

Speed records  
for cryptographic software:  
an update

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## Elliptic-curve cryptography

Define  $p = 2^{226} - 5$ ;  $p$  is prime.

Consider the elliptic curve

$$y^2 = x^3 + 7530x^2 + x \text{ over } \mathbf{Z}/p.$$

For  $n \in \mathbf{Z}$ : Multiply

$(53(2^{224} - 1)/(2^8 - 1), \dots)$  by  $n$

on the curve to get  $(K_n, \dots)$  or  $\infty$ .

# Compressed Diffie-Hellman

Your secret key:  $a \in 16\mathbf{Z}$

with  $0 \leq K_a < 2^{224}$ .

Your public key:  $K_a$ .

My secret key:  $b \in 16\mathbf{Z}$

with  $0 \leq K_b < 2^{224}$ .

My public key:  $K_b$ .

Our shared secret:  $K_{ab}$ .

Given  $a, K_b$ , can compute  $K_{ab}$   
in  $< 10^6$  cycles.

This is a very fast curve;  
somewhat faster than NIST P-224.

Elliptic-curve DH is much faster  
than other forms of DH  
at this presumed security level.

## Some computational tools

Curve shape  $y^2 = x^3 + c_2x^2 + x$   
allows very fast compressed  
curve multiplication.

(Montgomery 1987)

Small  $c_2 = 7530$  saves some mults.

Curve multiplication is only  
 $\approx 2000$  multiplications in  $\mathbf{Z}/p$   
and one inversion in  $\mathbf{Z}/p$ .

Represent integers as sums of floating-point numbers at specified scales.

Use radix  $R = 2^{28.25}$ ;  
sparse  $p = R^8 - 5$  allows very fast reduction mod  $p$ .

Floatasm: new language and generation/verification tools for straight-line fp code.

Keep the multiplier busy!

## Hashing with rare collisions

For 128-bit  $m_i$ 's: Define

$$h_r(m_0, m_1, \dots, m_{\ell-1}) = \\ (r^{\ell+1} + m_0 r^{\ell} + \dots + m_{\ell-1} r) \\ \text{mod } (2^{130} - 5).$$

$2^{130} - 5$  is prime  $> 2^{128}$

to allow 128-bit  $m_i$ 's.

Works well with radix  $2^{26}$ .

## Secret-key message authentication

I save  $(k, r) = \text{SHA-256}(K_a, K_{ab})$ .

You transmit  $n$ th message  $m$

as  $n, m, (F_k(n) + h_r(m)) \bmod 2^{128}$ ,

using strong secret-key cipher  $F$ .

(Easy to encrypt too.)

I reject  $n', m', s'$  if  $n'$  is old or if

$s' \neq (F_k(n') + h_r(m')) \bmod 2^{128}$ .



Can compute  $h_r(m)$  in  $< 10^3$  cycles  
for typical lengths of  $m$ .

No precomputation needed,  
thanks to wide  $m_i$ 's.

This is the fastest known method  
to handle a flood of forgeries while  
communicating with known users.

## Equation verification

To check a ring equation  
such as  $s^2 = tn + fh$  where  
 $s, t, n, f, h$  have thousands of bits:

Reduce  $s, t, n, f, h$  modulo  
secret 115-bit prime  $\ell$ .

Compute  $s^2 - tn - fh \pmod{\ell}$ .

## Public-key signature verification

Signature of  $m$  under public key  $n$

is  $(r, h, f, s, t)$  where

$r$  is a random 256-bit string,

$h$  is a cryptographic hash of  $(r, m)$ ,

$f \in \{1, -1, 2, -2\}$ , and

$s^2 = tn + fh$ .

Check  $s^2 = tn + fh$  in  $< 10^4$  cycles  
for 3072-bit public keys.

This is the fastest known method  
at its presumed security level.

Hello, chip designers

Common chips have multiplier computing 128-bit product, then rounding to 64 bits.

Small additional cost:

Provide the whole product, and a 136-bit adder.

Roughly  $4\times$  speedup in arithmetic.