the Turks viiftories, and have recruited ilieir broken Forces. But fay, I pray you, who could "fTure the Imperijlijls that they fliould avoid the h.izardofa Battels Wasitnot rather to be believed, (elpccially if we willconfider the boldnefs of ihc Turks^ who are wont to meet but wirh weak refiftances ) that anfwerable to what they gave oat, tbcy would advance and fotcethe Chrfffians to
£iva
give 1i.vtc!, as the Voyage taken by Soljman did promife, who kept not within his Confines, buc was encred into the Inapcrialifts Country , foiar as foaieof his Horfe Ti'oops made inrodes even to iVfrp)?jr a Town (landing in the fame Cham- painc Country, and not far from yienm-: And fay that being aflaultedby the Enemy, they had been forced to fight, who can deny but that both before, and afcet iheconflift, thebufinefs would have proved hazardous to the Impcrialifts, fince they were to fight at their own homes,and in their own defence ^ For great is that aftoniflitrient which is caufed by the bold coming on of an Enemy, and men are ahvaies readier to run away there where they have bcft means of faving thcmfclves j and in cafe of adverfe Foitune , the danger is greater when the Enemy is in the bowels of the State-, andif the inhabitants overcome, the lefsgood redounds by the vidiory, bccaufe the enemy hath time to rally, and to defend himfelf. Thefe were therefoie notable difadvantages, which were unaviodable whilft the Impcria- lifts Camp remained fixt before the walls of ^kww-i, and thereby made ihemfelves to depend upon the Enemies refolu.ion.
Notwithftanding ail this, he who fliall duely confidcr the prefent condition of the Affairs of the Empire, of the Militia, and of all other things which belongs to fucha buliaefs, may peradventure be of a different opinion, and juJgeotherwife, and if not commend, at leaft excufe the refolucion taJken by the ImpenaJifts, of not parting with their Army from before the walls oi'Fie»na, and from the River D^- mliius. That the Turkifli Empire is very great, and potent, is a thing too'vvell known by ustoourcoft; but the care how to prevent the maladie and\yeakncrs into which Chiiftendom is fallen by the grcatnefs of fuch an enemy, hath been fo long in cogitaton, as to ufe violent means, might bring ruine upon her, rather then procure her fafety. Chriftian Princes have not in this age a fetled, well difciplined, well ordered Militia, and kept in perpetuil pay, as the Turks have, and as the Htmans, and fomc othe. Empires have formerly had ■, Whence it is that numerous Arm cs cannot be raifed without length of time, and much difficulyr ^ and foe want of continual exercife, by which the Soldiers of one and the fame Nation have been known to be able to fupply every military Office, recourfq muft be had to fe\'eral Nations, for men fit for feveral anion's in War ^ (basic is thought that either by natural inclination, or byanticnt Cuftom, or by mcer opinion, every Nation is befl:, fome for one thing, fome for another ^ as alfo becaufe there are buc very few in any place, who are well inftrui5led in Military affairs. For no Mi- litia is entertained except it be in time of , need, or fome few who arc, kept in Garri- fons, with httle or no exercife.
The charge alfo of aflembling Soldiers from fever al, and far di(tant Countries, as alfo all things wh'ch belong to War, is much the greater-, and whereof not any one State of our Princes is complcatly furniflied. So as put all thefe together, itis fromhtncf, that when any enterprifc hath been to be taken again (I the Turks in thelc times, with numerous and powerful Foiccs, they have not been able to be got together in any reafonablc time, nor well ordered -, which delay arifing from necefl^y, bath hindied our preventing the Enemy, and our a(raulting them at their owndoois. But particularly , isitnot very well known, that at this time where- of vTenovvfpeak, C^far was toa(rcmble Soldiers from fo many Nations, fubjeft too, her Dominions, and to joyn together the Auxiliary Forces of Germany and Italy ^ as in doing thereof fo much labor and time was fpent, as before the Impe- rial Army was mi-ftered at Vietina^ 5*/yw4» was already come to Belgrade: foas, to have rcfolved upon preventing the Enemyjand of aflaulting his Confines before the arrival of his Army, was impoffiblc, though it had been thought expedient to have done fo-, nor ought reafon to prevail over experience ^ and this fo much the leis, for that there wants not other re^fons to prove that the Turks are readier ac
their
(191)
their counfel, and fpeedier at their executions, then we can be. But let U5 Cup- pofc that all prolixity and difficulties therein might have been helped, and that it had depended upon the free-will of the Imperial Commanders to aHault the Turks within their Confines; fay, I befeech you, what defign could the Imperia- lifts have had to enter into the Enemies Country i Should they perhaps have ftood idly cxpedling the(hpckof the Tqrkifh Army, if it fliould advance towards them ? or if ^^/ywjwfliould not have advanced, but have fhunned the encounter , fbouid ihcy have marched on and forced him to fight r Or fliould they have endeavored to have taken fome of the Towns, or Fores which were held by the Turks, by af- fault', and arry the prejudice home to him, who would have brought it to them inthe defence of another man? Let tts examine all thefe things, by confidering the laft propofition.
In what place Ihould the Imperial Army have incamped, which would rot have been very incommodious for them, and far offf they were not yet abfolutely pof- fefl ot divers Cities upon the Frontiers of Hungary^ as they were afterwards. But let us argue the bufinefs in general •, if the place were weak which they (hould af- fault, what honor fhould they win thereby ? Or would the advantage of fuch an acquificion have been anfwerable to the expence^ and to the expedation had of fuch an Armyf Bcfides, fuch purchafes arc to little purpofe 5 for fuch places are foon regained by him who is maftcr of the field 5 and if the Imperialifts would have at- tempted the taking of any ftrong place, and fliould not have cffedkd it foon and eafily, to how great danger did their Army cxpofe it felf ^ they murt either taiie their ilege, with lofs of honor, and with thofe other bad confequencies which fol- low in fuch like cafes -, or elfe they muft keep their ftation, and be cut in peeces, when a powerful Turkifli Army fhould come, and find the Imperialifts fcattered and bufied about the taking in of flrong Holds ^ as afterwards fell out upon the like occafion of Euda^ which might teach Commanders, with what temper they are to proceed when they fall upon fuch affairs, and when they have to dovyith a potent Enemy. But it may be yet more ftrongly urged, that whilft the Turkifli Forces fhould keep themfclves fafe and intire, the Imperialifts had but little hopes of keep- ing what they fliould happily have gotten. Were not Modone and Corene recover- ed from the Turks by the Imperial Forces, under the Enfigns of the fame Charts i yet thefe very Towns were foon after abandoned, and forfaken, becaufe they knew they were not able to maintain them againfl the Turkilh puiflant Forces. Have not the Imperialifts and Spaniards made oft-times many attempsin Africa, and had good fuccefs therein ? Yet in whofe pofTcffion are thefe very places now, which were gotten with fo much charge and danger ^ Did not the Turks foon repoflcfs themfelves of thofe places from whence they were driven i The League made againfl the Turks in the year 1537. wherein the fame and fo^ce^ of the fame Em- peror Cbirls were intereffedjdid it noi win C«fiel »tf<y4,aFortrefs fit for their grca-cft dcfigns^ But how long were we able to keep it, though, t were flrongly garri- foned ? Thefe experiences may fcrve to fliew,that the good gotten by fuch ctft and labor , hath not at laft proved any thing , fave difhonor in forgoing what was gotten.
But to fall upon the other head^ If the Imperial Army fliould have continued incamped in any ftrong fituationof the Enemy which they might have tjken, with- out attempting any thing more ^ howwonld it have been in any betrer condition, then it was when incamp'd hdoxc VtennA 1 rather on the contrary, the danger was greater and more evident of falling into mighty diforder, efpecially for want of viAudls, by their going from the Banks of Danftbius, from whence alone they could have been fatcly and opportunely furniflird therewithal •, f er they were to provide for the vii^ualing of a great man)', and the Enemy did abound in Horfe,
^'hereby
('sO
whereby their fuccors might have been cut off. It may peradvctiture be alleadged, tha: ihey might have prefcived a great tradl of Country from the inrodes, plunder, and firing made by the Twritj. But firft, they were not certain to make this ad- vantage, the Country being large, and expofed to fuch accidents as thefc •, nor were they abie,without dividing their Forces, to fupply all places : And the Turks feeing this place well guarded, if they fliould have taken their way above the Daaulfim, as ihcy did beneath it towards the «^//> J, finding the fields more large and open in thole parts in Mcravu, Silefia, and 4"pia, they might have made larger inrodes, and with lefs danger : whereas having quartered themfelves in the mountainous fito- aiions ot StirU and C*rinthia^ they might at leaft revenge the injury, and in fome fur. v>refc rve th ir honor by killing many of them, who being disbanded,were gone to pillage the Country.
It is commonly advantagious to advance towards the Confines of a Stace, whcr.. the Pafles are narrow and difficult, either by the ruggedncfs of the fituitions, or bv reafon of forts upon their Frontiers, fo as the Enemy may be by thefe ad- vantages kept afar off. But what was there in King Ferdinaniis Stncs, which could perfwade him to take this couife •, the Country being large, open, and where many / rmies would not have beenfufficient to have kept out an Army which was refolved to enter, as thefe did ■:• But it may be faid again, that this was not a lofs which would counterpoife ( as might very well have happened by reafon of their own in- copve 1 encies ) the breaking up of that Army, whereon the defenceof King Ferdi- Tinnds States did relie, and which was of fo great a concernment to all Chriftcndom. An(iit may be alfo added, that the further the ImferUlifts had advanced, whereby they might the better have met with the Enemy,and have fought him, if they fhould not afterwaids have done it, their fear would have appeared to have been fo much il'.t greater, and that they had repented to have proceeded fo far-, whereby they fhould not only no have increafed, but have leflened the reputation of the force and worth of that Ar.ny. But for what concerned their marching forward to encounter r.i.e Eneny, wi.h a lefolution of giving him battel at his own home, at which the Confi aerations made to the contrary do fecm chiefly to aim, it is a'bufinefs of fo wdghty, and fo numerous confcquences, as it deferves to be well examined. It is VI general Rule, That it is requifite the Aflailant fhould have greater Eorces then he who is aiflailed, or at leaft equal Forces : And is there anyone fo blinded with defire, as that he does not fee the Impcrialifis difadvantage in this behaUV Soljman bicui'ht with him an Army confifting of One hundred and forty thoufand figfiting men, and almoft as many men more for other Camp-occafions, furniflied with Artillery and all other Requifites for War, an Army vcrft in Vi(5lories, and which was then to fight in the fight of their Lord and Mafter, a fortunate and vafianc Prince -, and who arc promifed by their Law, that whofoever dies fighting for his welfare'and olory, fhall be eternally rewarded in heaven : An opinion wh:ch hath much advantaged the Turkifh affairs in point of War. Entire obedience, excellent military difcipiinc, patient undergoing all wants, and great toil and labor, are things whereiintt^ the Turkifh Armies arc accuflomed •, in vertue whereof it is, and not by chance, that they have had fo many viftories : And it was the opinion of all men, that thefe things did at this time abound in that Army. Now on the other fide, the Itnpcrial Army was far fliort of this in numbers, the fighting men not exceeding tlie number of Fourfcore and ten thoufand, whereof there were but Thirty thoufand Horfe. It is hard to fay what men might promife to themfelves from the Com- manders and Soldiers gallantry, fince no precedent nor fubfequent trial hath been I;nown to be made againft this Enemy : Marry, fuch diforders as are ufually feen in our prefcnt Miliiia, might eafilybe therein feen; the Spaniards mutinies before they were come to the Camp, the like of the ^^"//'i'" after their arrival, great and
open
■^
open hatred amongft the Nations which were in the faine Cartp, as if they had been in two Enemies Camps, infomuch as they werehke to fall together by the eirs more tl;en once, the SpAniirds and Italians being jointly highly inccnfed againft the Dutch; the Commanders at vaiiance amongft themfclv^s, envying one anothers glory, raifcrs of commotions and difobed.cncc amongft the Soldiery, as was feen by the laft of pun fhments infli(Sed upon fomc of them. Novv what the iffue in likeli- hood might prove betwixt two fuch Armies as you have here dtfcnbed of the Im- ferialifls and of the Turks^ any man may judge, who is capable of ordinary rcafon, without any further experience of War.
Buc to proceed to ihe other heads : What fituation could there be chofen which was rot difadvantagious for the Imperialifts c* The parts of Hn»^arj^ Watiach.'a, and of the neighboring places where the Armies were to m et, coniiftcd all of opt n Champaign^ where mofl afluredly the Horfe (wherein the TurkiHi Camp did fo abound ) have ihe better of Foot r, and worth is overcome by numba'f, where the IcfTer Army may be circumvented by a greater multitude, and bett.r ufe may be made of Horfe, which may cither advance where they find advantage, or recreac without any prejudice where they cannor vvithftand the Enemy. Therefore the Imperial Coramandeis knowing the difadvantage thereof in that (icuacion which chcy had taken, though they were feciTed by the City of Vienna, and by the Rivtr Danuhitti^ yet they ftood alwaies with their Squadrons in order for any aflaulc t, their Foot was divided into three great Squadrons, whereof cne flood fiim in the midft, and betwixt this and the other two were the Horfe quaitered.foasihcy did inclofe the whole bodyof the Army, which was furrcundedand fecured by great ftore of Artillery. Another reafon may be added, which is. That m cafe of mif- lortunc, the Imperial^fls Army might fuffcr a greater difcomfiuie then that of the Turks •, for it would be harder for the former to keep any of t.,eir Foot entire, or Gens d'Arms^ then for the Turks to preicrve their Light-horfe, which were al- ways ready according as occafion fliould ferve, either to cli.'.rge, or fuftain a charge, and fave themfelvcs. Wherefore it may be faid, that the hazard was not the fame, and therefore not to be put to the trial, as affairs ftood. And if it be advantagious to aflault an E nemy st his own door, the affording reft to Soldiers, whereby to be the better able to withftand and to rcpell with viftory thofc who come to afljult them, and are wearied by their long march, and the inconveniences thereof, hath alfo fome thing of good inic
Nor muft we be govern'd by examples wherein the fame accidents meet not j Ifcr general Rules arc not to be obferved at all times, and efpecially not in War, which is fubje(ft to fo many variations. If Cyw^ and the Romans^ when the firfl went to hght thci^^jrians^ and the other the Carthagintaas, fiad been in thai condition as thofc were of whom we now fpeak, we may perfwadeourfelves (fUch was their known wifdom) that they would have done otherwife : And if tl;e Romans chofe to meet Hannibal firft on the other fide the Mountains, md aferwards at his firft entrance into //4/;, it may be faid, befidcs the div<.rfity of accidents uh.ch ccun- fell'd them fo to do, that our Princes have no fuch Militia, nor lb ready, as the Romans had, nor had they means of recruiting their Armies fo fuon as the Romans could do in cafe of advtrfe fortune-, and that they were able to iraintainfo many Armies, not only in Italic buc in Sfain^ ^frica^ and Greece^ at tie f^irae time w hen JJannihalvizs'iiiltalj^ iliews, that as they weie forward in giving IjJUcI, f) thty knew how to fupply themfelves again : which the Imperialifts could not at this time have done, if they lliould have left that Army, which they had taken fuch pains to affemble together from fo many feveial parts. It is acknowledged, that to put ones fclf upon the hazard of a IJattel, is a thing which is done by w;fe Commander .s,when they are back'd with another Army, which may afford ihem means of fighting a
C c lecond
feconJ lime, or at leaft whereby they may eafily recruit in cafi: of adverfe fortune ; clle a \\holc State is adventured upon one only Battel. As for the fucccfs oi the Battel of Lepanto^ it was accompanied with fome accidents which are fcldora fccn to happen : For the Jtirks gave our mc n battel, which v.as willingly entertained by us, becaufe we might make ufe of the advantage of the Venetian Gallions, by whofe Arcil'ery their Fleet was divided and fcattcrcd, before they could come to a further confliif. Eat the next year, the condition of affairs being altered, they took ao- otl er courle : For the Turks^ who were taught by their former bad fucccfs, noc being \\ illing to join battel with our greater Veflels, and our men being wifely wcll- advifcd not to divide nor feparate their flighter Gallics from the greater, as finding ihemfrlves either weaker therein, or at leafl not ftronger, there was nothing done, thout^h the Fleets were feveral times very neer. In this point likcwife, the Land- Militia, and that of the Sea doth differ 5 for as for Sea-fights, theChriftian Forces are in number equal in Shipping to the Turks, but fufficiendy beyond them for matter of worth and difcipline : Marry, in Land-Armies the T«r)trdofar exceed the Chriftians in nurr.bers •, and as for valor and good difcipline, they cannot as yet be accounted inferior, unlefs we will, to detra(5l from the Enemy, add to our own fliame, as having been fo oftentimes beaten by fo bafe and unexpert men. But hovvfoevcr it be, we cannot but have a great efteem of the Turkish power, which their continued profperitie hath made fo. What reafonwas there then that anew Army, made up of fo many feveral Nations, wherein the Soldiers did hard- ly know their Captain?, and were muchlefs known by them, who had not as yet done any military a(ft jointly ,nor well learnt bow to know, nor follow their colours, not acquainted with the Country, and wanting all thofe things through which, by the true Art of War vi<flories are gotten, fhould advar.ce, and give Battel to an Enemy fo formidable both for fame and forces ^ nor can the event of a fee Battel betruly judged by whatbcfel thofe of theTutkifh Camp, who disbanding from the reft, went, though in great parties, to pillage the Enemies Country, thebufi- nefs not being any thing alike 5 the Tarkshad the difadvantage of the Countries fituadon, of being loaded with prey, of being in diforder (as commonly befals thofe who goto plunder, not to fight) and of other accidents. Bat befides all this, he who relates this bufinefs, mentions not any bafenefsin th« Turks, buc faies, That notwithftanding all thefedifadvantages, they defended thcmfelves ge- neioufly to the utmofl of their power;
But what did the LmtSolfmAn (who cannot be denied to have been very vali- ant, and greatly experienced in matter of War ) though he had all the advantages that have been mentioned i he did not advance with his Army as near us, as he might have done, nor did endeavor to enforce others, nor to be enforced himfelf to fighc, but rather went out of his dired way, which he bad taken to come to Vienna, and kept for themofl partinftrong and commodious feats, as between the two Riversof Sava and Dtava; and if a powerful and va'n-glorious Prince, who profefled that he had undertaken that War meerly out of a defire of glory would make ufe of hjefitatious counfels, where the confequcnccs were fo great and fo heavie •, how would it have bccomed chArls , a Prince no lefs wife then valiant , and who was neceffitated by many other important affairs of fome other States of his, to kivc GermA»j fuddenly, as he did, to nave put himfelf upon the dubious events of Battel , whereby to indanger almoft his whole Fortune -f When CMaritts vtasfent againfl the CymbriAns, who were fal n down into ltd-) ( which was thought to be as confiderable a War as any that the RentAns had made) the fame circumftances concurring thereunto, whereby to infufe terror, as do now to make the Turkifli Forces fo formidable 5 ascrueltie, borbarifm, the great number of the Enemy, and the fame of the viftories which rhcy had »von ;
the
the wife Commander would not ( though many occafions hid offered themfelvcs, and that he was taxed by the unej^erienced, of timeroufnefs ) come to a pitch'd field with fucli an Enemy till for mjny moneihs fpace he had kept the Army ac- cuftomcdto the performance of duties, and to Military anions, ar.d chiefly till he haj acquainted them withih:; afpedof the Enemy, and how to have the bectr of them in light skirmidics, which were not notwithftanding attempted but upoa gr< at advantage.
And if C.f/4r ufed to prevent the Enemy, and to be the firft that (liould aflault ; it is to be confiderei that he commanded a veteran Army, of whom he had by \on2, Wars had much experience. So as the fame example is not to be inade uie of inane.v and tumultuous Army, and of fo different conditions. Bu: let us likewife confider what were the reafons which made thefe two Princes take up Ainu-, for by the firft rife of Wars the reafon of their adminiftration, and the good incans whereby to conduce them to a good end, is b.ft known. The War ^VaSoffcn^lvco.■uhe Turks behalf, undertaken with great furqueLli-ie, and wicii gieac h(3pes of victory and glory', Solyman having propounded unro himfilf to revenge the injuries done by Ferdinand^ then King of Bohemia^ toj'ohn King c^ Hungary, who reigned under his Guardianihip and prote<5tiQn. Butwheiher this was t,is true intention or no, or but pretended, that he might podefs himfelf of the Kingdom of Hungary (as afterwards he did ) ic was moft certain, that he could not compafshis end of beating the Forces of thefe two jiuftrian Brothers, Ckarh, a.-,d Ferdinand. C^ftr on the other fide, being ufualiy diftraded and bufied , as now in particular, in other Wars, had betlken himfelf to this, to defend the aflaults which were threatned his Brothers Territories, as alfo th,e honor of his family, or. rather that of all Germany •, or, to confine ones felf to narrower bounds, it may be faid, that this contention of War did particularly concern the oppugning , and the defence of the City of Vienna. Soljman, who had for- merly little to his honor, been driven from before the walls of that Ciry, profeffed to return thither With greater Forces, being firmly rcfolved to reduce it to his power, and to challenge the Emperor to a pitch'd Battel. Cbarls on the contrary, having brought his Forces about that City, had propounded unto himfelf the keep- ing of it, and to fruftrate this fo great furie and boalting of Selymam. Now then, ^vhilfl: Vienna was prefcrved, and that flie was kept free from all dangers^ and that Selyman was fo curbed and frightned by the Imperialifts Forces, as that he du ft not advance, or make good his word which he had publickly proiciled, did not the Imperialifts tWe£t the bufinefs they had taken in hand, without the eff'ufionoc blood ? Did they not prefcrve their own honor, and do fervice to all ChnJtendots^ If this Army (as the fuccefs of Battel is more uncertain and dubious, then ?.nv v.hacfoever other iiumaneadlion ) had received any norable defeat, when would this wound have ever been cured 1 The affliiled body of Chnflendom muil have its wounds long kept open, and have ftill ulcerated more and more. How would Cxfars particular Enemies have been encouraged to fall upon his Territories, and to have endangered and molefted his own particular aifairs, whilft he fliould have (licvved courage enough, but little good counlel in defending another inans right, which did not immediately concern hiinfelf -f Had the Tnrks in 'ormer times been made retreat to their own Confines, as now they were, without having made any acqu fition, they had not been mafters of fo many Chriftian Kingdoms, as now they are. And had their Forces proved ftill vain, their Militia would liave been imbafed, and they would have been difcouraged from troubling others without any ^ood to themfelves; which peradvenrurc would have been the fafeft and Iccureft wav ot weakning fo great a power as that, by temporizing, affording them thereby occa- {jon of growing idle, and of falling into domcftick diforders, Co as th:y mi^ht the
C c s more
irore cafily have i eccived a blow,and have been overcome both by cuning an J force. Norwillic svailtoaffiimthcconciary, as \i' t'r^ fucurc dangers and troubles hid been certainly to have happened, or that they might have been made grcrater by a new commotion of War^ for it was mo eanfwerable torejfon, that whtnSoly r»a»Jihon\d have done his utmoft with his whole Forces, alTiftcd by hiso.\n prc- fcnce, he would have fuffcred the Eftutes of ^^uflria^ and of Germany to have remiined quier, if Kins, Fer^inaail hid rcfledcon;entwiih his ownPatiimonie, and with th; Kingdom of Bohemia^ together with the hopes of fucceedingin ih^- Empire, without intricating himfdfinnew troubles, by obftmately maintaining his pretences to the Kingdom oi' Hungary^ drawing thereby the fury of the Turkifh Forces upon him, as he often did. So iS King Fc-rdinandg liud t is Councellors are more to be blamed for thofe many mifchicfi which enfued afterwards, and for thofe which we are ftiU threatned with by the fo near neighborhood of the TurkiHi Forces then Chxrls the Emperor and his Commanders. For they feuni,' King ^'obn talcen into fo powerful a protedion as that of the Ottanun Empire, foasic was impofTible to put the Hutch in poflefli n thereof by driving of him out •, all anger and ambition ought to hape been laid afide, contenting tkmfelves rasher with the neighborhood of fo weak a Prince as the Kin^of Hnr^ary^ ihcn with that of fo powerful and formidable a Potentate, to whom four Empires and eighteen Kn?- doms do yield obedience.
Thefe things may be on all fides vaiioufly confidered, ss vaiious Judgments may be given on thofe aftions which are rot of a fetled, ordinary, and natural con- dition, but which through various accidents do flote up and down, as it happens in co'jnfels concerning War. The truth is, that the Forces, hopes ^-irs, an i almoft all other confequenccs of thefe two Empires were (as it were) equally ballanced in this behalf: So as it was a work not difcernible by humane wiCiom, Or by any true grounds, whether to have come to a pitch'd field,or to abftain from doing fo, would have been the better advice. In either of the Armies, the Flower of the Mii tia of the warlike Nations both of Eaff and Wefl was afifembled, a va{f number of Soldi- ers, excellent Commanders, moff valiant Piinces, and of as greit renown as any of vihatfoever former Age, and who had both of them won famous Viiitories. Great were the rewards, great the inconveniences, which were propofed on all fides ac- cordirg to the various fuccefs of fuchadays fight ; immortal glory, fliame rot to berafedout, high hopes, greateft fears. So as it is no wonder if in this parity of ob- jeds which prefcnted themfelves before the eyes both of the ImferiaUJls and Tutks^ a Battel, for which both parties were prepared and difpofcd,did not enfue. In which cafe he who will dctraft any thing from the Imperjalifts in not dar ng to fight, muft praifc their wifdom as much, and their mature advice •, it being a Rule generally ap- proved of by the univcrfal confent of all men, That where the bulinefs is doubtful and difficult, wemuftratheradherc to that which holds us Irom doing any thing, then towliat eggs us on: For, Had I tvifi, comes too late, and is always to no purpofe -, whereas whilft things arc whole and entire , place is left for new Counfels.
TAVLA
('P7)
PAULA PERUTA
A
Gentleman of V & D^l C S
HIS
SOLI LOQ.UI E;
IVhercin hs mak^s and ta\es a brief txmtnaUon ef thi whole of hk Life,
coHrfe
HAT do I dor What think I ^ What do I look for? My Age haftens already apace to the end of my life, and I mind not that end of Glory to which I am ordained. Thofe good things which I muft (hordy forso,ftand ahvaies fixe before my bodily e es, and I turn not the eyes of my mind towards thofe things which are prepared for me toinjoy e;ernaUy,ic is high time to know my rrror, and then to amend it. Old Age which ufeth to dead ihe affecti- ons of thefleft), oiu iit now t") quicken the - zeal of the Spirits 6 my foul fuinmoa thy
thoughtsabouc thee , which have ftraid fo long in the affjirsof this world •, knDw thy noble condition, and the tine end for which t: ou were created •, Let all thin^^s that proceed from thee be worthy of thee. Throw from thee chat vai!, which as'if thou had ft been blind, hathmadethee go gropmg and groveling through the waies of worldly defires, in danger of fallin'j into the dicch ot feme habituaffin ; wh.tc- by it would have been the harder for thee to lifc a-ain, and reaflume the righc way, Crear are the acknowledgments which thou oweft to thy Crea:or, who hath made ihce CUE of nothing •, made thee fo much more noble thm the fouls of all his o- iher creatures, he made thee partaker or lb many excellent gitts, chiefly of liberty, whereby thou nvift incrcafe the merit ot thy good works, as he never fuffcrs h;3 gr.}ce ro forfake thee, which thou mayft vity oltenbe a>v3icof, finding remorC- of confcience as often as thoiitalleft: imoany fin, and C> many mcitstions to ex- cite thee to the defpifal of eartl.ly h ngs, and to the love of luch as are cc!e!^:al, as certainly thou art very much unworthy fo great a benefit, itthoadoftrefiifrar./ longer, orelfea very bad friend unto thy fclf, if knowing ihctru.-ft good, thou
chufeft to deprive thy felf thereof.
Afluredly
('98)
Afliiredly, if I fliall take a true fcrutinie of my life, I (liall fir.d that I have made rriy felf a rec.'ptade of all vanity ; Thou who oughteftco have been a temple of perpetual prayer, of immaculate goodnefs, of pure love to divine things. I do not confidcr my firft and tender Age, wherein the ufeof Reafon being but weak, that which arifc'.h from thence is not much confiderable-, yet the tears and crying to which thofe very years are fuhjedt, might afford me occafion when I was greater of contemplating the miftery, and of knowing that the condition of this worldly life, wh:re;nto 1 was marching was but a valley of tears, a fountain of mifcrie- Wherefore I lliould have taken the greater heed not to have fuffered my felf to be in- fnarcd in the love of thofe thia£;s, where Wormwood lieshdden under Honey, and where weeping attends alwaies nigh upon laughter. In the Pueritia, which fuc- ceeded mine Infancie, I did not accaftom my felf ( as I ought to have done) to la- b-u aid f iffcrings, to humble and d evout thoughts, whereby the power of the flelh might have been weakened, and the foul exalted-, but I was detained by plea- furts and elFcminacie ; I betook my felf fo to follow and love vanity, as I began to fuck in whit corrupt cuftoms taught me, more then what was learr.t me by my Tutors. It'iought Riches,_Honois, and all worldly Greatneis, to be the gar- nKhings wh rewith men, and chiefly fuch as are nobly born, ought to adorn them- felvcS", ! called the lives of fuch ss lived better, and more retired from the world, m.eer madacfs.
Thefe conceptions grew more firmly fixed in me afterwards, wh n pafiing through the other Ages, Ifawthempraifcdand praftifcd by mens common con- fent, and chiefly by thofe who were eftcemed the wifeft, and moft happy -, fo as it was harder for me to pluck out thofe thoughts from out my heart, which had in procefsof time taken fo deep rooting. But if I refleftapon the years of my youth, which are as it were the Spring of our Agc,on which every thm 7 feems to fmile, and doth, as it were grow green,what can I remember which may make mc faiisfied with my felf, or from whence I may affirm, that I have gathered fuch fruit, as I would now in my old age be fed withal^ As I firft entred into my youth, I was, as it were challenged a d defied to a gallant wreftling by the fences, and worldly de- lights, and paited from them very many times overcome, feldomwith thevi«flo- lie. I betook my felf to my ftudie, and chiefly to that of Rhetorick, andofPhi- lofophie-, wherein having the luck to light upon excellent Mafters, Imadelome advancemet j I will not fay, that now I am (orrie for it, for thefeariealf the time that I imploied therein might have been fpent woii'e : but furely, I cannot deny but that I did thereby foment that affection which doth fometimes prevaricate better; to wit tothedefireof praife, 'andof felf-eftimation. Knowledge doth ofs»iimes puff iip him that is mafltr of it, fo as he forgets to glory in the Lord : I dare noc fiy I podclfcd it, for hardly could I tafte the waters of the over-flowing fountains or learning, through the fiiallownefs of wit, and other affairs that I was buficdin? yet man doth eafily flatter himfelf, and attributes unto hirnfelf more then falls to his fhare. Which is the caufe why ambition is feen to get into all places, yea even into their moft fccret retirements who forfike the world, being a vice which IS the harder to be cured, for that it keeps clofe and hidden. But what fliall I fay more •: What could I anfwer , if I flaould be asked w hat fruit I reaped by thefe my ftudies ^ I might pcradventurc fay, that the little of Phibfophie which I learnt hath more awakened my underftanding in knowing the truth of things.
But fay I pray, what need hath he to have recourfeto the candie.light of humane knowledge, who hath the bright Sim-fliineof Grace inhim, and to whom infal- lible truth is revealed i I did for a while give my felf to ftudy Moralitie, wherein I took fuch delight, asl v\rote a book thereof, which I was afterwards perfwaded
to
to print, and (o to impart it unto others : I learned how to become morally good; It is true I c'id •, but is not the firft precept in this knowledge, that the doftiineof nimncrj, is it of fe t very vain 1 f or u ccnfifts in doing, in action, not in knowing •, it had been much bettcr,that letting his commandemcnts before mine eies, who is the tru • and real Mafter of that Chriftian life which I live,and kwe vet to live, I ftiould have implored my time in obfciving the precepts of the divine Law, rather then in colledingtheDocumcnisof Philofopf^ers •, whowantiiigihetaftcofthattriicft, chitfcft, and moft excellent vertue, which divine love doih lb much the more afford, as it is the more ardently inflamcd,3pplied thcmfelves to a certain mediociitie,which is betttr difccrned or known in their Idea, or in their writings, then in the affedions or aftions which they go about to moderate. Afterwards, when I wascome tomans Eftate , be.ng commanded fo to do by him whom I ought to obey,and it btii^ a th'ng alfo which I my Itlf did much defire, I betook my lelf to write the H ftory of my Country ^ a s. ood and gallant work. But what proportion can the good re- ward which I hoped for thereby, b;ar with the pains I took, which was truly very oreatr Had Ifpent part of thetimeand ftudy which I imployed therein, in the reading of divine Books, I cannot doubt but that I fliould have been inflamed with the love of fpiritual things, which for fo long a time I did fo little reliih. And to pafs by other things, I cannot deny, as bcfl knowing mine own intrincecal affedi. ons, but that whilft I labored fo much to Celebrate the fame and glory of others by thsfe my Writings, I often felt within my felf a certain tickling and delight out of" the hope which 1 flattered my felf withal, and wherewith I nourilhed my thoughts, that by thefe my labors I my felf might likewife reap fome honor ^ and ( as the Poets fay ) live m my fame after my death. Oh grofs vanity ! aad when this af- fedion ( with which I muft confefs I was fometimes drunk ) gives place to reaibn, I acknowledge,that amongft all vanities none is greater then wordly glory ^ which is vain,becaufe man glories of that which is none of his,for he hath received every good th ng, efpecially the endowments of the foul, from God : Vain, becaufe it is no- thing of it felf 5 it hath no true exiftencie, it is made up of various opinions of men^ and of theirs moft, who know leaft^ Vain, becaufe it reflefts upon that which is not in us, upon that which is a trivial and common accident, to wit our Fame, the memory whereof wcdo with fo much vanity defire to propagate. Tell me thou humane foul, which artfo much inamored of this bare (hadow of good, which doth not at all belong unto thee, if after thou art departed out of this world, thou couldft have any thing to do with humane aifeifiions, what good would this falfe glory do thee, which thou doft fo much dote upon, as thou doft fometimes lofe the vvay which leads to true heavenly glory ; If thou (halt be damned, and in the eternal torments of Hell, thinkeft thou that the fatisfadion of this thy glory fliall be able any waies to eafe thofe immenfe and unconceivable Torments i and if thou fliall be fixt in heavenly blifs, what need in that abode hath he of worldly glory ,who is glorified with eternal glory f who is fatisfied, who is content, who is for ever bleded :" But fince I examine mine own waies,I return to confider my life.
Some few years fince I gave my felf to the government of my Country •, vrhere- inl found the way fo plain and eafie, and the favor and grace of my Country (o far above my meri:s, as I foon got into great Honors, and into the chicfeftlm- ployinents, which I ftill continue in, anddoimploy my time. But my Talent i? h fmall, as though I fpend it all, I know it is but little. And if I fpend all, how can I, according to humane refped, be blamed f Or what reafon have others to complain more of me, then I have of my felf .<' Since fo little a part of my life re- mjins, or almoft none at all, wherein I may recoiled my thoughts, what time have I to think of my end ^ to repent me of my fins c to endeavor amendment f and y et I fee I am not diligent in d oing any thing. The moft troublefom, yea, and
the
ihe moft contented thoughts wherewith my mind isnOA'incumbred, will vanifli as a (hadow, or as fmoak betore the winde, and fliallbc withered as floivtrs by the Suns beams-, and yet whilft this mind of mine is continually involved in thefeafTi- c'uous c;;re5, it is fo filled with the fantafms of thofe things wherein I imploy my felt all the day ion::, as I muft medi:3te onely upon them, and though unv\illingly, have them alwaies before mine ties, at all times, in every place, and upon all occa- fions : So as all contemplation of nobler and better things which I fometiraes tur.i my felf unto, is alwaies mixt with thcfe bafe atfedions, and troubled with ihcfe clouds of wo, Idly thoughts.
Alas, how hard is ic to ferve two Maflers,God and the World •: The world mea- fures its adions by its worldly refpeds-, hcuho makes that hisftay, who lives acco d ng to that, can make no new laws to hirafelf, but muft govern liiraleU by thofe which are commended, andpradtifcd by thofe who walk in thewaiesof the world. But how far different from thefe are Gods waies ? Pacience, Humility, Poverty, Obedience, Self-denial, and the giving over of all worldly care, aic things which are abhorr'd by the worldly wife, butotherwifc to God. How badly do the fallacious rules of worldly wifdom agree with the in ftrudions of trueChrif\i- anitic, cfpccially thofe of this corrupt Age, wherein heavenly and divine things are often troubled and confounded with a certain vainnsme of Reafon of State. Crowns, En pires, Kingdoms, and all power is given by God-, and though the weaknefsof our reafon be fuchasit cannor penetrate inrothe infinite abvfsof his wifdom, yet does he difpole and order all things with ce; tain and infallible ends, though unknown to us. Therefore unlefs that great, and omnipotent Lord God, by whom Kings do not oncly reign upon earth , but the earth it felf is fuftained and held up with a miraculous equality of weight, do not keep the City,how vain is all rhis your learning, O ye wife men of the world i and you Princes, how va n are all your Forces to maintain your Lordfhips and States ? Thou, whofoever thou art, who doft manage the weightieft affairs of Principalities,put thy heart into the hands of ihy God, and he will infufe worthie and becomming thoughts mtothee^ He will give thee true Wifdom and true Fortitude. The World builds nothing but To\\ers of 54^f// 5 nor is it aware thereof, till its defig s , and many years labors, being overthrown by its own confiifion, ic Ces its ralhnefs laid low •, and thofe thoughts which aimed at Heav.n thrown, dov^n to Hel'.
Buc I return again unto my felf.- I fee that thefe many years part whereio I approach to old age , I imploy my time in ftudies , thoughts, and imploy- ments, of differing natures m thcmfelves, but all conformable to what tends to my prejudice. For they robb'd me of my reft, have ftill oprcft me with many cares, and led me aftray from more holy defires, to which, if I had bent my mind in time, I might hope now to fit and feed at the Table of thofe true good things which now I want. What do I then do ? What do I think •: What do I exp:d^ Why do I not change my thoughts and e ercifcs, if 1 know that thofe wherein I have hitherto fpenc my time do me no good ; nor for all the labor I have taken, have made me ere a whit more happy then I was at fiift^ Nay, I may fay, they have made me more wretched, fince I have confumed the greateft part of my life wofully, and without any profir. Do I peradventure hope, that whilft I my felf do not change, the nature of thofe things whtrein I am verft fliould alter 1 That trouble Ihould turn to delight? That the Affairs of the world, fo full of anxious cares, fhouldturn to the peace andfolace of the foul i That worldly good fliallaffutr.e a new vertue of make- ing their poflelTors well apaid and fitisfied i That thefe brackifli waters of the pleafures of the Age, of which the more we drink, the more we areathirft, fliould become fvveet andfavoryj and afford any tiue delight or contents Men
who
(zoj)
vho are blind in what concerns d.cir own good, arc wonttoptivettthe na;u;eof tr ir gs •, to make them their M.ifters who are given to them to be fervanrs. Such are ihc goods of Fo;tune, as the common people call them, bccaufe they know not how to raife i hcmfelves up to the knowledge of that myftery whereby thai fu- p'.em: Author and free Donor doth difpenfe them. But what greater mifery is there then this fumane felicity •: The true Lord and God is made known unto us, andyctwc continue to adore the Idols of Avarice, Ambition, and Vain glo:y .• Look but upon thofe huge heaps of luine which thou maift every day fee in the Citv of Reme^ who was once the Queen of the World, where are now her im- ir.enfe treafures <: Where the m^jefty of her Empire < Where the pomp of fo many Triumphs^ the memory of fo many victories ^ all thefe, being made th; prey of time and death, l.e buried in thcfe mines. But thou who livcft by othtr precepts, and whohafte a truer knowledge of thy eternal life, and eternal death, confider better what the nature of thefe goods are, to which thou haft been fometimes car- red, with a lefs moderate affedion , by the torrent of continual cuftom. If they he not of great worth, as truly they are not, why dofl thou fo much lovs them i Why endeavorft thou fo much to be mafter of them < W hy dofl thou dread the lofs of ihcm fo much •: And if they have any thing of good in them, why doft thou not call to mind how foon thou arc to fof go them •'. How comes k to pafs this cur happic worldly man is not aware, that if the incrcafe of thefe goo.'S could make him happy, he makes himfelf miferable , whilft through overmuch loving ihem, he is more intent upon purchafing the little which he lacks, then in injoy.ng the very much which he pofTefTeth, whilft the fear of loofmg it doth continually moleft his mind •: a greater vexation then, which the foul hath none , becaufe it hath no bounds. We look upon their ou'.fide onely, and are enamored of a cer- tain handfome, but vain appearance which is in them, taking them foriheguids of our life. But if we would confider their infide, and difcover the dec:ipt and coufenage which is woven therein, we would fhun them, as fome holy men have done, leaft we be by them, and with them hurried down into Hell and damnation. We have our happmefs within us, and feek for itelfewhevc. He who will fearch his own houfe well , what wealth fliall he find there whereby to inrich himfelf wiih precious trcafurc, which is hidden from us becaufe the darkncfs of our aftcAi- ons lends us affray. If thy heart be fraught with pare thoughr';,if thy foul be pur- ged of all earthly paflTions.fo as the raics of that true and lively Sun which is alwaies reidy to illuminate thee, may pen. trate thereinto, thou (lidt foon tiifcover there jtwcls 01 fuch vertiic, price, and worth, as thou maift thereby puichafe the worlds p. ace and heavens glory. Thou flialt find thofe aifeftions which novv rage tumu'tu- oufly within thee , become quiet and obeii:nt to reafon-, an J thv^fe difibnant founds which CO fo perturb thy mind, will agree with fo juft proportion, as t'ley w.ll make a fweet harmonic in thy foul, and will prove a refrtdiin:^ to the troubles of the world, afigureof heavenly m Jodie, and of the glory of Paradice. O you Fathers, you good and holy Fathers, who being within your Clo;fter live in peace and quiet, f.r fron the World, and the cares thereof, not onely in your perfons but in your very thoughts -, if there may beany affection found without atfeCticn, and cn^y without fin, I do afiuredly envy in you thofe yoiifleafuic times, wherein you givj you: (elves wholly to prayer and meditation •, an idknefs, wh ch u true bL:f^neis,truc entertainment, andthe'true nutriment of the foul. What are Crowns, Scepters, and to be clothed in purple, but bonds whereby to keep thofe m.fer.;ble ones,whoni the woild terms liappy, faftned to perpetual vexation, and troubUibm cares ? With you, O Fathers.' it is that peace doth luhabic-, pejce which keeps you at unitie within your felves keeps your Aifeftions obedient to Reafon, and your Reaf.^n a devoL.t hand-maid to God, How can he who lives in ihcwoJdsMi'.icii, tafteof
D d th.fe
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ihefe fruits of true peaces So full cf cares, and deftradted with fo many thoughtsif Who i> continually to combatc with thofc Enemies who wage within him, towic theaffedior.sofp»orldly th'.ngs, to the which we oar felves, do as it wtrc furnilh I'orces againft our felves, by finding out ncvvobjedts, and new materials whereby to increafe them. We worldly men will feed the foul vvth meat which belongs not to her, wherefore it is no wonder if we be never fatisficd, and if one appetite be- get another even i» infinitum •, You, you arc they who teach us by your lives and examples, that nature is fatisfied with a little-, and that man can never be faid to be rich by abundance, nor poor by want 5 oiher goods, other endowments, other ornaments are requifite then thofethe world fceks after 5 the further a man advan- ces therein, the further he finds himfcif cntred into an intricate and confufed Laby- rinth, and after having made a long voyage, he findes himfelf further from his jnur- nics end then when he firft fet forih. But I perceive that I praife Matj, and f jIIow C^artha •, I ^now which is the right and fafe way, and I take an intricate an J dan- gerous way to lead me to my defired end. I am bufied, foUicited, and troubled with many things, and yet I know that one thing isonely neceflarie, that there is but ons th ng which can fo become the companion of my lite, as it will never forfake me. I fcrve the world, and being given over to cares I entertain them more and more •, love of Children, Hoiifliold govcrnment,adminiftrationof goods, the CommonweaUhs bufinefs, are things which I would fain free my feU of -, but I neither know how, nor when to do fo. I endeavor to be lefs affeftionate in having to do with worldly things? to tafte them for nutriment, not to be drunk with them ^ but how hard is it to fix the flippery appetite fo,as it fall not from the ufe to the abufe of thofe thing"^,'vherc- unto it is continually excited by the provocation of its perpetual companion, Sin ? He who ftands alvvaies near the fire, though he thruft not himfelf into it, fo as he be burnt and confumed, yethemuft feel a troublefom heat-, and which is worfe, the foul which is outwardly3 warmed with ihefe earthly affeftions , freezes inwardly for what concerns divine things : Prayers grow luke-warm, a'mf-deeds fcarce, fall- ings not ufualj and in brief, the thoughts of the foul are choaked by \h: co- gitations of the body- Yet'l am much comforted, that I find in my felf con- tinually a defire of becoming better -, which is a fign that I have not loft the princidles of well doing, and that I am not given over by the immcnfe grace of my Creator. Though I fail through thetroublcfomSeaof this world-, though my adions and thoughts flote up and down, not knowing where to find a Haven to put into-, yet (thanks be given to God) this (hip of my foul which contains many precious wares in her which were affigned over unto her, hath not madeHiip- wrack. The integrity of communication, puritie of confcience the knowledge of the trueft good, things which I have notufed according to their worth, are yet pre. ferved at their true price and value -, fo as they may one day enrich my foul , Thou my Lord, thou my Creator, thou my Redeemer, to whom my thoughts are better known then to my felf, let this my rtvcrent affcdion be acceptable to thy charitie -, through thy great goodnefs pardon my impetfedions, and fupply my defaults by thy infinite merit, foasi may totally defpile thefe earthly things ? free me from tiiefe fetters 5 keepnot oiine eyes fixt upon the earth, but turn them unto thee that art the fummum bomm^ and my fouls fole felicitic -, fince thou knoweft fjr better ther. my felf what way I had bcft walk in to purchafc falvation. If I be called to take pairs in this State, and to ufe my talent in this Civil life, do thou, O Lord, fo aflift my weaknefsby thy great grace and goodnefs, as that acknowledgments may cndy be made to thee, the Author of all my goodnefs for all my happy fuccceiies? thine be all honor and praife -, and fufFer me not to lofethat reward of my worldly la- bois,which thou thy felf haft bin pleafed that I (hould purchafeby undergoing them in thy name, and by piiefting all my Anions to thee. C rant, O Lord, that I may
(o think upon my mortal Children, as thati may not torget thec|my eternal Facherj govern thou all my Faculties fo, as I may know thou gavcft me tdem, th it thou pre- leiveft them to mc, and that it is mydutie to make ufe of thy Graces^ that I may love my earthly Country, yet not fo, as to make Icfs cftcem of my heavenly Country"-, thar I may fervcand obey my Commonwealth with integritie of confci • encc, with an intention to ferve hf r, and not ray fclf, and for ihy glory, not for mine own. Th.is is a miraculous work of thy hand, and which is onely to be acknow- ledged from thee. She is the onely example, in having for fo long a feriei of years, prcferved her fdf in Libertie, in Power, and in the true Religion : therefore if I can- lioc with fervor of fpirit ferve thee immediately , grant yet ih:;t I may ferve thee nor unworthily nor unufcfully in this moft excellent creature of thy making. And fince it now falls to my (hare to ferve my Country in this holy City of Rome^ as her Ambaflador to Pope Clement the Eighth j Grant that by ferving this thy Vicar upon earth, I may ferve thee the [better, uho art the trie and fupreineLord of Heaven. Of thy great goodnefs give mc that which I do not deferv** accept of my good will , for the good works which I ought to do ; and infufe thy Spirit into this thy Vicar, the common Father of thy People, and Shepheard of thy Sheep, who is fo fuUof zei.1 and charitie ; fo as that he may be able to draw this weather- besten (hip of Chriftianitie out of th»; ftorming Sea of thefe tioublefom times, and thar fhe be be ng gotten into the Haven of peace and fafety, may with hanJs lifted up to Heaven fay. This is the day which the Lord hath made^ let us rejoyce therein, and let tts always blefs bis mofi holy Name.
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