

**Reasoning about State
in a
Linear Logical Framework**

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- Logical frameworks
- *LLF*
- Case study
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Logical Frameworks

A **Logical Framework** is a formalism designed to represent and reason about deductive systems

formal system

programming languages, logics, real-time systems, ...

meta-representation

represent language constructs, model their semantics, encode properties and their proofs

effectiveness

immediacy and executability

Examples

Logics

- *Prolog*
- λ *Prolog* [Miller,Nadathur'88], *Isabelle* [Paulson'93]
- *Forum* [Miller'94]

Type theories

- *LF* [Harper,Honsell,Plotkin'93]
- *Coq* [Dowek&al'93], *Lego* [Pollack'94]
- *ALF* [Nordström'93], *NuPrl* [Constable&al'86]
- *LLF* [Cervesato,Pfenning'96]

Functionalities

- Specification

Formalize (abstract) syntax, operational semantics, and meta-theory

- Analysis

Support proof-checking, often theorem-proving

- Experimentation

Permit (limited) execution

Identify and reify fundamental principles of classes of deductive systems

Applications

(LF biased) [Harper&al.'93]

• Past

- Formalization of declarative programming languages and simple logics
- Representation of simple properties

• Present

- **State** [Cervesato,Pfenning'96; Cervesato&al.'99]
- Program verification and certification [Necula'97; Paulson'96]

• Future

Assisted design of new and better logics, programming languages, ...

- Meta-theorem provers [Schürmann,Pfenning'98]
- Other recurring notions [Polakow,Pfenning'99]

LLF, a Logical Framework for State

- Design

- Extend a logical framework with linear logic constructs
- Extend linear logic to reason about state


- Implementation

- Automated support for *LLF* specifications
- Higher-order linear logic programming language

- Applications

- Reasoning about state
- Specification of state-based problems
- *Everything that could be done in LF*

Linear Logic in Brief



Main resource operators

- $A \otimes B$ = “ A and B simultaneously”
- $A \& B$ = “ A and B alternatively”
- \top = “resource sink”
- $A \multimap B$ = “ B assuming A as a resource”
- $A \rightarrow B$ = “ B assuming A as a logical hypothesis”

Meta-Language

• Syntax

Kinds $K ::= \text{type} \mid \Pi x:A. K$

Type families $P ::= a \mid P M$

Types $A ::= P \mid \Pi x:A. B$
 $\mid A \multimap B \mid A \& B \mid \top$

Objects $M ::= x \mid c \mid \lambda x:A. M \mid M N$
 $\mid \hat{\lambda}x:A. M \mid M \hat{\sim} N \mid \langle M, N \rangle \mid \text{fst } M \mid \text{snd } M \mid \langle \rangle$

• Typing judgment

Linear context
 $x \hat{?} A, \dots$

$\Gamma; \Delta \vdash_{\Sigma} M : A$

Intuitionistic context
 $x:A, \dots$

Signature
 $a:K, \dots, c:A, \dots$

“ M has type A
 in Γ , Δ and Σ ”

Main Properties

- Decidable type checking
 - ↪ Automated support
- Unique canonical forms
 - ↪ Easy proofs of adequacy
 - ↪ Logic programming
- Derivations represented by terms
 - ↪ Meta-reasoning
 - ↪ Program transformation
- Conservative over LF [Harper&al.'93]
 - ↪ Inherits work done on LF

Applications

Reasoning

- Imperative programming languages
- Substructural logics
- Security protocols

Specification / Simulation

- Hardware architectures
- Real-time systems
- Planning
- Games

+ *LF* achievements

- Functional languages, logic programming languages
- Logics
- Category theory, ...

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Implementation

Computer-aided specification

- Type-checking
- Type reconstruction
- **Innovations:** spine calculus, dependent explicit substitutions

Execution

- Higher-order linear constraint logic programming language
- **Innovations:** higher-order unification, context-management, compilation

Forthcoming ...

- Meta-theorem prover
- **Innovations:** reasoning about *LLF* specs, linear explicit substitutions

Limitations

With state

- Indirect representation of transition systems
- Resource modularity

Beyond state

- Extensionality (negation, extensional quantification)
- Ordering (priority, stacks, ...)

Multiset Rewriting

Multiset

$$\ddot{X} = X_1, \dots, X_n$$

Multiset rewrite rule

$$\ddot{X} \longrightarrow \ddot{Y}$$

Computation

$$\ddot{X}, \ddot{Z} \xrightarrow{\ddot{X} \rightarrow \ddot{Y}} \ddot{Y}, \ddot{Z}$$

Parametric multisets

$$X_i(\vec{t})$$

\hookrightarrow computation relies on unification

Generative multiset rule

$$\ddot{X}(\vec{t}) \longrightarrow \multimap \vec{x}. \ddot{Y}(\vec{t}, \vec{x})$$

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Message Exchange

$$A \longrightarrow B : M$$

- Local state transitions
- Interaction with the network

$$A_i(\vec{a}), \dots \longrightarrow A_{i'}(\vec{a}), N^+(M)$$

$$B_j(\vec{b}), N^-(M) \longrightarrow B_{j'}(\vec{b}), \dots$$

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Brand-New Nonces

- Use counter

$$A_i, \text{currNonce}(n) \longrightarrow A_j, \text{currNonce}(n+1), N^+(\dots n \dots)$$

↪ simplistic

↪ complicates reasoning

- Use abstraction

$$A_i \longrightarrow \wp n. A_j, N^+(\dots n \dots)$$

↪ not completely realistic

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Cryptography

- Transcribe the encryption/decryption algorithms
 - ↪ painful (but feasible)
 - ↪ complicates reasoning about protocol issues
 - ↪ does not allow reasoning about cryptographic issues
- Use abstraction
 - ↪ constructor: $\{M\}_k$
 - ↪ destructor: pattern matching
 - ↪ unrealistic but often acceptable

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Network

$$N^+(M) \longrightarrow N^-(M)$$

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Intruder

- Dolev-Yao model

- $N^+(M) \longrightarrow I(M)$
- $I(M) \longrightarrow N^-(M), I(M)$
- $I(< M, N >) \longrightarrow I(M), I(N)$
- $I(M), I(N) \longrightarrow I(< M, N >), I(M), I(N)$
- $I(\{M\}_k), I(k) \longrightarrow I(M), I(k)$
- $I(M), I(k) \longrightarrow I(\{M\}_k), I(M), I(k)$
- $\longrightarrow \text{?}n. I(n)$

- More powerful models are possible

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Example

Needham-Schroeder key exchange (simplified)

$$A \longrightarrow B : \{ \langle n_a, A \rangle \}_{k_b}$$

$$B \longrightarrow A : \{ \langle n_a, n_b, B \rangle \}_{k_a}$$

$$A \longrightarrow B : \{ n_b \}_{k_b}$$

...

$$A_0 \longrightarrow \wp n_a. N^+(\{ \langle n_a, A \rangle \}_{k_b}), A_1(B, n_a)$$

$$B_0, N^-(\{ \langle n, A \rangle \}_{k_b}) \longrightarrow \wp n_b. N^+(\{ \langle n, n_b, B \rangle \}_{k_a}), B_1(A, n, n_b)$$

$$A_1(B, n_a), N^-(\{ \langle n_a, n, B \rangle \}_{k_a}) \longrightarrow N^+(\{ n \}_{k_b}), A_2(B, n_a, n)$$

$$B_1(A, n, n_b), N^-(\{ n_b \}_{k_b}) \longrightarrow B_2(A, n, n_b), \dots$$

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Linear Logic Strikes Back

Generative multiset rewriting is linear logic undercover

$$\ddot{X}(\vec{x}) \longrightarrow \multimap \vec{y}. \ddot{Y}(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$$

$$\Downarrow$$

$$\forall \vec{x}. \bigotimes \ddot{X}(\vec{x}) \multimap \exists \vec{y}. \bigotimes \ddot{Y}(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$$

The translation preserves the semantics

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Coding in *LLF*

No \otimes , no \exists !?

$$\forall \vec{x}. X_1(\vec{x}) \otimes \dots \otimes X_m(\vec{x}) \multimap \exists \vec{y}. Y_1(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \otimes \dots \otimes Y_m(\vec{x}, \vec{y})$$

\Downarrow

$$\begin{aligned}
\forall \vec{x}. \text{loop} \multimap & X_1(\vec{x}) \\
& \dots \\
& \multimap X_n(\vec{x}) \\
& \multimap \forall \vec{y}. (Y_1(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \multimap \\
& \quad \dots \\
& \quad Y_m(\vec{x}, \vec{y}) \multimap \text{loop})
\end{aligned}$$

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Needham-Schroeder

```

nsA1 : loop
  o- annKey B
  o- a0
  o- ({Na:atm}
      a1 B (@ Na)
      -o toNet (crypt ((@ Na) * (@ (k2m A))) B)
      -o loop).

nsB1 : loop
  o- b0
  o- fromNet (crypt (X * (@ (k2m A))) B)
  o- annKey A
  o- (      {Nb:atm} b1 A X (@ Nb)
      -o toNet (crypt (X * (@ Nb) * (@ (k2m B))) A)
      -o loop).

```

Needham-Schroeder

```
nsA2 : loop
  o- a1 B X
  o- fromNet (crypt (X * Y * (@ (k2m B)) A)
  o- (      toNet (crypt Y B)
      -o a2 B X Y
      -o loop).
```

```
nsB2 : loop
  o- b1 A X Y
  o- fromNet (crypt Y B)
  o- (b2 A X Y -o loop).
```


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Uses of *LLF*

- Simulation

↪ trivial

- Attack detection

↪ tricky

- Reasoning

↪ feasible



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No Net

Theorem

For every run \mathcal{R} there is a run \mathcal{R}' that

- does not use the network rule
- exchanges the same messages in the same order
- has the same or bigger intruder knowledge

Proof: Replace network uses with interception + resend by the intruder

□

Yields huge savings during protocol analysis

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LLF Formalization

- This proof can be represented in *LLF*
- It is executable and implements the transformation
- Same technique has been applied to more involved problems

LLF,

- combines the meta-reasoning power of logical frameworks with the ability of handling state of linear logic
- conservative extension of the logical framework *LF*
- implemented as a linear logic programming language
- used for the representation of
 - imperative programming languages
 - substructural and modal logics
 - state transition systems, ...

Future Directions

- Experimentation with *LLF*: more state-based systems, new limitations
- Complete *LLF*: efficiency, environment
- Meta-theorem prover: get help proving things
- Beyond *LLF*: direct support for transition systems, modularity, negation, ...

An Example: LF (Meta-Language)

Typing judgment

$$\Gamma \vdash_{\Sigma} M : A$$

“ M has type A
in Γ and Σ ”

Context
 $x:A, \dots$

Signature
 $a:K, \dots, c:A, \dots$

An Example: *LF* (Representation Methodology—Cont'd)

$$\boxed{x_i : \tau_i, \dots} \vdash \tau \quad \Omega \vdash e : \tau = M$$

$$\ulcorner \Omega \urcorner \vdash_{\Sigma} M : \text{has_type } \ulcorner e \urcorner \ulcorner \tau \urcorner$$

where for each $x_i : \tau_i$ in Ω ,

$$\ulcorner x_i : \tau_i \urcorner = x_i : \text{exp}, t_i : \text{has_type } x_i \ulcorner \tau_i \urcorner$$

- context operations reduce to meta-level primitives
- meta-theoretic properties are inherited from the meta-language

Problem!

$$\boxed{c_i = v_i, \dots} \vdash \frac{\mathcal{E}}{S \triangleright K \vdash e \hookrightarrow a} \vdash M$$

$$\vdash S \vdash_{\Sigma} M : \text{eval} \vdash K \vdash e \vdash a$$

This does not work!

- S is subject to *destructive operations* (e.g. assignment)
- traditional log. frameworks do not allow removing assumptions from the context

A way out ...

$$\cdot \vdash_{\Sigma} M : \text{eval} \vdash S \vdash K \vdash e \vdash a$$

... **but**, we must encode *explicitly*

- context operations (lookup, insertion, ...)
- context-related properties (weakening, exchange, ...)