# Design Intent: a Principled Approach to Application Security

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# The Design-Code Security Gap

### **Design-Level Security**

- Proactive
  - Security lifecycle
  - Threat modeling
  - Design evaluations
- Risks
  - Lack of detail
  - Missed interactions
  - Out of date

## **Code-Level Security**

- Reactive
  - Security testing
  - Inspection
  - Code scanning tools
- Risks
  - Low-level abstractions
  - Tremendous complexity
  - Incompatible assumptions
  - Lack of context



## **Example: Concurrency**

- Concurrency is increasingly common
  - Multi-core: must parallelize for performance
  - Many domains inherently concurrent
    - control systems, web, ...
- Source of new vulnerabilities
  - Time of Check Time of Use (TOCTOU) errors
- Example: java.util.logging defect
  - Found by CMU's Fluid research team, led by Bill Scherlis

Fluid tool: [Aaron Greenhouse and William L. Scherlis. Assuring and Evolving Concurrent Programs: Annotations and Policy. ICSE 2002,]



# Concurrency: java.util.logging.Logger

[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

```
public class Logger { ...
 private Filter filter;
  public void setFilter(Filter newFilter) ...
    if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
    filter = newFilter;
```

N.

```
public class Logger { ...
 private Filter filter;
 public void log(LogRecord record) {
    synchronized (this) {
      if (filter != null
          && !filter.isLoggable(record)) return;
```

Consider log() in isolation



[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

```
/** ... All methods on Logger are multi-thread safe.
public class Logger { ...
 private Filter filter;
    @param newFilter a filter object (may be null)
 public void setFilter(Filter newFilter) ... {
    if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
    filter = newFilter:
 public void log(LogRecord record) { ...
    synchronized (this) {
      if (filter != null
          && !filter.isLoggable(record)) return;
```

Consider class Logger in it's entirety!



[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

```
/** ... All methods on Logger are multi-thread safe. */
public class Logger { ...
 private Filter filter;
  /**
   * @param newFilter a filter object (may be null)
 public void setFilter(Filter newFilter)...{
    if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
    filter = newFilter;
 public void log(LogRecord record)
    synchronized (this)
      if (filter != null
          && !filter.isLoggable(record))
```

Class Logger has a *race condition*.



[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

```
/** ... All methods on Logger are multi-thread safe. */
public class Logger { ...
 private Filter filter;
  /**
   * @param newFilter a filter object (may be null)
 public synchronized void setFilter(Filter newFilter)...{
    if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
    filter = newFilter:
 public void log(LogRecord record) { ...
    synchronized (this) {
      if (filter != null
          && !filter.isLoggable(record)) return;
```

Correction: synchronize setFilter()



# Concurrency Defects are Devilish



- Hard to test for
  - Occur on rare paths
  - Nondeterministic, irreproducible
- Hard to inspect for
  - Non-local inconsistencies
  - Requires model of design



# Design Intent: Bridging Design and Code

## **Design Intent:**

Automatically checkable engineering information that describes *how* code meets its quality requirements


#### Validates Design against Code

- Keeps design up to date
- Ensures details are not omitted

#### Ensures Code follows Design

- Avoids inconsistent assumptions
- Raises level of abstraction
- Manages complexity

Bottom line: <u>Assurance</u> that secure design is realized in secure code



[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

```
public void setFilter(Filter newFilter)...{
   if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
   filter = newFilter;
}
```

- How do we know this is a defect?
  - Logger is intended to be used concurrently
  - The Logger instance's lock protects filter
  - The lock may not be currently held
- These are all about design intent!
- How can a tool help the engineer:
  - Discover design intent is needed?
  - Check the design intent against the code?
  - Find the defect?





[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

- Discover design intent is needed
  - Tool observes synchronized statement, asks what state the lock protects

```
public void log(LogRecord record) { ...
    synchronized (this) {
        if (filter != null
                && !filter.isLoggable(record)) return;
        } ...
} ...
```

User adds design intent:

```
// @lock FL is this protects filter
public class Logger {
    ...
}
```





[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]

- Now the intent is in the source
  - The tool can check consistency between intent and code
  - Tool observes an access to filter
  - filter is protected by lock FL
  - FL is not known to be held
  - Warning: unprotected field access; possible race condition detected

```
// @lock FL is this protects filter
public class Logger {
   public void setFilter(Filter newFilter)...{
     if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
     filter = newFilter;
   }
```

- User can now fix the defect
  - Tool responds that all field accesses are now protected



[Source: Aaron Greenhouse]


- Look again: is this always a defect?
- What if the caller is supposed to lock before calling setFilter?
  - That's design intent!
  - Instead of synchronizing, the user can add more design intent:

```
// @lock FL is this protects filter
public class Logger {
    // @requiresLock FL
    public void setFilter(Filter newFilter)...{
    if (!anonymous) manager.checkAccess();
    filter = newFilter;
}
```

- Now the tool reports that intent and code are consistent
  - But it warns if setFilter is called without acquiring the lock!



# Case Study: java.util.concurrent



## Commercial Case Studies with Fluid

[Source: William Scherlis]

## **Top-10 Software Vendor**

- 300 kloc Java
  - Production code
- 3 days of modeling
  - Both by CMU and vendor
- 25 faults detected
  - Deadlocks and races
  - Fixes checked into codebase

## **Major Aerospace Vendor**

- 250 kloc Java
  - 4 production systems
  - Some already deployed
- Races found in all 4
  - Fixes made to 3 of 4

#### **Developer/Manager Quotes:**

It would have been very difficult if not impossible to find these issues without the Fluid analysis

I'm actually considering implementing a policy that you can't add a synchronize to the code without documenting [in Fluid notation] what region it applies to.



## Commercial Case Studies with Fluid

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Now available commercially as SureLogic's JSure tool

ava ction systems ready deployed nd in all 4 ade to 3 of 4

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# Another Design Intent Success Story

Not so long ago, Windows was not so reliable...



A problem has been detected and Windows has been shut down to prevent damage to your computer.

The problem seems to be caused by the following file: SPCMDCON.SYS

PAGE\_FAULT\_IN\_NONPAGED\_AREA

If this is the first time you've seen this Stop error screen, restart your computer. If this screen appears again, follow these steps:

Check to make sun for any Windows u

If problems conti

or software. Disa

# This doesn't happen much anymore...

rly installed. ware manufact<u>urer</u>

led hardware or shadowing.

If you need to use Safe Mode to remove or disable components, restart your computer, press F8 to select Advanced Startup Options, and then select Safe Mode.


Technical information:

\*\*\* STOP: 0x00000050 (0xFD3094C2,0x00000001,0xFBFE7617,0x00000000)

SPCMDCON.SYS - Address FBFE7617 base at FBFE5000, DateStamp 3d6dd67c


## Device Driver Design Intent

- Most blue screens came from buggy device drivers
  - Device driver model very complex
  - Gap between model and code
- Design Intent
  - Machine-checkable summary of device driver rules
- SLAM tool
  - Reports inconsistencies











## Factors in SLAM's Success

- Deep math, targeted technology
  - Boolean abstraction, model checking, theorem proving, abstraction refinement
  - Analysis specialized to the problem



- Device driver rules
- Tool tuned for scalability, usability
  - SLAM research prototype → Static Driver Verifier
  - Analyzes code separately
  - Shows actionable error trace
- Business case
  - Low cost: only Microsoft writes design intent
  - High benefit: driver certification
    - → inclusion in Windows build







# Design Intent Today: Languages and Libraries

- C: char\*
  - Intent: here's a bunch of memory
  - Append: beware of strcpy...



- Java: char[]

  - Append: ArrayCopy may fail, but does so securely
- Library: String
  - Intent: a string, backed with automatically managed memory.
  - Append: no buffer overruns
  - SQL queries: pasting Strings risks command injection
- Library: PreparedStatement
  - This is a SQL query, ready to accept parameters
  - Resistant to command injection attacks







## Design Intent Today: Other Tools

Microsoft analysis tools



Design intent: how big is that buffer?

void writeToBuf(\_\_out\_ecount(BUF\_SIZE) char \*buffer)

- Expressed in Standard Annotation Language (SAL)
- Checked by PREfast free download from Microsoft
- FindBugs open source Java tool
  - Design intent: could that value be null?



interface Map<K,V> {
 public @CheckForNull V get(@NonNull K key);



## Design Intent: More Effective Tools

- Findbugs study
  - Added design intent regarding null
  - Small increase in false warning rate
    - From near zero to 10-20%
  - Major increase in % real null pointer bugs found
    - From 0-30% to 50-80%

[David Hovemeyer, Jaime Spacco, and William Pugh. Evaluating and Tuning a Static Analysis to Find Null Pointer Bugs. PASTE 2005.]



## Design Intent: More Effective QA

- Testing
  - Shows boundaries of normal behavior
    - Aids in constructing appropriate test suites
    - Facilitates robustness testing
- Inspection
  - Provides context so developers can check consistency of assumptions
    - Who locks the lock? Could this be null? Design intent documents.



# Design Intent and the Supply Chain

- Supply chain
  - Multiple sources
  - Differential trust
  - New vulnerabilities
- Design intent role
  - Captures richer interface
  - Example: who acquires the lock?
- Benefits
  - Avoids inconsistent assumptions
  - Direct assurance of supplied components
  - Compositional analysis





# Putting Analysis Tools into Practice

- Adopt incrementally
  - Start with early adopters, small teams
  - Use as champions in rest of organization
- Prioritize tools
  - Focus on high value defects, with low false warning rates
    - context dependent: unused variable assignments a major bottleneck at eBay
  - Turn off less useful checkers
- Ensure developer buy-in, then build into process
  - Example: check-in gates, QA handoff standards
  - Ensure there's a way to override enforcement
- Support the tool

[Sources: Manuvir Das (Microsoft) and Ciera Jaspan (eBay)]




## Design Intent: Emerging Research

- Two current projects
  - Architectural information flow
  - Component interaction protocols



# Information Flow: Threat Modeling


- Data flow diagrams
  - Processes
  - Data sources, sinks, and flows feedback
  - Trust boundaries
- Security review
  - Completeness
  - Potential threats
- Key Microsoft process
  - Vista: 1400 data flow diagrams
  - Claim: 50% vulnerability reduction
- The Big Question: does reality match the diagram?






# Information Flow Case Study: CryptoDB

- CryptoDB
  - Secure database system
  - From Kenan's textbook
  - Includes cryptography, access control
  - Java implementation
- Level 1 data flow diagram shown
- Study: extract flows
  - Associate code with elements
    - Comment-like program annotations
  - Generate as-built architecture
  - Compare to data-flow diagram






# Key Challenge: Managing Complexity




## Design Intent-Based Extraction




## Architectural Design Intent

With Marwan Abi-Antoun




- Data structure encapsulation
  - OWNED: Hide data objects within high-level abstractions



[Abi-Antoun & Barnes, ASE '10]


- Comparison non-trivial
  - Names in code differ from diagram
  - Multiple design components merged into one
- Diagrams mostly consistent
  - A few differences marked with X (missing) or + (added)
- Conformance analysis easily found injected defects




With Kevin Bierhoff, Nels Beckman

- Protocol constraints
  - Order of calls
  - Required argument state
- Challenges
  - What if we forget a step?
    - Especially on an error path?
  - What if multiple clients use the object?
    - If one client closes it, does that interfere with other clients?

## **Ganymed SSH-2 Protocol**







## **Protocol Specification**

```
states open, closed
class StreamProtocol {
     true \Rightarrow unique(this) in open
     public StreamProtocol() { ... }
     unique(this) in open
     \Rightarrow unique(this) in open
     public read(int) { ... }
     unique(this) in open
     ⇒ unique(this) in closed
     public void close() { ... }
```

- Declare states open, closed
- Constructor returns unique permission to open stream
- Read requires unique (exclusive) access to open stream

 Close transitions from open to closed



#### With Kevin Bierhoff, Nels Beckman

## **Protocol Verification**

```
states open, closed
class StreamProtocol {
    true \Rightarrow unique(this) in open
     public StreamProtocol() { ... }
     unique(this) in open
    ⇒ unique(this) in open
     public read(int) { ... }
     unique(this) in open
    ⇒ unique(this) in closed
    public void close() { ... }
```



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## Modular Protocol Verification

```
states open, closed
                                                unique(s) in open
                                                \Rightarrow unique(s) in open
class StreamProtocol {
                                           void process(StreamProtocol s) {
    true \Rightarrow unique(this) in open
                                                     unique(s) in open
    public StreamProtocol() { ... }
                                                s.read(); // precondition satisfied
                                                     unique (s) in open
    unique(this) in open
    ⇒ unique(this) in open
    public read(int) { ... }
                                            StreamProtocol s = new StreamProtocol();
                                                     unique(s) in open
     unique(this) in open
                                           while(s.available() > 0)
    ⇒ unique(this) in closed
                                                process(s); // precondition satisfied
    public void close() { ... }
                                                     unique(s) in open
                                           s.close();
                                                     unique(s) in closed
```

## Implementation Verification

```
unique(this) in open
states open, closed
                                                ⇒ unique(this) in open
class StreamWrapper {
                                           public int read() {
    invariant open: unique(str) in open
                                                    unique(this) in open
    invariant closed: unique(str) in closed
                                                unpack this;
                                                    unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
    private StreamProtocol str;
                                                        unique(str) in open
                                                           // precondition satisfied
                                                str.read();
    unique(s) in open
    ⇒ unique(this) in open
                                                    unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
    StreamWrapper(StreamProtocol s)
                                                        unique(str) in open
                                                pack this to open;
        unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
                                                    unique(this) in open
        unique(s) in open
        str = s;
        pack this to open;
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```

#### With Kevin Bierhoff, Nels Beckman

## Implementation Verification (2)

```
states open, closed
                                           unique(this) in open
                                                ⇒ unique(this) in closed
class StreamWrapper {
                                           public void close() {
    invariant open: unique(str) in open
                                                    unique(this) in open
    invariant closed: unique(str) in closed
                                                unpack this;
                                                    unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
    private StreamProtocol str;
                                                         unique(str) in open
                                                str.close(); // precondition satisfied
    unique(s) in open
    ⇒ unique(this) in open
                                                    unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
    StreamWrapper(StreamProtocol s)
                                                         unique(str) in closed
                                                pack this to closed;
         unpacked(this, unique) ⊗
                                                    unique(this) in closed
         unique(s) in open
        str = s;
         pack this to open;
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```


## Java Specifications

- Ganymed SSH-2 Protocol
- Collections and iterators
- I/O streams
- JDBC (database connectivity)
- Regular expressions
- Exceptions

#### **Verification Studies**

- Depth: Apache Beehive
  - Open Source resource access library
  - Has its own protocol
    - Common scenario: one API builds on another
  - Verified implementation uses JDBC correctly
- Breadth: PMD analysis tool
  - 39 kLOC of realistic code
  - Verified correct use of iterators

First field study of semantically deep protocol analysis for objects at this scale



# Design Intent: a Principled Approach to Application Security

- Design intent is critical
  - Can <u>assure</u> that secure design is realized in secure code
- Design intent is available today
  - Languages, libraries, and emerging tools
  - Provides immediate value
- Research is exploring new kinds of design intent

