

Batch NFS

D. J. Bernstein

University of Illinois at Chicago &
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

Tanja Lange

Technische Universiteit Eindhoven

In this talk $\log L$ means

$(1 + o(1))(\log N)^{1/3}(\log \log N)^{2/3}$.

L is often written

“ $L_N(1/3)$ ” or “ $L_N(1/3)^{1+o(1)}$ ”.

Exponents of L in this talk

are limited to $10^{-6}\mathbf{Z}$.

Rigorously proven? Ha ha ha.

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1. "The attack machine costs more than this RSA key is worth."
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Best results achieved in asymptotic time L^1 using chips. *AT* is L^1 .

Our main result is a batch attack with time L^1 using chips. *AT* per chip is L^1 .

This paper is at $L^{o(1)}$, speedup is superpolynomial. Results are a guess from

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Best result known
time $L^{1.185632}$
using chip area L^0
AT is $L^{1.976052}$.

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AT is $L^{1.976052}$.

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a batch of $L^{0.5}$ keys:

time $L^{1.022400}$

using chip area $L^{1.181600}$;

AT per key is $L^{1.704000}$.

This paper also looks more closely

at $L^{o(1)}$, analyzing asymptotic

speedup from early-abort ECM.

Results are not what one would

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Asymptotic conse

1. Attack cost per

is reduced, so atta

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2. Primary bottler

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3. Attack time is

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breaking key rotat

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using chip area $L^{0.790420}$;
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Eratosth

Sieving s
using pri

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2	2	
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5		
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9		3
10	2	
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12	2 2	3
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14	2	
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etc.

for *one* key

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.181600.

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Pomerance.

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Eratosthenes for s

Sieving small integers using primes 2, 3, 5

1			
2	2		
3		3	
4	2 2		
5			5
6	2	3	
7			7
8	2 2 2		
9		3 3	
10	2		5
11			
12	2 2	3	
13			
14	2		7
15		3	5
16	2 2 2 2		
17			
18	2	3 3	
19			
20	2 2		5

etc.

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Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers $i > 0$ using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

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1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

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factorization—well suited

ne-shelf graphics cards.

ck time is reduced

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key rotation.

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1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

The Q s

Sieving a

using pri

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

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Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers $i > 0$
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

The Q sieve

Sieving i and 611
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1					612	2
2	2				613	2
3		3			614	2
4	2 2				615	2
5			5		616	2
6	2	3			617	2
7				7	618	2
8	2 2 2				619	2
9		3 3			620	2
10	2		5		621	2
11					622	2
12	2 2	3			623	2
13					624	2
14	2			7	625	2
15		3	5		626	2
16	2 2 2 2				627	2
17					628	2
18	2	3 3			629	2
19					630	2
20	2 2		5		631	2

etc.

Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers $i > 0$
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for sm
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

612	2 2		3 3	
613				
614	2			
615			3	5
616	2 2 2			
617				
618	2		3	
619				
620	2 2			5
621			3 3 3	
622	2			
623				
624	2 2 2 2	3		
625				5
626	2			
627			3	
628	2 2			
629				
630	2		3 3	5
631				

Eratosthenes for smoothness

Sieving small integers $i > 0$
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for small i
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

etc.

612	2 2	3 3		
613				
614	2			
615		3	5	
616	2 2 2			7
617				
618	2	3		
619				
620	2 2		5	
621		3 3 3		
622	2			
623				7
624	2 2 2 2	3		
625			5 5 5 5	
626	2			
627		3		
628	2 2			
629				
630	2	3 3	5	7
631				

Primes for smoothness

small integers $i > 0$
 times 2, 3, 5, 7:

5
7
3
5
7
5
3
5

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for small i
 using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1				
2	2			
3		3		
4	2 2			
5			5	
6	2	3		
7				7
8	2 2 2			
9		3 3		
10	2		5	
11				
12	2 2	3		
13				
14	2			7
15		3	5	
16	2 2 2 2			
17				
18	2	3 3		
19				
20	2 2		5	

612	2 2	3 3		
613				
614	2			
615		3	5	
616	2 2 2			7
617				
618	2	3		
619				
620	2 2		5	
621		3 3 3		
622	2			
623				7
624	2 2 2 2 3			
625			5 5 5 5	
626	2			
627		3		
628	2 2			
629				
630	2	3 3	5	7
631				

etc.

Have computed
 the congruence
 for some

$$14 \cdot 625$$

$$64 \cdot 675$$

$$75 \cdot 686$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot$$

$$= 2^8 3^4 5$$

$$\gcd\{611$$

$$= 47.$$

$$611 = 47$$

smoothness

egers $i > 0$
5, 7:

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for small i
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1							
2	2						
3			3				
4	2 2						
5					5		
6	2		3				
7						7	
8	2 2 2						
9			3 3				
10	2				5		
11							
12	2 2		3				
13							
14	2					7	
15			3		5		
16	2 2 2 2						
17							
18	2		3 3				
19							
20	2 2				5		
612	2 2		3 3				
613							
614	2						
615			3		5		
616	2 2 2						7
617							
618	2		3				
619							
620	2 2				5		
621			3 3 3				
622	2						
623							7
624	2 2 2 2 3						
625					5 5 5 5		
626	2						
627			3				
628	2 2						
629							
630	2		3 3		5		7
631							

etc.

Have complete fac
the congruences i
for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 611$$
$$= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 611\}$$
$$= 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for small i using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1							
2	2						
3		3					
4	2 2						
5			5				
6	2	3					
7				7			
8	2 2 2						
9		3 3					
10	2		5				
11							
12	2 2	3					
13							
14	2			7			
15		3	5				
16	2 2 2 2						
17							
18	2	3 3					
19							
20	2 2		5				
612	2 2		3 3				
613							
614	2						
615			3	5			
616	2 2 2					7	
617							
618	2		3				
619							
620	2 2			5			
621			3 3 3				
622	2						
623						7	
624	2 2 2 2 3						
625				5 5 5 5			
626	2						
627			3				
628	2 2						
629							
630	2		3 3	5		7	
631							

etc.

Have complete factorization of the congruences $i \equiv 611 + i \pmod{m}$ for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686 \\ = 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75\} = 2^4 3^2 5 \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The Q sieve

Sieving i and $611 + i$ for small i
using primes 2, 3, 5, 7:

1					612	2 2	3 3			
2	2				613					
3			3		614	2				
4	2 2				615		3	5		
5				5	616	2 2 2				7
6	2		3		617					
7					618	2	3			
8	2 2 2				619					
9			3 3		620	2 2		5		
10	2			5	621		3 3 3			
11					622	2				
12	2 2		3		623					7
13					624	2 2 2 2 3				
14	2				625			5 5 5 5		
15			3	5	626	2				
16	2 2 2 2				627		3			
17					628	2 2				
18	2		3 3		629					
19					630	2	3 3	5		7
20	2 2			5	631					

etc.

Have complete factorization of
the congruences $i \equiv 611 + i$
for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$\begin{aligned} &14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686 \\ &= 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2. \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ &= 47. \end{aligned}$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

ieve

i and $611 + i$ for small i
imes 2, 3, 5, 7:

	612	2 2	3 3		
	613				
	614	2			
	615		3	5	
5	616	2 2 2			7
	617				
7	618	2	3		
	619				
3	620	2 2		5	
5	621		3 3 3		
	622	2			
	623				7
	624	2 2 2 2 3			
7	625			5 5 5 5	
5	626	2			
	627		3		
	628	2 2			
3	629				
	630	2	3 3	5	7
5	631				

Have complete factorization of
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$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

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$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The num

Generaliz

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a$$

$$\rightarrow a - b$$

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For any

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Optimal

$$(\mu + o(1))$$

$+ i$ for small i
5, 7:

2	3 3			
2 2	3	5		7
	3			
2	3 3 3	5		
2 2 2 3				7
		5 5 5 5		
2	3			
	3 3	5		7

Have complete factorization of
the congruences $i \equiv 611 + i$
for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

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$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The number-field

Generalize $i \equiv i +$
 $\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN$ (N is a
 $\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b$
for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$
of nonzero integer

For any m can find
so that factoring m
produces factorization

Optimal choice of
 $(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^2$

small i

Have complete factorization of the congruences $i \equiv 611 + i$ for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686 \\ = 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The number-field sieve

Generalize $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m}$$

for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any m can find α

so that factoring $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of N .

Optimal choice of $\log m$ is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)$$

7

7

5 5 5

7

Have complete factorization of the congruences $i \equiv 611 + i$ for some i 's.

$$14 \cdot 625 = 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$64 \cdot 675 = 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$75 \cdot 686 = 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686 \\ = 2^8 3^4 5^8 7^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\gcd\{611, 14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\} \\ = 47.$$

$$611 = 47 \cdot 13.$$

The number-field sieve

Generalize $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$$

for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any m can find α so that factoring $m - \alpha$ produces factorization of N .

Optimal choice of $\log m$ is $(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}$.

complete factorization of

congruences $i \equiv 611 + i$

the i 's.

$$= 2^1 3^0 5^4 7^1.$$

$$= 2^6 3^3 5^2 7^0.$$

$$= 2^1 3^1 5^2 7^3.$$

$$75 \cdot 625 \cdot 675 \cdot 686$$

$$87^4 = (2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$\{14 \cdot 64 \cdot 75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2\}$$

$$7 \cdot 13.$$

The number-field sieve

Generalize $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$$

for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any m can find α

so that factoring $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of N .

Optimal choice of $\log m$ is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}.$$

RAM co

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Smooth

Sieve L^1

Find L^0 .

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Total RA

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Total RA

using m

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with AT

Factorization of

$$\equiv 611 + i$$

$$7^1.$$

$$7^0.$$

$$7^3.$$

$$575 \cdot 686$$

$$(3^2 5^4 7^2)^2.$$

$$75 - 2^4 3^2 5^4 7^2 \}$$

The number-field sieve

Generalize $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$$

$$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$$

for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any m can find α

so that factoring $m - \alpha$

produces factorization of N .

Optimal choice of $\log m$ is

$$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}.$$

RAM cost analysis

1993 Buhler–Lenstra

Smoothness bound

Sieve $L^{1.923000}$ pairs

Find $L^{0.961500}$ pairs

with $a - bm$ and c

Total RAM time L

1993 Coppersmith

Total RAM time L

using multiple numbers

(Multiple numbers

don't seem to compare

with AT , factory, c

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The number-field sieve

Generalize $i \equiv i + N \pmod{N}$

$\rightarrow a \equiv a + bN \pmod{N}$

$\rightarrow a - bm \equiv a - b\alpha \pmod{m - \alpha}$

for root $\alpha \in \mathbf{C}$

of nonzero integer poly.

For any m can find α

so that factoring $m - \alpha$
produces factorization of N .

Optimal choice of $\log m$ is

$(\mu + o(1))(\log N)^{2/3}(\log \log N)^{1/3}$.

$5^4 7^2$

RAM cost analysis

1993 Buhler–Lenstra–Pomer

Smoothness bound $L^{0.961500}$

Sieve $L^{1.923000}$ pairs (a, b) .

Find $L^{0.961500}$ pairs

with $a - bm$ and $a - b\alpha$ sm

Total RAM time $L^{1.923000}$.

1993 Coppersmith:

Total RAM time $L^{1.901884}$

using multiple number fields

(Multiple number fields

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Semi-fix: Reduce smoothness
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AT cost $L^{1.976052}$.

(2001 Bernstein)

Cost analysis

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The factorization

1993 Coppersmith
There *exists* an algorithm
that factors any integer
with same #bits as N
in RAM time $L^{1.63}$

Smoothness bound
Smaller than before
so need more (a, b)

Algorithm *knows* a
such that $a - bm$

Note: one m work
Algorithm uses ECM
whether $a - b\alpha_N$

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The factorization factory

1993 Coppersmith:

There *exists* an algorithm
that factors any integer
with same #bits as N
in RAM time $L^{1.638587}$.

Smoothness bound $L^{0.819290}$

Smaller than before,
so need more (a, b) .

Algorithm *knows* all (a, b)
such that $a - bm$ is smooth

Note: one m works for all N

Algorithm uses ECM to check
whether $a - b\alpha_N$ is smooth.

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Need to precompute

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RAM time $L^{2.0068}$

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Finding this algorithm is slower than running it. Need to precompute all (a, b) such that $a - bm$ is smooth. RAM time $L^{2.006853}$.

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Standard conversion of precomputation into batching: if there are enough targets, more than $L^{0.368266}$, then precomputation cost becomes negligible.

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The big problem: Coppersmith's algorithm has size $L^{1.638587}$.

Huge *AT* cost; useless in reality.

Factorization factory

Coppersmith:

exists an algorithm

finds any integer

of size $\leq N$

with time $L^{1.638587}$.

improves bound $L^{0.819290}$.

better than before,

finds more (a, b) .

algorithm knows all (a, b)

such that $a - bm$ is smooth.

where m works for all N .

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if $a - b\alpha_N$ is smooth.

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Batch N

Goal: O

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Batch NFS

Goal: Optimize AT

1. Generate (a, b)

Test $a - bm$ for smooth

2. Make many copies

close to each (a, b)

When smooth $a -$

test each $a - b\alpha_N$

3. After all smooth

reorganize: for each

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4. Linear algebra.

Finding this algorithm
is slower than running it.
Need to precompute all (a, b)
such that $a - bm$ is smooth.
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Standard conversion of
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algorithm has size $L^{1.638587}$.
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Batch NFS

Goal: Optimize AT asymptotically

1. Generate (a, b) in parallel

Test $a - bm$ for smoothness

2. Make many copies of each

close to each (a, b) generator

When smooth $a - bm$ is found

test each $a - b\alpha_N$ for smoothness

3. After all smooths are found

reorganize: for each N , bring

relevant (a, b) close together

4. Linear algebra.

Finding this algorithm

is slower than running it.

Need to precompute all (a, b)

such that $a - bm$ is smooth.

RAM time $L^{2.006853}$.

Standard conversion of

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more than $L^{0.368266}$,

then precomputation cost

becomes negligible.

The big problem: Coppersmith's

algorithm has size $L^{1.638587}$.

Huge AT cost; useless in reality.

Batch NFS

Goal: Optimize AT asymptotics.

1. Generate (a, b) in parallel.

Test $a - bm$ for smoothness.

2. Make many copies of each N ,
close to each (a, b) generator.

When smooth $a - bm$ is found,
test each $a - b\alpha_N$ for smoothness.

3. After all smooths are found,
reorganize: for each N , bring
relevant (a, b) close together.

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Batch NFS

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Generate (a, b)

Is $a - bm$
smooth?

If so, store.

Repeat.

Generate (a, b)

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Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	C
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	
If so, store.	If so, store.	
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Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	
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Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

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Test $a - bm$ for smoothness.

2. Make many copies of each N , close to each (a, b) generator.

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3. After all smooths are found, reorganize: for each N , bring relevant (a, b) close together.

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FS

optimize AT asymptotics.

generate (a, b) in parallel.

$a - bm$ for smoothness.

use many copies of each N ,

each (a, b) generator.

smooth $a - bm$ is found,
then $a - b\alpha_N$ for smoothness.

until all smooths are found,

optimize: for each N , bring

(a, b) close together.

in algebra.

Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) up. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) up. Repeat.

T asymptotics.

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smoothness.

copies of each N ,
) generator.

$-bm$ is found,
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se together.

Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.
Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.	Generate (a, b) . Is $a - bm$ smooth? If so, store. Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.

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Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.

Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ N_9, N_{10}, N_{11} N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ N_9, N_{10}, N_{11} N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ N_9, N_{10}, N_{11} N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ N_9, N_{10}, N_{11} N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}
$N_1, N_2, N_3,$ $N_5, N_6, N_7,$ N_9, N_{10}, N_{11} N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}

Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .	Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$ smooth?	Is $a - bm$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.
Repeat.	Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth?	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9, N_{10}
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}, N_{14}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9, N_{10}
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}, N_{14}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9, N_{10}
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}, N_{14}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9, N_{10}
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}, N_{14}

Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) .
Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) .
Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) .
Repeat.
Generate (a, b) .
Is $a - bm$
smooth?
If so, store.
Send (a, b) .
Repeat.

Is $a - b\alpha_1$	Is $a - b\alpha_2$	Is $a - b\alpha_3$	Is $a - b\alpha_4$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$	Is $a - b\alpha_6$	Is $a - b\alpha_7$	Is $a - b\alpha_8$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	right. Repeat.	down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$
smooth?	smooth?	smooth?	smooth?
If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.	If so, store.
Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .	Send (a, b) .
up. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.	left. Repeat.

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	N_9
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_{13}

Is $a - b\alpha_1$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_2$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_3$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_4$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_5$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_6$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_7$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_8$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_9$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{10}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{11}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . right. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{12}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . down. Repeat.
Is $a - b\alpha_{13}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . up. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{14}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{15}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.	Is $a - b\alpha_{16}$ smooth? If so, store. Send (a, b) . left. Repeat.

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8 $N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$ $N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
N_{11}, N_{12}	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
N_{15}, N_{16}	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
N_{11}, N_{12}	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
N_{15}, N_{16}	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
N_{11}, N_{12}	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
N_{15}, N_{16}	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
N_{11}, N_{12}	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
N_{15}, N_{16}	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for N_1 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	L
Linear algebra for N_5 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	L
Linear algebra for N_9 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	L
Linear algebra for N_{13} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	L

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for N_1 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_5 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_9 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_{13} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4	N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8	N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$	$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$	$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for N_1 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_2 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_3 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_5 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_6 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_7 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_9 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{10} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{11} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_{13} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{14} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{15} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)

N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$
N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4
N_5, N_6, N_7, N_8
$N_9, N_{10}, N_{11}, N_{12}$
$N_{13}, N_{14}, N_{15}, N_{16}$

Linear algebra for N_1 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_2 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_3 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$
Linear algebra for N_5 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_6 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_7 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$
Linear algebra for N_9 using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_{10} using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_{11} using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$
Linear algebra for N_{13} using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_{14} using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$	Linear algebra for N_{15} using congruences $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$ $(a, b) (a, b) (a, b)$

$/4$
$/8$
V_{12}
N_{16}
$/4$
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V_{12}
N_{16}
$/4$
$/8$
V_{12}
N_{16}
$/4$
$/8$
V_{12}
N_{16}

Linear algebra for N_1 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_2 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_3 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_4 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_5 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_6 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_7 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_8 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_9 using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{10} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{11} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{12} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)
Linear algebra for N_{13} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{14} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{15} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)	Linear algebra for N_{16} using congruences (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b) (a, b)

